Christopher Gandy

JSISA 473

Professor Anchordoguy

The Japan Socialist Party

Introduction
A characteristic inherent to most modern democracies is the existence of party
competition. Parties offer different incentives to voters, and provide different policy options if
one form of government is failing to deliver demands to the people. In the United States we see
this play out between the Democrats and the Republicans, for example. Both parties sit close to
the center, and weigh towards the left or right depending on certain issues; however, the parties
maintain unified stances in their respective platforms. In doing so, they are able to capitalize on
a large voter base in an attempt to cater to the demands of the overall population. This creates
competition between two parties, and makes them much more attentive to voters needs; as they
desire to stay in power. However, from 1955 through 1993 in Japan, we see something different;
despite having a second, large opposition party, Japan never developed a true two party system.
Idealism did not prevail in Japan after the First World War. The Second World War,
however, brought tremendous destruction to Japan, inflicting wartime devastation on the country
for the first time in its history.1 The United States, under the command of SCAP (Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers) and General Douglas MacArthur, occupied the nation from
1945 until 1952 and implemented democracy and a constitution written under their supervision
by a non-Japanese committee. This constitution has never been altered, and maintains an article
that set Japan off on a very unique path of political development. The article that makes this
constitution unique, and sets the precedent for the political party discussed in this paper, is none
other than Article 9. Article 9 essentially states that the Japanese will not commit any acts of
war, and belligerency of the state will not be recognized; however, they do maintain a self-

WADA SHUICHI p. 408

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defense force (SDF), which was created due to the reverse course (the USAs need for Japan as
an ally in the Pacific against the communist bloc). Article 9, as a policy, was utilized mainly by
the pacifist movement that developed out of the ashes of war in Japan.
When Japan stabilized after the war, it became split between those who were pro USA
and those who were anti USA; those who were idealists, and those who were conservative
nationalists.2 The focus of this paper is primarily on the idealists; more specifically, the Japan
Socialist Party (JSP). The JSP served as the largest opposition party to the Liberal Democratic
Partys (LDP) reign from 1955-1993; however, they were just that: an opposition. The JSP was
never able to effectively offer a platform as an alternative to the LDPs success during the high
periods of economic growth. This paper will begin by giving an overview and background of the
JSP. It will then discuss essential reasons that grapple with why the JSP failed to rise from
merely an opposition party and create a true alternative to the LDP; thus, forming what could
have been a two party system of competition. The paper will end by showing how the party lost
and ultimately dissolved.
The JSP had chances early on to gain power and become a true alternative to the LDP.
One event being the Structural Reform plan advocated by Eda Saburo. However, opportunities
like this were not seized. A main reason was because of the internal conflict between the JSPs
factions. Because of this, a truly unified party platform could not be determined, and the party
began to lose electorally. Parties split off from the JSP, and contributed to the JSPs pressure on
both the right and left. Furthermore, the LDP had a stranglehold via its clientelistic system on
Inaka (rural Japan), and was able to capitalize on the SNTV MMD (Single member nontransferable vote, multi-member district) system, and gain overwhelming success due to its large,
2

Wada Shuichi p.407

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growing supply of pork during times of high economic growth. This was very hard for the JSP
to contend with, since they were not in a central position of power. Lastly, after electoral form in
1993 the JSP formed a coalition with its arch rival, the LDP, in order to secure a socialist leader
as the Prime Minister. This was something that had not been achieved since immediately after
World War II. However, in doing so, they discarded most of the partys platform and ideology,
and subsequently dissolved and reformed. Ultimately, with the combination of external and
internal pressures on the JSP, the ideal of socialism could not be maintained and could not gain
enough power in the 55 system; thus, as time went on and chances were missed to become more
pragmatic, and offer a viable policy alternative to the LDP, their inevitable decline ensued.

