so “ ‘THE ENTRY OF THE SOVIET UNION INTO ‘THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN: Military Plans, 1941-1945 Google UNIVERO 4 2 ces aC PREFACE In response to inquiries by Members of the Congress and the press, agencies of the Department of Defense were asked to survey their files for documents relevant to the entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan. This survey involved a search in the V most relevant files and a review of the information accumlated by the historical agencies of the Department. The following report is based on these sources. The report covers the major official military advice given on the question of Soviet participation in the war against Japan for the period from Pearl Harbor to the surrender of Japan. Since strategic planning functions were centered in Washington during World War II, the documents deal mainty with high-level military activities in Washington. The views and recomendations of the cific theater comaanders on the subject matter have been included to the extent available. Where certain phases of the subject have already been treated at length in works previously published, these works have been cited to avoid detailed retelling and lengthy documentation of the sane material. The records of the Department of Defense do not contain the full story of the events leading to the entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan, since various aspects of this subject were handled by officials outside of the War and Navy Departments. iit t Google auignee yo mcScheduled historical publications of Department of Defense agencies will relate the events in greater detail after a more exhaustive scrutiny of files than was possible in the time available for this report. September 1955 iv MICHIGANv. ‘TABLE OF CONTENTS After Pearl Harbor... 22 se eee eevee UZ ee ec ee eee ee ee eee ees From Teheran to Yalta, 194h .. 1... eee Restatement of the Concept of the War Against Uapan se eee ee ee ee ee The Problem of Joint United States-Soviet Planning 4 ¢ ¢4@ Wale 3k § 6 68 e ew e Reexamination of Soviet Participation .... Yelta to Potsdam, 1945 .......-.02-- The Yalta Conference... +e eee sees Review of Pacific Strategy... .....-- Preparations for the Potsdam Conference . . Potsdam Conference and Surrender of Japan Go gle UNIVERSITY OF MICHIG 9 aff 17 28 28 12 89I, AFTER PEARL HARBOR The critical military situation in the Pacific following the Japanese attack on Pearl Karbor prompted intensive consideration in Washington, as well as in the field, of advantages that might be derived from Soviet entry into the war against Japan. The desirability of U.S.S.R. partici- pation was indirectly suggested by President Roosevelt's remarks to Soviet Ambassador Litvinov on December 8, 19)1,+ discussed by Secretary of State Cordell Hull with Ambassador Litvinov on the same day,* pro= posed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to the Soviet Government on De~ cember 8,2 and recommended by General Douglas Machrthur to General George C,. Marshall on December 10, 1941. General MacArthur's message read as follows: The mass of enemy air and naval strength committed in the theatre from Singapore to the Philippines and eastward established his wealness in Japan proper and definite information available here shows that entry of Russia is enemy greatest fear, Most fav- orable opportunity now exists and immediate attack on Japan from north would not only inflict heavy punishment but would at once relieve pressure from objectives of Jap drive to southward. Infor- mation being secured by Knight, who is known to Miles, establishes that heavy air attack on Jap objectives would not only pull in much of present widely dispersed air strength but would destroy much of their exposed oil supply. Golden opportunity exists for a master strpke while the eneny is engaged in over-extended initial air efforts. 1 World Peace Foundation, Documents on American Foreign Relations, 19-42, (Boston, 1952), Vol. IV; pp. 609-10. 2 Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, (New York, 1948), Vole II, p. nn, 3 Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilvell's Mission to China, (Washington, D.C., 1953), pp. 50-51. L sg, Gen Mackrthur to Gen Marshall, No. 198, 10 Dec lil. Google i OhGeneral Marshall discussed General MacArthur's suggestions with Secretary of War Henry L, Stimson that same day, but Mr. Stimson felt that, since Mr. Litvinov had already expressed informally his government's desire to remain neutral in the Far Eastern war, the Soviet Union might consider any pressure for such participation a sign of United States weakness.° On December 11, the Soviet Anb ador officially informed the Secretary of State that the Soviet Union "was not then in position Je cooperate with us against Japan, Russia, he said, was fighting on a huge scale against Germany and could not risk an attack by Japan."® Nevertheless, during the following days the President explored the problem further with his civilian and militery advisers and decided that the preparation of plans for joint allied action against Japan, as pro- posed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, might best be achieved through conferences at Singapore, Chungking, and Moscow. The Soviet Union was to participate in the latter two conferences, but no Soviet representatives attended the Chungking meeting after Marshal Stalin explained to the Chinese Government that the Soviet Union could not enter the Far Eastern war at this time, and the President's suggestion for a meeting in Moscow trailed off into a series of inconclusive messages.? 3 win, Conf between Sec Stimson, Gen Marshall, Gen Gerow, Gen Handy, and Mr. Pundy, 10 Dec Ll. © wuil, Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 1411. 7 For a discussion of these negotiations, see Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, pp. 51-52, and Maurice Matloff and Edvin M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, (washington, D.C, 1953)5 PI 2 Google Unive NetsOn December 15, 19L1, General Marshall summarized for General Mackrthur the current status of negotiations to bring additional pressure to bear on Japan: The President has suggested to the Generalissimo that he call a military conference of representatives of China, Great Britain, the Dutch, United States and Russia at Chungking prior to December seventeenth to exchange information aad to consider the military and naval action particularly in Eastern Asia which may most effectively be employed to accomplish the defeat of Japan and her allies, He hopes that the conference will arrive at a concrete preliminary plan and that this plan be communicated to him in greatest secrecy by December twentieth, Major General George H. Brett, en route from India, assisted by Brigadier Gen= eral John Magruder has been designated to represent the United States, General Brett has been instructed that in discussions and plans he will support the views of the War Department as fully as is consistent with facts and circumstances developed at the con= ference, The War Department views stated to him are as follows: Each of the associated powers should make every effort to take advantage of the overextended Japanese front to which end max- imum and concerted action against every section of the Japanese front should be brought as rapidly as possible and further ex- tension of that front should be forced to the maximum that avail- able means will permit; the effect of such action will be to pres vent the concentration of Japanese effort against a particular sector and will cause more rapid wastage of the reserves and re- sources of Japan; vigorous steps should be taken by each govern- ment having troops necessarily on the defensive to assure repul- sion of attack whether by sea, air or ground and the maximum co= operation practicable should be given by associated powers, The President has also asked the British to hold a military and naval conference of Chinese, American, and Dutch officers on December seventeenth at Singapore and report operational plans as they see the situation in the Southern Zone, Lt. Col. F. G, Brink has been directly designated as the representative of the War De= partment because secrecy of your communications with him is un= certain, A summary of your views which are generally concurred in by the President has been given Colonel Brink for his infor- mation ard presentation at the conference. He has been informed of War Department purpose to send air reinforcements into the Philippines and to utilize long range B-2h planes now organizing for movenent via Africa for the supply of vital items from Aus= tralian bases to your forces, He has been instructed to present to conference the importance to the whole defensive structure in 3 Google eect ithe Western Pacific of success in the Philippines, He will om phasize importance of re-establishing limited sea travel between Philippines and Australian bases to supplement air traffic. Prior to the conference Colonel Brink will confer with the Am- erican naval representative to be designated by the Navy Depart- ment for the conference so that presentations made by represent- atives of the United States will be in agreement as far as possi- ble. He has been instructed to submit to the War Department inmediately upon conclusion of the conference and by the most expeditious means consistent with secrecy a full report and, if secrecy can be assured, to submit a copy of his report to you, If practicable from the viewpoint of secrecy, convey your views with respect to the subject of the respective conferences to the U.S. representatives at Chungking and Singapore, Conferences of a similar nature are being held in Washington and Moscow, Your messages of December thirteenth and fourteenth have been studied by the President. The strategic importance of the Philippines is fully recognized and there has been and will be no repeat no wavering in the determination to support you. The problem of supply is complicated by Naval losses in the Pacific but as recommended in yours of December fourteenth bomber and pursuit reinforcements are to be rushed to you. Keep us, advised of the situation as you see it. Acknowledge, Marshall, The British and United States Chiefs of Staff, meeting in Washington during late December 191 and early January 1912, took note of the Soviet decision not to enter the war against Japan for the time being. In set- ting forth allied grand strategy, the Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed that Germany was "still the prime enemy" and that "her defeat is the key to victory." Therefore, "only the minimum of force necessary for the safe= guarding of vital interests in other theatres should be diverted from operations against Germany." With regard to the Far East, the Chiefs agreed that: 8 Msg, Gen Marshall to Gen Macarthur, No. 787, 15 Dec ll. 4 Google CoalThe security of Australia, New Zealand, and India must be maintained, and the Chinese war effort supported, Secondly, points of vantage from which an offensive against Japan can eventually be developed must be secured, Our immediate object must therefore be to hold:= @- Hawaii and Alaska. B. Singapore, the East Indies Barrier, and the Philippines. ce Rangoon and the route to China. 3d. The Maritime Provinces of Siberia. The minimum forces required e hold the above will have to be a matter of mutual discussion,’ Thus, at the end of 19h the question of Soviet participation in tht war against Japan had been suspended, not resolved. At the same time, the importance of holding the Maritime Provinces of Siberia was recog- nized as an allied objective, 9 Us-Br CeofS Memo, sub: American-Eritish Grand Strategy, approved 31 Dec li. 5 Google iiunneeen on caeTe 19b2 During 192 the question of Soviet involvement in the Pacific war was raised intermittently in Washington because of the possibility that Japan might attack the U.S.S.R. and of the interest that the Army Air Forces had in establishing air bases in Siberia, Military planning to counter a Japanese attack or to mount an aerial offensive from Siberia required specific information about Soviet capabilities in the Far East that the Soviet Government failed to make available. Consequently, consideration of Soviet entry into the Pacific war remained inconclusive. The possibility of a Japanese attack on the U.S.S.R. received in- creased attention in the spring of 1912.2 At that time Japanese suc- cesses in the Pacific and in Southeast Asia areas provided the Japanese military forces with increased flexibility. On March l, 192, the Pres= ident asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to restudy the question of Soviet participation in the Pacific war: While there is no assurance of war between Russia and Japan this Spring, such a war is always a definite possibility. This possibility is enhanced if the Japanese are able to withdraw a relatively large nunber of troops and planes from the southwest Pacific area, leaving only a containing force there, I think it would be a good thing if the United /sic/ Staffs would hold one or two sessions in regard to the position of Great Britain and the United States in the event of such a war, It should be studied, of course, from all angles, such as an offensive by the United Nations, starting from the southern 1 For a discussion of these planning activities, see Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 19L1-1942, pps 1u2-li6. 6 Google ITY OF MICHIarea, thus compelling Japan to send more forces there; second, from the point of view of the use of Chinese territory by Russia and the United States to conduct various kinds of offensives against Japan; third, from the point of view of opening up the Aleutian Islands route to Kamchatka and Siberia; the latter would also include, during the Summer months, the possibility of sending supplies to the Russian forces by an even more north- erly route-=past Yrangel Island to the Arctic coast of Siberia and thence South. The Joint Chiefs of Staff noted in their reply to the President on March 30, 1942, that more information about Soviet plans and forces was required to answer the questions raised by the Presidents On March lth the President sent a memorandum to Admiral Stark and General Marshall directing that a study be made of the action which should be taken by the United Nations in the event /“ of war between Russia and Japan. This study has been the subject of consideration by the Joint Staff Planners who have come to the conclusion that before realistic plans for United-Nation action may be made, informa tion with regard to the plans and strength of Soviet forces is essential, Aside from action by United States forces in the Southwest Pacific for the purpose of diverting Japanese strength away from Siberia (a method which would be employed in any case, as it fits in with our current war operations), the possibility of employing United States forces in and near Siberia depends on the ability of the Soviet forces to hold sea, land, and air bases to which the United States forces could proceed, and from which they could operate, We do not know the strengths of the various categories of forces in Siberia and Manchukuo, nor whether the Soviet plans to attempt to hold the Maritime Provinces or to re- tire westward with a wlew to maintaining an active front. It would be unwise for the United States to undertake active op= erations in Siberia until after its military officials were in possession of complete information as to Soviet strengths and plans, and unless the validity of this information had been con- firmed by a careful and exhaustive examination, by United States officers, of Soviet forces and facilities in the Siberian theater. 2 JcS 16, Note by Secys, sub: United Nations Action in Case of War between Russia and Japan, 6 Mar Li2. GoogleUp to the present, it has been impossible for our mili- tary authorities to obtain any but the scantiest information concerning Soviet forces, and it is questionable if more information would be supplied by the Soviet. The only way it seems possible to obtain this information would be through @ direct agreement between the highest United States and Soviet political authorities In light of the above, it is respectfully suggested that the President may care to initiate steps with the Soviet Government looking toward an agreement which would permit complete military collaboration with the U.S.8.R. If such an agreement can be reached, United States officers could then be sent to Siberia on an inspection trip and staff conversations undertaken after they return. Problems of cooperation could be examined during the conversations and realistic plans developed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum vas returned without com- ment. The subject of aid to the Soviet Union was also referred to in messages exchanged early in May 1942 by the President and General Macarthur. On May 6 the President sent a cable explaining the War Department's inability to furnish the reinforcements General Machrthur had requested. In the matter of grand strategy /the President had written] I find it difficult this Spring and Summer to get away from the simple fact that the Russian armies are killing more Axis per- sonnel and destroying more Axis materiel than all the other twenty-five United Nations put together. Therefore, it has seemed wholly logical to support the great Russian effort in 1942 by seeking to get all munitions to them that we possi- bly can, and also to develop plans aimed at diverting German land and air forces from the Russian front. The President closed his message with the request that General Macarthur give him his +++ personal guess on whether Japan will continue large operations against India and Ceylon or will stop at approx- imately the Calcutta line. Also, as to whether an all-oug attack will be launched against Australia or New Zealand. 3 Memo, Gen Marshall and Adm King to Pres, 30 Mar 42. 4 Meg, Pres to Gen MacArthur, 6 May 42, CM-OUT 1131. GoogleIn response to this request, General Macarthur on May 8 re- viewed the current war situation in the Far East and presented a plea for a reorientation of strategy from Europe to the Pacific and the reinforcement of his conmand: seo I deem it of the utmost importance to provide adequate security for Australia and the Pacific Area, thus maine taining a constant frontal defense and a flank threat against further movement to the soutiward, This should be followed at the earliest possible moment by offensive action or at least by a sufficiently dangerous initial threat of offensive action to affect the ¢aemy plans and dispositions. This would meet the demands of the immediate strategic situation and would satisfy American public opinion by providing an adequate effort in the only theater which is charged exclu- sively to the United States, I agree with the President as to the predominant importance of the Russian front, It is vital and nothing should prevent its maximum support. Only limited assistance, however, can be transported there so that the necessity for a second front is self-evident, That front should be in the Pacific theater, Nowhere else can it be so successfully launched and nowhere else will it so assist the Russians, Tne Siberian pressure now exerted on him by Japan will be at once released, permitting him either to utilize the Siberian resources in direct support of his European front or to join his allies in the Pacific attack, In addition, it would protect Australia; 4t would protect India since the best defense for India is provided in the Pacific rather than in the Indian Ocean, and it would have the enthusiastic psychological support of the entire American nation. These recommendations, however, were not acted upon. Further discussion of the Soviet Union's role in the Pacific war was spurred by tne Japanese attacks against Midway and the Meutians in early June 19:2. The Japanese campaign begain with an air raid on Dutch Herbor on June 3, The next day Japanese troops were landed on Kiska and Attu Islands. The results of Msg, Gen Macarthur to Gen Marshall, 8 May L2. 9 Google i Ohthe battle of Midvay lessened the enemy threat to United States forces, but the possibility remained that the occupation of the J Aleutian Islands might be preliminary to an attack against the Soviet Union. This eventuality indicated the desirability of closer military cooperation with the Soviet Union, Moreover, there existed the need f or additional information to facilitate the delivery of lend-lease aircraft through Alaska and Siberia, On June 15, 1942, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked the President to obtain Marshal Stalin's approval for United States- Soviet military staff conversations. The President accepted this suggestion and on June 17 dispatched the following message to Marshal Stalin: The situation in the Alaska area and North Pacific is developing to where tangible evidence is presented that the Japanese possibly are getting ready to conduct operations against the Soviet Union Maritime Provinces, We are ready in case of such an attack to assist you with our air power, providing there are available in Siberia landing fields which are adequate, To permit the prompt effectuation of such an operation, there must be careful coordination between the Soviet Union and the United States. I was very pleased to find through Litvinof that the movement of U.S. planes tron jlaska via Northern Russia to your western battlefront, has your approval. I believe that in order that this new danger in the Pacific Area may be met, there should be immediately an exchange of detailed information relative to establishments in the Alaskan and Siberian Areas now in existence and the inaugu- ration of secret staff conversations between joint repr sentatives of the Navy, Army, and Air Force on natters essential to our conmon interests. 