Consti 1

GERRYMANDERING IS THE
ARRANGEMENT OF DISTRICTS IN SUCH A

WAY AS TO FAVOR THE ELECTION OF
PREFERRED CANDIDATE (USUALLY REELECTIONISTS) THROUGH THE INCLUSION
THEREIN ONLY OF THOSE AREAS WHERE
THEY EXPECT TO WIN, REGARDLESS OF
THE RESULTANT SHAPE OF SUCH
DISTRICTS. (*****)
2.
QUALIFICATIONS (*****)
SEC. 6, ART. VI NO PERSON SHALL

BE A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REP
UNLESS HE 1) IS A NATURAL-BORN
CITIZEN OF THE PHIL, 2) ON THE DAY OF
ELECTION, IS AT LEAST 25 YEARS OLD, 3)
IS ABLE TO READ AND WRITE, AND 4)
EXCEPT THE PARTY-LIST REP, MUST BE A
REGISTERED VOTER IN THE DISTRICT IN
WHICH HE SHALL BE ELECTED, AND 5) A
RESIDENT THEREOF FOR A PERIOD OF
NOT LESS THAN ONE YEAR IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDING THE DAY OF THE ELECTION.
CHAPTER 8
LEGISLATIVE DEPT.
C.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:
3.
TERM *****
SEC. 7, ART. VI THE MEMBERS
OF THE HOUSE OF REP SHALL BE ELECTED
FOR A TERM OF 3 YEARS WHICH SHALL
BEGIN, UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY
LAW, AT NOON ON THE 30TH DAY OF JUNE
FOLLOWING THEIR ELECTION.
NO MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF
REP SHALL SERVE FOR MORE THAN 3
CONSECUTIVE TERMS. VOLUNTARY
RENUNCIATION OF THE OFFICE FOR ANY
LENGTH OF TIME SHALL NOT BE
CONSIDERED AS AN INTERRUPTION IN THE
CONTINUITY OF HIS SERVICE FOR THE
FULL TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS
ELECTED.
D.
PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES:
(*****)
SEC. 11, ART. VI A SENATOR OR
MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REP SHALL, IN
ALL OFFENSES PUNISHABLE BY NOT MORE
THAN 6 YEARS IMPRISONMENT, BE
PRIVILEGED FROM ARREST WHILE THE
CONGRESS IS IN SESSION. NO MEMBER
SHALL BE QUESTIONED NOR BE HELD
LIABLE IN ANY OTHER PLACE FOR ANY
SPEECH OR DEBATE IN THE CONGRESS OR
IN ANY COMMITTEE THEREOF.
SECTION COVERS: 1) PRIVILEGE
FROM ARREST
2)
PRIVILEGE OF SPEECH AND DEBATE
D.
CHAPTER 8
LEGISLATIVE DEPT.
1.
PRIVILEGE FROM ARREST
(*****)
THE 1935 CONSTITUTION ON
PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY FROM ARREST
EXCEPTED ALL CRIMINAL OFFENSES
REGARDLESS OF DEGREE, WITH THE
RESULT THAT THE LEGISLATOR COULD
CLAIM SAME ONLY AGAINST CIVIL
ARRESTS. FOR ANY CRIMINAL OFFENSE,
HE WAS SUBJECTED TO ARREST AT ANY
TIME, EVEN DURING THE SESSIONS.
D.
CHAPTER 8
LEGISLATIVE DEPT.
2.
PRIVILEGE OF SPEECH AND
DEBATE (*****)
2.1 COFFIN V. COFFIN (A MASS. 1)
THESE CONDITIONS WERE FIRST LAID
DOWN IN THIS LEADING CASE WHERE THE
PRIVILEGE WAS DENIED A LEGISLATOR
WHO UTTERED SLANDEROUS REMARKS IN
THE COURSE OF A PRIVATE
CONVERSATION WITH A CONSTITUENT
DURING A LULL IN THE SESSION.
CHAPTER 8
LEGISLATIVE DEPT.
D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES:
4.
INCOMPATIBLE AND
FORBIDDEN OFFICES (*****)
SEC. 13, ART. VI NO SENATOR OR

MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REP MAY
HOLD ANY OTHER OFFICE OR
EMPLOYMENT IN THE GOVT, OR ANY
SUBDIVISION, AGENCY, OR
INSTRUMENTALITY THEREOF, INCLUDING
GOCC OR THEIR SUBSIDIARIES, DURING
HIS TERM WITHOUT FORFEITING HIS SEAT.
NEITHER SHALL HE BE APPOINTED TO ANY
OFFICE WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN CREATED
OR THE EMOLUMENTS THEREOF
INCREASED DURING THE TERM FOR
WHICH HE WAS ELECTED.
CHAPTER 8
LEGISLATIVE DEPT.
D.
4.
INCOMPATIBLE AND
THE FIRST PART IS CALLED

INCOMPATIBLE OFFICE; WHILE THE
SECOND PART IS CALLED FORBIDDEN

OFFICE.
NOTE: DISTINGUISH BETWEEN
TERM AND TENURE (FETALINO V.
COMELEC, 686 SCRA 813, 12/4/2012)
TERM THE TIME DURING WHICH THE
OFFICER MAY CLAIM TO THE OFFICE AS A
MATTER OF RIGHT (ITS THE PERIOD
INDICATED IN THE CONSTITUTION OR
LAW); TENURE THE ACTUAL PERIOD THE
OFFICER HELD THE OFFICE WHICH CAN BE
SHORTER THAN THE TERM IN A CASE.
CHAPTER 8
LEGISLATIVE DEPT.
D.
4.
INCOMPATIBLE AND
4.1
ADAZA V. PACANA (135
SCRA 431) - IN THIS CASE, THE
PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT WERE
ELECTED GOVERNOR AND VICEGOVERNOR, RESPECTIVELY, OF MISAMIS
ORIENTAL. BOTH SUBSEQUENTLY RAN
FOR THE BATASAN PAMBANSA, BUT ONLY
THE PETITIONER WON. ADAZA THEN
QUALIFIED AS MEMBER OF THE
LAWMAKING BODY, WHEREUPON, PACANA
ASSUMED THE GOVERNORSHIP AS
STATUTORY SUCCESSOR. ADAZA
CHALLENGED PACANAS TAKEOVER,
CONTENDING THAT UNDER THE
PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM A LEGISLATOR
COULD CONCURRENTLY SERVE AS
GOVERNOR; HENCE,
CHAPTER 8
LEGISLATIVE DEPT.
D.
4.
INCOMPATIBLE AND
4.1
ADAZA V. PACANA (135
SCRA 431) (CONT):
THERE WAS NO VACANCY IN THE
GOVERNORSHIP THAT PACANA COULD
FILL. THE SC UNANIMOUSLY REJECTED
THIS ARGUMENT AND HELD THAT ADAZA
AUTOMATICALLY FORFEITED THE
GOVERNORSHIP THE MOMENT HE TOOK
HIS OATH AS A MEMBER OF THE
BATASANG PAMBANSA.
CHAPTER 8
LEGISLATIVE DEPT.
D.
4.
INCOMPATIBLE AND
4.2
CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION
NOT EVERY OTHER OFFICE IS TO BE
REGARDED AS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE
LEGISLATIVE POSITION. FOR EXAMPLE,
MEMBERSHIP IN THE ELECTORAL
TRIBUNALS (SET & HET) IS PERMITTED

UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.
CHAPTER 8
LEGISLATIVE DEPT.
D.
4.
INCOMPATIBLE AND
4.3
EX-OFFICIO MEMBERS
MOREOVER, IF IT BE SHOWN THAT THE
SECOND OFFICE IS AN EXTENSION OF THE
LEGISLATIVE POSITION OR IS IN AID OF
LEGISLATIVE DUTIES, THE HOLDING
THEREOF WILL NOT RESULT IN THE LOSS
OF THE LEGISLATORS SEAT IN CONGRESS.
ACCORDINGLY, THE CHAIRMEN OF
THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REP ON
EDUCATION RETAIN THEIR SEATS IN
CONGRESS WHILE SITTING
CONCURRENTLY AS EX-OFFICIO MEMBERS
IN THE UP BOARD OF REGENTS.
CHAPTER 8
LEGISLATIVE DEPT.
D.
4.
INCOMPATIBLE AND
4.4
FORBIDDEN OFFICE
EVEN IF THE MEMBER OF
CONGRESS IS WILLING TO FORFEIT HIS
LEGISLATIVE SEAT THEREIN, HE MAY NOT
BE APPOINTED TO ANY OFFICE IN THE
GOVERNMENT THAT HAS BEEN: 1)
CREATED, OR 2) EMOLUMENTS THEREOF
HAVE BEEN INCREASED, DURING HIS
TERM.
EXAMPLE: A SENATOR WITH 6YEAR TERM, PROPOSED THE CREATION OF
A NEW AGENCY; BEFORE IT IS FINALLY
PASSED INTO LAW, HE RESIGNED. CAN HE
BE APPOINTED TO HEAD THE NEW
AGENCY? IF HE WAS NOT THE
PROPONENT, AND HE RESIGNED, CAN HE
BE APPOINTED?
CHAPTER 8
LEGISLATIVE DEPT.
F. QUORUM:
3. DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA
V. SENATE OF THE PHL (659
SCRA 270, 10/18/2011) RE:
SEC. 1, ART. XVII OF RA NO.
9054 (PROMULGATED
3/31/2001) ACT TO
STRENGTHEN AND EXPAND
THE ORGANIC ACT OF THE
ARMM, AMENDING RA NO.
6734 (ARMM ACT): ******
SEC. 1, ART. XVII OF RA 9054 CO
NSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE
CONSTITUTION(?), THIS ORGANIC ACT
MAY BE REAMENDED OR REVISED BY

CONGRESS OF THE PHL UPON A VOTE OF
2/3 OF THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REP AND THE SENATE VOTING
SEPARATELY.
F.
CHAPTER 8
LEGISLATIVE DEPT.
QUORUM:
3. DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA V.

SENATE OF THE PHL,
659 SCRA
270, 10/18/2011) *****
IN THIS CASE, THE SC NULLIFIED A
LAW REQUIRING WHAT
IT REFERRED TO AS A
SUPERMAJORITY VOTE OF 2/3 OF ALL
THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS FOR
PURPOSES OF AMENDING OR REPEALING
THE SAME, STATING THAT SAID
PROVISION GAVE SAID LAW THE
CHARACTER OF AN IRREPEALABLE LAW BY
REQUIRING MORE THAN WHAT THE
CONSTITUTION DEMANDS. NOTE: RA
6734 REQUIRES ONLY MAJORITY OF ALL
THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.
LANDMARK CASES:
1. DAZA V. SINGSON, 180 SCRA
496
2. CUNANAN V. TAN, 5 SCRA 1
CHAPTER 8
LEGISLATIVE DEPT.
QUESTIONAIRES:
1.
WHAT COMPOSES THE
CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES?
CHAPTER 8
LEGISLATIVE DEPT.
2.
SHOULD MANNY PACQUIAO
DECIDES TO
RUN FOR THE
SENATE AS SUGGESTED BY
SOME
PEOPLE, WHAT QUALIFICATIONS
MUST
HE POSSESS?
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP IN ACCORDANCE

WITH THE CONSTITUTION AND LAW,
CONSIDERED NATURAL-BORN CITIZENS?
CHAPTER 8
LEGISLATIVE DEPT.
6.
WHAT DO YOU
UNDERSTAND BY THE TERM
RESIDENCE?
o
ANIMUS MANENDI
o
ANIMUS REVERTENDI
o
ANIMUS NONREVERTENDI
NOTA BENE: MUST READ CASES:
A.
LIM v. PELAEZ,
ELECTORAL CASE NO.
36, HET.
B.
BRILLANTE v. REYES,
ELECTORAL CASE
NO. 31, HET
(1988)
CHAPTER 8
LEGISLATIVE DEPT.
7.
WHAT DO YOU
UNDERSTAND BY THE TERM THE DAY OF
THE ELECTION?
NOTA BENE: MUST READ CASE:
ESPINOSA v. AQUINO, ELECTORAL
CASE NO. 9, SENATE ELECTORAL
TRIBUTANL.
CHAPTER 8
LEGISLATIVE DEPT.
8.
WHAT IS
GERRYMANDERING?
9.
WHAT IS THE HISTORICAL
BASIS OF THIS
TERM?
CHAPTER 8
LEGISLATIVE DEPT.
CHAPTER 8
LEGISLATIVE DEPT.
3.
SHOULD JINKY PACQUIAO
DECIDES TO
RUN FOR THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
TO
REPRESENT THE PROVINCE OF
SARANGANI, WHAT
QUALIFICATIONS MUST
HE POSSESS?
CHAPTER 8
LEGISLATIVE DEPT.
4.
WHO ARE CONSIDERED NATURALBORN CITIZENS?
5.
ARE PERSONS BORN OF
FOREIGN MOTHERS WHO ELECTED
10.
OFFICE OF:
WHAT ARE THE TERMS OF

A.
MEMBERS OF THE
SENATE?
B.
HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES?
MEMBERS OF THE
CHAPETER 8
LEGISLATIVE DEPT.
11.
CAN A MEMBER OF
CONGRESS BE ARRESTED
FOR THE
COMMISSION OF A CRIME WHILE
CONGRESS IS IN SESSION?
12.
WHAT ARE THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AVAILMENT
OF THE PRIVILEGE FROM ARREST?
CHAPTER 8
LEGISLATIVE DEPT.
13.
CAN A MEMBER OF
CONGRESS BE QUESTIONED OR
HELD LIABLE IN ANY OTHER PLACE FOR
ANY SPEECH OR DEBATE IN

CONGRESS OR IN ANY COMMITTEE
HEARING THEREOF?
14.
WHAT ARE THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
AVAILMENT
OF THE PRIVILEGE OF
SPEECH AND DEBATE?
MUST READ CASE: OSMENA v.
PENDATUN, GR
L-17144, OCTOBER
28, 1960.
CHAPTER 8
LEGISLATIVE DEPT.
15.
WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY
LEGISLATURE OR
LEGISLATIVE
COMMITTEE IS FUNCTIONING
OR IN
SESSION?
16.
WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY
FINAL ADJOURNMENT?
NOTA BENE: MUST READ CASE:
A. LOPEZ v. DELOS REYES,
55 PHIL. 205
B. JIMENEZ v.
CABANGBANG, 17 SCRA 876
CHAPTER 8
LEGISLATIVE DEPT.
17.
CAN A MEMBER OF
CONGRESS HOLD
OTHER
OFFICE OR EMPLOYMENT IN THE
GOVERNMENT OR ANY OF ITS
AGENCY
DURING HIS TERM OF
OFFICE?
21.
WHAT IS THE
COMPOSITION OF THE
ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL? WHAT IS ITS
FUNCTION?
CHAPTER 8
LEGISLATIVE DEPT.
22.
WHAT IS THE COMPOSITION
OF THE
COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS?
WHAT IS ITS FUNCTION?
GOOD LUCK
CHAPTER 9
POWERS OF
CONGRESS
CLASSIFICATION OF
CONGRESS: (*****)
1.
2.
POWER;
3.
4.
POWERS OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER;
NON-LEGISLATIVE
IMPLIED POWER;
INHERENT POWER.
18.
CONGRESS CREATED AN
OFFICE NAMED
NATIONAL ARTISTS
DEVELOPMENT AGENCY.
CAN A
MEMBER OF SUCH CONGRESS
WHO
CREATED THIS OFFICE QUALIFY TO
HEAD IT AFTER THE TERM OF HIS
OFFICE?
CHAPTER 8
LEGISLATIVE DEPT.
19.
CAN A MEMBER OF CONGRESS
APPEAR PERSONALLY AS COUNSEL
BEFORE ANY COURT, ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL, QUASI-JUDICIAL OR ANY
OTHER ADMINISTRA- TIVE BODIES?
MUST READ CASE:
PUYAT v. DE GUZMAN, 113 SCRA 23
CHAPTER 8
LEGISLATIVE DEPT.
20.
MANNY POQUIAO WAS
ELECTED CONGRESSMAN FOR THE
IST DISTRICT OF KIG. BEFORE
HIS
ELECTION HE TRANSFERRED HIS SHARES
IN THE FAMILY CORPORATION TO
HIS SON.
QUESTION: CAN HIS SON ENTER
INTO A GOVT CONTRACT DURING HIS
TERM OF OFFICE?
CHAPTER 8
LEGISLATIVE DEPT.
CHAPTER 9
POWERS OF
CONGRESS
CLASSIFICATION OF POWERS OF
CONGRESS. (*****)
1.
LEGISLATIVE POWER. - IS
THE AUTHORITY TO MAKE LAWS
AND
TO ALTER AND REPEAL THEM.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION:
THE LEGISLATIVE POWER SHALL BE
VESTED IN THE CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES WHICH WILL CONSIST OF A
SENATE AND A HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES,
EXCEPT TO THE
EXTENT RESERVED TO THE PEOPLE BY
THE PROVISION ON INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM (Section 1, Article VI,
Constitution).
a. NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER: (*****)
POWERS OF
CONGRESS
a.1)
IT IS A DERIVATIVE AND
DELEGATED POWER: (*****)
AS VESTED BY THE
CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS,
IT IS
DERIVATIVE AND DELEGATED POWER.
THE CONSTITUTION IS THE WORK OR
WILL OF THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, IN
THEIR ORIGINAL, SOVEREIGN, AND
UNLIMITED CAPACITY. LAW IS THE
WORK OR WILL OF THE
LEGISLATURE IN THEIR DERIVATIVE
AND SUBORDINATE CAPACITY. THE ONE
(FORMER) IS THE WORK OF THE CREATOR,
AND THE OTHER (LATTER) OF THE
CREATURE. THE CONSTITUTION FIXES
LIMITS TO THE EXERCISE OF

LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY, AND
PRESCRIBES THE ORBIT WITHIN WHICH IT
MUST MOVE (Vanhornes Lessee v.
Dorrance, 2 Dall, 304, 308 [U.S.1795]).
SIMPLY PUT,
LEGISLATIVE
POWER IS ONE DERIVED FROM, AND
DELEGATED BY, THE SOVEREIGN PEOPLE
TO CONGRESS THROUGH THE
CONSTITUTION. *****
POWERS OF
CONGRESS
a.2)
IT IS A PLENARY
LEGISLATIVE POWER: (*****)
UNLIKE THE CONSTITUTION OF

THE UNITED STATES WHICH CONTAINS
ONLY A GRANT OF ENUMERATED
LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE FEDERAL
CONGRESS (ALL LEGISLATIVE POWERS
HEREIN GRANTED . . . Sec. 1, Art. 1,
US Constitution), THE 1987, LIKE THE
1973 AND 1935 CONSTITUTIONS,
EMBODIES A GRANT OF PLENARY
LEGISLATIVE POWER TO THE PHIL.
LEGISLATURE.
THUS,
ANY
POWER,
DEEMED TO BE
LEGISLATIVE BY USAGE AND
TRADITION, IS NECESSARILY
POSSESSED BY CONGRESS,
UNLESS
THE ORGANIC ACT HAS LODGED IT
ELSEWHERE (Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil.
192 [1946]).
AND IN FACT, SEC. 1,
ART. VI OF THE 1987 ORGANIC LAW
HAS
ALSO
GIVEN
LEGISLATIVE
POWER
TO
THE ELECTORATE
THROUGH THE EXERCISE OF
INITIATIVE
AND REFERENDUM AS
SET DOWN IN SEC. 32, ART. VI.
POWERS OF
CONGRESS
AS COROLLARY TO THIS PLENARY
GRANT OF LEGISLATIVE POWER, IT
FOLLOWS:
a.
THAT THE CONGRESS
ALONE CAN MAKE LAWS AND
CONGRESS MAY NOT DELEGATE
ITS LAW MAKING
POWER. THIS IS
THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DELEGATION
OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
b.
THAT CONGRESS CANNOT
PASS IRREPEALABLE LAWS.
SIMPLY PUT, A PLENARY
LEGISLATIVE POWER IS THE POWER
TO
ENACT LAWS COVERING
ANY
MATTER
SUBJECT ONLY TO THE
PROHIBITIONS AND LIMITATIONS
EMBODIED IN THE CONSTITUTION. *****
COVERING ALL SUBJECT

