JUDICIALACTIVISM

PROJECTREPORT:2014
MADHAVVIDHIMAHAVIDYALAYA
(GWALIOR)

INGUIDANCEOF:

SUBMITTEDBY:

DR.MAMTAMISHRA
ASST.PROFESSOR
M.V.M.GWALIOR

ANUJASINGH
LL.M.SECONDSEM
ROLLNO.1268213

TABLEOFCONTENTS

CHAPTERNAME

PAGENO.

JudicialActivism:AnIntroduction

DefiningJudicialActivism

OriginofJudicialActivism

67

JudicialActivisminIndia

810

ConstitutionalPosition

1112

JudicialActivismV.JudicialRestraint

1314

TransgressingTheBoundaries

15

IssuesandConcerns

16

AccountabilityofJudiciary

1718

SeparationofPowers

1921

InfluenceByPoliticalEstablishments

22

Conclusion

2324
3

Bibliography

25

JUDICIALACTIVISM:ANINTRODUCTION
The success of a democracy, especially one based on a federal
system,dependslargelyonanimpartialandindependentjudiciary
endowedwithsufficientpowerstoadministerjustice.Theframersof
the Indian Constitution, therefore, thought it fit to entrust the
judiciarywithvastpowers.Thetrinityofanindependentjudiciary,
independentconstitutionalreview,andthesupremacyoflawoperate
togetherfortheworkingofaconstitutionalgovernment.
The Trinity Legislative, Judiciary and the Executiveis an
accomplished phenomena, Harmonious existence is a theory.
MontesquieuaFrenchPhilosopher,believedthatconcentrationof
powerinone personorgroupresultsindisastrousconsequences.
Therfore,governmentalfunctionsshallbevestedinthreedifferent
organstheLegislature,theExecutiveandtheJudiciary.Hefurther
felt that each organ should be independent from others and they
shouldnotinterferewitheachother.HisprincipleofSeparationof
Powerscanbeencapsulatedasfollows:
Eachorganshouldbeindependentofanother.
No one organ should perform functions that belong to the
other.
For any of the two combined together could lead to disastrous
consequences. For instance if Judiciary combines with the
Executive,itwillresultinjudgesbecomingviolentandoppressive.
IftheJudiciarycombineswiththeLegislature,therewouldbeno
liberty.AndiftheExecutiveandtheLegislaturecombineitwould
lead to arbitrariness. Two prominent constitutional functionaries
recentlyexpressedtheirconcernovertheroleplayedbytheIndian
Judiciary.Judiciaryisnotanoverridingauthorityandnoorganhas

therighttoemphasizepowersofanother,Theseassertionshave,in
the wake of several apex court rulings, striking down executive
decisionsandparliamentarylegislations.

DEFININGJUDICIALACTIVISM
According to Black's Law Dictionary, judicial activism is "a
philosophyofjudicialdecisionmakingwherebyjudgesallowtheir
personalviewsaboutpublicpolicy,amongotherfactors,toguide
their decisions, usually with the suggestion that adherents of this
philosophytendtofindconstitutionalviolationsandarewillingto
ignoreprecedent."
Activismmeansapolicyofvigorousactionofaphilosophyora
creativewill1orThedoctrineorpolicyofbeingactiveordoing
things with decision. Judicial Activism would therefore mean
taking recourse to judicial process leading to judicial
pronouncementsondifferentintricateissuesitisactiveroleplayed
onthepartoftheJudiciary.
In the words of Justice J.S.Verma, Judicial Activism must
necessarilymeantheactiveprocessofimplementationoftherule
oflaw,essentialforthepreservationoffunctionaldemocracy.
AccordingtoProf.UpendraBaxi,JudicialActivismisanascriptive
term.Itmeansdifferentthingstodifferentpeople.
Judicialactivismdescribesjudicialrulingsuspectedofbeingbased
onpersonalorpoliticalconsiderationsratherthanonexistinglaw.
The question of judicial activism is closely related to
constitutional,statutoryconstruction,andseparationofpowers.