Background and Overview

The JSP was established in 1945 soon after the end of World War II, and took part in two
coalition cabinets in the early years of postwar politics (19471948). By 1948 the JSP had
gained enough votes to lead a government for a few months in a coalition with two non-socialist
parties. Despite growing in strength, at this same time, some serious weaknesses manifested.
First, electoral strength was not matched by local organization (socialism), which had very
shallow depth routed in Japanese society. Second, the party in 1945 was little more than a
coalition of weak factions dating from the 1920s. These ranged from democratic socialists to
near-Communists.3
The JSP suffered its worst defeat in the 1949 election. In the previous election of 1947,
the Socialists had received 26% of the total vote cast and obtained 143 seats (out of 466 total) in
the lower house. The JSP had won plurality, which laid the basis for the two consecutive centerleft coalition governments. The 1949 election took place after the collapse of these governments.
3

J.A.A Stockwin p. 187

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The JSPs vote share dropped to 13.5% and its seats to 48. The right-wing element of the JSP
was especially hit hard. Both the Chairman (and former PM) Katayama and the Party Secretary
Nishio lost their seats. The left-wing members who had participated in the coalition cabinet and
who were thus considered pragmatic left, such as Kanju Kato, Masaru Nomizo, and Eiji
Tomiyoshi, also lost their seats. Clearly, voters were punishing moderates within the party for
making too many policy compromises in the coalition.4 According to Kohno, this was largely
considered the reason why the JSP continued towards the left afterwards.5 Had the Socialists
pulled together in this election they could have possibly unified sooner, and maintained their
position in the Diet.

In October of 1951 the party split into a Left Socialist Party (LSP) and a Right Socialist
Party (RSP), which existed until their reunification in 1955. The issue of the split was over
foreign policy. In short, the Left opposed, while the Right partially supported the Allied peace
settlement with Japan. The LSP subsequently developed a foreign policy of unarmed neutralism

4
5

Masaru Kohno p.64

Masaru Kohno p.65

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and opposed the American presence in Japan, while the RSP committed itself neither to the
American presence nor to neutralism. When the two parties reunited in 1955 the left had already
overtaken the Right electorally; this was reflected in their policy of accepting neutrality.6 (Shown
in Figure 1 on the previous page: Source: Masaru Kohno p.58)
The two parties reunited in 1955, which was the same year the LDP was established by
the merger of two conservative parties. For the next four decades, the LDP and the JSP were the
two largest parties in Japan, with the LDP maintaining continuous power. This party system
came to be known in Japan as the 1955 regime.7
Between 1955 and 1960 the JSP was led by Suzuki Mosaburo from the Left and
Asanuma Inejiro from the Right. Under their leadership the party became increasingly radical.
It led large street demonstrations against objectionable legislation and its foreign policy became
more and more pro-Communist. For example: when Asanuma, the former Right Socialist, led a
party delegation to Peking in March 1959 he made an impromptu remark, seized upon by the
press, that American imperialism is the common enemy of the peoples of Japan and China.
This was never repudiated by the JSP.8 Though, the JSPs focus on China, mainly its factional
dispute on Chinas Cultural Revolution, will be discussed later on.
Continuing on, despite the JSP prospering electorally until 1958, from there on out its
progress dwindled. This was widely attributed to a weak organization and lack of appeal beyond
industrial workers. The main trade union federation, Sokyo, had been the main backer of the JSP.
The party was increasingly dependent on Sokyo, many of whose member unions were composed
of workers in Government utilities and the public service. Faced with oppressive restrictions on
6

J.A.A Stockwin p. 187

Ko Maeda p. 345
8
J.A.A Stockwin p.187-188
7

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their right to conventional industrial action, these unions (and others) resorted to total opposition
to all government policy, using the JSP for this political purpose.9 One should make note that
this trend continued, but as time went on, the JSP continued to lose support in Inaka. The JSP
received support in rural areas earlier in the postwar period, but this support declined as Japans
urban areas expanded.10 Eventually cities and their labor unions would be the JSPs primary
support and focus. This could not contend with the LDPs clientelistic system that overtook
Inaka.
In regards to factions splitting, late in 1959 Nishio Suehiro, a faction leader of the right
wing (discussed briefly above), seceded and formed the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP).
Nishio argued that the class party advocated by the left would merely stagnate, and that the
JSP should become a peoples party with a broader image.11 The DSPs inception created
pressure on the JSP in addition to other parties, such as the JCP (Japan Communist Party;
however, the issue of political parties shall be addressed later in more detail.
As the JSP began turning left in its policy, intraparty conflict merged in the Fall of this
year. Left wing members criticized Nishios stance on foreign and security policy. Nishio
described the cold war structure not as an ideological conflict between capitalism and socialism,
but as a confrontation between democratic nations and totalitarian states.12 He had a pragmatic
view on the Security Treaty, and was aiming to try and bridge the gap between the USA.
However, he did support terminating it; just he believed it would take more than a decade.13