MATTER,
DERIVED FROM, AND DELEGATED BY,
THE SOVEREIGN PEOPLE TO CONGRESS
THROUGH THE CONSTITUTION.
POWERS
OF CONGRESS
b.
LIMITATIONS ON LEGISLATIVE
POWER: (*****)
SPEAKING OF THE POWERS OF THE
LEGISLATIVE DEPT. OF GOVERNMENT
UNDER THE AMERICAN FLAG, AN
EARLY CASE DECIDED BY THE PHIL.
SUPREME COURT SAID:
SOMEONE
HAS SAID THAT
THE POWERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE
DEPARTMENT, LIKE THE BOUNDARIES
OF THE OCEAN,
ARE UNLIMITED.
IN CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT,
HOWEVER, AS WELL AS GOVERNMENTS
ACTING UNDER DELEGATED AUTHORITY,
THE POWERS OF EACH OF THE
DEPARTMENTS OF THE SAME ARE
LIMITED AND CONFINED WITHIN THE
FOUR WALLS OF THE CONSTITUTION
OR THE CHARTER, AND EACH DEPT.
CAN ONLY EXERCISE SUCH POWERS AS
ARE EXPRESSLY GIVEN AND SUCH
OTHER POWERS AS ARE NECESSARILY
POWERS OF
CONGRESS
IMPLIED FROM THE GIVEN (OR
EXPRESS) POWERS. THE
CONSTITUTION IS THE SHORE OF
LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AGAINST WHICH
THE WAVES OF LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT
MAY DASH, BUT OVER WHICH IT
CANNOT LEAP (Govt. v. Springer,
50Phil. 529, 309 [1927]).
ALTHOUGH THE ORIGINAL 1973
CONSTITUTION ADOPTED A
PARLIAMENTARY
FORM
OF
GOVERRNMENT,
IT DID NOT ADOPT
THE
ENGLISH
PRINCIPLE
OF
PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY
UNDER
WHICH
PARLIAMENT
CAN
DO
EVERTHING BUT MAKE A WOMAN A
MAN,
AND A MAN A WOMAN (De
Lolme, The Constitution of England 102
[1853]. NEITHER DID THE REVISION
OF 1981 NOR THE 1987
CONSTITUTION. THUS, LEGISLATIVE
POWER REMAINS A LIMITED POWER
AFTER THE MANNER OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM
EMBODIED IN THE 1935 CONSTITUTION.
POWERS OF
CONGRESS
IT IS SUBJECT TO:
b.1)
SUBSTANTIVE LIMITATIONS
(*****) WHICH
CIRCUMSCRIBE BOTH
THE EXERCISE OF THE
POWER
POWERS OF
CONGRESS
a.3) IN SUMMARY: *****
LEGISLATIVE POWER IS A
PLENARY POWER
TO ENACT LAWS
ITSELF AND THE ALLOWABLE SUBJECTS

OF
LEGISLATION.
THE SUBSTANTIVE
LIMITATIONS ARE FOUND IN:
b.1.a) ARTICLE III, THE
BILL OF RIGHTS;
b.1.b) ARTICLE VI, THE
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT;
b.1.c) OTHER PORTIONS
OF THE CONSTITUTION.
POWERS OF
CONGRESS
b.2)
FORMAL AND PROCEDURAL
LIMITATIONS (*****) PRESCRIBING
THE MANNER OF PASSING BILLS
AND THE
FORM THEY SHOULD
TAKE. THESE ARE FOUND, AMONG
OTHERS, IN:
b.2a) SEC. 24, ART. VII, THE

PASSAGE OF APPROPRIATION,
REVENUE, AND TARIFF AND OTHER BILLS;
b.2.b) SEC. 26(1), ART. VII,
SINGULARITY OF SUBJECT OF
BILLS;
b.2.c) SEC. 26(2), ART. VII,
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS;
b.2.d) SEC. 27(1), ART. VII,
APPROVAL OF BILLS INTO LAW.
POWERS OF
CONGRESS
b.3)
IN SUMMARY: *****
LEGISLATIVE IS SUBJECT TO
SUBSTANTIVE,
FORMAL,
AND
PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS AS EMBODIED
IN THE
CONSTITUTION.
POWERS OF
CONGRESS
c.
CLASSIFICATION OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER: (*****)
c.1) GENERAL LEGISLATIVE
POWER
CONSISTS IN
THE
ENACTMENT OF LAWS INTENDED AS
RULES OF
CONDUCT TO GOVERN
THE RELATIONS AMONG
INDIVIDUALS
OR BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUALS AND
THE STATE.
c.2)SPECIFIC LEGISLATIVE POWER
- CONSISTS IN THE
ENACTMENT
OF LAWS EXPRESSLY MANDATED IN
THE CONSTITUTION, SUCH AS
TO PASS A GENERAL
APPROPRIATION LAW.
NOTE: HOW ABOUT THE ANTIDYNASTY LAW?
POWERS OF
CONGRESS
CONGRESS:
2.
SUCH AS:
NON-LEGISLATIVE POWER,
2.a) POWER TO IMPEACH;

2.b) POWER TO CONCUR
IN TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT
EXECUTED BY THE
PRESIDENT;
2.c) POWER TO DECLARE
THE EXISTENCE OF WAR;
2.d) POWER TO ACT AS
CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY;
2.e) POWER TO CONCUR
IN AMNESTY GRANTED BY
THE PRESIDENT;
2.f) POWER TO ACT AS
BOARD OF CANVASSER FOR
PRESIDENTIAL AND VICEPRESIDENTIAL VOTES.
POWERS OF
CONGRESS
CONGRESS:
3.
IMPLIED POWERS THOSE
THAT ARE ESSENTIAL TO
THE
EFFECTIVE EXECUTION OF OTHER
POWERS EXPRESSLY GRANTED.
EXAMPLE POWER OF
LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION.
4.
INHERENT POWERS
THESE ARE POWERS WHICH THOUGH
NOT EXPRESSLY GIVEN ARE
NEVERTHELESS EXERCISED BY
CONGRESS AS THEY ARE
NECESSARY FOR ITS EXISTENCE.
EXAMPLES (EXAMPLES GIVEN ARE
ALSO EXPRESS POWERS):
a. TO DETERMINE THE
RULES OF ITS PROCEEDINGS (Sec. 16
[3] & 21, Art. VII);
b. TO DISCIPLINE ITS
MEMBERS (Sec. 16[3], Art. VII);
c. TO KEEP JOURNALS OF ITS
PROCEEDINGS (Sec. 16[4], Art.
VII).
POWERS OF
CONGRESS
REPORT ON THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS:
1.
JOURNALS
1.1
JOURNAL OF
PROCEEDINGS
1.2
RECORD OF
PROCEEDINGS
2.
FLOW CHART OF
PROCEDURE
3.
ORIGIN OF BILLS
4.
PROHIBITED MEASURES
5.
TITLE OF BILLS
6.
ENROLLED BILL
7.
ENGROSSED BILL
8.
FORMALITIES
9.
APPROVAL OF BILLS
POWERS OF
CONGRESS
LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES:
SEC. 21, ART. VI: (*****)
THE SENATE OR THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OR ANY OF ITS
RESPECTIVE COMMITTEES MAY CONDUCT
INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION IN
ACCORDANCE WITH ITS DULY PUBLISHED
RULES OF PROCEDURE. THE RIGHTS OF
PERSONS APPEARING IN OR AFFECTED BY
SUCH INQUIRIES SHALL BE RESPECTED.
POWERS OF
CONGRESS
SEC. 21, ART. VI (CONT): (*****)
1.
IN AID OF LEGISLATION ( BENGZON
V. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE, 203
SCRA 767) IN THIS CASE, PETITIONERS
SOUGHT TO RESTRAIN THE RESPONDENT
FROM INVESTIGATING THEIR
PARTICIPATION IN THE ALLEGED MISUSE
OF GOVERNMENT FUNDS AND THE ILLICIT
ACQUISITION OF PROPERTIES BEING
CLAIMED BY THE PCGG FOR THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHL.
THE SC GRANTED THE PETITION,

HOLDING, INTER ALIA, THAT THE
PETITIONERS ARE PRESENTLY
IMPLEADED AS DEFENDANT IN A CASE
BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN, WHICH
INVOLVES ISSUES INTIMATELY RELATED TO
THE SUBJECT OF CONTEMPLETED INQUIRY
BEFORE THE RESPONDENT COMMITTEE,
AND THAT NO LEGISLATION WAS
APPARENTLY BEING CONTEMPLETED IN
CONNECTION WITH THE SAID
INVESTIGATION.
HE DECISION, HOWEVER, FAILED
TO CONSIDER THAT THE PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN WAS
CRIMINAL IN NATURE AND THAT THE
PURPOSE OF THE LEGISLATIVE
INVESTIGATION WAS TO ASCERTAIN THE
DISPOSITION OF FUNDS AND PROPERTIES
CLAIMED TO BE PUBLIC IN NATURE. ITS
FINDINGS ON THIS MATTER COULD BE THE
SUBJECT OF LEGISLATION ALTHOUGH IT
MAY NOT HAVE BEEN EXPRESSLY STATED
THAT SUCH WAS THE PURPOSE OF THE
INQUIRY. AS OBSERVED IN THE EARLIER
CASE OF ARNAULT V. NAZARENO (87 PHIL
29), THE SC SAID WE ARE BOUND TO
PRESUME THAT THE ACTION OF THE
LEGISLATIVE BODY WAS WITH A
LEGITIMATE OBJECT IF IT WAS CAPABLE OF
BEING SO CONSTRUED, AND WE HAVE NO
RIGHT TO ASSUME THAT THE CONTRARY
WAS INTENDED.
POWERS OF
CONGRESS
SEC. 21, ART. VI (CONT): (*****)
1.1)
IN AID OF LEGISLATION (RECENT
JURISPRUDENCE):
GARCILLANO V. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES (575 SCRA 170,
12/23/2008):
THE SC STRESSED THAT THE
SENATE CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO
CONTINUE WITH THE CONDUCT OF THE
QUESTIONED LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY
WITHOUT DULY PUBLISHED RULES OF
PROCEDURE, IN CLEAR DEROGATION OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT.
IN SAID CASE, THE PETITIONERS
CLAIMED THAT THERE WAS NO NEED TO
PUBLISH ANEW THE SENATES RULES OF
PROCEDURE GOVERNING INQUIRIES IN AID
OF
LEGISLATION, CONSIDERING THAT THEY
HAD BEEN PUBLISHED IN NEWSPAPERS OF
GEN. CIRCULATION ONLY IN 1995 AND IN
2006, ALTHOUGH IT WAS CONCEDED THAT
SAID RULES HAD NOT BEEN PUBLISHED
FOR PURPOSES OF THE 14TH CONGRESS,
WHICH COMMENCED ON JUNE 30, 2007.
CITING NERI V. SENATE COMMITTEE ON
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
AND INVESTIGATIONS (549 SCRA 77,
3/25/2008); AND (564 SCRA 152,
9/4/2008), THE COURT CLARIFIED THAT IT
IS
INCUMBENT UPON THE SENATE
TO PUBLISH THE RULES FOR ITS
LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES IN EACH
CONGRESS OR TO OTHERWISE MAKE THE
PUBLISHED RULES CLEARLY STATE THAT
THE SAME SHALL BE EFFECTIVE IN
SUBSEQUENT CONGRESSES OR UNTIL
THEY ARE AMENDED OR REPEALED TO
SUFFICENTLY PUT PUBLIC ON NOTICE.
THE COURT LIKEWISE EXPLAINED

THAT PUBLICATION OF SAID RULES
THROUGH THE INTERNET CANNOT BE
CONSIDERED AS COMPLIANCE WITH THIS
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS. IN
ANY EVENT, THE LEGISLATURE HAS BEEN
ACKNOWLEDGED TO POSSESS VIRTUALLY
UNRESTRICTED AUTHORITY TO
DETERMINE ITS OWN RULES AND
WOULD BE AT
LIBERTY TO ALTER OR MODIFY
THESE RULES AT ANY TIME IT MAY SEE FIT,
SUBJECT ONLY TO THE IMPERATIVES OF
QUORUM, VOTING AND PUBLICATION.
(DE LA PAZ V. SENATE, 579 SCRA 521,
2/13/2009).
IN ADDITION TO THESE
LIMITATIONS, THE SC HAS
ACKNOWLEDGED THAT OTHER
PREROGATIVES, PRINCIPLES AND RIGHTS
MAY VALIDLY BE INVOKED AGAINST THIS

POWER OF CONGRESS. THESE WOULD
INCLUDE THE PRESIDENTS EXECUTIVE
PRIVILEGE, BUT ONLY IN RELATION TO
CERTAIN TYPES OF INFORMATION OF A
SENSITIVE CHARACTER AND WHICH
WOULD NOT SERVE TO AUTOMATICALLY
EXEMPT EXECUTIVE OFFICIALS FROM THE
DUTY TO DISCLOSE INFORMATION BY THE
MERE FACT OF THEIR BEING EXECUTIVE
OFFICIALS (SENATE V. ERMITA, 488 SCRA
1, 4/20/2006), THE FISCAL AUTONOMY
AND CONSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF
THE JUDICIARY (SENATE V. ERMITA,
SUPRA), THE SUB-JUDICE RULE,
WHICH RESTRICTS COMMENTS AND
DISCLOSURES PERTAINING TO JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS TO AVOID PREJUDGING THE
ISSUE, INFLUENCING THE COURT, OR
OBSTRUCTING THE ADMINSTRATION OF
JUSTICE (ROMERO V. ESTRADA, 583 SCRA
396, 4/2/2009), THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
(SABIO V. GORDON, 504 SCRA 704,
10/17/2006), WHICH, HOWEVER, MAY NOT
BE PROPERLY INVOKED IF THE SUBJECT OF
THE LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY PERTAINS TO
THE WITNESS DISCHARGE OF HIS
OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS, AND THE RIGHT TO
SELF-INCRIMINATION (STANDARD
CHARTERED BANK V. SENATE COMMITTEE
ON BANKS, 541 SCRA 456, `12/27/2007).
POWERS OF
CONGRESS
SEC. 21, ART. VI (CONT): (*****)
1.1)
IN AID OF LEGISLATION (RECENT
JURISPRUDENCE):
GUDANI V. SENGA (498 SCRA 671,
8/15/2006):
IN GUDANI V. SENGA (498 SCRA

671, 8/15/2006), THE COURT DECLARED
THAT THE PRESIDENT, AS COMMANDERIN-CHIEF, MAY VALIDLY PROHIBIT A
GENERAL FROM APPEARING IN A
LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY, ALTHOUGH THE
LEGISLATURE WOULD NOT BE
PRECLUDED FROM SEEKING JUDICIAL
RELIEF TO COMPEL HIS ATTENDANCE.
POWERS OF
CONGRESS
SEC. 21, ART. VI (CONT): (*****)
2.
PUNISHMENT FOR FAILURE OR
REFUSAL OR CONTUMACY OF WITNESS
(ARNAULT V. NAZARENO (87 PHIL 29) FAILURE OR REFUSAL TO ATTEND A
LEGITIMATE INVESTIGATION OR
CONTUMACY OF THE WITNESS MAY BE
PUNISHED AS LEGISLATIVE CONTEMPT.

THUS IN THIS CASE, THE PETITIONER WAS
ORDERED INCARCERATED BY THE SENATE
UNTIL SUCH TIME AS HE DECIDED TO
ANSWER CERTAIN RELEVANT QUESTIONS
PUT TO HIM IN CONNECTION WITH THE
INVESTIGATION OF A GOVERNMENT
TRANSACTION.
IT WAS HELD IN THIS CASE THAT THE

QUESTIONS THAT MAY BE RAISED IN A
LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION DO NOT
NECESSARILY HAVE TO BE RELEVANT TO
ANY PENDING LEGISLATION, PROVIDED
ONLY THAT THEY ARE RELEVANT TO THE
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE INVESTIGATION
BEING CONDUCTED. SUCH
INVESTIGATION MAY RESULT IN THE
SUBMISSION OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION
BASED UPON THE FINDINGS OF THE
INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE.
POWERS OF
CONGRESS
SEC. 21, ART. VI (CONT): (*****)
3. DURATION OF PUNISHMENT (LOPEZ
V. DE LOS REYES, 55 PHIL. 170)
AND (ARNAULT V. NAZARENO):
IN THE OLD RULE ANNOUNCED IN
LOPEZ V. DE LOS
REYES, WAS THAT
THE PUNISHMENT COULD LAST
ONLY
FOR THE DURATION OF THE SESSION
WHEN THE
CONTEMPT WAS
COMMITTED.
IN ARNAULT CASE, HOWEVER, THE

SC HELD THAT THE OFFENDER COULD
BE IMPRISONED INDEFINITELY BY THE
SENATE, IT BEING A CONTINUING BODY,
PROVIDED THAT THE PUNISHMENT
DID NOT BECOME
SO LONG AS TO
VIOLATE DUE PROCESS.
AS FOR THE HOUSE OF REP, THE
SAME DECISION DECLARED THAT THE
IMPRISONMENT COULD LAST NOT ONLY
DURING THE SESSION WHEN THE
OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED BUT UNTIL
THE FINAL ADJOURNMENT (ADJOURNMENT
SINE DIE) OF THE BODY. THIS RULE IS
PRESUMABLY STILL VALID AND MAY BE
APPLIED, UNLESS CHANGED, TO THE
PRESENT CONGRESS.
POWERS OF
CONGRESS
SEC. 21, ART. VI (CONT): (*****)

3.3
LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY IS A
POLITICAL QUESTION (DE LA PAZ V.
SENATE, 579 SCRA 521, 2/13/2009;
PHILCOMSAT V. SENATE, 673 SCRA 611,
6/19/2012):
IN THESE CASES, THE SC
CLARIFIED THAT THE SUBJECT OF A
LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY IS A POLITICAL
QUESTION, AND THE MERE FILING OF A
CRIMINAL OR AN ADMINISTRATIVE
COMPLAINT BEFORE A COURT OR A
QUASI-JUDICIAL BODY SHOULD NOT
AUTOMATICALLY BAR THE CONDUCT OF
LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION (STANDARD
CHARTERED BANK V. SENATE COMMITTEE
ON BANKS, 541 SCRA 456, 12/27/2007).
POWERS OF
CONGRESS
THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION *****
REPORT ON CURRENT
APPROPRIATIONS CASES:
1)
TRANSFER OF FUNDS
2)
PDAF CASES
3)
DAP CASES
REQUIRED: a. COPIES OF
ORGINAL CASES WITH FINAL
DECISIONS
b. CASE
DIGESTS/POWER POINT REPORT
c. CASE FOLDERS
d. TWO (2)
STUDENTS
POWERS OF
CONGRESS
THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION *****
SEC. 29(1), ART. VI NO MONEY SHALL
BE PAID OUT OF THE TREASURY EXCEPT IN
PURUSUANCE OF AN APPROPRIATION
MADE BY LAW.
1. APPROPRIATION DEFINED AN
APPROPRIATION MEASURE MAY BE
DEFINED AS A STATUTE THE
PRIMARY AND SPECIFIC PURPOSE
OF WHICH IS TO AUTHORIZE THE
RELEASE OF PUBLIC FUNDS FROM
THE TREASURY.
EXAMPLE: THE GENERAL
APPROPRIATIONS ACT.
POWERS OF
CONGRESS
THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION
2. IMPLIED LIMITATIONS
2.1a) PASCUAL V. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC

