CHAPTER 14 WHAT CAUSES DEMOCRATIZATION? BARBARA GEDDES. esearct on democratization has become increwsingly sophisticated during the ast decade With the completion and sharing of new dates and the ratcheting up of texning in satinics and modeling, approaches to studying democratization have ‘hanged gresly since the mid-so90% Economic mal of democratization and lange sail investigations of is causes play am eer larger role in He sty, “What we thik we know about derncratization has changed mach les, though we fae some inteigung new ides to think about Recent recach hs confirmed what vee thought we knew several decades ago: richer counties are more iy 0 be ‘Eemocratc. Controversy continues about whether economic development increases the Hlethood of transition to democracy, Preworki and his coauthors (2000) hae argu empha development reduces the likehood of democratic breakdown, thus increasing the ‘numberof ich demecatc countries evn though it has no causal on tans tions democracy. Other cael amass of regime chang, however, continue 19 find a reationship between development and transitions to democracy (ef, Bix an Stokes 2005; Epstein et forthcoming). ‘Sow other empiial regularities have achieved the status of styled! facts, though all re ao been challenged: Reines on Ol and perhaps other mine ‘xprt, reduces the lkthood of democracy (Barro 196; Ross 200, Fh 003) ‘Countries with ge Mastin populations are ls ily tote democratic Fish 3003) ‘Weiner (a8?) and Payne (19s) among others have sgssted that Brith colo heritage contributes to beter prospects for democracy er and Baro (196) finds sppor forthe claims! ca AAs with the relationship tetween development and democracy, controversy continue about whether these ate causal ratonsipe oF coeltions explained BY omsthing ele. Among thos who blew rationshipe are ata, there aredisagree ‘ments about the process through which the eats predce the outcome. Middle ast experts explain the eoeeation betwen ol wealth and dictatorship asa conse- quence of reir state that can wet ets fom the sale fatal resources to Aistbte subsides to lege pats ofthe population ad thus to maintain popula ‘compliance withthe reine (Anderson 187 Cryst 995. In pal agent, Durning (2006) agus that ol ets nin some cecumstances be used to sustain erpocracy. Herb (200), however, shows that when a measure of deeopment that ‘eludes the eft of ot om the economy is used in place of GDP per apis ia "tistical analysis of the cnses of democratization oi-ch countries it the same psters a other countries The proxy mesure of development hasa strong postive ‘fect on changes in democracy scare, ad rent dependence, measured separately, Ineo fet In ahort he challengesthe existence of elatonsip between ol wealth and regime type Some observes hae suggested an aay beewcen Musim doctrine ‘or the aitudes of believers and authoritarianism, but Fish (202) suggests that ‘Maslin counties tend t be authoritarian not for thereon usually mentioned but because ofthe suppression of women's rights in these counties, "Ini93, Seymour Marti Lipset argued that mosenization eased derocracy. He support his cam with whit was then a tateof she art quantiave tet a able ‘showing relationship between varios measore of development and democracy in ‘cross-section of counties, In succeeding decades, analytic techniques have Become ‘much more sophisticated, more data have become avalable, and scholars have developed more nuanced measures of democracy never more sophisicatd ways nats have confirmed the existence of a cortetion between democracy and ‘development (Bolen and Jackin is; Burkhart and Lets Beck 1994 Casio ‘owzski 195; Barro 1996 Praewor et 2000) Without denigrating ther conts- betion, which has bos very great iti til possible to note that te beyond greater certainty about that orginal claim bas een added othe ple of knowledge me canbe ‘emsoray sure we now Trying to understand democratization, we have traditionally eled on descip- tions of transitions in indvidal countries and small groups of counties or lrgeN statistical studies. The case stus have ben very useful in proving information ‘shout particular transitions Large N sts typ inclode al counts fr which Jnformation about proposed caussis available. Tha stadies have bul the curren sccumulition of inowledge about the reatioship between development and dem ‘ocracy The author ofthe rge-N studs have ngs various process through ‘which growth and the rested spread of eucation, urbanization, and indvidal ‘mobility night lead to demands for democracy, ad many of hese arguments ave 2 bt se Asm a) Gr ng hg Acogh and Rabin (08) ehh homens all ly ado atone Sec ed egetbeen tesa A comdation between elucation, especialy primary education, and democracy swell establahed (Bar 1996) Some studies have found a reationhip teteen the income share of the idle css and democracy (Baro 1996). The eults on urbanization are mind, wih some showing anes fest on doe ‘acy. These tudes have not actly modled the pres of democratization via these avenus, however: They ll sem 1 assume hat if tizns want democracy and Fave the required sil, they can achieve ‘Ginen the suaity and amount of elor expended on understanding demo tiation, its stating to understand vo itl Scholar have responded by pushing the research frentier in two intriguing diecions. Some have taken up Robert Baro (1996) halenge “Given the strength ofthe Lipset/Aritote hypothe as ‘an empirical regularity, tt surprising that conwincng theoretical model of the ‘elton Jo not exist, Thus development of sich Uheory i privity for future research (Sta)” Moding and tetng interactions between elites, who may no ‘want wo share power and citizen, who may want 10 influence disribution and ‘herfore demand democracy ar 4 means of iin ifuence, have now moved to the top of the rscarch anda. Several scholars have proposed plausible deductive rguments tht identify undeing cass of democratization, most of which are ‘orlted with development and that therefore explain the corti, The next Section dics recent mods ofthe pres of democratization and the evidence supporing them 1 ferent ection has been taken by other anabsts, who cam that inter- ‘tonal factors hve played such larger role i explaining democratization than ‘Stier obser: had rized, I international frees hae a major fect om dem- ‘czatiation, and expecially there isan iteration between international and ‘domestic factors, their excision from sats texts may explain some of the limited and contradictory res bane in thee te Internationa infloencs Inne barely figured in the historical Ieratre on democratization, but stds Inching them have produced interesting result inthe ast few yar. The second section below summarizes ecent ining bout international effets om transitions to democracy. In respons to the mf ues and alr to which the stay of democratization ‘nse, {sues tat the reason els have ben somewhat miedo far ith the ‘phenomenon we label democratization actualy inde several diferent cous Drocese. tthe lrge-N studies have humped multiple cause process into the Sime statistical model, iti nt surprising that only the most basic relationships Iv emerge Similar, fhe mcs that ave ben proposed it democratization in some comtet tot ther thenit sal nt srpesing that epi support for the model hasbeen modest diferent approach to understanding democatiation ‘would begin by disagrating int several dine processor subgroups an then Theorsing diferent anaton process separately Inthe thd ection discus some iferent ways to think about theoretically wnt aggregations of the process of ‘democratization. 