10 Google iyceeee ee tcntThis matter is considered to be of such great urgency that our conferees should have the power to make definite plans and begin action. I propose that such representatives appoigted by you and me néet in Moscow and Washington at once. When no reply had been received by June 23, the President sent & second message, stressing the advantage of delivering aircraft through Alaska and Siberia: Adding to my despatch of June 17 to you, it is desired to stress the very large timesaving which would be accom plisned in delivering aircraft to the U.S.5.R. if, instead of delivering through Africa as we are now doing, the deliveries could be made through Siberia and Alaska, The ferrying of short-range airplanes now being shipped by water could be accomplished by establishment of the ferry route through Siberia. If landing fields, navigational and weather facilities can be set up to connect with our own airways at Nome, I am ready to have U.S. ferrying crews deliver airplanes to you at Lake Baikal. A connec- tion between such airways into Siberia with landing fields progressing into Vladivostok area can easily be accomplished. Our air units, therefore, could be moved rapidly into that area for your assistance in case the Japanese initiated operations versus your Maritime Provinces. From ny study of the problem of setting up an air route to Lake Baikal via Siberia, it is apparent that bulk supplies like gasoline and machinery to build up landing fields could necessarily be transported into Eastern Siberia by water, using certain rivers which empty into the Arctic Ocean, This movement by water would have to be done within the next few weeks before these rivers are frozen over. I have sent this communication to you prior to receipt of your answer to my despatch of 17 June because of the necessity for initiating early action. To hasten this air route development, providing you agree with the urgency and importance thereof, it is requested that you permit a flight over the proposed route of one U.S, airplane from Alaska for purposes of survey and exploration, in order to find out the amount of supplies and equipment required for the building of the essential landing fields and facilities for navi- gation, The people making this flight would take all 6 Msg, Pres to Marshal Stalin, 17 Jun 12. n t Googleprecautions to insure their non-identification in any regard with the military services, including the wearing of civilian clothes. They would actually make the trip as representatives of a comercial company. This survey flight would not take the place of the discussions by our joint Army, Navy, and air represent- atives which were recomended by me in my despatch of 17 June. They would be carried on solely for the purpose of permitting those representatives to begin their dis- cussions with more definite and detailed knowledge of the problems involved than they otherwise would have. One or two of your officials or officers at Nome could, of course, be taken,’ In reply, Marshal Stalin addressed himself only to the question of a lend-lease air route from Alaska, avoiding discussion of the possibility that the Japanese would attack Siberia. He announced that work was already progressing on airfields and that he felt aircraft should be piloted by Soviet flyers who would also make the proposed survey flight across Siberia, accompanied by United States representatives. He agreed to a meeting of military representatives "for the purpose of exchanging information s0 far as this will be necessary." The meeting should be held in Moscow and not in Washington, "since it was clear that it was only a question of the number of planes that could be delivered per month, "8 7 Msg, Pres to Marshal Stalin, 23 Jun 2. 8 Msgs, Amb Standley to SecState, Nos, 227 and 231, 2 Jul l2. This information was transmitted in a Soviet note, further clarified by a conversation between Marshal Stalin and Ambassador Standley, See William H. Standley and Arthur A. Ageton, Admiral Ambassador to Russia, (Chicago, 1955), pp. 28-50. 12 Google F iThe President decided to go ahead on the basis of thi: partial acceptance of his proposals. He informed Marshal Stalin on July 6 that he had designated Maj. Gen. Follett Bradley of the Army Air Forces as his representative to go to Moscow. General Bradley would be assisted by the United States military and naval attaches, Al- though the Soviet Government had agreed only to discussions of the trans-Siberian air ferry route, the United States representatives were authorized to discuss and arrange cooperative action against Japan if the question should be raised by Soviet officials.? During the summer of 192, while the Soviets were losing terri- tory to tae Germans in southern Russia, General Bradley was able to make only slow and halting progress in opening the Alaska-Siberia ferry route. Finally, on October 6, he obtained Marshai Stalin's permission for a survey of the Siberian air bases. Marshal Stalin indicated that "although Japan and Russia had a neutrality pact no one in Russia believed any Japanese statement and that he felt Japan might attack at any time."10 General Bradley decided that he required additional instructions before making this survey and returned to Washington in early December 1942. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, after reviewing the problem, suggested to the President that he inform Marshal Stalin of United States readi- ness to commit three heavy bomber groups to Siberia. This proposal was sent on December 30: > vor a discussion of the Bradley mission and the resulting negot- ations, see Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, pp. 339-h6. 10 Msg, Maj Gen Bradley to Cots, 5 /6/ Oct 42, GIN 290. 13 Google IVERSITY OF MICHIIn the event that Japan should attaek Russia in the Far East, I am prepared to assist you in that theater with an American Air Force of approximately 100 four-engined bombardment. airplanes as early as practicable, provided that certain items of supply and equipment are furnished by Soviet authorities and that suitable operation facil- itdes are prepared in advance. Supply of our units must be entirely by air transport, hence it will be necessary for Soviet Governnent to furnish such items as bombs, fuel, lubricants, transportation, shelter, heat, and other minor items to be determined. Although we have no positive information that Japan will attack Russia, it does appear to be an eventual prob- ability. Therefore, in order that we may be prepared for this contingency, I propose that the survey of air force facilities in the Far Bast, authorized by you to General Bradley on October 6, be made now, and that the discussions initiated on November 11 on your authority between General Bradley and General Korolenko be continued, It is my intention to appoint General Bradley, who has ny full confidence, to continue these discussions for the United States if you so agree, He will be empovered to explore for the United States every phase of combined Russo- American operations in the Far East Theater and, based upon his survey, to recommend the composition and strength of our air forces which will be allocated to assist you should the necessity arise. He will also determine the extent of advance preparations practicable and necessary to ensure effective participation of our units promptly on initiation of hostilities. Marshal Stalin replied on January 5, 1943: I have received your message concerning the Far East. Please accept my appreciation of your willingness to send 100 bombers for the Soviet Union to the Far East. How- ever, I must say that at the present time we want aid in airplanes not at the Far East, where the U.S.S.R. is not engaged in war, but at the front of the fiercest war against the Germans, i.e., at the Soviet-German front. ‘The arrival of these airplanes, without fliers, (we have enough fliers of our own), at the south-western or the central front would play an enormous role on the most important sectors of our struggle against Hitler,12 11 praft msg with memo, JCS to Pres, 30 Dec L2. 12 Msg, Marshal Stalin to Pres, 5 Jan h3. ab Google \ ITY OF MICHIon January 8, 193,' the President tried to clarify the terns for United States assistance in the Far East. Again pointing out that the offer included complete Air Force units, not just air- planes, the President stated: Our proposal regarding the 100 planes referred to a situation which would occur if hostilities were actually to break out between Japan and Russia, Under such con- ditions we calculated that by regrouping our air units in the Pacific Theater 100 planes in organized units could be concentrated in Eastern Siberia because tneir action as well as your battle there would enable us to reduce our air strength elsewhere in the Pacific Theater. My radio was intended to be in the nature of antic= ipatory protective planning against a possibility only. The immediate action recommended was in reference to the survey and discussions by General Bradley with Soviet officials. Only by such preliminary survey and advance planning will it be possible to render reasonably prompt assistance in the event of an outbreak of hostilities in Siberia. +s I would appreciate an early reply to my proposal of December 30 that General Rradley and his party proceed without delayto the Far East for survey and staff discussions.+3 That Marshal Stalin had not misconstrued the offer, but had rejected it, became clear in his message of January 13, 19L3: As regards sending bombing avio-units to the Far East, I made clear in my previous messages that what we want is not avio-units, but airplanes without fliers, as we have more than enough fliers of our own, ,This is in the first place. In the second place, we want your aid in airplanes not in the Far East, where the U.S.S.R. is not in a state of war, but at the Soviet-Gernan front, where the need for aviation aid is particularly acute. 13 Msg, Pres to Marshal Stalin, 8 Jan 3. 15 t Google univer atI do not quite understand your suggestion that General Bradley should inspect Russian military objects in the Far ast and in other parts of the U.S.S.R. It would seem obvious that Russian military objects can be inspected only by Russian inspectors, just as American military objects can be inspected only by American inspectors. In this re- spect fhere/must be no misunderstanding. As a result of this reply, the Bradley survey was called off. For the time being consideration of using air bases in Siberia for bombing missions against Japan was dropped. The Soviet attitude also made unlikely the possibility of establishing in the near future a northern route of approach to Japan via the Aleutians, the Kamchatka Peninsula, and the Kurile Islands, Nevertheless, the potential use of the northern route remained a factor in United States military planning. 1b Msg, Marshal Stalin to Pres, 13 Jan 43. 16 t Google JIVERSITY OF MICHIGANIII. 1943 Discussions among the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union during 193 focused principally on the problem of coordinating the allied war effort against Germany. Only minor attention was given to the question of Soviet participation in the Pacific war at the four major interallied conferences that took place during the year--the first at Casablanca in January, the second at Washington in way, the third at Quebec in August, and the final one at Cairo-Teheran in November and December. Military planners continued to hope for eventual soviet aid against Japan, aad at the Teheran Conference Marshal Stalin stated that such aid would be forthcoming after the defeat of Germany. Field commanders were not drawn into strategic planning activities except when their particular theaters were directly affected. The Casablanca Conference in January 1943 was concerned largely with allied strategy for winning the war against Germany, Discussion of the war against Japan centered on operations to be undertaken during the current year, and in these Soviet participation appeared most unlikely. In stating the objectives that the United States planned to achieve in the northern Pacific during 1913, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not go beyond agreeing that the Aleutian chain should be made as secure as possible, both to check further ex- pansion by Japan and to prepare to support the Soviet Union in case of war with Japan 2 cos 168, Memo by JcS, sub: Conduct of the War in the Pacific Theater in 19,3, 22 Jan 13, 17 t Google VEA message summarizing for Marshal Stalin the results of the conference, drafted for the President and the Prime Minister by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, read in part as follows: We are in no doubt that our correct strategy is to con- centrate on the defeat of Germany, with a view of achieving early and decisive victory in the European Theater. At the same time, we mst maintain sufficient pressure on Japan to retain the initiative in the Pacific and Far ast, sustain China, and prevent the Japanese from extending their ag- gression to other theaters such as your Maritime Province The United States-United Kingdom Washington Conference in May 1943 was partially occasioned by the fact that earlier decisions had committed the allies to undertake more operations than proved possible of accomplishment with the limited resources available. ‘The restatement of allied strategy, approved at the conference, as- sumed the desirability of Soviet participation in the war against Japen: I. OVERALL OBJECTIVE In conjunction with RUSSIA ana other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional sur- render of the AXIS power Ii. OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECULION OF THE WAR 1. In cooperation with RUSSIA and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the AXIS in EUROPE. 2. Simtaneously, in cooperation with other PACIFIC Powers concerned to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against JAPAN with the purpose of continually reducing her Military pover and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the overall objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken. 2 cos 165/2, Memo by CCS, sub: Draft Telegram from the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain to Premier Stalin, 22 Jan 43. 18 Google F i3. Upon the defeat of the AXIS in EUROFE, in cooperation with other PACIFIC Powers and, if possible, with RUSSIA, to direct the full resources of the UNITED STATES and GREAT HRITAIN to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of JAPAN. 4s for operations in the northern Pacific, the Combined Chiefs of Staff decided in favor of expelling the Japanese from the Aleutians, but rejected for the time being the idea of attacking Japan across the northern route: Our present strategic concept does not, contemplate further amphibious operations west of the ALEUTIANS. Our forces there will assume a defensive role until conditions J are favorable to operations in suppprt of RUSSIA in the KAMCHATKA PENINSULA--Siberian area.’ The President and the Prime Minister approved the overall strategic concept and also accepted the Combined Chiefs of Staff decision to eject the Japanese from the, Aleutians. Operations to secure the Aleutian chain were carried out as planned. On May 11, 1943, landings began on Attu. Later, in mid- August, when United States troops came ashore on Kiska, they found that the enemy had anticipated the move and departed. While the Kiska operation was being mounted, the President and the Prime Minister met at Quebec for the third conference of the year. During this meeting the military planners reaffirmed the overall strategic concept for the prosecution of the war that had been adopted at the Washington Conference in May. In regard to the possibility of a Russo-Japanese war, the Joint Chiefs of 3 cos 242/6, Memo by CCS, sub: Final Report to the President and Prime Minister, 25 May 3 (copy for info to CINC, SWPA). 4 cog 239/1, Note by Secys, ub: Operations in the Pacific and Far East in 1943-bh, 23 May 43 (copy for info to CINC, SWPA). i Google Unive NetsGueoec, Staff submitted the following estimate of the situation: ‘There exists between Russia and Japan.a basic conflict of interest. Japan cannot enjoy complete strategic security without gaining control of the eastern region of Siberia. Russia is determined to hold that region, the strategic security of which requires the ultimate expulsion of Jepan from the mainland of Asia and from southern Sakhalin. For the present, however, both Russia and Japan desire to avoid war with each other in order to be free to direct their efforts against their respective enemies. Russia is likely to intervene in the var against Japan at some stage, but not before the German threat to her has been removed. After that, she will make her decision in the light of her own interests and will intervene only when she reckons that Japan can be defeated at a small cost to her.> The military results of the Quebec Conference were summarized for the President and the Prime Minister on the final day of the meetings. The section of the Combined Chiefs of Staff report dealing with the long-term strategy against Japan included the following statement: From every point of view operations should be framed to force the defeat of JAPAN as soon as possible after the defeat of GERMANY. Planning should be on the basis of accomplishing this vithin 12 months of that event. Decis- tons as to specific operations which will insure a rapid course of events must avait further examination .... The only specific operations in 1944 that might possibly involve the Soviet Union were those against Paramshiru and the Kuriles, 5 CCS 300, Memo by JCS, sub: Estimate of the Enemy Situation, 1943-Kl, Pacific-Far East Area, 6 Aug 43 (contents for info to CINC, SWPA). A more extensive analysis of the Soviet Union's position has been pub- lished by Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimte History, (New York, 1948), pp. 748-49. The primary source for the Published quotation has not been found in Department of Defense files and appears not to have been a formal official position, al- though in general agreement with CCS 300, quoted above, and JCS 506, quoted on page 21. © ces 319/5, Note by CCS, sub: Final Report to the President and Prime Minister, 24 Aug 43 (copy of relevant extracts for info to CINC, SWPA). 20 Google‘ut the Combined Chiefs of Staff merely agreed to give consideration to such operations. The conference did not discuss steps for ob- taining Soviet participation in the Pacific war, nor did the President and the Prime Minister allude to this subject in their message to Marshal Stalin summarizing the decisions taken at Quebec. Consideration of military operations against the Kuriles was started immediately after the Quebec Conference, but it soon became clear, after consultation with Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, that sus- tained operations in the Kuriles during 1944 would seriously inter- fere with offensive operations scheduled in other Pacific areas. Consequently, the project was dropped. When Marshal Stalin had been unable to accept the invitation to met with the President and the Prime Minister at Quebec, he hed suggested that a meeting of Foreign Ministers be convened at Moscow. Before this meeting opened in October 1943, the President appointed Mr. W. Averell Harriman the new ambassador to the Soviet Union and designated Maj. Gen. John R. Deane to be a member of the United States delegation to the Moscow Conference. The latter was to re- main in Moscow as head of the United States Military Mission. In their instructions to General Deane, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out not only the vital role of the Soviet Union in the de- feat of Germany but also: The great importance to the United States of Russia's full participation in the war against Japan after the defeat of Germany as essential to the prompt and srushing defeat of Japan at far less cost to the United States and Great Britain.? 7 JCS 506, Note by Secy, sub: Instructions Concerning Duty as Military Observer at American-British-Soviet Conference, 18 Sep 43. t Google a IversThe Moscow Conference opened on October 19, 1943, and was pri- marily concerned with European political matters. Military discussion revolved around the question of a second front in Europe and the establishment of bases in the Soviet Union for use in shuttle bomb- ing of German targets. Informally the Soviet representatives in- dicated that their government was moving closer to participation in the Pacific war. General Deane reported on October 31 at follows: Mr, Stalin gave an off the record dinner party at the conclusion of the conference last night. The atmosphere was one of complete desire for co-operation and I feel that Mr. has done a great job in this regard in the conference. Tt was significant that after the dinner ve vere shown a lengthy picture of Japanese penetration in Siberia in 1921. It vas distinctly anti-Japanese propaganda and we all felt it was an indirect method of telling us their attitude with regard to Japan. In private conversation with Molotov, Vashinsky /sic/ and others we have heard more direct state- nts indicating that they will Join in the Pacific var as ‘s00n as Germany is defeated. Secretary of State Hull has reported that at the conference Stalin astonished and delighted him "by saying clearly and unequivo- cably that, when the Allies succeeded in defeating Germany, the Soviet Union vould then join in defeating Japan."9 Such a commit- ment, hovever, vas not included in the conference protocols. Sub- sequently, similar assurances were given to Mr. Harriman by Mr. Molotov in early November 1943.10 A meeting of the President, the Prime Minister, and Marshal Stalin was finally arranged for November-December 1943 at Teheran, to be preceded by a meeting of the first two with Generalissimo Chiang 8 Mag, Maj Gen Deane to JCS, 31 Oct 43, CM-IN 655. 9 Hull, Memoirs, Vol. II, pp. 1113, 1309-10. 10 Meg, Amb Harriman to Gen Marshall, 2 Nov 43, CM-IN 1946. 22 GoogleKai-shek at Cairo. During these meetings, the Combined Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed, without any change, the overall strategy for the conduct of the war approved at the Washington Conference in May 1943.11 A United States intelligence estimate, submitted for the information of the Chiefs, showed little change in Russo-Japanese relations since v Preliminary to the Teheran Conference, the Combined Chiefs of the Quebec Conference and predicted continued neutrality unle: some overt act was committed or an open threat posed.l@ Staff discussed among many other subjects their forthcoming meeting with Soviet representatives. Both Ambassador Harriman and General Deane expressed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the opinion that the Soviet Union had every intention of joining the United States and Great Britain in the var against Japan as soon as Germany had capitulated, but that she feared a break with Japan before complet- ing preparations.13 Subsequently, a list of the most important subjects to be dis- cussed with the Soviet military leaders was dravn up by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and accepted by the British Chiefs of Steff. On this list were five items relating to Japen. a. Request Soviets to furnish combat intelligence in- formation concerning Japan; if agreed to we will present specific questions through the military mission at MOSCOW. 1 gee above, p. 19. CCS 360/2, Note by Secys, sub: Basic Policies for the Next United States-British Staff Conference, 6 Nov 43 (contents for info to CINC, SWPA). Approved 22 Nov 43. 12 see above, p. 20. CCS 300/2, Memo by JCS, sub: Estimate of Enemy Situation, 1944 - Pacific-Far East, 18 Nov 43 (copy for info to CINC,SWPA). 13 yin, JCS 127th and 129th Mtgs, 22 and 24 Nov 43. > B Google iNivERSTY OF MICHb. Request Soviets to indicate whether they consider it desirable at this time to set in hand arrangements to base Soviet submarine force in U. S. territory. fg. Request Soviets to indicate what direct or indirect assistance they will be able to give, if it is found possible to launch an attack on the Northern Kuriles. a. Soviets to indicate what ports, if any, they could allow the U.S. Navy to use. Kequest Soviets to furnish data on ports through Military Mission in order that we may deter- mine the size and type of Naval Task Force we can employ. Soviets to indicate what air bases, if any, they could allow our air forces to use for operations against Japan, and what facilities, including gasoline and bombs, could be s' plied. What eir routes to these bases could be providearl® Although at Teheran the military staffs never discussed the war against Japan, Marshal Stalin did mention the subject at the first meeting of the allied var leaders on November 28, 1943. After the President had reviewed allied strategy and described in some detail United States operations in the Pacific, Marshal Stalin re- plied as follows: +++ a8 regards the first part of the President's remarks, we Soviets welcome your successes in the Pacific. Unfor- tunately we have not so far been able to help because we require too mich of our forces on the Western Front and ere unable to leunch any operations against Japan at this time Our forces now in the East are more or less satisfactory for defense. Hovever, they mst be increased about three-fold for purposes of offensive operations. This condition will not take place until Germany has been forced to capitulate. Then by our common front we shall win.) The next day, November 29, the President gave Marshal Stalin the questions prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and indicated that he thought it imperative that Joint planning for eventual 1 50s 606/2, Rpt by JPS, sub: Collaboration with the U.S.S.R., 25 Nov 43. Approved with minor editorial changes by CCS, 26 Nov 43. 