Also published inthis series Theorles of Ethles edited by Philippa Foot Knowledge and Belef edited by A. Phillips Griffiths The Philosophy of Science edited by P. H. Nidditch The Theory of Meaning edited by G. H.R, Parkinson Political Philosophy edited by Anthony Quinton Philosophical Logic edited by P. F. Strawson The Philosophy of Perception edited by G, J. Warnock ‘The Philosophy of Action edited by Alan R. White Other volumes are in preparation THE PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS Edited by JAAKKO HINTIKKA OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 1969(Oxford University Press, Ely House, London W.1 © oxrono university exess 1969 CONTENTS Isrmoouerios 1 1. m, wv. vu. vim. 1% ‘Seaareic ENTAILMENT AND FORMAL DERIABILITY by E,W. Beth ‘Tue CouPterenes oF THe Finst-Onpex FUNCTIONAL, ‘Couvereness in rie Tatony oF Tyres ‘by Leon Henkin ‘LanouAans i wine Set REFERENCE 8 PossnL by Raymond M. Smullyan Tronwat Rio0UR AND CoMPLETEsEss PROOFS by Goore Kreiel Svsreus or PrepicaTive ANALYSS by Solomon Ferman ‘Av Iivrenpastanion oF tie Inrurnontsic SevTeNTAL Toate by Kurt Gadel ‘Tur Preset Tasony OF TuRiNo MACHINE COMPUTABILETY by Hartley Rogers, Jr “Maruamicat Lootc: Waar Has If Dont FoR THE Prosorny oF Maritarics? (Excerpt) by Georg Kreiel “Tus Meraruvsics oF ru CALCULUS by Abraham Robinson War s Euswenrany Gsomeray? by Alfed Tarski [Norss ow tit Cowrausuroas ur 153, 164 116 178 185INTRODUCTION {ray seem strange to reprint the papers collected here under the ite “The Philosophy of Mathematics’ In the majriy of them, no specifically phil sophial problems seem tobe discussed. ‘Although this impression is not unfounded inthe present circumstances the papers appearing here nevertheless exempify the kind of reading which 1 judge tobe by Tar the most useful for a student of the philosophy of mathematics. these days, the worthwhile articles and books devoted to the philosophy ofmathematicsin the narrow sense of the word ‘philosophy’ ae few, and thie quality frequently leaves a great deal tobe desired. Often the reader soon discovers that such & book or article isnot based ca any- thing ike the adequate acquaintance withthe large and important body of ‘materials which is indispeasabie for any future philosophy of mathematics, ‘namely the literature of symbolic gic and foundational studies. It is not likely that any substantial progress can be made in the genuinely phil sophical study of mathematics without using the concepts and results ‘eveloped in this literature toa much greater extent than has happened so far, However tre it may be that no philosophical problems are solved by results in loge, not to ute the wealth of material which is available here simply makes the dicusson as unrealistic asa dscasion of legal philo- sophy would bef it were not based on any knowledge ofthe actual oper- ‘ton of the law. Thus the most wseful contribution that «book of readings an make inthis azea is to ensue that some of the recent resis in logic nd foundational studies ae acesible to an interested reader To Go this {sth ist aim ofthe present volume. ‘What, then, are these philosophically relevant insights that a philor- ‘ophet of mathematics ought tobe interested in? This question cannot be answered adequately within the confines of ths introduction, for an answer ‘would amount to a survey of an extensive, rapidly growing, and complex field. Furthermore, about as good a suvey as anyone can hope to find aleady exists in Andrze| Mostowskis volume Thirty Years of Foundational Studies, listed in the bibliography atthe end of this volume. (Al other references inthis introduction are alo to works listed in the same bibio- sap, unless otherwise specified) ‘What can be done hee isto try to supply enough background for the selections reprinted in this volume to enable a reader to make use of them. ‘The following informal sketch cannot help being loose and inaccurate. 1 have tried mainly to indicate some ofthe most interesting interconnections2 INTRODUCTION between the dierent types of recent work represented here, and also to mention a few recent developments which are not represeated in our sections. ‘Probably the most important large-scale recent development in logic and foundational studies i the growth ofthe theory which wed to be known as logical semantics but which is now usualy reerred 1925 medel theory. It can be characterized, very roughly, as a study ofthe interrelations of Tanguage—usually a! precise logical symbolsm—and the “reali? this language represents. The basic questions concer the conditions in which a {ormla can be said to be tre in a structure or ‘mode’ Simple as this ‘question may seem, It soon leads to interesting problems. One of them concerns the lass of sentences true in all models—the cast of logical ‘truths, a they ae usually called. Can this clase be represented a8 the the- ‘orem of some axiomatic system? This completeness question is answered ‘fimatively for frstorder languages (quantfcational languages). The first proof was given by Gédel in the early thirties. (See Kurt Gédel, “Die Vollstindigkeit der Axiome de logschen Funktionenkalkil’, Monat ef fr Mathematik and Physik, Vo. 37 (1930), 99. 349-0.) Ove ofthe ‘most important subsequent proofs given in Heakia's st paper reprined in the present volume. Henkn's proof is interesting for several reasons, one ‘of which sis strategy of forming a sequeace of etain maximal consistent sets of sentence whase union ean then be seen tobe usable as a mode! in ‘which all its members are tue. Certain sets of formulas thus exemplity the very structure which these formulae impose on the models in which they Tis Known that no similar proof exists in higher-order logics. Logical truths about arbitrary ses, unlike logical truths about arbitrary individuals, cannot be axiomatized. Tis fellows fom Gels incompletenes proof fot arithmetic, forall the requisite arithmetical assumptions are easily ex- pressed in terms of higher-order Jopics. Mest of the purportedly popular Aiscussions of Gdel’s famous result are somewhat unsatisfactory, how fever. One of the best slf-conttned expositions seems to be Raymond Smullyan’s paper reprinted here- The whole complex of problems concera- ng Gode’s proof of the imposiility ofa consistency proof ofa sytem ‘containing arithmetic within the same system is discussed in wider per- spective in Feferman’s salient paper ‘Arithmetization of Metamathe- However, Henkin’s other paper reprinted here shows that completeness ‘an be reached even in nighe-ondet opis ifwe ate willing to admit ‘non- standard models’ in which quantifation over al sets no longer refers all arbitrary subsets of our domain of individuals but only to all members INTRODUCTION 3 of some ‘arbitrary subset of the power set of the set of individuals; and Similarly for pais, tls, et. These subsets cannot be completely arbitrary, however, for they mst be rch enough to allow the interpretation of all our formulas (e. second-order formulas). This a rather strong requirement, for it means inter aliaclosure with respect othe projective operations that correspond to diferent kinds of quantification and not jut with respect to ‘the Boolean operations. I this fact is overlooked, Henkin’ completeness proof for type theory may give the impression that higher-ordet logics are ‘uch simpler than they rally are. Their actual dificult i ustrated, for cxample, by the complesty of the problem of extending the Genten- Herbrand techniques (t be mentioned later) from first-order logic to higher-orde logics Takeut's problem which i discused in Schote, *Symtactical and Sernanicl Properties’, and which has only recently been partially solved (by Tait, Prawitz, and others) is a case in point. ‘Aa intriguing aspect ofthe completeness and incompleteness results is that one of ther starting-ponts (viz. our concept of what constitutes com- pltenes) i inevitably an idea which can pethaps be formulated in naive fettheoretical terms but which either is not formulated axiomatically to ‘begin with or which (inthe case of incompleteness) cannot even possibly be so formulated. Yet conceps ofthis kind are most interesting. We seem t0 have many clear intuitions concerning them, and its important to develop ‘waysof bandlingthem. Someaspectso thissituationare discusedinour first ‘election rom Kreisel,enitled “Informal Rigour and Completeness Proof ‘One might describe the phenomenon of incompleteness by saying that ‘one cannot axiomatically rule out all non-standard models and catch only the intended ‘standard’ ones. The inevitable presence of non-standard ‘models ean occasionally be tured into a blessing, however, as demon- strated by Abraham Robinson's non-standard models for anlyss. These ‘models serve to vindicate some ofthe locutions and ideas of the old "meta ‘hice ofthe cleus’ which meanwhile have been relegated tothe stats ‘of hopelessly loose heuristic ideas. Even infinitesimals the bugbear of every introductory calculus course, can thus be made perfecly respectable. Here is one of several recent developments that demonstrate strikingly the relevance of current work tothe traditional issues in the philosophy of mathematics ‘Completeness and incompleteness results are only samples, however, of the variety of results that have been obtained in model theory concerning what can or cannot be expresed in diferent kinds of language and con coring the variety of models that a theory ean or cannot have. These insights into the Timits of whan ca8 be expressed in diferent kinds of languages are among the most important recent developments in the whole4 INTRODUCTION ates of logic and foundations, and deserve more attention than has bees sven to them by philosophers. The ony fesult that his provoked mush Philosophical discussion is the Lowenhelm-Skolem result that every Aaxiomatizable first-order theory has a countable model. (For is variants and generalizations, see Vaughts 1964 pepe.) The fact that this includes, systems of axiomatic et theory in which the existence of uncountable sets can be proved is but a further instanceof the difficulty of ruling out un- MG)] and (Ey) [S(y) & M(y)]? We interpret the notion of LOIcAL. CONSEQUENCE a semantic ental TMordrto ole sucha problem ety toshow, by oiatngout suitable counter-example, that heist formula does not lgyally follow fom the second and third one. euch a counter-example found, thn we have 8 ‘esti answer to our problem. Andi turs out hat no suitable count trample can be foundy sea we have an afrmativeanewe. To this ae, However, we must be su that no sulablecountersaample whascever faa; therefore, we Ug not to lok for counterexample it & ‘haphazard manner, but we mut rather ty to construct ene ina systematic sway. Now there inded systematic method for constructing a counter: ‘ample if avalable; i consists in raving up a seman tables. Let us onset the abeaun which corespond to the above problems () and, respective. ‘ad () The tableau makes it clear that inthis case we can indeed find a Suitable counter-example; it fllows that (in agreement with Arstoe’s ‘llopstien, and withthe result of our discussion in Section 1) the fist formula does nt Topical follow from the second an third ones, Valid Invalid © Got aH © E917) a5 ©) )iMO)-&5ON ) OMe © © Pa Me @ | @ POAT ° Po | oso and | oso) (3) cose __ © | 19 PO &5H ® M) &5O) @ | 09 Po) (13) and (15 2) Mo) 03) 56 SEMANTIC ENTAILMENT 6 Inconstruting the above abieu, we proce sfollows, The lines (1)-(3) simply state the conditions to be satisfied by any suitable counter-example. ‘On account of line (1), there must be some individual which fulfis the condition: PCs) & MiG); let this indudaal be sien the name‘. Then we Ihave line 4 and hence lines ()-(7). By line 3, the individual a must not fulfil the condition PC) & S{a) this accounts fr lines (8)(10). Likewise, by line (, there must be some individual which fulfls the condition -M() & SG): if we give tthe name’ then we obtain line (11) and hence lines (120-06. "As we have taken care ofall conditions (1)-(3), there is no reason 19 introauee addtional individuals; so we may consider the construction {2 be succesfully terminated. We observe that, 0 each of the atom P(@), PC), Mia), M(B), (a), and S(D), the tableau assigns a efit ath cali’ Sothecounter-example povided by the tableau can be described as follows ‘The universe consist of two individual, clled'a' ands; the property P belongs to abut not to b, and so des the property S;the property M, on the other hand, belongs tob but not 10a "A suitable counterexample in connection with problem () moy, of ‘course, involve other individuals besides thove called“ and. One such ‘counter-example was already mentioned in Section I. Another one is shown, Fig.16 BW. BETH by Fig. 1, where the notions P, M, and Sare represented by regions (uch MO © EN (SaFO @ GIS) & MON) © S@&P@ (©) S@ & Mca) OFO (and) © s@ 2) Maa) an Mo __ o © P@) MO o 9) Po) an M@) 3 | come “The fiture of ou systematic attempt appears online (12), where we are ‘compelled to assign to Ma truth value which difers from the one which ‘bad previously obtained on lin (6. From the failure of our systematic ftempt i follows thas any ober attempt must fil aswel: Fo a suitable Counter-evample has t9 satisfy conditions (1). Therefore, is universe ‘must conain an individual which falls the formula: Sy) & Mf(y); and it this individual is given the name‘a’, then we obtain line (8) and hence al the remaining lines in the tableau, Soan arbitrary counter-example which satisies conditions (1) and (2) cannot satisfy condition (3); and this is exactly what we express by saying that formela (3) is semantically entailed by formulas (1) and (2). AX a matter of fact, this result corresponds to [Avntote’s rule forthe syllogism in the modus FEsrxo; and even Our argi+ tment i closely related © Aristotle's method of proof by xbeoss.? 44. Heuristic Considerations: Transformation of Semantie Tebleawe, Let ts rearrange Ou table for problem (i) inthe following manner: we do ‘ot change the lft colums, but we extend it by adding below all formulas Inthe right column in the reverse order; the result isa follows. 1M, Roche, Aste Formal Lot Amsterdam, 1951) p47 J Lskasiovc, Arai Spot Oxford 1930.98.29 SEMANTIC ENTAILMENT ” Q) @) [P@) + MOD (orem) 2) E)SV&MON (rem) @S@&M@) hye 1) © Se) @ OM@ __ ® ©) Plo) ~ Ma) o (hyp 2) ay Meo) (and (10) Or@ (hyp 2) ® S@aFO and) OESHPO Coy This ought to bea pleasant surprise! For it provides us with a formal Aerivation, made up of step-by-step inferences, each of which i an appl cation of some formal rule of inference; let us consider the argument in ‘more detail ‘On line (4) we introduce, besides the ‘given premisse’ (1) nd (2), an additional hypothesis, Past ofthe derivation is made “under the hypothesis this isindleatd by single horizontal ines at the begining anda the end. ‘The conclusions (5}-(7) ae selexplanatory (Oa line (10, a second hypothesis is ntroduoed, The part of the der- vation which is made ‘under the hypothess 2 is indicated by double horizontal lines. Onlin (11), we apply modus ronens. Hypothesis 2 thus turns out to ental a formal contradiction; the appropriate conclusion fx absurdo is dravn online (9); the remaining part ofthe derivation no longer depends upon hypothesis 2. The conclusion on lin (8 i again self- explanatory. ‘And now follows, online (3), nother important step. might appear as ‘it the statement on this line, namely (Ex) (S(2) & P(E), ought sill tobe ‘made ‘under the hypothesis that we have S(a) & M(a) For the content ‘uagess that inthe derivation of formula (3) the special choice ofthe in- Yin a left column, (@)X & Vina right column, (6) X+ Yin aleft column of) X++ Vina ‘ight column, then the tableau must be split up, and we insert: (2) Xin one left subcolumn and Yin the other {() Yin one left column and Xin the right column nor conjugnte witht {© Xin one sight subcolumn and Y inthe other ' SEMANTIC ENTAILMENT a (@) Both Xand Yin one left column and once more both and Yin the ‘ight column not conjugate with (©) Xin one lett subcolume, Fin the right subcolumn conjugate with it, Y in the other (ft subcolumn, and X in the remaining right sub- column, (i IF (E59 XC) appears ina eft column of (2) X(x) in right column, then we introduce a new individual p and we insert X(p)in the same coluran {itisconvenient not to appy this rule unt all posibiltes of epplying other ‘ules have ben exhausted; the pat of the construction which tarts with the introduction ofthe &'* individual and whic terminates atthe introduction ‘ofthe (& + 1) one is denoted a its stage). (i) If one and the same formula appears in two conjugate columns, then the corresponding tableau (o stable) i closed, x) Ifallsubtableaux subordinate to some tableau (Or subableas) are ‘loved, then that ables or subeableau) ite is also closed. (@) If al posites of applying rules ()-(i) have been exhausted, ‘whereas te tableau i not closed, then the tableau provides ut witha suitable ‘counter-example, and is terminated 1t willbe clear that the rules (9) exatly reflect the meaning ofthe words ‘all ‘some’, ‘no’ ‘and... then orf and only fan of the symbols by whic they have been replaced. For instance, part of rule (i) corresponds tothe following rule of semantics: The sentence "X and J” teue andthe formula: “¥ & ¥*isvaid,ifand only if both Xand Yare true (or valid), However, these rues assume a completely focal characte, if instead of speaking about an individuslp we speak about a sytnba ‘7 Perhapsit wll be useful togvean example ofthe application ofthe rules. [Let us construct a smantic tabla, taking inital formu CH) Ae V BEN in the left column, and: AV OBO) {nthe right column (se tableau on p. 2), We have now taken care of point (1) on the programme outlined in Section 5. So we turn t poins (I) and (HI); these points canbe handled very quickly, by stating the following definitions, ‘@ A formal proof inthe System of Netaral Deduction F of the sequent: Gayo Ya Yo 1s closed semantic tableau in which the initial formulas are: Uj, Us, in the left column, and ¥, Y2,..