1 INVESTIGATING THE Process: WHAT CAUSES THE CORRELATION BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT AND Democracy? In yer influential bok and article, Preworski and coauthors (3997, 200) have ‘gued that there no rations btwn level of economic development and traneions to democracy, They note tht transitions can occ for many easons, ‘otal of which are systematic. ‘They cam thatthe apprent relationship results ftom the poll staliy of rich democracies. Although poor democracies some- times colle and return to dictatorship ich democracies never do. which over time Teds to a high proportion of rch countries among democracies. Using 2 Ailerent mensre of democracy and 3 dataset covering much longer peiod of time, Geach and Choun (2004) ao find no elatonship between development fant trastons to democracy aer controlling for characteristics of countre? ‘eighbors? ‘Other anats,howevet, have been unpersaded by Praeworki et als argument. Ina very careful analy that extends the ie period back to 1850, Boi and Stokes (Goo show that development does contbte a demacai tantions, hough the average fet forthe whole pred is sal lative to the fect of development on ‘maintaining democracy In fa. they note that a carfal reading of Democracy and Development shows that even Prewoai etal. (2000) nd small satis sign ian ef of development onthe Hekbod of wansitions to democracy. Bote ad Stokes (ao) show tht when the dite i divided by time periods economic development san extremely important predictor of transi prior o 1950 but has ‘onl small (though statistically igicnt fet nthe post 930 prod. Epstein ‘al. (frcoming slo challenge the Pracworal etl (200) findings. They show ‘hate are changes by tsi richotomous measure of democracy rather hana Aichotomous one as Peter aid. They find that devdopment as strong Dredicve power for trinstions into and out of the category they call parva ‘erocray, but ls efecto transits fom fll autocracy to fall democracy. Eten eta’ (forthcoming) ndings shoul probably be interpreted as meaning that development fa good predictor ofthe stening ot routinization of author tarian regimes though not aces of regime change. * Roche (ama) a dt ein amen pment and denon se coun de eg oe ery nie mee eg ee ont ‘Sitcom ce tie ting niece Seder ts ‘Shinran ee elope iy scien wh eng ence nen ‘Sent mg sel sin mht be fat Seapets ‘Soca sm tho ung er econ beeen npn me et ‘aie of densa sem non hp nre Nora ‘Screg’ nee ee ents Sop samcLr comomic development is cored with many other trends and one oF more of hve maybe the caus mechanism that accounts forthe apparent rationship Irtween development and dmocrcy Lipet and oer modernization theorists siggested tht Increasing eduction, equal, buszaton, experience of working in factories andthe weakening of traditional loyales to tbe and willage—all ‘orcs of economic deveopment—would rst in ctzens with moe tert Sn participatory atte who would domand yin goverment (Lipset 193 les and Sth 197). These arguments src the experiences and vals of ‘ordinary chiens athe bases or democracy witout seaiving the proces though ‘which tamsitions might occur or ving mich atenton to the possible rctance [OF elites to gie up power: Scholar influenced by Marx expect the mile case Ivhich tens to grow a the economy dveops—t0 be the care ofthe demand for ‘Gemocracy no Dougie, no democracy Zak and Feng (208) have move 2 Proves though which this rltionship might unfold, but have not tested Bois (00) Acemogand Robinson (ao 203) and Zakand Feng (200) age that demctization s more lily when the income ditebution—which tends to ‘fen uta countries each high levels of Jvelopment—ir more a: Boix and ‘Acmogh/Rabinan age tht sites er relintribution ls when income distrib tin relly equal because the median voter's preference with regard totes will then be les confinatory. Elites, according to Acemogl and Rabin (201, ate ‘lng to cede some power her hank the cots revaation when they expect ‘eroticy not tole to extremely redstiutine tation. Boix (200) expects a Tinea lationship betwen etait ad the ithood of democratization. Aen ‘said Robinsons (ane) model suggests non-monotonic relationship: a hw Teves of inequality, a crease can promote democracy y incteasing the threat of revolution, but at higher level of ncqualty, elites wl repre ether than oferng ‘ancssons because of thi ar ofthe retributive consequences of democrat: tion, An empirical challenge to these arguments that evidence of more al Income ditions in democracies at ext mized (Bolen and Jackman 1985) “Thee i evidence thatthe caren st of recltrant itatrsips made up of ourtrcs with especialy noua income dstbutions. In the post-Second Werk ‘Wor pio, longer ved digatrshipe (exchading, monarchies) have more equal Income daibations than bi oe ois (om) and Rogol (98) argue that capital moby, which alo tend to sie with development ao contributes o democratization, When capitals motile itcan fe in espana to igh tes. Keowing that, democratic governments re ‘expect to refs fom taxing hei soles need ot en democracy. Inthe Bois {Goos) mode ite interest cam be protected ether bya rte ua income Aistbtin oe by apt mobility, Where captal mobility low an counties with predominantly ictal economies, nd income unequal however, tes shold curing to negotiate democratization. The Box and Acemogl/ Robinson ag ments are dscised in more dtl below 2 MopELs OF DEMOCRATIZATION AS STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS BETWEEN ELires AND CITIZENS Model ofthe interactions tween ring lites and oer that may lead to democ: fatation canbe divided into two ctsorcs depending on ther basi assumptions {Bout who the relevant actor are and what thee goals are. The Boi (2003) and ‘Acemogle/Rebinson (200) models described above sume that the most important Alivio within scien between ich and poor, sndthat he ich frm and mainsin ‘itatorshipsin onder to protet ther ast: They