15 Min, lst Plen Seas, USA, Gr Brit, and USSR, 28 Nov 43. 2b t Google veSoviet participation in the Pacific war begin at once. Stalin promised to study the questions relating to the Far East after his return to Moscow. Late in December, Mr. Molotov informed Ambassador Harriman that information about the Japanese could be furnished, but that the remaining questions required further study or could not be answered "at the present time."16 After returning to Cairo from Teheran, the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved in principle, as a basis for further investigation and preparation, an overall plan for the defeat of Japan. The plan took account of the possibility thet the defeat of Japan might be accomplished by sea and air blockade and aerial bombardment without an invasion of the Japanese home islands. Provision, however, was to be made for an expansion of the plan to met the contingency of invasion if this proved necessary. ‘The plan also included the possibility that Germany might be defeated in 19ll and the possi- bility that the Soviet Union would enter the var against Japan shortly thereafter. Accordingly, preparations were to be made to take advantage of such a development. The general concept of the plan vas that the main effort against / Japan would be made in the Pacific, with concurrent advances along the New Guinea-Netherlands East Indies-Philippines axis and across the Central Pacific through the Japanese Mandated Islands. Opera- 16 Deane, The Strange Alliance, pp. 226-27; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History, pp. 764-85. 25 Google eect itions in the North Pacific, South Pacific, China, and the Soutn= east Asia Theater were to be merely in support of the main operations. However, “in the event of the U.S.S.R. entering the war, operations in the North Pacific may assume far greater importance and may in- volve a major redeployment of forces."17 Annex I tv the plan was a note on preparations to be made for Possible Soviet entry into the war. It read as follows: 1. We should urge the U.S.S.R. to come in as early as possible; ask them to tell us when they propose to come in; what they propose to do when they come in; and what they want us to do to help. 2. Meanwhile, in so far as they do not conflict with the operations in the Central and Southwest Pacific, pre- parations should be made by the spring or early summer of phy so that we can assist her:- a. By building up supplies by trans-Pacific ship- ment, sea and air, By insuring that her defenses and means in Kamchatka are adequate. If she wants our forces there we should be prepared to move them in, especially air. c. By furnishing aircraft and air units released from the European front, both from the East and the West. 3. If and when conversations with the Soviets can be arranged, plans should also be made for operations:- a. To enter and develop bases in Kamchatka and the Maritime Provinces. b. To seize and hold the Northern Kuriles and to open a sea route to the Maritime Provinces. 4. We must constantly review the situation so as to be ready to adjust our operations elsewhere when the U.S.S.R. come into the war. Also annexed to the plan was an outline for the employment of B-29 aircraft from either China or Siberia.18 17 cos 417, Rpt by CPS, sub: Over-All Plan for the Defeat of Japan, 2 Dec 43 (copy for info to CINC, SWPA). 18 reid. Google % ITY OF MICHIIn 0 paper dealing with specific operations to be undertaken against Japan in 194k, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated: 1. We are agreed that every effort should be exerted to JV bring the U.8.S.R. into the war against Japan at the earliest practicacle date, and that plans should be prepared in that event. * * * * 5. North Pacific. Plans for the North Pacific in- volve the augnentation of base facilities and defensive installations in the Aleutians in preparation for entry into the Kuriles and Soviet territory in the event of Russian collaboration. Naval surface and submarine ection, in- cluding raids on the Japanese fishing fleet will be carried out. Preparations will be made for executing very long range strategic bombing against the Kuriles and northern Japan.t? At the end of 1943, the military plennerg had reason to believe that the Soviet Union would participete in the Pacific war after the defeat of Germany. Whether she would actually do so when the time came, and under what conditions, were still unknown. More- over, the political problem of what she would want as a price re- mained to be settled by the heads of covernment.20 / 19 cos 397 (rev), Memo by JCS, sud: Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan, 1944, 3 Dee 43 (copy for info to CINC, SPA). 20 At Teheran Marshal Stalin indicated to the President and the Prime Minister that the Soviet Union wanted all of Sakhalin, the Kuriles, and accese to a warm water port in the Pacific, such as Dairen. See Msg, Amb Harriman to Pres, 15 Dec 44, printed in Department of State uncorrected galley proof, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, i945 (hereinafter: Malta-Yalta Galleys), Pt. 1, Pp. 352-53. See also Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate Hietory, pp. 791-92. a7 t Google UNIVE!IV. FROM TEHERAN TO YALTA, 1944 Restatement of the Concept of the War inst J With eventual Soviet participation in the war against Japan having been promised at Teheran, the United States military planners continued to review during the spring of 19/44 the overall plan for the defeat of Japan in the light of the accelerating advance of United States forces in the Central Pacific and Southwest Pacific areas. The planners finally came to the conclusion that sea and air blockade and intensive air bombardment could be relied upon to “lover Japanese ability and will to resist" but could not guarantee the early unconditional surrender of Japan. Hence the necessity of invading the home islands had to be accepted. On July 11, 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this revised concept, thereby sanctioning for planning purposes the following program of operations: a. Concurrent advances through the Ryukyus, Bonins, and Southeast China coast for the purpose of intensifying the blockade and air bombardment of Japan and creating a situation favorable for: b. An amphibious assault on Kyushu for the purpose of further reducing Japanese capabilities by engaging and fixing major enemy forces and establishing a tactical condition favorable to: A decisive stroke against the industrial heart of Japan by means of an amphibious attack through the Tokyo plain assisted by contiaued pressure from Kyushu. + s0S 92h, Rpt by JPS, sub: Operations Against Japan Subsequent to Formosa, 30 Jun 4k, and Decision Amending JCS 924, 11 Jul bh (copy for info to CINC, SWPA). 28 Google pmRVeRsity OF MEHRThe plan assigned target dates during the period april 1 through June 30, 1945, for the invasion of the Bonins and the Ryukyus, accompanied by increasing air attacks on the Japanese homeland. The final phase was temporarily scheduled to start with an invasion of Kyushu on October 1, 1945, and culminate in an assault on the Tokyo region of Honshu at the end of December 1945~ The defeat of Japan envisazed in this concept was "not contingent /” upon the active participation of Russia in the war." Still, the Possibility existed that the Soviet Union might be drawn into the conflict by a Japanese attack on her Siberian forces. In that event the planners felt that the Soviet Union would probably be "capable of little more than holding its own and tying down the Kwantung Aray, unless assisted by other United Nations." Under more favorable cir- cumstances, however, the Soviet Army's contribution might be of particular value: & Russian drive into Yanchuria coincident with or prior to our invasion of Kyushu would prevent any appreciable movenent of Japanese forces southward into Korea and North China and would necessitate retention of all Japanese forces on the Asiatic mainland. Such action by Russia would facilitate our invasiop of Kyushu and our ultimate invasion of the heart of Japan.’ Further, the Soviet Union might allow the operation of Unitec. States strategic bombers from airfields in Kamchatka and the Amur River valley, "thus increasing the number of bases and directions from which such attacks can be launched upon Japan." But the Joint Ibid. 29 \ Google UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGANChiefs of Staff believed that the support of such an undertaking would require United States naval operations in the North Pacific to open and secure a sea route to Siberia.? Having agreed to the new overall statement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented it to their Gritish colleagues for combined approval: Our successes to date, our present superiority in air and sea forces, and the prospective availability of forces following the defeat of German, lead us to believe that our concept of operations...should envisage an invasion into the industrial heart of Japan. While it may be possible to defeat Japan by sustained aerial bombardment and the destruction of her sea and air forces, this would probably involve an unacceptable delay. The United States Chiefs of Staff therefore recommend that the overall objective be restated as follows: To force the unconditional surrender of Japan by: (1) Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength. (2) Invading and soizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan. At the Quebec Conference in September 19h the British Chiefs of Staff approved the revised overall plan for the defeat of Japan. The intention of invadins the Japanese home islands received the endorsement of the Preside. ai the frime Minister.® 3 pid. 4 ccs 17/3, Yeno by JCS, s Japan, 11 Jul bk (copy for ino over-all Objective in the War Against to CIN’, SWPA). 5 cos U17/9, Note ty Secys, oil: Overall Qojective in the War Against Japan, 11 Sep ls .C3 60/2, hote by Secys, sub: Report to the Presi- dent and Prime ‘inister, lo Sep Lu (cory for info to CINC, SWPA). 30 t Google unAt the same conference, the Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed the establishment of a planning date for the end of the war against Japan. The sole purpose was to provide guidance for production scheduling and manpower allocation. While the British Chiefs of Staff proposed an estimate of two years after the defeat of Germany, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had been using a one year period, recommended as a compromise an 18-month period, "to be adjusted Periodically to conform to the course of the war." The latter re- commendation was accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff ad approv- nd by the President and the Prime inister.© The Problem of Joint United States-Soviet Planning Although the approved overall plan was "not contingent upon the active participation of Russia in the war," such participation / had been promised at Teheran, To coordinate United States operations in the Pacific with prospective Soviet action, the military planners in Washington needed detailed information on Soviet capabilities and intentions in the Far East. General Deane's efforts to obtain this information in Moscow had produced no return by the veginning of 19h. During the first months of that year, the military planners in Washington prepared and forwarded lists of questions for General Deane to submit to Soviet officials, but the Soviet response continued to be disappointing. § cos 678/1, Note by Secys, sub: Planning Date for the End of the War Against Japan, 20 Sep i. 31 Google NIVERSITY OF MICHIDuring the first half of 19h it appeared impossible to arrange for any systematic Soviet-United States discussion of Far Eastern matters. Early in February Marshal Stalin told Ambassador Harriman that the United States would be permitted to operate aircraft from Siberia after the Soviet Union declared war on Japan.” No opportunity was offered, however, for consultation with Soviet Air Force officers about the details of such an undertaking. In April the Soviet Government requested delivery of 500 heavy bombers with which to develop its own strategic air force, but negotiations on this matter also failed to make prozress. Then in an interview with Marshal Stalin on June 10, 19h, Ambassador Harriman encountered a mre encouraging attitude. In my talk with Stalin yesterday evening (10 June) we discussed in considerable detail the participation of the Soviet Union in the Japanese War .... I brought up the ques- tion of the basing of our bombers in the Soviet Far East and stated that you and our Chiefs of Staff believed no time should be lost in coming to an agreement and in working out the necessary plans for supplies. He agreed that this was desirable and stressed the necessity for the utmost secrecy. He added that it was not only a question of the Air Jorce but that the ground operations and Naval operations should be considered as well. He explained that there were now 12 air fields some of them new in the area between Vladivostok and Sovietskaya Gavan suitable for heavy bombers and that we could expect to receive the use of six or seven of them. More with mtaled strips could be provided if necessary. It is evident that since my talk with Stalin in February the Soviets have gone ahead with the construction of heavy bomber bases in the Far East using I believe the experience gained from us in preparation of the fields for shuttle bombing. Stalin agreed that it would be desirable to start promptly in building up reserves of gasoline and other supplies usin” the Pacific route as the Japanese no longer interfered. I explained that it was hoped that the 7 og, amb Harriman to Pres, 2 Feb lh. For a full discussion of these negotiations see Deane, The Strange Alliance, pp. 229-35. 32 Google ITY OF MICHINorthern convoys could be resumed again at a later date so that this stocking could 'be done without interference with the protocol commitments. Stalin asked whether the British would have to participate in these discussions... . I said that these discussions could be carried on between General Deane, his Air Officer General Walsh, and Naval Officer Admiral Olsen, with the appropriate Soviet officers and that it was not necessary to involve the British at this time as they did not have day bombers. At a later stage when the entire strategy of the Pacific war was considered the British, of course, would be involved. He agreed that these discussions should start promptly. I could not pin him down on a date but he assured me that it would not be long delayed saying “the sooner the better." Stalin brought up the question of the supplying by us of heavy bombers for the Red Air Force. I explained that General arnold was ready to begin to deliver them beginning in the autym after agreement, had been reached regarding our operation from Soviet Far Eastern bases. We would not only give them the planes but would help train the Soviet crews in the flying of the bombers and in the tactical operations either in the United States or by sending instructors to the Soviet Union. He said he would prefer to have instruc- tors come to the Soviet Union as only trained Soviet pilots and navigators would be used., These are, of course, details ‘that can be worked out later.’ In preparation for the expected conferences, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded additional instructions to General Deane on duly 5: In initial discussions you should emphasize our desire for early operation of U. S. heavy bombers and long range fighter escort from bases in Siberia and the Maritime Provinces. To facilitate planning we need detailed informa tion on the location, condition, capacity, and probable availability of airfields, provisions for air defense, both anti-aircraft and fighter, and logistical capabilities to include supply, maintenance, servicing, and housing. You should stress the necessity for early preparation for air transport movement of initial American Air Forces into Eastern Siberia and the early build-up of airdrome equip- ment and supply levels. The size of the air forces employed will depend, to a large degree, on the logistical capabil- ities for their support, Detailed data on all air matters have been furnished you by General Arnold in his WAR 56070, June 23. 8 veg, amb Harriman to-Pree, 11 Jun bi. 33 Google F iWe do not contemplate the use of ground combat forces in Siberia, except perhaps some anti-aircraft, since it appears that all of the ground forces available will be required to carry out our operations in the Pacific, The meager information we now have for Eastern Siberia indicates that all facilities which could be made available to us would be used best for the logistic support of the U. S. air effort from that area. Such plans as may result for operations in these areas will involve naval operations for opening up and securing a sea route into the Maritime Provinces. Your exploratory discussions should cover information required for this pur- pose... Despite these hopeful preparations, no meeting of importance occurred in Moscow until September 23, 19Ll, when Mr. Harriman and the British Ambassador went to inform Marshal Stalin of the results of the Quebec Conference. The Marshal's remarks on that occasion again opened the prospect of United States-Soviet staff convert tions regarding the war with Japan: The British Ambassador and I had a most satisfactory talk with Stalin this evening. We handed him your and the Prime Minister's message regarding the Quebec decisions .... In discussing the Pacific war I explained that the plans referred to in your message covered the use af British and American resources. Stalin inquired whether we wished to bring Japan to her knees without Russian assistance or whether you still wished as you suggested in Teheran Russian partici- pation, The British Ambassador and I both assured him that Russian participation was desired but that no plans could be made for the use of Soviet resources until Marshal Stalin was ready to initiate discussions. jie then stated that there was no change in his attitude as he had expressed it to you at Teheran, Russia is ready to participate in the war against Japan after Germany is defeated, He asked what were the plans for the defeat of Japan and particularly what part the Allies desired to assign to Russia. I explained that General 9 Msg, JCS to Maj Gen Deane, 5 Jul 4h, G4-OUT 60689, 3k. Google iiunneeen on caeDeane had been authorized to discuss with the Red Army Staff plans for Russian participation in the Japenese ware He said that would be desirable and the discussions could proceed in a few days. I referred to our previous talks regarding the use of air bases in the Maritime Provinces and Stalin said "that is not the most important question." He stated further that it would be necessary for the Red Arny to move 25 to 30 divisions to the Far Zast. He was somewhat surprised that after the assurance he had given at Teheran we were not taking into account in our planning the participation of Russia and he appeared anxious to know specifically what role we would want Kussia to play. He gave every indication of being ready and willing to cooperate but did not want to be an uninvited participant. It seems clear that we will get greater cooperation from him if we will suggest the operations that we would like the Russians to undertake rather than wait their proposals. Because of this new aspect General Deane is cabling the Joint Chiefs of Staff for more detailed instructions than he has previously received. I strongly recommend that we follow the course Stalin has indicated and that General Deane be authorized to discuss with the Red Army Staff in broad outline at least our Pacific strategy and to propoge the full measure of Russian participation desired..,. 10 In acknowledging this dispatch on September 28, 194), the Pres- ident wrote Ambassador Harriman, "I have at no time entertained any doubts whatever in regard to the Teheran agreement about Pacific campaign. 11 two days later a Presidential message to Prine iinister Churchill expressed the opinion that "Stalin is at the present time sensitive about any doubt as to his intention to help us in the orient."12 To Marshal Stalin the President cabled on October hi: + +. I want to reiterate to you how completely I accept the assurances which you have given us on this point /the war against Japan7. Our three countries are waging a successful 20 Msg, Amb Harriman to Pres, 23 Sep hh. 1 ysg, Pres to Amb Harriman, 28 Sep Uh. 2 sg, Pres to Prime Vinister, 30 Sep bl. 35 t Google Univewar against Germany and we can surely join together with no less success in crushing a nation that I am sure in Ny heart is as great an enemy of Russia as she is of ours.1. In response to Marshal Stalin's request for a specific role in the Pacific war, the Joint Gniefs of Staff approved on September 28, with a few minor changes, a list of objectives submitted by General Deane: J 2. The broad strategic concept of Russian partici- pation should be aimed at the following objectives in order of priority: a Securing the Trans-Siberian Railroad and the Vladivostok Peninsula. b. Setting up American and Soviet Strategic Air Forces for operations against Japan from the Maritime Provinces and the Kamchatka Peninsula. ¢. Interdiction of lines of communications between Japan proper and the Asiatic mainland. d. Destroy Japanese ground and air forces in Manchurii es Securing the Pacific supply route in which Pussian participation would include: 1. Making available for United States use: Petropavlovsk as a naval support and supply base; and areas on the Kamchatka Peninsula for air bases, 2, Neutralization by air of southern Sakhalin and Hokkaido. 3. Improvement of port facilities and inland transportation at and from Nikolaevsk, Magadan, Petropavlovsk, and Sovietskaya Gagan. l. Military occupation of southern Sakhalin, 5. Soviet naval cooperation with the United States Navy as situation dictates.1 Again, the military staff conversations did not materialize, but the visit of Prime Minister Churchill to Moscow in October 19h) provided a new opportunity for the discussion of Soviet participation in the war against Japan, The matter was considered at a conference 13 wsg, Pres to Amb Harriman, l Oct hi. Printed in Malta-Yalta Galleys, Pt. I, p. 33% 14 msg, JCS to Maj Gen Deane, 28 Sep li, CM-OUT 36050. 