WORKS AND COMMUNICATION (110 PHIL.
331) (CONT): *****
THE SUPREME COURT OBSERVED THAT
THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE IMPROVED
WITH PUBLIC FUNDS WAS PRIVATE IN
NATURE AT THE TIME THE APPROPRIATION
WAS MADE. THE CIRCUMSTANCE THAT
THE ROADS WERE LATER DONATED TO
THE GOVT DID NOT CURE THE BASIC
DEFECT OF THE APPROPRIATION AS IT
WAS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
POWERS OF
CONGRESS
THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
IN ADDITION TO THESE EXTRACONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS, THE
CONSTITUTION LISTS DOWN SEVERAL
SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER OF
APPROPRIATION OF THE CONGRESS:
3.1) SEC. 24, ART. VI: (*****)
ALL APPROPRIATION BILLS SHOULD
ORIGINATE EXCLUSIVELY IN THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, BUT THE SENATE MAY
PROPOSE OR CONCUR WITH
AMENDMENTS.
POWERS OF
CONGRESS
THE POWER OF TAXATION
SEC. 28(3), ART. VI (CHARITABLE
INSTITUTIONS) : (*****)
CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS,
CHURCHES, PARSONAGES OR CONVENTS
APPURTENANT THERETO, MOSQUES, NONPROFIT CEMETERIES, AND ALL LANDS,
BUILDINGS AND IMPROVEMENTS
ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY, AND EXCLUSIVELY
USED FOR RELIGIOUS, CHARITABLE, OR
EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES SHALL BE
EXEMPT FROM TAXATION.
POWERS OF
CONGRESS
THE POWER OF TAXATION
SEC. 28(3), ART. VI (CHARITABLE

INSTITUTIONS) :
LLADOC V. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE (14 SCRA 292) (*****)
IN THIS CASE, A DONATION OF
P10,000 WAS ACCEPTED BY A PARISH
PRIEST FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF A
CHURCH. THE BIR SOUGHT TO IMPOSE A
DONEES TAX UPON HIS SUCCESSOR, WHO
PROTESTED, INVOKING THE
CONSTITUTIONAL EXEMPTION OF
RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS.
THE SC SUSTAINED THE BIR,
HOLDING THAT THE TAX IMPOSED WAS AN
EXCISE TAX, A TAX LEVIED NOT UPON THE
CHURCH ITSELF BUT UPON THE PARISH
PRIEST FOR THE EXERCISE BY HIM OF THE
PRIVILEGE OF RECEIVING THE DONATION.
THE TAXES COVERED BY THE
CONSTITUTIONAL EXEMPTION ARE REAL
ESTATE TAXES OR AD VALOREN TAXES
IMPOSED ON THE PROPERTY ITSELF.
POWERS OF
CONGRESS
REFERENDUM AND INITIATIVE
SEC. 32, ART. VI (ENABLING LAW
RA NO. 6735):
a) INITIATIVE (CONT) THERE ARE
3 SYTEMS OF INITIATIVE, NAMELY:
a.3 INITIATIVE ON LOCAL
LEGISLATION WHICH REFERS TO A
PETITION PROPOSING TO ENACT A
REGIONAL, PROVINCIAL, CITY, MUNICIPAL,
OR BARANGAY LAW, RESOLUTION, OR
ORDINANCE.
b)
INDIRECT INITIATIVE IS
THE EXERCISE OF INITIATIVE BY THE
PEOPLE THROUGH A PROPOSITION SENT
TO CONGRESS OR LOCAL LEGISLATIVE
BODY (SEC. 2, RA 6735).
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
3. QUALIFICATIONS OF THE
PRESIDENT (MEMORIZE
VERBATIM): (*****)
SEC. 2, ART. VII, PROVIDES THAT:
NO PERSON MAY BE ELECTED
PRESIDENT UNLESS HE IS:
a.
A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN
OF THE PHILIPPINES;
b.
A REGISTERED VOTER;
c.
ABLE TO READ AND WRITE;
d.
AT LEAST FORTY YEARS OF
AGE ON THE DAY OF THE
ELECTION;
AND
e.
A RESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES FOR AT LEAST TEN
YEARS
IMMEDIATELY PRECEEDING SUCH
ELECTION.
3.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
QUALIFICATIONS OF THE
PRESIDENT. (*****)
RECITATION:
1) CAN CONGRESS
OR REDUCE THE
ABOVE QUALIFICATIONS?
2) WHAT IS EXPRESSIO
UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO
ALTERIUS
3) WHO IS CONSIDERED A
NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN?
4) DEFINE RESIDENCE?
INCREASE
4.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
MEANING OF RESIDENCE. (*****)
WHO IS CONSIDERED RESIDENT OF

THE PHILIPPINES (MEMORIZE VERBATIM)?
AS DECIDED BY THE SUPREME
COURT IN SEVERAL CASES:
ONE IS A RESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES IF HE IS DOMI- CILED
THERE, THAT IS, THERE MUST CONCUR:
(1) BODILY PRESENCE IN THE
LOCALITY;
(2) AN INTENTION TO REMAIN
THERE ANIMUS MANENDI; AND
3. AN INTENTION TO ABANDON
THE OLD DOMICILE, IF HE HAD
ONE,
OR ANIMUS NON-REVERTENDI.
WHILE, HOWEVER, BODILY
PRESENCE IN THE LOCALITY IS
REQUIRED, THE RESIDENCY
REQUIREMENT ALLOWS FOR TEMPORARY
PHYSICAL ABSENCES PROVIDED THAT
THE ANIMUS REVERTENDI TO THE
DOMICILE IS NEVER ABAN-DONED.
(Gallego v. Vera, 73 Phil. 453 [1941]);
Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954]).
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
6. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION TERM OF OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE VICEPRESIDENT. (*****)
THE PRESIDENT AND THE

VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL BE ELECTED BY
DIRECT VOTE OF THE PEOPLE FOR A
TERM OF SIX YEARS WHICH SHALL BEGIN
AT NOON ON THE 30TH
DAY OF JUNE
NEXT FOLLOWING THE DAY OF THE
ELECTION AND SHALL END AT NOON OF
THE SAME DATE SIX YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
THE PRESIDENT SHALL NOT BE

ELIGIBLE FOR ANY REELECTION. NO
PERSON WHO HAS SUCCEEDED AS

PRESIDENT AND HAS SERVED AS SUCH
FOR MORE THAN FOUR YEARS SHALL
BE QUALIFIED FOR ELECTION TO THE
SAME OFFICE AT ANY TIME. (Sec. 4,
Art. VII, par. 1).
NOTA BENE: LONZANIDA V.
COMELEC (311 SCRA 602) RE
THREE-TERM
LIMIT IN THE CONSTITUTION.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
NOTE LONZANIDA V. COMELEC
CASE (311 SCRA 602) REGARDING THE 3TERM LIMIT IN THE CONSTITUTION:
IN THIS CASE, THE PETITIONER

WAS ELECTED 3 TIMES AS MAYOR BUT
LOST IN AN ELECTION PROTEST AND WAS
OUSTED DURING HIS 3RD TERM.
INTERPRETING THE 3-TERM LIMIT IN THE
CONSTITUTION AND LGC FOR LOCAL
OFFICIALS, THE SC HELD THAT HE WAS
NOT DISQUALIFIED FROM RUNNING FOR
THE SAME POSITION AGAIN BECAUSE HIS
3RD ELECTION WAS NULLIFIED AND HE DID
NOT FULLY SERVE THE 3RD TERM.
HOWEVER, THIS RULING IS NOT
NECESSARILY DECISIVE OF THE QUESTION
AS IT APPLIES TO THE TERM LIMITS OF
THE PRESIDENT AND THE VICEPRESIDENT.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
6. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION-TERM
OF OFFICE
NO VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL
SERVE FOR MORE THAN TWO
SUCCESSIVE TERMS. VOLUNTARY
RENUNCIATION OF THE OFFICE FOR
ANY LENGTH OF TIME SHALL NOT
BE CONSIDERED AS AN INTERRUPTION
IN THE CONTINUITY OF THE SERVICE
FOR THE FULL TERM FOR WHICH HE
WAS ELECTED. (Sec. 4, Art. VII, par. 2).
THE SUPREME COURT, SITTING
EN BANC, SHALL BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF
ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO THE
ELECTION, RETURNS, AND
QUALIFICATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT OR
VICE-PRESIDENT, AND MAY PROMULGATE
ITS RULES FOR THE PURPOSE. (Sec. 4,
Art. VII, par. 7).
7.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
DISCUSSION ON THE TERM OF THE
PRESIDENT. (***)
IT WAS ARGUED THAT SIX YEARS

WAS LONG ENOUGH FOR A GOOD
PRESIDENT TO IMPLEMENT HIS
PROGRAMS AND, RATHER
OPTIMISTICALLY, THAT WITH THE
CONSTRAINTS BUILT AROUND THE
PRESIDENCY, A BAD ONE WOULD NOT
SUCCEED
IN ACCOMPLISHING HIS
EVIL DESIGNS.
7.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
PRESIDENT. (***)
THE FIXING OF THE EXACT TIME

AND DATE FOR THE START AND ENDING
OF THE TERM EXCLUDES THE RIGHT TO
HOLD-OVER. AT NOON ON JUNE 30
SIX YEARS AFTER THE START OF THE
TERM, EITHER THE NEWLY ELECTED
PRESIDENT TAKES OVER OR THE RULE ON
FILLING OF VACANCIES FOUND IN
SECTION 7, ARTICLE VII BECOMES
OPERATIVE.
7.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
PRESIDENT.***
AN INNOVATION INTRODUCED BY
THE 1986 CONCOM IS THE LIMIT ON THE
NUMBER OF TERM A PRESIDENT MAY
SERVE.
A PRESIDENT IS NOT
ELIGIBLE FOR ANY REELECTION FOR
THAT OFFICE, THAT IS, EITHER
IMMEDIATELY AFTER HIS TERM OR
EVEN AFTER AN INTERVAL OF ONE
OR MORE TERMS.
NOTA BENE: THE ERAP CASE WAS
NOT TESTED IN THE SC
AS HE LOST IN
THE ELECTION TO AQUINO IN
2010
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.
7.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
PRESIDENT.***
IT WAS THOUGHT THAT THE

ELIMINATION OF THE PROSPECT OF
REELECTION WOULD MAKE FOR A
MORE INDEPENDENT PRESIDENT
CAPABLE OF MAKING CORRECT, EVEN
IF UNPOPULAR, DECISIONS. THE
PROHIBITION OF REELECTION APPLIES
TO ANY PERSON WHO HAS SERVED*
AS PRESIDENT FOR MORE THAN FOUR
YEARS. (The Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines, First

Edition, 1988, Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.).
VICE-PRESIDENT, AND MAY PROMULGATE

ITS RULES FOR THE PURPOSE. (par. 7,
Sec. 4, Art. VII)
*EITHER BY ELECTION OR
SUCCESSION
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
THE SECOND PROVISION STATES:
THE MEMBERS OF THE SC AND OTHER
COURTS ESTABLISHED BY LAW SHALL NOT
BE DESIGNATED TO ANY AGENCY
PERFORMING QUASI-JUDICIAL OR
ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS. (Sec. 12,
Art. VIII)
MACALINTAL ALSO SAID THE HIGH
COURT WAS MISTAKEN IN CREATING THE
PET BECAUSE THE CONSTITUTION DOES
NOT AUTHORIZE THE CREATION OF
ANOTHER TRIBUNAL OPERATING ON ITS
OWN BUDGET.
MACALINTAL ARGUED THAT THE
PET GIVES SC MAGISTRATES DUAL
POSITIONS IN GOVERNMENT.
5.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
CASE EXAMPLE - TERM OF OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT:
IN AN ELECTION FOR THE

PRESIDENCY FOR A TERM OF 6 YEARS
STARTING JUNE 30, 200A TO JUNE 30,
200G, MR. MEROLCO WAS PROCLAIMED
AS THE ELECTED PRESIDENT FOR A
FIXED TERM OF 6 YEARS STARTING
JUNE 30, 200A. HOWEVER, MR. GSAS,
HIS RIVAL, FILED AN ELECTION PROTEST
WITH THE PET. AFTER 4-1/2 YEARS IN
OFFICE, THE ELECTION PROTEST WAS
DECIDED IN FAVOR OF MR.
GSAS;THEREAFTER, MR . GSAS TOOK HIS
OATH OF OFFICE AS THE DULY
ELECTED PRESIDENT TO GOVERN THE
COUNTRY FOR THE BALANCE OF THE
TERM WHICH IS 1-1/2 YEARS.
QUESTIONS: CAN MR. MEROLCO
RUN FOR PRESIDENT IN THE
NEXT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION? HOW
ABOUT MR. GSAS?
(Note Lonzanida v.
Comelec, case 311 SCRA 602)
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL (MACALINTAL SEEKS
ABOLITION OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL PETITION WITH SC DATED
APRIL 5, 2010):
PGMA ELECTION LAWYER, R.
MACALINTAL, SOUGHT THE ABOLITION OF
THE PET, WHICH HE ARGUED WAS
ILLEGALLY CREATED AND COULD BE
UNNECESSARILY EATING UP GOVERNMENT
FUNDS.
IN A 7-PAGE PETITION,
MACALINTAL ASKED THE SC TO DECLARE
THE CREATION OF THE PET IN VIOLATION
OF TWO PROVISIONS IN THE
CONSTITUTION: PAR. 7, SEC. 4,
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE THAT
THIS PETITION BE RESOLVED WITH
DISPATCH IN VIEW OF THE FORTHCOMING
PRESIDENDTIAL ELECTIONS IN MAY, 2010
WHERE CASES MAY BE FILED INVOLVING
THE ELECTION, RETURNS OR
QUALIFICATIONS OF CANDIDATES FOR
PRESIDENT OR VICE-PRESIDENT, HE SAID
IN THE PETITION.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
ART. VII, AND SEC. 12, ART. VIII.
MACALINTAL ARGUED THAT THE SC
SITTING EN BANC SHOULD RESOLVE
ELECTORAL PROTESTS IN THE
PRESIDENTIAL AND VICE-PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS, AND NOT THE PET.
THE FIRST PROVISION STATES:
THE SC, SITTING EN BANC, SHALL BE THE
SOLE JUDGE OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING
TO THE ELECTION, RETURNS, AND
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
THE SC HELD THAT THE

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PET IS
AUTHORIZED BY THE LAST PAR. OF SEC. 4,
ART. VII OF THE CONSTITUTION AND
SUPPORTED BY THE DISCUSSIONS OF THE
MEMBERS OF THE CONCOM. THE
PROVISION WHICH STATES THAT THE SC
SITTING EN BANC, SHALL BE THE SOLE
JUDGE OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO
ELECTIONS, RETURNS, AND
VICE PRESIDENT, AND MAY PROMULGATE
ITS RULES FOR THE PURPOSE,
MANDATES THE SC TO CREATE THE PET,
THE COURT HELD.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
THE COURT STRESSED THE

PLENARY GRANT TO IT BY THE
CONSTITUTION OF JUDICIAL POWER AND
THAT UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF
NECESSARY IMPLICATION, THE
ADDITIONAL JURISDICTION BESTOWED BY

THE LAST PAR. OF SEC. 4, ART. VII OF THE
CONSTITUTION TO DECIDE PRESIDENTIAL
AND VICE PRESDIENTIAL CONTESTS
INCLUDES THE MEANS NECESSARY TO
CARRY IT. THE SC RULED THAT ITS
METHOD OF DECIDING PRESDIENTIAL AND
VICE PRESDIENTIAL ELECTION CONTESTS
THROUGH PET, IS ACTUALLY A DERIVATIVE
OF THE EXERCISE OF THE PREROGATIVE
CONFERRED BY THE SAID
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION (LAST PAR.,
SEC. 4, ARTICLE VII).
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
THE SC HELD THE POWER OF PET

IS A DERIVATIVE OF THE PLENARY
JUDICIAL POWER ALLOCATED TO COURTS
OF LAW, EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR IN
THE CONSTITUTION. (MAKALINTAL V.
PET, GR NO. 191618, JUNE 7, 2011) [WRR].
8.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION.
A.
THERE ARE TWO SETS OF
RULES ON PRESIDENTIAL
SUCCESSION:
SECTION 7 ON VACANCIES
OCCURING BEFORE THE PRESIDENT
ASSUMED HIS TERM OF OFFICE;
SECTION 8 ON VACANCIES
OCCURING AFTER THE PRESIDENT
ASSUMED HIS TERM OF OFFICE.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
8. PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION:
SECTION 7, ARTICLE VII (BEFORE
ASSUMING OFFICE):
THE PRESIDENT-ELECT AND

THE VICE-PRESIDENT-ELECT SHALL
ASSUME OFFICE AT THE BEGINNING OF
THEIR TERMS.
IF THE PRESIDENT-ELECT FAILS
TO QUALIFY, THE VICE-PRESIDENT
ELECT SHALL ACT AS PRESIDENT
UNTIL THE PRESIDENT-ELECT SHALL HAVE
QUALIFIED.
IF THE PRESIDENT SHALL NOT
HAVE BEEN CHOSEN, THE VICEPRESIDENT-ELECT SHALL ACT AS
PRESIDENT UNTIL A PRESIDENT SHALL
HAVE BEEN CHOSEN AND QUALIFIED.
8.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
IF AT THE BEGINNING OF THE

TERM OF THE PRESIDENT, THE
PRESIDENT-ELECT SHALL HAVE DIED OR
SHALL HAVE BECOME PERMANENTLY
DISABLED, THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL
BECOME PRESIDENT.
WHERE NO PRESIDENT AND
VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE BEEN
CHOSEN OR SHALL HAVE QUALIFIED, OR
WHERE BOTH SHALL HAVE DIED OR
BECOME PERMANENTLY DISABLED, THE
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OR,
IN
CASE OF HIS INABILITY,
THE
SPEAKER
OF
THE
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES SHALL ACT AS
PRESIDENT UNTIL A PRESIDENT OR A
VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE BEEN CHOSEN AND QUALIFIED.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
8. PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION.
THE CONGRESS SHALL BY LAW
PROVIDE FOR THE MANNER IN WHICH
ONE WHO IS TO ACT AS PRESIDENT
SHALL BE SELECTED
UNTIL A
PRESIDENT OR A VICE-PRESIDENT
SHALL HAVE QUALIFIED, IN CASE OF
DEATH, PERMANENT DISABILITY, OR
INABILITY OF THE OFFICIALS MENTIONED
IN THE NEXT PRECEEDING PAPRAGRAPH.
SECTION 8, ARTICLE VII (AFTER
ASSUMING OFFICE):
IN CASE OF DEATH, PERMANENT
DISABILITY, REMOVAL FROM OFFICE, OR
RESIGNATION OF THE PRESIDENT, THE
VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL BECOME THE
PRESIDENT TO SERVE THE
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
8. THEPRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION.
UNEXPIRED TERM.
IN CASE
OF DEATH, PERMANENT DISABILITY,
REMOVAL FROM OFFICE, OR
RESIGNATION OF BOTH THE PRESIDENT
AND VICE-PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT OF
THE SENATE OR, IN CASE OF HIS
INABILITY, THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVE SHALL THEN ACT
AS PRESIDENT UNTIL THE
PRESIDENT OR VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL
HAVE BEEN ELECTED AND QUALIFIED.
8.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
THEPRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION.
THE CONGRESS SHALL BY LAW

PROVIDE, WHO SHALL SERVE AS
PRESIDENT IN CASE OF DEATH,
PERMANENT DISABILITY, OR
RESIGNATION OF THE ACTING
PRESIDENT.
HE SHALL SERVE UNTIL
THE PRESIDENT OR THE VICE-PRESIDENT
SHALL HAVE BEEN ELECTED AND

