Scribd Logo
Загрузить

Добро пожаловать в Scribd!

  • Baumgartner & Jones Agenda Setting Theory

    Загружено:

    furqan
    14 просмотров7 страниц
    Discusses the agendas and instability theory of public policy

    Оригинальное название

    Baumgartner & Jones Agenda Setting theory

    Авторское право

    © © All Rights Reserved

    Доступные форматы

    PDF или читайте онлайн в Scribd

    Этот документ был вам полезен?

    Это неприемлемый материал?

    Пожаловаться на этот документ
    Discusses the agendas and instability theory of public policy

    Авторское право:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Скачайте в формате PDF или читайте онлайн в Scribd
    Отметить как неприемлемый контент
    14 просмотров7 страниц

    Baumgartner & Jones Agenda Setting Theory

    Загружено:

    furqan
    Discusses the agendas and instability theory of public policy

    Авторское право:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Скачайте в формате PDF или читайте онлайн в Scribd
    Отметить как неприемлемый контент
    из 7
    Baxritip, Epwanp. 1961. Political Influence. (New York: Free Press). enor, Peter and Touas Luckuans. 1966, The Social Construction of Reality (Garden City: Doubleday), Dowvan, Patt, 1977. “Whither Urban Policy Analysis ‘A Review Essay,” Polity, 9 (Summet): 503-27. EpELvaN, Mursay. 1974, The Symbolic Uses of Politics. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press). EpNER, SHELDON, 1976, “Intergovernmental Policy Development: The Importance of Problem Definition,” pp. 149-68 in Charles O. Jones and Robert D. Thomas, eds., Public Policy Making in a Federal System (Beverly Hills, Calif: Sage Publications). Eutav, Hinz and Ronter Evestonr. 1968. “Policy Maps of City Councils and Policy Outcomes," American Political Science Review, 62 (March): 124-43. Friepuax, MitrOx. 1962. Capitalism and Freedom, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), Frown, Lewis. 1967. "An Analysis of Public Policy in Cities? Journal of Politics, 29 (February): 94-108. Goown, R. Kewwert and W, Bruce Suxnanp. 1976, “Political Processes and Public Expenditures: ‘A Re-Examination Based on Theories of Representative Government,” American Political Science Review, 70 (December): 1127-35. Gnzennerc, Gronce et al. 1977. “Developing Public Policy Theory: Perspectives from Empirical Chapter 24 * Agendas and Instability 154 Research,” American Political Science Review, 71 (December): 1532-44. Greexstox, J. Davo and Pact Petenses. 1973. Race and Authority in Urban Politics. (New York Russell Sage) Hatpems, MORTON. 1972. “The Decision to Deploy the ABM,” World Politics, 25 (October): 62-95. Horrennerr, RicHaRp. 1974. The Study of Public Policy: (New York: Bobbs Meri). Knauer, Ratpul. 1969. Participation of the Poor (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice HalD. Livesey, Ronen ancl Ina SHARKANSKY. 1971, Urban Politics and Public Policy. (New York: Harper & Row), Low, Turopore, 1964. “American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory,” World Politics, 16 uly): 677-715. Ousox, Mancun, 1965. The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press). Piven, FRANCES Fox and Rician CLowaRD. 1971. Regulating the Poor. (New York: Vintage). PRESSMAN, JEPPREY and AARON Witpavsky. 1973. Implementation. (Berkeley: Uni California Press). ScuartscuveipeR, E. E. 1960. The Semi-Sovereign People. (New York: Holt, Rinchart & Winston), Wusox, James Q. 1973. Political Organizations. (New York: Basic Books). ersity of Agendas and Instability AGENDA-SETTING AND EQUILIBRIUM Models of policymaking are generally based on the twin principles of incrementalism and nega- tive feedback. Incrementalism can be the result of, om Prank R. Baur sicago press, 1993), pp. 6-25, Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones 4 deliberate decisional style as decision makers ‘make limited, reversible changes in the status quo because of bounds on their abilities to predict the impact of their decisions (Lindblom 1959; Hayes wer and Bryan D. Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics (Chicago: The University of 152 Part Three + ‘Theories on the Policy Process 1992). For example, new budgets for agencies are generally based on the previous year's allocation (Wildavsky 1984). Incremental changes in politi cal systems can also be the result of countermo- Dilization. As one group gains political advantage, others mobilize to protect themselves. In such situations, mobilizations are subject to a negative- feedback process in which changes from the cur- rent state of the system are not large. Both forms of change, one deliberate and the other inadvertent, result in a self-correcting system, If deliberate incremental decisions characterize pol- icymaking, then decisions that lead to undesirable consequences