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1. ELCANO v. HILLG.R. No. L-24303, May 26, 1977

G.R. No. L-24303, May 26, 1977
Topic: Sources of Obligation
Reginald Hill, son of Atty. Marvin Hill who was a minor but emancipated through
marriage, killed Agapito Elcano. However, in a criminal case filed against him, he was
acquitted because of absence of intent to kill and his offense was that coupled with
mistake. The family of Elcano now filed claim for damages but, upon motion of
defendants, such was dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Quezon City on the
basis that Reginald was acquitted of the criminal charge and that they have no cause
of action against his father as he was already emancipated by his marriage.
Whether petitioners have a right of action against defendants in that Reginald
was acquitted of the criminal case and was already emancipated by marriage
The Court held that despite Reginalds acquittal, petitioners shall not be barred
from instituting recovery for damages as under Article 2177 of the Civil Code. The
nature of the offense is that of culpa aquiliana where it involved negligence of the
defendant and wherein there was no preexisting contractual relation between them.
The civil action was separate and independent from the criminal case. Also, petitioners
have action against his father as Article 2180 states that those responsible for the
persons who committed an offense which was a quasi-delict shall also be liable. His marriage
does not emancipate him from entering into transaction which gives rise to
judicial litigation and so his father is subsidiary liable. The Court reversed the appealed
decision and ordered the trial court to proceed according to its opinion.

2. Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil 607

Facts: On May 3, 1936, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate taxicab driven
by Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Dimapilis. The carretela was over-turned, and a
passenger, a 16-year old boy, Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died. A criminal action was
filed against Fontanilla, and he was convicted. The court in the criminal case granted the petition
to reserve the civil action. Garcia and Almario, parents of the deceased, on March 7, 1939, filed
a civil action against Barredo, the proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Fontanilla,
making him primarily and directly responsible under culpa acquiliana of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. It is undisputed that Fontanillas negligence was the cause of the
accident, as he was driving on the wrong side of the road at high speed, and there was no
showing that Barredo exercised the diligence of a good father of a family, a defense to Article
2180 of the said Code. Barredos theory of defense is that Fontanillas negligence being
punished by the Revised Penal Code, his liability as employer is only subsidiary, but Fontanilla,
was not sued for civil liability. Hence, Barredo claims that he cannot be held liable.
Issue: Whether or not Barredo, as employer is civilly liable for the acts of Fontanilla, his
Held: Quasi-delict or culpa acquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code of the
Philippines is entirely distinct and independent from a delict or crime under the Revised Penal
Code. In this jurisdiction, the same negligent act causing damage may produce civil liability
(subsidiary) arising from a crime under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines;
or create an action for quasi-delicto or culpa aquiliana under Articles 2179 and 2180 of the Civil
Code and the parties are free to choose which course to take. And in the instant case, the
negligent act of Fontanilla produces two (2) liabilities of Barredo: First, a subsidiary one because
of the civil liability of Fontanilla arising from the latters criminal negligence under Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code, and second, Barredos primary and direct responsibility arising from his
presumed negligence as an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Since the plaintiffs
are free to choose what remedy to take, they preferred the second, which is within their rights.
This is the more expedious and effective method of relief because Fontanilla was either in prison
or just been released or had no property. Barredo was held liable for damages.

3. Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113

Facts: On October 22, 1969, at around 4pm, a 3-way vehicular accident occurred along MacArthur Highway Bulacan, involving a Mercedez Benz owned and driven by petitioner, a private
jeep owned and driven by respondent Salazar and a gravel and sand truck owned by respondent
Timbol and driven by Montoya. As a consequence, separate informations were filed against
Salazar and Montoya.
At the trial, petitioner testified that Salazar overtook the truck, swerved to the left and hit his
car. He further testified that before impact, Salazar jumped from the jeep not knowing that
Salazar was hit by the truck of Montoya. Montoya affirmed this. On the other hand, Salazar tried
to show that after overtaking the truck, he flashed a signal showing his intention to turn left but
was stopped at by a policeman directing traffic at the intersection which he contends to be the
time he was hit by the truck causing his jeep to hit petitioners car.
(1) Whether or not the damages ensued to the vehicle of petitioner shall be the liability of the
driver of the jeep or of the truck.
(2) Whether or not the trucks owner may be held liable for damages caused by him employee.
Held: Thus, the trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any liability, civil and criminal,
in view of its findings that the collision between Salazar's jeep and petitioner's car was the result
of the former having been bumped from behind by the truck driven by Montoya. Neither was
petitioner awarded damages as he was not a complainant against truck-driver Montoya but only
against jeep-owner-driver Salazar.
That petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in the civil case is based on quasi-delict is
evident from the recitals in the complaint to wit: that while petitioner was driving his car along
MacArthur Highway at Marilao, Bulacan, a jeep owned and driven by Salazar suddenly swerved
to his (petitioner's) lane and collided with his car That the sudden swerving of Salazar's jeep was
caused either by the negligence and lack of skill of Freddie Montoya, Timbol's employee, who
was then driving a gravel and sand truck iii the same direction as Salazar's jeep; and that as a
consequence of the collision, petitioner's car suffered extensive damages. Clearly, therefore, the
two factors that a cause of action must consist of, namely: (1) plaintiff's primary right, i.e., that
he is the owner of a Mercedes Benz, and (2) defendant's delict or wrongful act or omission
which violated plaintiff's primary right, i.e., the negligence or lack of skill either of jeep-owner
Salazar or of Timbol's employee, Montoya, in driving the truck, causing Salazar's jeep to swerve
and collide with petitioner's car, were alleged in the Complaint.

Consequently, petitioner's cause of action being based on quasi-delict, respondent Judge

committed reversible error when he dismissed the civil suit against the truck-owner, as said case
may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
In view of what has been proven and established during the trial, accused Freddie Montoya
would be held able for having bumped and hit the rear portion of the jeep driven by the accused
Rodolfo Salazar. Considering that the collision between the jeep driven by Rodolfo Salazar and
the car owned and driven by Edgardo Mendoza was the result of the hitting on the rear of the
jeep by the truck driven by Freddie Montoya, this Court behaves that accused Rodolfo Salazar
cannot be held able for the damages sustained by Edgardo Mendoza's car.

4. Perez vs. Pomar (G.R. No. L-1299, November 16, 1903)

The petitioner Don Vicente Perez filed before the Court of First Instance of Laguna a
complaint asking the court to determine the amount due to him for the services he rendered in
the Tabacalera Company and that the defendant Eugenio Pomar be condemned to the payment
of damages amounting to $3,200, gold, together with the costs of suit. Prior to this event, the
petitioner was asked to be an English interpreter between the defendant and the military
authorities and that after that incident, the petitioner continued to render his services to the
respondent and that he obtained passes and accompanied Pomar upon his journeys to some of
the towns in Province of Laguna( e.g conferences between the respondent and the colonel
commanding the local garrison, conferences with Captain Lemen in the town of Pilar, major in
command in Pagsanjan about the shipment of goods from Manila) and that the plaintiff was
assured by the respondent that in every rendered service to the said company, there would be
such payment. Thus, caused him to abandon his soap business and suffered damages in the sum
of $3,200. The defendant filed for dismissal of the complaint denying the allegations stated by
the petitioner. He also stated that Perez borrowed from time to time money amounting to $175
for his soap business, that Perez purposes in accompanying him is to extend his business and
mercantile relations, free transportation, and that Perez had acted as interpreter of his own
free will without any offer of payment and therefore no legal relation between them existed.

Whether or not the respondent is oblige to pay the continued service rendered by the

Yes. The Court decision is that the judgement should be rendered against Don Eugenio
Pomar for the payment to the plaintiff of the sum of 200 Mexican pesos.