aso assume, at do many economic ‘model of thoritaran pits thatthe hey policy decision that determines the lee tt redsibtin isthe level of ation on domestic capital is asumed hat the median voter, who i poor fers high taxes in onder to redistribute wealth. The ‘more tneyua the income disribtion, the poorer the median voter and thus the more confscatory the tax tale can be expected to be ina democracy. In shor the mean voter in these modes has ever met "Homer Els consider ‘hanging the rales however, beaut ofthe threat of volnc or revolution. In thse ‘model pllicians are pec pets of cet intrsts nd pola lender do not Imeximize their own feemie dtinct om the revenue ofthe dite group they represent. "Analerative conception of astcracy assumes thatthe most important division in scicy i betwen the rls (sometimes simple oa single dictator) and the ule They assume that rts imine ove income fom tx een at the ‘xpense ofboth ich and poor red ales thas sete a the highest rate that does ‘hot dtr economic effort by ctzens In thee model, rulers ofr increments of ‘emocray when dong so can increase the ceili oftheir promises to prove Public pods and other polis that wil increase economic gronth and thus ene other and led (Nor nd Weingast 8; Weingast oy: Escriba Folch 2003). [Aeratey,dempxraticntttions maybe ofeed asa means of dry increasing ‘evens (Lev gt ate and Lien 985 Rog 98). Bueno de Mesquite {Gon propose» moe complied set of social visions and actors: Tear a Fuling Coalion: acetone” that indudes those citizens who can aft the Compostion of the ruling coalition: and siden those who are taxed bt polity ‘marginal nal these model the ruled cae about growth andthe share oftheir own ‘rection the allowed to Kp Taation snot sean asa mens of distribution Ta tvor ofthe pe, ut rater a mens of ensiching rulers. Res become rich by uli they do ot ule aus they were ich before achieving power. Tey cling 10 power inorder to continue collecting revenue fom the productive population under fk cont not to protect themes fom redtibtve taxation. The main ve eran dt ein a tiem engrant on ruler’ purmit of wealth for themacies is the teat of declining re cased by apt ight oF reduction in exnomic effort. Bisa tcc opprencis lr someitghs nt the proce of democrtnation. Bix (2909) amd Acemeluabinon (2001) model ae plausible sipliications rly democratization: in Wester Europe and of many transitions in Latin ch but model emphasizing the conic betwen rts and rele are more tnble when applied to recent stole over demoxraizaion in As, Easter the Middle East, and parts of Asa These mods, lage studies of dutatztion to date, have Smpliclyauured that single model wil explain ateaton in ll tines and al cicumsanos. Rich Rulers versus Poor Ruled ote above Boi (2003) argues tat income equal and capital moby reduce fears of democracy, the frst because it rodoces expected retribution by governments andthe sewond because proves capital holes eth a {option if taxes become confiscatory. This is a seminal conebaton to the ure on democratization because it provides plausible mirofousations for fobscrnd concation between development and democracy. Other udable ofthe research incudea seriou effort to txt the argument and the incon intcnth- and eal tretcth-cetry democratization: the ana Viet al other goanttive studies of democratization have looked only athe pos red Ward War period because of data imitations, Boihas madea hig foto ome thos limitations "The Bois (203) study as ot rsa ll debates, however, in part because the ical support forthe argiment is somewhat ambiguous. On the positive side, iat has a substantial eft onthe Hind of democratization ia that eves iso-90 and ths les most Aficandemocratzatons We do nove i the result would change if numberof wanstions in poor Afican junties wee added The percentage offal farms used 83 proxy fo inequality ie historical tes has a negative fect onthe probability of ransion contrary expectations One ofthe measures of eapital moby, average share of gicuture 2 percentage of GDP, ails to prodoce expec ests Othe nator used to caital mobility have strong ellets bl ambiguous interpretations “Phe ratio of al exports to total exports, or example, 2 pause indicator of fers to ange pars fhe poplation ethos ren at nether the reported ctionship between ol dependence and democratization cause by rice capital mobility or the strategic te of sours By distor 0 popular suppor? Average yeas of choolng suse as measre of human capital, which is more mobile than physi capital and ois finds a pote relationship hetwern ec ton and democratization. Many other anayt have fund this lationship, how ‘ct and attributed it to the propensity of more-ccated citizens to demand democracy In shot, although Boas argument pawl and attractively simple, the empirical investigation snot definitive The argument ts wel with the sted facts of West European democratization, however, and redistributive changes = lowed democratization in Western Furope ae this argument wood predict (Linde 959. Farther eof this argument deere tbe important tems on the research spends of sents of democratization, ‘Acmogla anid Robinson's (2001) argument begins with many of the same basic 'ssumptions about the way the world works as Boies Tals gives a central ole in restance to democratisation to elites” fear of redatibution when the sting ‘income dtsbation fs unequal rections ae complicate, however, by lining ‘he threat of revolution to perio freeson-In this argent when the rich are ‘hrestened by revolt (which only occurs during receson), they cam grant redistribution witout changing the political system, gran democracy a8 4 way of ‘making the commitment to rediibtion credible or repress. Redistribution wilh ‘out regime change snot eee to the poor because they now that dey cannot ‘maintain the thre of revolation afer the recesion rover, Acording to Acmogha and Robinson, democratization is @ more credible commitment to maintaining tedtribution over longer time prio. (Why the poor should accep democrat ‘ion as credit when even the model aliws the rich to age coup A they are iscsi by the Inter aerate ot clear) ‘The introtion of yecesions, which vary in both intensity and fequency ‘substantial complies making predictions about the effets of inequality on elite ‘havior: Equality makes democratization ls tating to efits, but how they ‘reac to inequality depends on the serioumes ofthe thet of evoltion and the cot of tepresion. In this mode, the Iikihood of revolution depends on inequality (hic ncreses the threat of revolution) and the intensity of recession (which zcreases revolutions cost othe poor). Pequen reasons, however, incense the Hthood that the dite can credibly oer redatibution without democratization ‘because frequent