J.A.A Stockwin p. 188

Patterson and Robbins p. 124
11
J.A.A. Stockwin p.188
12
Wada Shuichi p. 416
13
Wada Shuichi p.417
10

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Despite having some ups and downs throughout the 70s and 80s, the trend overall was
downwards for the JSP in terms of electoral success (Shown in Figure 2 below: Kohno p.60).
Meanwhile, the LDP had been utilizing the SNTV electoral system via its own factions and
clientelistic system (discussed later) in order to maintain overwhelming power in rural areas and
pull seats into the Diet. In order to counter this, the JSP and other parties formed a coalition to
give reform to the electoral system and temporarily oust the LDP from power; but, this coalition
shortly failed, and the JSP entered another collation with the LDP, ironically. In order to achieve

a socialist prime minister, they sacrificed the ideology that the party held to for so long.
As we can see, the JSP was torn almost from the time it kicked off in the post-war period.
It was divided, and supported an ideal that had very shallow roots in a society that had just came
out of what was essentially a militaristic, fascist regime. Its primary focus was on labor unions,
and those who would support the socialist movement. The fragmentation continued to grow

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shortly after, and the party began to split further. In order to understand why, it is essential to
look at the factions of the party more intricately.

Party Factions
A large reason why the JSP failed externally, was due to the tension it faced internally.
The party, as discussed above, was divided between two sides that reunited early on in the PostWar period. Despite reuniting to form a single socialist party, these two sides would divide
further over some key issues, ultimately costing the party losses in many areas. While the JSP
could not have stopped its electoral decline completely, it could have preserved more of its
support if it had been able to bridge its internal ideological gaps to keep itself from
fragmenting.14 A good example of this is shown in the JSPs dealings overall with the Chinese
Cultural Revolution.
According to Ko Maeda, the JSPs failure to moderate its leftist policy position is a
widely accepted factor that made the LDPs long tenure possible.15 Despite maintaining a basic
internal consensus on matters such as normalization of diplomatic and economic relations with
the CPR (Communist Party in China), for example, inter-factional disagreements deeply tore the
party apart in the case of the Cultural Revolution.16 If a party cannot come together on key
issues, how can the people truly find it a comfortable solution, or replacement, to the current
government that is achieving large economic success? This was something the JSP seemed to
miss.

14

Patterson and Robbins p. 119

Maeda p. 343
16
Chae-Jin Lee p.230
15

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Going forward with the Cultural Revolution case, the left wing Sasaki faction and the
structural reformist Eda faction of the JSP exhibited a severe rivalry in their policy discussions
with China. Initially, the Sasaki faction, along with the extremist Heiwa Doshikai (Peace
Comrades), responded enthusiastically to the Cultural Revolution.17 In contrast, the Eda faction
refrained from either praising or condemning the Cultural Revolution during 1966, but kept a
watchful eye on its development.18
Tracing back to 1965 when Sasaki assumed chairmanship, the Eda faction raised the
question of Sasaki's close association with the CPR to challenge his political integrity. Whatever
Sasaki might say, the Socialist Movement argued, "It is clear that the Chinese are supporting the
Sasaki faction and the latter is favorably responding to that support."19 How are comments like
this beneficial to the party overall? Factional ideologies were dividing the party, and the party
was more committed to these ideologies, than its success as a unit; thus, not gaining power over
the lower house, achieving the position of prime minister, and actually influencing policy in their
favor early on.
The dispute, however, does not end with just two factional sides, nor with firm opinions
on those sides. Eventually the centrist Katsumata faction, which formed an anti-mainstream
alliance with Eda Saburo and Kono Mitsu displayed a rather sympathetic attitude towards the
Cultural Revolution. They made it clear that the Cultural Revolution, however, was a form of
thought was not directly relevant to the JSP which had its own independent revolution strategy.
Despite the Eda, Kono, and Katsumata factions remaining critical of the Cultural Revolution and
Mao, once chosen as Secretary-General, Eda refrained from public criticism of the CPR and the