-in the ight column,2 5 Ww. BETH valid Ialid €) @Q) 4) V BON @ (AW) Y BO) SEMANTIC ENTAILMENT a eructure of Gentzen's Calculus of Natural Deduction or adapt the prin * Giples underlying his Calculus of Sequents “Though the connections of our semanti tableau to some System of [Natural Dedction were already discussed in Section 4, it wll be useful aso © Olav Bon wae {> or above table the anlar shape of deanna syutam of © av De @ 40 thir hin. SSeS eee ) O)BO) 2) 10) [4Q) V BO) (prem) o | wi) (6) Bi) @ O)A@)V BOI) ©) Aa) | 0) Bo re ——_—_— (2) aay (enn) an uv a0n | o @ (9 BO) cae) 3 aa BO © 0) " © ao (oan Gi) i) 2 bal @) Aw) <3) ae | 0930) @ @ABTOTGT— cat,2) (A formal derivation in F ofthe conclusion ¥ from the premisses Uy, Ue formal proof in F ofthe sequent: Uy Uap FH (ip A formal derivation in F ofthe formula U asa logical contradiction isa formal proof in F of the sequent: ute Ue symbol ‘0 is used to express the fact that no formula appears atthe Fight side ofthe sequen. (i) A formal derivation in F of the formula Vasa opical identity is a formal proof in F of the sequent: ory. “The main content ofthese definitions could also be stated as follows: A formal derivation in Fof the conclusion V from the premises Uy, Uo i8 ‘cloed semantic tableau in whic the initial formulas ae: Uy, Ui the [eft column, and ¥in the rght column. ‘wil be clear that on account ofthis treatment of point (HI) we avoid the necessity of dealing with point (IV) Ircan, however, be argued that itis preferable to give the derivations in Fa more familia shape ‘We shall not yeld to this argument, but nevertheless it is imteresting to show that, i necessary, we could easily give the formal derivations in F a ‘more normal appearance. Specifcaly, we could ether borrow the general we try to transform the dosed tableau into a proof in some Calculus of, Sequents, the result is as follows. We obtain a version of this Callus, which is closely related to Hasenjegers Symmetric Caleulus® Aa) aa) Bi) Be) ; Aa) + Aa), BOS) __B(b) + A), BO) A@)V BO) FA), BO) (2X9) AG) V BON] F Xo), BO) (XY) AG) V BON] F@)A, (9B) XO) LAG) V BON] FG) A) V OBO ‘As these formal derivations have been constructed, $0 to speak, in a purely mechanical manner (we have indeed come alarmingly near the Tralization of the ‘ideal ofa caleulurratiocinator “logical machine’; I ‘shal return to this point later on), one might expect them to be rather clumsy and cumbersome. But this anticipation is not corroborated; to the ‘contrary, the above derivations are remarkably concise and the derivations ‘obtained by our procedure can even be proved toe, ina sense, the shortest ‘ones which are possible. The first derivation, for instance, uses a rather daring dilemma, which 1 would certainly have avoided (by means of a redytio), but which is, in view ofthe tableau, completely jusied. Ifwe are submitted & derivation (belonging to F ort some other system, suchas thote in Hilbert-Ackermann’s Grundzge or in Quine’s Methods of Lope) which seems to be incorrect of needlessly involved, then, by con structing a suitable tableau, we obtain a correct ora simplified derivation, Drovided such a derivation aa be found. In particular, an indirect proof —“ Ew BETH wil be repiaced by a direct one, whenever such a proof is available; this fs tan interesting result in Connection witha paper on this subject by Lwen- beim? 1 Infinite Tableau. shall now show that in certain cates the construs- tion ofa semantic tableay involves infinitely many step, and discuss the possiblity of pointing out the existence of 2 salable counter-example if sucha situation arises {@) The fist, and rather obvious, casei that ofa sequent Uy, Upson ad fH, which involves infinitely many premisses U, Ui. I this cas, is con ‘enient slighty to change the division of the construction into successive stages as follows. We begin the fist stage by taking into account the intial formulas U, and V and by introducing one individual a. We pass on to a ‘new stage either by taking nto account anew formula U or by introdvcing 1 new individual pif the k'™stage started with the introduction of a new Individual p then the (k+ 1" stage must start with taking into acount a ‘ew inital formula U,: andi the A stage started with taking into account ‘new inital formula U, then the (k + 1) stage wll normally start with he Introduction of anew individual p; however, it may happen tht a een ‘ofthe A™ stage we have n0 reason fo inuroduce# new individual, and in that ‘ease the t+ 1)" stage wil tart with taking into account still another new ‘nial formula U, 1 —ltwil be clear that the above sequent wl be provable in F,ifand onl if for some j, the sequent: Up Upson UO is provable in F. Accordingly, the conclusion Vis derivable in F som che premisses Ui, Uy, ad nf if and only if for same itis drivable from the premisses Uy, Us. '@) Even ove single intial formula U may give rise to an infinite tableau, provided it contains some binary predicate (ot relation). Let us conser as fan example the sequent: ure, ‘where U's aotrtain formula studied by K. Schott (1934); (2) CREB) (RE 9) & (LRG, 2) > RGD L. Lawesbeim, ‘On Making nde roof Din ranted by W. V. Quine ‘Seni tre al. 18 (seo the ater cers to enter mort by Beno and Srthewenberg Cl. Gooden, root by rea od aeaun, Math Carte, ou tne ¥ seasrc evraninent » a 0 hE ACBIR Ae rent wm SATE) ORD ©) (Ry) (VLD) | 2 stage. j Gmuaeors oma oes Loony] RUDRA ——| 03) 22,1) | 1 Gi) RGD (@ ma.yomod on man wR 9 REBAHy..9 (16) ROI) 1 EACH ‘Third sage CD) RQ,3&CL1 20) 8,3) 2D @)RE,2 = RE,3] 22) RU2)RU,3) 2H RA,3) 25) R22) 82.3) 28) RG.2)-+ 26,3) GD RGD +282, £0) sage RO=1)8), ROB RO—2,K) RED &E)(.) OED stage Rbk + D&E) 1 Rak) RUA RK DRUGS, ROW Bs R341) R=) Ub A)» Rkgkes 1) RUE IK) RE A+) RED REL2 oh) oR Ik) RO +1 A) RULED &(B)(..) 52) stage ROAD) (Lad (29) RG,2) @ #G,1) 09) 20,3) BU KD, Ry Dp RO KD), RU) Rie ety2% © w. Bern “The corresponding semantic tableau is (schematically) represented on p. 25. Iti convenient, in such 3 case, to denote the individuals by the humeral 1°,» 1 wish to lay some stress onthe folowing points, “i There is no counterexample With a finite universe. For inthe frst place the universe must not be empty. So we take some individual and give the mame ‘1; ther we have AC, 1 and, furthermore, there must be some ingyidual which falls the conditions: R(,y)and (2)(RE,1) > RNs as 1 doesnot fi the fist condition, the individual we need now must be different from 1 It is given the name then we clearly have R(L,2) and G){Re,1) ~ R(z,2)}, In addition, we have R22), and there must be some individual which fll the conditions Ry) and (2)[R(,2) — Rey}; we ‘ind that this individual must be diferent from 1 and 2 and we give it the name's). te ‘GD In accordance withthe discussion under (the construction of our tableau turns out to be fatally determined by the data of the problem. On secount of rule (vib) in section 6, the tableau has to be spit up again and “gain, but most ofthe subtableaux ths obtained are quickly closed whereas those which are not yield exactly the same truth values for the atomic formulas RU, RD, RO, 2. RON, RQD, oy ROWDy on Mis ‘ary to se that the tableau indeed provides us with a counterexample, ‘which canbe simply desribed a follows: the universe consist of ll nat ‘numbers I, 2,3, ».- and forthe binary predicate R we take the relation Smale than between natural sumbes. (ii) One might suspect that the emergence of infinite tableaux (and, ‘pence, of counter-examples involving infinitely many individual) points to some deficiency in our approach. However, soch a view would be mistaken, ‘We wish to establish a logical theory whichis adapted to such situations as ‘may present themselves in scientific argument. For instance, it ought 19 provide the framework fora discussion onthe (unsolved) problem whether fc not Fermat's Last Theorem is derivable from the axioms of arithmetic. ‘The corresponding semantic tableau would look a follows valid Irvalid ‘Axioms of Arithmetic Fermat's Last Theorem [Now if counter-example i o satisfy the conditions stated in the left column, it must certainly involve infisitely many individuals. Soifin some SEMANTIC ENTAILMENT n ‘manner we exclude infinite tableaux, we cannot hope ever to establish an appropriate framework for dealing with problems of the above kind, (@) Teil be clear tha, generally speaking, with respect tothe problem whether oF not a certain conclusion V LoGicaLLy FouLoMs from given remisses Us, Us, (the general problem whether or nota certain sequent ‘MOLDS TAUE is feated inthe same manne), we have to anticipate thee possiblities. 1) The tableau provides us with a suitable finite counter-example for proving that Vis nor semantically entailed by U;, Uy» in this case, Vis fot drivable in F from Us, Us, (Gi) The construction ofthe tableau breaks down; in this case Vis both semantically entailed by, and derivable in F ftom U, Us, (i). The constuction ofthe tableau involves infinitely many steps; inthis cate the tableau it not closed, hence Vi ot derivable in Ffeom Uy, Us In cases () and (i), the completeness theorem forthe system F clearly ‘pols true. It wllalso hold true in case (i) ifthe construction ofthe ableay ‘provides us with a suitable counter-example. Inthe particular situation which has jst been examined, we were indeed able to point out the existence of a suitable counter-example; however, this ‘situation was exceptionally simple: the counterexample corresponded toa familar mathematical structure, and so it was recognized rather than dis- covered, Tn general we must be prepared to meet with a chaotic sscession of tableaux being split up and of subtableaux being closed. We cannot expt that we will always beable to discover some regularity in the proces and then to “ead some counter-example fom the tables. "Now inorder to havea least a guide in ths labyrinth, we shal represent ‘our tableau by a certain configuration which still more concie and there- fore gives an even clearer insight into the progres of our systematic ater at constructing a suitable counter-example. This configuration consists of points and lie segments, andi called a (binary) re. ‘For each formula which weinser in out tableau, one point isaded tothe corresponding tree. The poins corresponding to the formulas in one and ‘the same subtableau are sringwiseconnetted, in accordance with the order in which the formulas eppearin the tableau, the distinction between the two columas in a subtabieau being disregarded. I the tableau (or subtablea) is slit up, then the tree contains a fork; this shows the relations of subordi- avin which may exist between various tableaux. ‘By way filluteation, wehave constructed in ig. 2 part ofthe tre which ‘corresponds to the tableau on p. 25. To save space, we have omitted the parts), (0), and () which areexaoly ike (@).Ps © W. BET ew be lear thatthe troe can be considered as composed of branches, which start at the “top” and stretch downward as far a8 posible. Such & branch coresponds toa sequence of ‘ested’ subtableau, each subiableat in the sequence being subordinate to all preceding ones. Tis sequence ‘obviously must belong fo one of three ' types. (0) Te may terminate on account ofthe fact that all possibilities of applying rules (vi) in Section 6 have been ex: haute i) It may break off on account of ‘the closure ofthe last subeabieau which (Gy Te goes on indefinitely; it willbe lear tha this situation wil resentiteil itand only if the corresponding branch inthe tree goes on indefinitely. "Type (i) of no impartance for us, si €oes not provide us with suitable ‘counter-example; however, both type @) fd type (i) ald suitable counte ‘examples and Bence will be discussed. ‘Actually, we shal only del with type (i), as itis very easy to adapt the argo ment to type) Let us suppose that Uj, Us, and ¥ have been the initial formulas in the {ableau and that they contain property Jeter” and a elation eter “Ret the iver consi of the numbers 1, 2,3, ‘We consider the atomic formulas GA) and RU do = 1s 23, which “appear in the tableau and-sobtaleaux belonging to our sequence. As none of, these tableaux is closed, no formula can appear both left and eight. In order to oblain a counter-example, ‘we now must select predicates for the Teters'4" and (ef. Section 1), We take the property A and the relation R which can be defined as follows. SEMANTIC ENTAILMENT 2 (A) We say thatthe natural number & has the property A, if and only if the atomie formule Ck) appears in left column (or subcoluma) belonging to the above sequence. ‘(R) Wersay thatthe natural number jis i the relation R tthe natural number k, ifand only ifthe atomic formula RK) apeasin ale column (er subcolumn) belonging tothe above sequence. Finaly, we have to show tht the counter-example thus obtained is @ suitable counter-example fr proving that the formula Vis no semantically fatalled by U; and Ul. This means that we have to pont out that, forthe hove property & sad relation Rand with respect fo the universe which consists of al natura numbers, the formulas Uy and U are valid, whereas ‘the formula ¥ is iavalid. We do so by showing that al formulas in left ‘column (of our sequence) ae vid and that ll formulas in a ight column fre invalid; let us observe that, fo all atomic formulas, tis assertion it Jusifed on acoount of definitions (A) and (R). Wenow consider nonatomic formulas; it wll be sufficient to discus afew parcular cass, n connection sith the rules fr the construction of semantic tables. i) Suppose that (XC) appears in a left column, bat is invalids if ().X(a is tvalid then, for some natural number k, (8) must be invalid ‘on the other hand, all formulas X() appear inlet columa, I follows that some frnula X(@) appears ina lft column, but is invalid ‘(ia) Suppose that XV Y appears in a et column, buts invalid; all, continpations ofthis let column, either X or ¥ must appear; on the other hand, if XV ¥ is ivald, then both X and ¥ must be invalid It follows that either X or Yappears ina left columa, but is invalid ‘On account ofthis discussion, any discrepancy between the tableau and the counter-example is transferred to ever shorter formulas, and finaly to the aomic formulas. But we know already tha, for atomic formulas, there ‘en benosuch discrepancy. So we have proved our asertin it follows that se have indeed obtained a suitable counterexample (infact, the above discussion merely shows thatthe rule (}-(i) in Section 6 were suitably chosen) ‘So, evenif the construction ofa semantic tableau involves infinitely many ‘steps it will nevertheless enable us to point outa suitable counter-example, provided the corresponding tre contains a branch which goes on indef- ‘tel. And hence the proof of the completeness theorem for our System F ‘an be concluded by showing that every tree which B). Gi) 14 ina wf and xan individual variable then (x) ea wih. Method (i) for forming ws is called quantficatin with respec to he variables. Ay ‘occurrence of the variable x in the formula (x) is aed Bound Any ‘cccurrence of 2 symbol which is not a bound oecurrenee of an individual ‘variable according to this rules calle fee. In adition to formal manipulation ofthe frmblas ofthis system we shall bbe canceened with their meaning according to the folowing interpretation, The propositional constants ae 19 denote one ofthe truth valves, T of F, the symbol" denoting F, and the propositional variables ae to have the set of these truth values as their range. Let an arbiteary se, J, be specified 8 domain of individual, and let each individual constant denote a par- ticular element of this domain while the individual Variables have Yas their ange. The functional constants (variables) of degree are to denote (ange ‘over) subsets ofthe st of al ordered m-tuples of J. Gl...) 810 have the value T or F according asthe w-tuple (2, £2) Of individuals i ris notin thesetG;(4 > B) sto havethevalve FIA is T and Bis F,otherwise ‘Tyand (3) isto have the value justi case A has the value for every clement xin 'W-4isa wf, Ia domain, andi theres some assignment of denotations to the constants of 4 and of values ofthe appropriate kind to the variables with fee occurrecesin 4, such tht for this assignment takes onthe value ‘T according to the above interpretation, we say that is sarsable with respect to I I every such assignment yels the value T for we say that A scold with respect 1. Aivalid fit s valid with respect every domain, ‘We shall give & set of axioms and formal rules of inference adequate to ‘permit formal proof of every valid formals. Before giving the axioms, however, we describe certain rules of 4A pore preci, stat scpast of thee leas an be formulted slong te line of ar (aed Tush 'Der Wahssge tm Sen formalleren Spacer ‘Stati Playin, VoL (835, pp. Sols). But this seman veruon ‘afer or purposes.“ LEON HENKIN abbreviation which we use te simply dhe appearance of wif and formula Schemata. I 4 is any wif and x any individual variable we write =A foe (42D), (ana for ~@)~A, From the rules of interpretation it is seen that ~A has the value T of F according a3 has the value F or T, while (12) denotes T justin ease there is some individual xi for which has the value Furthecmore we may omit Outermost paenthes, replace a lft paren thesis by a dot omitting its mate a the same time iis mate comes atthe end ofthe formula excePt possibly for other right parentheses), and puta Sequence of wis separated by occurences of = when assoxiation tothe Tet is intended, For example, A> B>,C>D>E for (A> B)> (C2 D)>E), where 4, B,C, B, Emay be wis or abbreviations of ws. IFA, B, Care any wis the following ae called axioms: 1. C>482C 2 A> B2-A>(B20)>44D€ 3 42/2 foa 4 GA> B)>. A> 0B, where x is any individual variable with no ree oocurence in A. ‘5. (2)4> B, where xis any individual variable, y any individual symbol, and Bis obtained by subsiuting y for each free occurence of x in a, provided that no free occurrence of in 4 isin a well-formed part of of fhe form ()C. ‘There ae two formal rules of inference: 1 (Modus Pvens). To infer B rom any pair of formulas 4, A> B. 1 Generalization. To infer (x) from A, wheee xs any individual variable A finite sequence of wisi called a formal proof from assumptions T, where isa st of wf if every formule af the Sequence iether an axiom, fn element of For ele aises from one or two previous formulas ofthe ‘sequence by modus ponens or peeralization, except that no variable with & {ee occurence in some formulaof I'may be generalized upon. I Ai the lastformulaofsucha sequencewe wite P +4, Instead of {Fy} + BUDA) ‘denoting the set formed from I by adpining the wf 4), we sall write, ‘AF BIFTis the empty set we call the sequence simply & formal proof and ‘write 4. In this ease is called formal freorem. Our object i to sho ‘that evry valid formula i formal theorem, and hence that our system of axioms and rules is complete. - be FIRST-ORDER FUNCTIONAL CALCULUS 6S ‘The following theorems about the fistorder functional callus ar all cither well-known and contained in standard Works, oF else very simply ‘derivable fom such results. Weshall use them vithou proof here, refering the reader to Church for fuller account. (The Deduction Theorem) IfT, A F Bien T + A> B(forany wis A, Band any st Pot wi). 