recsins allow the poor to threaten evolution oe, ths efor ‘ing the bargain. So intense recesions destabilize dictatorships leading to demo tiation, vation. oF epresion, ut frequent recsions lead pradoxically table ‘uthoriarianism with resribution. The bottom ln, according to Acemog and Robinson (20 95) that "democracy is mor likey Yo be comsiated the vel ‘ofineqeaityis limite, wheres high inequality lily oad to political nati, thr inthe form of fequent regime changes or repression of socal unset” Incontrast tothe Boi argument, Acemogha and Robinson expect income inegua- ‘ty wo lead to unstable repime changes, not coined authoritarianism. One ofthe trative features of the Acemogla and Rebinwon mode is that it explains epested ‘rantions between democracy and dictators,» phenomenon that as characet- in some parts ofthe developing word since the mil of the twentieth century. Theste nptcaion ota mah of atin Amer ad Teter ae deepng ore ec et mato ee ee eck ies eee eee (errno domecunion sae been pron cfpeateieea tes fue brogn oc frat othclac wench onary tare eet Tiog: pits cf prascvesmce my aly xref fore aes a ‘epee thom bet thy Wit not a fSpoet Bes ee dlrbaoa imc el comp sod Rhine estate peered scttheraenccts seao sig Seocratn ngey Mh toe inka, bt the copa imeignon of te daiomnipbaweme ree tp a (ruiy dor nt ser sng spr fe tae rome et pce tego fhe raion denecary sed anon Fr pata psery perm inthe word more unequal on average than democrat Bales onl Icke (a) find no rtnsip Bete deta nd gt Praca a (Se i tsi net temo ly tol ad ano omutcy Ty Beds seeps ena ey Inenlly (in deocrce) sod donee edown Mk pt ‘ont ca bree emo apa ome daseah oe totsepet tees th cgay ens dommes sare The mod ain mae th man rnc dessa onary cin oth tt hey exe Rel eet: Linke toed thoes tite epeced dnt oral in Were Bane eae oe Sip toward dencralion were en, bt Malin, Sete el St {Gan hte xem Somer de nt on wp tbe ace thx danke’ Wek tbe pried ths a Teco eos ‘td ely ons ie twenty xno Many toh con Tnlwercmmun pop! deen ces al rare Se a ih neem hi a si ns Ein pce til te meme! fe mocha epee sete and co hr ona a ce i ‘Staciaan eines be mea yar of gear raorieg A tr fr toe poner ed eh et ot ra ce Tne sy wou sot an em ‘22 Revenue Maximizing Rulers versus Politically Powerless Citizens “This approach tothe sty of democratization, which owes much seminal aries ‘byNoth and Weingast (98) and Olson (ion, seats as maximising th own hg hh individ reve i ation and cen as sharing die for provctity- enhancing polices and pac goods repress of wheter hey are ich or poor. In this image of polis, ae rebate wealth fom ctizens toler, not from rich {to poor Ralers may want eee order to purse wars to buy support in oder to Sta in power oor personal conspin: thee reason dos not fet the ogc of the anpmeat lr are mite by hi desi for revenue tool public goods fn ta rate ta does ot rede favetnent orf. Te some versions ofthis approach, social elites or bodes of capital are most, affected by the ers polis and can do most to destabilize bis rl they ae ‘Kents. Consequently they ate the ones most Hkly to be accommodated when {he ule fers an sitar form of partpaton in retun fr their cooper ation. Rulers may offer representative intitations as a means offering a credible Commitment to supply deed pubic goods (Lei it: Noth and Weingast 1985: Era Flch 200) or snp exchange fr wealth holders contingent consent to the tation of mail eaptal (Blea Lien 1985). Asin the Boi (200) argument ‘democratization tecones more Hkely as apa becomes more mobile, but the ‘eno forthe retomhip changes. The more mabie apt dconding to Bates ane Lien (985th hardest tx without contingent consent and thus the more Ikly the role wlfr representative instittions Rogowsi (1998) ut more ‘general form ofthis login which izes ability to move away increses the Iieibod that rues wl or tem representative institutions or good government jn onder o induce them to ems, alongwith ther productive apa, within the fuler’steitory® Thus these modes often explain the Sst small steps toward ‘emocratzation fom abst monarchy. ‘Bueno de Megat aoe) suggest more complicated genera framework for ‘understanding pls in both democracy and autoracy. Their model tetera, Inds a ruler supported by winning coalition; "selectors" meaning those Citizens who hae some inence on who can jin the winsing coaiton: and eden who ply no role in selecting rulers. In demosrace, the eetorate ithe ‘fanchised population, and he winning coalition is made up of those who voted forthe winning party or calton that roughly 50 percent ofthe sdectorate In ingle party autortaran regime the winning coalion sth mall rowp of actu flrs andthe sectorte is made up ofall members of he ruling pay In military fegimes the winning colton the Junta andthe skort is the ofc corps. “They do not dscse reasons fo diferent authoritarian instttional choices ules maximize persona venue via taxation But are constrained by the ned 0 provide private and public gods in order wo maintain the suppor ofthe wining Calton If enough members of the ruling coalition defect Because they are dis SStisied with ther share, the ruler is ovedown. Clizens outside the wining be aya rasa ht vig te lero one ‘io nee a ft te moo ate soeatin ef nly rom the public goods provided when the winning coaition i too large tobe maintained by private gods lone. Resident and sometimes members the sectorat may bol demonstrations or join rebellions to challenge rus who tax them oo heavily or provide insficent Public gods, but ules this mod! aways esond with reson. revolution "ry chllengsr win despite repression the nee rules fice the sare incentives that ‘ther rulers do onarow the winning coalition and kep resources for hemsles. In ‘ther word, revolutions and pop uprisings ia this mode do not thesten ‘ediibuton ola to democracy. lstend they lead to a seizure of power by a ‘ow leader and winning coaition who maximize heir own weth atte expense of thowe they exch One ofthe most vcfl and mpc eis points made by Bocno de Mesqita eas tha participation in coup, upg of revaaton does nt qaranee the participant an improved share of power or wealth after the fal of the old regime bere howe wh lead such moverents have incentives after they ‘win to renge on eater promises “Thus democracy cannot arise a8 4 response to popular uprising in his mol. Invent aris when the members of the winning colon can benefit themselves ‘by expanding iss, Members of wianing coaitons ae cross pressured when it ‘comes to these of coalition they prefer to be prt of. Thee individual share of Private goods is larger when the coalition sma, but the ruler Keeps ess for Fimsefand provides more pic and total private pods when the coalition gt. Inthe model the winning coalition has tipping point