1
5

ORIGINOFJUDICIALACTIVISM
The concept of judicial activism which is another name for
innovativeinterpretationwasnotoftherecentpast;itwasbornin
1804whenChiefJusticeMarshall,thegreatestJudgeoftheEnglish
speakingworld,decidedMarburyv.Madison1.Heobservedthat
the Constitution was the fundamental and paramount law of the
nationand"itisforthecourttosaywhatthelawis".Heconcluded
that the particular phraseology of the Constitution of theUnited
Statesconfirms and strengthens the principle supposed to be
essentialtoallwrittenConstitutions.Thatalawrepugnanttothe
Constitutionisvoidandthatthecourtsaswellasotherdepartments
areboundbythatinstrument.Iftherewasconflictbetweenalaw
madebytheCongressandtheprovisionsintheConstitution,itwas
thedutyofthecourttoenforcetheConstitutionandignorethelaw.
Thetwinconceptsofjudicialreviewandjudicialactivismwerethus
born.
Some proponents of a stronger judiciary argue that the judiciary
helps provide checks and balances and should grant itself an
expandedroletocounterbalancetheeffectsoftransientmajoritarian,
i.e. there should be an increase in the powers of a branch of
governmentwhichisnotdirectlysubjecttotheelectorate,sothatthe
majoritycannotdominateoroppressanyparticularminoritythrough
itselectivepowers.Moreover,theyarguethatthejudiciarystrikes
down both elected and unelected official action, that in some
instances acts of legislative bodies reflect the view the transient

majoritymayhavehadatthemomentofpassageandnotnecessarily
the view the same legislative body may have at the time the
legislation is struck down, that the judges that are appointed are
usuallyappointedbypreviouslyelectedexecutiveofficialssothat
theirphilosophyshouldreflectthatofthosewhonominatedthem,
thatanindependentjudiciaryisagreatassettocivilsocietysince
corporationsandthewealthyareunabletodictatetheirversionof
constitutional interpretation with threat of stopping political
donations.

JUDICIALACTIVISMININDIA

Duringthelasttwodecades,judicialactivismhasplayedamajor
role in protecting the rights and freedoms of individuals, as
guaranteedundertheconstitution.Afterthelandmarkdecisioninthe
MenkaGandhiscase,courtshaveassumedanactivistpostureand
comeforwardtotherescueofaggrievedcitizens.Inanumberof
cases, subsequent to the Menka Gandhis case, the judiciary
interpretedtheconstitutionalprovisioninitswiderpossiblemeaning
toprotectbasiccivillibertiesandfundamentalrights.Duringthis
period,ourjudiciarydevelopedtheconceptofsocialactionlitigation
andpublicinterestlitigationbydiscardingthetraditionalandself
imposed limitations on its own jurisdiction. In 1975, Justice VR
KrishnaIyerforthefirsttimeintheBarCouncilscaseadvocated
theliberalinterpretationoflocusstandiinpublicinterestlitigation.
HeobservedthatinadevelopingcountrylikeIndia,publicoriented
litigationbetterfulfilstheruleoflawifitistorunclosetotherule
oflife.Theconceptofpublicinterestlitigationtookaclearershape
throughtheremarkablejudgmentinwhatispopularlyknownasthe
caseofthejudgestransfer.Inthiscase, JusticeBhagwati said
thatthetraditionalrulewasofancientvintageandaroseduringan
erawhenprivatelawdominatedthescene.Heobservedthatthereis
anurgentneedtoinnovatenewmethodsanddevisenewstrategies
forthepurposeofprovidingaccesstojusticetothelargemassesof
peoplewhoaredeniedtheirhumanrightsandtowhomfreedomand
liberty have no meaning. The courts have a duty to utilize the
initiativeandzealofpublicmindedpersonsandorganizationsby
allowingthemtoactforgeneralorgroupinterest.
JusticeBhagwatifurtherdevelopedtheideaofsocialjusticethrough
courtsinanothercaseinwhichhe observed,Thetimehasnow

