TheopeningoftheSecondFront

tookpressureofftheUSSRinEasternEurope
Alliesagreedtothisinprinciplebutdidnotopenthesecondfrontuntilthetimewasdeemed
right
ThisinturncausedStalintobesuspiciousthattheAlliesweredeliberatelydelayingthe
openingoftheSecondFrontinhopetoseetheSovietstobepermanentlyweakenedby
Germanattacks

TheWarsawUprising
August1944
RedArmyapproachedWarsawandGermanoccupyingforcespreparedtoretreat
PolishresistancehomearmyroseuptoliberatePolandthemselves
encouragedbySovietsandbelievedtheywouldbeassistedbyRedArmy
StalinorderedhisarmytorestonothersideofVistulariver
Germansslaughteredpoles
15,000membersofthePolishresistancearmywerekilled

TensionsatYalta
GermanyonthevergeofbeingdefeatedwiththeSecondFrontfinallyopenedduring
Normandylandingsof1944
AlliesdecidedthatGermanywouldbedisarmed,demilitarized,denazified,anddivided
postwarGermanytobedividedintofourzonesamongstAlliesAlliedControlCouncilset
uptogovernGermany
StalindemandedalargepercentageofthereparationsfromGermanytobegiventoRussians
borderbetweenPolandandtheUSSRtobedrawnatCurzonLine
frontierbacktowhereithadbeenbeforetheRussoPolishWarof1921
SovietswantedCommunistdominatedLublinCommitteeinPoland
SovietsintentionregardingPolandevidentlyseenwithKatynForestMassacreaswellas
failureofSovietforcestoassistPolishundergroundinWarsawUprising

ClearDivisionsatPotsdam
TrumanchallengedthenewwesternfrontierbetweenPolandandGermany(OderNeisseline)
insistedforthereorganizationofPolishgovernment
StalinsendorsementoftheLublinPolesdidnotappeasetheUSA
USAunhappyaboutPercentagesAgreementmadebilaterallybyStalinandChurchill
spheresofinfluencesdiscussedintermsofpercentages
Trumanrevealedthesuccessofthefirstatomicbombtestinginthisconference
firstABdroppedonHiroshimaAugust1945
secondAbdroppedonNagasaki
AmericansdidnotencourageSovietstojoinPacificwarinthefirsttimeever

Hiroshima
FirstatomicbombdroppedinHiroshimaonAugust1945

TheRedArmyinEasternEurope
SovietUnioncontrolinEEbecameknownassatelliteempire

countrieskepttheirseparatelegalidentities(theonlythingthatseparatedthemselvesfrom
Moscow)
Tiedintomoscowslinesduetothefollowing:
sovietmilitarypower,salamitactics,statepoliceandsecurity,COMECON
bytheendof1948,satellitestateswereeconomicalyandmilitarilyunderthecontrolofthe
USSR

SalamiTactics
SovietssupervisedtheorganizationofgovernmentsinEE
eachofthepartieswasslicedoff,oneaftertheother
communistcorewasleftandultimatelythelocalCommunistswerereplacedwithMoscow
trainedpeople
BaggageTrainleadersreturnedtoEasternEuropeensuredthatthepostwargovernment
oftheirrespectivecountries

Germany
Potsdam:
stateofwar:GermanysurrenderedunconditionallyandUSinvadingJapanesemainland
Germany:economyofGermanywouldrunasawholebutwaslimitedtodomesticindustry
andagriculture
Sovietsreceive24%oftheirreparationbillfromWesternzonesmoreagricultural
Easternzonewastogivefoodinexchange

Iran
TehranConference1943
criticalturningpointvictoriesin1942forAllies
UKandUSAstillhaventlaunchedtheSecondFrontthattheSovietshavebeendemanding
for
StalincontinuedtopressurehisAlliestoinvadenorthwesternEuropeinordertotake
someburdenoffUSSRsshoulders
WhattodowithGermany
differentviewsaboutthefutureofGermany
lessonsfromthefailureofTreatyofVersailles
agreedupontheideathattheunconditionalsurrenderofGermanywastheir
objective
RooseveltsupportedOperationoverlord
StalinsconcernswithsecurityanddemandedtohaveasayinhowPolandspostwar
borderswouldbeshaped
arguedthatPolandhadbeenthetraditionallaunchingpadforinvasionsofRussia
USSRgottokeeptheterritorythatwasseizedin1939
PolandwouldbegiventerritoryonitswesternborderwithGermany
createdanotrulyindependentPolandensuredfuturehostilitybetweenGermanyand
Poland
PuppetRegimePolandwouldhavetolooktoUSSRforfuturesecurity
Sovietsdemandedtherighttokeepterritorytheyhadseizedbetween193940whichwould
givethemcontrolofBalticStates,partsofFinlandandRomania

UKandUSAagreedtotheSovietannexationoftheseterritories
wentagainst1941AtlanticChartervalues
settleinternationaldisputesthroughcollectivesecurityorganization,UnitedNations
mainpositiveoutcomes:UnitedNations,agreementontheneedforweakpostwarGermany

Kennan'sLongTelegram
keyidea:Sovietsystemwasbuoyedbythethreatofahostileworldoutsideitsborders
KennanarguedthatUSSRsviewoftheworldwasatraditionaloneofinsecuritywantedto
advanceStalinistideology
Sovietregimewascruelandrepressive
HostilerelationshipbetweenrussiaandtheUSA

Churchill'sFultonSpeech
IronCurtainSpeech
Sovietreaction:withdrewfromIMF,steppedupantiWesternpropaganda
initiatedanewfiveyeareconomiclife

InstabilityinGreeceandTurkey
postWW2:antiimperialist,nationalistandtoacertainextent,ProCommunistrebellions
inGreeceandTurkey
rebellionssupportedanddirectedbySoviets?