QUALIFIED, AND BE SUBJECT TO THE
SAME RESTRICTIONS OF POWERS AND
DISQUALIFICATION AS THE ACTING
PRESIDENT.
HAVE ENDED
BUT WAS
PREVENTED FROM DOING SO.
JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO
DECLARED IN PART FOR THE
COURT:
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
THE CASES CONTEMPLATED IN
SECTION 7 ARE:
a.
FAILURE OF THE
PRESIDENT-ELECT TO QUALIFY, THAT
IS, TO ASSUME HIS OFFICE BY
TAKING THE OATH AND
ENTERING
INTO THE DISCHARGE OF HIS DUTIES;
b.
FAILUE TO ELECT THE
PRESIDENT,
AS WHERE THE
CANVASS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS HAS NOT YET
BEEN
COMPLETED, OR WHERE FOR ONE
REASON OR ANOTHER THE
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION HAS
NOT BEEN
HELD;
c.
DEATH OR PERMANENT
DISABILITY OF THE PRESDIENT
ELECT.
IN (a) AND (b), THE VICEPRESIDENT SHALL MERELY ACTS AS
PRESIDENT; WHILE, IN (c), HE BECOMES
THE PRESIDENT.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
B.
ESTRADA V. GMA:
IN SUM,
WE HOLD
THAT THE RESIGNATION OF THE
PETITIONER CANNOT BE DOUBTED. IT
WAS CONFIRMED BY HIS LEAVING
MALACANANG. IN THE PRESS RELEASE
CONTAINING HIS FINAL STATEMENT, (1)
HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE OATH-TAKING
OF THE RESPONDENT AS PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC ALBEIT WITH
RESERVATION ABOUT ITS LEGALITY;
(2) HE EMPHASIZED HE WAS LEAVING
THE PALACE, THE SEAT OF THE
PRESIDENCY, FOR THE SAKE OF
PEACE AND IN ORDER TO BEGIN THE
HEALING PROCESS OF OUR NATION. HE
DID NOT SAY HE WAS LEAVING THE
PALACE DUE TO ANY KIND OF INABILITY
AND THAT HE WAS GOING TO RE-ASSUME
THE PRESIDENCY AS SOON AS THE
DISABILITY APPEARS (DIS?); (3) HE
EXPRESSED HIS GRATITUDE TO THE
PEOPLE FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO
SERVE THEM. WITHOUT DOUBT HE
WAS REFERRING TO THE PAST
8.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
SECTION 8 DEALS WITH VACANCIES

OCCURING IN THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT DURING HIS INCUMBENCY
AND IS LIMITED TO FOUR INSTANCES:
a.
DEATH;
b.
REMOVAL;
c.
RESIGNATION; OR
d.
PERMANENT DISABILITY,
LIKE INCURABLE INSANITY.
8.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
B.
JOSEPH ESTRADA V. GMA
(G.R. NO. L-146738, MARCH 2, 2001).
ESTRADA QUESTIONED
GMAS RIGHT TO SUCCEED HIM AS
PRESDIENT, CLAIMING THAT HE
HAD LEFT MALACANANG
ON JAN. 20,
2001 ONLY TO DIFFUSE THE TENSION
BUILDING
UP AMONG
THE
DEMONSTRATORS
AT EDSA WHO
WERE DEMANDING HIS
RESIGNATION.
HE DENIED HE
HAD RESIGNED AND SAID HE
HAD EVERY INTENTION
TO RETURN
AFTER THE DISTURBANCES SHALL
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
B. ESTRADA V. GMA:
OPPORTUNITY GIVEN HIM TO
SERVE THE PEOPLE AS THEIR
PRESIDENT; (4) HE ASSURED THAT HE
WILL NOT SHIRK FROM ANY FUTURE
CHALLENGE THAT MAY COME AHEAD IN
THE SAME SERVICE OF OUR COUNTRY.
PETITIONERS REFERENCE IS TO A
FUTURE CHALLENGE AFTER OCCUPYING
THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT WHICH
HE HAS GIVEN UP, AND (5) HE
CALLED ON HIS SUPPORTERS TO JOIN HIM
IN THE PROMOTION OF A NATIONAL
SPIRIT OF RECONCILIATION AND
SOLIDARITY. CERTAINLY, THE NATIONAL
SPIRIT OF RECONCILIATION AND
SOLIDARITY COULD NOT BE ATTAINED IF
HE DID NOT GIVE UP THE PRESIDENCY.
THE PRESS RELEASE WAS PETITIONERS
VALEDICTORY, HIS FINAL ACT OF
FAREWELL. HIS PRESIDEN-CY IS NOW
IN THE PAST TENSE.
8.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
B.
ESTRADA V. GMA:
ESTRADA ALSO AGRUED THAT

GMA COULD NOT HAVE REPLACED HIM
EITHER IN AN ACTING CAPACITY
BECAUSE THE DETERMINATION OF THE
PRESIDENTS INABILITY TO DISCHARGE
THE POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF HIS
OFFICE SHOULD BE MADE BY THE
CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE
PROCEDURE LAID DOWN IN SECTION
11, ARTICLE VII. THE COURT HELD THAT
HE HAD NOT BEEN REPLACED ON THAT
GROUND; AND ANYWAY, THE SENATE
AND THE HOUSE HAD, BY RESOLUTION,
FORMALLY RECOGNIZED GMA AS THE
CONSTITUTIONAL SUCCESSOR OF
ESTRADA BY REASON OF HIS
RESIGNATION AS PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
C.
INABILITY OF THE
PRESIDENT TO DISCHARGE HIS
POWERS AND DUTIES.
SECTION 11, ARTICLE VII.
WHENEVER THE PRESIDENT TRANSMIT
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE
AND THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES HIS WRITTEN
DECLARATION THAT HE IS UNABLE
TO DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND
DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE, AND UNTIL
HE TRANSMITS TO THEM A WRITTEN
DECLARATION TO THE CONTRARY,
SUCH
POWERS
AND
DUTIES
SHALL BE DISCHARGED
BY
THE
VICE-PRESIDENT
AS
ACTING
PRESIDENT.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
C.
INABILITY OF THE
POWERS AND DUTIES (CONT):
WHENEVER A MAJORITY OF
ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE CABINET
TRANSMIT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SENATE AND TO THE SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THEIR
WRITTEN DECLARATION THAT THE
PRESIDENT IS UNABLE TO DISCHARGE
THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS
OFFICE, THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL
DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF
THE OFFICE AS ACTING PRESIDENT.
THEREAFTER, WHEN THE
PRESIDENT TRANSMIT TO THE
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND TO
THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES HIS WRITTEN
DECLARATION
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
C. INABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT . .
. (CONT):
THAT NO INABILITY EXISTS, HE
SHALL REASSUME THE POWERS AND
DUTIES
OF HIS OFFICE.
MEANWHILE, SHOULD A MAJORITY OF
ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE CABINET
TRANSMIT WITHIN FIVE DAYS TO THE
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND TO THE
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES THEIR WRITTEN
DECLARATION THAT THE PRESIDENT IS
UNABLE TO DISCHARGE THE POWERS
AND DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE, THE
CONGRESS SHALL DECIDE THE ISSUE.
FOR THAT PURPOSE, THE CONGRESS
SHALL CONVENE, IF IT IS NOT IN
SESSION, WITHIN FORTY-EIGHT HOURS,
IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS RULES AND
WITHOUT NEED OF CALL.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
C. INABILITY OF THE
PRESIDENT . . . (CONT):
IF THE CONGRESS WITHIN TEN
DAYS AFTER RECEIPT OF THE LAST
WRITTEN DECLARATION, OR, IF NOT IN
SESSION, WITHIN TWELVE DAYS AFTER
IT IS REQUIRED TO
ASSEMBLE,
DETERMINES BY A TWO-THIRDS VOTE
OF BOTH HOUSES, VOTING SEPARATELY,
THAT THE PRESIDENTV IS UNABLE TO
DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND DUTIES
OF HIS OFFICE, THE VICE-PRESIDENT
SHALL ACT AS PRESIDENT ; OTHERWISE,
THE PRESIDENT SHALL CONTINUE
EXERCISING THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF
HIS OFFICE.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
C.
INABILITY OF THE
POWERS AND DUTIES (CONT).
1. ESTRADA V. GMA (G.R. L
- 146738, March 2, 2001)
JAN. 20, 2001
SIR,
BY VIRTUE OF PROVISION
SEC. 11, ART. VII OF THE
CONSTITUTION, I AM HEREBY
TRANSMITTING THIS
DECLARATION
THAT I AM UNABLE TO EXERCISE THE
POWERS AND DUTIES OF MY
OFFICE. BY OPERATION
OF
LAW
AND
THE CONSTITUTION,
THE VICEPRESIDENT SHALL BE THE
ACTING PRESIDENT.
PRESIDENT JOSEPH
EJERCITO ESTRADA
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
C.
INABILITY OF THE
POWERS AND DUTIES (CONT):
2. ESTRADA V. GMA (G.R. L

146738, March 2, 2001).
ESTRADA TRIED TO
THIS PROVISION BY HIS
MYSTERIOUS LETTER BUT THE
COURT
HELD THAT
HE
HAD NOT BEEN REPLACED ON
THAT GROUND; AND
ANYWAY,
THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE HAD,
BY
RESOLUTION,
FORMALLY
RECOGNIZED GMA AS THE
CONSTITUTIONAL SUCCESSOR
BY REASON OF HIS
RESIGNATION
AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE
PHILIPPINES. HENCE, THIS ISSUE
BECAME A POLITICAL QUESTION WHICH
THE
COURT, UNDER THE DOCTRINE
OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, HAS
NO POWER TO REVIEW.
TEST
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
8. PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. (***)
D.
VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF
THE VICE-PRESIDENT
DURING THE TERM FOR WHICH
HE WAS ELECTED.
QUESTION: WHAT IS THE

CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS
REQUIRED TO REPLACE AND
INSTALL A
NEW VICEPRESDIDENT IN CASE A VACANCY
OCCURS IN HIS OFFICE
DURING THE TERM
FOR
WHICH HE WAS ELECTED, LIKE FOR
INSTANCE, WHEN
THE INCUMBENT VICE-PRESIDENT SUCCEDED AS
PRESIDENT?
8.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
D.
VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF
THE VICE-PRESIDENT
DURING THE TERM FOR
WHICH HE WAS ELECTED.
SECTION 9, ARTICLE VII:
WHENEVER THERE IS A VACANCY IN THE
OFFICE OF THE VICE-PRESIDENT DURING
THE TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED,
THE PRESDIENT SHALL NOMINATE A VICE-
PRESIDENT FROM AMONG THE MEMBERS

OF SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES WHO SHALL ASSUME
OFFICE UPON CONFIRMATION BY A
MAJORITY VOTE OF ALL THE
MEMBERS OF BOTH HOUSES OF
CONGRESS VOTING SEPA-RATELY.
(GMA & GUINGONA CASE)
8.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
E. FILLING OF THE VACANCY IN THE

OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT
AND VICE-PRESIDENT (SIMULTANEOUS):
SECTION 10, ARTICLE VII: THE
CONGRESS SHALL, AT TEN OCLOCK IN
THE MORNING OF THE THIRD DAY
AFTER VACANCY
IN THE OFFICES
OF THE PRESIDENT AND
VICEPRESIDENT OCCURS,
CONVENE IN
ACCORDANCE WITH ITS RULES
WITHOUT NEED OF A CALL AND WITHIN
SEVEN DAYS ENACT A LAW CALLING
FOR A SPECIAL ELEC- TION TO ELECT A
PRESIDENT AND A VICE-PRESIDENT TO
BE HELD NOT EARLIER THAN 45 DAYS
NOR LATER THAN 60 DAYS FROM THE
TIME OF SUCH CALL. THE BILL CALLING
SUCH SPECIAL ELECTION SHAL BE
DEEMED CERTIFIED UNDER PARAGRAPH
2, SECTION 26, ARTICLE VI OF THIS
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
E. FILLING OF THE VACANCY IN THE
OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT
AND VICE-PRESIDENT (SIMULTANEOUS):
CONSTITUTION AND SHALL

BECOME LAW UPON ITS APPROVAL ON
THIRD READING BY THE CONGRESS.
APPROPRIATION FOR THE SPECIAL
ELECTION SHALL
BE CHARGED
AGAINST ANY CURRENT APPROPRIATIONS AND SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM
THE REQUIRE
-MENTS OF PARAGRAPH
4, SECTION 25, ARTICLE VI OF
THIS CONSTITUTION. THE CONVENING OF
THE CONGRESS CANNOT BE
SUSPENDED NOR
THE SPECIAL
ELECTION POSTPONED.
NO SPECIAL
ELECTION
SHALL BE CALLED
IF
THE VACANCY
OCCURS
WITHIN
I8 MONTHS BEFORE THE DATE OF
THE
NEXT PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
9. EXECUTIVE INHIBITIONS (*****)
QUESTION: CAN AN ENERGY
SECRETARY BE QUALIFIED TO THE
APPOINTMENT AS MEMBER OF THE
BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE

UNIVERSITY OF
THE PHILIPPINES?
a) SECTION 13, ARTICLE
VII;
b) SECTION 7, PAR. 2,
ARTICLE IX-B;
c) SECTION I, ARTICLE XI;
d) EXECUTIVE ORDER NO.
284, JULY 23, 1987
e) CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
V. THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY (194 SCRA 317) DECLARING
EXECUTIVE
ORDER NO. 284
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
SEC. 13, ARTICLE VII: (*****)
THE PRESIDENT, VICE-PRESIDENT,
THE MEMBERS OF THE CABINET, AND
THEIR DEPUTIES OR ASSISTANTS SHALL
NOT, UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN
THIS CONSTITUTION, HOLD ANY OTHER
OFFICE OR EMPLOY-MENT DURING
THEIR TENURE.
THEY SHALL NOT,
DURING SAID TENURE, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY PRACTICE ANY OTHER
PROFESSION, PARTICIPATE IN
ANY
BUSINESS, OR BE FINANCIALLY
INTERESTED IN
ANY CONTRACT
WITH, OR IN ANY FRANCHISE, OR
SPECIAL PRIVILEGE GRANTED BY THE
GOVERNMENT
OR ANY SUBDIVISION,
AGENCY, OR INSTRUMENTALITY THEREOF,
INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR
CON-TROLLED CORPORATIONS OR THEIR
SUBSIDIARIES.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
SEC. 7, 2ND PAR, ARTICLE IX-B, THE CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION): (*****)
UNLESS OTHERWISE ALLOWED
BY LAW OR BY THE PRIMARY FUNCTIONS
OF HIS POSITION, NO APPOINTIVE
OFFICIAL SHALL HOLD ANY OTHER OFFICE
OR EMPLOYMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT
OR ANY SUBDI-VISION, AGENCY OR
INSTRUMENTALITY THEREOF, INCLUDING
GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED
CORPORATIONS OR THEIR SUBSIDIARIES.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
SEC. 1, ARTICLE XI, ACCOUNTABILITY OF
PUBLIC OFFICERS:
PUBLIC OFFICE IS A PUBLIC TRUST.
PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES MUST
AT ALL TIMES BE ACCOUNTA- BLE TO THE
PEOPLE, SERVE THEM WITH UTMOST RESPONSIBILITY, INTEGRITY, LOYALTY, AND
EFFICIENCY, ACT WITH PATRIOTISM AND
JUSTICE, AND LEAD MO- DEST LIVES.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 284, JULY 23,
1987, RULE ON MULTIPLE POSITIONS FOR
THE CABINET MEMBERS AND OTHER

APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS:
SEC. 1 EVEN IF ALLOWED BY
LAW OR BY THE PRIMARY FUNCTION OF
HIS POSITIONS, A MEMBER OF CABINET,
UNDERSECRETARY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OR OTHER APPOINTIVE OFFICIAL OF THE
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT MAY, IN
ADDITION TO HIS PRIMARY POSITION,
HOLD NOT MORE THAN TWO POSITIONS
IN THE GOVERNMENT AND GOCCS AND
RECEIVE THE CORRESPONDING
COMPENSATION THEREFOR: PROVIDED,
THAT THIS LIMITATIONS SHALL NOT
APPLY TO AD HOC BODIES OR
COMMITTEES, OR TO BOARDS, COUNCILS,
OR BODIES OF WHICH THE PRESIDENT IS
THE CHAIRMAN.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 284, JULY 23, 1987
(CONT):
1)
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (194 SCRA
317) (*****)- IN THIS CASE, THE
PETITIONER CHALLENGED EO NO. 284,
JULY 23, 1987, WHICH IN EFFECT
ALLOWED CABINET MEMBERS, THEIR
UNDERSECRETARIES AND ASSISTANT
SECRETARIES AND OTHER APPOINTIVE
OFFICIALS OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPT TO
HOLD OTHER POSITIONS IN THE GOVT
ALBIET SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS
IMPOSED THEREIN. THE RESPONDENTS,
IN REFUTING THE PETITIONEDRS
ARGUMENT THAT THE MEASURE WAS
VIOLATIVE OF ART. VII, SEC. 13 OF THE
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
(CONT):
1)
317) (CONT): CONSTITUTION, INVOKED
ART. IX-B, SEC. 7, ALLOWING THE
HOLDING OF MULTIPLE POSITIONS BY THE
APPOINTIVE OFFICIAL IF ALLOWED BY
LAW OR BY THE PRIMARY FUNCTIONS OF
HIS POSITION.
IN DECLARING THE EO
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, THE SC DECLARED:
IN THE LIGHT OF THE CONSTRUCTION
GIVEN TO SEC. 13, ART. VII IN RELATION
TO SEC. 7, PAR. 2, ART. IX-B OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, EXECUTIVE ORDER NO.
284 DATED JULY 23, 1987 IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
(CONT):
1)
317) (CONT): OSTENSIBLY RESTRICTING
THE NUMBER OF POSTIONS THAT CABINET
MEMBERS, UNDERSECRETARIES OR
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES MAY HOLD IN
ADDITION TO THEIR PRIMARY POSITION
TO NOT MORE THAN 2 POSITIONS IN THE
GOVT AND GOCCS, EO 284 ACTUALLY
ALLOWS THEM TO HOLD MULTIPLE
OFFICES OR EMPLOYMENT IN DIRECT
CONTRAVENTION OF THE EXPRESS
MANDATE OF SEC.13, ART. VII OF THE
1987 CONSTITUTION PROHIBITING THEM
FROM DOING SO, UNLESS OTHERWISE
PROVIDED IN THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
ITSELF.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
(CONT):
1)
317) (CONT): THE COURT IS ALERTED BY
REPONSDENTS TO THE IMPRACTICAL
CONSEQUENCES THAT WILL RESULT FROM
A STRICT APPLICATION OF THE
PROHIBITION MANDATED UNDER SEC. 13,
ART. VII (CONSTITUTION) ON THE
OPERATIONS OF THE GOVT, CONSIDERING
THAT CABINET MEMBERS WOULD BE
STRIPPED OF THEIR OFFICES HELD IN AN
EX-OFFICIO CAPACITY, BY REASON OF
THEIR PRIMARY POSITIONS OR BY VIRTUE
OF LEGISLATION.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
(CONT):
1)
317) (CONT): AS EARLIER CLARIFIED IN
THIS DECISION, EX-OFFICIO POSTS OR
THOSE REQUIRED BY THE PRIMARY
FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE OFFICIAL
CONCERNED DO NOT FALL WITHIN THE
DEFINITION OF ANY OTHER OFFICE
WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION. WITH
RESPECT TO OTHER OFFICES OR
EMPLOYMENT HELD BY VIRTUE OF
LEGISLATION, INCLUDING
CHAIRMANSHIPS OR DIRECTORSHIPS IN
GOCCS AND THEIR SUBSIDIARIES,
SUFFICE IT TO SAY THAT THE FEARED
IMPRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES ARE MORE
APPARENT THAN REAL. BEING HEAD OF
AN
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
(CONT):
1)
317) (CONT): EXECUTIVE DEPT IS NO

MEAN JOB. IT IS MORE THAN A FULL-TIME
JOB, REQUIRING FULL ATTENTION,
SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS AND
EXPERTISE. IF MAXIMUM BENEFITS ARE
TO BE DERIVED FROM A DEPT HEADS
ABILITY AND EXPERTISE, HE SHOULD BE
ALLOWED TO ATTEND TO HIS DUTIES AND
RESPONSIBILITIES WITHOUT THE
DISTRACTION OF OTHER GOVT OFFICES
OR EMPLOYMENT.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
(CONT):
1)
317) (CONT): HE SHOULD BE PRECLUDED
FROM DISSIPATING HIS EFFORTS,
ATTENTION AND ENERGY AMONG TOO
MANY POSITIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY,
WHICH MAY RESULT IN HAPZARDNESS
AND INEFFICIENCY. SURELY THE
ADVANTAGES TO BE DERIVED FROM THIS
CONCENTRATION OF ATTENTION,
KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERTISE,
PARTICULARLY AT THIS STATE OF OUR
NATIONAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPEMNT,
FAR OUTWEIGH THE BENEFITS, IF ANY,
THAT MAY BE GAINED FROM A
DEPARTMENT HEAD SPREADING HIMSELF
TOO THIN AND TAKING IN MORE THAN
WHAT HE CAN HANDLE.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
10. PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY. (*****)
QUESTION:
IS THE PRESIDENT IMMUNE FROM
SUIT?
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
10. PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY.
A. LEGAL BASIS:
1)
THE 1935 CONSTITUTION
2) ORIGINAL 1973 CONSTITUION
THE PRESIDENT SHALL BE IMMUNE
FROM SUIT DURING HIS TENURE.
3) 1973 CONSTITUTION, AS
AMENDED IN 1981:
THE PRESIDENT SHALL BE
IMMUNE FROM SUIT DURING HIS
TENURE. THEREAFTER,
NO SUIT
WHATSOEVER SHALL LIE FOR THE
OFFICIAL
ACTS DONE BY HIM OR
BY OTHERS PURSUANT TO HIS
SPECIFIC ORDERS DURING HIS
TENURE.
4) 1987 CONSTITUTION
5) FORBES, ETC. V. CHUOCO TIACO
AND CROSSFIELD
(16 PHIL. 534 [1910]).
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
B.
1987 CONSTITUTION.
WHEN THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
WAS CRAFTED, ITS FRAMERS DID NOT
REENACT THE EXECUTIVE UMMUNITY
PROVISION OF THE 1973 CONSTITUTION.
THE FOLLOWING EXPLANATION WAS
GIVEN BY DELEGATE J. BERNAS, VIZ:
MR. SUAREZ. THANK YOU.