can be reversed. Hence deliberate inerementalism allows a system to maintain a dy- ‘namic equilibrium with its environment, Similarly, a democratic system that allows groups to mobilize ‘and countermobilize will display dynamic equilib- rium, When the system veers away from balance, it corrects itself, always tending toward an equi librium between the demands of democratically organized interests and the policy outputs of gov- emment. This view of a politcal system at balance is quite conservative, since it implies that dramatic changes from the status quo are unlikely. Even a casual observer of the public agenda ‘can easily note that public attention to social prob- lems is anything but incremental. Rather, issues have a way of grabbing headlines and dominating the schedules of public officials when they were virwally ignored only weeks or months before. Policy action may or may not follow attention, but when it does, it will not flow incrementally. In the scholarly literature on agenda-setting, incremen- talism plays little role. Rather, focusing events, chance occurences, public-opinion campaigns by organized interests, and speeches by public of als are seen! to cause issues to shoot high onto the agenda in a short period. Herbert Simon has noted that such intermit- tent performance characterizes certain classes of, social systems. In such cases, “the environment makes parallel demands on the system, but the system can respond only serially” (Simon 1977, 157). That is, the system is grappling with a great number of real, tangible, problems, but its lead- cers can attend to them only one at a time. In such situations, just how problems capture the atten- tion of policymakers is critical. The intermittent nature of high-level attention to a given prob- em builds into our system of government the possibilty not only of incrementalism, but also of periodic punctuations to these temporary periods of equilibrium. Why have students of the policy process so often ignored the nonineremental nature of the allocation of attention to problems in political systems? There are two reasons. First is the tra- ditional division of labor among scholars. Those Who have studied policy implementation typically have not emphasized the dramatic changes that often occur in the public agenda, and those who focus on the agenda often discount the strong el- cements of stability of incrementalism present in other parts of the policy cycle. Second is « ten: dency among some to view the disruptive acts of agenda access as political penumbra, either sym- bolic events designed to reassure the mass public Edelman, 1964) oF as furious activity that fails to solve problems (Downs 1972) Taking a broader view of the policy process forces us to consider seriously both the politics of negative feedback and the processes of agendasetting that lead to dramatic change. ...[Wle show that both of these processes are at work simultaneously in American politics, and that they interact to produce long periods of relative stability or inerementalism in- terrupted by short bursts of dramatic change. Far from being penumbra, these bursts alter forever the prevailing arrangements in a policy system. Inthe pluralist model of countervailing forces in the political system, “potential groups” mobilize ‘when their interests are threatened (Truman 1951, 30). In the absence of artificial oF legal barriers to organization and lobbying, social and professional ‘groups can be expected to protect themselves, as the invisible hand of action and reaction produces 4 sort of equilibrium in politics just as the invis- ible hand of the marketplace does in economics ‘While few accept these notions of unfettered orga nization these days, especially after Olson's (1965) discussion of the inherent advantages of certain kinds of groups over others in generating the support needed to mobilize effectively, perceived. threats do indeed produce increased mobilization in many cases (see Hansen 1985). ‘The most significant ceitcisms of the pluralist approach have focused on bias in the mobilization of interests. AS E. thirty years ago, “Tl shat the heavenly ci class accent” (1960 cf political contfic Because in any giv people disintereste Sion berween win policy dispute giv enlarge the scope ‘ enlargement of the sential to the den ‘mains central to all 4 raises the questi seeking to put som 20 keep something and Charles Elder ‘aquiry by noting ¢ ‘cymakers attempt t pation in a given p ‘Much of rec: ‘ered on the quest from, John Kingdo research with his sdeas and the expl unity” by policy en 1990), reviewing found that issue de opportunity interac The questio: rom?" is interesting ally a surfeit of pol sernatives are struct ing “winners” in the policy to strong sym economic growth, often reach the dec

    Вам также может понравиться