come when the courts must become the court for the poor and
strugglingmassesofthiscountry.Theymustshedtheircharacteras
upholderoftheestablishedorderandthestatusquo.Theymustbe
sensitizedtotheneedofdoingjusticetothelargemassesofpeople
towhomjusticehasbeendeniedbyacruelandheartlesssocietyfor
generations.Itisthroughpublicinterestlitigationthatproblemsof
poorarenowcomingtotheforefrontandtheentiretheatreofthe
law is changing. It holds out great possibilities for the future.
TheSupremeCourtinitiatedthiscasebyconvertingaletterwritten
by the Peoples Union for Democratic Rights. The letter,
addressedtooneofSupremeCourtjudges,wasbaseduponareport
madebyateamofthreesocialscientistswhowerecommissionedby
the Peoples Union for Democratic Rights for the purpose of
investigatingandinquiringintotheconditionunderwhichworkmen
were employed in the construction work of various projects
connectedwiththeAsianGames.Inthiscase,theSupremeCourt
came down heavily against critics of public interest litigation.
It was observed that those who were decrying public interest
litigations,didnotseemtorealizethatthecourtsarenotmeantonly
fortherichandthewelltodo,forthelandlordandthegentry,for
thebusinessmagnateandtheindustrialtycoonbuttheyexistalsofor
thepoorandthedowntrodden,thehavenotsandthehandicapped
andthehalfhungrymillions.Publicinterestlitigationandjudicial
activismhastouchedalmosteveryaspectoflife.Beitthecaseof
bonded labour, rehabilitation of freed bonded labour, payment of
minimumwages,protectionofpavementandslumdwellers,juvenile
offenders,childlabour,illegaldetentions,tortureandmaltreatment
of woman in police lockup, the implementation of various
provisionsoftheconstitution,environmentproblems,thecourtstook
cognizanceofeachcaseandlaiddownvariousjudgmentstoprotect
the basic human rights of each and every member of society.
No doubt law regulates the society, but some time society also

regulates law. Changing aspirations of people also affects law.

Constitutions,courtsandotherpartsofthejudicialsystemaremade
for common people. Realising the fact that in spite of all
constitutional provisions and other enactments, socioeconomic
justice remained a distant dream for the poor and downtrodden,
Justice Bhagwati invites judges to use their power to further the
causeofsocialjustice.
InhisworkSocialActionLitigation:TheIndianExpressJustic
eBhagwatiobserved
Today,wefindthatinthirdworldcountries,therearelargenumber
ofgroupswhicharebeingsubjectedtoexploitation,injusticeand
evenviolence.Inthisclimateofconflictandinjustice,judgeshave
to play a positive role and they cannot content themselves by
invokingthedoctrineofselfrestraintandpassiveinterpretation.The
judgesinIndiahavefortunatelyamostpotentjudicialpowerintheir
hands,namelythepowerofjudicialreview.Thejudiciaryhasto
playavitalandimportantrolenotonlyinpreventingtheremedying
abuse and misuse of power but also in
eliminatingexploitationandinjustice.