17

Chae-Jin Lee p.230

Chae-Jin Lee p.231
19
Chae-Jin Lee p.233
18

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Professor Anchordoguy

leftwing faction, in an effort to lessen tensions with Sasaki and Peking.20 No firm stances could
be made, and the party could not reach agreement overall.
This case points to a fundamental weakness in the JSP itself; namely the lack of a broad
ideological and theoretical discipline which can transcend factional differences.21 Because of
this the party became more vulnerable to intense factional divisions and rivalries which in turn
generated a profound crisis in the organizational and psychological makeup of the JSP.22 As
Chae-Jin Lee concludes, The case of the Cultural Revolution suggests that the way the JSP
formulated its positions on sensitive foreign issues was largely a function of inter-factional
conflicts and compromises in terms of leadership contests and ideological divergence. A
particular official policy adopted by the JSP may therefore represent the dominant mainstream
faction or a common denominator of conflicting factional positions. As a product of factional
compromise, such a policy will usually be conveniently ambivalent and unstable.23
Ultimately, the Cultural Revolution not only worsened Peking's relations with the Eda,
Kono, and Katsumata factions, but also aggravated its conflict with the JCP.24 Factional disputes
were not only isolated to this issue; however, the Cultural Revolution showcases a very blatant
example. As the paper continues, I shall discuss how factional disputes led to splits in parties
and the failure of structural reform; thus, breaking unification and weakening the party further.

20

Chae-Jin Lee 242

Chae-Jin Lee p. 242
22
Chae-Jin Lee p.243
23
Chae-Jin Lee p.243
24
Chae-Jin Lee p.237
21

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Christopher Gandy

JSISA 473

Professor Anchordoguy

Opposition Parties and Party Splits

As time went on through the early stages of the JSP, and the party continued to remain
torn between issues on the left and right, some members eventually had enough and branched off
to form entirely new parties. The first example of this was discussed earlier with the DSP in
1959.
Below is an image that showcases the parties respective positions from 1955-1960

(Figure 3: Wada Shuichi p.415).

Increased electoral competition on its left and right flanks directly inhibited the ability of
the JSPs candidates to win legislative seats in district elections, and indirectly by leading the
party to commit too many nomination errors, which, in turn, led to the loss of district seats that it
otherwise would have obtained.25 Being divided ideologically, lead to serious centrifugal

25

Patterson and Robbins p.119

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tendencies. Ultimately, the JSPs right-wing elements bolted and formed new parties, which
added to the JSPs competition on its right flank. The right-flank competition was formidable
enough, without the addition of these new parties.26 In addition to the right flanks increased
pressure, the Japan Communist Party (JCP) existed on the far left, and added pressure there, as
well.
So, the JSP sat neither on the left, right, or center, really. It was somewhere in the middle
of the left; in about as firm of a position as the opinion its members collectively maintained.
Furthermore, the fact that the support for the party suddenly declined when new parties emerged
suggests that voters did not consider the JSP a credible and viable alternative to the LDP. Instead,
the JSP functioned as a watchdog organization monitoring the LDP government.27
The JSPs persistent adherence to its original policies had the effect of polarizing the
Japanese party system, thus creating opportunities for new parties to enter the electoral
competition at the center of the ideological space. The emergence of the Clean Government
Party (CGP) in the late 1960s and the New Liberal Club (NLC) in the mid-1970s, in addition to
the two splinters (DSP and SDF) clearly reflected this niche created by the JSP-LDP
confrontation.28
Additional competition, as discussed above, appeared on both sides. The CGP began to
endorse opposition candidates on the right in the 1967 election, predominantly in urban
districts.29 Furthermore, the JCP caused much trouble for the JSP when their voter support
increased, particularly in response to the environmental problems that plagued Japan throughout

