Daniel Noteboom

Mr. Clatterbaugh
Phil 267 AH
10/21/2011

In this paper I will explain Rowes rationality version of evil argument, explain why I
favor this argument over other evil arguments, and explain one problem with this argument.
Rowes argument starts off by saying that justified suffering is still an evil even if good
things result. However, intense suffering that leads to a greater good or prevents a worse evil
from occurring may be morally permissible. Given this, Rowe makes the following argument in
premise 1; we have good reason to believe there is intense suffering that an omnipotent,
omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting
some evil equally bad or worse.(Rowe, 342) This type of suffering is essentially gratuitous
suffering. An omnipotent being has the power to prevent any event in which suffering occurs,
and an omniscient being knows about every event in which suffering occurs, so there is no
reason why the suffering should have occurred. Next, Rowe states in premise 2 that an
omniscient, wholly good being would prevent this gratuitous suffering. In the conclusion, 3, we
have good reason to believe an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being does not exist. Rowe
states that 2 is a necessary condition for a wholly good being that seems to agree with the moral
standards of most people.
Rowe then focuses on the first premise. He describes a situation where a fawn is trapped
by a tree in a forest fire and endures great agony before it dies. The fawns suffering seems
completely pointless; it is a case of gratuitous suffering. An omnipotent, omniscient could have
prevented this pointless suffering so God does not exist. Rowe states that it can never be
completely known whether the suffering of the fawn was indeed pointless. However, knowing
something is different from having rational grounds for believing something. I can reasonably
believe that, as a healthy 18-year-old, I will not die tomorrow, but I can never know for certain
whether I will die tomorrow or not. Even if the fawns suffering could somehow be justified, all

Daniel Noteboom
Mr. Clatterbaugh
Phil 267 AH
10/21/2011

the other cases of seemingly pointless evil still have to be considered. Out of all these seemingly
pointless cases, it is rational to believe that at least one of them could not have occurred without
preventing a greater or good or resulting in a worse evil. Thus, it is rational to believe that a
wholly good, omnipotent, omniscient God does not exist.
One objection to this argument is Snyders no-see-um inferences objection. He argues
that just because we cannot see a reason why some evil would occur does not mean that the
reasons do not exist. Rowe is assuming that we would expect to understand the justification of an
evil if there were one. Snyder does not believe this is the case. He provides the example of the
possibility of alien life. Just because aliens have not contacted us doesnt mean that we can
reasonably conclude that they do not exist. Many questions about aliens need to be answered
before we can assume anything. For example, do aliens have the intelligence to contact us? And
if they have intelligence would they want to? And if they want to, do they have the means at their
disposal? None of these questions are clear, so a rational person would not make up their mind
either way.
Snyder argues that Rowes assumption is similar to the alien example. Just as I wouldnt
understand two PhDs in math discussing some complex math formula, I shouldnt presuppose to
understand Gods greater plans. Snyder also makes a progress argument saying that future
progress implies present ignorance.(Snyder, 357) This progress applies to goods as well so we
may be ignorant of certain greater goods. Finally, the goods required to outweigh horrific evils
would have to be so complex that we would have no hope of understanding them. A child cannot
understand the true value of his parents mutual love at a young age. In the same way, adults
might be children in the eyes of God who are too nave to understand Gods great love for us.
All these arguments give us good reason to be in doubt about whether it is highly likely we

Daniel Noteboom
Mr. Clatterbaugh
Phil 267 AH
10/21/2011

would see a greater good(Snyder, 356) which is good enough reason not to believe Rowes
assumption. Being in doubt about Rowes assumption is different from viewing it as false, which
would imply that we know Gods plans. Snyder shows that to jump from we think there is no
possible good to there is no such greater good is not a good assumption to make (Snyder, 358).
I like Rowes rationality argument from evil because it does not try to prove too much,
and so it is harder to attack. The rationality version of Rowes argument does not argue for truth
like some other arguments from evil. Truth is extremely hard to prove and is more open to attack.
To disprove the rationality argument one needs to provide a way of thinking that is more rational.
Snyder attempts to do this in the argument above. But if his argument goes through, then how are
people expected to know good from evil? If people cannot tell good from evil, then how are
people supposed to avoid sin. Its not rational to think that God would expect people to abstain
from evil without knowing what good and evil were. Thus, its not rational to believe that we
dont understand enough about good and evil to think that we cant understand the greater goods
that come from a fawn being horribly burned in a forest. One of the stronger attacks on Rowes
argument has failed to convince me which is part of the reason why I like it the best.
I also like this argument the best because it is very hard for the theist to attack in general.
The theist has to explain every single type of evil to succeed while the nontheist merely has to
find one gratuitous evil. Snyder tries to avoid this by saying we are in the dark about all of these
evils. But if we are in the dark about so many evils, how can we be expected to make any
decisions? Either way of attacking this argument is fairly difficult. I also like how Rowe explains
things clearly and is modest about what he has accomplished. Rowes rationality argument does
not definitively prove that God does not exist, but it does prove that is rational to believe God

Daniel Noteboom
Mr. Clatterbaugh
Phil 267 AH
10/21/2011

does not exist. Rowe proves this point well, moving slowly and providing sufficient details as he
moves through the argument.
Altogether, Rowes rationality argument from evil provides good reason for doubting the
existence of God. The argument is difficult to attack which led me to pick this argument as the
best one that has been discussed thus far.

Daniel Noteboom
Mr. Clatterbaugh
Phil 267 AH
10/21/2011

Bibliography
Rowe, William The Problem of Evil and some Varieties of Atheism, Readings in the
Philosophy of Religion. Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview, 2008. Print.
Howard-Snyder, Daniel Rowes Argument from Particular Horrors Readings in the Philosophy
of Religion. Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview, 2008. Print.