6 FBO f>.B>C, 1 FB2eC>f>eB>C>f 8 Fad )>+0042h 9. F(a) > />.GmB>f) IV. If is et of wie no one of which contains a free oscurrence ofthe individual symbol ui isa wif and B is obtained from it by replacing ‘each free occurrence of u by the individual symbol x (none ofthese occur- ‘enoet of x being bound in B), then if TF 4, also PF B ‘This competes our description ofthe formal system; or, more accurately, ‘of cass of formal systems, a certain degree of arbitrariness having been Jef with espet tothe nature and numberof primitive symbols. Let S; be a particular system determined by some definite choice of primitive symbols A set of wil of Sy wil be called inconsistent it A Ff, folberwise content A set of wis ofS wil be sad 0 be simultaneously Sarisfable in some domain T of individuals if there is some assignment of , (= 0, 1 2). Clearly Ty ‘contains A, Tis consistent, for if 7 +f then the formal roof off from ‘sumptions I, would be a formal proa of ffrom tome finite subset of Ty 8s assumptions, and hence for some 1 (J= 1, 0, -..) Toy Ff conbary to ‘construction of the sets of, Finally, is maximal consistent because if A is. owl of Sy such that (Ty A Je consetent then surely (Zhu A) is consistent foreach I; hence wil appear in some To, and son. Having obained I we proceed 10 the sytem Sand form ast T} ofits cas as follows, Selst the frst inthe standard ordering) cf of Ty which has the form (33) 4 (unabbrevated: (34>), and let 4” be the result of substituting the symbol of forall free occurrences ofthe variable inthe wif. The set (Foy4’) must be a consistent st of cms (of 5, For suppose that Tp, A’ Ff Then by TL (the Deduction Theorem), Ty FA’; hence by 1V, Tet A>S; by M, Ty haKA>f); and s0 by 8 and I, TF Gx)4>, Bul by assumption Ty kGx).A. Hence modus nens gives I + fcontary tothe construction of Jy a a consistent st ‘We proceed in tar to each ew fT baving the form (32) 4, and forthe {J of these we add to Jy che cw A” of S, obtained by substituting the ‘constant, Zr each free occurrence of the Variable xi the wif 4. Each of ‘hese adjunctions leaves us with a consistent set of ews of S bythe argu ‘ment above. Finally, afterall such formulas 4° have been added, we enlarge the resulting sit of formulas to a maximal consistent set of ews of Sin ‘the same way that I’ was obtained fom A in, Thissetof ews wecall “After the set hasbeen formed in the system 5, we construct I. i8 ‘Sia by the same method used in geting 7 from I but using the constants tsty = 12,30) in place of x, Finally weletP, be the st of cw of 5S. consisting ofall those formulas which are in any 1, It is easy to see tat F, possesses the following proved: © [is maximal consistent st of ew ofS, FIRST-ORDER FUNCTIONAL CALCULUS ” Gi) Ita formula of the form (33)4 isin T, then I, also contains a formula 4’ obtained from the wit A by substituting some constant for each free securence ofthe variable (Our entire construction has been for the purpose of obtaining ase of formulas with these two properties; they are the only properties we shal, ‘se now in showing tat the elements of’, aresimultancousystieiblelg 1 denumerable domain of individuals Infact we take as our domain I simply the set of individual constants of {Su and we assign fo each such constant (considered as a symbol io aa interpreted system) itself (considered as an individual) a denotation. It remains 10 assign values in the form of truthvalues to propositional symbols, and ses of ordered tuples of individuals to functional symbols ‘of degre® n,n such a way as 10 lad toa value T for each ewff of I, Every propositional symbol, 4 of Sy cwf ofS; we asign tot the value Tor F according as I, F 4 or 20t Let G be any functional symbol of degre n, We assign tit the class of those tuples Cyd.) Of inde vidual constants uch that Ty F Gay v0) This assignment determines a unique wth-ralue for each ewff of Sy ‘under the fundamental interpretation prescribed for quantification and>* (We may note tha che symbol "/" i assigned F in agreement with hat interpretation since I, is consistent) We now g0 on tostow the Lain. For each owt A ofS, she associated value isT or F according as TF Aorrot “Te proof is by induction on the length of 4. We may notice, fs, that B itwedonothavel/, b a forsomecwf 4of'S, then wedohave [, FA>f For by property (of I, we would have I, AF and 30, FAD Poy IL Incase Ais an elementary cwf the emma isclearly tre from the nature of the assignment ‘Suppose Ais B> C. If Chasthevalue T, by induction hypothesis I, FC: then I, + B> Cy 1 and 1. This agrees withthe lemme since B=" has the vale Tin this case. Similarly, i Bhat he value F we donothave, + B by induction hypothesis. Hea I', FB>f, and I’, + B>C by 6 and L ‘Again we have agreement withthe lemma since BC has the value T i this case also. Finally if B and C have the values T and F respectively, $0 that (induction hypothesis) I, +B while T., F C> f, we must show that T., + B> C does ot hold (since > C has the value Fin this cas). But {by 7 and two applications of | we conclude that I, F B> C> f. Now we ce that if, + B> C then T, Fy'by 1, contrary to the fact that Tis stent (property.« LEON HENKIN Suppose 4 is (2) IFT, (2) B then (by Sand 1) P, FB’, where Bis obtained by replacing al Tree occurrences of» in B by some (arbitrary) Individual constant. That i induction hypothesis, & has the valve T for covery individual x of J; therefore 4 has the value T and the lemma is tstablished inthe case. fon the other hand, we do not have I F(x), then I, F (2) B> f whence (by9,D ., ¥ (32)B =f) Hence, by property of I, for some individual constant u, we have I, | B'>f, where B° {is obtained from B by replacing each fre occurence of x by my. Hence for this w we cannot have Py FB ese I’, Ff by T contrary to the fa that Tis consistent (property) That i, by induction hypotbesis, has the value F for atleast the one individual m of [and so (2) has te value F as asserted bythe lemma for this case. ‘This concludes the inductive proof of the lemma. In particular the formulas of I, all have the vale T for our assignment and so are sie ‘taneously satisable in the denumerable domain Z. Since the formulas of, ‘Arae included among those of I, our theorem i proved forthe case of @ ‘system Sy whose primitive symbols are denumerabe. "To modity the proof in the case of an arbitrary system Sy itis only necessary to replace the set of symbols i by SybOH is where {anges ‘over the postive integers a before but « ranges over a st with the same ‘ardinal number asthe st of primitive symbols of S,; and to fix on some particular well-ordering of the formulas of the new, in place of the andard enumeration employed above. (Of couree the axiom of choice ‘must be used in this connection.) “The completeness ofthe system Sy is an immediate consequence of out theorem. CConotany 1.14 ipa vad wl ofS) then +A, Fit consider th case where A i cw. Since A is valid A> fas the value F for any assignment with respect to any domain; ie, > /'s not satisabe. By our theorem it is therefore inconsistent: A>. Hence FAa>f>/by ll and F A by 3andL ‘The case of wi 4’ which contains some free oocurtence ofan individual variablemay be reduced tothe case of thecwfl A (the closure of A) obtained by prefxing to.’ universal quantifiers with respect to each individual ‘variable with ree occurrences in (in the order in which they appeat). For iiscear from the definition of validity that if 4s valid soi 4. Bu then 4. From which we may infer F 4” by sucesive applications of Sand I. Conouany 2. Let Sy be a functional calculus of first order and m the cardinal number ofthe set ofits primitive symbols. If ts a st of culls ' Riancniiaeninicitinencoenin FIRST-ORDER FUNCTIONAL CALCULUS whic Is simultaneously sotsale then in particular A ts simultaneously sale in some domain of cardial m. Thisisan immediate consequence of our theorem and the act that it Ais, simultaneously satistable it must als be consistent (since ules of inference preserve the property of having the value T for any particular assignment in fy domain, and so could not lead tothe formula), For the special case ‘where m s Rp tis corollary is the well-known Skolem-Léwenhelm rest Ttshould be noticed for ths case, thatthe assertion ofa set of ews A can ‘no more compel a domain te be faite than non-denumerably infinite: there Is always a denumerably infinite domain available. There ate aio always domains of any cardinality greater than Ny in which consistent set A is simultaneously satisfable, and sometimes finite domains. However, for certain A no finite domain wil do ‘Along with the truth functions of propositional calculus and quanti cation wth respect to individual variables the first-order functional calculus sometimes formulated soa to include the aotion of equality as between individuals. Formally this may be accomplished by singling out some func- tional constant of degree 2, say Q, abbrviating QU.) 38 x= » (for indi vidual symbols x, ), and adding the axiom schemata El eax. E2, r=y>+ A> B, where Bis obtained ftom A by replacing some free Fora stem cardinal number as by ‘a cardinal number not greater than’, where the ‘efition of simultaneously satsfable’ must be supplemented bythe pro- vision that the symbol '~’ shall denote the relation of equality between individuals, To prove this we notice that a set of ews inthe sytem Sj may be regard #08 se of ews (4,E,F) in the sytem Sy, where E} the set of closures of anloms Ei (= 1,2) Since Ej, E; #x=y>y~xand Ej, Ej hry >oy=1>x=2 we see thatthe assignment which gives a value T 10 each formula ef A, Ej, Ej must assign some equivalence relation {othe functional symbol Q. If we take the domain of equivalence classes ‘determined by this relation over the orginal domain J of constants, and ‘aSsan 10 each individual consunt (as denotation) the cass determined by itself, we are led to a new assignment which i eally seen to satisfy A (Gimitaneously) in 5, ‘A set of wfls may be thought ofa set of axioms determining certain domaine as models; namely, domains in which the wis ate simultaneously ‘stisable, Fora frstorderealulis containing the notion of equality we “7p, Shoe, “Ober einige Grandapnaen der Mathematik aap er Noate Fdewsepr tno | Ones 1950 80 LEON HENKIN can find axiom sete which estrct models to be finite, unlike the situation for caleuli without equality. More special, given any finite set of finite rurnbes there exist axiom sets whose models are pressly those domains Invehich the numberof individuals is one ofthe elements ofthe given sl (For example, ifthe set of numbers is the pai (1,3) the single axiom (X00 = 9) Ve BENGE) 2 Oy) A= C2 na AWetavenyvens wil suce, where 4 A B, Av B abbreviate ~(A>~B), A> B> B re- spectively) However, an axiom set which has models of arbitrarily large ‘nite cardinality must also possess an infnite model as one sees by con ‘sidering the formulas Cx: BeBe) Bede Cay may Am Ue) a A= Oe AD Since by hypothesis any finite number ofthe Car simultaneously sats- fable they are consistent. Hence all the C, are consistent and so simul- taneously satisGable which can happen only in an infinite domain of individuals "Thete are axiom sets with no finite models—namely, the set of al for. rmulasC; defined above, Every axiom set with an infinite model has models ‘nth arbitrary infinite cardinality. For if, range over any set whatever the set of ll formulas ~(x, = x) for distinct, will be consistent since the assumption ofan infrite model guarantees consistency for any Site Set ofthese formulae) and so can be simultaneously sated. Tn simplified form the proof of our theorem and corollary 1 may be carried out forthe propostional callus. For this system the syerbol Sind the construction ofS, may be omitted, an assignment of vues being made dreetly from I. While such a proof of the completeness of the propositional calculus i short compared with other proofs the literature the later are to be preferred since they furnish a constracive method for Finding a formal proof of any hen auology, rater han merely demon *tathough it doesnt ner ih the sbetnne of Heist itshoul be sett ets af ora oa om ents peat SECA eset tbe Sect and ors stad for coreg set Richa Siete sd teen Heth. "On the Bein of Formal Devcon’, Sorel of Syme Loni Vo 20958), 9p. 19. Fa Wineresenernnes sean nA SA nr COMPLETENESS IN THE THEORY OF TYPES! Leow Hewes? ‘Tur first order functional exculus was proved complete by Gide in 1920. Roughly speaking ths prof demonstrates tht each formula of theealeulus {sa formal theorem which becomes & true sentence under every one of certain intended clas of interpretations ofthe formal system For the functional calculus of second order, in which predicate variables may be bound, 2 very diferent kind of result is known: no mater what (recursive) st of axioms are chosen, the system willcontain a formula which is valid bat not a formal theorem. This follows from results of Godel ‘concerning systems containing a theory of natural numbers, because a Anite categorical set of axioms forthe positive integers canbe formulated Within a second order calculus to which a functional constant has Been Added. By a valid formula ofthe second order calculus is meant one which ex prestes true proposition whenever the individual variables ae interpreted ‘ranging over an (arbitary) domain of elements while the functional ‘variables of degree range overall sets of ordered mtuples of individuals. Under this defsition of valdty, we must conclude from G8de!'s result thatthe calculus esentially incomplete, Tt happens, however, that there i a wider class of modes which furnish “an interpretation forthe symbolism ofthe calculus consistent withthe usual me no rt Lp ol 8 (88 6. ml la PS oni tt ‘A en i ae Ta cop ora net OWT erates ee oP even ee ct Segura os Sacer a cama Sr Tae auto’ wis io tan rteuce Alonzo Church sa eins mr oe CR eae SOON ES ea Tae he no "SR SSE vents de en ns : af ans re eg tinea TE ere et Rann enn YEH Shiome Tome ae Method Poa, Wl 38 Ch atta Sc and2 LEON HENKIN sxioms and formal rule of inference. Roughly, these models consist of an arbiteary domain of individuals, as before, but now an arbitrary class of $248 of ordered ntuple of individuals as the range for functional variables ‘of degree If we redefine the notion of valid formula to mean one which ‘expresses a true proposition with respect to every one of rAese models, we ‘an then prove that the usual axiom system forthe second order calculus i ‘complete: aformela is valid i and only if ia formal theorem.* “Asimilar result holds forthe calcul of higher order. n this paper, we will sive the details fora system of order « embodying simple theory of (nite) types. We shall employ the rather elegant formulation of Church,” the details of which are summarized below: Type symbols (to be used as subsri): 1. oand ate type symbols, 2. a, Bare type symbols so is. Primitce symbols (where 2 may be any type symbol): Variables! fs Bp Xo Yn Zn Constant: Ninoy Acosen Hoan Ste Improper: 4(°3 Welt formed formulas) and their ype: 1. A variable or constant alone i wf and has the type ofits subscript 2 If Agg and Bp ate wis of type (of) and f respectively, then (Aug Bp) isa wiof type a 3. AC Ags awit of type and ap variable of type then (ap Aa) is & wif of 998 (f. ‘Aaoccurence ofa variable apis boundititis ina wf cf tearm (hag, ‘otherwise the occurrence is free. ! These clases canot teal be ken in a altogether arbitrary manner I ery fomuls ste have am ierretton, For eumpe ie frmala Fi mere {eating tat wis nthe in then “F) cae tate the ep ot [Bence fhe tana for futon vrais sich Fthould be eve under cose Peentatn, Sica rere toast of otered ars some ode teste tf nda = sang the formula (3) + projection of the st Ge ‘nese ee hat the vsious domain te Gost under projection Inshore ‘aod 9 compounding Yom of te eae he asced wih soe Spt ton the domaine of a mocel, wth resto winch te Some a be Saeed, ‘The satenent of comptes canbe gs fry and ove for models meng {hee our condos "a demonsmaton of thi pe of compensa be cased ot slong he sof ‘ge ath recent pape copes ofthe rt oer fant eee “°F Rigs Carch,"ktmaion otal ry ope Fura of Sto Lape Vol $150, 3p 50 8 : (envacers oe ‘THEORY OF TYPES 3 Letters Ag: Bys Co Wl be used as syntactical variables for wis of type = Abbreviations Ay 4," BD CAB) for (=A) V(~B), A> B) for (mA) B) a, (028) Ga)2, W~Ad) GarBd) for enna) for (rsd SeaMUoa%) > Sone)? GASP By foe Oiend A080 {a writing wifs and subscripts, we shall practise the omission of paren- theses nd thei supplantaton by dots on occasion, the principal rues of {estaetion being ist tha the formula shall be wel formed; secondly, that tssodation ist the ef and tity, that a dot is to be replaced by a let parenthesis having its mate as far tothe right a8 posible. (Fora detailed Statement of usage, refer to Church) “Axioms and Axiom Schema: 1 Va) 2% 2 x2 GeV) 3. GeV) 2009) fb GendarGy i> v0 ©. ONOuiherd S90 VMs 10. x= 99%) 6 CpUapE™| Ufa? false fo) ‘ules of Inference: 1. To replace any part Ay of formula by the result of substituting ay for bg throughout 4, provided tht by is nota fre variable of A, and ap oes not occur in T, To replace any part (a, A,B, ofa wil by the result of substituting 2B, for ay throughout p, provided that the bound variables of ae ‘isinet both from a, and the fre variables of B,. Ul. To infer A, rom By if B, may be inferred from A, by a sisele application of Rue I. TV. From Aya 0 infer Aug By if he variable ais not fre in Aya V, From 4p'> By aod A, infer By VI. From dy40y 10 infer Teen) ow DFOvided that the variable ais 90% free in Ave PD ?Sep~ ad* LEON HENKIN ‘A fsite sequence of wffs each of which is an axiom or obtained from preceding elements of the sequence by a single application of one of the rules I-VLiscalled formal prof- I Ais an element of some formal proof, we write F A and say that 8a formal theorem. ‘This completes our description of the formal system. In order to discuss the quetion ofits completenes, we must now give a precise account ofthe ‘manner in which this formalism isto be interpreted. By a standard model, we mean a family of domains, one for sachtype- symbol, a follows: Dis an arbitrary se of elements called Inds, Dy isthe set consisting of two truth values, T and F, and Dg isthe se fal functions dened over Dy with values in Dy. ‘By an assignment with respect 0 a standard model (D,), we mean & rapping ¢ of the variables of the formal system into the domains ofthe ‘mode! such that for a varable a, of type «as argument, the valve da) of isan element of D, ‘We shall associate with each assignment ¢ a mapping Vy ofall the formulas ofthe formal system such that ¥j(4,) isan element of D, foreach Wit Ay of type =, We shall define the values V4(4,)simaltaneously forall by induction on the length ofthe wif 4, (i) HA, isa variable, set ¥4(A,) = H(Ag)- Let V4) be the fuetion ‘whose vals are given bythe fable 2 | Fede) t| F Fl oT Let V4(Aoa) be the funtion whose value for arguments T, Fare the functions given by the tables 1,2 respectively | yA) | (Aru ERD) T T T T F T F F Lat V4(TToon) be the function which has the valve just for the single argument which s the function mapping D, into the constant value T, Let Vl) be Some fixed function whose valve for any argument fof Poe (oft he elements of D, mapped into T by ff there is euch an elemen). i) Ih, has the form Bap Cp define V4(BpCp) to be the valle ofthe function ¥4(B,4) for the argument VCps ‘THEORY OF TYPES 8 Gh suratalhaae essa adook Peat ee Poe cin teeseeet oe etamenoaan ea Coa tia eenltiect cae ee eee a astride T for every assignment ¢ with respect to every standard model {D,).