THE
LAST QUESTION IS
WITH
REFERENCE
TO
THE
COMMITTEES OMITTING
IN THE
DRAFT PROPOSAL THE IMMUNITY
PROVISION FOR THE PRESIDENT. I
AGREE WITH COM. NOLLEDO THAT THE
COMMITTEE DID VERY WELL IN
STRIKING OUT THIS SECOND SENTENCE,
AT THE VERY LEAST, OF THE ORIGINAL
PROVISION ON IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
UNDER
THE 1973 CONSTITUTION.
BUT
WOULD
THE
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
COMMITTEE MEMBERS NOT AGREE
TO A RESTORATION OF AT LEAST THE
FIRST SENTENCE THAT THE PRESIDENT
SHALL BE IMMUNE FROM SUIT DURING
HIS TENURE, CONSIDERING THAT IF
WE DO NOT PROVIDE HIM THAT KIND OF
IMMUNITY, HE MIGHT BE SPENDING ALL
HIS TIME FACING LITIGATIONS, AS THE
PRESIDENT-IN-EXILE IN HAWAII IS
NOW FACING LITIGATIONS ALMOST
DAILY?
FR. BERNAS.
THE REASON
FOR THE OMISSION IS THAT WE
CONSIDER IT UNDERSTOOD IN PRESENT
JURISPRUDENCE THAT DURING HIS
TENURE HE IS IMMUNE FROM SUIT.
MR. SUAREZ. SO THERE IS NO
NEED TO EXPRESS IT HERE.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
FR. BERNAS. THERE IS NO

NEED. IT WAS THAT WAY BEFORE. THE
ONLY INNOVATION MADE BY THE 1973
CONSTITUTION WAS TO MAKE THAT
EXPLICIT AND TO ADD OTHER THINGS.
MR. SUAREZ.
ON THAT
UNDERSTANDING, I WILL NOT PRESS FOR
ANY MORE QUERY, MADAM PRESIDENT.
I THANK THE COMMISSIONER FOR THE
CLARIFICATION. (CITED BY THE SC IN
ESTRADA V. GMA & ESTRADA V. DESIERTO
CASES).
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
10. PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY. (*****)

C.
FORBES,ETC., V. CHUOCO
TIACO AND CROSSFIELD
(16 Phil. 534 [1910]).
THE COURT SAID ON THE
PRINCIPLE OF NON-LIABILITY:
THE THING WHICH THE
JUDICIARY CAN NOT DO IS MULCT THE
GOVERNOR-GENERAL PERSONALLY IN
DAMAGES WHICH RESULT FROM THE
PERFORMANCE OF HIS OFFICIAL DUTY
PUBLIC POLICY FORBIDS IT.
WHAT IS HELD HERE IS THAT HE
WILL BE PROTECTED FROM PERSONAL
LIABITY FOR DAMAGES NOT ONLY WHEN
HE ACTS WITHIN HIS AUTHORITY, BUT
ALSO WHEN HE IS WITHOUT
AUTHORITY,
PROVIDED HE ACTUALLY
USED DISCRETION AND
JUDGMENT,
THAT
IS
JUDICIAL FACULTY,
IN
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
C. FORBES, ETC V. CHUOCO TIACO
AND CROSSFIELD (CONT):
DETERMINING WHETHER HE HAD
AUTHORITY TO ACT OR NOT. IN OTHER
WORDS, HE IS ENTITLED TO PROTECTION
IN DETERMINING THE QUESTION OF
HIS AUTHORITY. IF HE DECIDES
WRONGLY, HE IS STILL PROTECTED
PROVIDED THE QUESTION OF HIS
AUTHORITY WAS ONE OVER WHICH TWO
MEN, REASONABLY QUALIFIED FOR THAT
POSITION, MIGHT HONESTLY DIFFER;
BUT HE IS NOT PROTECTED IF THE LACK
OF AUTHORITY TO ACT IS SO PLAIN
THAT TWO SUCH MEN COULD NOT
HONESTLY DIFFER OVER ITS
DETERMINATION.
IN SUCH CASE, HE
ACTS, NOT A GOVERNOR-GENERAL BUT
AS A PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL, AND, AS
SUCH, MUST ANSWER FOR THE
CONSEQUENCES OF HIS ACT.
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
D. THE COURT UNDERSCORED
THE CONSEQUENCES IF THE CHIEF
EXECUTIVE WAS NOT GRANTED
IMMUNITY FROM
SUIT, VIZ:
XXX.
ACTION UPON
IMPORTANT MATTERS OF STATE
DELAYED;
THE TIME AND
SUBSTANCE OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE
SPENT IN WRANGLING LITIGATION;
DISRESPECT ENGENDERED FOR THE
PERSON OF ONE OF THE HIGHEST
OFFICIALS OF THE STATE AND FOR
THE OFFICE HE OCCUPIES;
A
TENDENCY
TO UNREST AND
DISORDER; RESULTING IN A WAY, IN A
DISTRUST AS TO THE INTEGRITY OF
GOVERNMENT ITSELF. (CITED BY THE SC

IN ESTRADA V. GMA & ESTRADA V.
DESIERTO CASES).
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
E. ESTRADA V. DESIERTO, GR NOS.
146771-15, MARCH 2, 2001 (IMMUNITY OF
A NON-SITTING PRESIDENT):
WHEN SEVERAL CRIMINAL
CHARGES WERE FILED AGAINST HIM WITH
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FORMER PRES.
ESTRADA SOUGHT TO DISMISS THEM ON
THE GROUND OF HIS CLAIMED
PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY. IN THIS CASE,
THE SC DISMISSED HIS PETITION,
HOLDING IN PART AS FOLLOWS:
WE NOW COME TO THE IMMUNITY
THAT CAN BE CLAIMED BY PETITIONER AS
A NON-STTTING PRESIDENT. THE CASES
FILED AGAINST PETITIONER ESTRADA
ARE CRIMINAL IN CHARACTER. THEY
INVOLVE PLUNDER, BRIBERY, AND GRAFT
AND CORRUPTION. BY NO STRETCH OF
THE IMAGINATION CAN
THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
E. ESTRADA V. DESIERTO (GR NOS.
146771-15, MARCH 2, 2001) (CONT):
THESE CRIMES, ESPECIALLY
PLUNDER WHICH CARRIES THE DEATH
PENALTY, BE COVERED BY THE ALLEGED
MANTLE OF IMMUNITY OF A NON-SITTING
PRESIDENT. PETITIONER CANNOT CITE
ANY DECISION OF THIS COURT LICENSING
THE PRESIDENT TO COMMIT CRIMINAL
ACTS AND WRAPPING HIM WITH THE
POST-TENURE IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY.
IT WILL BE ANOMALOUS TO HOLD THAT
IMMUNITY IS AN INOCULATION FROM
LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL ACTS AND
OMISSIONS. THE RULE IS THAT
UNLAWFUL ACTS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS
ARE NOT ACTS OF THE STATE, AND THE
OFFICER WHO ACTS ILLEGALLY IS NOT
ACTING AS SUCH BUT STANDS IN THE
SAME FOOTING AS ANY OTHER
TRESPASSER.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
A. SCOPE OF POWERS OF THE
PRESIDENT:
MENTION HAS ALREADY BEEN
MADE OF THE PROFOUND
INFLUENCE
EXERTED BY THE PRESIDENT AS HEAD OF
STATE AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES. THIS
INFLUENCE DERIVES FROM THE VAST
POWERS CONFERRED ON HIM THAT
ENABLE HIM TO ASSUME
THE
LEADERSHIP IN THE CONDUCT OF PUBLIC
AND
GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS.
THIS LEADERSHIP IS DISPLAYED BY

HIM NOT ONLY IN THE
ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS BUT ALSO
IN THEIR ENACTMENT,
AS WELL AS
IN THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
THE
COMMAND OF THE AFP, THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE
GOVERNMENT
AND EVEN THE CRYSTALLIZATION OF
PUBLIC
OPINION ON VITAL ISSUES.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
PRESIDENT (CONT):
SO THE QUESTION IS:
DOES THE PRESIDENT ENJOY THE
TOTALITY OF EXECUTIVE
POWER? IS
HE AUTHORIZED TO EXERCISE ANY POWER
SO
LONG AS IT IS BY NATURE
EXECUTIVE? IN OTHER WORDS, IS EVERY
POWER RELATING TO THE ENFORCEMENT
AND
ADMINISTRATION OF LAWS TO BE
REGARDED AS BELONGING TO THE
PRESIDENT BY VIRTUE OF HIS OFFICE?
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
PRESIDENT (CONT):
1) VILLENA V. SECRETARY OF THE (67
PHIL 451) AND PLANAS V. GIL
(67 PHIL
62):
THE ORIGINAL VIEW OF OUR SUPREME
COURT ON THESE QUESTIONS AS THEY
APPLIED TO THE PRESIDENT UNDER THE
1935 CONSTITUTION FAVORED HIS
COMPLETE ASSUMPTION OF THE
EXECUTIVE POWER. IN THESE CASES, THE
SC DECLARED THAT THE PRESIDENT OF
THE PHIL IS THE EXECUTIVE OF THE GOVT
OF THE PHIL, AND NO OTHER AND THAT
ALL EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY IS THUS
VESTED IN HIM.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
PRESIDENT (CONT):
2. MYERS V. US (272 US 52) - THE
PRONOUCEMENTS IN VILLENA AND
PLANAS WERE IN KEEPING WITH THIS U.S.
CASE WHERE CHIEF JUSTICE TAFT HELD
THAT THE WORDS OF SEC. 2 FOLLOWING
THE GENERAL GRANT OF EXECUTIVE
POWER UNDER SEC. 1 WERE EITHER AN
ENUMERATION AND EMPHASIS OF
SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE,
NOT ALL INCLUSIVE, OR WERE
LIMITATIONS UPON THE GENERAL GRANT
OF EXECUTIVE POWER.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
PRESIDENT (CONT):
2. MYERS V. US (272 US 52) (CONT):
THE U.S. SC CITED WITH APPROVAL
ALEXANDER HAMILTONS (ONE OF THE
FOUNDING FATHERS OF USA) OPINION
THAT THE ENUMERATION (OF SPECIFIC

POWERS) OUGHT THEREFORE TO BE
CONSIDERED AS INTENDED MERELY TO
SPECIFY THE PRINCIPAL ARTICLES
IMPLIED IN THE DEFINITION OF POWER,
LEAVING THE REST TO FLOW FROM THE
GENERAL GRANT OF THAT POWER.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
PRESIDENT (CONT):
3. LACSON V. ROQUE (92 PHIL. 456) AND
MONDANO V. SILVASOA (97 PHIL. 143):
THE FOREGOING VIEWS HAVE BEEN
RECONSIDERED IN FAVOR OF A STRICTER
INTERPRETATION OF EXECUTIVE POWER.
IN THESE TWO CASES, FOR EXAMPLE, OUR
SC HELD THAT THE PRESIDENTS POWER
OF GENERAL SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS COULD BE EXERCISED BY
HIM ONLY AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
PRESIDENT (CONT):
4. YOUNGSTOWN TUBE AND SHEET
CO. V. SAWYER (343 U.S. 579):
IN THIS FAMOUS STEEL SEIZURE CASE IN
THE U.S., PRESIDENT TRUMANS
TAKEOVER OF THE STEEL MILLS TO
CONTINUE THEIR OPERATIONS WHILE THE
STEEL WORKERS WERE ON STRIKE WAS
DECLARED ILLEGAL IN THE ABSENCE OF A
SPECIFIC CONSTITUTIONAL OR
STATUTORY AUTHORITY. THE ARGUMENT
OFFERED WAS THAT THE CLAUSE VESTING
IN THE PRESIDENT THE EXECUTIVE
POWER CONSTITUTE A GRANT OF ALL
EXECUTIVE POWER OF WHICH THE
GOVERNMENT IS CAPABLE..
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
PRESIDENT (CONT):
4. YOUNGSTOWN TUBE AND SHEET
CO. V. SAWYER (343 U.S. 579)
(CONT):
THE U.S. SC, BY A VOTE OF 6 TO 3, DID
NOT AGREE. IF THAT BE TRUE, JUSTICE
BLACK COMMENTED, IT IS DIFFICULT TO
SEE WHY OUR FOREFATHERS BOTHERED
TO ADD SEVERAL SPECIFIC ITEMS,
INCLUDING SOME TRIFLING ONES . . . I
CANNOT ACCEPT THE VIEW THAT THIS
CLAUSE IS A GRANT IN BULK OF ALL
CONCEIVABLE EXECUTIVE POWER BUT
REGARDS IT AS AN ALLOCATION TO THE
PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE OF THE GENERIC
POWERS THEREATER STATED.
A.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
SCOPE OF POWERS OF THE
PRESIDENT (CONT):
5. MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS (177 SCRA

668):
IN THIS CASE, THE SC DECLARED: X X X
WE HOLD THE VIEW THAT ALTHOUGH THE
1987 CONSTITUTION IMPOSES
LIMITATIONS ON THE EXERCISE OF
SPECIFIC POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT, IT
MAINTAINS INTACT WHAT IS
TRADITIONALLY CONSIDERED AS WITHIN
THE SCOPE OF EXECUTIVE POWER.
COROLLARILY, THE POWERS OF THE
PRESDIENT CANNOT BE SAID TO BE
LIMITED ONLY TO THE SPECIFIC POWERS
ENUMERATED IN THE CONSTITUTION. IN
OTHER WORDS, EXECUTIVE POWER IS
MORE THAN THE SUM OF SPECIFIC
POWERS SO ENUMERATED.
NOTE: THIS CANNOT BE CONSIDERED THE
LAST WORD ON THE MATTER,
CONSIDERING THE STRONG DISSENTS
REGISTERED IN THIS 8-7 DECISION.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
PRESIDENT (CONT):
6. LAUREL V. GARCIA (187 SCRA 797):
IN THIS SUBSEQUENT CASE, THE SC
PROHIBITED THE SALE OF THE
PROPERTIES OF THE PHILIPPINES AT
ROPPONGI, JAPAN, ON THE GROUND,
INTER ALIA, THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES HAD NO SPECIFIC
STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO SELL THEM.
NOTE: THIS TIME THE VOTE WAS 9-6
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
PRESIDENT (CONT):
7. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF 1987 (EO
NO. 292, JULY 25, 1987,
EFFECTIVE NOV.
24, 1989 PER RA NO. 6682)
POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT (BOOK III,
TITLE I):
a. POWER OF CONTROL (CHAPTER 1)
b. ORDINANCE POWER (CHAPTER 2)
c. POWER OVER ALIENS (CHAPTER 3)
d. POWERS OF EMINENT DOMAIN,
ESCHEAT, LAND RESERVATION AND
RECOVERY OF ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH
(CHAPTER 4)
e. POWER OF APPOINTMENT (CHAPTER 5)
f. GENERAL SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS (CHAPTER 6)
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
PRESIDENT (CONT):
7. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF 1987 (EO
NO. 292, JULY 25, 1987, EFFECTIVE NOV.
24, 1989 PER RA NO. 6682)
POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT (BOOK III,
TITLE I) (CONT):
g. OTHER POWERS (CHAPTER 7):
g.1) SEC. 19. SUCH OTHER POWERS AS

ARE PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION.
g.2) SEC. 20. RESIDUAL POWERS
UNLESS CONGRESS PROVIDES
OTHERWISE, THE PRESIDENT SHALL
EXERCISE SUCH OTHER POWERS AND
FUNCTIONS VESTED IN THE PRESIDENT
WHICH ARE PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE
LAWS AND WHICH ARE NOT SPECIFICALLY
ENUMERATED ABOVE, OR WHICH ARE NOT
DELEGATED BY THE PRESIDENT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH LAW. (WRR)
B.
FROM
FROM
FROM
FROM
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
THE APPOINTING POWER. (*****)
1.
APPOINTMENT
2. DISTINGUISH APPOINTMENT
COMMISSION
3. DISTINGUISH APPOINTMENT
DESIGNATION
4.
DISTINGUISH PERMANENT
TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT
5.
DISTINGUISH REGULAR
AD INTERIM APPOINTMENT
6. IF THE POWER TO APPOINT

BELONGS TO THE PRESIDENT,
CAN
CONGRESS INTERFERS WITH IT BY
PRESCRIBING THE
QUALIFICATIONS
FOR THE PUBLIC OFFICE?
IF THE
PRESIDENT APPOINTS ONE WHO
LACKS QUALIFICATION,
IS THIS
ISSUE A POLITICAL QUESTION THAT
CANNOT BE A SUBJECT OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW?
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
ANSWER TO NO. 6:
SINCE THE APPOINMENT TO
OFFICE IS AN EXECUTIVE FUNCTION,
THE CLEAR IMPLICATION IS THAT
THE LEGISLATURE MAY NOT USURP
SUCH FUNCTION. THE LEGISLATURE
MAY CREATE AN OFFICE AND PRESCRIBE
THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE PERSON
WHO MAY HOLD THE OFFICE, BUT IT
MAY NEITHER SPECIFY WHO SHALL BE
APPOINTED TO SUCH NOR ACTUALLY
APPOINT HIM.
IF THE PRESIDENT APPOINTS ONE
WHO LACKS THE QUALIFICATIONS, IT IS
NOT A POLITICAL QUESTION; HENCE, IT
CAN BE THE SUBJECT OF A JUDICIAL
REVIEW.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
B. THE APPOINTING POWER.
7.
THE PRESIDENT IN A PHONE
CALL APPOINTED MEROLCO
AS
SECRETARY OF DECS. AFTER THE
CALL, MEROLCO
THROW OUT A
LAVISH PARTY, WITH 500 GUESTS, AND
SPEND P500,000.00. BEFORE

FORMALLY ACCEPTING THE
APPOINTMENT, THE PRESIDENT
APPOINTED AND
ISSUED A
COMMISION INSTEAD TO GSAS AS
SECRETARY OF
DECS.
QUESTIONS:
a) CAN MEROLCO SUE THE
PRESIDENT FOR DAMAGES?
b) IS THE APPOINTMENT OF
GSAS LEGAL?
8.
WHAT ARE THE
CATEGORIES OF OFFICIALS WHO ARE
SUBJECT TO THE APPOINTING
POWER OF THE
PRESIDENT? (*****)
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
C. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON
THE
APPOINTING POWER (SEC. 16,
ART. VII): (*****)
(1) THE PRESIDENT SHALL