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CONSTTUTIONALPOSITION
TheConstitutionprovidesforsufficientprovisionstomaintainthe
theoryofSeparationofPowers.Article50prescribesseparationof
theJudiciaryfromtheExecutive.Articles121and211forbidthe
legislaturefromdiscussingtheconductofanyjudgeindischargeof
hisduties.Articles122and212prohibitthecourtsfromsittingin
judgementovertheinternalproceedingsofthelegislature.Article
105(2)and194(2)ontheotherhand,protectthelegislatorsfrom
interferenceofthecourtswithregardstheirfreedomofspeechand
expression.
Thus the Constitution of India, tries its best to inculcate
Montesquieus theory of Separation of Powers, but what actually
happenswhentheJudiciaryactuallyoversteps?Andwhatexactlyis
overstepping by the judiciary. These questions have remained
unansweredbytheConstitution.
JudicialreviewisasignificantsourceofJudicialActivism.Onecan
say that the seeds of Judicial Activism were sown in Judicial
Review. Though in India, the Constitution does not specifically
mentionthepowerofJudicialReview,butitdoesmentionthatany
act violative of Fundamental Rights can be declared
unconstitutional.ThustheJudiciarycanoverridethepowersofthe
Legislature through Judicial Review. In India power of Judicial
ReviewisnowconsideredtobeabasicfeatureoftheConstitution.
InitiallythepowerofJudicialreviewwaslimitedtocheckingthe
acts or decisions affecting fundamental rights, but lately the
Judiciaryhasalsostartedexpressingitsconcerninmattersrelating
tosocial,developmentalandenvironmentalissues.
ItcouldbeeasilysaidthattheEmergencyof1975andtheperiod
immediately thereafter constituted defining moments for Judicial
Activism in India. The infamous ADM Jabalpur v Shukla,
popularlyknownastheHabeasCorpuscasewasdecidedandwasa

11

blow to the civil liberties in India. The suspension of Article 21

prohibitedthechallengingofanydetentionsmadeduringthattime.
TheConstitutionwasalsoamendedtopermittheexcessesofthe
Emergency. The Decision was strongly condemned and Judicial
ActivismhadastrongmoralbasisaftertheEmergency.

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JUDICIALACTIVISMV.JUDICIALRESTRAINT
HavingunderstoodthemeaningofthewordJudicialActivism,it
wouldbelegitimatetosaythatthelinebetweenthetermsJudicial
ActivismandJudicialOverReachisdifficulttodraw.Astheformer
ChiefJusticeofIndia,JusticeAhmadihasstatedSometimesthis
Activism has the potential to transcend the borders of Judicial
Reviewandturnintopopulismandexcessivism.
ThustoonejudgeitmaybeActivismwhiletotheotheritmaybe
OverReach.OrtooneswhomayagreewiththeJudgementitmaybe
Activism and to those who disagree it maybe Over Reach. It is
difficult to lay down strict guidelines as to when it would be
ActivismandwhentheJudiciarymightbeoverreaching.Butifwe
havealookatsomeoftheprovisionsofourConstitutionlikeArticle
32(RighttoConstitutionalRemediesintheSupremeCourtdirectly
forenforcementofallfundamentalrights),Article226(powerof
high courts to issue certain writs) and Article 227 (power of
superintendenceoverallcourtsandtribunalsbythehighcourt),just
goes to show that the basic document of governance our
Constitution has provided for these overreaching provisions. The
ConstitutionhasplacedthatresponsibilityofJudicialGovernancein
theJudgesofhigherjudiciary.
Judiciaryisthatbranchofthegovernmentwithgreatestinstitutional
capacity to enforce the legal norms in a disinterested way. The
Legislature and the Executive because of their vested interest of
seeking reelection are prone to ignore constitutional limits to
pampertheelectorate.
Following are the reasons for justifying the law making of the
Judiciary:
Judges are fit candidates to make law since the rational
dialecticcomesnaturallytocommonlawjudge

13

 Judicial decisions stand and fall on the strength of their

reasons,andthejudiciallawmakingroleismoreinteractive
andbroadbasedthanisusuallyassumed.
Further, benefit of such law making is that it provokes the
legislaturetoact,inwhichcaselegislaturemaybepersuadedto
replacetheadhoclegislationwithmorecomprehensiveand
properlegislation.
AgreatstrengthoftheJudiciaryinlawmakingwasthatitis
notelectedandsonotbeholdentovotebanks.
Finally he gives a constitutional justification, that judges in
IndiaareboundbytheiroathasJudgestoplayanactiverole
inlawmaking
Judicial Activism in a modern democratic set up isto be looked
upon as an agency to curb legislative adventurism and executive
tyranny by enforcing Constitutional limits. Approach to Judicial
Activismcouldbeeithernegativeoraffirmative.