36 t Google UNIVERSTEY OF MICHIGANon October 1h attended by the Prime Minister, Marshal Stalin, their chief advisors, and the United States representatives in Moscow, Tiscussion continued the following day, with Foreign Minister Anthony Eden heading the British delegation, and at a separate meeting of the United States and Soviet representatives on October 17. At these conferences, Marshal Stalin accepted the list of missions for his Far Eastern forces suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, indicated that the Soviet Union would open hostilities against the Japanese about three months after the end of the Buropean war, and accepted the United States requests for air bases in the Maritime Provinces and Kamchatka, the use of Petropavlovsk as a naval base, and the dispatch of small United States survey parties to these areas, At the same time, however, the Soviet leader presented a bill of requirements for equipment, food, and fuel amounting to 860,000 tons of dry cargo and 206,000 tons of Uquid cargo for the buildup of reserve stocks in Siberia (Opera- tion MILEPOST), He welcomed the suggestion that a group of United States and Soviet staff officers proceed at once with detailed planning for these undertakings.2> 15 For these discussions see (1) Msg, Amb Harriman to Pres, 10 Oct hs (2) Msg, Amb Harriman to Pres, 11 Oct liu; (3) Msg, Pres to Amb Harriman, 11 Oct hs (4) Msg, Amb Harriman to Pres, 15 Oct his (5) Msg, Maj Gen Deane to JCS, 15 Oct lh; (6) Msg, Amb Harriman to Pres, 15 Oct Lh; (7) Msg, Amb Harriman to Pres, 17 Oct bs (8) Msg, Maj Gen Deane to JCS, 17 Oct Lu. (All printed in Malta- Yalta Galleys, Pt. I, pp. 339-49.) See also Deane, The Strange Alliance, pp. 2lb-9. 37 Google Gnivesh ce MREThe promised staff meetings again failed to occur, despite the assignment to Moscow of a special group of United States planning officers headed by Brig. Gen, Frank N. Roberts, Such meetings as were held centered on the Siberian supply program, Operation MILEPOST. On December 1h, however, Marshal Stalin spelled out to Ambassador Harriman the political requirements for Soviet participation, including the annexation of the Kuriles and lower Sakhalin, the restoration of former Russian holdings in Manchuria, and the recognition of the status quo in Outer Mongolia. Mearwhile, a major setback was experienced on the military level when General Deane was informed by General A. I. Antonov on December 16 that the United States request for air bases in the Maritime Provinces could not be granted, since all the available facilities would be needed by the Soviet forces. United States protests against this reversal of Marshal Stalin's previous assurances failed to alter the decision,1? examination of Soviet Participation However halting th2 progress in Moscow, planning for the final stage of the Pacific war had to continue in Washington since the campaigns of the fall of 19 were bringing United States forces to the edge of Japan's inner zone of defense, Among the planning 16 sg, Amb Harriman to Pres, 15 Dec li. (Printed in Malta-Yalta Galleys, Pt. I, pp. 352-53.) 17 Msg, Maj Gen Deane to JCS, 16 Dec Lh. See also Deane, The Strange Alliance, pp. 259-60. For an appeal for a tougner approach to the Soviet Government, see Ltr, Maj Gen Deane to Gen Marshall, 2 Dec hh. (Malta-Yalta Galleys, Pt. I, pp. L09-10.) 38 Google Gnivesh ce MREpapers considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was a study of Soviet participation in the war against Japan, submitted in Novenber.18 The paper pointed out that Srviet participation, wnile desir- able to hasten the unconditional surrender of Japan, was not essential. Therefore, support should not be given the Soviets at ¢* the expense of the main United States effort in the Pacific: Throughout current war planning there is implicit conviction that the defeat of Japan may be accomplished without Russian participation in the war. As a corollary it has been considered that our main effort is a first charge against our forces and resources and that no support which would prejudice this effort could be afforded Russia. However there is also general recognition of the desirability, from our standpoint, of Russia's early entry into the war in order to add to the weight of force which may be applied to outain- ing the earliest possible Japanese defeat. Within limitations imposed by time, availability of forces and resources, and by lines of comunication there will remain the capability for undertaking measures to encourage Russian entry into the war and to provide some decree of support prior to and after their entry....19 The paper recognized that the self interest of the Soviet Union J would inevitably bring her into the Pacific war, but suggested that the timing might be influenced by United States logistical and operational support: Russia's interests in the Far East and in post-war world politics will undoubtedly force her entry into the war against Japan. Unless Japan strikes first, the factors affecting the timing of Russia's entry will be predominantly those of self-interest. It is probable, however, that logistical and operational support from us would be signifi- cant in influencing the time of Russia's entry; specifically, assistance in building up her level of supplies in the Far East. In any case, Russia will probably enter the war if and when either of two major conditions is satisfied: a. Her strength in Siberia is sufficient to offer 18 Jos 1176, Rpt by JPS, sub: Russian Participataon in the War Against Japan, 23 Nov hh (copy for info tc CINC, SWPA). 19 Ibid. 39 *Daives y Google Unive Netsprospects of success in operations against the Kwantung ‘be Our position in the Pacific is such as to indicate speedy and conclusive defeat of Japan.20 The planners considered that: The effect of Russia's entry will be to cause the commitment and expenditure of enemy forces and resourc in North China and Manchuria which might otherwise be eaployed in the defense of Japan and might algo cause the withdrawal of forces from Japan to Manchuria.’ The benefits would accrue, however, only if the Soviet entry occurred under optigum conditions. Russia's entry will be most effective if it occurs as soon she is ready to launch and maintain a strong offensive. If hostilities break out vefore that time the Japanese can seize the initiative and attack so to cut the Trans-Siberian Railway. Such action might put the Russians off balance to such an extent as seriously to delay or even prevent a Russian offensive and could conceivably result in a serious defeat of the Soviet Far Eastern Forces. A setback of this nature to the Russians might remove the threat to Manchuria sufficiently to eliminate or postpone the need for Japanese reinforcement there. Thus, the Japanese might be able to leave more or less intact their forces for defense of the homeland. We might also be met with a demand from the Russians for assistance that would materially affect our preparations for the final assault on Japan proper. It is apparent, therefore, that the timing of Russia's entry is so important that it may be decisive in determining whether the result will be to our advantage or actually detrimental to our contemplated operations. In view of this there will always remain the possibility that Japan may precipitate hostilities against Russia in order to insure that the inevitable conflict takes place under conditions favorable to herself. In order to provide maximum support to our main effort the Russian offensive into Manchuria and her aerial attack on Japan should be launched at least three months prior to 20 Ibid. 21 roid. Googleour invasion of Kyushu. This would result in additional disruption of Japan's economic structure, insure the maximum commitment of Kwantung Army troops at the time of our land- inge, and might even result in the movement of troops from Japan to Manchuria before our invasion takes place, If the Russian offensive takes place simultaneously with, or after, the invasion of Japan the enemy will retain to some extent the capability of reinforcing the homeland and can be expected to do so in view of the greater importance of his home islands and his ability to delay with minimum forces the Russian advance for an appreciable period of time — probably until a decision is reached ir the battle for Japan. While the maximum advantage to us results from Russian entry prior to our invasion of Japan, the reverse is true from the Russian viewpoint. The maximum military advantage to them will obtain if they attack after our initial lodg- nent has been effected and Japanese fopses in Manchuria have begun to move to reinforce Japan. In conclusion, the paper suggested guidelines for United States military policy in regard to Soviet participation: 32. It 4s concluded thats Basic principles regarding our policy toward Russia's entry into the war against Japan are: a. We desire Russian entry at the earliest possible date consistent with her ability to engage in offensive operations and are prepared to offer the maximum support possible without prejudice to our main effort against Japan. b. We consider that the mission of Russian Far Eastern Forces should be to conduct an all-out offensive against Manchuria to force the commitment of Japanese forces and resources in North China and Manchuria that might other- wise be employed in the defense of Japan, to conduct intensive sir operations against Japan proper and to interdict lingg of communication between Japan and the Mainland of Asia. While the basic principles found general approval, the various courses of action open to the United States in support of these prin- 22 reid. 23 rota. t Googleciples were subject to considerable further study in December 19hh and January 19,5. Realistic evaluations of future operations in the Kuriles, Kamchatka, or the Maritime Provinces proved impossible to make because of lack of information on Soviet intentions and capabilities. For this reason, the final military survey of the problem prior to the Yalta Conference, approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 24, 1945, stressed the urgent need for additional infor@ition from the Soviet Union and cautioned that all United States actions in support of the Soviets in the Far East should be closely evaluated in the light of their overall contribution to the early defeat of Japan: We conclude that: a. In negotiations with the Russians we should deter- mine 8 soon as possible: (1) Any new factors as to the optimum timing from the Russian viewpoint of her entry into the war against Japan, particularly with respect to her logistic capabilities. (2) Latest information as to the concept of Russian operations after hostilities are opened. (3) The extent to which Russian operations on the mainland of Siberia will depend on a Pacific supply route after outbreak of war. (4) Whether or not the Russian estimate of air forces to be based in the faritime rrovinces includes a Russian strategic air force, and if so, its strength and composition and Russian plans for pre-hostility base develop- ment. (5) Potentialities of Kamchatka for the basing of defensive ground forces, air and licht naval forces, and Russia's capabilities and intentions toward the developing of bases for such forces prior to her entry into the war. (6) Russian requirements, if any, for United States assistance in the defense of Kamchatka, particularly as re~ gards ground forces. t Google ve abe We should: (1) State the basic principles as to Russian entry into the war against Japan as follows: (a) Basic ‘principles regarding our policy toward Russia's entry in the war against Japan are: (4) We desire Russian entry at the earliest possible date consistent with her ability to engage in offensive operations and are prepared to offer the maximum support Possible without prejudice to our main effort against Japan. (44) We consider that the mission of Russian Far Eastern forces should be to conduct an all-out offensive against Manchuria to contain Japanese forces and resources in North China and Manchuria that might otherwise be employed in the defense of Japan; to conduct, in conjunction with U. S. strategic air forces based in Siberia, intensive air operations against Japan proper; and to interdict lines of commnication between Japan and the mainland of Asia. (b) In furtherance of these principles, we should deliver the maximum possible supplies without detri- ment to our own war effort. (c) We enter into immediate negotiations with Russia to determine the feasibility, practicability, desir- ability and necessity for undertaking any or all of the following courses of action: (1) To establish air and naval forces in Kamchatka, including the naval base at Petropavlovsk. (iL) To base U, S, strategic air forces in Eastern Siberia. (444) To develop an air transport route from Kamchatka to Eastern Siberia. (iv) To open a North Pacific line of communica— tion to Siberia, (v) To permit Russian submarines and light naval craft to operate from our bases in the Aleutians. (2) Indicate to the Russians that any operations by us to open sea routes to Sea of Okhotsk-Amur River porte will be extremely costly and at the expense of our om efforts toward Japan from the south; that because of limitation of means, the probability of amphibious operations in the North Pacific in 1945 is remote. (3) Emphasize that if we are to conduct a difficult campaign to open a sea route of only limited capacity the U. S, and U.S.S.R. should insure that the use made of the route will be that which will bring about earliest defeat of Japan. (4) Indicate clearly that if a supply route is open- ed and maintained by the diversion of U.S. forces and re- sources, in order to cain full advantage of this effort, we Googleexpect Russian agreenent to the basing of U.S, strategic sir forces in eastern Siberia....2 The same conclusions, supported by explanatory data, were formally transmitted to the President by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a memorandum dated January 23, 1945. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also suggested that "Marshal Stalin be asked that necessary admin- istrative steps be taken to make collaboration between the United States and the U.S.S.R. work more efficiently and more rapidly." It was recommended that the matters covered in the memorandum be made subjects for discussion on "on the broadest basis," if raised at the coming conference, but that the details should be worked out separately between United States and Soviet staff representa- tives.25 The current status of United States operational plans for the unconditional surrender of Japan was summarized for the Combined Chiefs of Staff on January 22, 19L5: 1. ‘The agreed overall objective in the war against Japan has been expressed as follows: To force the unconditional surrender of Japan by? (1) Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength. (2) Invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan. 2. The United States Chiefs of Staff have adopted the following as a basis for planning in the war against Japan: 2h Jcs 1176/6, Rpt by JPS, sub: Russian Participation in the War Against Japan, 18 Jan 5, as revised by JCS decision amending JCS 1176/6, 24 Jan LS. (Malte-Yalta Galleys, Pt. I, pp. 361-65.) 25 Memo, Gen Marshall for JCS to Pres, 23 Jan U5. (Malta-Yalta Galleys, Pt. I, pp. 368-71.) db Google cheThe concept of operations for the main effort in the Pacific is: ‘a. Following the Okinawa operation to seize additional positions to intensify the blockade and air bombardment of Japan in order to create a situation favorable to: b. An assault on Kyushu for the purpose of further reducing Japanese capabilities by containing and destroying major enemy forces and furtner intensifying the blockade and air bombardment in order to establish a tactical position favorable to: ¢. The decisive invasion of the industrial heart of Japan through the Tokyo plain. 3. The following sequence and timing of operations have deen directed by the United States Chiefs of Staff and plans prepared by theater commanders: Objectives Target Date Objectives Target ‘Date Continuation of operations in the - Philippines (Luzon, Mindoro, Leyte) Iwo Jina 19 February 1915 Okinawa and extension therefrom in 1 April-August 1945 the Ryukyus L. Until @ firm date can be established when re- deployment from Europe can begin, planning will be continued for an operation to seize a position in the Chusan-Ningpo area and for invasion of Kyushu-Honshu in the winter of 1945-1946. 5. Examination is being conducted of the necessity for and cost of operations to maintain and defend a sea route to the Sea of Okhotsk when the entry of Russia in the war against Japan becomes imminent. Examination so far has shown that the possibility of seizing a position in the Kuriles for that purpose during the favorable weather period of 1945 1s remote due to lack of sufficient resources. The possibility of maintaining and defending such a sea route from bases in Kamchatka alone is being further examined, 6. The United States Chiefs of Staff have also directed examination and preparation of a plan of campaign against Japan in the event that prolongation of the European war requires pgstponenent of the invasion of Japan until well into 196. 26 ccs 17/11, Memo by JCS, sub: Operations for the Defeat of Japan, 22 Jan 1945. (Malta-Yalta Galleys, Pt. I, pp. 367-68.) Later became Appendix B of CCS 776/3, copy for info to CINC, SWPA (Malta-Yalta Galleys, Pt. II, p. 708). us t Google eReV. YALTA TO POTSDAM, 1945 ‘The Yalta Conference When the Yalta Conference opened on February h, 195, the United States planners had previously been given assurance, specifically in November 193 and in September and October 19li, that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan approxi- mately three months after the defeat of Germany.) what remained js be settled at the conference were first, the political terms Y for Soviet intervention, and second, the military problems involved in coordinating Soviet operations with United States plans. ‘The first was a matter for the political chiefs and was settled on February 8, 1915, in a conference between the President and Marshal Stalin attended by Ambassador Harriman, Mr. Molotov, and two interpreters.? The terms agreed upon were essentially the same as those outlined by Marshal Stalin to Ambassador Harriman on December 15, 19s The preservation of the status quo in Outer Mongolia, the reatoration of the former rights of Russia in Man- churia, the internaticnalization of Dairen, the return of southern Sakhalin, and the annexation of the Kuriles.3 The final statement of the agreement, including the understanding that the concurrence 1 See pp. 2h, 3h-35, 37. 2 Min, Mtg Pres with Marshal Stalin, 8 Feb 5 (Malta-Yalta Galleys, Pt. IL,pp- 659-63). 3 See p. 38, The Joint Chiefs of Staff were present at a prelim- inary meeting of the President with his political and military advisors on February where the Soviet proposals were summarized by Ambassador Harriman. (Min, Mtg Pres with Advisors, 4 Feb \5, Malta-Yalta Galleys, Pt. IT, pp. 500-502.) iF} Google i Ohof Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek be obtained, was drawn up by Am bassador Harriman and Mr. Molotov on February 10, 1945, and signed by the President, the Prime Minister, and Marshal Stalin on the next day. On the military side, the Yalta Conference produced less con- ‘erete results, but provided the military planners with certain basic information regarding joint United States-Soviet military effort in the Pacific. The questions to be asked the Soviet officials were developed prior to the Yalta Conference and considered again at meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on February 4, 5, 7, and 8.9 Soviet officials refused to discuss these questions at the two tri- partite military meetings on February 5 and 6 until "after the war in the Far East had been considered by the Heads of Government."® ‘The matter was raised by the President in his meeting with Marshal Stalin on February 8,’ and the questions were finally discussed in detail at the United States-Soviet Chiefs of Staff conferences on February 8 and 9.8 1 Memo, sub: Conversations Regarding the Entry of the Soviet Union into the War against Japan, 10 Feb 5, and Agreement Re- garding Entry of the Soviet Union into the War against Japan (Malta-Yelta Galleys, Pt. II, pp. 758-61, 626-27), 5 win, Jos 167th, 188th, 189th, and 190th wtge, ls §» Ty and 8 Fikes ((ealeerzaite Galleys, Pt. IZ, pp. 198-99, 52h-25, 603-60h, § win, Ist and 2nd Tripartite Military Mtg Yalta Galleys, Pt. II, pp. 536, 57h.) 5 and 6 Feb LS. (Malta- 7 win, Mog Pres with Marshal Stalin, 8 Feb US, (Malta-Yalta Galleys, Pt. II) pe 659.) 8 Min, Mtgs Amer and Sov Csofs, 8 and 9 Feb lS. (Malte-Yalta Galleys, Pt, II, pp. 652m58, 711-17.) ur Google CoalIn general, the information sought by the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerned matters which had been raised by General Deane in Moscow at various occasions during the past year but never answered by Soviet officials. At Yalta, however, Soviet represent- atives were more cooperative, The answers given by the Soviet officials were the following: To the First Question -- (Changes in projected opera= tions). No change, except for delay in transfer of troops which it had been planned to get under way the first of the year. These troops are now engaged in the Central Sector on the Eastern Front, therefore the delay. To the Second Question -- (Necessity for Pacific Supply route). Marshal Stalin stated the Pacific Sea supply route will be required particularly for the delivery of food stuffs and petroleum products. Sone air transport will probably be needed but due to its small carrying ca- pacity the sea route is of first importance. To the Third Question -- (U.S. Airbases). Aviation 8 in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk region will be given the United States Air Forces, Reconnaissances can now be nade, To the Fourth Question -- (U.S, Defenses Kamchatka). Because Kamchatka is very far from the mainland, United States assistance there will be very helpful. To the Fifth Question -- (Soviet construction for U.S.) When it is finally decided in exactly what places and what types of construction are required for the United States Air Forces in the district mentioned in the third question, the Russians will be able to carry out this construction for the United States forces, Assistance in the way of materiel is very desirable -- gasoline tankage, imock-down buildings, etc. To the Sixth Question -- (Kamchatka Survey party). With regard to the reconnaissance of the Kamchatka region we ask you to arrange for the departure of the party only at the very last moment because under present conditions it is impossible to make the reconnaissance in secrecy. This does not apply to tne reconnaissance of the Amur River district. 