26

Patterson and Robbins p.123

Ko Maeda p (349)
28
Masaru Kohno p.59-60
29
Patterson and Robbins p.124
27

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the 1960s and 1970s.30 The JCPs vote shares were just over 2 percent in the 1958 election, but
this average increased dramatically over the next several elections. Although the JCPs vote
shares reached 10.22 percent in the 1979 election, they dropped slightly over the remaining five
elections, averaging 8 percent in these contests.31 However, this was still votes that could have
been going to the JSP leftist factions members.
More opposition parties endorsed more candidates, causing the total opposition vote to
become fragmented. This fragmentation increased the potential for the opposition party
candidates to go down together and lose seats that they otherwise might have won.32
As the opposition camp became fragmented, the chances of the JSP replacing the LDP in
government diminished. Perhaps the only viable strategy left for the JSP would have been to
explore a coalition with these centrist parties, but the JSPs leftist dominance precluded this
scenario. Thus, it is not surprising that the JSP was increasingly perceived as a party of
perpetual opposition, rather than a party ready to participate in government.33
Though, to offer some defense to the JSPs fragmentation, it was partially due to history;
and was hard to counter the routes of its own organization in the partys movement. The JSP had
not had time to mature as a party, it was inexperienced and divided between various ideological
factions that originated in separate groups that had formed in the 1920s and 1930s. Moreover,
with government functioning under constraints imposed by the Occupation not to speak of the

30

Patterson and Robbins p.124

Patterson and Robbins p.134
32
Patterson and Robbins p.135
33
Masaru Kohno p.61
31

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constraints of coexisting with its coalition partners it had little opportunity to make much
impact on problematic areas of policy.34
However, there was one chance the JSP had to make a change. Doing so would have
modernized the party platform, and make a much more pragmatic attempt at dealing with the
LDP and other competition. This was in the Structural Reform Plan advocated by Eda Saburo,
and it shall be discussed in the following section.

Structural Reform
Structural Reform (SR) was a concept advocated in order to make the JSP a more pragmatic,
progressive party electorally. This owed a great deal to Eda Saburo, the energetic General
Secretary of the JSP. Eda explained that the party lacked any clear policy by means of which it
could positively work for the achievement of power. It had consequently been forced into a
negative, defensive posture, concentrating solely on "opposition" to each new initiative of its
opponents.35
The Structural Reform movement began within the JSP in 1962, and was a Marxist inspired
doctrine derived from the Italian Communist Party leader, Palmiro Togliatti, but it contained
within it the potential to give the JSP the kind of flexibility it needed to adapt to the changing
needs and demands of an electorate experiencing rapid increases in its standard of living during
the period of rapid economic growth.36
Eda explained the SR as follows: By pressing our demands for policy changes, and by
seeking positively to infiltrate into production relations, we can gradually accumulate partial

34

J.A.A Stockwin p.123

R.P. Dore p.4
36
J.A.A Stockwin p.123
35

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reforms and by undermining the basis of the monopolists' control we can isolate them . . . and
work for a national concentration of forces opposed to monopoly capital. When the situation and
the balance of forces is propitious, we can then establish, with the support of such an "antimonopoly national alliance", a government dedicated to the triple aims of preserving the
constitution, establishing democracy, and pursuing a neutral foreign policy. From there we can
proceed to transform such a government into a socialist regime and open the road to
Socialism.37 He had offered an actual plan for the party to work towards achieving its goals.
However, due to the complex nature of socialism, and factors of power within the party, this
would be very hard to get people to go along with.
Another aspect of the SR was a renewed effort to move away from its elitist traditions,
transform itself into an effective mass party with a strong national organization, and a sounder
basis of electoral support. There was to be a membership drive and a new emphasis on securing
representation at all levels of local government. The new drive, however, was no more
successful than previous ones.38 It was very hard to get many JSP to go along with this reform,
as their incumbency could have potentially been at risk. The JSP was fragmented due to these
individual stances.
To be competitive against the LDP, one thing the JSP absolutely needed to do then was to
increase the number of its candidates.39 However, fielding more candidates would have made
the JSP incumbents worse off in terms of their reelection prospects. If two or more JSP
candidates ran in a district, the votes of the party supporters would have been split between the