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TRANSGRESSINGTHEBOUNDRIES
This intolerance to the abuse of Judicial Activism had longbeen
cumulating. The Indian Courts, apparently, have forgotten their
place in the Constitutional arrangement. They have flagrantly
breached the principle of Separation of Powers. As pointed out
byHon'bleMr.JusticeJ.S.Verma,theformerCJI,inhisDr.
K.L. Dubey Lecturethe Judiciary has intervened to question a
'mysteriouscar'racingdowntheTughlaqRoadinDelhi,allotment
of a particular bungalow to a Judge, specific bungalows for the
Judges, pool, monkeys capering in colonies, stray cattle on the
streets,clearingpublicconveniences,levyingcongestionchargesat
peakhoursatairportswithheavytraffic,etc.underthethreatofuse
ofcontemptpowertoenforcecomplianceofitsorders.Recently,the
Courts have apparently, if not clearly, strayed into the executive
domain or in matters of policy. use and misuse of ambulances,
requirements for establishing a world class burns ward in the
hospital,thekindofairDelhitiesbreathe,begginginpublic,theuse
of subways, the nature of buses we board, the legality of
constructionsinDelhi,identifyingthebuildingstobedemolished,
the size of speedbreakers on roads, autorickshaw overcharging,
growingfrequencyofroadaccidentsandenhancingofroadfinesetc.

15

ISSUESANDCONCERNS
The following are the main issues or areas of concern with an
activistJudiciary
Where the Judiciary interferes with the functions clearly of
administrative or legislative nature, in such cases, is the
Judiciaryresponsible/accountabletoanyoneforthedischarge
of such functions and what are constitutional and legal
sanctions behind such orders made and directions given by
courts,bywayofJudicialActivism?
dilutionofthetheoryofSeparationofPowersisinadvertent
whenthereisanactivistJudiciary.Thecriticsbelievethatit
goesagainsttheConstitution.
JudicialActivismcouldbeusedbythecurrentdaypolitical
establishmentstogettheirinterestsprotected.Andthusthere
maybemisuseoftheJudicialProcess.

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ACCOUNTABILITYOFJUDICIARY
OneofthemainconcernsforthecriticsofJudicialActivismisthat
thelawmakingdone byjudgesisnogoodtill it isbroughtinto
effect.TheLawmakingorganofthegovernmenttheLegislature
has the means of making laws and bringing them into effect,
unfortunately the Judiciary does not. So what happens when the
Judiciarymakesalawbutfailstoeffectivelyimplementitbecause
oflackofmeanstodoso?
S.P Sathe in his book Judicial Activism in IndiaTransgressing
BordersandEnforcingLimitsmakesadifferencebetweenJudicial
LawmakingintheRealistSenseandNonRealistSense.Hesays
thatJudicialLawmakingintherealistsenseiswhattheCourtdoes
whenitexpandsthemeaningsofthewordspersonallibertyordue
process of law or freedom of speech and expression. When
howevertheCourtlaysdownguidelinesforintercountryadoption,
againstsexualharassmentofworkingwomenattheworkplace,or
abolitionofchildlabour,itisnotjudiciallawmakingintherealist
sensebutamountstolegislatinglikealegislature.Sathetermsthisas
judicialexcessivism.
ItiswhensuchlawmakingisundertakenbytheJudiciarythatthe
question of how to implement the law arises. If the Legislature
passeslegislationtotheeffect,itwouldbeapictureperfectscenario.
ButwhentheLegislaturerefusestotakeanaction,thereisavacuum
thatscreatedbetweenthelawpronouncedintheJudgementandits
actualimplementation.Acourtisnotequippedwiththeskillsand
competence to discharge functions that essentially belong to the
othercoordinateorgansofthegovernment.
Thesecondquestionthatarisesiswhethersuchlegislationbythe
Courtisdesirable?thiscanbeansweredincontextwithSeparation
ofPowersDoctrine,Butthedesirabilityofsuchalegislationcanbe
contestedvisavisthefactthatsuchlawmakingbythecourtmight