48 Google OhTo the Seventh Question -- (Occupation of Sakhalin). ‘The Russians will take the southern half of Sakhalin Island considering this should be one of the first operations. (Opening of the Straits of La Perouse), Answer is the same as yesterday, The Russians will do this. To the Eighth Question -- (Moscow Planning). Marshal Stalin stated that "From our side we shall fulfill your desires to carry on the planning vigorously." To the Ninth Question -- (Effect of weather on opera- tions), From a ground force point of view the most difficult conditions will be experienced in the thaws and floods in ‘April and May and although June is a favorable month, July and August are undesirable. As far es the ground forces are concerned weather will be most favorable in Septenber, October and November, At sea weather is favorable in July, August and September. To the Tenth Question -- (Additional weather stations). Arrangements will be made to open additional stations if the details will be presented to the Russian authorities.? From the overall military point of view, the Yalta Conference confirmed the plans previously developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to force the unconditional surrender of Japan, These plans were approved by the President and the Prime Minister.10 The Prime Minister's suggestion to offer Japan, after Germany's defeat, an opportunity to-surrender on less harsh terms than unconditional surrender was viewed skeptically by the President who, however, "thought that this was a matter that might well be mentioned to Marshal Stelin,"1l No change, however, was made in the final objective, and the unconditional surrender of Japan remained the goal for which the military leaders had to plan. 9 Memo of Conversation, Mtg of Amar and Sov CsofS, 9 Feb 45. (Malta-Yalta Galleys, Pt. II, pp. 715-16). 10 yin, CCS 188th Mtg and CCS Mtg with Pres and Prine Minister, 9 Feb lS. (Malta-Yalta Galleys, Pt. II, pp. 68h-86, 70h-11). 11 Min, CCS Mtg with Pres and Prime Minister, 9 Feb 5. (Malta- Yalta Galleys, Pt, II, pp. 70-705). 49 Google Oh/ On the matter of Soviet participation in the Pacific war, the Soviet political conditions had been agreed upon by the President and Marshal Stalin. On the military side, renewed assurances for closer cooperation had been given, but no military agreements had been signed. The commanders in the Far East and Pacific were informed of the military results of the Yalta Conference, especially as they bore on the war against Japan, by a group of Washington planning officers who left the Crinea on February 10. The discussions with General MacArthur concerned Ivo Jima, the Philippines campaign, command in the Pacific, oil in Borneo, ending Japanese resistance in the Southwest Pacific, plans for turning over to the British responsibility for operations in the Netherlands East Indies and Now Guinea, and the entry of the Soviet Union into the Pacific war.!? 45 for the final operations against Japan, Brig. Gen, George A. Lincoln, a member of the visiting group of Washington planning officers, reported his conversation with General MacArthur on February 25, 195, as follows: Concerning overall plan General Macarthur considers it essential that maximum number of Jap divisions be engaged and pinned dow on Asiatic mainland, before United States forces strike Japan proper. 12 Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division, (Washington, D.C. , is PPe 307=308 13 Msg, Brig Gen Lincoln to Gen Marshall for Maj Gen Hull, 25 Feb lS, CM-I 25948. 50 GoogleAfter bis return to Washington, General Lincoln supple- mented this message with a memorandum for General Marshall, dated March 8, 19h5, including the following paragraph: As to Russia, General MacArthur pointed out that politically they want a warm water port which would be Port arthur. He considered that it would be impractica- ble to deny them such a port because of their great military power. Therefore, it was only right they should share the cost in blood in defeating Japan. From the military standpoint we should make every effort to get Russia into the Japanese war before we go into Japan, otherwise we will take the impact of the Jap divisions and reap the losses, while the Russians in due time advance into an area free of major resistance, General Macarthur stated he considered the President should start putting pressure on the Russians now.: 1h Informal Memo, G.AsL. for CofS, 8 Mar 5. Col Paul L. Freeman, Jr., an Operations Division officer of the War Department visiting the Southwest Pacific Area during the campaign in the Philippines, reported similar opinions by General MacArthur in a letter to General Marshall, 13 Feb 5, sub: Summary of an Hour and a Half Conversation with General Macarthur: General Macarthur then elaborated on his concept of operations for the ultimate defeat of Japan, He was in thorough agreement that the only means of defeating Japan was by the invasion of the industrial heart of Japan. He stressed the potency of the Japanese army and stated that when we entered Japan we must be prepared to reckon with the Japanese army in far greater strength than is now there. He was apprehensive as to the possibility of the movenent of the bulk of the Manchurian army and other Japanese forces from China to the defense of the homeland, He emphatically stated that we must not invade Japan proper unless the Russian army is previously committed to action in Manchuria. He said that this was essential, and that it should be done without the three month's delay upon the conclusion of the defeat of Germany as intimated by Marshal Stalin to the President, He said that it was only necessary for action to commence in Manchuria to contain that force of Japanese in order to make possible our invasion of Japan and the rapid conclusion of the war. He understands Russia's aims; that they would want all of Manchuria, Korea and possibly part of North China, This seisure of territory was SL Google F iReview of Pacific St egy Despite the Yalta promises, increased Soviet cooperation in planning United States-Soviet strategy in the Pacific did not materialize during the months after the Yalta Conference. The special United States planning group under General Roberts re= turned to Moscow but found the situation unchanged, The dis- cussion at the two meetings that could be arranged in a 7-week period never went beyond the subject of organizational procedure.l5 15 Deane, The Strange Alliance, p, 261. 14 (cont'd) Aneritables but the United States must insist that Russia ay her way by invading Manchuria at the earliest possible Gate after the defeat of Germany. a. He understood that the Navy still favored a plan whereby they would ring Japan proper with air bases and naval bases and eventually blockade and bombard them into submission. He said that thie never would be effective. (I informed him that that was the opinion of the JCS and was agreed upon at Sextant ode name for Cairo Conference, November-December 19h3/). b. General Macarthur agreed that the Tokyo Plain was the proper place to invade Japan and he was fully conver- sant with the restrictions of seasons. He believed it would be a mistake to make a prior landing in Japan, either in Kyushu or Hokkaido. He felt that proper timing, in con- junction with a move by the Russians and the strategic surprise to be gained, would be a far greater advantage in landing initially in the heart of Japan whereby the enemy force could be split, rather than to tip our hand by first landing at some other remote part of the Japanese islands. 52 GoogleNeither the survey party for Kamchatka nor that for the Amur River ar ever entered Soviet territory. In addition to these discouraging developments, serious difficulties with the Soviet Union were encountered in Europe where complications developed regarding the government of liberated countries in eastern Europe, surrender negotiations for German forces in Italy, the repatriation of United States prisoners liberated by the Soviets, and the coordination of allied land and air operations, It was in this atmosphere that the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed in April the overall plan for the unconditional sur- render of Japan and reconsidered the value of the Soviet contri- bution to this objective. The review of the overall strategic plan turned on the question of whether or not an invasion of the Japanese home islands was actually necessary. The views of the field commanders were sought for this review, especially since on April 3 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had reached after long consideration a decision on the command arrangements for the final phasea of the Pacific war. General MacArthur was named Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific, and all Army resources in the tneater were placed under his command, Admiral Nimitz was assigned command of all naval forces in the Pacific theater. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were to exercise strategic direction over the theater, normally charging General MacArthur with responsibility for land 53 Google ITY OF MICHIcampaigns and Admiral Nimitz for naval campaigns. Command of the strategic bombing effort was retained by General Henry H. Arnold under the direct control of the Joint Chiefs of stafr,l6 With this decision, the field commanders assumed official responsibility for making operational plans in accordance with their assigned missions. On April 12, General Marshall cabled General MacArtaurs Within the next few days it may be necessary for me to discuss with the other Chiefs of Staff, the question of our basic strategy in the Western Pacific, There is an honest difference of opinion on this problem, One school of thought is that much more preparation is necessary than is possible with target dates of 1 Decenber and 1 March for the main operations. Hence a campaign of air-sea blockade and bombardment should be adopted which involves the Chusan operation, and perhaps others such as a lodgment on Shantung or Korea or the islands in the Tsushima Strait area. The points made for this scheme include the high casualties incident to landings on Japan proper, the necessity for further beating down Jap airpower, the cutting off of Japan from reinforce- nents moving from the mainland of Asia, and the possibility of bringing about surrender without a major landing on Japan proper. There is a point about the Japanese reaction to a landing on the sacred soil of Japan. Also there is the question of our ability to get ready for an operation against Japan proper soon enough so that our present pres= sure will be maintained without let-up. The other school of thought believes in driving straight into Japan proper as soon as the forces can be mounted from the Philippines and landbased air established in the Ryukyus. This school of thought considers that Jap air and sea power will be weakened surficiently by the end of this year to permit invasion, Our naval oper- ations, plus air operating from the Ryukyus, plus the limited capabilities of Jap sipping and inland transport, will prevent material reinforcement of Japan, Russia's entry into the war would be a prerequisite to a landing in the Japanese homeland in Decenber, Tne B-29's and 16 Jes 1259/4, subs Command and Operational Directives for the Pacific, 3 Apr LS. Google " iiniveReee ce letcarrier strikes will have devastated large areas and furtner softened the Jap homeland, As to landing operations involving high casualties, experience in the Philipoines and even in Okinawa shows that wherever the U.S. has been able to employ all the supporting arms and services on a battlefield, suit- able for maneuver either on land or amphibiously, the Jap has been defeated with acceptable losses, On the other hand, a series of island and limited objective operations resulta in high losses per unit engaged, may result in commitment of large numbers of troops, and does not assure the early termination of the war. Furthermore, there is always the chance of being sucked into the comitment of large forces in a non-decisive operation, such as on the coast of China. As to weather, any month is suitable, although winter months are less desirable for sea operations and more desirable for air and ground operation. In summary, one school of thought places emphasis on the first paragraph of the over-all objective in appendix B of CCS 776/3 and questions the need for invading Japan; whereas the other school of thought considers that by the end of the year the first part of the over-all objective will be adequately accomplished and an immediate invasion is the quickest and cheapest way to assure the end of the war. Will you let me have your thoughts on this problem for use within the next few days in possible discussions.l7 General MacArthur in his reply on April 20, analyzed the strategic problem at length: 1, Analysis of strategy in western Pacific indicates that there are three general courses of action open to us: Course 1, Encircle Japan by further expansion to the westward, deploying maximum air forces preparatory to attacks on Kyushu and Honshu in succession or directly against Honshu. Course 2, Encircle Japan by further expansion to the westward with a view to its complete isolation and endeavor to bonb Japan into submission without effecting landings in homeland, Course 3, Attack Kyushu and install air forces to cover a decisive assault on Honshuy 17 Msg, Gen Marshall to Gen MacArthur, 12 Apr 5, Q{-OUT 67098. For Appendix P «f CCS 776/3, see pp. lii-45 and footnote 2h. 55 Google IVERSITY OF MICH!Course 1 would provide greater air power for final assault and would attain a high degree of neutral- ization prior to attack; would isolate the Japanese Islands from access to outside reinforcement or resources; might permit the bypassing of Kyushu and a direct attack on Honshu, It would deploy our resources off the main axis of advance; would not increase short range air coverage of vital areas of the Japanese Islands; would require a large part of the available sources in the Pacific; would prevent an attack on the main Japanese Islands until after redeploy= nent from Europe; might commit the United States to heavy involvement on the mainland of China; unless Xyushu can be bypassed, might require a postponement of the Honshu oper- ation until 197; involves a definite loss of time by inserting comprehensive operations prior to delivery of the main attack; would result in greater loss of life. 3. Course 2 if successful would be at a minimum cost of 1ife but would prolong the war indefinitely; would fail to utilize our resources for amphibious offensive movements assumes success of air power alone to conquer a people in spite of its demonstrated failure in Europe, where Germany was subjected to more intensive bombardment than can be brought to bear against Japan, and where all the available resources in ground troops of the United States, the United Kingdom and Ruseia had to be committed in order to force a decision. 4. Course 3 would attain neutralization by estab- lishing air power at the closest practicable distance from the final objective in the Japanese Islands; would permit application of full power of our conbined resources, ground, naval and air, on the decisive objective; would place our forces in the most favorable location for the final assault; would deliver an attack against an area which probably will be more lightly defended this year than next; would continue the offensive methods which have proven so successful in Pacific campaigns; would place maximum pressure of our com bined forces upon the enemy, which might well force his surrender earlier tham anticipated, and would place us in the most favorable position for delivery of the decisive assault early in 196. Our attack would have to be launched with a lesser degree of neutralization and with a shorter period of time for preparation. 5. Analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the possible courses of action clearly indicates that course three is the preferable plan. It should be adopted unless: 56 Google ‘ ;A, It is considered that we have insufficient air power to support the operation, or B, The resources in the Pacific are insufficient or cannot be gathered in time for its launching this year and therefore another course of action should be pursued in the interim in order to maintain unrelenting pressure upon the enemy, accepting the delays incident to the conduct of such operations concurrently with concentration for the main attacks 6, I am of the opinion that the ground, naval, air and logistic resources in the Pacific are adequate to carry out course three. The Japanese fleet has been re- duced to practical impotency. The Japanese Air Force has been reduced to a line of action which involves uncoordi- nated, suicidal attacks against our forces, employing all types of planes, including trainers. Its attrition is heavy and its power for sustained action 1s diminishing rapidly. These conditions will be accentuated after the establishment of our air forces in the Ryukyus. with the increase in the tempo of VLR attacks the enemy's ability to provide replacement planes will diminish, and the Japanese potentiality will decline at an increasing rate. It is believed that the development of air bases in the Ryukyus will, in conjunction with carrier based planes, give us sufficient air power to support landing on Kyushu and that the establishment of our air forces there will ensure complete air supremacy over Honshu, Logistic considerations present the most difficult problem. Provi- sion of necessary service troops to activate and operate bases and at the same time to provide a service garrison for Kyushu requires prompt supply of transportation for concentration and a ruthless combing out of rear areas. With one exception it is believed that with a vigorous pooling of our Army and Navy interests throughout the Pacific the necessary service troops can be found to per= form the minimum required functions by the exception of hospital beds, It is estimated that some 36,000 additional beds not now available in the Pacific will be required; not all of them, however, prior to D day. Vigorous displace= ment of land based air into the Ryukyus will be necessary and potential airfield sites are believed to be available, Concentration of engineer effort with the corresponding reduction of projects in rear areas will be essential. By pooling resources of army and navy it is believed that engineer effort can be obtained, 7. From the standpoint of weather it appears that November would be the best month to initiate the operation.16 18 Msg, Gen Macarthur to Gen Marshall, 20 April lS, CM-IN 19089. 57 Google Unive NetsAdmiral Nimit2's comments were also requested. He, too, approved the plan'for the invasion of Kyushu and reconmended November 1 as the target date: 2. Until we are able to invade Japan with assurance of success we should continue to encircle and isolate by occupying positions which will cut off Japan from China and Korea and from which bombing of Japan can be intensi- fied. Movement to the China coast will have the additional effect of ensuring Russia's entry into the war. Movenent to positions which control the Korea Strait will have the additional effect of opening an all-season sea route to Russia. 3. However, I am in agreement with the invasion of Kyusho oe the earliest date as the way to achieve decisive victory if the requisite conditions are met on which my comments follow: a. Control of the sea. This has been virtually accomplished by the destruction of the greater part of the Japanese fleet. b. Control of the air. The fleet and the shore- based air forces are rapidly destroying the enemy air force in being and the Twentieth Air Force is effectually destroying the enemy ability to replace his losses. Tne mass suicide tactics are damaging many ships but we can better afford our ship losses and damage than the eneny can afford his air losses, By concentrating resources on the development of Okinawa as a naval and air base we can improve our naval and air position and accelerate the deterioration of the enemy air force. c. Combat troops. This is primarily an Arny question, An amphibious corps of three Marine divisions can be ready. d. Shipping. This is the most critical problem. We should not commence an invasion of Japan without adequate reserves of personnel and supplies in the Philippines, Marianas and Ryukyus, If these reserves are to be available procurement and movenent must be commenced without delay. The shipping now and prospectively available in the Pacific must be increased rapidly. Control should be entrusted to an agency in the Pacific. e. Logistic organization. Readiness for invasion this fall will necessitate making full use of existing logistic organizations and procedures. Drastic reorgand: tions will consume time which cannot be spared, 58 Google ITY OF MICHIf. Supplies. I assume that the Navy Department can furnish all the naval supplies needed including winter clothing for sailors and marines. g. Weather. The risk of typhoons has been accepted in other operations and is not controlling. However, the assault must take place early enough to leave time for un- loading troops and supplies over the beaches before the heavy winter surf commences, November lst is the last target date recommended. h, ‘Intervening operations. At least one position should be taken between Okinawa and Kyushu, Kikai Jima (Iceberg III D) is the best. Attacks on Japan by the fleet and shore-based air forces and the sea and air blockade should be intensified through the sumer, lu. Maximum acceleration of developments in the Ryukyus requires that additional Arny air forces be made available together with construction and service troops to support them, If decision is made to invade Kyushu this fall it would appear advisable to replace VIR wings planned for the Ryukyus with types better adapted for attack on enemy air forces and air installations and for close support of troopse 5S. I have designated the principal naval commanders for the naval and the amphibious phases of OLYMPIC and have ear= marked an amphibious corps. The Miyako operations has /sic/ been deferred in the interest of rapid development of Okinawa, Assault shipping is being made available to CINCSWPA as rap- idly as revision of plans permits. 6, In my opinion the feasibility of OLYMPIC in 19h5 depends on the prompt provision of adequate shipping and adequate Army supplies and services, The fleet including the Fleet Marine Force can be ready. 7. If OLYMPIC can not be done this year, I recommend occupation of the Chusan Archipelago followed by operations to control the Korea Strait. Any important diversion of resources to open a sea route and supply Russia this summer may prevent OLYMPIC this fall even though effected under the minimum concept of escorting through the Kuriles. The shipping itself will be an important diversion of resources and may make the difference between readiness this fall and postponenent, 8, We must be prepared to accept heavy casualties whenever we invade Japan, Wherever our best troops have met the Japanese Army on the defensive in prepared defensive positions it has been a competent fighting force. Our previous 59 t Google unsuccesses against illfed and poorly supplied units cut down by our overpowering naval and air action should not be used as the sole basis of estimating the type of resistance we will meet in the Japanese homeland where the enemy lines of communication will be short and enemy supplies more adequate. However, I am confident of the ability of our soldiers and marines eventually to defeat the Japanese Army anywhere. These views from the field commanders supported those fashington planners who believed that the invasion of the home Jan stili constituted the preferable course of action for the unconditional surrender of Japan. The role of the Soviet Union in this strategy appeared increasingly less important as did the establishment of United States air bases in Siberia and the ypening of a supply route through the Kuriles, Both of these operations had been projected at the Yalta Conference. On April 16, General Deane, back in washington for consultation, noted that military collaboration with the Soviet Union was no longer vital to the United States, andrecommended limiting future collaboration to projects that would be of primary importance to the United States in the prosecution of the war.20 In a separate paper, General Deane presented certain conclusions of the United States planning group in Moscow, After careful study the planning group had concluded that the benefits that would derive from locating a United States strategic bomber force in Siberia at this time were worth only a small fraction of the cost and that the 9 Msg, Adm Nimitz to Adm King, 28 Apr U5. (OLYMPIC was the code name given to tne planned operations against Kyusnu.) 