37

R.P Dore p.4-5

R.P. Dore p.9-10
39
Ko Maeda p.349
38

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candidates, making a reliable victory more difficult.40 These candidates, in their position of
power, were in a comfortable position to not support change; despite needing it as a party overall.
Individual stances and positions, and the lack of a common vision like SR, ultimately would
limit the JSP as a party, and prevent it from gaining more candidates with a common goal for
success.
Ultimately, the SR reformist campaign came up against determined opposition from factions
in the JSP that interpreted Structural Reform as a bid to dominate the leadership of the party and
take it in directions already laid out by the DSP.41 This isnt too surprising, considering the
factional situation discussed above.
At the 21st party congress in January 1962, there was heated debate over the SR, and a
motion was adopted that prohibited the party to immediately accept the SR as the partys
principle. Later, at the 22nd party congress in November 1962, the anti-SR group intensified its
attack on Eda, and a motion to censure Eda was adopted by a narrow margin. Eda then resigned
from the party secretary post, and the conflict within the party subsided after this event. 42 The
JSP then adopted a hard-liner leftist document, The Road to Socialism in Japan, in 1964,
which subsequently bound the partys behavior for a long time to come. When Eda and his
argument for policy moderation lost, the JSP reverted to a leftist-dominated party, and the chance
to become a competitive party might also have vanished. Kakuei Tanaka, an LDP heavyweight
and prime minister in the 1970s, once said that Eda was the most formidable man in the JSP and
the LDP might have been defeated if Eda had become the JSPs leader.43

40

Ko Maeda p.349
J.A.A. Stockwin p.124
42
Ko Maeda p.347
43
Ko Maeda p.347
41

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However, the SR document was defended throughout the 1970s. But ultimately, it never
went through. Dismayed by the partys inability to change, Eda and his group left the party, and
created the Social Democratic Front (SDF) in 1977.44 The JSP continued, but with continued
lack luster success as seen in Figure 1. By this point, the LDP was in government for a very long
time, and had given Japan great levels of economic growth to pull itself out of the poverty seen
after the War. Despite losing popularity, as well, the LDP was able to capitalize on the SNTV
system with its own factions funded by koenkai (support groups for politicians) through a system
that Ethan Scheiner calls clientelism.

The LDPs Clientelistic System

First, it is important to point out that this section derives directly from Ethan Scheiners
book, Democracy Without Competition in Japan. All information on the clientelistic system is
solely credited to him. However, before showcasing Ethans argument for why the LDP was
able to stay in power against the oppositions failure, Id like to give a bit of background on the
LDP.
The LDP, like the JSP, had/has its own factions; though, they are quite weak today when
compared with pre-electoral reform. Factions are highly personal organizations within the LDP
that a member must join if he/she desires any electoral success. This is because candidates need
to tap into the large pool of money that each faction has (led by a leader of each faction; the
strongest faction leader in the LDP would receive the position of Prime Minister) in order to fund
events for their koenkai. Since politicians cannot directly advertise themselves at times of

44

Masaru Kohno p.58-59

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election due to very strict electoral rules, they must rely on an informal support group: this is the
koenkai. Koenkai members (even after reform) pledge loyalty to a politician, and in return the
politician, essentially, hangs out with them and supports their interests. This came in the form of
taking people to onsens (hot springs), amusement parks, BBQs, et cetera. Also, the politician
must attend funerals and other events of members in his/her koenkai. These events kept LDP
politicians busy for most of the year.
This is essentially part of the clientistic system that Ethan speaks of. In his book he
makes note that they create direct bonds with voters (via private goods) usually in the form of
Pork barrel spending. This Pork would then be expended on infrastructure projects, and projects
in Inaka. It was hard for voters to turn down a new rail-road stop to their small town, or new
public works projects that could create revenue; so the LDP essentially locked people into voting
for them, whether they liked them as a party or not. It was mainly about the individual politician
that people supported, not the party.
One might ask, why not vote for other parties regardless of this? To which I answer this.
The smaller parties had nowhere near the amount of funding control by the central government
for which local government must rely on for its financial graces. Few oppositions held local
offices, as well. Over one third of Japan is rural, and the LDP capitalized on this. With the JSP
only focusing on cities and labor unions, for much of the post-war period, they were not a viable
option for rural voters that mainly consisted of farmers. The LDP could expend its large central
funds that it had accumulated here in order to gain many seats in the Diet. This was due to how
electoral boundaries were drawn under SNTV MMD (prior to 1993). The pro-clientelistic
support had special privileges granted to them, as well. They could do things like send mail at

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no extra cost, could work in public employment, et cetra; all of which offered economic safety
net.
In summary, clientelism was fiscal centralization plus institutional protectionism of a
clientelists clienteles. Local government was dependent on central government for success at
the local level. Limited zones of geographic competition, as long as there was no drain on the
economy (aka the period of high growth until the bubble burst in the late 1980s), were taken
advantage of by the LDP. In these areas, the clientelist state and productive economic sectors
could work together. These factors directly contributed to the oppositions failure. Furthermore,
Japan was very financially centralized, and the power was held by elites creating linkages to a
support base in society.
It is amusing to see such blatant corruption in a democracy, but thats exactly why it
worked for so long. That is until 1993, when the LDP was ousted from power temporarily, and
the JSP and other parties formed a coalition to reform this form of corruption of the electoral
system.