17

notseeallfuturerequirementsandmighthavebeenmadewithout
taking into consideration various viewpoints. For e.g. Vishakhas
case,whereguidelinesagainstsexualharassmentatworkwerelaid
down. It took the Legislature over a decade to contemplate
Legislationtotheeffect.TheCourtdidlaydowntheguidelines,but
onlytheLegislaturehadtothinkthroughwhatwouldhappenincase
ofbreachofsuchguidelines,whatwouldbethepenaltiesthatwould
be imposed, what would mean by the term sexual harassment,
whether only women could be liable to be sexually harassed at
workplacesandmanysuchconcerns.Thusthediscussionboilsdown
tothebasicquestionofwhatlaws,principleswouldbeapplicableto
theJudiciaryindecidingmatterswhichareessentiallypertainingto
otherorgansofthestates? Andwhatisthemethodorprocedure
providedbytheConstitutionoranylawfortheenforcementofsuch
orderspassedbythecourts?
ThedangerofJudiciarycreatingamultiplicityofrightswithoutthe
possibilityofadequateenforcementwill,intheultimateanalysis,be
counterproductiveandunderminethecredibilityoftheinstitution.
Whenlawsthatarepronouncedcannotbeimplemented,theentire
processofmakingsuchlawsbecomesasham.

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SEPERATIONOFPOWERS
Separation of Powers doctrine as envisaged by Montesquieu has
beenheldasoneofthebasicfeaturesofourConstitution.There
couldbefivecategoriesofJudicialActionwhichcouldbefurther
categorisedintoActivismandExcessivism
MinimalJudicialactionandliteralinterpretation: Under
this the Judiciary cantraverse onlyterritory demarcated for
thembythelegislatureandtheexecutive,andassuchthereis
nocontroversy,neitherthereisanyscopeofanycontroversy.
Creativeorpurposeinterpretation:forinstanceexpanding
themeaningofcertainterms.
The Oversight Function over the Executive : Executive
actionormalfunction,Fillingingapsandexercisingoversight
overtheexecutiveinaction.
The Oversight Function over the Legislature: Making
common law, ad hoc legislation where legislature fails to
legislate, or there are lacunae in existing legislation and
passingordersanddirectionsandreviewingfunctioningofthe
legislature.
Creative interpretation which amounts to rewriting the
Constitution.
Thereisnostraightjacketformulawhichwillhelpinarrivingata
conclusionthatJudiciaryhasoversteppedorithasbeenwellwithin
its limits. A case, how decided is dependent on how a judge
perceivesitandintegrateshiswisdomwiththelawofthelandto
arriveataconclusion.Sothereisnoobjectivitybutonlysubjectivity
thatbecomesadecidingfactortodeterminewhethertheDoctrine
hasbeendilutedornot.
GlaringexamplesofJudiciaryoversteppingitslimitsandsteppingin
totheareaoftheexecutivehasbeenorderspassedbyHonourable
19