* eee weenie tae cis eae an pepe chemin reeeter eonioen SSeeereuan/ ea vcnr cae mammneat er ceca eres aa ems as clea ater anes erin mar etccan eno Seouel ohio raaoens aac boacot Se ee Picea een areata cmuesie Se neler I armas shasta tnehs ante clamiras aces econ asieas We meet nor toner veay ce ee eer eep aieaiees Seamer cenmensctay crs ae Fe ee Hens incr aannatonaric oman Saeed ticaaneaanras a eee Sees Serene eecmrees seston amet ape er eer Se gpaserta ae caeene ceed ourmanton Se aoet eee tee eee Uiavscnomonnacnrrd ances eenctaerar ment canes case ae aera eens aaa nation othe aotion of vali, be maprings Yo maybe wid to dee be {gost ofthe dntaron oft wf 4a contng no ee ocsarene fay sre Wieden Oy ng aid dae oo ct ae eae ‘Them the Senotaton of les Vtg for tay 4 We tin dee the etn of dati te sane neuen pet ena) othe mode (Dy) If Fis aniéabie wih pect fo steed me say campy tat ‘ea ve *6 LEON HENKIN the axioms 1-6, 10%, 11% formal proof canbe obtained for some Wil An we write AF dy IA FA, for every wif Ay, we say that A is inconsistent, otherwise consent. Timonea 1 IFA i any consistent st of ews, there ia general mode (in which ach domain D, i demumerable) with respect fo which A i stifle ‘We shall make use of the following derived results about the formal callus which we quote without proof: VIL The deduction theorem holds: If A, A. By, then A tty > By where Ais any set of evils, Ay is any caf and By i any WA. (A proof is given Ja Church) 12, n> 42 13, FALD By Se~ A> By> Be I Aap Aig?» Bp By Aap By > Aap By i Bb Aap) Chapsp~ Aap Aapltp)~ (Aaa%p~ Aap) Stan (As ¥)) Toor Aon BB. F Any? AaaltnensCa) CRS a> a BI. Fla) A> de ‘The first step in our proof of Theorem 1 is to construct @ maximal consistent set Pofewflssuch that contains A, whereby maximal is meant that if, is aay ew not in then the enlarged set (T4,} i inconsistent. Sucha set I'may be obtained in many ways. Ifwe enumerate al ofthe owls insome standard order, we may test them one at atime, adding them t0 A and previously added formulas whenever this does not result i an incon- sistent set. The union of this increasing sequence of sets is then easly seen to be maximal consistent. ¥ ‘THEORY OF TYPES ey has certain simple properties which we shall use. If Ay is any wf, itis lear that we camot have both I'F A, and I” ~ dy for then by 12 and V, ‘we would obtain" B, for any B,, contrary tothe consistency of. On the ‘other hand, atleast one ofthe cwis Aq, ~ A, must be in I”. For otherwise, ‘sing the maximal propety of Twewouldhave 4, Band, ~A, * By for any B,, By VI it then follows that I" 4, B, and + ~A,> By, whence by 13 and V "+, conary to the consistency of I. Two cut Ay, By of type will be called equoalentif TF Ay = By, Using 14, 16,and V, we etl se that hiss a genuine congruence relation 30 that the st ofall ews of type = is pattoned into disjoint equivalent classes (4a) (B,)..swch that (4, Jand(B,Jareequalifand onlyit 4, sequivalent ‘We now define by induction on a frame of domains (D,), an simul taneous a one-one mapping @ of equitalece cases ont the domains Da sch that BCA,D isn Dy ‘a is the set of to uth ales, T and F, and for any cw A, of type 0 PAD 8 T oF according 84, oe ~ yin. We st show that 4 function of equivalence cases and doesnot relly depend on the pa ticular representative 4 chosen. But by I7and V,wesee hati "Fg and 2B, is equivalent to 4, (ie, PF, 8) then T By: and siely i 1 and B, i equivalen to Athen PB, by 18 To ee that © is one-one, we ube 19 fo show that I 4) and (EB) are both Te, ThA, and FFB), then Thy By a0 tha 4] (Buh Slat 28 sows that Lg] is (8 incase 64) and 94a, are both ‘, smyth set of equivalence Casas (4, all ews of type «And ADs (4,} 20 hat icerainy one-one Now supose that Dy and Dy have ben defined swell asthe ale of forall equivalence clases of formulas of ype «and of pe and that very element of Dy oF Dp the vale of for some Ago By) rege tively. Define (Aug) t0 be the fonction whose vale, for te cement PCB) of Dy is Oday By Ths defition is justia by the fat att Aas and By are equivalent 0 Agy and By respectively ten App fatvalent gy By a8 one Ses 8921. To Se that ® is one-one sepane that Aap) and BLAag) have the same vale for every B34) of Hence 264,89) ~ OU 4ggB) and so, by the induction fypotheds that © is one-one for equivalence classes of formas of type 2 Ae gBp is auivalnt to AipB foreach wf By. Tn artical i we ake By te be (Cap) ~(Aagxp "Aug, we ee by 2 that gp and Azy are eqvalent so that [Acp] (Aaah Theone-one function ® having bee us completly ‘ined, we dtine Bayt be the et of vals (Ltn) forall mts dp, ‘Now let beanyasiznment mappingeach varabe x, nto someclrat* LEON HENKIN OUAa) of Dy, where Ay i 4 cull Given any WH By et Bf be Sw ‘obtained from By by replacing all re occurence in By of any variable by some cuit Ay sch that x)= ACAD. Lesa, For ecery and By we have VB “The proo is by induction cm be length of Bp (TB, sa arable and 4084) ste lament LAG) of Dy en by eof. se Name ent ay fault 10 fy 00 YB) KB) (ash =a = UD. ere By oe Nog HAA(ALD 17, then by defition Tete niece OY 23 PP = Nag dy 20 that SCNow Ac) 6 F That i BINED haps T ito F, Constaly f OCA,D i F hen by deiiton FoNmaaig gat hab Tse Aa mae Fin THe dp PUBRD i thiscase eee ay hos bance Bt Ae RLCDs ten tition Ph eubetee 67 34 Pt Arg yf a0) Ay 0 tha BU Aane Cu is T no matter whether O((A,D is T of F. Similarly, using 25 and 26, we see PAD iat, OUCAD i Fy and OCA) i Ts oF F aa ar Csompering ins wih the Seton of V4(Aanc We that {Relonma holden this cae ai. ‘Spoe Bp it Taeay whence Bf i yy the vale of Taf the argument (Acc iT, then [°F ToonyAag whence by 27°F Ava Ce for every cwff C, 80 that (4, maps every element of D, into T. On the Sheba MLAs mape chery OCD ito, ten we have aking the particular case where Cy is (t%_)~(AoaXah Dt AgglO%a) ~ Asse) Pence BY 28 TF Tings tog That i OUToon,) maps M(AcgD into. ‘Tetomma holds in cane rani By toon beac Bf i ony Let Age Be & day tb sory ino Tio hat TF Aug Ten By 2 so ta The vale of OUcyaq) for the argument Bacar) Mimappad nt Ty telat, Therefore erty ake Mn) tote Tne. Gp Sopp that Bp base form By Cy Ahi) that oe have already show, = Wyn eynmcune iptv salve of EBRD forthe sepurment OCCA), whic i HUBE, CD. But GpyCyi is simply BB, Ct Hence V4(Bp,C,) ~ O40, Cr) iy Sunpon at By the frm May Cy and ou indcton hypothesis ie OM{CaD = VCC for evry essgnment g. Let O4(4,D be any le We asuie induction hypo- V4(Bp,) and ICED = i | | i ‘ iirc ‘THEORY OF TYPES ° ment of Dy, Ten the valve ay C)D forthe argument U4, Dis by defisiton 02, C,)* 4). But by applying I to the right member ofthe instance F(a, C, Ay = a, Co dy oF 14, we find Fa, Cu), = Cl shee is the assignment which hs th same value as forever argument exept the Vrsble and Hey) 6 HLAyD. That i, (ay) Ay} — (C3) 50 thatthe valve of (a, CD for the argument HL4,D & BICED—oe fC.) by inde tion hotties. Since for every azzument (Ga, C,)*D snd Vth, Cy) ave the same valu, they most De ual “Tit coneludes the proof of wi ema, “Theorem 1 now follows directly from the lemma. rhe frst plac, the frame of domaine (D,) ia general model since V4) is an clement ot Dy for every wi By and assignment 4. Because the elements of any D, ae in ‘one-one comespondence with equivalence clases of ws each domain ‘enumerable, Since for every el AE dy, ¢ Being an atbicary asin: ‘ment since therefore forevery ew A, of Te have Bila, = andsince ‘Aiea subset of follows that V4) isT fr any element A, of Aji, ‘Ais sats wih eget 0 the ode (D,. ‘Tusonen 2, For any wil Aus we have F Ay If and on If Ay an the general sense. From the definition of validity, we easily see that Ay valid if nd only ifthe ew x) (92d is valid where. gq the Variables with free occurences in dys and hence A i vali if and only if V4) (ran)Aa) is F for every asignment $ with respect to every general model (D3). By Theorem I, this condition implies thatthe set 4 whose ony ele- ‘ment is the or ~ C4.) -- Credo i inconsistent and hence, in particular, Uy) os addy Flea) Cale Now applying Vii, 30, and 31 (Goveal times), we" see that if A, valid, then ¥ Ay. The converse can be verified directly by checking the validity ofthe axioms and noticing that the rules of inference operting on valid formulas lea only to valid formulas. ‘Taomn 3. 4 set I of ents i sarsable with respect 10 some model of denurerable domains Df and ony if every ine subset of Ti sarishable By Theorem 1, if T"is not stisfable with respect to some model of Geaurerable domains, thea Tis inconsistent s0 that, in particular, T+ Gx) Since the Formal proof of (x,)x, contains only a finite number of forma, there must be some finite subset A= (Aju 4y) of Fr such {hat djs dg Cea) ¥o, whence by repeated applications of VII,» 4; > Da dy> (dy, Bul then by Theorem 2, theCwEE Ay Pa.ne Ay > (5% is valid so that we must have some V4(4,) = Fy Iyunnm for any ¢ with respect to any model; Le, Ais not salstable. Thus, ifevery fie subset A@ LEON HENKIN cof Ps satisiabe, then P's stile with respect toa mode of denumer~ ‘tbiedomains. The converse is immediate. It's saishae, then 8 ae is finite subsets, and hence Tis satisfable with eapet to some mode! f denumerable domains. This may be taken tv generalization ofthe Skolen Lowertcim theorem for the frst order functional cleuls- valgus of Tere 1,2, nt 3 be poe for aon fal mS Suter none eo nado the em wich ve wean da te pce we mayo ny erro ac pmie om. n cae mt ofc Set gia ox onion of dns n the tenet a ed oy hc condon athe onan of hema vi Sora not set nao hes esa The roa eects a ety eth ons en De ‘ ‘in the s2cond place, the symbols t,o, and the axioms of choice (11") sah opens es we ht compat the oo! fs tr tos wih mele firming» genes of fm cat opto te pen anf sdloming cram contant seer ed reins tae mo or hem The ta an day cana te pr metone a oom 6 ae een cnt pee fw ae wiling 0 1 re Sic iis contin cons whch ae reed se atone sae vale ory ene See ltr of he ross cay ce be reba otasaniono dapat Int ate 2, He ca ee enced by apm nono gane. “Theorem can be applied to throw ight onormalied systems of umber theory. “The concepts of elementary number theory may be introduced into the pure functional calculus of order by definition, a form particularly suited ‘athe presen formation being given i Church Under this approach the natural number are identified with certain functions. Alternatively We may ‘hooue to ently the ratural numbers with the individuals making up the ‘domain or type «In sucha system, convenient fo construct an applied Calvulus by introducing the constants 0, and S,, and adding the following formal equivalents of Peano's postulates: PL Gde~ Sue =0, BL ID Su = $9? HY PB, fudafa0 2 + Cfo > Sol S.4dT> | from one general model to another,° ‘THEORY OF TYPES a ‘The Peano axioms are generally thought to characterize the number- sequence fully in the sense that they orm categorical axiom et any to models for which are bomorphi. As Skoler” points out, however, this ‘oadition obtains only if “et'—as appeass in the axiom of complete induction (our P3)—is interpreted with is standard meaning. Since, ow- ever, the seope Call sets of individuals’) ofthe quantifier (7) ay Vary {allows that we may’ expect non- |. standard models forthe Peano axioms "This argument may be somewhat clare if we consider in deal the usual roof of the eaegaicity of Peano's postulates. One easily shows that aay ‘model forthe axioms must contain a sequence of the order-ype of the ‘atural numbers by considering the indvigval 0, $,.0, S50). ‘sing PI and P2to show them distinct and without other predecesors Then the proof continues as follows. ‘Suppose that the domain of individuals contained elements othe than those ofthis sequence (which we may as well identify With the natural ‘numbers themselves). Then consider the class of individuals consisting of 4st the natural numbers. Sine it contains 2r0(0,) and is closed under the fuccesor function (S,.), we infet fm the axiom of complete indvetion (3) that it contains a individual, contrary vo te hypothesis that some fndividuals were not numbers. ‘By examining this proof, wesc that wecan conclude only that ifa generat _model satisfies Peano's axioms and at the same ime possesses a domain of {aividuals not isomorphic to the natural numbers, then the domain D,, of sets of individuals cannot contain the st consisting of ust those individ ‘whieh are numbers. ‘Although Skolem indicates that the ening of natural number’is tive to the variable meaning of ‘set he does not give any example of a notstendard number system satistying all of Peano's axioms. Inv later pars," however, he proves that it isimpossble to characterize the natural ‘umber sequence by any deouerable sytem of axioms formulated within the fst orde functional calculus (to which may be added any st of fune- tional constants dexoting numerical functions and relations) the individual “on eis Gung eh, Sere «monn ae concen opie ean Sete eter nara da aeons ay ee ere ara t Signa ire hak ge Oana tok te Sipear al ies caer SS ae eee ee@ LEON HENKIN ‘ariables ranging ver the ‘number thenseves.Skolem makes ingenious te ofa theorem on sequences of functions ich he had previously proved) to consrucy, foreach st of axioms for the number sequence ofthe pe thecibd above ast of urea unction: which sata the axioms, bat favea diferent order pe than the natural nubs This rel, fr axiom ‘ystems which donot involve cls variable, cannot be regarded ae Being t {llpuradovod since the cai had never bec ede that uch sysene ete ‘ater By appealing to Theorem 3, howewes i ecomes a spe mater to consrct a model containing 8 con-standard numb sem whch wll sets al fe Peano postulates aswell as any preasigned et f fret cor (which may incode constants or speci funtion aswel a on ‘ants and variables of bisher ype). We have ony (adjoin anew primitive constant u and add to We given et of anions he none tit of formals 1220, 2 Sy mF SSO See any Bite subet ofthe en thse ser formule is ceary sas, follows rom theorem that some denumerable model satisfies the il eof fouls, and sch a model a the propete sought. By adding «non-dequmerable numberof rim tive constants of together with all formals fo for &y 2 Ey we may tven build models for which the Peano axons are all and wich contain ‘tumber stem having any ven carina! “These same remarks sulcefo show more generally that no mathematical som sytem can be genulely categorical Gxtermie its model to within ‘Somorphisn unles i constsine fs domsin of elements to have some ‘etn cardinal number provided that he loge ton oft and {untion ae axomatizd slong wth the spec mathemateal notions “Theexistnce of non-standard modes saying axiom-systems fr hum- ter theory throws new light on the phenomenon of evnconsitency, ft investigated by Tart and Godel A formal system fs oinconsient if for some formula Ay, the formulas 4,0, a(S 0) da(Sy(S0)-y we) dy areal provable Tarski, and ae! Gide) showed the eno of consent systems which were vinconsstnt. We can now se tat ch Systems can and mus br iterpreted as fering (oa nonstandard numer ‘sem whose lerents code the natal numbers as a proper subst {tis generally recognize that al hore of number theory now in he erature canbe formalized and proved within the fantinal calls of 12,4 soar tesa fo formulations of ahi within the Se ode anes! ‘lel as estaba by hMalet,“Unenununge as dem Cebit der mate Iinishen Logi, ecu maton. ns Vol 1 (1930), pp S236. Maes ‘eth a rat tears cena resunlaice tothe math wd tbo | need {GrProtesor Charch Yor beging this pape to my atenion: (Added Perry Ta, be, THEORY OF TYPES e ‘order with axioms P1-P3 add. (In fact, much weaker systems sui) ‘On the one hand, it follows from Theorem I that these systems can be reinterpreted as true assertions about a reat variety of mumber-systems ‘other than the naturel numbers. On the other hand, it follows from the results of Godel tha here ae true theorems about the natural mimbers ‘hich cannot be proved by extant methods (conssteney assumed), "Now Gide’ proof furnishes certain special formulas which ae shown to ‘be true but unprovable, but thee is no general method indicated for etab- lishing that a givea theorem cannot be proved from given axioms. From ‘Theorem 1, we see that such 2 method is supplied by the procedure of constructing non-standard models for number theory in which “et” and ‘function’ are reinterpreted. It, therefore, becomes of practical interest 12 ‘number-theorists to study the structure of such mode's ‘A detailed investigation ofthese numerical structure is beyond the scope ‘ofthe present paper. Asan example, however, we quote one simple result: ‘Every nonstandard denumerable model forthe Peano axioms has the order type we (a +a) where is the type af the rational:Vv LANGUAGES IN WHICH SELF REFERENCE IS POSSIBLE! Ravwonp M, SMULLYAN 1. Introduction, This paper treats of semantical systems $ of suficent strength so tha for any Set 7 definable in S (ia sense which wil be made prise), there must exst a sentence X which i true in $ if and ony if itis En clement of 172 We call such an 1a Tarski sentence for W. Iti the Scotence which im a purely extensional Sense) says of self that tis in W7? If is the set of all expressions not provable in some syntactical sytem C, then X isthe Gdel Sentence which is true (in $) i and only if itis not provable (in C). We provide a novel method fo the construction ofthese Sentences, which yields sentences particularly sinple a structure. The method isapplicable toa variety of stems, including a form of elementary tthmetic, and some systems of protosyntax self applied Tn application (0 the former, we obtain an extremely simple and direct proof ofa theorem, which i esventally Tasks theorem thatthe truth set of elementary arith Inetc is not aithmedcally definable, “The crux of our method i in the use of a certain function, the ‘norm function, which eplaes the classical use ofthe diagonal function, To gives om she Jornal of Symbolic Lows, Vol 2 (957, $67, Coptigh © 195 iy peeabtion ots bison: be Arerhn Mabemateal Sci, and “teat sce thant Profesor Radoiph Carap, ofthe Univer sib Goal at Los Anoees and to Protea John Kemeny and Dr, Edvard. hehe eowth Ces fr oeabetnesen wh k Gy semangcal gam Swe mern ae of reeset sepa Fathuabeopetie Wi bone Tt Sof seen ald te sanencs of 3 (Cea ie eae wongeion=in a cena gym, he onl way we an rani te ness pas‘ ae hate ey he ghee roe ‘ah ews eaten eft eat see fe Sey lisene” Hower ins chs we ned of Tart sentence ar Raikiiy rosy ee cre cones an inosoa t, then we wok, ‘apes Tank semence fr Was asemene X which nt ny ue an ony ‘Fe nt wnc ata express be poponon cat Xe Ethernet Scag cota cer ana the tern forthcoming pape. -spuemuel Moony Si ppb SELF REFERENCE IN LANGUAGES 6 heuristic idea of the norm function, lt us define the norm of an expression E (of informal English) a E followed by its own quotation. Now, given aset W (of expressions), in W, we do 5038 follows: W contains the norm of W contains the norm of* This sentence X says ‘that the norm ofthe expression 'W contains the norm of" isin W. However, ‘the norm ofthis expression is ¥ itself Hence Xistrueifand only if Xe 3 "This construction is much ike one due to Quine.