NOMINATE AND, WITH THE CONSENT OF
THE COMMISSION ON APPOINMENTS,
APPOINT THE HEADS OF THE
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS,
AMBASSADORS, OTHER PUBLIC
MINISTERS AND CONSULS, OR OFFICERS
OF THE ARMED FORCES FROM THE
RANK OF COLONEL OR NAVAL CAPTAIN,
AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE
APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN HIM IN
THIS CONSTITUTION.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
THE
ART. VII): (*****)
(2) HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ALL

OTHER OFFICERS OF THE GOVERNMENT
WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE NOT
OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR BY LAW,
AND THOSE WHOM HE MAY BE
AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO APPOINT.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
THE
ART. VII): (*****)
(3) THE CONGRESS MAY, BY LAW,

VEST THE APPOINTMENT OF OTHER
OFFICERS LOWER IN RANK IN THE
PRESIDENT ALONE, IN THE COURTS, OR
IN THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS,
AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS, OR BOARDS.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
C.
THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON

ART. VII) *****
THE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE
THE POWER TO MAKE
APPOINTMENTS DURING RECESS OF THE
CONGRESS, WHETHER VOLUNTARY OR
COMPULSORY, BUT SUCH
APPOINTMENTS SHALL BE EFFECTIVE
ONLY UNTIL DISAPPROVED BY THE
COMMISSION
ON
APPOINTMENTS
OR UNTIL THE NEXT ADJOURNMENT
OF THE CONGRESS.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
CATEGORIES OF OFFICIALS WHO
ARE SUBJECT
TO THE APPOINTING POWER OF
THE PRESIDENT:*****
1.
THE HEADS OF THE
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS;
2.
AMBASSADORS, OTHER
PUBLIC MINISTERS AND
CONSULS;
3.
OFFICERS OF THE ARMED
FORCES FROM THE RANK OF
COLONEL OR NAVAL CAPTAIN;
4.
THOSE OTHER OFFICERS
WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE
VESTED IN HIM BY THE
CONSTITUTION;
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
CATEGORIES OF OFFICIAL WHO
ARE SUBJEC TO THE APPOINTING POWER
OF THE PRESIDENT (CONT): *****
5.
ALL OTHER OFFICERS OF
THE GOVERNMENT WHOSE
APPOINTMENTS ARE NOT
PROVIDED FOR BY LAW; AND
6.
THOSE WHOM HE MAY BE
AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO
APPOINT;
7.
OFFICERS LOWER IN RANK
WHOSE APPOINTMENTS
THE
CONGRESS MAY BY LAW VEST IN THE
PRESIDENT
ALONE.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
QUESTION:
IS THE APPOINTMENT OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF THE BIR SUBJECT TO
THE CONFIRMATION OF THE COMMISSION
ON APPOINTMENT?
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
D. SARMIENTO III V. MISON (156 SCRA

549 [Dec. 17, 1987]).
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION (12-2
Vote) (*****)
1.
PETITIONERS SARMIENTO III
& ARCILLA, TAXPAYERS AND MEMBERS
OF IBP, CLAIMED THAT THE
APPOINTMENT OF MISON AS
COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF
CUSTOMS REQUIRES THE
CONFIRMATION OF THE COMMISSION
ON APPOINTMENTS IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE CONSTITUTION.
2.
RESPONDENTS MISON &
CARAGUE MAINTAINED THAT SUCH
APPOINTMENT DOES NOT NEED THE
CONFIRMATION OF THE CA SINCE
CONFIRMATION IS REQUIRED ONLY FOR
THE OFFICERS MENTIONED IN THE
FIRST SENTENCE OF SECTION 16,
ARTICLE VII, TO WIT:
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
a.
THE HEADS OF THE
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS;
b.
AMBASSADORS, OTHER
PUBLIC MINISTERS AND CONSULS;
c.
OFFICERS OF THE ARMED
FORCES FROM THE RANK OF
COLONEL OR NAVAL CAPTAIN;
d.
OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE
APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN
THE
PRESIDENT IN THE CONSTITUTION.
NO CONFIRMATION IS REQUIRED
FOR:
a.
ALL OTHER OFFICERS
WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE NOT
OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY LAW
(Second Sentence, Constitution);
b.
THOSE WHOM THE
PRESIDENT MAY BE AUTHORIZED BY
LAW TO APPOINT (Second
Sentence, Constitution); AND
c.
THOSE OTHER OFFICERS
LOWER IN RANK WHOSE
APPOINTMENT IS VESTED IN
THE PRESIDENT ALONE
(Third
Sentence, Constitution).
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
3.
AMICUS CURIAE SENATOR
NEPTALI GONZALES ARGUED THAT THE
PHRASE IN THE SECOND SENTENCE HE
SHALL ALSO APPOINT IMPLIES THAT
THE PRESIDENT SHALL IN LIKE
MANNER APPOINT THE OFFICERS
MENTIONED IN THE SECOND SENTENCE.
IN OTHER WORDS, THE PRESIDENT SHALL
APPOINT THE OFFICERS MENTIONED IN
SAID SECOND SENTENCE IN THE SAME
MANNER AS HE APPOINTS OFFICERS
MENTIONED IN THE FIRST SENTENCE,
THAT IS, BY NOMINATION AND WITH
THE CONSENT (CONFIRMATION) OF THE
CA.
4.
MAJORITY OF THE COURT
HELD THAT THE COMMISSIONER OF
CUSTOMS IS NOT SUBJECT TO
CONFIRMATION, BEING OF THE RANK OF
THE BUREAU DIRECTOR, WHO WAS
PURPOSELY DELETED FROM THE LISTING
OF THOSE WHOSE APPOINTMENTS HAD
TO BE APPROVED BY THE CA. AS
POINTED OUT BY THE
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
COURT: IN THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, HOWEVER, AS ALREADY
POINTED OUT, THE CLEAR AND
EXPRESSED INTENT OF ITS FRAMERS
WAS TO EXCLUDE PRESIDENTIAL
APPOINTMENTS FROM CONFIRMATION BY
THE CA, EXCEPT APPOINTMENTS TO
OFFICES EXPRESSLY MENTIONED IN THE
FIRST SENTENCE OF SECTION 16, ARTICLE
VII. *****
5.
JUSTICE CRUZ DISSENTED:
THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT BUREAU
DIRECTORS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO BE
CONFIRMED UNDER THE FIRST
SENTENCE OF SECTION 16, BUT THAT IS
NOT THE PROVISION WE OUGHT TO
INTERPRET. IT IS THE SECOND
SENTENCE WE MUST UNDERSTAND FOR
A PROPER RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE
NOW BEFORE US. SIGNIFICANTLY,
ALTHOUGH THERE WAS A LONG
DISCUSSION OF THE FIRST SENTENCE
IN THE CONCOM, THERE WAS NONE ON
THE SECOND SENTENCE
WE
CAN
THEREFORE
SPECULATE
ON
THE
CORRECT
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
INTERPRETATION OF THIS
PROVISION IN THE LIGHT OF THE FIRST
AND THIRD SENTENCES OF SECTION 16
OR BY BY READING THIS SECTION IN ITS
TOTALITY.
THE MAJORITY OPINION SAYS
THAT THE SECOND SENTENCE IS THE
EXCEPTION TO THE FIRST SENTENCE
AND HOLDS THAT THE SETS
OF
OFFICERS
SPECIFIED THEREIN MAY
BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT
WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE OF THE
CA.
THIS INTERPRETATION IS
PREGNANT WITH MISCHIEVOUS
IF
NOT ALSO RIDICULOUS RESULTS
THAT PRESUMABLY WERE NOT
ENVISIONED BY THE FRAMERS.
ONE MAY WONDER WHY IT WAS
FELT NECESSARY TO INCLUDE THE
SECOND SENTENCE AT ALL,
CONSIDERING THE MAJORITY OPINION
THAT THE ENUMERATION IN THE FIRST
SENTENCE OF THE OFFICERS SUBJECT TO
CONFIRMATION IS EXCLUSIVE ON
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
THE BASIS OF EXPRESSIO

UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS.
IF
THAT BE SO, THE FIRST SENTENCE
WOULD HAVE BEEN SUFFICIENT BY
ITSELF TO CON- VEY THE IDEA THAT ALL
OTHER APPOINTEES OF THE
PRESIDENT WOULD NOT
NEED
CONFIRMATION.
MY OWN READING IS THAT THE
SECOND SENTENCE
IS BUT A
CONTINUATION OF THE IDEA
EXPRESSED
IN THE FIRST
SENTENCE AND SIMPLY MENTIONS
THE OTHER OFFICERS APPOINTED BY
THE PRESIDENT WHO ARE ALSO
SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
IN MY VIEW, THE ONLY
OFFICERS APPOINTED BY THE
PRESIDENT WHO ARE NOT SUBJECT TO
CONFIRMATION BY THE CA ARE:
(1) THE MEMBERS OF THE

JUDICIARY AND THE OMBUDSMAN
AND HIS DEPUTIES, WHO ARE
NOMINATED BY THE JUDICIAL
AND
BAR COUNCIL;
(2) THE VICE-PRESIDENT WHEN
HE IS APPOINTED TO THE CABINET; AND
(3) OTHER OFFICERS LOWER IN
RANK, BUT ONLY WHEN THEIR
APPOINTMENT IS VESTED BY LAW
IN THE PRESIDENT
ALONE.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
E.
QUESTION:
MAY CONGRESS PASS A LAW
ADDING TO THE CONSITUTIONAL LIST
OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS
REQUIRE THE APPROVAL OR
CONFIRMATION BY THE COMMISSION
ON APPOINTMENTS?
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
F. WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE
FUNCTION OF THE CA: (***)
ALTHOUGH THE CA IS
ASSEMBLED BY CONGRESS AND CAN
MEET ONLY WHEN CONGRESS IS IN
SESSION AND, THEREFORE, CAN, TO
THAT EXTENT, BE IMMOBILIZED WHEN
CONGRESS DECIDES TO ADJOURN
(Guevara v. Inocentes, 16 SCRA 379), THE
CA IS A CREATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION

AND NOT OF CONGRESS, AND IS NOT
LEGISLATIVE BUT EXECUTIVE IN
NATURE. AS THE SC SAID ALTHOUGH
ITS MEMBERSHIP IS CONFINED TO
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, SAID
COMMISSION IS INDEPENDENT OF
CONGRESS IN FACT, THE FUNCTIONS OF
THE COMMISSION ARE PURELY
EXECUTIVE IN NATURE (Cunanan v. Tan,
Jr., 5 SCRA 1).
SO WHEN THE CA CHECKS THE
APPOINTMENTS MADE BY THE PRESIDENT,
IT IS NOT STRICTLY A CASE OF THE
LEGISLATIVE INTERFERRING WITH THE
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
AD INTERIM VS. MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENT:
SEC. PAR., SEC. 16, ART. VII THE
PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE THE POWER TO
MAKE APPOINTMENTS DURING THE
RECESS OF CONGRESS, WHETHER OR
COMPULSORY, BUT SUCH APPOINTSMENT
SHALL BE EFFECTIVE ONLY UNTIL
DISAPPROVAL BY THE CA OR UNTIL THE
NEXT ADJOURNMENT OF THE CONGRESS.
AD INTERIM OR RECESS APPOINTMENT
IS ONE MADE BY THE PRESIDENT WHEN
CONGRESS IS NOT IN SESSION.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
AD INTERIM VS. MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENT
(CONT):
MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENT IS ONE MADE
ALMOST AT THE END OF THE TERM OF AN
INCUMBENT PRESIDENT TO FORESTALL
THE RIGHTS AND PREROGATIVES OF HIS
SUCCESSOR BY MAKING A PROSPECTIVE
APPOINTMENT TO FILL AN OFFICE, THE
TERM OF WHICH IS NOT TO BEGIN UNTIL
HIS OWN TERM AND POWER HAVE
EXPIRED. (SIGUIENTE VS. SEC. OF
JUSTICE, GR NO. L-20370, NOV. 29, 1963)
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
(CONT):
AYTONA V. CASTILLO (4 SCRA 1) :
FACTS: UPON ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE,
PRES. MACAPAGAL ISSUED A0 NO. 2
RECALLING AND CANCELLING ALL ADINTERIM APPOINTMENTS MADE BY PRES.
GARCIA AFTER DEC. 13, 1961. AMONG
THESE APPOINTEES WAS DOMINADOR V.
AYTONA AS GOV OF CENTRAL BANK. ON
JAN. 1, 1962, ANDRES V. CASTILLO WAS
APPOINTED, AD INTERIM, AS GOV. OF
CENTRAL BANK BY MACAPAGAL. HE
IMMEDIATELY QUALIFIED. BOTH CASTILLO
AND AYTONA DISCHARGED THEIR DUTIES
UNTIL JAN. 3, 1962 WHEN AYTONA WAS
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT

(CONT):
AYTONA V. CASTILLO (4 SCRA 1) :
PREVENTED BY A CONTIGENT OF THE AFP
UPON ALLEGED INSTRUCTION OF
CASTILLO, AYTONA THEN FILED THIS
ACTION CONTESTING THE RIGHT OF
CASTILLO TO DISCHARGE THE POWERS OF
GOV. OF CENTRAL BANK.
HELD: THIS IS A CASE OF MIDNIGHT OF
APPOINTMENT DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
G.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS OF
THE APPOINTING POWER OF THE
PRESIDENT:
SECTION 14, ART. VII:
APPOINTMENTS EXTENDED BY AN
ACTING PRESIDENT SHALL REMAIN
EFFECTIVE UNLESS REVOKED BY THE
ELECTED PRESIDENT WITHIN NINETY
DAYS FROM HIS ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE.
SECTION 15, ART. VII: TWO
MONTHS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE NEXT
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND UP TO THE
END OF HIS TERM, A PRESIDENT OR
ACTING PRESIDENT SHALL NOT MAKE
APPOINTMENTS EXCEPT TEMPORARY
APPOINTMENTS TO EXECUTIVE
POSITIONS WHEN CONTINUED
VACANCIES THEREIN WILL PREJUDICE
PUBLIC SERVICE OR ENDANGER PUBLIC
SAFETY. (NOTE: READ THE CJ CORONA
CASE - DE CASTRO V. JBC & PGMA, GR NO.
191002, MAR 7 & APR 20, 2010)
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
G.
PRESIDENT:
SECTION 15, ART. VII: TWO

MONTHS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE NEXT
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND UP TO THE
END OF HIS TERM, A PRESIDENT OR
ACTING PRESIDENT SHALL NOT MAKE
APPOINTMENTS EXCEPT TEMPORARY
APPOINTMENTS TO EXECUTIVE
POSITIONS WHEN CONTINUED
VACANCIES THEREIN WILL PREJUDICE
PUBLIC SERVICE OR ENDANGER PUBLIC
SAFETY. (NOTE: READ THE AYTONA V.
CASTILLO CASE [ 4 SCRA 1] AND CJ
CORONA CASE - DE CASTRO V. JBC &
PGMA, GR NO. 191002, MAR 7 & APR 20,
2010)
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
G.
PRESIDENT:
SECTION 15, ART. VII:
THE OBVIOUS PURPOSE OF THIS

PROVISION IS TO PREVENT THE USE, OR
ABUSE, OF THE APPOINTING POWER FOR
THE PURPOSE OF ENLISTING POLITICAL
SUPPORT IN EXCHANGE FOR SOME
APPOINTIVE OFFICE IN GOVT. THIS WILL
ALSO PREVENT THE MID-NIGHT
APPOINTMENTS THAT MAY OTHERWISE
BE ISSUED BY AN OUTGOING PRESIDENT,
AS HAPPENED IN THE CASE OF AYTONA V.
CASTILLO (4 SCRA 1) WHERE THE FORMER
WAS APPOINTED CB GOVERNOR BY
GARCIA AFTER DEC. 13, 1961 AND THEN
THE LATTER WAS APPOINTED TO THE
SAME POSITION BY MACAPGAL ON JAN. 2,
1962. THE FORMER APPOINTMENT WAS
RECALLED BY MACAPAGAL.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
G. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS OF
PRESIDENT:
SEC. 4 (1), ART. VIII, APPOINTMENT
OF MEMBERS OF SC:
THE SUPREME COURT SHALL BE
COMPOSED OF A CHIEF JUSTICE AND
FOURTEEN ASSOCIATE JUSTICES. IT MAY
SIT EN BANC OR IN ITS DISCRETION, IN
DIVISION OF THREE, FIVE, OR SEVEN
MEMBERS. ANY VACANCY SHALL BE
FILLED WITHIN NINETY (90) FROM THE
OCCURRENCE THEREOF.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
G.
PRESIDENT:
SEC. 4 (1), ART. VIII, APPOINTMENT

OF MEMBERS OF SC:
QUESTION: SUPPOSE THE 90-DAY
REQUIREMENT IN SEC. 4 (1), ART. VIII
CONFLICTS WITH SEC. 15, ART. VII,
PROHIBITING THE PRESIDENT FROM
MAKING APPOINTMENTS DURING THE
PERIOD OF 2 MONTHS IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDING THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION AND UP TO THE END OF HIS
TERM, IS THE INCUMBENT PRESIDENT
BARRED FROM FILLING UP ANY VACANCY
IN THE SUPREME COURT?
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
G.
PRESIDENT:
SEC. 4 (1), ART. VIII:

APPOINTMENTS OF MEMBERS OF SC:
IN IN RE MATEO A. VALENZUELA
AND PLACIDO B. VALLARTE (298 SCRA
408), THE SC HELD THAT DURING THE

PERIOD COVERED BY SEC. 15, ART. VII,
THE PRESIDENT IS NEITHER REQUIRED
TO MAKE APPOINTMENTS TO THE COURTS
NOR ALLOWED TO DO SO, AND SEC. 4(1)
AND SEC. 9 OF ART. VIII SIMPLY MEAN
THAT THE PRESIDENT IS REQUIRED TO
FILL VACANCIES IN THE COURTS WITHIN
THE TIME FRAMES PROVIDED
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
G.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION OF
THE APPOINTING POWER:

APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS OF SC:
THEREIN UNLESS PROHIBITED BY
SEC. 15, OF ART. VII. IT IS NOTEWORTHY
THAT THE PROHIBITION ON
APPOINTMENTS COMES INTO EFFECT
ONLY ONCE EVERY SIX YEARS.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
G.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION OF
THE APPOINTING POWER:

APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS OF SC:
IN THE DE CASTRO V. JBC & PGMA
CASE, GR NO. 191002, MARCH 17, 2010 &
APRIL 20, 2010 (THE CJ RENATO CORONA
CASE), THE SC HELD THAT THE 2-MONTH
RULE APPLIES ONLY TO APPOINTMENTS IN
THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT BUT NOT TO
THE MEMBERS OF THE SC WHICH THE
PRESIDENT IS MANDATED TO FILL UP
WITHIN 90 DAYS FROM OCCURRENCE OF
ANY VACANCY.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
G.
PRESIDENT:
SEC. 9, ART. VIII, APPOINTMENT OF
MEMBERS OF THE SC AND JUDGES OF THE
LOWER COURTS:
THE MEMBERS OF THE SC AND
JUDGES OF LOWER COURTS SHALL BE
APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT FROM A
LIST OF AT LEAST THREE NOMINEES
PREPARED BY THE JBC FOR EVERY
VACANCY. SUCH APPOINTMENTS NEED NO
CONFIRMATION.
FOR THE LOWER COURTS, THE
PRESIDENT SHALL ISSUE THE
APPOINTMENTS WITHIN 90 DAYS FROM
THE SUBMISSION OF THE LIST.