atthe szeat which it peers ‘increase further Once that happens, democray wil eventually follow: This mode, lke thove debe above, portrays democratiation site Ie. In the Bueno de “Mesquite al (200) model however winning coalition ees are motivated simpy by wanting to improve thet wn wee elt o tht ofthe uke. They are nt responding cite oa challenge frm the excl or tothe threat of capital sie, ‘Models that phase confit btn evens maiming rulers and polly owes cen ete elements of ality in many eet transitions in deep Ing countries Once the changes inthe international economy provoked by the debt ‘is ad render state interventionist development soteges usustanable, many Suthortarian governments were forced to begin iberaliing their economies. n ‘nde to atrat private investment to replace stat ivestment that could not be ‘tained without foreign inflows, governments had 0 offer more prodiable pol ‘es and certain pubic ods conde to priate investment (Roberts 006) ke ‘emocrats dictators survival in otc i thretened by poot economic performance ‘At noted by North and Weingast (89), Acemoglu and Robinson (200), Fart Fh (203) and others poiy promises made dictators inherent Ick ere iy, Dictators can incre the cry ofthese promises by creating insitations {hat give capita olders ayn plcy making and that increase the onsrans on the dictators arbitrary power. Democratic iattions sich as Igiatures and ‘hart dectoral competition con create howe constrains if he commitment {he institution change site conssered credible I the institutions benef both the rr by increasing revenae andthe red by increasing rodoctvy or welie, tonal bargain is slenfrcing and thus credible. These models, in rovade reson for extinginittiona bargains tobe more credible than oes to provide dese polices inthe absence of insitutonal hangs which the Aecmogl and Robison (201) model does not. "The move thus suggest imtons about why democratization and economic liberaaton tend to vary together the ate twentieth century (Hellman 1938). Pio w the debt erie of the 1980s, governments hala choice between relying ‘primarily on state imestinent or private investment. Those that chose state inves ‘ent did ot han oiler cee commitments to provide public goods, predic ‘ble economic plcy.or pois favorable to private investors inorder 1 secure ‘evenflo aul ths the economic pressure toi intttional constraints on ‘ler arbitrary powers was lm. Since the 980, the sate investment strategy hat become unworkabe excep possibly in coon lant on the export of lo other high priced natural eourcs. Consequently. governments have sought t0atract ‘rvate investment va eaptal-renly polices and pital instittins that con strain the dictators discretion help 10 make those polices credible to investors (Roberts 3006). ‘The emphasis onthe interest ferences between rulers and role and on reis- tration in aor flrs ara central tof dictatorship fits well wth what we know shout many ofthe dictatorships refered to as personal, sultans, or patrimo- al by diferent author. There model not accommodate the role that popular ‘prisings have played in many late twentitcentury democratization, however. “Moreover, most ofthese modes are very absteat and most ests of them have been tatrwyfocsed oe open to multiple interpretations. ‘Some fete oft went entry democratization have not ound thee way ‘nto model, though they have been incided in lrgeN statistical stds. The comelation between reance on oil exports and authoritarianism, fr example, has been found repeat n developing counties ii usuly sate owned oF owned by foreign mutnatioal apd tated hel. Whether ts ate owned or no, he ovement craw its evens lrg from natural source production, not from taxation on domestic wealth holder. large mostly descriptive teature on the effects of oon pls exists (Kal 3997: Chaudhry 1997; Anderson 1987; Crystal 1993) Yet I know of no mode that ha grappled seriouly with state ownership of productive resources and iff on the struggle over democratization. All models Assume «captain economy with priate domestic imestors as important ators. Dating the third wave af democatation, however, mos trnstion affected at thoriavan regimes in which state ivestment was high. In many, foreign investment sls played ge role, and revene fom foreign aid was more important than evens rom tation in some Tetrnationl factors have alo bec largely absent fom modes of democrats tion Many csrvers have nagested hat iternatinal fore, such asthe difsion of democratic en and prewure from intematioal Soancilinsitions to democr- ae, have allel ranutions, especialy since the 1980s Earlier quantitative suis found it hard to dacument these inluencs, bt Gasorowski (3995) and Geischand Choun (2004) show that the proportion of democratic neighbors increas he Tlbod of transitions to democracy in neighboring counties, ending some oppor tothe difsion argument. Jon Pevchouse (203) shows that membership [rreonalnemational organizations in which most ther members are democrai creme the lio! of democratization, Since membership in democratic (Gonalnerational organizations i ikey tobe cored with having democratic ‘Sghbrs, however, we cannot be sure whether organizations have an indcpendent ‘ect beyond the eet of living in "good" neighborhood, Bueno de Mexia, ‘Swemon and Woller (192s Bueno de Mesquit and Siveson 1995) show that wa ‘Hats the aria ofboth poll leaders nd eines. leitch and Choun (204) ‘how that war increase the likihood of transition from one authoritarian govern {hem to amaher, but neither Gleditach and Choun (2004) nor Pevehouse (3003) ‘Bows song evidence that war in the neghtorhood decease the Hikthood of ‘democratization, as some have suggested. Marino (2005) shows tha although ‘Shutons ae efecive at bringing down democratic lars, they have hit eflet the sur of dictators and therefore we can infer itl fet on authoritarian mest Theoretical treatments of democratisation, however conte ofocs ot ‘Somes cn M may be that the focus on domestic cases appropriate when ‘Shlaningdemocratations before the Second World War, but that international faflaencer both economic and polical—have become more pronounced vet 3 DISAGGREGATING DEMOCRATIZATION esuming tha thee i ne explanation of democratization may be the eso that ‘Ghotursconins to dngree about its causes. Dilferent analy have doer know inde abou some st of cases than others and naturally thei intitions formalize in mel ft the cass they know best beter than those they know les wel. The Findings of large N studies fer rom each otber depending om specication ie fod incaded, ae cases se, leaving ery basic Kens contest. Such varying ‘Eats shoul be expected ingle statisti model are being imposed on a tof “Tapuate process without fot to sei ow the process