CommunistPartysuccessinItalyandFrance
grewstrongerinpostwarEurope
membershipincreasingduetoeconomicdeprivationsandhardshipsexperiencedattheendof
thewar

TheTrumanDoctrine
radicalchangeinUSforeignpolicywhichhastraditionallybeenisolationist
inresponsetounstable
TrumansdecisionasaffectednotonlybyChurchillsperception

TheMarshallPlan
MarshallbelievedthattheeconomiesofWesternEuropeneededimmediatehelpfromthe
USA
followedquitenaturallyontheTrumanDoctrineeconomicextensionoftheideasoutlined
bythepresident
aims:reviveEuropeaneconomiespoliticalstabilityandsocialcouldbeensuedinthefuture
SovietsbelievedthatUSAwasestablishingaEuropeanempireandthatitsmethodwas
economicdominationanddependence

COMECON(January1949)
acentralizedagencythatlinkedEasternbloccountriestoMoscowdesignedtostimulate
andcontroltheireconomicdevelopment,supportcollectivisationofagriculturaland
developmentofheavyindustry
responsetoMarshallPlanMolotovPlanseriesofbilateraltradeagreements


COMINFORM
createdasaninstrumenttoincreaseStalinscontrolovertheCommunistpartiesofother
countries
WestwasconcernedthatthisorganizationwouldactivelyspreadCommunismintheWests
ownsphereofinfluenceWesternEurope

Mr'X'Article
KennanarguedthattheUnitedStatespolicytowardstheSovietUnionhadtobeoneofthe
longtermcontainmentofSovietexpansionism
USshouldregardtheUSSRpoliticallyasrivalratherthanpartner
KenanhadstronginfluenceonPresidentTruman
hadinfluenceoverAmericanpublicopinionduetohisexpertiseonSovietpolicy

CzechoslovakianCoup
1948SovietscontinuedtoattempttoconsolidatetheircontroloverEasternEurope
CzechwishedtoleanmoretowardsWesternsidessphereofinfluence
WorriedStalinbecauseCzechexpressedinterestinreceivingaidfromtheMarshallPlan
certainamountofsentimentalfeelingintheWestforCzechsafterabandonmentin
theMunichAgreementsof1938
StalinorganizedforpressuretobeputontheCzechcoalitiongovernment
CzechCommunistPartyleaderdemandedtheformationofacommunistledgovernment

ImpactoftheBerlinBlockadeontheestablishmentoftheCIA:
1.WhywastheBerlinBlockadeatestforUSintelligence?
BerlinCrisisbeganMarch1948
importanttestfortheAmericanintelligenceestablishment
StalintriedtopushtheAlliesoutofWesternBerlin,intelligenceofficersjudgedwhetherhis
pressurewasapreludetowaroracalculatedbluff
2.Whatweretheconclusionsdrawnatthetime?
March1948:AmericanMilitaryGovernorinBerlindescribedsubtlechangeinSoviet
attitudewhichconvincedhimthatwarmightsooncomewithdramaticsuddenness
theybelievedthattheUSSRwouldnotresorttomilitaryactionwithinthenext60days
followedbyseriesofescalatingSovietprovocations:blockadeofBerlinandAlliedairlift
3.WhatwastheimpactofthecrisisonUSintelligence?
nonationalintelligenceunittoproduceassessmentsatthattime
DCIHillenkoetterestablishedanadhoc,interagencycommitteetoprepareanestimateof
Sovietintentions
adhoccommitteeestimatesprovedtohaveimmediateandlongtermrelevancefor
policymakersinWashington
4.WhatarethevalueandlimitationsofusingthisasasourceforfindingoutabouttheBerlinCrisisof
1949?
TheBerlinCrisiswasanationalintelligenceproblemthatittranscendedthebureaucraticlines
thathaddividedtheintelligencefortheprevioustwoyears
Theotheralternativewasquitesimplyparalysis

CaseStudy

Causes

Impact

Significance

BerlinBlockade
19481949

Germanyskeystrategic
position
Differingaimsofthemain
powers
increasinglackoftrustbetween
bothparties
disputesbetweenpostwar
powerswithinGermany

divisionofGermany
thecontinuationoffourpower
controlinBerlin
theformationoftheNATO

PostwarGermany:
BerlinwasagreedtobedividedtemporarilyintofourzonesadministeredbytheACCwith
BerlinsgovernancebeingtheresponsibilityofAlliedKommandantur
temporaryarrangement
Germanywastreatedasoneeconomicunit
by1949,Germanyhadpermanentlydividedintotwoseparatestates

WhydidpostwarpowersfailtounifyGermany?
Germanyskeystrategicpositionanddifferingaimsofthemainpowers
geographicalproximitiesandpotentialeconomicstrengthconcernforallcountries
USSRdidnotwishfortheresurgenceofGermanyposeassecuritythreat
wantedtogetasmuchoutofGermanyatthesametimereparations
FrancefearedaunitedGermany
USwishedforGermanytogothroughrapideconomicrecovery