HISTORY OF THE MS as eee eae | INVASION OF HOLLAND AND BELGIUM| HISTORY OF THE} JHCOND WORLD AWAY ‘Second Edition 1972 139 © Marshall Cavendish USA Led 1973 125 Foundation Reader Subscription Offer A subscription to History of the Second World War ensures that you don’t miss a single Part. We mail each issue directly to yourhomeeachweek. Tohelpyou start your collection, we are offering an introductory subscription at $9-00 for 12 issues —a saving of $2-40, Turn to the leaflet in the center of this issue for your order form THIS WEEK’S CONTENTS: Breakthrough at Sedan Alistair Horne Invasion of Holland and Belgium Jean-Léon Charles Men Who Worked for Hitler Roger Manvel! and Heinrich Fraenkel NEXT WEEK: In next week's stirring issue, we present the story of operation Dynamo— the evacuation of the Allied troops besieged at Dunkirk, ‘Trapped within a tiny perimeter and exhausted by the swift success of the Blitzkrieg, the troops appeared to be at the mercy of the Luftwaffe, But the Germans had not reckoned on the effects of the sand on their bombs or on the brillant direction of Admiral Ramsey. They had also not counted on the gallant and unstinting efforts of the civilian population who helped to rescue over 330,000 troops in 9 days. This is one of the most moving episodes of the war and one you will not want to miss. 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Through this gap the Panzers roared triumphantly to the sea—cutting off the British and French who had responded to the German attack in the north Alistair Horne On May 9, 1940, General Erwin Rommel, commanding the VII Panzer Division whieh he had only taken over less than three months previously, wrote a brief nate to his wife Dosrest L We're packing up at last. Let’s hope not im vain. You'll get all the news for the next few days from the papers. Don’t worry yourself. Everything will go all right ‘At 0532 hours the next. morning Rommel's tanks crossed the southern end of the Belgian frontier, heading for the Meuse at Dinant, 65 miles away. Almost simul- taneously the main body of Hitler's Panzers rolled over the Luxembourg frontier to Rommel's south, near Vianden where that Famous propagandist of two Franoo-German ware ago, Vielor Hugo, had spont his declining years. The spearhead commander, General Guderian, had left his men in no Aoubt as to their ultimate objective: it was the Channel. But in his memoirs he added that ‘at that time nobody actually believed in a successful outcome, apart from Hitler, ‘Manstein, and myselt’ ‘An astonishing gamble had been Inunchod which was to lead to perhaps the most Aevastatingly brilliant, lightning eampalgn in history. More than'to almost any other single factor, the degree of its success was due to @ series of accidents which had Drought about a radical change in the German stratogic plan, Originally Hitler hhad intended to. attack in the West on Novernber 12, 1989, hurd on the heels of the overthrow of Poland. Bad weather and ‘equipment deficiencies had eaused the offen sive to be postponed. The plan would hardly hhave been more conservative and” un inspiring hod it, been dreamed up by a British General Staff of the inter-war years. Called Fall Gelb ("Plan Yellow), it was closely based on the Schlioffon Plan, the fanking thrust through Belgium which had failed in 1974. Is lack of imagination threw General yon Manstein, one of the best military brains in Germany, into utter despair and he had set about preparing an falternative plan. The Manatein Plan (later talled Sichelschnitt, or, literally, the "sweep fof a scythe’) envisaged a German advance into northern Belgium which would, how. ever, merely actin Liddell Hart's ad: Imirable simile—‘like a matador's cloak’ to ddraw into Belgium the BEF and the powerful French forces in Flanders and to distract the Alliee while the main blow was de- livered elsewhere. This was to come Just north of the end of the Maginot Line, through the hilly “and densely” forested country of the Ardennes, which the French General Stall were known to consider as "impaseable’ and which they had therefore covered with only light forces. Ifthe break mpassable’, and so they covered it through succeeded it would ooeur an the ‘Mouse, roughly between Namur and Sedan, fn which sector no less than seven of Hitler's ten Panzer divisions were concentrated. ‘Manstein’s temerity produced the kind of reaction common to “conservative army ‘establishments’ everywhere, and he was dispatched to an infantry corps faraway in eastern Germany, Bul on January” 10 fan aircraft bearing a German stall officer with most of the dotaile of Fall Gelb was forced down inside Belgium, thereby necessitating @ prompt revision of the plan. By February 17 Hitler, pushing a reluetant General Sia, had adopted a modified version of Manatein's alternative plan, and Within loss than 12 weeks preparations for the great offensive were completed. In the north Book's Army Group B was to march into Belgium, waving the 'matador’s cloak’ He was. allotted only 28 divisions while Rundstedt’s Group A, which was to plunge through the Ardennes, contained” 44— including the seven Panter divisions, to be reinforced by two more from Bock's group ‘once the Allied “bull” had committed itself In northern Belgium and a breakthrough hhad been achieved on the Meuse. The main weight of Rundstedt’s thrust on the Meuse was entrusted to Kleist’s Panzer. group, land it in turn was divided into two spear- heads of which the stronger comprised Guderian’s ‘corps of three armoured di- usBreakthrough at Sedan (continued) ne, aimed at Sedan. On. Guderian’s right came Reinhardt's corps of two Panzer divisions, with orders to throw a bridge hhead across the Meuse at Monthermé Still further north was Hoth’s corps, con~ sisting of the V and VII (Rommel's) Panzer Divisions, detailed of to provide Sank cover tothe main thrust, Tt was perhaps a measure of the German General Staffs lack of confidence in Sichel- sschnitt that, beyond seizing bridgeheads fon the Meuse, no further orders were given to the Pangers in the event of a break- through sueccoding, ‘On the other side of the lines, 33 British and French divisions (including some of the best in France) faced the ‘matedar's cloak’ of Bock's 28, poised to march into Belgium tunder General Gamelin’s ‘Dyle Manoeuvre! ‘The vital sector between Namur and the northern terminal of the Maginot Line was held by General Corap's Sth Army and Hunt- zigor’s 2nd Army, consisting of only 12 largely second-rate divisions. ‘The seam between the wo armies lay just downstream. from Sedan. As to the reason for the light- ness of the force responsible for this stretch of the Meuse, the French General Staif hhad refused to budge trom the traditional opinion that the Ardennes were 'impassab) despite the fact that as early as 1028 Liddell ‘Hart, among others, had warned that. their Impassability. was "much ex aggeratod’. As' lar