DelhiHighCourtonsubjectsrangingfromageandothercriteriafor
nurseryadmissions,unauthorisedschools,begginginpublic,auto
rickshawovercharging,sizeofspeedbreakersontheroad.Theseare
clearly policy areas, where the Judiciary has interfered and
legislated.
It is believed that the framers of our Constitution took care to
provideforanindependentandimpartialJudiciaryastheinterpreter
oftheConstitutionandasthecustodianoftherightsofthecitizens
throughtheprocessofJudicialReview,whichpermitstheJudiciary
tointerpretlawsbutnotlaythemdown.Judicialreviewismuch
stricteraconcept,whereasJudicialActivism,asthenamesuggestsis
much wider in scope. The framers, it is true, only permitted to
enquire into any legislation or an executive action. But Judicial
Activismtendstohijackthefunctionsoftheotherorgansandact
uponit.
ThequestionthenarisesisthatwhywouldJudiciaryoverstep?And
theanswertothisisgivenbySatheveryclearly
ThoseIndianswhofindingthatthelegislaturesandtheexecutive
s are not responding to their grievances turn to courts for
protection against injustice from a classstructured polity, and
securesomerelief,howeverpaltry,havebeguntolooktotheCourt
astheirownchoice.SathefurtheraddsthatJudicialprocessis
expensivedilatoryandtechnicalandifitispreferreddespitesuch
inherentdefects,itisonlybecausetheotheravenuesofredressal
havebecomeineffectiveandunreliable.
ThisishowtheentireconceptofPublicInterestLitigationcameup
anditsproutedfromnowherebutfromanActivistJudiciary.
Having stated the reasons for the Judiciary overstepping, the
pertinentquestionhereiswhetherthisoversteppingisdilutingthe
DoctrineandthusbeingcontrarytotheConstitution?Thequestion
canbeansweredinthelightofthefollowingparameters

20

 True Constitution, although makes separate provisions for

three organsofthestate, doesnotplacethem inwatertight
compartments.
The Constitution by virtue of Article 142 gives extensive
powerstotheSupremeCourtinexerciseofitsjurisdictionto
passanydecreesormakeanyordersforcarryingoutjustice.
AsJusticeVivianBosehasdescribedthispowergrantedby
Article142astheflamingswordinanelegantprose
WehaveuponusthewholearmouroftheConstitutionandwalk
henceforthinitsenlightenedways,wearingthebreastplateofits
protecting provisions and flashing the flaming sword of its
inspiration
The Constitution instead of putting the organs into watertight
compartments,givesthemaleewaytomovearound,especiallythe
JudiciarybywayofArticle142andbyholdingJudicialReviewas
thebasicfeatureoftheConstitution.Theissuethenisnotwhether
dilutingtheDoctrineiscontrarytotheConstitution,buthowfarcan
thedoctrinebedilutedorwhatarethepermissiblelimitsofsuch
dilution. The content of Judicial Power is not defined in our
Constitution.TruetheJudiciarycannotcrossthelineofseparationto
the extent that it usurps the powers of the other organs. But the
abovementionedguidelinesbytheCourtsareexamplesofinstances
wherethelegislaturedidnotlegislateatall.Andalsotheguidelines
laiddownbytheJudiciarybecomethelawofthelandonlywhen,
evenafterhavinggivensuchGUIDELINES,thelegislaturefails
totakeanysteptofillinthegap.FailureofLegislaturetoacteven
after having been given guidelines cannot be held against the
JudiciaryunderthegarbofdilutingtheDoctrineofSeparationof
Powers.

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INFLUENCEBYPOLITICALESTABLISHMENTS

Ajudicialdecisioneitherstigmatisesorlegitimisesadecisionofthe
legislatureortheexecutive.judicialdecisionneedstobeneither
politicallymotivated,norpoliticallyinclined,sinceitisthroughits
decisionsthatthecourtchangestheexistingpowerrelations,judicial
activismisboundtobepoliticalinnature.Throughitsdecisionsthe
constitutionalcourtbecomesanimportantpowercentreof
democracy.Thusapoliticisedjudicialpronouncementnotonly
strikesattherootsofthedemocracybutataintedjudiciarycannever
dojustice.
ItisnaturalforthecriticsofJudicialActivismtofearaninfluenceof
thecurrentpoliticalestablishmentontheJudiciary.
Averyglaringexamplehasbeentheentireperiodofemergencyof
1975whentheJudiciarywasalmostcontrolledbytheLegislature.
Theemergencybroughtinsevererestrictionsonanindividualliberty
andjudicialreview.
Thepurposeistodepictlucidlyhowthejudiciary,ifdoesnot
practiseselfrestraintcanbeapuppetinthehandsoftheLegislature.
Thoughtheironyisthatonthefaceofit,itseemed,intheabove
case,thattheJudiciarydirectedtheLegislature,butanalysingitone
realisesthattheLegislatureactually,throughthejudicialprocess,
sortedthematterinitsowninterests.