® We cary it out for some formalized languages. Ip Section 2, which s essentially expository, we construct @ very precise, though quite trivial semantcal system $>, which takes quotation and the norm function as primitive. The study ofthis system will havea good deal of heuristic value inasmuch a8 Sp, despite its {rival embodies the crucial dens behind undecidabiity esl for deeper ‘non-trivial systems. We then consider, in Section 3, the general uie ofthe ‘orm function, and we nally apply the ress, in Section 4 toasystem S, which isa formal variant of elementary arithmetic. This variant consets of taking the lover functional calculus with class abstractors, rather than ‘quantifiers as primitive. Tis alteration, though in no way afeting the ‘Steagth ofthe system, cevertheless makes possible the particularly simple proof of Tarsk's or Godel’ theorem, since the arithmetization of subst- tution can thereby be circumvented quite simply 'By the norm of an expression E (of S,) we mean E followed by is own {Godel mumerai(e, the numeral designating its Gbdel umes) Now, given any vet H of expressions whose set of Gédel numbers is arithmetical ‘Sefinable, we show quite easly the existence of an expression H of lass abstraction, such that for any expression E, H followed by the G8del numeral of Eis a tre sentence if and only if the norm of E isin W. Then, if we fellow H by ts own Godel numeral, the resulting sentence Hh (which isthe norm of H) i tre if and only if it is in W. This sa rough sketch of ur procedure. 2 The Preliminary System Sy and the Semantical System Sp. In this section, we formalize the ideas bebind the preceding heuristic acount of the norm function, For convenieace, weft construct preiminary system 2p cootat wih this constrain et wt defice the dpuralaion of 38 the sel of saat the quotation of Boral nccencs fhe vataie ie ‘fren he owing ft etc for (when fom) he clanal cops Aion’ W conte ie Sagonleaion of conaoe the Sgonaaton af Tha ists contusion nvr uate inborn gosto), whee Oe tolts quotation Tha« RAYMOND M, SMULLYAN ‘Se whowe expressions wl be built rom the three signs "* and "N’. The Second sign will serve as our formal quotation mark, since we reserve Drdinary quotation marks for meta-linguisic use. The sgn °N? will be endowed withthe same meaning asthe norm of" The sign "willbe an undefined predicate constant. or any property (se) Pof expressions ofS, ‘ve then define the semantical stem Sp by giving a rule of tuth for Sp. For any P,'# willbe interpreted in Sy a designating . Signs of Sy: $y *.N. Preliminary Definitions (1) By an expression (ofS) we mean any string buat from the three signs of $2) By the Formal) quotation of an ex- pression, we mean the expression surrounded by stars. 3) By the norm ofan txpresion, we mean the expresion followed by its own (formal quotation Formation Rules for (Indcideal) Dsignators: () The quotation of any expression isa designator. @) IF isa designator, sos "NE" (ie, 'N'followed by E). Alternatce Defintion: ("A designator isan expression which is either a quotation (of some ‘other expression) ora quotation preceded by one or more ‘N's, Rules of Designation in Sy RI. The quotation ofan expression E designates E. 2. IE, designates Ey, then "NE; designates the norm of E;. Defintion ofa Sentence of Sy () A sentence of Sis an expression consisting of "followed by @ esignator. ‘The Semanal System Sy FFor any property P, we define the semantical system Sa follows: (1) The rules for designators, designation and sentence formation in Sp are the same as in Sy {@) The rule of truth for 5, isthe following 3, Forany designator E, gE istruein Sp the expression designated by E Gin Sp) has the property P. ‘Thonen 21, There exists a expression of Sy, which designates self Poor, “#N* designates °N’ (by Rule 1) Hence ‘N¢N* designates the norm of ‘Thus 'NON™ designates itself by Rule 2) whichis NeN™ SELF REFERENCE IN LANGUAGES a ‘Trronun 2.2. There exists a sentence Gof Sy such that for any property P, G is true in Sy = G has te property P. Poor. ‘N*4N* designates “JN* GN" (by RI and R2). ‘Thus G, viz, ‘6N* GN" is our desired sentence, Rasank. Gis, ofcourse, the formalized version of W contains the norm of W contains the norm of"$isbut an abbreviation of HW contain, and SN" abbreviate “the norm of (Conottany 23. cannot be coextensive withthe se ofall ele (nomrue) sentences ofS nor iP coextensive withthe set ofall expressions ofS, Which (are not tae sentences of Sp 2.4, A stnonotn Fon oF THEOREM 2.2 By a predicate we mean ether“f? Cor followed by one or more ‘N's. ‘We say that an expression E satisfies a predicate H (in S;) if H followed by the quotation '*E*" of Es tru in Sy. Lastly, we say that aset of expressions of Si definable (in) if there exists a predicate H which is Satisfied by all and only those expressions which are in IY. lis worth noting a this point, that if, designates E, thn Esatisies H. if and only if "HE," is tre. This follows from R3 by induction on the ‘number of N's occurring in H. For any set W, we let 1(W) 5 stb ofall expressions whose norm sin Ls 25, If i definable in Sp, then 50 i 0). Proor. Let H be the predicate which defines W (ie, which is satised by Just those elements which arin 7). Then H followed by ‘will esatsed ‘by precisely those elements which ae in (7). Thus (7) is definable (in Sn. ‘We can now stale the following theorem, of which Theorem 2.2 a special case ‘Tuonsn 2.6, For any st W definable Sp, thee i a sentence X which i true in Spf and only if XW. 2 if we wih wo coasts mints sien Le wich frais te aga ‘ut i ie uy 87 spn fio ea lo i odie us Ri nse w $y Ra Wy Soupaten then Bey sail ne dagoatstion o Ey Gch al of repatng each coarsest Es the qutaon of Eh iE depen Ey then GE) nsec sur inErifen eo Eth te prope PThen he epson of Thewem SE Seu BeBe a Fr ste tm 33) oe« RAYMOND M, SMULLYAN oor. Assume His definable, Then 4 i 7) (by Lemma). Hence there ‘exists predicate B such that forany expression E, “H*E* is rue (in) = Een") = TEHEN ew, Taking B= H, HH iste = HOH ew. “Thus X, viz, (HOH? is ur desited serence Rewang, Theorem 2.6 says (in view of the tu functionality of the toicondiiona) no moce nor lest than this: each set definable in Sp either contains some truths of Sr oF lacks some falshoods. (Conousany 2.7. These of false sentnces of Spi ot definable lt Sp 0" inthe complement relative the set of all expressions ofS) ofthe 2 of rae sentences of Sp defioabl i Sp Conotsany 2:8. Suppose we extend Sp tothe enlarged semantial system (Sp by ding the new sl", and adding the felling owe rls 4, IE Xs a sentence 50 is =H", RS. "=X Tis true in Sp» Xis not true in Sp “Then in thie system Sp, the truth et of Sis not dofinale ‘Pnoor. For has the property that the complement of any st definable in Spis again definable in Sp, since if H defines W, then ~H defines the complement of W. Hence the truth et fot definable since its complement isnot definable by Corollary 27 ‘Rewanx. Spi about as simple system as can be constructed which has the interesting property that the truth set of the system isnot definable Within the system and that, moreover, any posible extension of Sp will fetain this feature. By an extension, we mean any system constricted from ‘Si.by posbly adding additonal signs, and cules, but retaining the old rules in which, however, the word ‘expression is redaterpeted to mean an ox. piston ofthe enlarged system, Likewise, if we take any extension ofS) ‘then though we may greatly ealarge the collection of definable sts, no ‘of them can ponibly be co-extensve with the set of false sentences of the extension 28, EXTENSION OF Sp TOA SEMANMICO-SYNTACTICAL SYSTEM SF. Suppose ‘now that we selec an arbitrary tet of sentences of 5 and eal them axiom, And select a st of rues for infecting sentences from other sentences (oF Finite ses of sentences). The axioms, together withthe rules of inferene, form a socalled syntactical system, or ealeulus C: Let be the ordered SELF REFERENCE IN LANGUAGES « pair (Sp.C). Thus Sf isa mathematical system, or interpreted calculus, We Tet Tbe theset of tue sentences ofS (also called tue sentences of $—) and Th, te st of sentences provable in'C (aso called provable sentences, oF theoremt,of S$). We already know that the complement T of T (relative to the set of expressions is not semantically detinablein $§ (Le, not definable inp); however TR may well happen tobe fit is, however, then we have, as an immediate corollary of 2.6, the following miniature version of G8del's theorem Tiazonem 2.9. Ifthe set Tis emantially definable in Sf then thar some sentence true in S§ cannot be proved in Sf or some fale sentence can be proved. This situations sometimes described by saying that Sf iseithersemant- cally incomplete or semantically inconsistent. 240, We can easly comstrct a system Sf obeying the hypothesis of ‘theorem 29 as follows: Before we choose a property P we frst construct completely arbary cleat C. Then we simply define Pto be the st ofall expressions not provable in C. Thea “isl wil be the predicate which femantcally defines Th in Sf, and the sentence G, viz, “gN°#N*, of| ‘Thoorem 22 will be our G8del sentence for Sf, which is true ifand ony if rot provable in the system. In Tas, for purposes of illustration It at ‘considera calculus C with ony finite nomber of axioms, and no rules of inference. Ths the theorems of C are the axioms of C: Now, if G was included as one of the axioms, iti automatically false (in this system), whereas if vas eft out, then tis true, by very virtue of being eft out Thus, this system is, with dramatic clarity, obviously inconsistent or incomplete REMARK. Suppose that we take P to be the set of sentences which ave provable in C. Thea G becomes the Henkin sentence for the system $5, Svbich is tre inthis Sytem, if and only if G ts provable in. Is G tue in 541 This obviously depends on C. I, for example, we take C such that ts Sel of axioms is nul, then G is certainly both false and aon-provable. Aa. ‘example ofa choie of C (other than an obvious one in which G tet s an axiom) for which G i true isthe following: We take for our single axiom ‘A, the expresion “$* #N*6N". We take a single rule R: If two desi rators Ey and E have the same designatur in S, then ‘GE; i directly ‘derivable from “gE; . This rule i reasonable’ In the sense that it does preserve truth in Sp. Now, iG, viz, N*GN", tre inthis $F oF not? Tis tue, providing t is provable. Now since "N¢4N" and “+ SN*4N**" both have the same ‘designatum "$N*4N*, then "gN*N*" is immediately derivable from» RAYMOND M. SMULLYAN "GeANUGNE by R, Le, Cis immediately derivable fom 4,, hence Gis provable, and hence aso rue ‘Wenow consider whether not this system $isemantically consistent. ‘We have already observed that rule R des preserve truth, so the question reduces to whether or not 4 i tru, Well by R3 of Sp, 4 i ue precisely incase "JN" BN" has the property P, ie, precisely in cae Gis provable, ‘when 3, Semantcal Systeme with Predicates and Individual Constants i this section, we consider any semantieal system S, of which certain expressions {alld predicates and certain expressions calle (individual) constant are 30 ‘elated tat any predicate fllowed by any constant na sentence of S. We flso wish tohave something ofthe nature ofa Gel correspondence which ‘wll asign a unique constant (E) to each expression Eo that g(E) will be peculiar to Ei, we considera I--1 correspondence g whose domain i ‘the set of ll expresions, and whose range ia subset proper or otherwise) ‘of the individual constants. We sal often write“ for (EY By the norm (Of E, we mean EE (ie, E followed by g(E))** For ast WV of expressions (Of S, by 9) we mean the et of all E whose norm iin A predicate His said to define the set W (lative to g, understood) if W consis ofall and only thore expresions E such that HE is tue. The following theorem, though quite simple, is basic ‘Tuconea 31, For any set W of expresions of a sufilent condition for the existence ofa Tarski sentence for W is that (W) be definable. Proor, Suppose »(W) is definable. Then for some preicate H and for any EHE istrue > Ee 1") ontew, Hence Hit is true = Hit eW, Conousany 3.2 Leting F be the set of non-true sentences ofS. and T the se ofall exprestons which are not rue sentences, hen nliher fF) nor (F) ‘ave definable in . {The word “norm wy suggested by the folowing wage: In Mathematics, when sweet Toncon Tu} aro epee te ety fe) same rlre o Barn ga Ale sweat Fey ahr te In awk ce an te oss der sate ee ‘xpresion €jE, Th for thi fe) our ormet Ea ere ‘rota Quine handy sugped at I emar tt he norm ofa prin Seautopca athe ase oF Yelmmennem tenner SELF REFERENCE IN LANGUAGES 1 CConottany 32 Ifwe extend § 10a xemantco-sytactical system SE, and YeATH are definable in S, then Ss semantically incomplete or inconsistent ‘Actually, to apply Corollary 3.3 to concrete situations, one would mast likely show that (TR) is definable by showing (1) Th is definable and (2) For any st W, if Wis definable, so is (4. Semanticl systems strong {enough to enjoy property 2) (whichis purely a property ofS, rather than (of C)areof particularimportance. We hall henceforth refer to suchsystems 35 semantically normal (or, more brief, ‘normal. Thus Sis normal if ‘whenever 1s definable S508 1(1), Semantical normality, ofcourse, relative to the G8del correspondence CConoutany 34 JS is semantically normal, then (0) There isa Task sentence X foreach definable set. (2) F isnot definable in S nor is. ©) 1f nowstheorembood of € is definable in S, then Sis semantically Incomplete or incontstet. Raman. The trivial stems S, of Section 2 ate semantically noemal relative tothe correspondence g mapping each expresion ontoisqustation (the individual constants of Sp ar, of course, the dexgnatos). In fc, ‘Lema 25 asserts precisely that. Iis by virtue of normality that ne showed the non-deinailty of Tin Sp. was daliberatly constucied withthe view of establishing normality as simply as possible. ‘We now turn to a non-tcvial system S. for which we easly establish semantical normality 44. Sptems of Arithmetic. The fis arithmetical system S which we con- sider ie much like arithmetic inthe frst order functional calculus. We have ‘numerals (names of numbers), numerical variables, the logical connectives {all denable fom the primitive") of joint dena), ideatiy, andthe primi- tive arithmetical operations of (multiplication) and 7 (exponentiation), ‘We depart from the lower funetional callus in that, given a (well-formed) formula F anda variable, eg‘, we form the (las) abstract "x ead "the set of x's such that F’ We use abstracts to form new formulas in to ways, viz, (1) Fora numeral N, "X(FIN" (fead"N' isa member ofthe set (Of Xs such that For “the set of ¥'s such that F contains N’) and Q) a(F) = X(F2)" ead “the St of such tha F identical with the set of| 1's such that F,") By @2) we easily define universal quantification thus: FONE) 5, PMP) = abe 0) ‘A formal description of S, now follows ‘Signs of S42 8's (rs hin Ae We ell these signs ‘S'S respectively Sin RAYMOND M. SMULLYAN Rates of Formation, Desionarion od Tet 1. Aun ing of") of length, designates the postive ines m eso fllowe by ing feet, isa vase 5 Beery numeral and every vatableisa term. 4 Trend tae tems 9 are Cy)" and (Q) "UG 14 ad conan no variables and rapectvey Gina and ma then the above Sevrten respectively designe mm abd of. Sit and ty are tems ten 01," formula, clled an atomic formula A oocurences of vorbis are fe, Ino varades are preset, Berea Ai ica sentence, and fate sepience i and ony iy and #2 ‘ante the same number ser Toul ail hn "(> (Csaba. NO chante afin a(F) ee. HP ia varable sins from mth te yeeoccanences of Bin o(F)' are thorn FF contin no fee sr beer hana ten (cals precate and he aration oF 11 Hy and Ha cures of any variable # nts For i f f ues and are variables, Fy and F formula, and if oF) ~ UF) cons no fee varable ti sentence, tre