Electoral Re-form, the End of the JSP, and Afterwards

The 1993 HoR election was a huge turning point for Japanese politics. During this event,
the LDPs reign since 1955 was brought down by a coalition of LDP defectors and other parties.
The goal of this was primarily electoral reform from the SNTV MMD system to a SMD/PR
system.
In short in SNTV MMD, parties could run multiple candidates in every district. The LDP
had stronger candidates, more candidates, more money, and was in power for a very long time.
They were able to dump their members in many districts (especially Inaka ones, as discussed
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previously), and depending on the district size (usually 3-5 people per one, though ranging from
1-6), could obtain a majority of the seats rather easily. In the new system, electoral lines were
re-drawn and the system was reformed to a Mixed System (MM). This consisted of 300 SMD
(single member districts) and 180 PR (originally 200 Proportional Representation) blocs. In
short, now 300 districts could only elect one member to the Diet (who won the most votes),
while the remainder were selected from the PR bloc.45 The PR bloc members were
proportionally elected by the district size, and selected off of a party list. Members who ran for
PR were typically losers in the SMD.
So how did the LDP lose? On June 6th, 1993 a vote of no confidence passed in the
lower house; this was backed by LDP defectors- Ozawa Ichiro (largely credited for bringing
down the 55 system), Hata, and Takemura. It was rather simple, the LDP turned against the
LDP prime minister, and called an election. The LDP did not win, as a simple majority is all that
is required to do this. The Diet became dissolved, and everyone except the prime minister
became a candidate. During this time, a coalition formed between the JRP, JNP, JSP, CGP, DSP,
Sakigake, and SDL (essentially all parties besides the JCP). They ultimately ended up winning
the most seats in the HoR election, and a new prime minister, Morihiro Hosokawa of the Japan
New Party (who helped form the coalition with Ozawa), was elected.46
However, this not to last long. The JSP left the coalition in 1994 to join a coalition with
the LDP, its long-time enemy. This was partially because of its poor treatment by the LDP
defectors who led the coalition and partly to have its own leader, Murayama Tomiichi, named
the prime minister.47 Doing so, the JSP abandoned the bulk of its position it staked its identity

45

Professor Robert Pekkanen lecture 4/23/2013: Politics and Government in Japan

Professor Robert Pekkanen Lecture 4/23/2013: Politics and Government in Japan
47
Ethan Scheiner p. 42
46

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on in order to join with the LDP. Murayama, as Prime Minister, declared the self-defense
forces to be constitutional, the U.S-Japan security treaty to be indispensable, the national anthem
Kimigayo and Hinomaru national flag to be legitimate, nuclear-energy plans in Japan to be
necessary, and an increase in the consumption tax to be unavoidable.48 In short, the JSP blew
away its entire political philosophy for the sake of obtaining the prime minister. But what is the
prime ministers value if one does not support their own agenda?
Murayama served as PM until January of 1996, and the party crumbled as a unit shortly
after. How could people support something that was willing to so blatantly sacrifice everything

it stood for, just to achieve the PM? Once in PM, as well, they were not in a position to carry out
any of the reforms that they had hoped for; socialism, it would seem, clashed with the test of
time and realism. Despite this, it continued on in a sense. This is shown by it branching off and

48

Ethan Scheiner p.42

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reforming; one party being the SDP (Social Democratic Party); however, the SDP is extremely
weak electorally. In addition, other new parties were formed with future prospects; for example,
the Democratic Party (DPJ). The DPJ would take the place of the JSP as the new rival to the
LDP and eventually take power again from the LDP in 2009. (Figure 4 shows this: Wada Suichi
p.420)