H.
ENSURE THAT THE LAWS BE

FAITHFULLY EXECUTED.
1. THE POWER OF CONTROL
2. THE POWER OF GENERAL
SUPERVISION
3. THE TAKE CARE CLAUSE
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
THE REMOVAL POWER. (*****)
QUESTIONS:
1.
THE POWER TO APPOINT
CARRIES WITH IT THE
IMPLIED
POWER TO REMOVE. IS THIS POWER TO
REMOVE ABSOLUTE?
2.
CAN AN OFFICER
APPOINTED TO A 3-YEAR TERM
BE LEGALLY REMOVED BY THE
PRESIDENT EVEN
BEFORE THE EXPIRY
OF THE SAID TERM?
H.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
THE REMOVAL POWER.
3.
CAN AN OFFICER
APPOINTED TO A POSITION WITHOUT
A FIXED TERM BE REMOVED BY
THE PRESDENT
ANYTIME?
4.
CAN AN OFFICER WHOSE
OFFICE WAS GIVEN A
P1.00
BUDGET COMPLAIN OF CONSTRUCTIVE
TERMINATION?
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
H. THE REMOVAL POWER. (*****)
ALAJAR V. ALBA (100 Phil.
683)
(VICE-MAYOR OF ROXAS
CITY)
2.
4.
CONTROL (*****) IS
DEFINED AS THE POWER OF AN
OFFICER TO ALTER OR MODIFY
OR NULLIFY OR
SET ASIDE WHAT A
SUBORDINATE OFFICER HAD
DONE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF
HIS DUTIES AND
TO SUBSTITUTE THE
JUDGMENT OF THE FORMER
FOR
THAT OF THE LATTER (Montano v.
Silvosa, 97
Phil. 143).
5.
SUPERVISION (*****)
MEANS OVERSEEING OR THE
POWER OR AUTHORITY OF AN
OFFICER TO SEE
THAT
SUBORDINATE OFFICERS PERFORM
THEIR DUTIES (Ibid).
QUESTIONS:
1.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
APARRI V. CA (127 SCRA
231)
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
5.1
POWER OF SUPERVISION
SEC. 4, ART. X (LOCAL GOVT)

THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHIL. SHAL L
EXERCISE GENERAL SUPERVISION OVER
LOCAL GOVT. PROVINCES WITH
RESPECT TO COMPO-NENT CITIES AND
MUNICIPALITIES, AND CITIES AND
MUNICIPALITIES WITH RESPECT TO
COMPONENT BA-RANGAYS SHALL
ENSURE THAT THE ACTS OF THEIR
COMPONENT UNITS ARE WITHIN THE
SCOPE OF THEIR
PRESCRIBED POWERS AND
FUNCTIONS.
(GENERAL MANAGER OF
NARRA)
AN OFFICER WHOSE OFFICE IS
NOT FIXED BY LAW, HOLDS THE SAME
AT THE PLEASURE OF THE
APPOINTING POWER. WHEN HE IS
REPLACED BY THE APPOINTING POWER
OR HIS OFFICE ABOLISHED BY LAW, HE
IS NOT CONSIDERED TERMINATED BUT
THAT HIS TERM OF OFFICE HAS MERELY
EXPIRED.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
I.
THE CONTROL POWER. (*****)
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION,
SECTION 17, ARTICLE VII: THE
PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE CONTROL
ALL THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS,
BUREAUS AND OFFICES. HE SHALL
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
6.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN
CONTROL AND SUPERVISION:*****
OF
IN THE CASE OF DRILON V. LIM

(235 SCRA 135), THE SC ELABORATED ON
THE DISTINCTION THUS:
AN OFFICER IN CONTROL LAYS
DOWN THE RULES IN THE DOING OF AN
ACT. IF THEY ARE NOT FOLLOWED, HE
MAY, IN HIS DISCRETION, ORDER THE ACT
UNDONE OR RE-DONE BY HIS
SUBORDINATE OR HE MAY EVEN DECIDE
TO DO IT HIMSELF. SUPERVISION DOES
NOT COVER SUCH AUTHORITY. THE
SUPERVISOR OR SUPERINTENDENT
MERELY SEES TO IT THAT THE RULES ARE
FOLLOWED, BUT HE HIMSELF DOES NOT
LAY DOWN SUCH RULES, NOR DOES HE

HAVE THE DISCRETION TO MODIFY OR
REPLACE THEM.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
6.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN
CONTROL AND SUPERVISION:*****
IN THE CASE OF DRILON V. LIM

(235 SCRA 135), THE SC ELABORATED ON
THE DISTINCTION THUS (CONTINUED):
IF THE RULES ARE NOT OBSERVED,
HE MAY ORDER THE WORK DONE OR REDONE BUT ONLY TO CONFORM TO THE
PRESCRIBED RULES. HE MAY NOT
PRESCRIBE HIS OWN MANNER FOR THE
DOING OF THE ACT. HE HAS NO JUDGMENT
ON THIS MATTER EXCEPT TO SEE TO IT
THAT THE RULES ARE FOLLOWED.
7.
TAKE CARE CLAUSE - THE
POWER TO INSURE THAT ALL LAWS ARE
FAITHFULLY EXECUTED.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
7.1
THE TAKE CARE CLAUSE
THE LAW THE PRESIDENT IS
SUPPOSED TO ENFORCE INCLUDES THE
CONSTITUTION ITSELF, STATUTES,
JUDICIAL DECISIONS, ADMINISTRATIVE
RULES AND REGULATIONS, MUNICIPAL
ORDINANCIES, WAS WELL
AS TREATIES
ENTERED INTO BY OUR GOVERNMENT.
QUESTION:
IS THE PRESIDENT EMPOWERED
NOT TO ENFORCE
A LAW WHICH
IN HIS BELIEF IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
J. THE MILITARY POWER (SECTION
18, ARTICLE VII). (*****)
THIS SECTION BOLSTER THE
PRINCIPLE ANNOUNCED IN ARTICLE II,
SECTION 3, THAT: CIVILIAN AUTHORITY
IS, AT ALL TIMES, SUPREME OVER THE
MILITARY. BY MAKING THE PRESIDENT
THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF ALL THE
ARMED FORCES, THE CONSTITUTION
LESSENS THE DANGER OF A MILITARY
TAKE-OVER OF THE GOVERNMENT IN
VIOLATION OF ITS REPUBLICAN
NATURE.
THE MILITARY POWER ENABLES
THE PRESIDENT TO: (*****)
1.
COMMAND ALL THE ARMED
FORCES;
2.
SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE
OF THE
WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS; AND
3.
DECLARE MARTIAL LAW.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
1.
FORCES:
COMMAND OF THE ARMED
THE POWER OF THE

SWORD MAKES THE PRESIDENT THE
MOST IMPORTANT FIGURE IN
THE COUNTRY IN TIMES OF
WAR
OR OTHER SIMILAR EMRGENCY. HE CAN:
a. ORGANIZE COURT
MARTIAL FOR THE DISCIPLINE OF THE
MEMBERS OF THE ARMED
FORCES VIOLATING MILITARY
LAW;
RUFFY V. CHIEF OF STAFF
(75 Phil. 875) COURT MARTIAL IS
AN AGENCY OF EXECUTIVE IN
CHARACTER WHICH MAY BE CONVENED
BY
THE
PRESIDENT
INDEPENDENTLY OF LEGISLATION AND
BY VIRTUE OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
FUNCTION AS COMMANDER-INCHIEF. THESE ARE NOT JUDICIARY
COURTS.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
b. CREATE MILITARY COMMISSION
FOR THE PUNISHMENT
OF WAR
CRIMMINALS.
KURODA V. JALANDONI (42
O.G. 4282) THE SUPREME COURT, CITING
THE EARLIER CASE OF YAMASHITA V.
STYER (75 Phil.
563), WHICH
UPHELD THE JURISDICTION OF
MILITARY
COMMISSION OVER WAR
CRIMMINALS, DECLARED THAT
THE
PROMULGATION
OF
EXECUTIVE
ORDER NO. 68
ESTABLISHING WAR
CRIMES OFFICE WAS AN EXERCISE BY
THE PRESIDENT OF HIS POWERS
AS COMMANDIER-IN-CHIEF OF ALL OUR
ARMED FORCES.
AQUINO V. MILITARY
COMMISSION NO. 2 (63 SCRA 546, [1975])
THE SUPREME COURT UPHELD

THE POWER OF THE PRES.
TO
CREATE MILITARY TRIBUNALS
AUTHORIZED TO
TRY
NOT ONLY
MILITARY PERSONNEL BUT ALSO
CIVILIANS
EVEN IF AT THAT TIME
CIVIL COURTS WERE OPEN AND
FUNCTIONING,
THUS,
REJECTING THE OPEN
COURT
THEORY OBSERVED
IN THE UNITED STATES.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
OLAQUER V. MILITARY
COMMISSION NO. 34 (150 SCRA 144,
[MAY 22, 1987]). - IN THIS CASE,
HOWEVER, THE AQUINO DECISION
WAS REVERSED AND IT WAS HELD IN
PART:
DUE PROCESS OF LAW
DEMANDS THAT IN ALL CRIMMINAL
PROSECUTIONS (WHERE THE
ACCUSED STANDS TO LOSE
EITHER HIS LIFE OR HIS LIBERTY),

THE ACCUSED SHALL BE
ENTITLED
TO, AMONG OTHERS, A TRIAL.
THE TRIAL
CONTEMPLATED BY THE
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION, IN RELATION TO
THE CHARTER AS A WHOLE, IS A TRIAL
BY JUDICIAL PROCESS, NOT BY
EXECUTIVE OR
MILITARY
PROCESS.
A
MILITARY
COMMISSION OR
TRIBUNAL, BY
WHATEVER NAME THEY ARE CALLED,
ARE
NOT COURTS WITHIN THE
PHILIPPINE JUDICIAL SYSTEM.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
c. CALL OUT THE ARMED FORCES
TO PREVENT OR SUPRESS
LAWLESS
VIOLENCE, INVASION, OR REBELLION.
IBP V. ZAMORA (338
SCRA 81) IBP QUESTIONED THE
COMMAND
OF PRES.
ESTRADA DEPLOYING THE PHIL.
MARINES TO JOIN THE PNP IN
VISIBILITY PATROLS AROUND
METRO
MANILA FOR THE PURPOSE OF CRIME
PREVENTION.
THE ORDER WAS
OBVIOUSLY BASED ON THE DETERIORATING PEACE AND ORDER IN
THE METROPOLIS.
THE IBP
CONTENDED THAT THERE WAS NO
EMERGENCY OR
A STATE OF
LAWLESS VIOLENCE TO WARRANT
THE
CALLING OF THE ARMED FORCES,
WHICH WOULD HAVE THE
EFFECT OF
MILITARIZING THE GOVERNMENT TO
THE
PREJUDICE
OF
INDIVIDUAL
LIBERTIES
AND
THE SUPREMACY
OF CIVILIAN AUTHORITY.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
IBP V. ZAMORA
(CONTINUATION)
THE SUPREME COURT
DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION,
HOLDING THAT
INASMUCH AS THE
IBP HAD NOT SHOWN THAT THE
PRESIDENT
HAD
COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
ISSUING HIS COMMAND, IT WAS NOT
INCLINED TO OVERRULE THE
PRESIDENTS DETERMINATION
OF THE FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE
CALLING OF THE MARINES.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
2.
SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF THE
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.*****
CORPUS SHALL NOT BE SUSPENDED

EXCEPT IN CASES OF INVASION,
INSURRECTION,
OR REBELLION, WHEN
THE PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT, IN ANY
OF WHICH EVENTS THE SAME MAY BE
SUSPENDED WHENEVER DURING SUCH
PERIOD THE NECESSITY FOR SUCH
SUSPENSION SHALL EXIST.
1973 CONSTITUTION BILL OF
RIGHTS (SEC. 15, ART.1V): THE
PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS SHALL NOT BE SUSPENDED
EXCEPT IN CASES OF INVASION,
INSURRECTION, REBELLION, OR
IMMINENT DANGER THEREOF, WHEN
PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT .
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
1935 CONSTITUION, SEC. 10 (2),
ART. VII: IN CASE OF INVASION,
INSURRECTION, OR REBELLION, OR
PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT, HE
MAY SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF THE
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
1973 CONSTITUTION, SEC. 11, ART.
VII: IN CASE OF INVASION,
PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT, HE MAY
SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS
1987 CONSTITUTION, SEC. 18, ART.
VII: IN CASE OF INVASION, OR
REBELLION, WHEN THE PUBLIC SAFETY
REQUIRES IT, HE MAY, FOR A PERIOD
OF NOT EXCEEDING 60 DAYS, SUSPEND
THE PRIVILEGE OF HABEAS CORPUS
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
QUESTION:
WHAT IS THE PRIVILEGE OF THE
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS?
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
CORPUS
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS A
PREROGATIVE WRIT OF LIBERTY
EMPLOYED TO TEST THE VALIDITY OF A
PERSONS DETENTION. IF HE IS
RESTRAINED OF HIS LIBERTY, HE OR
SOMEONE ACTING ON HIS BEHALF MAY
FILE A PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS TO
SECURE HIS RELEASE.
1935 CONSTITUTION BILL OF

RIGHTS (SEC. 14, ART. III): THE
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
CORPUS
THE WRIT IS DIRECTED TO THE
PERSON DETAINING ANOTHER,
COMMANDING HIM TO PRODUCE THE
BODY OF THE PRISONER AT A DESIGNATED

TIME AND PLACE, WITH THE DAY AND
CAUSE OF HIS CAPTION AND DETENTION,
TO DO, TO SUBMIT TO, AND RECEIVE
WHATEVER THE COURT OR JUDGE
AWARDING THE WRIT SHALL CONSIDER IN
HIS BEHALF. IT IS A HIGH PREROGATIVE
COMMON LAW WRIT OF ANCIENT ORIGIN
THE GREAT OBJECT OF WHICH IS THE
LIBERATION OF THOSE WHO MAY BE IN
PRISON WITHOUT SUFFICIENT CAUSE.
(MORAN, RULES OF COURT, VOL. II, 499).
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
1987 CONSTITUTION BILL
OF RIGHTS (SEC. 15, ART. III): THE
PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS SHALL NOT BE
SUSPENDED EXCEPT IN CASES OF
INVASION OR REBELLION, WHEN PUBLIC
SAFETY REQUIRES IT.
(SEC. 13, ART. III) THE
RIGHT TO BAIL SHALL NOT
BE
IMPAIRED EVEN WHEN THE
PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT
OF
HABEAS CORPUS IS SUSPENDED
MONTENEGRO V.
CASTANEDA (91 Phil. 882) IN 1951,
PRES. QUIRINO BASED HIS SUSPENSION
OF THE PRIVILEGE OF
THE WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS ON SEDITION
AND
IMMINENT DANGER OF
INSURRECTION OR REBELLION.
IF HE
HAD NOT ADDED THE LATTER GROUND,
WHICH
WAS LISTED IN THE
1935 CHARTER, THE SC WOULD HAVE
INVALIDATED HIS PROCLAMATION.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
BARCELON V. BAKER (5 Phil.
87)
and MONTNENGRO V.
CASTANEDA (91 Phil. 882)
CASES,
THE SUPREME COURT HELD
THAT THE DETERMINATION BY
THE PRESIDENT
OF THE PHILIPPINES
OF THE EXISTENCE OF ANY OF THE
GROUNDS PRESCRIBED BY THE
CONSTITUTION FOR THE
SUSPENSION
OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF
HABEAS
CORPUS SHOULD BE
CONCLUSIVE UPON THE COURTS.
THE JUSTIFICATION WAS
THAT THE PRESIDENT, WITH ALL
THE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AVAILABLE
TO
HIM
AS
COMMANDER-INCHIEF, WAS IN A BETTER POSTION THAN
THE SUPREME COURT TO
ASCERTAIN THE REAL STATE
OF
PEACE AND
ORDER IN THE COUNTRY.
IN SHORT, IN THESE TWO
CASES, THE DETERMINATION
BY
THE PRESIDENT OF THE FACTUAL
BASIS, WAS CONSI- DERED
A
POLITICAL QUESTION AND BEYOND
THE POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

OF THE JUDICIARY.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
LANSANG V. GARCIA (42 SCRA
448) THE DOCTRINE IN THE
BARCELON AND MONTENEGRO CASES
WAS ABANDONED IN THE LANSANG CASE
WHERE THE SUPREME COURT DECLARED
THAT IT HAD THE POWER TO INQUIRE
INTO THE FACTUAL BASIS OF THE
SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS BY PRES.
MARCOS IN AUG. 1971 AND TO ANNUL
THE SAME IF NO LEGAL GROUND COULD
BE ESTABLISHED.
AFTER HEARINGS, HOWEVER, A
UNANIMOUS COURT, AFTER SATISFYING
ITSELF THAT THERE WAS ACTUALLY A
MASSIVE AND SYSTEMATIC
COMMUNIST-OIRIENTED CAMPAIGN TO
OVERTHROW THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILS. BY FORCE, AS CLAIMED BY THE
PRESIDENT, DECIDED TO UPHOLD THE
SUS-PENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
GARCIA-PADILLA V. ENRILE (121
SCRA 472)*****
IN THIS CASE, HOWEVER, THE
SUPREME COURT REVERSED THE
LANSANG DECISION AND REVIVED
THE BAKER AND MONTENEGRO
DOCTRINES, REITERATING THAT THE
SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE
OF
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WAS
A POLITICAL QUESTION TO BE
RESOLVED SOLELY BY THE PRESIDENT.
1987 CONSTITUTION (PAR. 3, SEC.

18, ART. VII) THIS PROVISION,
HOWEVER, HAS ABROGATED THE GARCIAPADILLA DOCTRINE AND EXPRESSLY
CONSITUTIONLIZED THE LANSANG
DOCTRINE, THUS NOW,
THE
SUPREME COURT MAY REVIEW THE
SUFFICIENCY OF THE FACTUAL BASIS OF
THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS...
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
3.
DECLARE MARTIAL LAW.
1935 CONSTITUTION (SEC. 10[2],
ART. VII) . . . IN CASE OF INVASION,
PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT,
HE
MAY . . . PLACE THE PHILIPPINES OR
ANY PART THEREOF UNDER
MARTIAL LAW.
1973 CONSTITUTION (SEC. 11,
ART. VII) SAME PROVISION.
1987 CONSTITUION (SEC. 18,

ART. VII) IN CAS OF INVA-SION,
REBELLION, WHEN THE PUBLIC SAFETY
REQUIRES IT,
HE MAY, FOR A
PERIOD NOT EXCEEDING 60 DAYS,
PLACE THE PHILIPPINES OR ANY PART
THEREOF UNDER MARTIAL LAW.
MORE THAN THIS, CONGRESSIONAL INTERVENTION AND APPROVAL IS ALREADY
NECESSARY.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
AQUINO V. ENRILE (59 SCRA 183).
IN THIS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT,
BY UNANIMOUS VOTE OF ITS
MEMBERS THEN, SUSTAINED THE
PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW BY
PRES. MARCOS ON SEPT. 23, 1973, BUT
NO CLEAR CONSENSUS WAS REACHED
ON
THE
JUSTIFICATION FOR THE
COMMON CONCLUSION.
FOR THIS
REASON, EACH OF THE JUSTICES
SUBMITTED HIS OWN OPINION OF THE
RATIONALE FOR SUCH PROCLAMATION.
MARTIAL LAW UNDER THE 1987
CONSTITUION
CONFORMS WITH
WILLOUGHBY THAT MARTIAL LAW IN ITS
STRICT SENSE REFERS TO THAT LAW
WHICH HAS APPLICATION WHEN THE
MILITARY ARM DOES NOT SUPERSED
CIVIL AUTHORITY BUT IS CALLED UPON
TO AID IT IN THE EXECUTION OF ITS
CIVIL FUNCTION.
4.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
LIMITATIONS OF THE MILITARY
POWERS. (*****)
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION HAS

PROVIDED FOR THE FOLLOWING
SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE ORIGINAL
AUTHORITY OF THE COMMANDER-INCHIEF:
a.
HE MAY CALL OUT THE
ARMED FORCES WHEN IT BECOMES
NECESSARY TO PREVENT OR
SUPRESS LAWLESS VIOLENCE,
INVASION, OR REBELLION ONLY.
b.
THE GROUNDS FOR THE
SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
AND THE PROCLMATION OF
MARTIAL LAW ARE NOW LIMITED
ONLY TO INVASION OR
REBELLION,
WHEN PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
4. LIMITATIONS OF THE MILITARY
POWERS: (*****)
c.
THE DURATION OF SUCH
SUSPENSION OR PROCLAMATION SHALL
NOT EXCEED SIXTY (60) DAYS,

FOLLOWING WHICH
IT SHALL BE
AUTOMATICALLY LIFTED.
d.
WITHIN FORTY EIGHT
HOURS AFTER SUCH SUSPENSION OR
PROCLAMATION, THE PRESIDENT
SHALL PERSONALLY OR IN WRITING
REPORT HIS ACTION TO THE CONGRESS.
IF NOT IN
SESSION,
CONGRESS
MUST CONVENE WITHIN 24 HOURS
WITHOUT NEED OF A CALL.
e.
CONGRESS MAY THEN,
BY A MAJORITY VOTE OF ALL ITS
MEMBERS VOTING JOINTLY,
REVOKE HIS ACTION.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
4. LIMITATIONS OF THE MILITARY
POWERS: (*****)
f.
THE REVOCATION MAY NOT
BE SET ASIDE BY THE
PRESIDENT.
g.
BY THE SAME VOTE AND
IN THE SAME MANNER, THE
CONGRESS MAY, UPON INITIATIVE
OF THE PRESIDENT, EXTEND HIS
SUSPENSION OR PROCLAMATION FOR A
PERIOD TO BE DETERMINED BY
THE CONGRESS IF THE
INVASION OR
REBELLION SHALL CONTINUE AND THE
PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES THE
EXTENSION.
4.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
POWERS: (*****)
h.
THE ACTION OF THE
PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS SHALL
BE SUBJECT TO REVIEW BY THE
SUPREME COURT WHICH
SHALL HAVE
THE AUTHORITY
TO
DETERMINE
THE
SUFFICIENCY OF THE FACTUAL
BASIS OF SUCH ACTION. THIS
MATTER IS NO LONGER
CONSIDERED A POLITICAL QUESTION
AND MAY BE RAISED IN AN
APPROPRIATE PROCEEDING BY
ANY
CITIZEN.
MOREVER, THE SUPREME
COURT MUST
DECIDE THE
CHALLENGE WITHIN 30 DAYS FROM THE
TIME IT IS FILED.
4.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
POWERS: (*****)
i.
MARTIAL LAW DOES NOT
AUTOMATICALLY SUSPEND THE
PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS OR THE
OPERATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION. THE CIVIL COURTS
AND
THE LEGISLATIVE BODIES
SHALL REMAIN OPEN.