The Court ruled out that if there is a tacit and mutual consent as to the rendition of the
services, the defendant is still obliged to pay such compensation to the petitioner even if there
is no written contract entered between the two parties on the basis of quasi-contract. When
one party knowingly receives something for nothing, the courts may impose a quasi contract.
Under a quasi contract, neither party is originally intended to create an agreement. Instead, an
arrangement is imposed by a judge to rectify an occurrence of unjust enrichment. On the
services rendered by the petitioner in the province of Laguna, it follows that there was a
bilateral obligation on the part of both parties because the defendant accepted the benefit of

the service rendered by the petitioner and that in turn the petitioner expected him to pay his
rendition of service. Provided in Article 22 of the Civil Code, Every person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something
at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. The fact
that the defendant consented to accept an interpreter's services on various occasions, rendered
in his behalf and not considered as free, it is just that he should pay the reasonable payment
because it is well-known principle of law that no one should be permitted to enrich himself to
the damage of another.

5. Song Fo and Co., vs. Hawaiian-Philippine Co. [47 SCRA

821 G.R. No. 23769. September 16, 1925]
Facts: Hawaiian-Philippine Co. got into a contract with Song Fo & Co. where it would deliver
molasses to the latter.
Hawaiian-Philippine Co. was able to deliver 55,006 gallons of molasses before the breach of
SFC filed a complaint for breach of contract against Hawaiian-Philippine Co. and asked
P70,369.50. Hawaiian-Philippine Co. answered that there was a delay in the payment from Song
Fo & Co. and that Hawaiian-Philippine Co. has the right to rescind the contract due to that and
claims it as a special defense.
The judgment of the trial court condemned Hawaiian-Philippine Co. to pay Song Fo & Co. a total
of P35,317.93, with legal interest from the date of the presentation of the complaint, and with
(1) Did Hawaiian-Philippine Co. agree to sell 400,000 gallons of molasses or 300,000 gallons of
(2) Had Hawaiian-Philippine Co. the right to rescind the contract of sale made with Song Fo &
(3) On the basis first, of a contract for 300,000 gallons of molasses, and second, of a contract
imprudently breached by Hawaiian-Philippine Co., what is the measure of damages?
(1) Only 300,000 gallons of molasses was agreed to by Hawaiian-Philippine Co. as seen in the
documents presented in court. The language used with reference to the additional 100,000
gallons was not a definite promise.
(2) With reference to the second question, doubt has risen as to when Song Fo & Co. was
supposed to make the payments for the delivery of molasses as shown in the documents
presented by the parties.
The Supreme Court said that Hawaiian-Philippine Co. does not have the right to rescind the
contract. It should be noted that the time of payment stipulated for in the contract should be

treated as of the presence of the contract. There was only a slight breach of contract when the
payment was delayed for 20 days after which Hawaiian-Philippine Co. accepted the payment of
the overdue accounts and continued with the contract, waiving its right to rescind the contract.
The delay in the payment of Song Fo & Co. was not such a violation for the contract.
(3) With regard to the third question, the first cause of action of Song Fo & Co. is based on the
greater expense to which it was put in being compelled to secure molasses from other sources
to which Supreme Court ruled that P3,000 should be paid by Hawaiian-Philippine Co. with legal
interest from October 2, 1923 until payment.
The second cause of action was based on the lost profits on account of the breach of contract.
Supreme Court said that Song Fo & Co. is not entitled to recover anything under the second
cause of action because the testimony of Mr. Song Heng will follow the same line of thought as
that of the trial court which in unsustainable and there was no means for the court to find out
what items make up the P14,000 of alleged lost profits.

