ISSUED IN THE INTEREST OF EQUALITY AND PUBLIC BENEFIT

the quashing of the Notifications on the ground that the Notifications (A) were passed by the state
government of Lemuria without giving an opportunity of being heard to the directors of
Koiribaari.com and weareheretohelp.com
first get to know under which law was the notification made if at all :- Sec. 26 A and Ram Jawaya Kapoor v.
State of Punjab.
Second try to distinguish whether this notification was a legislative exercise or executive :- refer Gotwala
pan masala case. Arguments are present for both sides.
Third, is an obvious step if you portray it to be administrative then principles of natural justice prevails if not
then principles such as audi alterem partem do not work.
Notifications were against their fundamental rights under Article 14 and Article 21 of the
Constitution of Shambala; and (B) were against their fundamental rights under Article 19 (g) of the
Constitution of Shambala;
Multiple arguments may be made

Under Art. 14 one can use the reasonable classification test. Justice Tendulkar case
Or one can apply arbitrariness test as given by E. P. Royappa case
With respect to Art. 19 it is very easy as under Art. 19 (6) public health is not strictly given. One can
argue that public order has to be read very broadly. Use STATE OF GUJ. V. MIZARPUR MOTI
KURESHI KASSAB JAMAT, (2005) 8 S.C.C. 534. NARENDRA KUMAR V. UNION OF INDIA,
A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 430. COOVERJEE V. THE EXCISE COMMISSIONER AND THE CHIEF
COMMISSIONER, AJMER, .A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 220.
Under Art. 21 one can either adopt right to basic medicine as a part of right to life and arguments of
due procedure established by law etc can be made.

W.R.T. SPL
Challenge the ambit of SLP.
Whether new pleas can be taken if at all when can such plea be taken. Try to argue that the matter in the
lower court i.e., banning of website under IT law can only occur if any unlawful activity is carried on by the
Petitioners. Refer Sec. 79 and 69A of IT Act. Reda with the interpretation accorded to these sections by
Shreya Singal Case.. This essentially proves that both the question of quashing of the FIR and the banning to
be herd together. Now as per established case laws and jurisprudence of the Apex court Only new pleas will
be herd if it goes to the core of the existing matter .refer Narahar Engg. Case.
Now argue that the Sections under Drugs and cosmetics Act are not fulfilled which obvious conclusion is that
FIR need to be quashed. From the Respondent argue that the case for FIR quashing could have been
relegated to the high court under Sec 498 of CrPC. Further try to introduce that there is question of facts
which cannot be taken in any case under the SLP as a new plea.
Now for quashing of FIR use the Sec. wise approach. For quashing use the critia given by famous bajanlal
case (3rd one) and try to prove that one of the ingradient in the crime is not present in this case.
With respect to Sec. 27 (b)(ii)

use the mahammed Shabir case where the term stocked and exhibited are used together.
Or, use Ryan heights Act of USA to portray that term dispense is not present in this case instant.
Or, the vicarious liability concept is alien to criminal law jurisprudence unless specifically stated in
the act. You can bring certain strength from the opposite side by reffering to Sec. 34 of the drugs Act
w.r.t directors.

With 18 (C)

Try to argue that there was no license prescribed for online market place under the drug act rules.
So there cannot be any violation of the same.
Petitioners were not under the chapue of either Sce. 18 or 27.

In respect of Sec. 23

"Wilfully obstructs"1 "Wilfully" in this section means an intention that the deliberate act should in
fact obstruct the police officer. 2 Now not having a warehouse or document is because they are not
sellers in the first place hence such mischievous interpretation cannot take place.

With respect to Magic remedy Act

In the present case, if the contents of website are read and understood in the context of aims and
objects for which the Act has been brought in force, it cannot be said that the sale violates Section
3(d) of the Act. The medicines put up for sale does not suggest that they cure any particular disease
of any sorts only material particulars such as brand, ingredients are provided if any.

W.r.t non application of mind

Several arguments can be made:

Speaking order vs. non-speaking order.

Order passed without reasons
Not deciding the ambit of Sec. 79
Difference between B2B/ B2C not clarified
Order passed against wrong party DIPP
It is very easy to pick holes in the impugned judgement.

W.R.T stay.
Essentially it is a very factual based arguments as to why stay is necessary for the above. 3
Use principles such as prima facie case, irreparable loss etc in your arguments. From the opposite side try to
assess the situation as if it would have happened in the real world and what courts do in these type of cases.
w.r.t stay on the IT laws
Whether Sec. 79 is a defence for intermediary
Further argument might be brought with respect of Sec. 79 which serves as an umbrella for such third party
claims. Refer to Shreya Singal case, My Space Case etc.
Now applying Sec. 79 as defence one has to take care about guidelines under Shreya Singal case.
Shreya Singhal Case points that the Court order and/or the notification by the appropriate Government or its
agency must strictly conform to the subject matters laid down in Article 19(2). Unlawful acts beyond what is
laid down in 120 Article 19(2) obviously cannot form any part of Section 79.
Here one has to see whether the crime under the magic remedy act falls under the Art 19 (1) thereby attract
the exceptions of the Art. 19 (2) or not . Refer Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India,
MANU/SC/0016/1959MANU/SC/0016/1959 : AIR 1960 (SC) 554. For contrary arguments refer TATA Press
case. Essentially one must argue whether advertisements fall under category of right to speech or trade which
is essential under Sec. 79 as per Shreya Singal case.

1 Police Act 1964 (Clause 48), Section 51(3).

2 Willmott v. Atack (1977) Q.B. 498
3 The power to grant stay of investigation and trial is a very extraordinary power
given to High Courts and the same power is to be exercised sparingly only to
prevent an abuse of the process and to promote the ends of justice. It is
therefore clear that: (i) such an extraordinary power has to be exercised with due
caution and circumspection. (ii) Once such a power is exercised, Court should not
lose sight of the case where it has exercised its extraordinary power of staying
investigation and trial. (iii) Court should make it a point of finally disposing of
such proceedings as early as possible

w.r.t Stay for investigation under FEMA

Wrong impleadment, it has to be ED and not DIPP, even though DIPP would merely redirect such complaints
to ED/RBI.
Further B2B under the policy of 2014 has not been clarified.
Essentially whether the petitioner were involved in sale of goods / sale of their website is essential for
B2B/B2C. whether merchants are consumers of sale of data/space in petitioners website or still they remain
business entity. Now two types of interpretation is possible for B2B which s essential in solving the same. Use
FEMA rules Schedule also for new innovative arguments. From the Respondent one possible solution is that
the court below ordered DIPP to clarify the interpretation of B2B which it is going to every shortly in real life
world too. Further the change of department from DIPP to Finance under business allocation rules 1961 is
also important post Modi Govt. for impleadment. In such a case when the clarification Is a discretionary power
on the DIPP it was important for the court to clarify for itself.
These are not exhaustive arguments one can find many more.

Happy Mooting!