might fer ver ime rim ifeent kinds of transtions {sug that it would be uefa to conser the ‘omit that process of democratization might be diferent in diferent context ‘Shrine ihe om oth neo hah cin aon “pee receptor med fee! hoe «mambo lage Nd ve me ates snc faanytime ChaehoeCheun)cmpe sw e pne o ‘that these ferences might be systematic, and that developing a theoretical under sanding of these difeences would lad to ssel empires reuks and a beter understanding of how transitions realy take place. wo content diferences that might influence the democratization proces are the Instr perio in which it takes pce andthe type of regime that democracy replaces. Early democratization ook place in captat economies in wich the ch ‘usually el political power Later democratization hae abo occured in counties ith high eves of state ownership of productive ast, eapeialy natural resources. State ownership makes posible bth the accumblaton of west by pital leaders nd ako the distibution of benefits to supporter, and in some cass citizens, without the need for high taxation of private wealth holder. Rules who have cquited wealth through acess to state resources in contrast to those who hold political power because they own priate wealth, have to far ksing most oftheir ets if they are deposed, regardless ofthe income diarbuton or other fctor that tight lect future tation, Most ranstons before the Second Woeld War were transitions rm some formof ligarcic government: many were gradual transitions from very limited satrage to neil univer. Pst Second World War democratization: have occurred in several ‘quite diferent ways, but neryall have svolved a transtion 1 mediate universal Sfrage democracy. These have included the transition from clonal rule to ni ‘vera sufage democracy at independence; transitions from universal stage a thoritarianizm to universal suffrage democracy and redemocratiations in which ‘most of the partis and political insations ofa prio democracy ae reinstated a the concision ofan authoritarian feted, Gradual transitions fom limited to slmost univers slfrage have Bee rare during the lat ity years (#. Huntington wan. If ite opposition to democracy is motivate by fea of restrbutve tation, ‘gradual increases insure shoud be easier than rapid ones because the median ‘ote after limited enfanchsement would be richer and thus demand less eis ‘nition. Such isttutional choices are olen made daring bargaining over the conditions of transion. We might expect authoritarian rulers concerned about redistributive taxation to negotiate incremental enfranchisement, But dictators ‘rth different fear might not consider univer sufrage threatening "aris iterations nflences om democratination have arguably had greater cffecs since the Second Work War and perhaps greater ail since the 198s. The ‘ilerences inthe sources of dictators wealth before and ater the Second World War ‘noted above ae associated with a change in economic trate that swept through the developing world tetween about ap30 and oro, Neral developing countries fntated development strategies tht increased state investment, nership, and regulation of their economies. These strategies redid governments’ dependence ‘toca incu mepve t on ppcs or demctaton rit and fest Ct shear. Gotercnl ip) she at oem ees erst ets oe ihe donut rig ioe pteon private investors and created non-tax sources of revenue, which could then be {Grud along with monopolies and subsidies of various Kinds in exchange for ‘Ryport. The ability ture sate resources to expropat taional and foreign ah holders and create new ites beholden tothe government may have reduced Frere for democratization during the decades when tht strategy remained viable. ST nowond change inthe international economy, epnning around 98a with the deb cay brought that period tan end When foreign lending was no longer ‘Nala to cover the trade and budget deficits characteristic f he state interven ‘oni dowlopment strategy, developing county governments faced intense presse toaope pois conducive to attracting investment Atracting investments depends Uo eit policy commitments and scure property rights. fa various analysts fave sped dictator can we legltuesand oer quast- democratic institutions Toate thir policy commitments credible, the economic strategy changes brought “Shout bythe det crit ofthe soos should have created stron incentives toward Some degre of democratization, Inthe posto period, we sean increase in both “democratzations andl the adoption of quai-democratc institutions by author taran regimes (Lei and Way 206) “Te ca ofthe Cold War har aio changed the proces of democratization. Before yor thortarian regimes wee supported wih extensive aidan ther lp fom both superpowers. Soch ad both increased the res repressive capacity (Boix rom aso} and abo added to dictator ability o buy support without rediibt- Ine frm domestic produces Since 190, Levitsy and Wy (2006) show tht those _Rinorlarin epncs with the closest kage othe USA and Wester Europe ae {he moat ikl have democratic looking nstiations such as multiparty elections In which some rel competion allowed. Such regimes maybe easier to dodge ‘nce oppostion i sual les sky and cosy in them. The eatin in foreign ‘Roo for dictatorships since the end ofthe Cld War alo contributed tothe Incense in democratization inthe late twentieth entry. “Tho, for bot domestic and international reasons, we might think that a model of the early proces of democratization would be diferent from a model ofthe ater Dros The finding by Bois and Stokes (200) that economic development and Freome dsiibution have much stronger eet onthe iktiho of democratization tore ge than afte ends support tthe idea hat modeling separate proces for the two time prods would be ful “thee cos time dlleents in the cases of democratization may be caused ia ut by ferences in the kinds of regimes rom which democraces emerge. Pe- ‘cond World War democratization, which occured primarily in Europe and Latin ‘Nene gener replaced governments contol by the ich, wheter these were ‘Bante ligchies oF monarchies, though eleoral systems with very limited Tatage. ta mt ofthe non- democrat regimes, eiatures existed, elie partis x pot-paris competed for ofr and trae y legislatures oni the power ‘timonaschs or exces had played an important role in detrnining the shape of folita ntttions. Democatiration tend to ocr through the extension of image to new groupe without other Lage intitaional changes. More cizens ote, sometimes ew partis formed t attract the votes ofthe newyenfanchised, In elections became fates, but parimentar systems in Burope and separation of| power systems in Latin America accommodated the inclusion of new voters and parties ‘We cannot make the se kinds