6. Mandarin Villa, Inc. vs. CA and Clodualdo de Jesus

G.R. No. 119850. 20 June 1996.
Ponente: Franciso, J.:
Facts: In the evening of 19 Oct 1989, private respondent de Jesus hosted a dinner for his friends
at the peririoners restaurant, the Mandarin Villa Seafoods Village in Mandaluyong City. After
dinner, the waiter handed to de Jesus the bill amounting to P2,658.50. De Jesus offered his
BANKARD credit card to the waiter for payment. Minutes later, the waiter returned and audibly
informed that said credit card had expired. De Jesus demonstrated that the card had yet to
expire on Sept 1990, as embossed on its face. De Jesus approached the cashier who again
dishonored such card. De Jesus offered his BPI express credit card instead and this was
accepted, honored and verified. The trial court and CA held petitioner to be negligent.
Issues: WON petitioner was negligent; If negligent, WON such negligence was the proximate
cause of private respondents damage.
Ruling: Petition dismissed. The test for determining the existence of negligence in a case may be
stated as follows: did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use the reasonable care
and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not,
then he is guilty of negligence. In the case at bar, the Point of Sale Guidelines which outlined the
steps that petitioner must follow under the circumstances reveals that whenever the words
CARD EXPIRED flashes on screen, petitioner should check cards expiry date as embossed in the
card itself. If unexpired, petitioner should honor the card. Clearly, it has not yet expired in 19
Oct 1989 when the same was dishonored by petitioner. Hence, petitioner did not use the
reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have used in the same
situation and as such, petitioner is guilty of negligence.
The humiliation and embarrassment of private respondent was brought about by the fact of
dishonor by petitioner of private respondents valid BANKARD. Hence, petitioners negligence is
the proximate cause of private respondents damage.

7. [G.R. No. 133107. March 25, 1999]


8. G.R. No. 73345. April 7, 1993.

HOUSE, INC., MILAGROS SANCHEZ SANTIAGO, in her capacity as Register of Deeds for the Province of
Cavite, ARTURO SOLITO, in his capacity as Register of Deeds for Metro Manila District IV, Makati, Metro
Manila and the INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.
-Plaintiff SSS approved the application of Defendant Moonwalk for a loan of P30,000,000 for thepurpose
of developing and constructing a housing project.
-Out of P30,000,000 approved loan, the sum of P9,595,000 was released to defendantMoonwalk.
-A third Amendment Deed of Mortgage was executed for the payment of the amount of P9,595,000.
-Moonwalk made a total payment of P23,657,901.84 to SSS for the loan principal of P12,254,700.
-After settlement of the account, SSS issued to Moonwalk the release of Mortgage for Moonwalks
Mortgaged properties.
-In letter to Moonwalk, SSS alleged that it committed an honest mistake in releasing defendant.
-That Moonwalk has still 12% penalty for failure to pay on time the amortization which is in thepenal
clause of the contract.
-Moonwalks counsel told SSS that it had completely paid its obligation to SSS and thereforethere is no
recovery of any penalty.
Is the penalty demandable even after the extinguishment of the principal obligation?
HELD:No. There has been a waiver of the penal clause as it was not demanded before the fullobligation
was fully paid and extinguished.

Default begins from the moment the creditor demands the performance of the obligation.In this case,
although there were late amortizations there was no demand made by SSSfor the payment of the
hence Moonwalk is not in delay in the payment of the penalty.No delay occurred and there was no
occasion when the penalty became demandable andenforceable.
Since there was no default in the performance of the main obligation-payment of theloan- SSS was
never entitled to recover any penalty.
If the demand for the payment of the penalty was made prior to the extinguishment of theobligation
which are: 1. e principal obligation 2. The interest of 12% on the principalobligation 3. The penalty of
12% for late payment for after demand, Moonwalk would be indelay and therefore liable for the

9. G.R. No. 134685

November 19, 1999

MARIA ANTONIA SIGUAN, petitioner, vs.