if and ony for ery Samal the aut FN) of elacngall fe cerns of xa Fy BY tn tne ret FN) of epg fe octtences of Pin Eby Nie RaBalent in Sy [i> ar her both rein Sor ether one 3) Forany predate a(F)" and numeral Ns the expression "(Ni ascntens aswell a form) a iste ian onthe result PND of {hncing ae eccurtenes in Fby Nr WO" It and Fy ae formula, 08 (| F) The fee ocurenees funy varablow are those of Fy andthowe of FF) and F,aesentences, Shon “(Fp UF ie sentence and iste abd ony if ether Fy nO abstracts, then [Hy =H) isa formula, The fee re those of Hy and thos of Note: The notation "F(NY of (8) oF) wll also be used for an arbitrary term t, not necessarily @numeralie, “F(” g the result of substituting frealy the term forthe te variable of F. “Gadel Numbering. For any expression F let oE) be the string of Arabic ‘numerals obtained by replacing , bythe Arabic numeral ‘1,8: By "2, In sou tre de ot ur We woe ten ewe fermen singe bo nin sation Gh er of ie A im SELF REFERENCE IN LANGUAGES a Sy by 9% This string of) designates (in decimal notation) a number, which ‘we wil cll g(E). We shall take for our Gide! umber of E (oiten (EY ‘or-E) the number (E+ Ie will facltate our exposition if we identify the numbers with the numerals (strings of “') which designate them ip Sq. Then we define the norm of Eto be E followed by its own Godel number. “Arithetization ofthe Norm Function. The following extremely simple definition accomplishes all the arithmetizatin of syntax which we need Def. 1-040) 510%. Explanation If xis the e-(Gde! number) of E, then fx) isthe gn of ‘te not of E. Ths, fer example, 37 i the g.n. of 8S, The norm of $5 S86 5)85 Shand ib Bis 3699....9 Cas 3700...0 7 10 Semonical Normality. We say that an expression Esatses the predicate UW Gelative to the Gidel corespondence g) i HE is true. The st ofall, expressions satisying Wis presisly the set defined by H, i the sense of ‘Section 3. We also say that E stisies the formula F (when ¥ vostains one free variable) if F(E s true, and we shal also refer tothe set ofall E ‘which satisty Fas the et detined by the formula F. Now, the eusal role played by the lass abstractors ofS, s that definabilty bya predicate, and Sefinabilty by a formula, are thereby equivalent. This isan immediate consequence of Rule 9 of sine, if H is the abstraction of F then E satises B= HE ist = F(E) is true (by Rule 9) > E satisfies F. Thus the sets respectively defined by H and F arethe sae. ‘A formula Fy wil called a normalize of formula FifFyissatisia by justthose expressions E whose norm satisfies F Inthe ight ofthe preceding paragraph, the statement that Si semantically normal is equivalent. the Statement tat every formula F (wth one fe variable) has a normalizes Fy, (since Fy defines (7), when F defines ‘Taromun 4.5 i semamscally normal relarive 10g. normalizes Fy. Wel ake Fy to be the result of eplcing the fre variable of F by 2-10" [or rather, bythe ‘unabbreviated form ((@)(QUIILILITT (3) fen OCB he Ene the orm SE woul hve hot te eT ae ns1” RAYMOND M. SMULLYAN “Then, for any numbers, Fy(x) and Flas) have the same truth-vales ‘Thus, for any expression E, E satis Fy = Fy(E) is true = Fin) is tre ‘= the norm of E satisfies F (since (2 isthe en. of norm of ED). Hence Fis saisied by those E whose norm satisfies Fand is thus a normalize of F Conottaey 4.2. (0) For eery definable se ofS there isa Tarski sentence, (2)The complement of the truth set TofS is ot definable inS (relative 108). ()T tslf sno definable in $, (lati tog). (4) Any proposed axiomat- sation of Sq such thatthe et ft theoreme definable nS (elatve 18) semantically incomplete or inconsistent ‘(and @) immediately follow rom the preceding theorem, together with the results of Section 3. In particular, in (1), wo construct a Tarski setence for aset W defined by formula F, we fst construct the normalizes Fy of F by the method ofthe preceding theorem, then take the abstraction Hof Fy, and then follow H by its own Godel number. Thus the Tas sentence for Wis the norm of the abstraction ofthe narmalier of the formula which defines W. (3) and () follow, since S, contains negation (definable from Réstank (8 of Corollary 42 can be thought of as one form of Gadel's ‘theorem, Definability in S, i actually equivalent to definability in prot _yntay (nthe sense of Que). Thus any formal system fr Sy whose set of theorems is protosyntactically definable wil be semantically incomplete or inconsistent. This essentially similar to Quine's result that protoeyntax ite not protosyntacialycompletble. “4.3. We have just shown a method for constructing normalizes which works for the particular Gadel correspondence g, which we employed, ‘Actually, i will work for any Gadel correspondence relative to which the norm function (eth function whic assigns to each expression its norm) ‘sstricdy definable, in the following sense 'A function (rom expressions to expressions) wll be said to be sricly defined bythe term (with one variable), iffor any two expressions Ey and Ep, E, = {(E.) if and only ifthe numeral & and the term ti) (viz, the result of subsitoting B for «in ) designate the same number. This notion of stritdefinailtyis quite diferent from the usual much weaker notion of (f9) We ht Gene TERE leds RGD cd ese he Pay mati Then ne ee fo (Aap & Ad 1} ( ontaconca te snp by aed deipion) Ths te Wty crepenteee Thee se we intros ony fr rps of simpy an eens na SexSuay forthe bu of a rogram SELF REFERENCE IN LANGUAGES n ‘ofall E svc that FUE) i tue, is called the st defined by F. For any set W, ‘we define D(W) as the st ofall F whose diagonalization isin W. Then the analogue of Theorem 31 i °A sulfcent condition forthe existence of a ‘Tarski sentence for Wis that DOP) be definable” Hence aso, DOP) isnot definable, We would then define normality, for such a language L, bythe Condition that whenever Wi definable in Ly 30 is D(W). Then ail other theorems in Section 3 have their obvious snalogues* “To apply these general notions to systems in standard formalization, ¢., lementary arithmetic, we would have, in analogy with the notion “ror. ‘male’, that of ‘diagonalizer’, where a diagonalizer Fy of «formula F ‘would bea formula satisfied by just those expressions whose diagonalization satisiedF. Then, if W is defined by F, and if thee exists a dagonalizes Fp for F, then the dagonalization of Fp (which is Fp(Fy), i the Tarski sentence for W. “This i esentally the classical constuction, The construction of the iagonalizer Fp is considerably more involved than the construction of the ‘ormalizer Fy. Again, we might say, this due tothe fact that concate- ‘ation i easier to arithmetize than substitution, We can profitably sid reption of analogous atpumens for $ and Eby seuutng tok especial ces St tre steal aretre Tis approsth wl be ‘Suited ies eedoming pat burac Scere of Usaturte Theo io SISch'e ayn conigenle great, the Sevper prope of undecabe ‘era ncoete'by Goa and Romerv INFORMAL RIGOUR AND COMPLETENESS. PROOFS Grono Kati Iisa commonplace that formal rigour consists in setting out formal rules land checking that a given derivation folows these rules; one of the more important achievements of mathematical logic is Turing’ analysis of what ‘formal rule is. Formal rigour does nor apply the discovery or choe of formal rules nor of notions; neither of basic notions sucha sein so-called classical mathemsccs, nor of technica notions such as group or tensor _pradut (technical, because formulated in terms of an already existing basic Tramewor), “The old fashioned’ idea is that one obtains rules and definitions by analysing intuitive notions and puting down theit properties. This is cer- tainly what mathematicians thought they were doing when defining length ‘or area or, for that matter, loicans when finding rules of inference of ‘axioms (properties) of mathematical structures suchas the continaum. The iseneral idea applies equally tothe so-called realist conception of mathe- ‘matics which supposes that these ntitivenotions are related tothe external ‘world more or less as the number 4 enters into configurations consisting of ‘elements, and tothe idealist conception which denies this or, at last, considers this relation as inesental 10 mathematics, What the “old fashioned” idea assumes is quite simply thet the intuitive notions are signfcan, be it in the external world or in thought (and a precise formu lation of what is signincant in a subject isthe result, nota starting pont of research into that subje. Thormal rigour wants) to make this analyssas pevse as posible with the means availabe), in particular fo eliminate dowteful properties of the Intuitive notions when drawing conclusions about them; ad (i) extend this analysis; in paricular not to leave undecided questions which can be dered by full use of evident properties of these intuitive notions. Below {he principal emphasis ison intuitive notions which donot occurin ordinary rathematical practi (so-called new primitive nions), but lead to new rept a oer sh oe pei Sa Anarene mate Soa aes a INFORMAL RIGOUR ” axioms for current notions. We give thee applications, moti following the old fashioned” idea of pushing abt farther chan before the analysis Of the intuitive notions considered. Section 1 concerns the diference btween familiar independence results, ofthe axiom of parallels from the other axioms of geometry, onthe one hand and the independence ef th con. ‘inwum hypothesis on the other; the difeence i Krmulated interns of higher-order consequence. Section ? dais with the relation betwee in. tuitive logical consequence onthe one hand and so-called semantic tesp, symtactic consequence on the other. Sestion 3 is omitted here—Ed) Sections 2 and 3 affect completeness questions for classical and intuitonist Drediate logic, which accounts for the ile ofthis talk; gute general’, problems of completeness (of rules) involv informal rigour, at east when ‘one is trying to decide completeness wth respect to an intuitive notion st consequence. (©) The case against informal rigour (or: antphilosophic doctrine). The present conference showed beyond a shadow of doubt tha several recent results in logs, particularly the Jedependence results for set theory, have leftlogicians bewildered about what to donextin other words thes fevuls 4o 20% Speak for themselves” (1 these logician), I belewe the reasons ‘underlying thet reaction, necessarily also make them suspicious of informal ‘gout, I shal try to analyse these reasons here. (a) Doctrnare objections (pragmatism, postism), Two fala objec- tions to informal rigour are these Why should one pay so much attetion to intuitive notions? Wha we want are definitions and rules that are rll; they at have to be aif tonotions that we have already. One might perhaps add: these notions are formed without highly developed experience; 20 why should they be ex. pected tobe fal? ‘Besides this (pragmatic objection we have a more theoretical (positivist) objection, i) These intuitive notions, in particular the (abstract) notions of validity, set, natural number or, 50 a no to leave out intuitions, intuitively con, vincing proof, ar illusions. When one examines them one finds that thet solid content lies in what we do, in how we act; and, in mathematics, thi contained inthe formal operations we perform. ‘A certain supercial plausibility cannot be denied to these objections Fist, when some abstract inzive notion turns out 19 be equivalent, at least in a cernin conten, to a postivistic relation, i, one definable ia ‘prccularly restricted terms, this has always important Consequences. For {stance (or detail se Setion 2) logical consequence applied to fst order | |# GEORG KREISEL Formulae, is equivalent to formal dervabiliy and fist order axiom systems permit a more general theory than higher order systems. Consequently, at & particular stage, the (pragmaticall) most rewarding work inthe subject ‘nay consist uit simply in exploiting the discovery of soch an equivalence ‘Second, one may be impressed bythe slow progres of work on some ofthe intuitive notion, particularly those associated with traditional philosophic ‘Guetions: pragmatism dcourages such work, and postivism tres to give theoretical fearon forthe slow proges. Now, objectively, such a negative sttudeis not supported hy the acs because progress was also slow in cases ‘were decisions wereevenaly obtained. (About 30 years between Hilbert first formulation of his fntist programme, cf. (6), p. 84, and Ges incompleteness theorems; neary a further 30 ears til precise analysis of fist proof was attempted.) But, subjectively, if a particular person 1s discouraged by the slow progress he had surely beter find himself anosher ‘ccupation, Certainly, sentially speaking, one is ina wholly futile posi tion one finds oneself stuck both with philosophy asa profession and with fntiphilosophical views such as pragmatism or positivism (pechaps, aftr having been attracted by traditional questions in one's youth. For, having repudiated specifically philosophical notions one i ft with those that are flo familiar to specialist in her Bel: what jobs can one hope to do as ‘well as these specialists? including the jos of clarification or explication Gf they ae to be done in curren rm)? I think ths fuity is felt quite consciously by many ofthe people involved. Having granted all his: whats wrong with () and (i)? Quite simply ths Though they raise perfectly lgtimate doubts or possibilities, they jst donot repect the fact, at last the fact of ctu intellectual experience. This i particulary irritating because pragmatism pays so much lip service to ex- petlence, and positivism claims to be empitially minded. Ad(is Let seven take for granted that we know roughly whatisfruitfl; fe all, hee again (.. asin the case of significance a precise formulation ‘nay only be posible after @ good deal of experience. Perhaps we do not [know a general reason why intuitive notions shoul have stood the tess of ‘experience wel; as one sometimes says: they might not have done so. But the fact remains that he, oat east, many of them, have. Refetion shows that we certainly couldn't have what we understand by ‘science’ if they hadn't. Instead of trying {0 fin reasone for, oF limitations of, this super feally remarkable situation, () denies its existence! (a most unpragmatic pragmatism), Two related so-aled pragmatic principles are to be men= tioned. Onesays that one must teat each problem’on its merits; one vight ‘nave to; but taken literally this would lave litle room for general theory oF t INFORMAL RIGOUR a for the distinction between what is fundamental and wha s secondary. Ot fagain (in mathematics), one sometimes ritczes complacenty old fashioned? disputes on the right definition of measure or te right topolosy. ‘because there ae several definitions. The most striking fat eres how few seem to be useful: these havent éropped from heaven; they, obviously, ‘were formulated before their applications were made, and they were not enerally obtained by trial and error. If they had been so obtained, mathe- ‘maticians should't be as contemptuous as they are about the study of litle ‘variants in definitions. Similar remarks apply tothe choice of axioms; but Since this is of direct logical importance the subject wil be taken up ini roper place in () Ad ji), Carly, if, consciously or unconsciously, one insists on analysing ‘the ‘slid content‘in positivist, in particular formal, terms thisis what one will find. Though more specif point about formalism and formalization are taken up throughout this paper in particular (e) and Section 2 below, ‘some matters of principle ae in order here. It might have tursed out that the motions which presen the most serous dificulies in practice are indeed abstract ones. But, quite nalvey, this i not so: knowing whether to inscriptions mean the same is often no hard: than knowing if they read the same! Equally, as was mentioned on p. 79 above, somtimes it does turn ‘ut that some notions are fully represented in formals erms: but thishas to be veried and Section 1 shows limitations. Perhaps one should di- ‘inguish between formalism (and positivism, which is merely # negative antiphilosophical doctrine, and a mechanistic conception of reasoning (mechanism inthe sense of Turing), which would lead one to expecta fll {ormalisticenalysis of actual reasoning. Itisto be remarked tha, ofa, the most that has ever been shown in support of this conception is that in cztain areas (¢, elementary logic, Section 2) reasoning could be mech ‘nical in the venue that a mechanism would get the same results; not that t ssi, that it would follow the same routes. It may be thatthe mechanistic conception isthe only moderately clear idea of reasoning that we have at presen. But «good poritvist should not conclude from this that therefore thisideais correct. (©) Unreliablity of some nutve notion: the rol of formalization in their ‘analysis. A uch more serious point than the portmanteau objections () ‘and (i) under (2) concerns specie abstract notions, for instance—to take the most famous examnple—the notion of set. Have nor the paradawes shown the compete unreliabliy of our inulvecowietions atlas about this par- ticular notion? First of al, historically speaking, this could’ be farther from the truth!2 GEORG KREISEL Wasn't Cantor a misunderstood martyr in the face of widespread re- actionary prejudice against employing the notion of set (or, a8 it was then ‘alle: clas) in mathematis? I 5, the paradoxes supported the intuitive ‘convictions of those reactionaries. Tt is probably true to say thatthe restionay caution was due to this: class presented itsef as vague notion, of, specially, a mixture of notions including () finite sets of individuals (ie. objects without member), or i) Sets of something (as in mathematics, sets of numbers, sts of points), but ‘so (ii) properties of intensons where one has no a prior’ bound on the extension (which are very common in ordinary thought but notin mathe- matics). If we aze thinking of ts of something, eof objects belonging 10 2, then the comprehension axiom isto be restricted to read (for any pro- perty P) Bx Vy(yexes [yea & POD; bat if we are thinking of properties gven in intension, whote range of Aefnition snot determined, we may wel have (with variables ranging over Properties) FO VRIO(R) + POR) ‘only one had better remember that these propetie