MILITARY
COURTS AND AGENCIES ARE NOT
CONFERRED JURISDICTION OVER
CIVILIANS WHERE THE CIVIL
COURTS ARE OPEN.
4.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
POWERS: (*****)
j.
THE SUSPENSION OF THE
CORPUS SHALL APPLY ONLY TO
PERSONS
FACING CHARGES OF
REBELLION OR OFFENSES
INHERENT IN OR DIRECTLY
CONNECTED WITH
INVASION.
k.
ANY PERSON ARRESTED
FOR SUCH OFFENSES MUST
BE JUDICIALLY CHARGED
THEREWITH WITHIN THREE
(3)
DAYS. OTHERWISE, HE SHALL BE
RELEASED.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
5.
JURISPRUDENTIAL LEGACY
OF MARTIAL LAW
WITH THE DECISION IN SANIDAD V.
COMELEC (73 SCRA
333 (OCT. 12,
1976), THE MAIN LINEAMENTS OF
PHIL. MARTIAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE
HAD BEEN DRAWN:
a) THE MARTIAL LAW
PROCLAMATION OF 1972 WAS VALIDLY
MADE ON THE BASIS OF AN EXISTING
REBELLION;
b)
THE IMPOSITION OF
MARTIAL LAW CARRIED WITH
IT THE
SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE
WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS;
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
5.
JURISPRUDENTIAL LEGACY
OF MARTIAL LAW
c)
THE MARTIAL LAW
ADMINISTRATOR COULD LEGISLATE ON
ANY MATTER RELATED TO THE WELFARE
OF THE NATION;
d)
HE COULD CREATE MILITARY
TRIBUNALS AND CONFER ON THEM
JURISDICTION TO TRY CIVILIANS FOR
CRIMES RELATED TO THE PURPOSE OF
MARTIAL RULE;
e)
IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY
OTHER OPERATIVE CONSTITUENT BODY
HE COULD EVEN PROPOSE
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
ALL OF THE ABOVE, MOREOVER,
ARE CONFIRMED BY THE BROAD GRANT
OF POWER FOUND IN ARTICLE XVII, SEC
3(2), OF THE 1973 CONSTITUTION WHICH

WAS ITSELF RATIFIED IN A MOST
UNIQUE MANNER. THE SUPREME COURT
WAS TO ADD LATER THAT, UNDER
MARTIAL LAW, CLAIMS OF DENIAL OF
SPEEDY TRIAL ARE UNAVAILING (OCAMPO
V. MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 25, 109
SCRA 22, Nov. 6, 1981), AND THAT THE
SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS ALSO
SUSPENDS THE RIGHT TO BAIL
(BUSCAYNO V. MILITARY COMMISSION
NOS. 1, 2, 6, and 25, 109 SCRA 273, Nov.
19, 1981).
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
ON JAN. 17, 1981, ON THE EVE
OF THE VISIT OF POPE
JOHN PAUL II
TO THE PHILS,
MARTIAL LAW WAS
LIFTED BY PROC. NO. 2045. BUT NOT
REALLY. IF THE HEART OF MARTIAL LAW
IS THE CONCENTRATION OF
GOVERNMENTAL POWERS IN THE
HANDS OF THE EXECUTIVE, THE
EQUIVALENT OF MARTIAL LAW REMAINED
AS PART OF NORMAL DAY TO DAY
GOVERNMENT. THIS WAS THE EFFECT OF
AMENDMENT NO. 6 OF 1976 WHICH
GRANTED FULL LEGISLATIVE POWER
TO THE PRESIDENT (THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, A COMMENTARY,
VOLUME II, FIRST EDITION, 1988,
JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.).
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
6.
THE NEW MARTIAL LAW
DOCTRINE
IT WAS UNDER THE SHADOW OF
THIS JURISPRUDENTIAL LEGACY OF THE
MARCOS REGIME THAT THE 1986 CONCOM
WENT ABOUT FORMULATING THE
MARTIAL LAW DOCTRINE OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION. IN SUM,
THE 1987
CONSTITUTION: 1) NARROWED THE
GROUNDS FOR THE IMPOSITION OF
MARTIAL LAW AND SUSPENSION OF
THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS, 2) LIMITED THE
DISCRETION OF THE PRESIDENT AND PUT
IT UNDER REVIEW POWERS OF
CONGRESS AND OF THE SUPREME
COURT, AND 3) REJECTED THE BULK
OF MARTIAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE THAT
HAD DEVELOP UNDER PRESIDENT
MARCOS.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
UNDER BOTH THE 1935 AND

1973 CONSTITUTIONS, THE PRIVILEGE OF
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS COULD
BE SUSPENDED AND MARTIAL LAW COULD
BE IMPOSED IN CASE OF INVASION,

THE PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT. THE
1987 CONSTITUTION HAS NARROWED
THE GROUNDS TO [ACTUAL]
INVASION
OR REBELLION, WHEN
THE PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES
IT.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
UNDER THE 1935 AND 1973
CONSTITUTION THE PRESIDENT COULD
SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE AND IMPOSE
MARTIAL LAW FOR AN INDEFINITE
DURATION AND CONGRESS HAD NO
POWER TO CURTAIL HIM OR REVIEW HIS
DECISION. UNDER THE 1987
CONSITUTION, THE INITIAL
SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE AND
THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW IS
STILL FOR THE PRESIDENT TO DECIDE BUT
THEY CAN ONLY BE FOR A PERIOD NOT
EXCEEDING SIXTY (60) DAYS. (THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, A COMMENTARY,
JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
K. THE PARDONING POWER: (*****)
1.
DEFINITION OF TERMS:
a. PARDON
b. COMMUNTATION
c. REPRIEVE
d. PARDON VS. PAROLE
e. PARDON VS. PAROLE VS.
PROBATION
f. PARDON VS. AMNESTY
2.
KINDS OF PARDON:
a. ABSOLUTE VS.
CONDITIONAL
b. PLENARY VS. PARTIAL
4.
UNITED STATES V. WILSON, (7

Pet 150 [1833]) C.J. MARSHALL SAID:
A PARDON IS AN ACT OF GRACE,
PROCEEDING FROM THE POWER
ENTRUSTED WITH THE EXECUTION OF THE
LAWS, WHICH EXEMPTS THE INDIVIDUAL
ON WHOM IT IS BESTOWED, FROM THE
PUNISHMENT THE LAW INFLICTS FOR A
CRIME HE HAS COMMITTED. IT IS THE
PRIVATE, THOUGH OFFICIAL ACT OF
THE EXECUTIVE MAGISTRATE,
DELIVERED TO THE INDIVIDUAL FOR
WHOSE BENEFIT IT IS INTENDED, AND
NOT COMMUNICATED OFFICALLY TO THE
COURT
K.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
K. THE PARDONING POWER. (*****)
3.
LIMITATIONS ON THE
PARDONING POWER:
a. CAN PARDON BE
GRANTED IN CASES OF IMPEACHMENT?
b. CAN PARDON BE
GRANTED FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY
ELECTION LAW?
c. CAN PARDON BE
GRANTED EVEN BEFORE CONVICTION
BY FINAL JUDGMENT?
d. CAN PARDON BE
EXTENDED TO A PERSON CONVICTED
OF LEGISLATIVE CONTEMPT.
e. CAN PARDON BE
EFFECTIVE EVEN IF THE PARDONEE
(CONVICTED PERSON) DOES
NOT ACCEPT IT?
K.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
THE PARDONING POWER.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
4.
NATURE OF PARDON.
NATURE OF PARDON.
UNITED STATES V. WILSON, (7

Pet 150 [1833]) (CONT):
A PARDON IS A DEED, TO THE
VALIDITY OF WHICH DELIVERY IS
ESSENTIAL, AND DELIVERY IS NOT
COMPLETE WITHOUT ACCEPTANCE. IT
MAY THEN BE REJECTED BY THE
PERSON TO WHOM IT IS TENDERED; AND
IF IT BE REJECTED, WE HAVE DISCOVERED
NO POWER IN A COURT TO FORCE IT ON
HIM.
K.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
THE PARDONING POWER. (*****)
5.
EFFECTS OF PARDON.
(*****)
EX PARTE GARLAND (71 U.S. 333)
FACTS: IN 1865, THE US CONGRESS

PASSED A LAW THAT EFFECTIVELY
BEBARRED FORMER MEMBERS OF THE
CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT BY
REQUIRING A LOYALTY OATH BE RECITED
BY ANY FEDERAL COURT OFFICER
AFFIRMING THAT THE OFFICER HAD
NEVER SERVED IN THE CONFEDERATE
GOVERNMENT.
AUGUSTUS HILL GARLAND, AN
ATTORNEY AND FORMER CONFEDERATE
SENATOR FROM ARKANSAS, HAD
PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED A PARDON
FROM PRES. ANDREW JOHNSON.
GARLAND PETITIONED THE US SUPREME
COURT TO DECLARE THE ACT OF
CONGRESS AS A BILL OF ATTAINDER
AND AN
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
K. THE PARDONING POWER.
5.
EFFECTS OF PARDON.
EX PARTE GARLAND (CONT):
EX
POST FACTO LAW WHICH UNFAIRLY
PUNISHED HIM FOR THE CRIME HE HAD
BEEN PARDONED FOR AND WAS
THEREFORE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
DECISION: IN A 5-4 VOTE, THE
SUPREME COURT RULED THAT THE LAW
WAS INDEED A BILL OF ATTAINDER AND
AN EX-POST FACTO LAW.
THE COURT
RULED THAT GARLAND WAS BEYOND
THE REACH OF PUNISHMENT OF ANY
KIND DUE TO HIS PRIOR PRESIDENTIAL
PARDON. THE COURT ALSO STATED THAT
COUNSELORS ARE OFFICERS OF THE
COURT AND NOT OFFICERS OF THE
UNITED STATES, AND THAT THEIR
REMOVAL WAS AN EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL
POWER AND NOT LEGISLATIVE POWER.
THE LAW WAS STRUCK DOWN, OPENING
THE WAY FOR FORMER CONFEDERATE
GOVERNEMNT OFFICIALS TO RETURN TO
THE POSITIONS WITHIN THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY.
OFFICE FOLLOWING HIS ELECTION HE

WAS GRANTED AN ABSOLUTE PARDON
BY PRES. QUEZON.
AS A RESULT, THE
SUPREME COURT HELD, HIS FORMER
DISABILITIES HAD BEEN REMOVED,
AND
HE WAS THEREFORE
ELIGIBLE
FOR
THE PUBLIC OFFICE IN
QUESTION.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
5.
EFFECTS OF PARDON.
EX PARTE GARLAND (CONT):
JUSTICE FILED SAID A PARDON
REACHES BOTH THE PUNISHMENT
PRESCRIBED FOR THE OFFENSE AND
THE GUILT OF THE OFFENDER; AND
WHEN THE PARDON IS FULL, IT
RELEASES THE PUNISHMENT AND
BLOTS OUT THE EXISTENCE OF GUILT, SO
THAT IN THE EYE OF THE LAW, THE
OFFENDER IS AS INNOCENT AS IF HE
HAD NEVER COMMITTED THE OFFENSE . . .
IT MAKES HIM, AS IT WERE, A NEW MAN,
AND GIVES HIM A NEW CREDIT AND
CAPACITY.
GARLAND WAS THEREAFTER READMITTED AND RE-INSTATED TO HIS
FORMER POSITION AS ATTORNEY AND
COUSELOR OF THE (FEDERAL) COURT.
MONSANTO V. FACTORAN (170

SCRA 190) (*****) THE EX PARTE
GARLAND DOCTRINE, AS APPLIED IN
THE PELOBELLO AND CRISTOBAL CASES,
HOWEVER, WAS MODIFIED IN THIS
CASE WHERE A WOMAN CONVICTED OF
ESTAFA THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS WAS GRANTED AN
ABSOLUTE PARDON AND THEREAFTER
CLAIMED SHE WAS ENTITLED AS A
CONSEQUENCE
TO REINSTATEMENT
AS ASSISTANT CITY TREASURER WHICH
THE COURT DID NOT AGREE.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
5.
EFFECTS OF PARDON.
PELOBELLO V. PALATINO (72 Phil.
441 [1941]). THE LEGAL EFFECT OF
A PARDON IS TO RESTORE NOT ONLY
THE OFFENDERS LIBERTY BUT ALSO HIS
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS.
IN THIS
CASE,
A MAYORS ELECTION WAS
CONTESTED ON THE GROUND THAT HE
WAS DISQUALIFIED FROM PUBLIC OFFICE
BECAUSE OF A PRIOR CONVICTION AND
IMPRISONMENT. IT WAS SHOWN,
HOWEVER, THAT BEFORE ASSUMING
K.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
5.
EFFECTS OF PARDON.
NOTA BENE: THE EX PARTE

GARLAND DOCTRINE WAS APPLIED IN
PELOBELLO V. PALATINO CASE, CRISTOBAL
V. LABRADOR CASE (71 PHIL. 34 [1940]),
AND SEVERAL OTHER CASES.
.
K.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
5.
K.
EFFECTS OF PARDON.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
5.
EFFECTS OF PARDON.
MONSANTO V. FACTORAN: C.J.

FERNAN SAID:
PARDON CANNOT
MASK THE ACTS CONSTITUTING THE
CRIME.
THESE ARE HISTORICAL
FACTS WHICH, DESPITE A PUBLIC
MANIFESTATION OF MERCY AND
FORGIVENESS IMPLICIT
IN PARDON,
ORDINARY PRUDENT MEN WILL TAKE
INTO ACCOUNT IN THEIR SUBSEQUENT
DEALINGS WITH THE ACTOR.
PARDON GRANTED AFTER
CONVICTION FREES THE INDIVIDUAL
FROM ALL THE PENALTIES AND
LEGAL DISABILITIES AND RESTORES
HIM TO ALL HIS CIVIL RIGHTS. BUT
UNLESS EXPRESSLY GROUNDED ON THE

K.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
5.
EFFECTS OF PARDON.
MONSANTO V. FACTORAN:
ERSONS INNOCENCE (WHICH IS
RARE), IT CANNOT BRING BACK LOST
REPUTATION FOR HONESTY, INTEGRITY
AND FAIR DEALING. THIS MUST BE
CONSTANTLY KEPT IN MIND LEST WE LOSE
TRACK OF THE TRUE CHARACTER AND
PURPOSE OF THE PRIVILEGE.
K.
THE POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT
5.
EFFECTS OF PARDON.
MONSANTO V. FACTORAN:
THUS, NOTWITHSTANDING THE

EXPANSIVE AND EFFUSIVE LANGUAGE OF
THE GARLAND CASE,
WE ARE IN
FULL AGREEMENT WITH THE COMMONLYHELD OPINION THAT PARDON DOES
NOT IPSO FACTO RESTORE A
CONVICTED FELON TO PUBLIC OFFICE
NECESSARILY RELINQUISHED
OR
FORFEITED
BY REASON OF THE
CONVICTION ALTHOUGH SUCH PARDON
UNDOUBTEDLY RESTORES HIS ELIGIBILITY
FOR APPOINTMENT TO THAT OFFICE.
AUTHORITIES
1.
PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW,
2002 EDITION, ISAGANI A. CRUZ,
RETIRED ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF
THE SUPREME COURT.
2.
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.

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GERRYMANDERING IS THE

ARRANGEMENT OF DISTRICTS IN SUCH A

SEC. 6, ART. VI NO PERSON SHALL

PRIVILEGE FROM ARREST

SEC. 13, ART. VI NO SENATOR OR

THE FIRST PART IS CALLED

SECOND PART IS CALLED FORBIDDEN

TRIBUNALS (SET & HET) IS PERMITTED

MAY BE REAMENDED OR REVISED BY

3. DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA V.

PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP IN ACCORDANCE

WHAT ARE THE TERMS OF

ANY SPEECH OR DEBATE IN

LIMITS TO THE EXERCISE OF

UNLIKE THE CONSTITUTION OF

COVERING ALL SUBJECT

ITSELF AND THE ALLOWABLE SUBJECTS

b.2a) SEC. 24, ART. VII, THE

2.a) POWER TO IMPEACH;

THE SC GRANTED THE PETITION,

THE COURT LIKEWISE EXPLAINED

MAY VALIDLY BE INVOKED AGAINST THIS

IN GUDANI V. SENGA (498 SCRA

PUNISHED AS LEGISLATIVE CONTEMPT.

IT WAS HELD IN THIS CASE THAT THE

IN ARNAULT CASE, HOWEVER, THE

SEC. 21, ART. VI (CONT): (*****)

2.1a) PASCUAL V. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC

SEC. 28(3), ART. VI (CHARITABLE

WHO IS CONSIDERED RESIDENT OF

THE PRESIDENT AND THE

THE PRESIDENT SHALL NOT BE

PERSON WHO HAS SUCCEEDED AS

IN THIS CASE, THE PETITIONER

IT WAS ARGUED THAT SIX YEARS

THE FIXING OF THE EXACT TIME

IT WAS THOUGHT THAT THE

Republic of the Philippines, First

VICE-PRESIDENT, AND MAY PROMULGATE

IN AN ELECTION FOR THE

THE SC HELD THAT THE

THE COURT STRESSED THE

ADDITIONAL JURISDICTION BESTOWED BY

THE SC HELD THE POWER OF PET

THE PRESIDENT-ELECT AND

IF AT THE BEGINNING OF THE

THE CONGRESS SHALL BY LAW

SHALL HAVE BEEN ELECTED AND

SECTION 8 DEALS WITH VACANCIES

ESTRADA ALSO AGRUED THAT

2. ESTRADA V. GMA (G.R. L

QUESTION: WHAT IS THE

PRESIDENT FROM AMONG THE MEMBERS

E. FILLING OF THE VACANCY IN THE

CONSTITUTION AND SHALL

BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE

THE CABINET MEMBERS AND OTHER

317) (CONT): EXECUTIVE DEPT IS NO

MR. SUAREZ. THANK YOU.

FR. BERNAS. THERE IS NO

10. PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY. (*****)

GOVERNMENT ITSELF. (CITED BY THE SC

THIS LEADERSHIP IS DISPLAYED BY