as reserves were con: cerned, no less than 30 French visions Were pinned down unprofitably onthe Maginoc Line, Jn addition to the ‘normal ‘garrison troops; two of France's threo Armoured divisions were allocated to the foree covering Belgium north of Namur. ‘Thus only some ten divisions remained in reaerve to mest all emergencies. Already by the first day of the battle the famous French ‘mass of manoeuvre’, of which 80 much was to be heard at various stages, was virtually 4 non-existont. The stage was perfeetly sot for tragedy ‘Gamelin, the French Army C-in-C, had bbeen Chief of Operations on Joffe’: stat in the First World War. At his headquarters in the Chateas de Vincennes he conducted affairs in an atmosphere of isolation from Gay-today avents not dissimilar to the great “offre at Chantilly. Visiting GHQ, General {de Gaulle said he was reminded ofa convent” ‘and added: ‘In his ivory tower at Vincennes, General Gamelin gave me the impression of a savant, testing the chemical reactions of his strategy ina laboratory.’ M Reynaud, the Prime Minister, had litle confidence in Gamelin, of whom he had once said that he ‘might be all right as a prefeet or a bishop’ Dbut not as a leader, and at a stormy Cabinet meeting on the very day before the Ger mans attacked he had attempted to sack Gamelin for his part in the Norwegian fiasco. Gamelin had a deputy, General The French chain of command is cumbersome Georges, who as ‘Commander-in-Chief of the North-Bast Theatre’ also~in theary— held direct executive command over opera- tions along the whole front from Switzer- land to the sea: but the responsibilities of the two generals were ill-defined and en. tangled, and thotr personal relations uneasy Between General Georges and the various army commanders came yet another general and his HQ Billotte, commanding Army oup 1, Gamelin had no control aver the air force. He had no. wireless at his com: Mand. post with which lo keep in contact ‘with his subordinate formations, From top to bottom the French chain of eommand was so complicated and cumbersome that, as the battle progressed, it was repeatedly to Je for the French the one element it needed. above all others time, part from this vital element, the two decisive weapons in the German onslaught wore the tank and the aeroplane. In tanks, the numerical advantage was with. the Allies, who could muster in France some 8,000" against the 2,700 contained im the German Panzer spearheads. Half the Ger- ‘man tanks ‘were light vehicles, Marks and I, with only machine-guns or & 20mm un. ‘The Mark IIT medium tank. then posseased a 37-mm gun which wae inferior {o both the British d-pounder and the ‘mm weapon of the French medium tan And ite armour was thinner (hough perhaps better in quality) than the French equiva Tents. ‘The German Mark TV carried only 8 low-velocity 7S-mm gun, while the French heavy” tank waa reckoned to be the best fank in any army at the time, During the ‘Phoney Wav’ French propaganda had mado ‘much of French tankcerews discovery that German anti-tank shells bounced of thei armour plating. Bul in speed and cruising Tange the German tanks hada distinet edge What counted most, however, was the organisation of the opposing armour. The French tanks. were split up between the cavalry and infantry commands, sealtered Shout among the major units ai, they’ had bhoen during the Fest World War. There were three armoured divisions, ut, these ‘had only’ been hastily’ constituted in 1940; there ‘were also three light. mechfnised Alivisions, but these were committed to the Dyle movement north of Namur and this wrere mover available az general reserves At the moment and place when they would Most be needed. ‘The German armour was concentrated. in ten highly" trained and thoroughly tested. Panzsr divisions, cach with a strength varying between 230 and 300" tanks apiece, compared to. the 130 and 169 reepoetively contained inthe Frene Int and 2nd Armoured Divisions, Moreover, antitank mines were only just beginning Teach the French forces! in the alr, the German margin of superior. ity’ was far more marked 3226 alrer Continued on page 116NORTH SEA NETHERLANDS Amsterd loser Devenvar® Heavily bombed 14 May Ostend © Bruges Dunkirk ev .cambra Sent oF gett bay 2 ocivan Main Belgian fine Seon Pan al OAM nae) eStart are) oro en) ee mg ee ey Meena eg) meter cat Pee cane Sueno en) the coast, Mr Roce Er ET Neri eee cake aaa Ceara Pen ees Feuer ern Bee en i Cece at ey Cou een MOE a} Poet Date cy Boer es ma COe ata te) aaa ney eng ene uwes DORR Orn Peco tcc Ben ica anaes oars eee Pasar at eee er DN ers Po eon rae Rees Pe tea nats ieee eat eerie Re Dee ets CUS unconditional surrender 5Breakthrough at Sedan (continued) of which 1,000 were fighters and 942 Stuka five-homhers, confronted 1,200 French and 630 British planes. ‘France had. precisely 54 dive-bombers, and her best fighter was ‘more than 30 mph slower than the Messer= fschmitts. Again, as with her armour, the French air forces were dispersed and in- capable of the speedy concentration — the principle of tho Sehteerpunk concentration point?) which lay at the very core of the Cer- fan war machine, Th artillery, France was numerically The French army deficient in morale Superior with 11,200 guns to 7,710, But, largely horse-drawn, it was prepared only for atatic warfare of the 1918-18 type and wasted. Valusble time in unlimbering and geting "nto! acion. There wae no al ropelied artillery euch as was tobe found in All the German Panzer divisions Finally, the French army. was notably dofciont in that alkimportant Intangible tmorate. The memories of Verdun. and, the 11500,000' dead of the First World. War aipied heavily on all ranks. The sapping tlfets of the Pront Populaire, appeasement, Hes oii idan ath 21 left thelr mark, au had the lethargy of dhe monthe of Phoney War itsll. "To thet serole a general of the French 2nd. Army, ‘We must edd the pernicious effest of Grins’ this cancerous growth which gnawe at the lifeblood ef the country’ in the larger {railway) stations spodtal rooms hed to be prepared, euphemistially known a8 "s- ethglation rooms" ‘Just after the Polish campaign, Hider with bis extraordinary Intuition had once ‘again proved. himself right, bis. generals crrong, when he neted to Jed "Phe spending Fitna ume on he Magingt Line, oer 4 period of many years, has not ben without fle on them [the French? they have been bred. on ideas of security. They have loxt their ash, whieh mode them tr ort enemies inthe First World War’ Whereas, fn contrast, it might be ald thatthe young Germans of the Wehrmacht gazing out at the swiftly passing Nay. cownteyside from the open hatches of their ghting machines, find supremely confident in the superiority ‘oftheir race—had acquired anew dash. [Asi crossed the frontier at dawn on May 10, ‘Kloin’s armoured group. presented @ remarkable spectacle from the eir it must fave apprare ae the