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Megan Coyne
Professor Levy
World War I: Causes, Consequences, and Controversies
Alternative Interpretations: Paper #1
30 October 2015
Ottoman Entrance into the First World War
In the decades preceding the First World War, the Ottoman Empire had steadily been
declining in influence. Despite becoming a member of the Concert of Europe in 1856, the
Ottoman Empire far from resembled an important political force. During the nineteenth and
early twentieth century, the empire suffered constant military defeats. The assassination of Franz
Ferdinand in June 1914 and the outbreak of war created an air of uncertainty within the fragile
Ottoman Empire. Ultimately, the Ottoman Empire decided to enter the war in November 1914
on the side of the Central Powers. This decision would prove fatal. By 1918, the empires
economy had been destroyed, a majority of the empires land was seized and divided into
partitions, and an estimated 12% of the empires population had died. A few years later, the
empire would cease to exist as a result of their intervention in the war. Given the empires
precarious position prior to this conflict, and its disastrous consequences, its decision to enter the
war is extremely interesting, and has been reprimanded by historians as a result. This paper will
explore several leading interpretations of the reasons prompting the Ottoman Empire to enter the
war, including the German-Ottoman alliance, national sentiment, and the leadership of the Young
of Enver Pasha.
I will first examine the Ottoman entrance into World War One in regards to the GermanOttoman alliance. Given the amount of blame that has been placed on Germany since the wars
end, it should come as no surprise that the idea of Germany pushing the Ottoman Empire into the
war is a leading interpretation. After Bismarcks dismissal in 1890, Germany greatly increased
their presence within the Ottoman Empire. For the next two decades, Germany continued to
heavily invest in the Ottoman Empire, beginning construction on the Berlin-Baghdad Railway in
1903. When hostilities broke out in July 1914, the Ottoman Empire was eager to form an
alliance with a Great Power, in an effort to increase their own security and end their diplomatic
isolation. Due to a long-standing rivalry with Russia, a result of Russias long-standing desire to
seize control of the Straits, the Ottomans approached Germany. Throughout July, Germany
repeatedly rejected Ottoman requests for an alliance, believing that this alliance would do them
more harm than good, as the empire was weak economically, militarily, and politically.
However, German leaders radically changed their attitude once hostilities actually began.
Confronted with the reality of a two-front war and a formal offer of assistance from the Turks,
both Moltke and the civilian leadersabandoned their previous reserve and called for immediate
Ottoman intervention against Russia (Trumpener 22, 1968). On August 2, 1914, a secret treaty
was concluded between the two, which required the Ottoman Empire to take military action in
the event of a Russian attack on Austria-Hungary. Additionally, this treaty called for the alliance
to end when the conflict ended. Grand Vizier Said Halim rejected this, and called for the treaty