of generzations about late tweteth-century tramitionsThe authoritarian regimes trom which Inte twentieth entry democra- tations emerged diferd from the stylized portaitin the paragraph abo. Fw of {heir rulers were born to wealthy familie Most came to prominence va eer & military cater ora vse to eaderhip in a rootonary oF matinalist party. Some ‘Contemporary authoritarian rpimet have repressed all elt activity, but many hve held efular elections seth eniveral suffrage. Competition for control of _gnernment his ben ited by restrictions on opposition partes or manipulation ‘voters and plying fd not estektions on sage: Some contemporary asthor tarian regimes have protected the interests of the ch bt others hae redistributed land; nationalized natural resources and expropriated other wealth Sometimes these xpropritions have ll to more equal income distribution and other times to an "ered but equally uneven dtebtion with wealth concentrated in the hands ofthe ‘ictator's family and supporters In the forme situation, egime supporters fea the tos of power entailed by more competitive pots, ot rdstbution. In theater, they fear confication, Being bought otal for coerption and human eights abuses, ‘rton and excution (Kamins, Nleps, and O'Neil 2008), bt these danger are ‘ot lene bya relatively equal income dstbution. Because ofthese dferences at twenteth- and twenty-first century democratia- tions may nt ony be diferent fom etl oes bit alo dierent rom each othe IF ‘wealthy private ctor its rule countries then they may inde resist democrat tion when they expect more redistributive aration, and ther ers may beallayed by 2 relatively equal Income distribution or capital mobility (Bix 2003). Incremental fafrage extensions may be expecially xy for them to endure I however, ring tlie cae to power ether though election or revolution athe leaders of move: tents determined to overthrow traitinal elite, then regards of wheter they {tually cried ou ther promises or have simpy stolen inthe ern, the fear of tring deposed sem unl tobe allayed by factors that edacefture taxation, Instead thei feats might be layed by enforceable Bargains not to prosecute them for coraption and human right buses (Le. allowing them tog into friendly exile) ‘oF insttetional Bargains that give them a good chance of returning t office in ‘ompetiveclction inthe fture. "These diflerencs do aot iply a return to case stale o within-regon compar- ‘sone as the mn way of dying democratisation, however" Rather they suggest ‘he pouty tat there are dheoetcaly relevant difleences among authoritarian ‘emer pa anton Pron Coe), erm ms oll be prone tt ‘Ganapati & yong repos wih te ke) osha dc penal ones encanta‘governments themselves and inthe way tha they interact with the rs tht may Feauire different explanations of how tations from them occu. As Diamond (Gana, 3) notes contemporary authoritarian regimes die from each othe and if \weareto understand the contemporary dynamics assim, ane pou of Fegime change (incudingfrure democratization), we must understand the difer- fen and in some respects new, typeof authoritarian rule” Hie attempt at casi fon, howe, simply relies om dratng ines betwen scores on the Frsdom Howe seat create categories. I the relevant diferences aren grec of not democrs tienes” then we do nt need to theorize proce separate can sly ince ‘4 mearar of democracy in static models, aa number anaes have: Unsit- Pring, the nd ha countries that ae more democratic atime one ar ky 10 ‘beeven more democratic at tine two. We cannot tll, howeve, wher the anasis means that es repressive frm of authoritarian are sr table that democr- tization soften incremental ad dictatorships that have liberalized somewhat none ear ofen continue on that path in subsequent years A more fut approach "sscation woud begin by thinking about how the cause of democratization sem te vary from one context 10 another Then csification col be based on expect ‘tons about how those difrences would be Hl to nfo? ine and Stepan (1996) ake a fiat step toward the hind of theoretically base lasifcatin that night help explain difleences in democratization processes with their classifcation of Some authoritarian regimes as “wlan” meaning one individual as discretion over all important personne and policy decisions, some 45 “aeo-ttaltaran” meaning in fe, pos Sins, and so on. They expt the ‘ual characteristics ofthese diferent kindof authoritarian regime to have tr Mic effects on dilerent aspects of democratic consoldation, Thee arguments have fot ben tested, but they do suggest plausible Tinks between characteris of| particular kinds of authortarinism and expected outcomes, post Second Work War authoritarian regimes with diferent kinds fers ten to have dierent institutional sroctures an diferent eationshipe with sp ‘ores and ordinary citizens, then we would expect them Yo break dow dierent because diferent institutions privege and dhavantage dfent groups. A imple spdintitve wy to categorize thew diferent Kinds of leadership and ination i 2 profesinaized military, hegemonic party. and personalitic.Thex regime type “vege fom struggles among elite contenders eh diferent backgrounds, apport ‘bases and sources afer seizures of power They do not drive in am obvious way fom undetrng social o economic structures and all ave been compatible with 3 tide range of economic Weoogis. All types were common in the ate twentieth ‘entry, 3 understanding something about how they break down might lp to ‘plain why post-i950 democratzatons have been diferent fom those that came Some ely decom af deminton sie! aston paces thames wg (Tice tees tm te eat nino Sree ed ce be 4 BARBARA GHDDES efor. nthe el wor tee rfc as of borden aes but we ean se thee ype to dep thor and emp expectations. ‘On ava goverment ally he peso miliary ae mare age sn ind tani Carr Gale)? Te tno easy dai by peer sono formance because fatonaltion Ser how trend aces many ofr fo ont tr othe brads im owder to eum the amed fons, Because of fe dread of ational, he fiat move toward cation fe aie within th itary it, a noted by {Donne Sct and White! 