20 Jes 1313, sub: Revision of Policy with Relation to Russia, 16 Apr 5. 60 Google UNIVERSITY OF MICHIopening of a supply route through the Kuriles was not vital to the success of Soviet operations. General Deane recommended, therefore, that the air base project be canceled and that the United States avait Soviet initiative before pursuing the supply route project. In a series of actions during the latter part of April, the Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted these recommendations. On April 19, they asked the United States Military Mission in Moscow to abandon all efforts to introduce additional personnel into the Soviet Union except on matters essential to the prosecution of the, war.2? On April 2h, they canceled the Siberian air base project.23 On the question of a Pacific supply route, they postponed, after consulting Admiral Ninitz, further active consideration "until the Soviets on their own initiative so request.” On April 2h, the overall Pacific strategy was reviewed for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, It was pointed out that tne early invasion of the Japanese hone islands represented the most suitable strategy to accomplish unconditional surrender. Soviet entry into the war was no longer considered necessary to make this invasion feasible. It was suggested that a "declaration of intention" be issued on the governmental level telling tne Japanese that their future did not 21 Jc 1313/1, sub: Revision of Policy with Relation to Russia, 16 Apr lS. For an extended discussion of these problems, see Deane, The Strange Alliance, pp. 262-65. 22 msg, JCS to Maj Gen Deane, 19 Apr 5, CM-OUT 701L0. 23 Jes 1313/2, sub: Revision of Policy with Relation to Russia, 23 Apr L5. 61 Google iv MICHIhold national suicide in order to encourage the formation of a government that would sign a surrender instrument. 1. The over-all strategic concept for the prosecution of the war includes provision to "bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan." The first agreed statement (SEXTANT, November-Decem- ber, 1943) of the over-all objective in the Japanese war contains the phrase "to invade Japan proper if this should rove to _be necessary" (C.C.S. ii17). At OCTAGON ten months Tater the over-all objective was revised to provide for "invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan" to be preceded by "establishing sea and air block- ades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength" (C.C.S. 17/3). The reasons prompting this revision were stated in C.C.S. 17/3, 11 July 19k, as follows: "Our successes to date, our present supe- riority in air and sea forces, and the prospective availabil- ity of forces following tne defeat of Germany, lead us to believe that our concept of operations against Japan ... should envisage an invasion into the industrial heart of Japan, While it may be possible to defeat Japan by sustained aerial bombardment and the destruction of her sea and air forces, this would probably involve an unacceptable delay." The latest proposal for assigning priority to operations against Japan (which the Combined Chief of Staff are now considering), sets up invasion and preliminary operations directly connected therewith as the supreme operations in the war against Japan. These developments reflect the conviction -- explicit in the statement of the over-all objective and re- inforced by experience -- the invasion is prerequisite to forcing the unconditional surrender of Japan.2! 2. Although the over-all odjective is as stated above discussion has continued as to whether or not a strategy of blockade and bombardment will not by itself bring about un- conditional surrender and the attainment of our war aims and be more acceptable than the strategy of invasion. In point of fact, tne "phases" expressed in the over-all objective, as written, constitute one continuous campaign of a series of operations and should be considered as such. * e * R ® U. WAR AIMS. From the Cairo Declaration and other statements of broad policy it appears that the major war aims of the United States are: 2b For the SEXTANT or Cairo Conference, see pp. 25-26, For the OCTAGON or Second Quebec Conference, September 194, see pp. 29-2. , 62 Google unigenere cr ACHEa, The restoration of the territories specified in the Cairo Declaration. b. The creation of conditions which will insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the peace and security of the world. &. The evantual emergence of a government in Japan which will respect the rights of other states and Japan's international obligations, 5. The agreed strategy and national policy is that the accomplishment of these aims is to be brought about by un- conditional surrender. The statement of the over-all objec- tive implies that unconditional surrender can be forced, and that invasion of the industrial heart of Japan will be decisive. It is by no means certain, however, that "unconditional surrender" can be brought about by any means, What can be accomplished is decisive military defeat and the results equivalent to un- conditional surrender, similar to the present situation in Germany. In no case to date in this war have organized Japa~ nese units surrendered. The concept of "unconditional surrender" is foreign to the Japanese nature, Therefore, ‘unconditional surrender" should be defined in terms understandable to the Japanese, who must be convinced that destruction or national suicide is not implied, This could be done by the announce= ment on a governmental level of a "declaration of intentions" which would tell the Japanese what their future holds. ance convinced of the inevitability of defeat, it is possible that a governnent could be formed in Japan that would sign and could enforce a surrender instrument, 6. Unless a definition of unconditional surrender can be given which is acceptable to the Japanese, there is no alternative to annihilation and no prospect that the threat of absolute defeat will bring about capitulation. The accomplishment of the unconditional surrender objectives then must be entirely brought about by force of arms. 7. A campaign of bombardment and blockade would aim at bringing about capitulation of Japan by seizing additional positions in order to isolate tne home islands and by de= struction and threat of virtual annihilation. This strategy does not provide assurance that it will lead to unconditional surrender or defeat. It is a strategy of limited aim and may bring about a negotiated peace falling short of complete fulfiliment of our war aims, Should encirclement fail to bring about capitulation, it then would be difficult, costly, and time consuming, to disengage forces to mount for invasion. 83 t » Go gle UNIVERSITY OF MICHI‘A campaign of invasion strikes directly at the hart of the empire and expectation would be that if the threat in itself did not cause capitulation, the continuation of the campaign through the full stages of invasion would result in unconditional surrender or absolute defeat, Prior defeat of Japan in the hone islands would also establish the greatest possibility that other empire forces would capitulate, and in any event make their defeat easier to accomplish. The reverse would not be true. Therefore, the invasion of Japan is considered the most suitable strategy to accomplish unconditional surrender or ultimate defeat, OTHER FACTORS SYPPORTING A STRATEGY OF INVASION 8, Intelligence based on results of recent operations and estimated results of directed operations ... indicate that enemy dispositions and capabilities in the main Japanese islands about 5 months after VE-Day will be such as to present no insurmountable difficulties to invasion. Important points of this estimate are: the impotence of the remaining units of the Japanese Fleet and air arms except possivly to attempt another all-out suicide defense as at Okinawa; a last resort use of training planes ani obsolete types; feverish efforts to strengthen defenses of vital areas; incapability of the Japanese to move reinforcements from Asia at a greater esti- mated rate than 1 division per montn; and limited and vulner- able interior communications. 9. Study by the Joint Target Analysis Group ... indicates that from bases now available or to become progressively avail- able as a result of directed operations, a program of land- based air bombardment of vital target systems in the home islands between now and 1 December 1945 will create tne situation necessary for invasion insofar as the Japanese reserve materiel position is concerned and her capability for moving what remains to her in reserve materiel, The studies indicate that the further reduction of production facilities and important central stocks attainable by air attack will have little significance after 1 December 19L5. 10. Studies and estimates by joint agencies also have shown that we should have available in the Pacific by Decem- ber 1945, sufficient forces and resources to initiate an invasion campaign on the scale of OLYMPIC-CORONET (36 divisions and 1,523,000 men, total).25 25 OLYMPIC was the code name for the planned assault on Kyushu and CORONET for the invasion of the Tokyo Plain. HI ' Go gle univer11, Initiation of a campaign of invasion on the scale of OLYMPIC-CORONET tnis winter is therefore considered feasible, and, based on current intelligence, there appears to be no necessity to consume time, effort and resources on the prior seizure of additional positions from which to strengthen the blockade and augnent bombardment. 12, Should later developments alter present estimates and hence make it necessary to reduce further Japanese capabilities before invasion, this should be done (in order of preference) by: a. Continuing blockade and bombardment tactics for a longer period from bases now available or to be progressive- ly available as a result of directed operations. b. Develop additional bases on ierritory in our possession in order to deploy and operate more aircraft. ¢- Asa last resort seize additional territory and develop bases thereon. It should be noted that if preparations are made to initiate invasion of the Japanese home islands on the scale of OLYMPIC-CORONET it snould be possible to execute any lesser contributory operation which later developnents might prove to be required. 13. CASUALTIES. It is possible only to generalize as to the expected casualty rates. Average casualty rate per thousand per day for operations in Guadalcanal, New Georgia, Leyte, Attu, Marshalls, Marianas, and Palau, all of which were amphibious assaults, were: Killed in action 1.78 Wounded in action 5.50 Missing in action 17 Total Ted Average casualty rates for protracted iand warfare in the European Theater of Operations are: Killed in action 236 Wounded in action = 1.74 Missing in action _.06 Total T16 Naval casualties can be expected to vary directly with the number of amphibious operations involved and with the length of the campaign, as the naval forces available for either strategy will be approximately the same. 65 Google Gage ai:From these figures it is concluded that we should: (1) limit the number of separate assault operations; and (2) direct them toward land campaigns in decisive areas, These conclusions further support the strategy of invasion at the earliest date. 1k. Although it is considered that at this point it has been established that initiation of a campaign of early in- vasion this winter is practicable; that such a campaign will attain the over-all objective more quickly than any other, and with a certainty that does not exist under any other plan; and that bombardment and blockade most probably cannot in themselves bring about the attainment of our war aims, a possible sequence df operations in such a campaign will now be developed in order to provide a rough comparison of estimated requirements and duration of the campaign. The chart ... shows requirements and target dates for OLYMPIC- CORONET and for a number of possible encircling operations. The following sequence of operations was selected for com- parative analysis with OLY¥PIC-CORONET. Maximum Requirements Operations Target Date Divisions Pei el Chusan-Ningpo U-5 months 6 238 000 after VE-Day Korea 4-5 months 13 570,000 after Chusan- Ningpo Kuriles Not later than 5 200 ,000 (Btorofu & 15 Uctober Matsuwa 1945 Islands) Quelpart- 2 monts 4 160,000 Tsushina after a Thus as to time, it is estimated that the selected sequence of operations in a campaign of blockade and bombardment could be completed about the fall of 1946, and similarly that OLYMPIC-CORUsu? o:.sati us should be completed by June 19h6.‘A comparison of forces required follows: Invasion 36 divisions 1,532,000 men Blockade and bombardment 23 divisions 1,168,000 men These figures represent a summation of the requirements for the series of operations and do not allow for the possible extrication and re-use of a part of the forces. Again, it should be noted that there is no assurance that the execution of this sequence of blockade and bombardment operations and, in fact, even the seizure of still other posi- tions would obviate ultimate invasions, * * * * * * 16. It 4s also for consideration whether entry of Russia into the war against Japan will require early operations by United States forces on the Asiatic mainland, a. Because of our estimated ability to interdict Japanese movement between the Asiatic mainland and Japan proper, early Russian entry into the war against Japan and attendant containing of the Kwantung army is no longer nec- essary to make invasion feasible. b. It snould be noted that the Cairo Declaration included provision that Manchuria be returned to China and that Russia hes not yet subscribed to the principles of this declaration. If Russia enters the war her forces will probably be the first into Manchuria, This will raise the question of introducing at least token U.S. forces into China. THE OPTIMUM STRATEGY 17. In view of all factors, we should follow the strategy of early invasion and our course should be: a. Apply full and unremitting pressure against Japan by strategic bombing and carrier raids in order to reduce war-making capacity and to demoralize the country, in preparation for invasion. b. Tighten blockade by means of air and sea patrols, and of air striking force and light naval forces to include blocking passages between Korea and Kyushu and routes through the Yellow Sea, c. Conduct only such contributory operations as are essential to establish the conditions prerequisite to invasion, @. Invade Japan at the earliest practicable date, 67 Google iv MICHI‘+ Occupy such areas in the industrial complex of Japan as sFe necessary to bring about unconditional surrender and to establish absolute military control.2 Although, during the review of this report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations, did not agree with the comparison of casualties between the two thea- ters, he did agree with the conclusions.’ on May 10, the Joint Chiefs of Staff officially noted the report which thus became the basis for future planning.”° on May 25, the directive for the Kyushu operation was issued to General MacArthur, Admiral Nimitz, and General Arnold, setting the target date at November 1, 195, as recommended by the field commanders.°? While these military reviews were taking place, similar dis- cussions were being held on the political level. The question or Soviet participation in the Pacific war was specifically raised on May 12 by Acting Secretary of State Joseph C, Grew in a memo- randun for Secretary of War Stimson and Secretary of the Navy Forrestal; 26 Jcs 92h/15, Rpt by JSP, sub: Pacific Strategy, 25 apr lS. 27 Jos 92/16, Memo by Adm King, sub: Pacific Strategy, 2 May lS. 28 Decision on JCS 92l/15, Note by Secys, sub: Pacific Strategy, 10 May U5. 29 ses 1331/3, Note by Secys, sub: Directive for operation OLYMPIC, 25 May L5. t Google / VERSE oe cenIn order to determine the policy of the United States Government in the Far East in connection with the political effects of the expected Soviet entry into the Pacific war and the relationship of the Yalta Agreement on this subject, I would appreciate receiving from you the views of the War Department on the following questions: 1. Is the entry of the Soviet Union into the Pacific war at the earliest possible monent of such vital interest to the United States as to preclude any attempt by the United States Government to obtain Soviet agreement to certain desirable political objectives in the Far East prior to such entry? 2. Should the Yalta decision in regard to Soviet political desires in the Far East be reconsidered or carried into effect in whole or in part? 3. Should a Soviet demand, if made, for participation in the military occupation of the Japanese home islands be granted or would such occupation adversely affect our long tern policy for the future treatment of Japan? In the opinion of the Department of State it would be desirable politically to obtain from the Soviet Government the following commitment and clerifications regarding the Far East prior to any implementation on our part of the Yalta Agreements 1. The Soviet Government should agree to use its influence with the Chinese Communists to assist this Govern- ment in its endeavors to bring about the unification of China under the National Government headed by Chiang Kai Shek. The achievement of Chinese unity on the basis considered most desirable by the United States Government should be agreed to by the Soviet Union before the United States Government should make any approach to the Chinese Government on the basis of the Yalta Agreement, The difficulties in regard to Sinklang should be settled by amicable agreement between the Soviet and Chinese Governments. 2. Unequivocal adherence of the Soviet Government to the Cairo Declaration regarding the return of Manchuria to Chinese sovereignty and the future status of Kor 3. Definite agreement of the Soviet Government that immediately Korea is liberated, whether before final capit- ulation of Japan or after, it be placed under the trustee- ship of the United States, Great Britain, China, and the 69 Google universSoviet Union. This agreement should make clear that the four trustees are to be the sole authority for the selection of a temporary Korean Covernnent. L. Before giving final approval to the annexation by the Soviet Union of the Kurile Islands it might be desirable to receive from the Soviet Government emergency landing 4, rights for commercial planes on certain of these islands. Seoretary Stimson's reply on May 21 summarized the current military evaluation of the Soviet role in the Pacific war: Following are the views of the War Department on the question contained in your memorandum of 12 May regarding the Soviet Union in the Far East, nto the war against Japan will be decided by the Russians on their own military and political basis with little re- gerd to any political action taken by the United States, The War Department's view is that while the U.S.S.R. will seek and will accept any political inducement proffered by the United States as a condition to her entry into the war against Japan, such political inducements will not in fact affect the Russian decision as to when, if ever, she will enter the war, Russian entry will have a profound military effect in that almost certainly it will materially shorten the war and thus save American lives. y 1. The War Department considers that Russian entry Military considerations therefore do not preclude an attempt by the United States Government to obtain Soviet agreement to desirable political objectives in the Far East prior to the entry of the Soviet Union into the Pacific War. 2. The concessions to Russia on Far Eastern matters which were made at Yalta are generally matters which are within the military power of Russia to obtain regardless of U.S, military action short of war, The War Department believes that Russia is militarily capable of defeating the Japanese and occupying Karafuto, Mancnuria, Korea and Northern Ghina before it would be possible for the U.S. military forces to occupy these areas, Only in the kuriles is the United States in a position to circumvent Russian initiative. If the United States were to occupy these islands to forestall Russian designs, it would be at the direct expense of the campaign to defeat Japan and would involve an unacceptable cost in American lives. Furthermore, the Russians can, if they choose, await the time when U.S. efforts will have practically completed the destruction of 30 Meno, Acting Sec Grew for Sec Stimson, 12 May lS. Google i OhJapanese misitary power and can then seize tne objectives they desire at a cost to them relatively much less than would be occasioned by their entry into the war at an early date. From the foregoing, it appears we can bring little, if any, military leverage to bear on the Russians in so far as the Far East is concerned, unless we choose to use force, From the military point of view it would be desirable to have @ complete understanding and agreement with the Russians con- cerning the Far East, If it is believed that the reconsid- eration of the Yalta agreement will assist such a complete understanding and agreement, then the War Department would favor it, but it is not believed that much good will come of a rediscussion at this time. 3. With regard to Soviet participation in the military occupation of the Japanese homeland, the War Department con- siders this to be a matter for political decision, From one military standpoint, this participation appears desirable, since it would reduce the military requirements of the U.S. for occupation purposes. On the other hand, our experiences with the Russians in the occupation of Germany may in the future lead to considerations which would point to the wisdom of exclusive occupation by our own forces. The discussion of this subject prior to Russian entry into the Japanese war does not appear necessary at this time, ‘The War Department concurs in the desirability of ob- taining the four commitments and clarifications desired of the Soviet Government by the Department of State, If the present schism in China continues and, at the same time, Russian forces advance to areas giving them close contact with the Chinese Communists, our present problems in China will become more complicated, unless a prior satisfactory understanding has been reached with the Russians, However, as a preliminary, some sort of understanding between the Chinese Communists and the Generalissimo seems to be in order as of first importance. As to emergency landing rights for commercial planes in the Kuriles, it would probably be best to make a specific proposal on this matter to the Russians in case it is desired to discuss the subject with them. However, Russia has the military capability of implementing unilaterally the Yalta agreement (except possibly the Kuriles). Hence, as pointed out above, measures other than U.S. military assistance must be found to persuade the Russians to give their agreement the four points listed in the State Department memorandum,9+ Ltr, Sec Stimson to Acting Sec Grew, 21 May l5. Secretary Forrestal wrote to Mr. Grew on May 21 that he was in accord with the views expressed in Secretary Stimson's letter of the same date. m1 Google UNIVERSITY OF MICHIPreparations for the Potsdam Conference The end of hostilities in Europe on May 8, 1945, pointed up the urgency of reaching settlements with the Soviet Union on post- war problems. For this reason Prime Minister Churchill and Pres- ident Truman agreed to seek a meeting with Marshal Stalin at an early date, After Marshal Stalin had consented, suggesting Berlin as the site, the scope of the conference was later broadened to in- clude a discussion of coordinating allied and Soviet operations against Japan, In preparation for this conference, Mr. Harry Hopkins was sent to Moscow, where on May 28, at his third meeting with Marshal Stalin, he discussed the Far Eastern situation. He was assured that Soviet armies would be deployed on the Manchurian border on August 8 and would launch their attack during the same month, but these operations appeared to be conditioned on the conclusion of a Sino-Soviet agree- ment: Harriman and I saw Stalin and Molotov for the third time last night. Following are the important results: 1. The Soviet Army will be properly deployed on the Manchurian positions by August 8th. _.2. Stalin repeated the statement he made at Yalta that the Russian people must have a good reason for going to war and that depended on the willingness of China to agree to the Yalta proposals. 