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to last until 1918, which illustrates that Berlin thought of the alliance as a way to gain the upper
hand during the July Crisis, while Istanbul perceived it as the road to long-term security by
deterring attacks on the Ottoman Empire (Aksakal 2008, 100). Germany wanted the Ottomans
to take direct, immediate action, and exert an impact on the eastern front. However, Ottoman
leaders repeatedly delayed entering the conflict, greatly frustrating German leaders. On
September 4, in an effort to push the empire into war, Germany announced that [Ottoman]
requests for personal, material, and financial aid now were on hold until the empire took an
active military role (Aksakal 2008, 145). Frustrated with their lack of success on the western
front and with Ottoman reluctance to take military action, [German General] Souchon forced
the governments hand (Anderson 1996, 314). Souchon led an attack on Russian ships in the
Black Sea, which effectively dragged the Ottomans directly into the conflict. As a result of the
German alliance, and their firm desire to have the Ottomans enter the war, [The Ottomans]
were no longer masters in their own house (Anderson 1996, 314).
In a second possible explanation, Mustafa Aksakal argues that it was the national
sentiment of the empire propelled it into war. Following the Balkan Wars, the domestic political
climate of the empire underwent a severe shift. Nationalism became incredibly prominent within
the empire, and literature during this time period promoted the spread of value. According to
Aksakal, the intellectual and emotional climate was consistent with, and, in fact, fostered the
embrace of war in 1914. That decision was the outcome less of irredentist ideas than the firm
conviction that war inevitably would have to be faced again in the near future (Aksakal 2008,
28). Aksakal attributes this sentiment to results of the Balkan Wars. The Ottomans humiliating
loss in the First Balkan War had a negative psychological effect on the empires constituents.
After Enver Pasha successfully recovered Adrianople in July 1913, during the Second Balkan
War, many began to believe that only military victory held the key to saving the
empire (Aksakal 2008, 24). This gave way to an important theme that emerged in the empire in
1914. Ottomans firmly believed that society must organize itself and prepare its every aspect
for war (Aksakal 2008, 30). Thus, when hostilities broke out in July 1914, the Ottomans were
united in the idea of defeating the Entente powers, who they perceived as a threat due to their
large imperial footprint in the Middle East, and reclaiming their former glory and power. In July
1914, the empires constituents were not opposed to war; rather, many believe that war was the
opportunity by which Ottoman aims of restoring a militarily powerful and politically
independent empire could be achieve (Aksakal 2008, 39).
A third explanation of the Ottoman entrance is that Enver Pasha, the Ottoman Minister of
War, single-handedly led the Ottoman Empire into war. Since the wars end, countless historians
and scholars have depicted Enver Pasha as a German-obsessed, pan-Islamic, power-hungry, warhawk, military dictator. When hostilities broke out in July 1914, Enver Pasha proposed forming
an alliance with Germany. Pasha served as a military attache in Berlin from 1909-11, making
him more sympathetic to the German cause. Eugene Rogan described Pasha as the biggest
Germanophile in the government (Rogan 2015, 40). Envers push for, and success in obtaining
an alliance with Germany has led to many blaming him for the empires entrance into the
conflict. Efraim and Inari Karsh claim that, Greed rather than necessity drove the Ottoman

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Empire into the First World War. Its war aim was to realize the imperialist vision of the powerful
minister of war Enver Pasha: a tangled web of grievances and revanchist hopes geared toward
reassertion of Ottoman imperial glory and unification of the Turkic peoples within an expanded
empire (Karsh and Karsh 1999, 138). Additionally, Envers subsequent actions, such as his
ordering in August 1914 of the immediate closure and mining of the southern end of the
Dardanelles and northern end of the Bosporus, led to heightened tensions with the Entente
powers. The fact that Enver took these actions with securing Grand Vizier Said Halims
approval has caused many to believe that Enver Pasha conspired against the Grand Vizier to
stack the decks for war (McMeekin 2010, 119). Sean McMeekin claims that the actions Pasha
took, such as his agreement with German leaders to begin operations against the Russians in
October 1914, without discussing these actions with other Ottoman leaders illustrate that Enver
Pasha had already decided on war, with or without full Cabinet support, and war is what Turkey
now got (McMeekin 2010, 120).
To conclude, there are a variety of possible theories explaining why the Ottoman Empire
entered the First World War. However, no single explanation is sufficient. Many scholars see the
German-Ottoman alliance as the ultimate factor pushing the Ottoman Empire into war. While
Germany certainly had a large influence over the Ottoman Empire, the empire was not solely
influenced, nor pushed into war, by Germany. Additionally, some scholars believe that national
interest and ideology were the main reason the Ottomans joined the conflict. While this certainly
influenced to some degree the Ottoman decision to go war, it was by no means the main reason.
Lastly, many historians have used Enver Pasha as a scapegoat for pushing the Ottoman Empire
into war. However, the fact that Enver Pasha repeatedly delayed Ottoman intervention illustrates
the flaws that exist within this interpretation. Additionally, Enver Pasha sought out an alliance
with Russia, the Ottomans long-standing enemy, days after signing the alliance with Germany.
This demonstrates the great lengths to which he was willing to go in order to avoid war,
highlighting that by no means did he propel the empire into war at the very first moment he
could. When hostilities broke out in July 1914, the Ottoman Empire saw the war as an
opportunity to reestablish their empire as a Great Power. The leaders of the Ottoman Empire
made the decision that they truly thought was in their best interest. Ottoman leaders, and a
majority of the empires constituents, truly believed that the Great War would save the crumbling
empire from its impending partition, and restore it to its former glory, or at least provide it with
some semblance of security. I will further expound upon this idea in my next paper.

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