presto: trafic jam in history. According to Rundstedv’s Chief. ofSiam, Blumentrite this ‘giant. phalanx’ St armour and vehicles ‘stretched back for $00 tulle, the rear rank Iving 80 miles to the east ofthe Rhine Had soon placed in ingle fle the tailend would have been in Konigsberg, in Bast Prussie, and the heed of the column in Trier, Overhead droned an Imnmense umbrella ofighters, ue amaningy oth litle effort was made by the French air foros to carry out any reconnaissance forties, Had they done 20, surely even the Most mediocre Deusime ‘Bureau ffcer ould not have failed to conclude that here ‘was where the main blow was going tafall 16 i‘The French Military Attaché in Berne hhad ‘indeed warned GHQ on. May 1 that ‘the German attack will occur between May 8 and May 10; the main effore will be made on Sedan’, But the Deusizme Bureau bad hosen to disbelieve this and other warn- Sings, and so no intensified air reconnaissance had been ordered, In that wonderfully sunny May weather of 1940, French soldiers con- tinued to listen insouciantly and nostalgic Ally to the struine of J'atlendrat coming from bistro radios a8 they sipped their pernods at tables outside. On May ® the ‘officers. of General Corap's Sth Armny HQ hed gone of to tee a play’ pat on for the troops st Vou aiers. Several” generals and thousands of Oicers snd men were away on leave. When rows of the Cerman atzack reached them, they. cboked the railroads ‘while trying to return to their units amid chaotie scenes Teminisoont of the outbreak of the Franco: Prussian War of 1870. Many were never t reach their units before these were over helmed ’As the news came through on May 10, General Gamelin issued an ordor of the day to announes.the ‘German onslaught, tor- hinating with the words Pétain had used at {he crisis of the Battle of Verdun 24 years tarer: Nous les aurons’’ Tt was one more {indication af just how deeply rooted in the mystique of the First World War was the French army of 1940. In London, Churehil replaced Chamberlain. In Germany, Hitler, on bearing that the Allies had rescted im: mediately to. the ‘matador’s cloak” by ‘moving Torward into’ Belgium, recorded: ‘Treould have wopt for joy: thoy’ had fallen into the trap. How lovely Felsennest was! ‘The birds in the morning, the view of the road up which the columns were advancing, the squadrons of planes overhead. There, { ‘was sure that everything would go right for met Tn Paris, Reynaud remarked anxiously to Paul Baudouin: "Now we shall seo what Gamelin is made of Tn conformity with the Allied ‘counter- stan’ that came into operation as soon as the mans crossed the Luxembourg and Bel- fan frontiers, the 2nd and Lith Corps at the left of General Corap's Sth Army left their frontier entrenchments and moved into Belgium. There, between Namur and Givet, ‘they took up Unprepsred positions on the Meuse. To! their right two. light. cavalry divisions and a brigade of Spahis (Afscan Native Cavalry), plus a similar force from the nd Army, crossed the Meuse to mect Rundsted's vanguard approaching through the Ardennes. Their orders were to fight @ delaying action, and to gauge the enemys Sstrength~the Inter a fanetion which should hhave been filled by air reconnaissance. Four and a half covalry divisions against the ‘mest powerful armoured foros. the. world had yet seen! Gneis reminded of some distant colonial war of the last contury, ‘when spearsmen of primitive. tribes ist ame up against the Gatling gun, or when the Mameluke horsemen ‘broke ‘on. the Napoleonic square. by the pyramids. Con stantly a the earspaign progresses the image is repeated, not of two dillerent armies Tegel i cnt, but of tp dierent age, "Tho Frouch eavalry met the enemy sooner than’ expected. The" famous Ardennes proved no hindrance at all to. tracked Yebiles, and little had been done to supple- ‘ent natural obstacles Few demolitions were carried out by the Belgians, many Toad-blocks were left undefended, Gn thetr Side ofthe frontier the French had declined eer cea ee eee ie wearer ee oon era Sie Seer er eae an arenes oh reine eae Seed eae eee cuvanna eae tonriineaurimcrtios vane et eee role was equally abortive. Painfully it could ait tera ae rpearane iss St ee pee events bea fie Seadoee ares Ceo ibed ane German Panzers overlook the Meuse from Dinant to Sedan fs the scene of one of France's greatest anus 1 was hr dat Napelon just 70 years ago, had capitulated together ‘with 100,000" mento Bismarck athe der Moltke. According to Gamelin’s ders, the French cavalry were now to hold Sedan ‘avallemts Butby 1900 hours thet eventing, Jn fear of being out-Nanked, they retreated to the left bank of the Meuse and blew the bridges, loaving. the Germans. to occupy Sedan ‘unopposed. As ight fell Corman Pansers overlooked the ‘Meuse ali the wa from Dinant o Sedan; there were no Frene forces lft on the far side of the river Ben atthe dneatene stor the rn despite the speed of the enemy “approach march’, the "local French” commanders Appear still to have assumed (basing their estimates, as usual, on ast World War experiences) chat the. Germans would ‘equire at leat five to six days before they ould concentrate enough arilery to fore a river eressing of the Meuse. They ignored the "German "Sivebombens On May. 12 the French ar force had distinguished itself, attacking with great élan, and shooting down some 30 sirerait at no loss to them: Selves: But che main weight ofthe Lustwaffe Fad not yet been eomamitied. That same day, Hitler's "ADC, Colanel Sebmundt, had enquired of Kleist whether he intended to ‘attempt an immodiate Meuse crossing, or to ‘wale tint the main body of the infantry frrived. “The question relleeted the re hewed nervousness “at OKH about. the udacity “of the Manstein. Plan. Aerial Photes ‘hed revealed «strongly fortified Gefence zone covering Sedan; however, an closer inspection, an expert. informed Kleist that these fortifications were still in the process of construction. ALthough even the fver-eager Cuderian pointed out that hie would have only two of his three Panzer divisions available, Kleist told Schmund that he preferred to attack ‘at once, without ‘wasting time’ 60 as to hit the French before they could regain theit breath. So long as he ould be guaranteed the full support of the Laftwaffe, the lack of artillery would not matter. This was duly promised by Hitler. “That night Kleist istued his orders tothe Panzer ‘group for crossing the Meuse the next day. "Almost the entire German ait Force he promised sith only modest exaggeration), will pat. on’ continuous fttacks which will crush the Prench defences fn the Meuse After these the group will fake the crossings st 1600 hours and tstablishitsbridgeheads’ Ye was Guderian's corps which, having captured Sedan, sas to deliver the hardest baw. Here the Mouse waa 60 yarde wide and tunferdable. On. the left baak the Prench ‘main line of resistance’ consisted of con: Grete. pillboxes and trenches behinds Substantial belt of bared wie. Each pill ox contained an anticlank gun and machine- ffuns, speced out on an average of ane to every 200 yards of front —sehich in iolt ‘was adequate, But, as Kleists sharp-eyed Photographie intelligence office had noticed, many were unBinished. The situation of the Seoond’ Hine’ of resistance, placed far too Clase behind the main line Uo be of any use {in the uid kind of warfare that Guderian ‘was about to introduce, was even worse. Manning these incomplote foreiications ‘were the 55th and Tie Divisions of General Grandsard's 10th Corps (2nd Army). They were ‘B-Class’ units, comprised of elderly eeorvists without.” much training for Sedan had been regarded as a ‘safe secon’ ‘Accnrding to. Geandsard himself, “cis cipline in these divisions was reduced by the Slackness in the men and lack of leederchip ‘amongst most of the. subalterns. Most ‘of the troops wore “at and abby men in thoir thirties. They were spread out thinly ‘over front about 25 miles wide. In terms of frliliery™at least superficially ~Grandard Seemed well supported. The Martée heights ‘overlooking Seen. provided excellent. ob- Servation posta, and by the morning of Mey 45 the Sth Division alone had 140 guns ‘massed on its sector. But because of the Steepness of the Meuse banks, only sbout Snethird ould actualy cove the river many were not yet properly dug in; and from tiie very boginaing the gunners were to be haunted by shortage of emumunition, "Early on the morning of May 13 Grand sard’s aivanced posts reported that Ger- man motoreyelists, tank, and. infantry wore ebouching ‘out of” the Ardennes Forest, heading for the Meuse. The French gunners opened ‘up on. the unbelievably thick concentrations of armour; bul spar. utBreakthrough at Sedan (continued) ingly, so as to conserve ammunition. The German guns did not reply. ‘Then, towards mid-day, the Stukas arrived. Down thoy screamed, loosing their 1,000-pound bombs ‘upon the thin-skinned French pill-boxes, fon the infantry crouching exposed in their trenches, and on the gun crews, in their poorly concealed, shallow (or often non- existent) gunpits: About a thousand planes were in the air, in densest formation. The noise was terrifying. The French reservist hhad the impression that each plane was shout to ‘land right on top of him’, that it simply could not miss. Nowhere was one out of sight, nowhere out of range of this terri- fying weapon. Due to the dive-bombers’ inaccuracy, casualties wore not in fact great. But, as fan instrument of terror, the Stuka was infinitely more effective than the "Big Hertha’ shells that had fiat howled down on Belgian forts in 1914; more than the first gas attack at Ypres; more than the first appearance of flamethrowers, or even of the tank. This was a new dimension of war for which not even tough, trained regulars were prepared; and Grandsard's men were flabby Eivilians in an army whose morale was not conspicuously high. For what ensued, they ould not entirely be blamed. 'The gunner Stopped firing and went to the ground, wrote one French general; ‘the infantry ‘cowered in their trenches, dazed by the crash ‘of bombs and the shriek of the dive-bombers; they had not developed the instinctive re- action of running to their anti-aircraft guns fand firing back. Their only concern was to Koop their heads well down.” “Around the battle-front the Messerachmitt squadrons circled, pouncing on any slower French fighter that attempted to Interfere with the work of the Stukas. The cringing toldiers cursed the air force and felt they hhad been abandoned. For five hours the paralysing bombardment continued, the German artillery joining in the fugue only when ithad reached its final crescendo, ‘AL 1600 hours the crossing began. The German timing was superb. "Immediately after the last’ bombs,’ said Major Keil mansegg, ‘under shower of falling earth, the frst pneumatic boats reached the opposite shore. Tho rislomen, motoreyclists, fand infantry rushed and encircled tho frst pilk-boxes’. "There they found the French Teservists often too stunned to fire back. ‘Themselves nervous in the extrome as to what they might find on the other side of the Meuse, the young German storm- troopers were’ enormously encouraged by the demoralisation caused by the Stukes. Guderian, who true to the new Panzor ‘mentality had erossed under shell fire in the first assault boat, recorded that the attack proceeded ‘as though it were being earried fut on, manoouvres, ‘The French artillery wae almest paralysed by the unceasing threat’ of attack by Stukas and bombers ‘The concrete emplacements along the Meuse hhad been put out of action by our anti-tank and flak artillery, and the enemy machine- ffunners were forced to keep down by the fire of our heavy weapons and artillery Despite the completely open nature of the ‘ground, our casualties remained light.” Here and there isolated casemates fought back with desperate, unsung heroism. But fon the whole the defence at Sedan was not 18 distinguished: the quality of Grandsard’s troops and the nature of the weapons ob: Poning ‘them ‘could hardly ‘have. deere Gtherwise. By late afternoon the French 55th Division's front had crumpled. in, {and Guderian gave orders for light armoured line to be rafted serose the Mouse. At 1800 hours General Lafontaine, commander of the 5th, was calmly considering means of e-stablishing. the situation at his ‘com- mand post just south of Bulkon. ‘Suddenly 2 wave of ierrified fugitives, gunners, infantry, in transport, on foot, many ut arms Dut dragging their Kibage, swept fe Bulson road. "The tanks’ are at * they ered, Some were firing thelr rifles like madmen Tt was a scane that would become all too familiar in France during the next. few ‘weeks. By nightfall on that. ominous day, May 19, Guderian’s 1 Panzer Division had ccetpied the Mariée heights, ‘smashing {rough both the main and secondary French defence lines in. one low. ‘During. the course of the night, Licuienant-Colonel Bald 'T Rie) Regiment though si largely unsupported. by armour —actuall pushed out as far as Chehéry, 6 miles beyond fhe river. On the lef of the German line, the X'Panver Division had hod harder time getting acros the river owing to its lack of frillery support but toohad established a Jougement ‘onthe left bank. Altogether Gutlerlan now ‘had a comfortably sub stantial ‘bridgehead across the Meuse~ $3 miles wide and 4 to 6 mills deep—and had rented dangerous bulge in Grandsard’s front, inia which his tanks slowly beyan to rumble as ploneers worked all through the ight. to throw pontoons’ aczos, the iver. There had till been no. serious, ‘coordinated counterattack on the part of the French, ‘Some 15 miles farther north on the Meuse the. atiempis of Reinhard’s KLI. Panzer Corps to seize bridgehead at Monthermé had met vith quite diferent results. The Luftwaffe had failed to appear at the