3. He stated for the first time that he was willing to take these proposals up directly with Soong when he comes to Moscow, He wants to see Soong not later than July first and expects us to take matter up at the same time with Chiang Kai Shek. Because of Stalin's statements about the Far East which follow, this procedure seems most desirable from our point of view. lu. He left no doubt in our mind that he intends to attack during August. It is therefore important that Soong come here not later than July lst. Stalin is ready to see him any, time ng 6 gle R Cc5. Stalin made categorical statement that he would do everything he could to promote unification of China under the leadership of Chiang Kai Shek. He further stated that this leadership should continue after the war because no one else was strong enough. He specifically stated no Communist leader was strong enough to unify China. He proposes to back the Generalissimo in spite of the reser- vations he expressed about him, 6. He repeated all of his statements made at Yalta, that he wanted a unified and steble China and wanted China to control all of Manchuria as part of a united China, He stated categorically that he had no territorial claims against China and mentioned specifically Manchuria and Sinkiang and that he would respect Chinese sovereignty in all areas his troops entered to fight the Japanese. 7. Stalin stated that he would welcome representatives of the Generalissimo to be with his troops entering Man- churia in order to facilitate the organization of Chinese adrinistration in Manchuria. 8. Stalin agreed with America's "open door" policy and went out of his way to indicate that the United States was the only power with the resources to aid China econom- ically after the war. He observed that Russia would have all it could do to provide for the internal economy of the Soviet Union for many years to come, 9. Stalin agreed that there should be a trusteeship for Korea under China, Great Britein, the Soviet Union and the United States. 10. We were very encouraged by conference on the Far East. Discussion on Japan follows in subsequent message.32 Marshal Stalin also pointed out tne dangers inherent in Japanese efforts to divide the allies in order to gain terms short of unconditional surrender and requested a share in the eventual occupation of Japan: Stalin is very anxious to discuss problems concerning Japan at his following conference with you. He wants to have matters about Japan settled before their collapse, His statements summarized as follows: 32 sg, Hopkins to Pres, 29 May LS 3 t Google un1. Japan is doomed and the Japanese know it. 2. Certain elements in Japan are putting out peace feelers, Therefore we should consider together our joint attitude and act in concert about the surrender of Japan. He expressed the fear that they will try to split the Allies. His statements about surrender follow: A. The Soviet Union prefers to go through with unconditional surrender and destroy the military might and forces of Japan once and for all. He thinks this is particularly to our interest because the Japanese have a deep seated antipathy to the United States and if the war lords, the industrial leaders and the politicians are permitted to withdraw to Japan with their armies undefested, their navy not totally destroyed and their industrial machine partially intact they will start at once to plan a war of revenge, Stalin made it quite clear that the Soviet Union wants to go through with unconditional sur- render and all that implies, B. He feels, however, that if we stick to un- conditional surrender the Japs will not give up and we will have to destroy them as we did Germany. C. The Japs may offer to surrender and see softer terms. while consideration of this has certain dangers as compared with paragraph (A) it nevertheless cannot be ruled out, (In the event th:t the Allies should depart from an- nounced policy of unconditional surrender and be prepared to accept a modified surrender, he visualizes imposing our will through our occupying forces and thereby gaining substantially same results as paragraph (A), in other words it seemed to us that he proposes under this heading to agree to milder peace terms but to give them the works once we get into Japan.) 3. Stalin expects that Russia will share in the actual occupation of Japan and wants an agreement with us and the British as to zones of occupation. . Stalin also wants an understanding between the Allies as to areas of operation in Manchuria and China....23 At the same time, the Soviet Government presented a new list of lend-lease requirements for its Far Eastern operations, amounting to 1,870,000 tons. This request was in addition to the original 33 Msg, Hopkins to Pres, 30 May h5. 74 Google iiunneeen on caeMILEPOST requirements of about 1,100,000 tons, nearly 80 percent of which had been delivered or was in shipment. The new request created serious problems for the logistic as well as the strategic planners. Soviet participation in the Pacific war was currently not vitals but desirable. Moreover, the President had on May 11 limited further lend-lease deliveries to the Soviet Union to urgent military requirenents needed for the Pacific war and supported by adequate information regarding their essentiality.34 The Soviet Government, however, was not furnishing this type of information. After long consideration with other government agencies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff on July 11 recom mended the shipment of such equipment to the Soviet Union as could ‘be made available in the light of competing demands and could be justified by the Soviet Union before September 30, 19h5.25 The war against Japan ended well before September 30, so the issue did not have to be resolved. During Mr. Hopkins' visit to Moscow in late May 195 agreement had been reached on July 15 as the approximate date for the next Big Three conference and on Berlin as the place. In preparation for this meeting, the Joint Chiefs of Staff again reexamined the plans for the unconditional surrender of Japan in the light of 34 Meno, Brig Gen Lincoln to Capt Duncan and McFarland, sub: Allocation of Supplies to the U.S.S.R., 12 May 45; Ltr, Dir USSR Br FEA to Adm Leahy, w/encls, 1) May 5. 35 Jes 1327/7, Note by Secy, sub: Lend-Lease Requirements of the USSR after 31 August L5, 11 Jul oS. 75 Google ITY OF MICHIrecent developments, On June 1h Admiral William D. Leahy informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the President desired to discuss these plans with them: The President today directed me to inform the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he wishes to mect with the Chiefs of Staff in the afternoon of the 18th, in his office, to dis- cuss the details of our campaign against Japan. He expects at this meeting to be thoroughly informed of: our intentions and prospects in preparation for his discussions with Churchill and Stalin. He will want information as to the number of men of the Army and ships of the Navy that wili be necessary to defeat Japan. He wants an estimate of tne time required and an estimate of the losses in killed and wounded that will result from an invasion of Japan proper. He wants an estimate of the time and the losses that wil. result fron an effort to defeat Japan by isolation, blockade, and bonbardment by sea and air forces. He desires to be informed as to exactly what we want the Russians to do. He desires information as to what useful contribution, if any, can be made by other Allied nations. It is his intention to make his decisions on tne campaign with the purpose of econonizing to the maximum extent possible in the loss of American lives. Economy in the use of time and in money cost is compar- atively unimportant, I suggest that a memorandum discussion of the above noted points be prepared in advance for delivery to the President at the tine of the meeting 4p order that he may find tine later to study the problem. On the same day, June 1h, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked the Pacific commanders to prepare for a sudden Japanese surrender: 36 Memo, Adm Leahy to JCS, 1 Jun 5. 76 Google f MICHIAlthough there is at present no evidence that sudden collapse or surrender of Japan is likely, the Joint Caiefs of Staff direct that plans be made to take immediate advan- tage of favorable circumstances, such as sudden collapse or surrender, to effect an entry into Japan proper for occupational purposes. On June 18, the Secretaries of War and Navy, Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff met with the President to discuss allied strategy for the unconditional surrender of Japant THE PRESIDENT stated that he had called the meeting for the purpose of informing himself with respect to the details of the campaign against Japan set out in Admiral Leahy's memorandum tothe Joint Chiefs of Staff on June Us. He asked General Marshall if he would express his opinion, GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the present situation with respect to operations against Japan was practically identical with the situation which had existed in connection with the operations proposed after Normandy. He then read, as an expression of his views, the following digest of a memorandum prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for presen- tation to the President (J.C.S. 1388): Our air and sea power has already greatly reduced move- ment of Jap shipping south of Korea and should in the next few months cut it to a trickle if not choke it off entirely. Hence, there is no need for seizing further positions in order to block Japanese conmunications south of Korea, General Macarthur and Admiral Nimitz are in agreement with the Chiefs of Staff in selecting 1 November as the target date to go into Kyushu because by that time: a. If we press preparations we can be ready. b. Our estimates are that our air action will have smashed practically every industrial target worth hitting in Japan as well as destroying huge areas in the Jap cities, ¢, The Japanese Navy, if any still exists, will be completely powerless. d. Our sea action and air power will have cut Jap reinforcenent capabilities from the mainland to negligible proportions. 37 sg, JCS to Gen Macarthur and Adm Nimitz, 1h Jun LS, C4-ouT aq 77 Google ITY OF MICHIImportant considerations bearing on the 1 November date rather than a later one are the weather and cutting to a minimum Jap time for preparation of defense. If we delay much after the beginning of Novenber the weather situation in the succeeding months may be such that the invasion of Japan, and hence the end of the war, will be delayed for up to 6 months. An outstanding military point about attacking Korea is the difficult terrain and beach conditions which appear to make the only acceptable assault areas Fusan in the southeast corner and Keijo, well up the western side. To get to Fusan, which is a strongly fortified area, we must move large and vulnerable assault forces past heavily fortified Japanese areas, The operation appears more difficult and costly than assault on Kyushu. Keijo appears an equally difficult and costly operation. After we have undertaken either one of them we still will not be as far forward as going into Kyushu, The Kyushu operation is essential to a strategy of strangulation and appears to be the least costly worth- while operation following Okinawa. The basic point is that a lodgement in Kyushu is essential, both to tightening our strangle hold of blockade and bombardment on Japan, and to forcing capitulation by invasion of the Tokyo Plain. We are bringing to bear against the Japanese every weapon and all the force we can employ and there is no reduction in our maximum possible application of bombardment and blockade, while at the same time we are pressing inva- sion preparations. It seems that if the Japanese are ever willing to capitulete short of complete military defeat in the field they will do it when faced by the completely hopeless prospect occasioned by (1) destruction already wrought by air bombardment and sea blockade, coupled with (2) a landing on Japan indicating the firmness of our resolution, and also perhaps coupled with (3) the entry or threat of entry of Kussia into the war. With reference to clean-up of the Asiatic mainland, our objective should be to get the Russians to deal with the Japs in Manchuria (and Korea if necessary) and to vitalize the Chinese to a point where, with assistance of American air power and sone supplies, tney can mop out their own country. 78Casualties. Our experience in the Pacific war is so diverse as to casualties that it is considered wrong to give any estimate in numbers, Using various combinations of Pacific experience, the War Department staff reaches the conclusion that the cost of securing a worthwhile position in Korea would almost certainly be greater than the cost of the Kyushu operation, Points on the optimistic side of the Kyushu operation are that: General Macarthur has not yet accepted responsibility for going ashore where there would be disproportionate casualties. The nature of the objective area gives room for maneuver, both on the land and by sea. As to any discussion of specific operations, the following data are pertinent: Jap Casualties Ratio U. S. Casualties Killed and Prisoners U.S. Campaign Killed, wounded, missing (Not including wounded) to Jap Leyte 17,000 78,000 12h.6- Luzon 31,000 156,000 1:5.0 Iwo Jima 20,000 25,000 131.25 Okinawa 34,000 (Ground) 61,000 1:2 7,700 (Navy) (not a complete count) Normandy (1st 30 days) 42,000 The record of General MacArtaur's operations from 1 March 194 through 1 May 1945 shows 13,742 U.S. kiiled compared to 310,165 Japanese killed, or a ratio of 22 tol. There is reason to believe that the first 30 days in Kyushu should not exceed the price we have paid for Luzon. It is a grim fact that there is not an easy, bloodless way to victory in war and it is the thankless task of the leaders to maintain their firm outward front which holds the reso- lution of their subordinates. Any irresolution in the leaders may result in costly weakening and indecision in the subordinates... An important point about Russian participation in the war is that the impact of Russian entry on the already hopeless Japanese may well be the decisive action levering them into capitulation at that time or shortly thereafter if we land in Japan, 79 Google Gnivesh ce MREIn considering the matter of command and control in the Pacific war which the British wish to raise at the next conference, we must bear in mind the point that anything smacking of combined command in the Pacific might increase the difficulties with Russia and perhaps with China. Further- more the obvious inefficiencies of combined command may directly result in increased cost in resources and American lives. GENERAL MARSHALL said that he had asked General Mac- Arthur's opinion on the proposed operation and had received from him the following telegram, which General Marshall then read: "I believe the operation presents less hazards of excessive loss than any other that has been suggested and that its decisive effect will eventually save lives by eliminating wasteful operations of nondecisive char= acter. I regard the operation as tne most economical one in effort and lives that is possible. In this re- spect it must be remembered that the several preceding months will involve practically no losses in ground troops and that sooner or later a decisive ground attack must be made. The hazard and loss will be greatly lessened if an attack is launched from Siberia suffi- ciently ahead of our target date to commit the eneny to major combat. I most earnestly recommend no change in OLYMPIC. Additional subsidiary attacks will simply build up our final total casualties," GENERAL MARSHALL. said that it was his personal view that the operation against Kyushu was the only course to pursue. He felt that air power alone was not sufficient to put the Japanese out of the war. It was unable alone to put the Germans out. General Eaker and General Eisen- hower both agreed to this, Against the Japanese, scattered through mountainous country, the problem would be much more difficult than it had been in Germany. He felt that this plan offered the only way the Japanese could be forced into a feeling of utter helplessness. The operation would be difficult but not more so than the assault in Normandy. He was convinced that every individ ual moving to the Pacific should be indoctrinated with a firm determination to see it through, 80 t Google eReADMIRAL KING agreed with General Marshall's views and said that the more he studied the matter, the more he was impressed with the strategic location of Kyushu, which he considered the key to the success of any siege operations. He pointed out that within three months the effects of air power based on Okinawa will begin to be felt strongly in Japan, It seems to him that Kyushu followed logically after Okinawa, It was a natural setup. It was his opinion that we should do Kyushu now, after which there would be time to judge the effect of possible operations by the Russians and the Chinese, The weather constituted quite a factor. So far as preparation was concerned, we must aim now for Tokyo Plain; otherwise we will never be able to accomplish it. If preparations do not go forward now, they cannot be arranged for later. Once started, however, they can always be stopped if desired, GENERAL MARSHALL agreed that Kyushu was a necessity and pointed out that it constituted a landing in the Japanese homeland, Kyushu having been arranged for, the decision as to further action could be made later. THE PRESIDENT inquired if a later decision would not depend on what the Russians agree to do. It was agreed that this would have considerable influence, ‘THE PRESIDENT then asked Admiral Leahy for his views of the situation, ADMIRAL LEAHY recalled that the President had been interested in knowing what the price in casualties for Kyushu would be and whether or not that price could be paid. He pointed out that the troops on Okinawa had lost 35 percent in casualties. If this percentage were applied to the nunber of troops to be employed in Kyushu, he thought from the similarity of the fighting to be expected that this would give a good estimate of the casualties to be expected. He was interested therefore in finding out how many troops are to be used in Kyushu, ADATRAL KING called attention to what he considered an important difference in Okinawa and Kyushu, There had been only one way to go on Okinawa, This meant a straight frontal attack against a highly fortified position. On Kyushu, however, landings would be made on three fronts simultaneously and there would be much more room for maneuver. It was his opinion that a realistic casualty figure for Kyushu would lie somewhere between the number experienced by General MacArthur in the operations on Luzon and the Okinawa casualties, 81 GoogleGENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the toval assault troops for the Kyushu campaign were shown in the memorandum prepared for the President as 766,700, He said, in answer to the President's question as to what opposition could be expected on Kyushu, that it was estimated at eight Japanese divisions or about 350,000 troops. He said that divisions were still being raised in Japan and that reinforcement from other areas was possible but it was becoming increasing- ly difficult and painful. THE PRESIDENT asked about the possibility of reinforce ments for Kyushu moving south from the other Japanese islands. GENERAL MARSHALL said that it was expected that all communications with Kyushu would be destroyed, ADMIRAL KING described in some detail the land con- munications between the other Japanese islands and Kyushu and stated that as a result of operations already planned, the Japanese would have to depend on sea shipping for any reinforcement, ADMIRAL LEAHY stressed the fact that Kyushu was an island, It was crossed by a mountain range, which would be difficult for either the Japanese or the Americans to cross. The Kyushu operation, in effect, contemplated the taking of another island from which to bring increased air power against Japan. THE PRESIDENT expressed the view that it was practically creating another Okinawa closer to Japan, to which the Chiefs of Staff agreed. THE PRESIDENT then asked General Eaker for his opinion of the operation as an air man, GENERAL EAKER said that he agreed completely with the statements made by General Marshall in his digest of the memorandum prepared for the President, He had just received a ceble in which General Arnold also expressed complete agreement. He stated that any blockade of Honshu was de- pendent upon airdromes on Kyushu; that the air plan con- templated employment of 0 groups of heavy bombers against Japan and that these could not be deployed without the use of airfields on Kyushu. He said that those who advocated the use against Japan of air power alone overlooked the very impressive fact that air casualties are always much heavier when the air faces the enemy alone and that these casualties never fail to drop as soon as the ground forces come in. Present air casualties are averaging 2 percent per 82 Google 'mission, about 30 percent per month. He wished to point out and to emphasize that deley favored only the enemy and he urged that there be no delay. ‘THE PRESIDENT said that as he understood it the Joint Ghiefs of Staff, after weighing all the possibilities of the situation and considering all possible alternative plans were still of the unanimous opinion that the Kyushu operation was the best solution under the circumstances, The Chiefs of Staff agreed that this was so. THE PRESIDENT then opinion. ked the Secretary of War for his MR, STIMSON agreed with the Chiefs of Staff that there was no other choice. He felt that he was personally re- sponsible to the President more for political than for military considerations. It was his opinion that there was a large submerged class in Japan who do not favor the present war and whose full opinion and influence hed never yet been felt. He felt sure that this submerged class would fight and fight tenaciously if attacked on their own ground. He was concerned that something should be done to arouse them and to develop any possible influence they might have before it becene necessary to come to grips with them, THE PRESIDENT stated that this possibility was being worked on all the time. He asked if the invasion of Japan by white men would not have the effect of more closely uniting the Japanese. MR, STIMSON thought there was every prospect of this, He agreed with the plan proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as being the best thing to do but ne still hoped for some fruitful accomplishment through other means, THE PRESIVENT then asked for the views of the Secretary of the Navy. MR. FORRESTAL pointed out that even if we wished to besiege Japan for a year or a year and a half, the capture of Kyushu would still be essential. Therefore, the sound decision is to proceed with the operation against Kyushu. There will still be time thereafter to consider the main decision in the light of subsequent events, MR. MCCLOY said he felt that the time was propitious now to study closely all possible means of bringing out the influence of the submerged group in Japan which had been referred to by Mr. Stinson, 83 Google i OhTHE PRESIDENT stated that one of iis objectives in connection with the coming conference would be to get from Russia all the assistance in the war that was possible. To this end he wanted to know all the decisions that he would have to make in advance in order to occupy the strongest possible position in the discussions. ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he could not agree with those who said to him that unless we obtain the unconditional sur- render of the Japanese that we will have lost the war. He feared no menace from Japan in the foreseeable future, even if we were unsuccessful in forcing unconditional surrender. What he did fear was that our insistence on unconditional surrender would result only in making the Japanese desperate and thereby increase our casualty lists. He did not think that this was at all necessary. THE PRESIDENT stated that it was with that thought in mind that he had left the door open for Congress to take appropriate action with reference to unconditional surrender. However, he did not feel that he could take any action at this time to change public opinion on the matter. THE PRESIDENT said he considered the Kyushu plan all right from the military standpoint and, so far as he was concerned, the Joint Chiefs of Staff could go ahead with it; that we can do this operation and then decide as to the final action later. * * * * THE PRESIDENT reiterated that his main reason for this conference witn the Chiefs of Staff was his desire to know definitely how far we could afford to go in the Japanese campaign, He had hoped that there was a possibility of preventing an Okinawa from one end of Japan to the other. He was clear on the situation now and was quite sure that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should proceed with the Kyushu operation. With reference to operations in China, GENERAL MARSHALL expressed the opinion that we should not seek an over-all commander in China. The present situation in which the Generalissimo was supporting General Wedemeyer, acting as his Chief of Staff, was entirely satisfactory. The suggestion of the appointment of an over-all commander might cause some difficulty. a4ADMIRAL KING said he wished to emphasize the point that, regardless of the desirability of the Russians entering the war, they were not indispensable and he did not think we should go so far as to bég them to come in, While the cost of defeating Japan would be greater, there was no question in his mind but that we could handle it alone. He thought that the realisation of this fact should greatly stygngthen the President's hand in the forthcoming conference. Shortly before the departure of the United States delegation for Potsdam, the Combined Intelligence Committee completed its latest estimate of the Japanese situation, Its report pointed out that the Japanese Navy had been reduced to the size of a small and un- balanced task force, that the Japanese Air Force was limited to suicide tactics, and that the Japanese Army, consisting of about 4,600,000 men, remained Japan's greatest military asset but retained little, if any, strategic mobility and was exposed to inereasing supply shortages. Despite this bleak outlook for Japan, it was believed that the prospects for surrender were slight until the Army leaders acknowledged defeat because of either the physical destruction of the Japanese armies or a desire to salvage enough to maintain the Japanese military tradition. The report presented the following conclusions: 11. Probable Military Strategy. The primary preoccupation of the Japanese High Command at present is the defense of the home islands, especially Kyushu and Honshu. For this defense they may dispose by the end of 1945 more than 35 active divisions plus 1) depot divisions, which, with army troops, will total over 2,000,000 men. Except possibly in the case of Hokkaido. 38 Min, JCS Mtg with Pres, 18 Jun LS, 85 Google eect iall available aircraft will be employed in the defense of the home islands, mainly in suicide operations. Their air effort might amount initially to 400-500 sorties of combat- type aircraft and 200-300 sorties of trainer-type aircraft during any 2h-hour period; this effort will, however, decline rapidly, Sinilarly all remaining naval units will be employed in suicide operations in defense of the homeland. The secondary preoccupation of the Japanese is to build up their forces in Manchuria, Korea, and North China against the Soviet threat. There they might dispose up to 10 divisions, totalling about 1,500,000 men, by December of this year, Reinforcements will come from Central and South China, They are unlikely to make a strong air effort in defense of Manchuria at the expense of the defense of Japan. If circumstances require it, the Japanese are prepared to abandon all of China south of the general line Tungkuan-Kaifeng- Nanking-Hangchow, except for the Canton-Hong Kong pocket, which they will hold with a strong garrison. ‘All other areas will be regarded as of minor importance only. They will not be reinforced from the Inner Zone, but their garrisons will be ordered to resist to the last in order to contain Allied forces which might otherwise be used against Japan, and in order to deny to the Allies strategic materials and bases in their areas, Strategy in these out= lying areas will, therefore, be designed to keep Japanese forces in being rather than to defend particular objectives to the last or to undertake more than, at the most, local counter-offensives. 12, Probable Political Stra’ + In general, Japan will use all political Treats for averting complete defeat or unconditional surrender. During the next few months the political strategy of the Government will exhibit the following aims to, . Continue and eyen increase its attempts to secure complete political unity within the Empire, possibly through personal rule, real or apparent, of the Emperor. b. Attempt to foster a belief among Japan's enemies that the war will prove costly and long drawn out if the United Nations insist on fighting until the complete conquest of Japan. ce Make desperate efforts to persuade the U.S.S.Re to continue her neutrality, if necessary by offering important territorial or other concessions, while at the same time making every effort to sow discord between the Americans and British on one side and the Russians on the other. As the situation deteriorates still further, Japan may even make a serious attempt to use the U.S.S.R. as a mediator in ending the war. 86 t Google univerd. Put out intermittent peace feelers, in an effort to bring the war to an acceptable end, to weaken the deter- mination of the United Nations to fight to tne bitter end, or to create inter-Allied dissension. e. Take all possible advantage of estranged relations between the Communists and Kuomintang factions in Cnina. 13. Possibility of Surrender, The Japanese ruling groups are aware of the desperate military situation and are increase- ingly desirous of 2 compromise peace, but still find uncondition- al surrender unacceptable. Tne basic policy of tne present government is to fight as long and as desperately as possible in the hope of avoiding complete defeat and of ac,uiring a better bargaining position in a negotiated peace. Japanese leaders are now playing for time in tne hope tnat Allied war weariness, Allied disunity, or some "miracie," will present an opportunity to arrange a compromise peace. We believe that a considerable portion of tne Japanese population now consider absolute military defeat to be probable. The increasing effects of sea blockade and cumulative devasta- tion wrougnt by strategic bombing, which nas already rendered millions homeLess and nas destroyed from 25 to 50 percent of the build-uo area of Japan's most inportant cities, should make this realization increasingly general. An entry of the Soviet Union into tne war would finally convince the Japanese of the inevitability of complete defeat. Although individual Japanese willingly sacrifice themselves in tne service of the nation, we doubt that the nation as a whole is predisposed toward national suicide. Ratner, the Japanese as a nation have a strong concept of national survival, regardless of tne fate of individuals. They would probably prefer national survival, even through surrender, to virtual extinction. The Japanese believe, however, that unconditional sur- render would be the equivalent of national extinction. There are as yet no indications that the Japanese are ready to accept such terms, The ideas of foreign occupation of the Japanese homeland, foreign custody of tne person of the Emperor, and the loss of prestige entailed by tne acceptance of "unconditional surrender" are most revolting to tie Jap- anese. ‘To avoid these conditions, if possible, and, in any event, to insure survival of the institution of the Emperor, the Javanese might well be wiliing to withdraw from ali the territory they have seized on tne Asiatic continent and in the southern Pacific, and even to agree to tue indenendence of Korea and to the practical disarmament or their military forces. 87 oiawwes Google i Y OF MICHIGANA conditional surrender by tie Japanese Government along the lines stated above might be offered by them at any time from now until the time of the complete destruction of all Japanese power of resistance. Since the Japanese Army is the principal repository of the Japanese military tradition it follows that the army leaders must, with a sufficient degree of unanimity, ac- knowledge defeat before Japan can be induced to surrender. This might be brought about either by the defeat of the main Japanese armies in the Inner Zone or through a desire on the part of the army leaders to salvage something from the wreck with a view to maintaining military tradition. For a sur- render to be acceptable to the Japanese Army, it would be necessary for the military leaders to believe that it would not entail discrediting warrior tradition and that it would permit the ultimate resurgence of a military Japan.39 The question of issuing a governmental proclamation to encourage acknowledgmont cf defeat by explaining that unconditional surrender did not mein national extinction had been extensively discussed during the previous months by civilian and military leaders in in ton, Officially, unconditional surrender remained the united States objective, and current military plans had been developed to achieve this objective. on July 2, Secretary of War Stimson submitted to the President the conclusion of his discussions with the Secretary of the Navy and the Acting Secretary of State. He recommended issuance of an allied proclamation spelling out the terms of surrender before Japan had been driven to fanatical despair, and thought that acceptance was likely, thereby making the costly invasion of the home isiands unnecessary. fe believed timt inclusion of assurances that the Japanese Government could, if desired, continue as a 39 cs 643/3, subi Estimate of the Enemy Situation, 8 Jul LS, 88 t » Go gle UNIVERSITY OF MICHIconstitutional monarchy under the present dynasty would substan- tially add to the chances of acceptance,40 Before leaving for the Potsdan Conference, the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated to the Soviet Chiefs of Staff the desirability of exchanging estimates of tne Japanese situation and of reaching definite agreements on the coordination of United States and Soviet operations, These preliminary negotiations were handled ie by General Deane in Yoscow. Potsdam Conference and Surrender of Japan The Potsdam Conference, July 17 to August 2, 1945, developed nothing new on the military side, The plans already made received final approval. On July 2h, the President and the Prime Minister approved the report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the con- duct of the war against Japan, The overall strategic concept was stated as follows: In cooperation with other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the defeat of Japan by: lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength; invading and seizing objectives in the Japanese home islands as the main effort; conducting such operations against objectives in other than the Japanese home islends as will contribute to the main effort; establishing absolute military control of Japan; and liberating Japanese-occupied territory if 40 Memo, Sec Stimson for Pres, 2 Jul L5, ‘uoted in full in Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in War and Peace, (New York, 1947), pp. 620-2h. 1D sg, JCS to Maj Gen Deane, 27 Jun LS, QI-CUT 23LN73 Msgs Nas Gen Deane to JCS, 29 Jun 45, CM-IN 26556; Ltr, Maj Gen Deane to Gen Antonov, 5 Jul LS. 89 ( Googlerequired? The strategic plans for the defeat of Japan had been developed by the United States Chiefs of Staff, noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and were accepted at the July 2 meeting: 1. In confornity with the over-all objective to bring about the unconditional surrender of Japan at the earliest possible date, the United States Chiefs of Staff have adopted the following concept of operations for tne main effort in the Pacific: a, From bases in Okinawa, Iwo Jima, Marianas, and the Philippines to intensify the blockade and air bombardment of Japan in order to create a situation favorable to: b. An assault on Kyushu for the purpose of further reducing Japanese carabilities by containing and destroying major enery forces and further intensifying the blockade and air bombardment in order to establish a tactical condition favorable to: c. The decisive invasion of Honshu, 2. We have curtailed our projected expansion in tho Ryukyus by deferring indefinitely the seizure of Miyako Jima and Kikai Jima, Using the resources originally provided for tyako and Kikai, we have accelerated the development of Okinawa. By doing this, a greater weight of effort will more promptly be brought to bear against Japan and the risk of ‘ecoming involved in operations which might delay the seizure of Kyushu is avoided. 3. In furtherance of the accomplishment of the over-all objectives, we have directed: a, The invasion of Kyushu. b. The continuation of operations for securing and maintaining control of sea conmunications to and in the western Pacific as are required for the accomplishment of the over-all objective. ce. The defeat of the remaining Japanese in the Philippines by such operations as can be executed without prejudice to the over-all objective. d. The seizure of Balikpapan, (This operation is now approaching successful completion. ) e. The continuance of strategic air operations to support the accomplishment of the over-all objective. 12 CCS 90/3, sub: Report to the President and Prime Minister of the Agreed Summary of Conclusions reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the "Terminal" Conference, 2h Jul US. 90 t Google inne4, Planning and preparation for the campaign in Japan subsequent to the invasion of Kyushu are continuing on the basis of meeting the target date for the invasion of Honshu. ‘This planning is premised on the belief that defeat of the enemy's forces in the Japanese homeland is a prerequisite to unconditional surrender, and that such a defeat will establish the optimm prospect of capitulation by Japanese forces out- side the main Japanese islands. We recognize the possibility also that our success in the main islands may not obviate the necessity of defeating Japanese forces elsewhere; decision as to steps to be taken in this eventuality must await further developments. 5. We are keeping under continuing review the possibil- ity of capitalizing at small cost upon Japanese military deterioration and withdrawals in the China Theater, without delaying the supreme operations. 6. We have directed the preparation of plans for the following: a. Keeping open a sea route to Russian Pacific ports. b. Operations to effect an entry into Japan proper for occupational purposes in order to take im- mediate advantege of favorable circumstances such as @ sudden enemy collapse or surrender. In keeping with this program, the Combined Chiefs of Staff sug- gested, and the President and the Prime Minister agreed that: ‘The following additional tasks will be undertaken in order to assist in the execution of the over-all strategic concept: a. Encourage Russian entry into the war against Japan. Provide such aid to her war- making capacity as may be necessary and practic- able in connection therewith. As for the planning date for the end of organized resistance by Japan, the report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff merely restated the general formils approved at earlier meeting! We recommend that for the purpose of planning production and the allocation of manpower, the planning date for the end of organized resistance by Japan be 15 November 1946 and 91 Google Unive Netsthat this date be p@Justed periodically to conform to the course of the war. “3 On July 24, the day of their meeting with the President and the Prime Minister, the Combined Chiefs of Staff also met with their Soviet counterparts and exchanged information on future operations. The Soviet Chiefs of Staff stated that the Soviet Union expected to attack the Japanese in Manchuria late in August, the date depending on the conferences with the Republic of China. /+# Two days later, on July 26, the Joint Chiefs of Steff had a meeting with the Soviet Chiefs to discuss more specifically the co- ordination of allied operations. The agenda for these discussions had been prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the form of five questions vhich had been handed by General Marshall to General stonov on July 2k: First Question -- Has the Soviet High Command received any instructions regarding the proposal to establish United States weather liaison groups in Petropavlovsk and Khabarovak as presented to Generalissimo Stalin by President Truman on 23 July 1945? Second Question -- United States naval surface forces will operate without restriction in the Seas of Okhotsk and Japan. United States submarine forces will operate without restriction in the Seas of Okhotek and Japan, south and east of a line established by connecting the following pointe: 43 cos 90/3, sub: Report to the President and Prine Minister of the Agreed Summary of Conclusions reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the "Terminal" Conference, 24 Jul 45, Appendix A, Memo on Plans and Operations in the Pacific. “A win, Tripartite Military Meeting, 24 Jul 45. The same information regarding Soviet entry into the Pacific war appears to have been given to tae President by Marshal Stalin in their first meeting on July 17. No minutes for this meeting have been found. See William D. Leahy, I Was There, (New York, 1950), p. 397; James F. Byrnes, Spesking Frankly, (New York, 1947), p. 205; and William Hillman, Mr. President New York, 1952), p- 123. t Google eyCoast of Korea at latitude 38° north, thence to latitude 400 north longitude 1350 east, thence to latitude L505! north longitude 1h0° east, thence along the parallel of Tatitude 15015" north, Tals boundary will be subject to later change as the situation may require. United States submarine operations north and west of this boundary and Soviet operations south and east of this boundary will be subject to coordination. Does the Soviet General Staff have any suggestions regarding further coordination of naval operations? Third Question -- United States air forces will operate without restriction south and east of the following line: Cape Lopatka, west to point at latitude 51°10! north longitude 147° east, thence to point at latituds 5045" north longitude 14)020' east, thence to point at latitude l50h5! north longitude 139030! east, thence to point at latitude 41920! north longitude 133020! east, thence westward to Seishin, Korea, thence north to railroad at Korean border, thence westward along railroad to Yungki and Changehun, thence along the river to Liaoyuan, Kailu and Cnihfeng, thence along the railroad through Tolum, Paochang, Wanchuan, Tatung, Fengchan, Tsining to Kweisul, thence northwest to the border of Outer Mongolia. This boundary will be subject to later change as the situation may require. United States air operations north and west of this boundary and Soviet operations south and east of this boundary will be subject to coordination. Does the Soviet General Staff have any suggestions regarding further coordination of air operations? Fourth Question — Does the Soviet High Command agree to the proposal for the immediate establishment of operational coordination and liaison as proposed by tne United States Chiefs of Staff in the letter sent by the Commanding General, United States Military Mission, to General Antonov on 5 July 1945? Fifth Question — It is assumed that, after D-day, Soviet or United States air and naval craft in emergencies will have access to the nearest Soviet or United States ports or airfields where they may obtain repairs, servicing, medical care and otherwise be assisted in making a speedy return to combat. Although in extreme emergency the nearest friendly facility would be sought, it is considered desirable to designate certain ports, airfields or areas where maximum facilities would be available. Will the Soviet Governnent designate such ports, airfields or areas furnishing infor- nation necessary for proper location, identification and approach together with information on recognition signals, 93 Google