are not everywhere ‘efined and so the laws of two valued logic are not valid (So, t be precise, the logical symbols have different meaning in the two cases) "Now, the reactionaries were wrong because atleast one element of the rminture (namely; set of something), fs described clearly by Russell and, specially, Zero, has proved tobe marvellousl clear and comprehensive. ‘But before this analysis the prospects were not rosy: what one could hope to-do was to put down assertions which are safe by all elements ofthe ‘mixture, and it just didnt look asf this ‘common part’ was going ead to 2 mathematically rich theory: more precisely, to something in terms of ‘which anything like (ten) curent mathemalis could be interpreted. In ions which are evidently valid for the particular notion isolated by Zerme (cumulative type structure) give a formal foundation (even) for 4 great deal of present day mathematical practice “The main problem which, in my opinion, the paradoxes present can be putquite wellinld fashioned language: what are he proper laws (te ogi) ated bythe intensional element of the crude mixture, in particular, the ‘lenent i) which satis the unrestricted comprehension axiom |The recursion theoren or pat cue fanctins i analogous to soc 2 conptheslon esas e mist sere sv oda the sa for mr) aba Se eRe Se aay compton usm witout ype retncean thous INFORMAL RIGOUR ® ‘Two conclusions about matters discussed at this mectng follow. Fi _Zermelo's analysis furnishes an instance ofa rigoous discovery of axioms (or the notion of set. To avoid trivial misunderstanding note thie: What ‘one means hee is that the intuitive notion of the cumulative ype structure Drovides a coherent source of axioms: our understanding is suficient 10 void an endles string of ambiguities to be resolved ty further basic di tinction, like the distinction above between abstract properties and ses of Something. Pragmatically speaking cf. (2) above, one does not have to put {op with an ad hoe collection of diferent axioms for diferent “purposes (Ghough ad hoe considerations may be needed to show which ofthe new axioms are relevant to a particular purpose). Denying the (alleged) bare ‘ation of multfurcation of our notion of St of the cumulative hierarchy i ‘nothing else but asserting the properties of ou intuitive conception ofthe ‘cumulative type structure mentioned above. This does not den the esta lished fac that, in addition to this basi troctur, there areal technically interesting non-standard models. From the presen’ point of view, the im- portance of adding srong axioms of infinity existence of large ordinal ») Isclear. For, adding them doesnot reict the unconditional assertions we ‘ean make about initial segments ofthe hierarchy below a; but leaving them ‘ut stops us from saying anything unconditional beyond «. For instance, ‘consider the axiom afinfnty (existence ofa, which s included in Zermel's fxioms);anarithmeti theorem 4 provedin Zermelo's theory, an arithmetic theores 8 proved from the Riemann hypothesis only. WithoUt the assump- ton of a, both 4 and Bare hypothetical: ‘statistically’, I suppose, ‘equally” stig, since after all the Riemann hypothesis has not led to a contr ‘ition (otherwise it would be refuted). But, intuitively, isestablshed and. ‘Bis not. Unless one denies the validity ofthis distinction, leaving out the ‘assumption of w conficts with requirement (i) on informal rigour on p. 78 ‘Second the actual formulation of axioms played an auxiliary rather than basic role in Zermelo's work the intuitive analysis ofthe crude mixture of notions namely the description ofthe typestructure, ed tothe good axioms these constitute a record, notte instruments of clarification. Anda similar ‘conceptual analysis wil be needed for solving the problem ofthe paradox. (©) Formalization. What has been said above about the formulation of, sxioms, applies even more to the formulation of rules of inference (or Hic in the Menor: Ce Mtns thse ceeding en the bere ft tv kind of conse prof dtest ston fat an Rass an Sores ‘epurthe puraeser art dead (rate ae (4. Ras Matinee of Meamathenatis, Waste (63)a GEORG KREISEL further details, see Section 2). In fact, on quite general grounds, one would ‘expect the role of formalization to be always auxiliary in the analysis of ‘notions. Afterall, thejob of formalization to record and codify arguments ‘without distinguishing the good from the bad. And, leaving generalities, if ‘ne considers the so-called ‘rises in mathematics, one never disagreed bout the inferences themselves, but either abou the axioms (compreien= sion axiom) or about the rules ofinference aw of the excluded middle the Intuitionistic eric), $0, precision ofthe notion of consequence was nota primary isu. If one believes that precision is the principal objective of formalization, and formalization of logic, one cannot be surprised that French mathematician wed o think oflogic asthe hygiene of mathemati and English mathematicians of logic as a matter of dotting the 1's and crossing the 1's (What logic doesis to study notions which were previously ‘otrecognized at al ori recognize, only used heuristically, and not made an object of detailed study; among them traditional philosophic nations) 1 seems certain that, for the psychological proces of understanding, formalization is indeed important; only Ido not have a good analysis. But there are some quite clear reasons why the roe of formalization for fundo- ‘mental analysis should be overvalued Fist and foremost, there are probably quite afew who scorn Hilbers programme, but hold on to formalization as a kind of colectve ree. Filbert wanted to show (asthe positivist in (a) above should have done) that ‘one really lost nothing by coining oneself to formal operations, and he found a way of expressing this in the form of a mathematical problem, namely his programme. Axiomatization, in fat sret formalization of inference, was essential for the very formulation ofthis programme. In ciently, there was no idea of ejecting on general grounds the notion of Second order consequence (Section 2), but of showing its equivalence, at leas in suitable contexts, to formal drivabiity, as had been done for fst ‘order logical consequence. Unless one had been coavinced of the latter ‘equivalence one would never have engaged in Hilbert’ proeramme. ‘Second, explicit formulation of axioms and rules undoubtedly plays a big role in everyday work of logician. Examples: () If the basic concepts are accepted, one can make deductions /romaxioms clearer by eliminating those formally unnecessary to the conclusion; but, eg in Zermelo's analysis t0 make the meaning of the basic concepts clear, he made them more speci. {i} Suppose one wants to explain why acetain question happens obe ore fe gueses a formal system, Le, properties ofthe intuitive nation, which mathematicians are Hkely to use; one supports this guess by showing that current mathematics follows from these axioms, and one explains the situation by showing that this question is wot decided in the formal sytem INFORMAL RIGOUR s (personaly ike this sort of thin). Gi fone wants to remember & proof ‘ne remembers the axioms used inthe proof: the les thereare the les proofs have to be remembered. (OF courseall his oes o show that alot ofthe everyday work of logicians ‘snot concerned with ndamentl analysis at al (ven if one would lke it fo be), As someone (nearly) sad at Balaclava: C'est magnifique, mai 2 ne sont pas es fondement 1. Higher-Order Asiomatizations and Independence Profs. Ths section takes the presse nation of set (inthe Sense ofthe cumulative? type structure ‘of Zermelo,(b),p. #2) 3s stating point and wes it to formulate and refine ‘ome intuitive distinctions, Spefeally, one analyses concepts according to the order ofthe language needed to define them. The connection between ‘this technical exposition (nthe sense of p78) and informal rigour appears in (@) below. tis clear thatthe matters technical because the very idea ofa definition requires an interpretation ofthe language, for instanceof the logical sym- bol. In the present case they ae interpreted by means of the (set-theoretic) operations of complementation, union and projection. The languages used fate those of predicate lie (for instance, in Church's book) ‘More of les familar examples. Such notions as equivalence relation or onder ate defined by First-order formulae Ay, Ay fesp., Le, in ordinary predicate cleulus, inthe sense that a structute consisting ofa domain aand 2 relation on a(.e,.bCa% a) satisfies Ay, Ap if and only if bis an equi ‘ance relation, resp. an order on a. We are nowadays very familar with this but it‘was a not at all obvious discovery that intuitive notions of ‘esuivalence or order could be defined in tems of sucha simple language a8 predicate logic of fit order. Equally it was a discovery thatthe only con- ‘epts definable in his way which are unigue upto isomorphism ae finite ‘Structures. 80, both the expressive powet and the limitations of firstorder Tanguage came as a surprise. "The familiar classical structures (natural numbers with the successor relation, the coosinuum with a denumerable dense base et. are definable by secontoner axioms, as shown by Dedekind. Zermelo showed that his Lrlemenae, se, obiets which have no cements but are differnt from. Evgeny, "rowers beste mr conepa cont present hemarves sconce eh seal arcs of tates ocr aia, Indus For the react portant ta convince fea ha nut gncat feature are teatane unger uomorpam or ass sss of womorphtene debnable ean rma ep Tec Sesa GEORG KREISEL cumulative hierarchy up tow oF a +a oF w +n (for fixed m) and other {important ordinals egally deinable by second-order formulae. When- ter we have sch asesond-order definition there i associated a schema in frst order form in he language considered): Fr instance, in Peano's axiom ‘VPL(P(O) & WsiPCa) -» PC& + D]) > VPC] ‘one replaces the second-order quantifier P by alist of those P which are explicitly defined in ordinary first-order form (from + and », for instance). ‘Almomen’s reflection shows thatthe evidence ofthe first-order axiom ‘eterna derives from the second-order schema: the diference i that when tne puts dovin the Astorder schema one is supposed to have convinces ‘nese thatthe specific formulae sed (in pariclar, the logical operations) fre well defined in ny structure that one considers; this wil be taken up in (below. (Warning. The choice of storder sea is not uniquely deter- mined by the second-order axioms! Thus Peano’s own axioms mention explicitly only the constant Oand the seeestor function S, not addition nor ‘ruliplication. The frsvorder schema built up from 0 and Ss a weak, Incidentally decidable subsystem of classical fistorder arithmetic above, ‘and quite inadequate for frmlating current informal arithmetic Informal Figour requires a much more detailed justification fr the choice of + and = ‘han is usualy supplied.) ‘Ao interesting example of «concept that noosa third-order defnition is that of measurable cardinal? Such concepts are rare: for, whenever ‘theoctically a whole hierarchy presets itself, in practice one only uss the first few levels ora notion outside that hierarchy altogether; two concepts may be mentioned here which are not definable by any formula the whole Hierarchy of languages of predicate loge ‘Evidenly, neither the cumulative type structure itself not the structure consisting ofthe ordinals with the ordering relation is definable by any formula of finite (or transite) order for (atleast, usualy) ome requires thatthe universe of the structures considered be a'set, and no seis iso ‘morphic tothe totality ofall ordinals, let alone of als. 'NB. The somewhat crude) classification in terms of order ofthe language considered has recently been refined by the use of infinite formule, for instance, infinite first-order formulae. These or, atleast, important clases (of them are intermediate between frsorder and second-order formulae since any structure definable by a formula in is also definable by means ‘ofa (inte) second-order formula, but not conversely. The ordinal «is an example. Corie ae INFORMAL RIGOUR " Wis clear that whats achieved in the ease of wis a technical analysis of certain sets of integers by means ofthe notion of integer (sich is used ‘Senta in the theory of infinite formulas)—perhaps, as one Wes induc tion to define, and obiain results about, prime numbers. The notion of fnteger self snot analyied in this way. ‘What is mich more intresting than this obvious remark isthe fact that rich theory of infinite formulae ean be developed specifically, many useful theorems about finite first-order formulae can be extended (0 infinite ones (cunningly chosen) but not to finite or infinite second-order formulae, (@) A reduction of assertions about higher order consequence to fist-, ‘order atemensin the language of st theory, Since the notion of resization. (ofa formula (r, of model of any given orders formulated in tems ofthe busi notion of set one may expectthat,e8., 4h; Bie, Bisaconsequence ‘ofthe second-order formula, is expressed by a fstorde formula of set theory. More precisely, expresed by sucha formula when the quantifiers are interpreted to range over ll es ofthe cumulative type stucture. One expects this simply becauseitisalwaysclaimed that this fis-order language {is adequate for all mathematies; so if it wereo't adequate for expressing second-order consequence, somebody would have noticed it* ‘A simple calculation verifies this; moreover, the definition wes exactly the same basic notions a3 that of frsorder consequence: nly instead of & ‘quantifier Va (over all es) followed by a formula whose quantifiers are restricted toa, ie. (V6), one asa formula containing also quantifiers (bea). ‘Asa corollary, any conclusion that we may formulae in erms of se2ond- ocder consequence canal be formulated by means fa rstorder assertion about the cumulative «ype structure. However, hewrstialy, thet is for Finding the Girst-order assertion, t may be very Useful to think in terms of second-order assertions ‘Example, Let 7 be Zermlo's axiom with the axiom of infinity, and let (CH be the yanenical) formulation of the continuum hypothesis in the following form: if C, isthe collection of hereditary finite sets without Individuals, Cy ~ CuU WED, Cova Can U Cys CH tates that XS Cys > FeO V Fo Cray, ley tat 0 ret efor tans, ome te ale th ee formulae of er theory, much tat ne Tes ta oe Bay es indeed By Corrente et? ‘A Tare empaind, Tt nt dnl by eo ends formal Gi he ‘Precise sense above). iGEORG KREISEL “which i expressed by mens of quantifiers over Cava. As Zermelo pointed tut (ece above), if we use the curtent setsheoretc definition Z(x) of the ‘Somutaie vearchy in any model of 2, this formula Z defines aC, fora mit ordinal ¢ > &. Consequently we have CIV Eh OD [Note that CHis formulated in fs-order language of set theory. Gt Duuncion formulated interns of higheardet comsequete: Tn conte tsthectample on CH above, Faces replacement nor 98 ‘ededby Zarclowaxioms (because 2 nsatisiedby Cy qand Fraenkel Siete sin penicarI independent of Zermeios secent-order TERBa She ty Cohen's root, CH i ely independent ofthe a-order ‘Shona nocd withthe anon) of Zermeo-Fraenke “Psa isto al the (materasa Ta hat he dino ewe scoala fomseuene and fotondeorseucnee (om fe ehee) sot wa ‘ny, shows a dire ben einen of Berm of sia igsomary ont one hand and of CH in staré they iguana as formolated by Pech or Biber) wealso havea secon-order a athe ano of conuity of Dedekind eto: he paral seam inn een aeconbodercnstence of tis axiom 1 1 26 Spon to Fraenkel ant, nt vo CH raaly consider the erp at tat nobofy was astonished by the independence of Facklam, Ut many people weve Sune y ESE aut Thisrentionngutecoriten with my esertion above hat (eEhubocaftne tarde stems derives frm thesecond-ords axiom TRS one explained vo a mathematician the iinet above be woul Fiera at thc ingenuity required o ext; own work he never ves tee thought to te for of he predate asd nthe comprehension {Semis theremoasehy, 8, Bourbalisenremed carlo 0 {eoShumions ora mathemati Yearem, but reves the anime of {Mecympustin a partculrdedition,ewhatiesanes oftecom tepehdon sas are used. Thi pacice i ite coset wih the Stan tat what oe ha i mind when lowing Boutbaks profs Teond order oxom: andthe practice would be hori unsentieit estat ook the ested hema as Basic) *e) Connection betnecn formal rigour and the ton of Rgher onder coaegans the fit porto nts that Henan eeded forthe ery ‘eitaton ofthe uneven stove. Th irtraes te weakness ofthe {era dostine im,» mich ens (0 acep 2 stntion ests formulted In cvtan rete terms, (NB. Ofcourse one INFORMAL RIGOUR ® ‘wants to study the formalist reduction, Hilber’s program of (),p-86 the restriction is not only acceptable, But necessary. Bo the ft that the i tuitvely significant distinction above cannot beso formulated, reduce the foundational importance ofa formals analysis, by requirement (i) of informal rigour) "Next it snot surprising that threis a certain arymmetry between the role ‘of higher-order consequence for derivabiity results (Section 1) and its rele independence results (Section 1(b). The same i flare, fom recursion theory. Thos ta establish negative (i. unsolvablty) results one will aim in the fst place to show reesve unsolabily, while to show solvability one gives a partizwar schema and a proof showing thatthe Schema works. Similaly, cf, end ofthe introduction; eve ia problem is recursively solvable, one may Wish to explain why it has not ben solved: by shoving, eg, that there i no schema ofa given kind which can be proved towork by given methods, of se by showing that calculations are too one.) Curiously enough, this obvious point is sometimes overlooked Fall, and this is ofcourse the most direct ink between the present and the main theme of this ale, second-order decigabilty of CH (in the ‘example of (a) above) sues this: new primitive notions, ee. properties ‘of natural numbers, which are nor definable inthe language of st theory (uch asin the footnote en p87), may have tobe taken seriously to decide ‘CH; for, what is eft out when one replaces the second-order axiom bythe schema, are precisely the properties which are not so definable. But Iam sure I don’t know: the ideas totally obviouk; most people the Bed are so accustomed to working With the restricted