ap. pointed hour, and the assault troops had Fone in supported only by the guns of the {fuk They just managed to. gain a foot hold across the river, but were immediately pinned down by a vigorous defence by the Rommel takes over personal command at Dinant Freoch 1Qind Division, For three days Reinhardt's corps remained in a deadlock, Tania ts fat ba armour perees thr) tnd. thus impotent to. aid in the main Breakthrough baie But arther north one meets again with Rommel, whogg, Vil" Paneer Divison — formang-part of Kleist’ secondary thrant— fied reached the Mouse just below Dinant. Here the Mouse, owing ins series of sharp meanders between igh and they wooded tscarpments, provided. the. Prench with {fester dafence headaches than, at Sedan. ino Corape thy Army ha had to advance tome 45 ales through Belgien teritory to tee up imprompeupostine, there, Yat Hommes cessing. had. been seriously hell up by French heavy artillery shelling, and by suall-nrms fre of Broach troops Goncetled"among eck ph at bank Promplly.scokiog” out, the. trouble. modi Rome! Soted "The situation when [arrived was none too plessast. Our boatsWhen the barrage lifted th pti cm ote wore being destroyed one after the other by the French flanking fire and the erossing eventually came. to a standstill’ Rommel himself came under fre from hidden sharp shooters, and later moved on to see if things were going any better with the ‘VI ile Regiment. Here again “he found failure, ‘withthe offcars badly” ‘shaken by” the casualties which their men had sufered” He adds "T now took over personal com: mand of the If Battalion of VII Rife Regi ment and for some time directed operations nyse Te seems that it was only through Rom- rmel's bold personal intervention, coupled ‘rth on extraordinary pies of negligence on the part of the Freneh 18th Division, that his division was able 40 cross the Meuse at all on the. 13th." On ‘reaching the river the Brevious day, a motoreyel reconnalssance patrol ad discovered a weir intact at Houx ‘They immediately tried to eros, but ere hhalied by the French 68th Regiment this Unit, however, was then relieved by the 16th Divibion, which for no very clear reason tok up a position on the high ground on the left bank om which fe wae quite impossible to cover the weir or its approaches. During the night of the 12th, the German motor eyelsia—without a abot being fired at them had erosed the weir and had established & precarious foothald‘on the other side. All through the 13th they chung on, inthe face af bitter French counterattacks, until reinforced by Rommel’s riflemen. Through: Out the night of Une 13¢h the situation of the Dinant bridgehead eontinaed to remain hazardous, and even by dawn of tho Lith Rommel had only sucoueded in ferrying 15 of his tanks aeross the Meuse. Any forceful French ripoite, supported. with’ armour, ‘would surely have dislodged Rommel, But during’ the whole of the Jdth only one counter-siroke.'was mounted. by” Corayis th Army, and this was deseribed as np and run raid earvied oat by a squadron of fanks' and some. machine-gun’ carriers. ‘The reasons for the delay in the French reaction willbe soen shorty. Thy the mamning of the Lith, the Germans had! three’ bridgehead of varying promise across the Meuse. Now began the phase of Consolidation, of building up forthe break through into the great plain of France that ly ahead. Te was eleatly at Sedan where lay the greatest opportunity for the’ Ger- tans, the greatest danger for the French. AAs noted earlier Guderlan had struck at the sam betwoon the 9h and. 2nd. Armies Grandsard’s unhappy reservist. divisions, the 38th and 7Ist, were already tn ruins and they held the northern flank of General Huntaigers ‘nd. Army. Tn th ‘cure ol that day, an ominous gap began to appear between the two armies. ‘un ‘AL 0130 hours Grandsard had ordered a dawn counteratack of two tank battalions fand two infantry rogimenta to be made on Gderian’s bridgeheed. But the operation hhad: to be. postponed. until 0700 hours, and even then only one-half the force was feady.Alchough at" dawn the “German bridgehead was sil only weakly bolstered by tanks, by the time the French were ready to go. into. netion Guderian had already pushed his frst armoured brigade. across the river and was folowing up with the Second, "At" 0830 Grandstrd’s "counter attacking 7th Tank Battalion was itself hic in the flank by the newly arrived Panzors, losing hal its tanks ina brie, savage action. The fist French effort had ‘led, and with it the last good chance of wiping ut the Sedan bulge. By the. afternoon Guderian had completed the annihilation of the 53th and Tist Divisions, and had got most of his I and II Panser Divisions across the Mouse. He now gave them the order “to change direction with all their forces, to cross the Ardennes Canal, and to head west with the objective of breaking clear through the French defences’. Having burst a hole in The French were fighting at a First World War tempo the flank of Huntziger’s 2nd Army, Guderian ‘was now wheeling round to smash at Corap's 9th Army. ‘Throughout the 14th, nearly 200 Allied bombers relentlessly attacked Guderian's Vital pontoon bridge across the Meuse. But although B6 planes were shot down, of which 35 were British, their mission failed. On land on the Panzers poured into the bridge- head. Meanwhile, the first of the French strategic reserves were about to be com. mitted to. the battle. ‘The Srd Armoured Division had arrived and was now at Huntziger’s disposal. In the words of one French military historian it was ‘a magni fleent formation. Tt arrived full of spirit, disgusted at the panic it had witnesced on the roads, and was desperately keen to measure itself against the enemy. And Guderian’s daring 90-degree wheel wea wards had exposed to the 8rd Armoured Division a temptingly vulnerable flank. But, like everything else tho French were to do in these desperate days, the opportunity was lost by an organisation which could react only at First World War tempo, Orders were too slow in arriving: refuelling the tanks took too long. Finally when the 3rd Armoured Division did reach its destination, the orders for a concerted thrust towards Sedan were countermanded. Instead, this super’ ‘mechanised unit, one of the mast powerful cchess pieces on the Allied side, was ordered to ‘dig in’ in static positions, and its tanks Were ‘dispersed over a front. of some 12 miles. Thus no counterattack in the Sedan Sector materialised that day, and Guderian was allowed to carry out his manoeuvre unimpeded. The Sed Armoured Division was fa wasted force. ‘A similar debacle occurred opposite Rom mel's tenuous bridgehead at Dinant. On May 12 the French Ist Armoured Division hhad been transported by rail to Charleroi, with orders to be ready to advance on Dinant. But, wrote Colonel Bardies, ‘it took them a long time to reach their positions, for the roads were cluttered with