9) snce mir oer ay decd to ‘etm to the barack rate than ing fred ot tanalon rm miitary rule {Gnd to be mgt and onder, Negation more Ht adv democracy ‘hans ent overthrew; nd he sce o profeionled miliary regimes are tay says ct in compen etn The he fall of 2 mary regime {Sua role ina demosncy hog may ot income the miro col ave ed the robust of Bag moc party egies Gc (ss) shows tht eis red by dominant pats in analy ngs than ter non mone forms of aorta ‘Gandhi and Proewonli Goes) age that datos apport by single pats Save longer in fice When doa o singe party Tepes fac severe cha Tenge thy to hang on by hanging nstuions to alo ome paricpaton by tmcrae opponents Woling and veering is thesteing moe extreme “prone at Okara: Magn 08) When thy the wring the wall {hey ut rotor ino negotiating ctor! stains that wl beet Sem ‘when they become ex-authoritarians competing in fair elections (Geddes 1995: Maal! 2000) If enero dominate pry eine cannot maintain thet ‘monopoly on power hey preter o bere by democracy sine they have & {pod chance of being aco continue tr poll res as democrat poli ans Repacment yan opposing authori regime ily Yo exude them ‘fo the pil gama best, Consequenty inant party ovement negotiate ther extentions trough cectons The scons Dated the rl of hegemonic tarts mot often nites dem, bot sometins they ret in new ge {onic pry ime This happen teat new ing pry an somtimes make {Seo htttione originally deed vo hp the previous rling ary. ‘egies in which power arte eronaized nde one individual weve, are swore lnc tobe epoca ys new dicatship than ya democracy Hades and ‘forell a), Pesonalsic datos are wing to negotiate leaving fice tecrse te les reser tno of sesinton proseation confiscation, oF Sie than do the leader: of eter Kins of uthrtaanism. Tanstions fom frrsonaie dictatorship ave eon init by vege insiders inten popular © Frag hing aan mdf do poring el odin rd tt alow thet ng etn ht os ee oman woe ity a2 ‘i css srs change hat ar meee ne eee odopposition, strikes, and demonstrations often force dictators conser allowing ‘mulparydetions (ration and van de Walle 497). Personae datos are more lly to be overthrown in. revelations, civil wars, popular upesings invasions (Shocpol and Goodwin 1994: Geddes 203). Ling and Chehbi (998) have described the dficukis of democratization flowing wht they cal antic egies Several observers have suggested that transis from personals role are ‘more ace by international actor sich ae presse om international nana Inseetions and invasion by aeighboring or excolonal countries, han ate other ins of authoritarianism, Intemational nancial institutions pressured numberof ‘ican dictators to age to multiparty tions (Bratton and van de Wal 197) Tor the ren the proces of tanstion from peroalized dictator shoal ot be mode ran eit led bargain Trastions from personalized detatorship "cles to ret in democracy but sometinsthey da A model that focused on ‘uch tamsions woul lp sto understand the special icumnstances tha ead 0 this outcome. Neeman and Wantcekon (200) have proposed that democracy ‘cco when ithe of two contending forces can dfet the other. They adres “Sustions in which oppostion to ditatorship bas dewlped ito ci war but the ‘mode might be generale ono lent frm of political conic. Medel tht «plain transitions o democracy from personalized dictatorship shouldbe onthe ‘democratization research agenda, ash mov that inchde foreign pressures. "Tere maybe other Ful ways of dsoggresting the democratization process. My pois in this section ha not ben to age that there ome trae way to re he ‘rons int hcormable arts bt rather hat we have comsidrable evidence hat nt fil democratization ccc in the sme way ad that hese ilerencs are tematic fot rndom, The Mention of democratization as one “hing” sa arti of ‘ur tx of noel language to describe the proces If the caren sate of piri owlae allows ge to that there ae theoretically important diferences ia democratization proces depending on wher they happened what ind of dict tomhip were being replac, or something ele, we should not expet a ingle model to apr al he proces we, Nor should we combine ll democratization i the ‘ne sail tts witout making an effort to specify cros-tie o other theo ‘tly leant diference 4 Conciuston Rect empirical esearch on democratization hs confirmed the relationship between scoomic development and democracy. Most research ls agrees that counties with ‘ol and mostly Muslim popuitions are ks likly to be democratic though these onc have xn challenge by some anasts. 1 has aio contre that ‘ounves with high educated populations are more likely to be democratic 536 BARBARA GeDDES “The explntions fr thew coreations remain contest Presta (2000) argue that ecnomic development cases democratic stability nat demecraization. Boi and Stokes (2005), however show tit economic development had a substantial impact on democratization before the Send Word Wa and connie to have a small et Mile East scholar ave dest a proces through which oil rents ae wasated Into popular acquisenc to authoritaanism, bt Hee (20s) anges tha ol wealth least # msspeciaton of statistical tots ofthe fect of economic development ‘on democratization in ol-ich cunts, not toa special kind of renter auhortran- ‘sm. Most observers hae attributed the apparent afinty between Islam and athor- tariansm to traditional values widely eld by indivdsal Musi, bat Fish (2003) thane thatthe treatment of wore in Masi societies hinders democratization, “These rpiialrepulaiis with contested interpretations bring two tasks to the forefront ofthe research agenda in the study of democratization: empisial studies timed explicitly a esting illeent causal mechanisms: and the ration of carefully ‘peced model to explain democratization. Some progres is being made on both font Fish (2002) tes his argument about dhe treatment of women. Het (2003) tempts to dizggregite the effects of retierism from the effect of economic ‘evelopment ata way of testing the renter state argument. Boix (200) tts his argument that income equality ane capital mobility increase the lilthood of ‘Semecraization, None of thes tests filly persuasive, but they ae very ust steps in the direction of wentifying causal mechanisms. Bobs (2003), Acemoglu and Robinson (2001 2003), Zak and Feng (203), North and Weingast (180), Weingast (0997), Bates and Lien (985), Neeman and Wantchekon (2002), and others have proposed formal models of democratization that ofr a numberof useful sighs. [Mort ofthese modes have been proposed as univers explanations of democratiza- tion, but when examined carefully most tur out to be wsefl simplifications of ‘democratization or elements of itn one specific contest. eget that we take seriously our own research showing systematic ferences in the proves of democratization across time and typeof authoritarianism. Other idferencs in the process may aso be theoretically important. We might make progress ister, both empirically and thorecly, if we inti clear domain for our arguments about the cases of democratization rather than assuming that jt because we cover many proces of democratization with one word we should ‘ko uncritaly mode tas One proces cards of what we know about historical land other diferenes. Rererences ‘Acemoese Ds and Rosson | 201A theory of pla wanton. Ameria Bzonamic Rovio 39-68, eae eran Origins of Dicatip and Democracy. New York: Cambridge Unive Pres