language that they may simpy not succeed im taking other properties seriously and, finally, compared With specific examples that come 2 mind, eg. te footnote on p. #7, the so-called axioms of iniity® which are formulated i first-order form are more efficient, 2 Intuitive Lopial Validity, Trash tn all Seetheoretic Structures, and Formal Deriabty, We sal consider formulse = of Finite order (a denot- ing formulae of ordet i), the predicate Vata to mean: «is intuitively valid, Vara valid in all set-theoretic structures, and Dai formally derivable ‘by means of some fixed (accepted) st of formal ules. For reference belo Ys einablein the language of st theory, and for recursive rules Ds is definable uniformly, Ue. fac each o> a, the Same formula defines D when the variables range over C,. Below, we tal also consider Vea validity in clases (.. the univees ofthe structure is class 2. Gade “RemasAstfoe te Pinon Beene Coneence on problems sn aida Te Undeciot eM Baniy, Now York 985), 9p. -R” GEORG KREISEL ‘and the relations are also classes) atleast for formula of fist and second order. What isthe Relation Between Val and V? (@) Meoning of Val. The intuitive meting of Val ers from that of V fn one particular: Va (merely) aserts that is tre in ll structures in the ‘cumulative hierarchy, mall sets in the precise sense of ser above, while Vala asserts that i tru in all structures (for an obvious example ofthe difference, see pp. 90-51). A current view is tht the notion of arbitrary structure and hence of intuitive logical validity is so vague shat itis absurd to ask fora proof eating itt a precise notion such as Vor D, and hee the most one can do isto givea kind of plausibility argument. Let us go back to the fact (wich mt in doubs) that One easons in smathematial practi, sng the notion of consequence oof logical con sequence, ely and surely (and, recall p. 84, the “criss in the past ia ‘lasial mathematics by (0, . #3, were not det lack of precision in the ‘notion of consequence). Aso, itis generally agreed that at the time of rege ‘who formulate rules fer first-order loge, Bolzano's set-theoretic definition ‘ofconsequence had been forgotten (and had tobe rediscovered by Tarski); yet one recognized the validity of Frege's rules (D,). This means that implciy ViVa(Dyat > Vale) was accepted, and therefore certainly Val was accepted as meaningful "Next, consider the two alternatives to Val. Fist (€. Bourbaki) ‘uli rately” inference is nothing ele but following formal rules, in otber ‘words Dis primary (though now D must not be regarded as define se ‘theoretically, but combinatorial). This ia specally pul idea, because 98 per ent ofthe readers, and 9 per cent ofthe writers of Bourbaki, don't have the rules their hesds tall! Nobody would expect a mathematician to ork on groups fhe di not know th definition ofa group. (By Section £0), the notion of set is treated in Bourbaki ike Val) Stcond, consider the susestion that ulimately” inference i semantcal ie, Vismeant. This tooishardly convincing. Consider a formula withthe ‘binary relation symbol £ as single non-lgical constant; et, rean that = js tre when the quantifier in « range overall sets and Eis replaced bythe ‘membership elation. (Note that, i. first-order formula of set theory.) ‘Then intuitively one concludes: Thais logically valid then 2y, ie. (in symbols): Vale > a. But one certainly doesnot conclude immediatly: Va» a: for ,regites that ‘be tre nthe strutute consisting ofa es (vith the membership relation); its universes not set at al. So Va (ais tr in each set-theoretic struct) INFORMAL RIGOUR o oes not allow us to conclude a, “immediately: this is made precise by ‘means of the results in (b)and (2 below, On the other hand one does accept ‘vivatVale! > Va!) the moment one takes it for granted that logic apples to mathematical "Nobody will deny that one knows more about Val after one has established its relations with V ad 0; but that doen't can that Val was tapue before. ‘Ip face we have the theorem: For j= 1, given the two accepted properties of Val above, Val Valaes Va) and Va!Valaes De). ‘The proof uses Gadet's completeness theorem: Va(Va > Da). Com bined with Va!(Da-— Vala) above, we have Val(Vaws Da), and with YiValVala! > Va!) above: Va\ Va‘ Vala) Without Gide!'scomplete- nese theorem we have from the two accepted properties of val: ‘Wal(Da > Va), incidentally theorem which des not involve the primitive nation Vala ‘At least, Vals not 10 vague to permit proof ofits equivalence to Vfor first-order « by use ofthe properties of Val abovel (0) TherelaionBeonen V2 (a containing binary E2ssingle non logical constant) and eq. To discuss the itis convenient to use the theory of ex- plicily definable properties (usually called: theory of classes) and the relation Sad, B39) to mean: the property A end the relation B( A x A) satisfy a. We can represent finite sequences of chasses ay, wy Ay_by a single clas (1 Kinayin-ep & x6 Ay) lf each A, isexplcly definable ois. Now, by standard techniques of forming truth definitions, Sar(4, 8,2) i defined by 3CZ(A,B,C,2) where 2 doesnot contain lass variables! other than (the fre variables) A, BC. Let U stand forthe class of restricted to U. ses, and & forthe membership relation ‘he defnion has he flowing marion property. If these variables ia sane ver Coo he comuanre hve the le re objec af Coes and he ated fils above for een tnd By Sac e ame sto © heer © ‘ues vel of Gey ont over cements 9 Cy expetysotoabe fom 4 INQ foe conetponlae ca or upheraree orgie gute erentn GEORG KREISEL For each porticular&! we have: Val + Sat(U,E,3) provable i the theory of clases with axiom of infinity, hence Va» 5. Cor, By a wellknown resltof Novak (ee App. AY), Va! >i provable inset theory for each formula & “The proof ofthe theorem ses Va(Va! > Dga!) for cut fee rules (e8 Gentzen'), and then, for fixed &, Dg > Sar(U,E,3) by means of a ruth ‘efnition for subjormulae of & For the proof of Wa(Va! =» Dea!) one ‘needs of course the axiom of infinity since some o are valid in all finite Structures without being logically valid "The machinery needed for this proof certainly justifies the reservations above aginst the assumption that we simply mean V (e, truth inal et theoretic structures in some precise sense of se) when Speaking of logical validity. Note incidentally, if we take any suitable finitely axiomatzed set ‘theory S, there isan &for which V&-— a, is not provable in (namely, take {or & the negation ofthe conjunction of the axioms of S, granted that a ‘sultble’ set theory cannot prove its own consisteney, ity ot ~ V3). “The doubts are further confirmed by (© Waltva! + Sea(U,E,a!) i mot provable i the theory of classes. it wer, dy the main result of App. A,” we should have an explicit set, ‘theoretic Fa! such that VatlVa > 5, E.Fe,9)) is provable in the theary of classes. This reduces toa purely set-theoretic formula o alla (Fas) hich s proved in afte subsystem $; of et theory; regarded asa formal ‘object of predicate logic (with € replaced by a binary elation symbol), Tet 8; be a and let (+, regarded ata formal objec, be Thus Fa Mo, eV) > Ziff, +12),05 + 12 ‘But for the particular formula 9; +12, without use of induction, we vetfy that (U,E> satisfies 2) +1 Le. ay 2ulFley +1 9),0) + Vn) (5) + Wala > By (Fa, 0. Since FS), and, by assumption, Fy), we have by, (0) +19) But this would prove the consistency ofS in) ‘Since endy om the Intended interpretation of the theory of clases {explicitly definable properties) (*) is valid, we hace found an instance of "Yomited bre 4) INFORMAL RIGOUR * cxincompetenes, Thus looking tthe intuitive relation Va, lads one not ‘only to formal proof asin (2) but also to incompleteness theorems. (@) All this a for first-order formulae. For higherorder formulae we donot hae conencng proof of 8, Wa%( Va» Vala) though one would fexpoct one. A more specific question can be formulated in tems of the bierarchy of types C. Let V° mean: rin all structures tha belong tC, “Then Wa! Vo > ev" as 179) (Skolem-Loweneim theorem), What Js the analogue (00) fr secondaorder formulae? eg. i is Zermelo's stem of axioms, P=" is false, V"9(-134 is rv. This analogue oa i certainly large. Let «assert ofthe structure (ae) that (itis Cy or limit numbers i, that saises Zermelo’s (econd)-order sxioms, (i) , Here () of socond order, and (ips of rst order relative to (). 8 ~ (ae), we have V°C1B) foro the First measurable cardinal, but not V° C1) for @ >. Since we do not even know a reduction analogous to the basic Skolem— Loewenheim theorem, its perhaps premature to ask for an analogue to Yal(V"tae+ Da). For instance, a well rounded theory of higher-order formulae may be posibie ony for infinitely long ones. For infinite fst- ‘order formulae we do know an analogue when Ds is replaced by certain [generalized inductive definitions (arta). ‘General Conclusion. Ther is ofcourse nothing new in treating Vas an understood concept; after all Gide! established completeness without having to mention V; he simply used implicitly the obvious W(Vala + vera) and Va{Da-> Vale) (incidetily for all 13), and. proved ‘Wal(V*"la-+ Da). 1 seems a sod time to examine thi soled problem carefully because (besides Heyting's rules for intuitionist validity, cf Section 3) we face problems about Fitist validity (Valy) and predcative ‘validity (Yalp) not unlike those raised by Frege's rules. Thus, asin is case, tre have (recursive) rules Dy, and Dp for finistic and prediatve deduc- tions respectively, established by means of autonomous progressions; and then equivalence to Vly, resp. Valp (or the languages considered) is almost a plausible as was Val» Dat the time of Frege. But we have not yet found principles as convincing as those of Section 2(a) above to clinch the matter in fact we do not have an analogue to V. POSTSCRIPT ‘The following bibliographical information seems useful; incident, it explains the omission of those sections of the orginal arile which are not, reprinted here.o GEORG KREISEL . 79, Section 3 (omitted here) analyses Brouwer’ empirical propositions hich he uses in his proof ef Wal ~Ax(ax ~0) > Bex 0), “These propositions have been further analysed by Kripke and Myhill (Mt ‘The particular use of these propositions by Brouwer and analysed in Section 3 is superseded by a more delicate analysis of fee choice sequences in paragraph 4 of (K2]- Incidentally, much more interesting vse of these propositions was made by Kripke who refuted, from them, Chureh's thesis by. deriving Va 3p Vn Sel T (pvt) A an ~ Un, (Evidently we have a 3p Vn amlT(pynym) Aan = Un) if ranges over lawless sequences, ‘ez, those generated by ad, since it would be absurd to prove of any die {hat it must fellow a predetermined sequence. Kripke’s argument is needed ‘because i concerns a diferent notion of sequence.) ‘Appendix B is superseded by much stronger conservative extession resuls not only for non-standard arithmetic, but also for non-standard analysis KS '. 86. Paragraph 4 of [K1] teats the step from second-order axioms 10 fstorder schemata systematically '. 87. Second paragraph. A good theory of infinite formulae is developed in the dissertation of J. Barwise, Stanford Universit, 1967. p.93.Some additional information about V* =" iscontained on pp. 191-2, of KK. L116. Krein “A Survey of Proot Thea’ own of Symbole Lal, Vol 38 (096) 9p. 3 THREE Kee “Lanes Sequences of Natural Number Compo, Vo. 20 , THEIL. Kreis “Axomtzations of Norandard Anis wiih are Consent: Mpplcaton of model ory To ier ton DORIC. Krcst and -L. Kelig, Element of marta pe, North-Holland Puting Coy amaera, iMisR, Myhiy‘Neter Towards am Axiomatizsion or intone Ani, Loge drape, NOLS (1S pp. OS ass 08 probaly vi SYSTEMS OF PREDICATIVE ANALYSIS! SoLoMON FerERMAN Dedicated to Professor Charles Loewner on the occasion of his “oth birthday. “Tuts paper is divided into two parts, Part I provides a resumé ofthe evol- tation ofthe notion of predicativity* Part I describes our own work on the subject" PART I 1. Conceptions of Sets Statements about ses ie atthe heart of most modern attempts to systematize all (or, atlas, all knowa) mathematics. ‘Technical and philosophical discussions concerning such systematizations and the undevving conceptions have ths occupied a considerable portion ofthe literature on the foundations of mathematics From these discussions we can distinguish faicly well atleast the two extremes of what sets are conceived to be In this section, wecompare these ‘so conceptions as they pertain to sets of finite ype, in particular, ses of ‘natural qumbers. The remainder ofthe paper i devoted to sytematzations ‘of mathematical analysis based on one of these conceptions. From one point of view, often identified asthe Platoare or Canorian conception, sts have an existence which is independent of human dei- nitions and constructions. The words “arbitrary set” are often used 10 ‘emphasize this idependeace. Various statements about sets are readily recognized tobe correct under tis conception, for example the axioms of From te Jounal of Symbol Lape, Vo. 2 (1964), pp 1-20. Copyright @ 196 Aeprnted by perme of the pelts the Amey Mathcad Sey, ond therthor {CEs nro: po bove= Ed ‘Fron a rece attesting sey of th ope the reader shoulé compare G. Kreis, su pein’ ain Std Mehmed Pre w ms We ae much indebed to Profesor Keel for many amiating dicons NOMach of the renerch forthe new work evetbed in Fare 11 below was sup eG See eS Ar Ress Oe OA ARO96 SOLOMON FEFERMAN ‘comprehension and of choice. Other statements, such as the continu hypothesis snd ite generalizations remain undecided on this conception. (However, the inability of humans to decide such questions an no more be charged as a defect of this conception than can thei inability to decide ‘certain nomber.theortial statements onthe basis ofthe usaal conceptions ofthe natural numbers) ‘The other extreme is what we shall rele toa the predicatve conception. “Acconding to this, ony the natural numbers can te regarded a given" tous (and, in the even more severe nominalist point of view, not even these abstract objects are available tous). In corrast, es are created by man to ‘ct as convenient abstractions (/aron parle) from particular conditions or definitions. In order, for example, to predicatively introduce a set S of, natural numbers we must have before usa condition (2), in tems of Which we define 5 by an Asive So Hh However, before wecan assert the existence of such S, should already have ‘been realized tha the defining condition x) has a welldetermined meaning hicks independent of whether orn there exist asetSsatisying (1.1) (ut ‘which ean depend on what sts have been previously realized to exist). In particular, to determing what members has, we should not beled via B(x) Intoa vciowrcirele which would return us to the very question we started ath, Conditions (3) which doo are said be impredicarive; it should be ‘expected that most conditions (x) involving quantifiers ranging over ‘abi- teary’ ses are ofthis nature. Finally, we can never speak sensibly (inthe predicative conception) ofthe ‘Yoality’ of all sets as 2 "completed totality" but only asa potential oalty whose fll contents never fully grasped but only relied bn stages. “The least upper bound principle of csssicl analysis provides anim portant example of the use of impredicative definitions. We can identily tional numbers with certain natural mumbers and then identify real mum bers with certain ses of natural numbers va Dedekind sections oF Cauchy Sequences. If we identify real numbers with the upper parts of Dedekind sections we see thatthe Lu. of a (bounded, non-empty) set of real ‘numbers (with rational Li) is imply given by S=A1¥(Xe.a) Ifa is aiven by a condition 6X), aa AxXe #4 60), then the intersection Sis given by ay Asbre Se AX) > x€ 39) SYSTEMS OF PREDICATIVE ANALYSIS ” ‘The existence of such Sis ofcourse, clear under the Cantorian conception. However, to answer the question ‘What ae the members of $? we would, in general, rst have to know what sets X satisfy 6X), and in particu whether or not 6(S) holds; this would, in turn, in general depend on Knowing what members Shs Objections tothe use ofimpreicative definitions in mathematics have been raised by a number of writes. At fst, these objections centred on their role in the paradoxes (Poincaré, Russel). However, i became clear before long thatthe paradoxes wee avoided by some simple estictions on the ute ofthe comprehension principle, while hardly abandoning impredi- ‘ative definitions otherwise, The more thorough-going critics, suchas Wea}, rejected thee ue throughout mathematics ad in particular as applied in the Lu. principe of analysis. Basically, thes critics refused to belive that tere was any evidence to support the Cantorian conception of sets as independently existing entities. Weyl desribed*impredicative analysis as “a house bull on san? ina Toscian’s paradise In defence ofthe Cantorian conception of es we quote Gade!” p. 137 “tessems to me thatthe assumption of such objects is quite as legitimate as the astumption of physical bodies and there is quite as much reason to ‘believe in their existence. They ar in the same sense necessary to obiain a factory system of mathematics as physical bodies are necessary for a Satisfactory theory of ou sense perceptions and in both cases itis imposs- ‘ble to interpret the propositions one Wants to assert about these entities as ‘propositions about the "dats, i, in the later case the actully cccuring Sense perceptions.” Earlier in the same essay (p. 127), Gel supports, ret jusifed, the vew that the axioms of logic and mathematics. need ‘ot necesarily be evident in themselves, but rather thee Justification let (xscdy asin physics inthe fact that they make it possible for these "sense perceptions” to he deduced; which of course would not exclude that they Also havea kind of intrinsic plausibility salar to that in physics’. Presum- bly, the direct evidence of mathematics whichis spoken of here and whic ‘corresponds tothe sense perceptions” of physics includes at least fii cally verfable propositions concerning the natural numbers (which is not tosay tha these ae al the data). ‘The actual development of mathematics strongly supports one interpre- thom the Sat the ena th sco TENG Be vue Race Uncharted Gdn de "FA Gadel,“ Ruseetls mathematical log’, The Pabsophy of Bertrand Ressl, New Yor 98h pps