Conclusion
The Japan Socialist Party, despite being the largest opposition to the LDP for the entire
55 system (1955-1993), lost its chance of becoming a viable alternative to the LDP very early
on. Beginning in 1949, the party was already beginning to fragment, as it lost the HoR election
and a bulk of its seats. After splitting off into two separate entities, then half-heartedly reuniting,
the party still could not reach a consensus as a unit. The JSP was unable to pull together a
collective ideological stance on socialism, and refuted pragmatic opportunities like Structural
Reform, in order to maintain incumbents positions of power.
Socialism, however, is a very broad ideological doctrine, with no well-known method on
how to perfectly achieve it. In short, according to Marx, it is a natural process that follows
capitalism on the road to communism. This, I cant stress enough, must take place naturally.
Forcing it onto a society ends up with individuals arguing their own interpretations of it, and not
much getting done; as seen in the case of Japan. Japan had a very weak socialist background,
and did not have the setting for it to flourish. They had just come out of the reigns of militarism
and essentially their own version of fascism. How could one expect socialism to miraculously
bloom from this without first going through capitalisms trials and errors? Article 9 was not
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even created by the Japanese people themselves, and that was a large reason why the movement
had any momentum to begin with. The JSP needed to adopt a more pragmatic stance if it wanted
to compete with the LDP and take power. Only when it was in power could it have achieved,
even minutely, the goals it desired.
While the JSPs never-ending bickering ensued, new parties were forming and adding
pressure on both the right and left. The JSPs heavy left lost votes to the JCP, while the right and
moderates had to contend with an even more formidable LDP, DSP, and other parties. As time
went on, new parties made it impossible for the JSP to gain strength electorally; especially since
it could not come together as a unit.
Furthermore, the LDP had too much power of its own; and fighting its clientelistic
system was beyond laughable. The JSP was so poorly put together, while the LDP had a very
well lined out system of corruption that played on the very voting system in which the game was
played. The competition was truly within the LDP itself, as its own factions fought for the
position of PM. The LDP continued to offer incentives for people to support it via its large
supply of pork due to fiscal centralization. It would then offer jobs, buildings, bridges, you name
it, to a stable 1/3 of the nation in order to secure these votes. The JSP had no such system, and
merely relied on labor unions/cities for a bulk of its votes; which diminished. As Japan gained
success under the LDP, and the clientelistic machine continued, their hope faded even further.
Even when the JSP finally obtained power in 1994, it was only for the sake of power; and
very myopic power, at best. They discarded everything they stood for just to achieve a PM for
two short years. To top it off, the PM stood for nothing, and did nothing that the party worked to
achieve for so long. Is it really a surprise that they dissolved?

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The JSPs success lied, and only lied, early on in their existence. They needed to
moderate their platform, come together on a more pragmatic approach to socialism, and advocate
it together from the start. The last real opportunity was Structural Reform, and that failed, as one
would expect.
I think that the lesson to be learned here is that ideals remain only ideals, if they do not
gain power in their own right to influence the times.

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References
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Decline of the Japan Socialist Party." Taiwan Journal of Democracy. no. 1 (2012): 119-144.
Maeda, Ko. "An Irrational Party of Rational Members; The Collision of Legislators' rReelection Quest with
Party Success in the Japan Socialist Party." Comparative Political Studies 2012 45. : 341-365.
Stockwin, J.A.A. "The Japanese Socialist Party under New Leadership." Asian Survey. no. 4 (1966): 187200.
Stockwin, J.A.A. "To oppose or to appease? Parties out of power and the need for real politics in Japan."
Japan Forum. no. 1 (2006): 115-132.
Lee, Chae-Jin. "Politics in the Japan Socialist Party: The Chinese Cultural Revolution Case." Asian Survey.
no. 3 (1970): 230-243.
Dore, R.P. "The Japanese Socialist Party and "Structural Reform"." Asian Survey. no. 8 (1961): 3-15.
Shuichi, Wada. "Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution and security policy: realism versus idealism in
Japan since the Second World War." Japan Forum. no. 3-4 (2010): 405-431.
Kohno, Masaru. "Electoral Origins of Japanese Socialists' Stagnation." Comparative Political Studies. no.
1 (1997): 55-77.
Scheiner, Ethan. Democracy Without Competition in Japan Opposition Failure in a One-Party Dominant
State. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Professor Robert Pekkanen, University of Washington, Course: Politics and Government in Japan, Date
of Lecture: 4/23/2013

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