Seeing troops and civilians ... Tt took the armoured division seven hours to cover 20 miles. It was short of petzol. It would be unable to fight that ‘day. Its commander halted it. Eventually Corap himself decided he would wait until the arrival of the ith North African Infantry’ Division before counter: attacking. In the meantime, the utterly lunrealistic 1918 doctrine of ‘containment’ ‘was what ho urged upon the 9th Army. The ensuing delay was just sufficient for Rommel to complete bridging operations, and his tanks too now surged across the Meuse. By nightfall’ he had established himself in foree at Onhaye, some 4 miles west of the ‘As May 14 came to a close, Corap and Huntziger each separately made fateful ugBreakthrough at Sedan (continued) decision. Huntzigor’s loft wing had collapsed fand he was confronted with the immediate necessity to fall back. But in which diree- ton? One way would expose the approaches to Paris, the other would uncover the northern’ flank of the Maginot Line. He {telephoned Genecal Georges for instructions. No answer. Finally he received the Delphic ‘order: "Do the best you can.’ On his own initiative, he now decided to pivot back- ‘wards on’ the Maginot Line, thus leaving & IO-mile gap between himself and Corap. During the 14th, Corap’s Sth Army had received the full attention of the Laft- walle: headquarters had beon smashed up, Tines of communication severed far behind the front, and the artillery paralysed, its horses slaughtered by the low-fiying Messer~ schmitts. Now Guderian was slicing deep {nto his right flank. But what appears to hhave depressed Corap most was the growth of Rommel’s pocket at Dinant. At 0200 hours on May 15 Corap told Billotte, the Army Group Commander, that his army was with- raving all along the line and that he now proposed abandoning the Meuse line to stand on a 'stopline’ running from Rocroi to Signy 'Abbaye. Billotie sanctioned the order. But in fue, as Colonel Bardies pointe Out, this line ‘existed only on paper. Ie was completely unmanned... The army corps that was going to pull back on the right of Corap’s army the Ast Corps—was a fort reg unt quite unable fo manoeure e respective decisions mede by Hunt- igor and Corap effectively opened the Sltice-gates, and May 15 was the day the flood burst into France. Opposite Rommel’s German infantry grab a quick ride Dinant bridgehead, the ‘stop-line’ which Corap had decreed and along which he ‘optimistically hoped to halt the Panzer tide =ran through Philippeville, only 15, miles ‘west of the Meuse. But in his orders for the 16th, Rommel, who by now had assembled moat of his division inside Une bridgehead ‘and wes all set to break out of it, laid down ‘an objective 8 miles beyond Philippeville; his intention ‘was to thrust straight through in one stride to our objective’ Again (a though the provious day his tank had beon bit twice) he decided to ride with the leading Panzer regiment. ‘Barly in the morning Rommel’ barely completed refuelling and its com- 120 ‘mander, General Bruneau, was still waiting to be toid what to do, Meanwhile, foreseeing a withdrawal instead of the projected ‘counter-atroke, on his own initiative he had taken the precaution of sending back to the rear his divisional artillery —which had only just arrived. Suddenly his static formation Tound itcolf caught between Rommel ad- vvancing to the south and the V Panzor Divi tion to the north. A bitter fight took place it Flavion, during which (according to French aecounta) some 100 German tanks ‘were knocked out. Rommel describes how his Panzer regi- ment ‘advanced in column through the woods to Philippeville, passing on the way ‘umorous guns and vehicles belonging to a French unit, whose men had tumbled head- Jong into the weorls at the approach of our tanks, having probably suffered heavily tunder our dive-hombars, Enormous craters compelled us to make several detours through the wood. About 3 miles. north- wast of Philippevilie there was a brief ex- ‘changed of fire with French troops occupying the hills and woods south of Philippeville, Our tanks fought the action on the move, with turrets traversed left, and the enemy ‘was soon silenced, From time to time enemy ‘anti-tank guna, tanks, and armoured cars were shot up.” As the’ day progressed, the Signs of a major debacle multiplied: ‘bun- dreds of French motoreyelists came out of ‘the bushes and, together with their officers, Slowly laid down their arms ... Among them ‘wore sevoral oficers, from whom Ireceived a umber of requests, including, among other ‘things, permission fo keep their batmen and hhave their kit picked up from Philippevile. ‘When the remains of Bruneau’ Ist Armoured Division limped off the. battle- field that night, ithad no more than 17 tanks Ieft. The first major tank-versus-tank battle of the campaign was over, and the only tunit ahead of Rommel capable of checking his advance had been destroyed. Meanwhile a terrible disarray had overtaken the in- fantry of Corap's 11th Corps. retreating back to the frontier line which it had left five days earlier to advance up to the ‘Meuse. Incredible though it may seem, but typical of this disarray, was the inability of the troops to get the frontier pill-bexes opened again—as the engineers who kept the keys had “disappeared But by nightfall fn the 15th Corap' 'stop-line', ordered only the night before, was in any case no longer relevant. In one bound Rommel had broken through it, reaching and passing beyond his wn objective. Looking back eastwards from the summit of @ hill, he noted that ‘endless pillars of dust could be seen rising as far fas the eye could reach—comforting signs that the VII Panzer Division's move into the ‘conquored territory had begun’. ‘At the other end of Kleist's front, Guderian, hada less spectacular day. He was prineip- ally concerned in securing the flank of the breakthrough against any’ attempt by Hunt- igor to breach it. This involved some bitter fighting for the heights arcund Stonne, which actually changed hands several times in the course of the day. Here, just as with the French Ist Armoured Division, Bro- card's Srd Division was still not ready to carry out a concerted counterattack, and was chevéed up piecemeal by Guderian’s Panzers over the next two days. Te was in the entre of the German front where perhaps the most significant events Of the 15th took place. Here Reinhardt's Panzer Corps had been bottled up ever since the 12th in its precarious bridgehead at Monthermé For three days Corap’s 41st Corps hed held Reinhardt in check with an extremely stout defence, though battered terribly by the Luftwaife. Its transport had suffered particularly heavy losses, and upon Corap’s order to withdraw to the ‘stop-line’ retreat turned into rout with alarming speed. At 0730 hours Reinhardt’s tanks ‘swarmed out of the Monthermé peninsula, rolling up the rear of 4st Corps. Making up for lost