A criminal case was filed against LIM with RTC-Cebu city for issuing 2 bouncing checks in the amounts of
P300,000 andP241,668, respectively to SiguanMeanwhile, on 2 July 1991, a Deed of Donation conveying
the following parcels of land and purportedly executed by LIM on 10August 1989 in favor of her
children, Linde, Ingrid and Neil, was registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Cebu City.
Newtransfer certificates of title were thereafter issued in the names of the donees. On 23 June 1993,
petitioner filed an accion pauliana against LIM and her children before RTC-Cebu City to rescind the
questioned Deed of Donation and to declare as null andvoid the new transfer certificates of title issued
for the lots covered by the questioned Deed.
Petitioner s contention:claimed therein that sometime in July 1991, LIM, through a Deed of Donation,
fraudulently transferred allher real property to her children in bad faith and in fraud of creditors,
including her; that LIM conspired and confederated with herchildren in antedating the questioned Deed
of Donation, to petitioner's and other creditors' prejudice; and that LIM, at the time of the fraudulent
conveyance, left no sufficient properties to pay her obligations.
LIM s contention:As regards the questioned Deed of Donation, LIM maintained that it was not
antedated but was made in goodfaith at a time when she had sufficient property. Finally, she alleged
that the Deed of Donation was registered only on 2 July 1991because she was seriously ill.
Issue: Whether the Deed of Donation executed by Rosa Lim (LIM) in favor of her children be rescinded
for being in fraud of petitioner Maria Antonia Siguan?
Even assuming arguendo that petitioner became a creditor of LIM prior to the celebration of the
contract of donation, still her action for rescission would not fare well because the third requisite was
not met. Under Article 1381 of the Civil Code, contracts entered into in fraud of creditors may be
rescinded only when the creditors cannot in any manner collect the claims due them. Also, Article1383
of the same Code provides that the action for rescission is but a subsidiary remedy which cannot be
instituted except when the party suffering damage has no other legal means to obtain reparation for the
The term "subsidiary remedy" has beendefined as "the exhaustion of all remedies by the prejudiced
creditor to collect claims due him before rescission is resorted to." It is,therefore, "essential that the
party asking for rescission prove that he has exhausted all other legal means to obtain satisfaction of his

Petitioner neither alleged nor proved that she did so. On this score, her action for the rescission of the
questioned deedis not maintainable even if the fraud charged actually did exist.


G.R. No. L-25802 January 31, 1972




G.R. No. L-6648

July 25, 1955


FERNANDO GONZAGA, JOSE GASTON and CESAR L. LOPEZ, on their own behalf and on behalf of
other sugar cane planters in Manapla, Cadiz and Victorias Districts, petitioners-appellees,
VICTORIAS MILLING CO., INC., respondent-appellant.


G.R. No. L-12191

October 14, 1918

JOSE CANGCO, plaintiff-appellant,

MANILA RAILROAD CO., defendant-appellee.
Facts: On January 20, 1915, Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Co (MRC). He was an
employee of the latter and he was given a pass so that he could ride the train for free. When he was
nearing his destination at about 7pm, he arose from his seat even though the train was not at full
stop. When he was about to alight from the train (which was still slightly moving) he accidentally
stepped on a sack of watermelons which he failed to notice due to the fact that it was dim. This
caused him to lose his balance at the door and he fell and his arm was crushed by the train and he
suffered other serious injuries. He was dragged a few meters more as the train slowed down.
It was established that the employees of MRC were negligent in piling the sacks of watermelons.
MRC raised as a defense the fact that Cangco was also negligent as he failed to exercise diligence
in alighting from the train as he did not wait for it to stop.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Railroad Co is liable for damages.
HELD: Yes. Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a common practice and a lot of
people are doing so every day without suffering injury. Cangco has the vigor and agility of young
manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the
same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. He was also ignorant of the fact that sacks
of watermelons were there as there were no appropriate warnings and the place was dimly lit.
The Court also elucidated on the distinction between the liability of employers under Article 2180 and
their liability for breach of contract [of carriage]:

NOTES: But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in the selection and
direction of the servant, he is not liable for the acts of the latter, whatever done within the scope of

his employment or not, if the damage done by the servant does not amount to a breach of the
contract between the master and the person injured.
The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission
which, without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another.
These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is
bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person.
When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions
that the same act which constitutes the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract
existed between the parties.
Manresa: Whether negligence occurs an incident in the course of the performance of a contractual
undertaking or in itself the source of an extra-contractual undertaking obligation, its essential
characteristics are identical.
Vinculum Juris: (def) It means an obligation of law, or the right of the obligee to enforce a civil
matter in a court of law.