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CONCLUSION
AswecanseetheDoctrineofSeparationofPowersrunsasathread
inallthemajorareasofconcerndiscussedabove.Inawayitis
actuallytheDoctrinewhichraisesamajorconcernandtheother
concernsflowoutfromit.Beittheinfrastructuremissingforthe
Judiciary to implement the laws or whether the Judiciary is
influencedbythepoliticalestablishmentoftheday,Separationof
Powersisattheroot.AndwhenexactlydoestheJudiciarydilutes
thedoctrineandcrossesthelimitsisnotdefined.
IftheintentionoftheframersoftheConstitutionwastonotletthe
Judiciarylegislate,itcouldhaveplacedallthreeorgansinseparate
watertightcompartments,whichithasveryclearlynot.Eventhe
framersoftheConstitutionintendedtogivespacetotheJudiciaryto
move around and about the line of separation. Though there are
examples of the Legislature exercising the Judicial Power for
instance in the disputes arising out of the 10 th Schedule of the
Constitution.AndsimilarlytheExecutivewhileexercisingstatutory
anddiscretionarypowerstakesupadjudicatoryroleandalsomakes
laws by way of subordinate legislation or by promulgation of
OrdinancesintermsofArticle123and213oftheConstitution.But
itisonlytheJudiciarywhichisbywayofArticle142givenwide
powerstopassordersordecreesinfurtheranceofJustice.Thatsthe
trustthattheframershaveplacedinthehigherJudiciary.Andsucha
trusthastocomewithresponsibility.Becausewithoutresponsibility
suchtrustcanbecometyrannicalandtheconsequencesahavocfora
democracy.
ThelegitimacyoftheCourtandJudicialActivismisderivedfrom
thefaiththatpeoplereposeintheJudiciaryandthusCourtshaveto
continuouslystrivetomaintaintheirlegitimacy. Alsoonehasto
understandthatJudgesafterallarehumanbeingsandtoerrisonly

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human.AnactivistJudgehastobepreparedtotakecriticismofhis
judgements.Thisisanimportanttooltokeepacheckonthefactthat
thetrustthattheframersoftheConstitutionhaveputintheJudiciary
ofthecountry,isrespectedandismaintainedwithresponsibility.
JusticeY.KSabharwalsaidinaninterview
When the Supreme Court declares that executive and the
legislature has exceeded its limits and crossed province the
judgementisadecisiononbehalfofWethepeopleofIndia,to
whomthelegislatureandtheexecutiveareaccountable
JudicialActivismprovidesasafetyvalveinademocracy.Justafew
concerns need to be addressed so as to prevent Judiciary from
usurpingthepowersoftheotherorgans.Andinsteadofaccusing
JudiciaryofOverreach,amechanismtoconcretisesuchguidelines
intolegislationsactively,shouldbedevised.Thepanaceafortheso
called evil overreach is with the Judiciary itself and self
restraintisthebestformofkeepingacheckonitself.
Toconcludequotingafewlines
That plants slowly nurtured by judicial craftsmanship have
grownintosturdytreesandhaveblossomedwithcolourfuland
fragrant flowers. Judicial Activism has added much needed
oxygen to a gigantic democratic experiment in India by the
alchemyofjudicophotosynthesis

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARYSOURCE
S.P.Sathe,bookonJudicialactivism
Fali.S.Nariman,BeforeMemoryFadesAnAutobiography
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