time, by evening its forward ele- ‘ments had reached Menteornet— no less than 87 miles west of the Meuse. This advance meant that Corap's 41st Corps had virtually ceased to exist; and it also carried with it the doom of the 9th Army, for Menteornet Corap is relieved of what remains of his command ‘es only 1 alles souat of Vein We Caras bedded Germans hod Broken clogs thrvugh ino his Peecaipeey aa ae cree ereaierad Ut what yemalnod Gis comand ho age menta of the 9th Army were handed eve: fe General Giant, Seventy comm the rth army, with whieh Coraethatored tiny was Ub reconeitited. Wrote Cora eh ae_O400 hours on the T6th, bear Hechead Brom, Disent to whore tas oun [hres ied Soe ete cy ar eeee pee Tease ‘ie hd een tan ie stumbling res {Terms in th pt ve da ef tetciry esti vas beeing eo {ta effect on the “German Panger trope (Sides eae yo setae! Faye one minis Goede tte percent ni daappcintment, Coderian now received ders fin Kiss fo bale the advance, but Eee cae ceataipeia nesgaeal Socio eee eee erie ee ape oolstama ot fall octet thelr enon gave Culerian's ten asso fay omnis catreicors ioe ae Montcomot I pasted an advancing column (fn Lancer Dvicvn Tbe eon vrs wide Seciaee iaree deeper eared compete victory, breakthrough. They Soncteal dente sees a al ee i ay eae en emer ters’ of bewildered" demoralied French ope, were bapantig to piv. heaton tp ofen, with the parpexad complaint Pratisoa’ ta tone a omoel arte ts fe eau cirtieae ta Prem Geo thoi faces ditorted with ero, lay huadled in the itches, slongaide elon, aod in rer ually tania an neal We peed fetugee columns, the ears abandoned by Be ceca: wt ot Ato pane te alts Dawa ven ae atealy spect? By tho end of tbe Iéthy Cuseran noied eae shasta airenty elvan oe tiles rin Sedan: Hi dors ret day tore to continue the pursuit unl ie ase drop of pero. Then, aariy'on the 47th oe eG een ese ecco before Kleist and fn sharp terme reminded te hig ‘halt doef the Taine Gecerian, fe rete trance ove ence ite bythe naention of Goel ft commandor ef he Army. What bed happened (Goran heat + Continued on page 122Breakthrough at Sedan (continued) quarters? It appears that even Hitler had {grown alarmed at the extraordinary success of the Panzers and feared that as they thrust deeper and deeper into France they would only be entering farther into an enemy tr2p. They must now pause and wait until the consolidating infantry could catch up. Guderian, comprehending the full scale of the French collapse better than those not so close to the front, once agnin argued passion. ately that there be no let-up in the advance during which the French might be allowed to re-form. Finally, after more heated argu: mont, it was agreed that Gudorian’'s HQ ‘must halt where it was, but that a 'reoon- hhaissance in force’ could be earried out. Once again interpreting his orders with a Nel- sonian liberality, Guderian climbed. bask into his tank and resumed his progress. ‘Chief among the factors that had made an impression upon Hitler had been the appar- ently increasing sctivity of the French armour, Yet in fact, although the OKW was not yet aware of it, By the evening of the 15th the French armoured reserve in the sector of the breakthrough had been all but wiped fout, The fate of the Ist and ard Armoured Divisions has already been seen. This lett in ellect only the 2nd Armoured Division, which on May 10 had been located in Cham: pagne, east of Rheims. The next three days {had spent dispersed on roads and railways between Rheims and Charleroi. On the 14th, General Georges had tried to re ‘assemble it and ordered it to take up position behind the ‘stop-line’ at Signy- Abbaye. In extended order, spread out over 25 miles, it eached the Monteornet area just as Gud rian and Reinhardt were smashing through fon the evening of May 15. Before it could concentrate, Guderian's leading divisions had eut it in two, with its soft vehicles on one side and its seattered armour on the other, ‘The mopping-up operation which terminated the life of the 2nd Armoured Division did not even eause the main Panzer Colonel De Gaulle commanded the French 4th Armoured Division thrust either to deviate or to slow ite im pelus, Bul none of this was seen by Hitler and the OKW by May 16, alarmed at the Potential danger of an armoured counter thrust against Kleist’s far extended flanks. "There now remained to the French High Command just one armoured unit, not including the French light mechanised divisions retreating from Belgium north of the breakthrough. It called itself the 4th ‘Armouted Division, but in act it was merely an ad hoc formation hastily thrown together from tank detachments collected from all ‘over France. The gunners of most of ite medium tanks had never fired the gun, while the drivers had had only four hours driving instruction. Its commander was a Colonel Charles de Gaulle, who had only received hig command on May 1, with the encouraging words (of General ' Georges) “There, de Gaulle! For you who have so long held the ideas which the enemy is putting into practice, here is the chance to act.’ De Gaulle hastened to Laon, and decided to launch a counterattack towards Montoornet 192 French tank in flames: th first tank-versus-tank battle was a debacle for the Frenchfon the 17th ‘with whatever forces might hhave reached me’. In faet by davn that day hhe had only received three battalions of tanks, and once again it was a story of precious reserves squandered in piecemeal Attacks. Although do Gaulle pressed his attack bravely and vigorously, Cuderian brushed it aside without even bothering to inform Kleist Said de Gaulle in his Memoirs ‘All the afternoon the Stukas, swooping out of thesky and returning ceaselessly, attacked four tanks and lorries. We had nothing with which to reply. Finally, German mechanised detachments, more and more numerous and ‘active, began skirmishing in our rear...” Meanwhile, in Paris during this momen- tous week emotions hed wavered between ppanie, false optimism, and sheer ignorance Of the gravity of the situation. The theatres fand restaurants were full, and the city's normal gaiety was enhanced by the marvel- Tous May sunshine. Bored by their provincial exile during the eight months of la drole de guerre’, many functionaries had actually Foturned from the places where they had been evacuated. ‘There were disquieting rumours in political ‘eouloirs, but relations between the Reynaud government and the High Command were 20 bad that # complete lack of communication had kept the politi cians blissfully unaware of just how bad things were, Then, (oo, Gamelin himself had been remarkably slow to realiso it. He had The French command was steadily breaking down not even loft his “ivory tower’ at Vinoennes to go to General Georges's HQ at La Ferté until May 13, the day Guderian was erossing, the Meuse. He was then ‘shaken by the realisation that no major reserves appeared to have been sent to the