85 scra 226 : Tugade vs CA

Facts: At about 9:15 o'clock in the morning of January 4, 1972, Rodolfo [Rayandayan] was
driving a Holden Kingswood car (the [Holden] car), bearing plate No. 52-19V (L-Rizal '71), owned
by the Sta. Ines Mining Corp. and assigned for use of its manager, on Ayala Avenue in Makati,
Rizal, going northwards. 2.
At the intersection of Ayala Avenue and Makati Avenue, Rayandayan was going to turn left on Makati
Avenue but he stopped to wait for the left turn signal and because a jeep in front of him was also at a
stop. 3.
While in that stop position, the Holden car was bumped from behind by Blue Car Taxi, bearing Plate No.
55-71R (TX-QC '71) and driven by Inocencio Tugade causing damage to the Holden car, the repairs of
which cost P778.10 . . . 4.
Tugade was then charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property. He pleaded not
guilty and while admitting that the collision was caused by faulty brakes of his taxicab, sought to
exculpate himself with the explanation that this fault could not and should not be traced to him. 5.
After trial, the lower court held Tugade guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Reckless Imprudence
resulting in damage to property and sentenced him to a fine of 1k and subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency and actual damages of P778.10 6.
Tugade appealed the decision reiterating that `the malfunctioning of the brakes at the time of accident
was due to a mechanical defect which even the exercise of due negligence of a good father of a family
cannot have prevented. 7.

CA affirmed TCs decision in toto.

Hence this petition.
Whether or not the faulty brakes of the taxicab constitutes caso fortuito?
Ruling 1.
No, it does not

An essential element of a caso fortuito is the occurrence of some extraordinary circumstance

independent of the will of the obligor, or of his employees. This element is lacking in the present case. It
is not suggested that the accident in question was due to an act of God or to adverse road conditions
which could not have been foreseen. As far as the record shows, the accident was caused either by
defects in the automobile or else through the negligence of its driver. This is not a caso fortuito which
would call for an acquittal of the driver.

14. Roberto Juntilla V. Clemente Fontanar

G.R. No. L-45637 May 31, 1985
Jeepney was driven by Berfol Camoro from Danao City to Cebu City. It was Clemente Fontanar but was
actually owned by defendant Fernando Banzon.
When the jeepney reached Mandaue City, the right rear tire exploded causing the vehicle to turn turtle.
Roberto Juntilla was sitting at the front seat was thrown out of the vehicle.
Upon landing on the ground, he momentarily lost consciousness. When he came to his senses, he found
that he had a lacerated wound on his right palm. He also injured his left arm, right thigh and on his
Because of his shock and injuries, he went back to Danao City but on the way, he discovered that his
"Omega" wrist watch worth P 852.70 was lost. Upon his arrival in Danao City, he immediately entered
the Danao City Hospital to attend to his injuries, and also requested his father-in-law to proceed
immediately to the place of the accident and look for the watch.
Roberto Juntilla filed for breach of contract with damages
Respondents: beyond the control since tire that exploded was newly bought and was only slightly used
RTC: favored Roberto Juntilla
CA: Reversed since accident was due to fortuitous event
ISSUE: W/N there is a fortuitous event
HELD: NO. CA reversed, RTC reinstated. passenger jeepney was running at a very fast speed before the
accident at a regular and safe speed will not jump into a ditch when its right rear tire blows up
passenger jeepney was overloaded 3 passengers in the front seat 14 passengers in the rear
caso fortuito presents the following essential characteristics:
(1) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply
with his obligation, must be independent of the human will.
(2) It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be
foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid.
(3) The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a
normal manner.

(4) the obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to
the creditor.
In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not independent of the
human will. The accident was caused either through the negligence of the driver or because of
mechanical defects in the tire. Common carriers should teach their drivers not to overload their vehicles,
not to exceed safe and legal speed limits, and to know the correct measures to take when a tire blows
up thus insuring the safety of passengers at all times
the source of a common carrier's legal liability is the contract of carriage, and by entering into the said
contract, it binds itself to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide,
using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with a due regard for all the circumstances. The
records show that this obligation was not met by the respondents
respondents likewise argue that the petitioner cannot recover any amount for failure to prove such
damages during the trial findings of facts of the City Court of Cebu