front. ‘On May 14 Gamelin went again to La Ferté, and rocoived a second shoek on learn- ing that no counterattacks had been laun- ched. His third visit the following morning brought yot a third shock: the news of the 9th Army's orders to withdraw. Up to this point, Gamelin appears to have had no idea as t just how serious was the German threat ‘on this part of the front. Even then Gamelin continued to exude extraordinary optimism, partially based on First World War exper! fence, although this stood in marked contrast to the atmosphere of stark gloom and paralysis which prevailed at General Georges’s HQ. On the evening of the 15th, when the German had well and truly broken through, Gamelin's daily. signal to the North African and Levant com. mands concluded: "To sum up, the 15th seems to show a lessening in intensity of enemy action. . Our front which was “shaken” batweon Namur and the area west of Montmedy, is gradually pulling itself together. ‘Behind this facade of optimism at General Georges’s headquarters, plan after plan of ‘containment’ had been’ evolved and passed down the tortuous and cumbersome French chain of command. But no sconer had a new ‘stopline’ been ordained than news arrived that the Panzers were already through It, tho slowly moving French reserves overrun In the French General Staffs endeavours to fight the Webrmacht’s revolutionary tech- nique of 1940 with the methods of 1918, one is reminded of Rivarol's comment on’ the émigrés and their foreign allies during the French Revolution: "They are always late by a year, by an army, and by an iden” As ceach successive plan ended in frustration, & French cclonel on liaison duty between Vin: cennes and La Rerte noted by the 15th ‘that our command organisation was. steadily breaking down, and that @ paralysis was creeping up, hour by houe’. What deepened this paralysis was the fact that it wae sill by no means clear what the Germans’ trate gic objective might be. Were they aiming for Paris? Or for Amiens and the Channel? Such was the fluidity of Klelos movements that Ie'might be either; thus the Prench High Command was repeatedly left wondering ‘where to dioct its fast disappearing eserves. Tate on the evening of the 16th, GQ re cxived the devastating news thal German tanks had reached Montcornet. Te was ‘com pletely “stupeiod’. Meanwhile Gamelin's Tisison officers were returning with their first reports direct from the 9th Army: "This army's stat has no detailed information about its divisions -,. the roads are choked With routed troops? According to André Pertinax, Gamelin up to this moment ‘seems te have cherished the illusion that every {hing could be "patched up”. Suddenly his ‘yer were opened” ‘The French C-in-C then Fang up Deladier, the Minister of National Defence. William Bullitt, the American am ‘baasador, was with Daladier when the tele- phone rang. After Daladier had listened to ‘whol Gamelin had to sey, he was beard to Shout ‘Not What-you are saying eannot be true’. When the extent of the eatastrope had aunke in, he abouted again down the telophone: "You ‘must allack at once!” Gamelin replied: “Attack! What with? I have. no reserves left” ‘The. conversation cended with the following exchange: "So it means the destruction of the French Mes, it me French army! "Phat light the French government decided to appeal fo Churchill urgently for more ait support. The following morning, Nay 16, the news reaching’ Paris was still worse, ‘Amions reported the arrival there, far bo hind the front, of fugitive soldiers from the broken Sth Army. Gamolin decided to order the general withdrawal of French forces from Belgium, Holland having capitulated the previous day. Reynaud gave the order for the government to prepare ta move to ‘Tours, and wired Churchill: “Last evening we los the bate ‘Tha iway to Paris lies open, Send all the troops and planes you can’ AL the same time he sent to Beirut for General Wey and, Marshal Fochs old Chie of Staff, and to Madrid for Marshal Pétain “the ‘Saviour of Verdun’ That same after boon Churehill arrived in Paris by ai At 5.30 pm a historie meeting took place in the ust Gray, Reynaud, alae, Gamal hurehll, and Sir John Dill were present In Churchill's words: as ‘The General [Gamelin] talked perhaps five minutes without anyone saying a” word. When he stopped there was @ considerable silence. 1 then asked: Where 1s the strtegie reserve?" and breaking into French, which Fused indifferently (in every sense): “Ol ext la masse de mancouvre?” General Gamelin turned to me and, with a shake of the head and a shrug, said:" Aucune’... NO STRAT: BGIC RESERVE. “Aucune” T vas dumb. founded. What wore we to think of the great French Army and its highest chiefs? ‘Ag he was listening, Churchill noticed how the destruction of the 123Breakthrough at Sedan (continued) ‘outside in the garden of the Quai d'Orsay clouds of smoke arose from large bonfires, fand I saw from the window venerable offcials pushing wheelbarrows of archives onto them..." ‘During the day that this conference took placo in Paris, at the front Rommel ad- ‘anced another 50 miles, breaking through the northern extension of the Maginot Line at a cost of only 39 killed and 59 wounded, while taking approximately 10,000 prison ers and 100 tanks. On May 17 the Panzers sweeping aside de Gaulle's counterattack reached the Sambre-Oise Canal and Laon, Jess than 60 miles from Paris as the crow flies. The Allied retreat from Belgium had bogun, and that day Reichenau’s VI An entered Brussels. In order to protect Paris, General Georges ordered the formation of new Tth Army composed of unite withdrawn from Alsace-Lorraine, But it was not at Paris that the German threat waa directed — as was at last to become plain to the French High Command the following day. French resistance was noticeably wasken- ing, the processes of collapse accelerating. COnthe 18th, Guderian—once again given his hhead—crosced the Sambre-Oise Canal, capturing St Quentin and Péronne. To the north, Rommel reached Cambrai, the scene of the famous British tank raid of 1917, fore-runner ofthe Panzer thrusts now search” ing northem Francs: ‘That night Corap's successor, General Giraud, arrived at Le Catelet On his rearward ‘path with two officers of his staff to discover that Rein- hardt's Panzers were already there and had broken up his headquarters. Giraud told the two officors to look after themsolves, while he himself wandered alone throughout, the night. At 0600 hours he was pleked up by & German tank patrol ‘On May 19 Guderian crossed the old Somme battlefield where so many hundred thousands had been killed and wounded to.advance a mile or two in the Firet World War. That same day de Gaulle attacked the lank of the "Panzer corridor” near Laon ‘again with his 4th Armoured Division; this time, according to Guderian himself, some of de Gaulle’s tanks actually penetrated to within mile of the German commander's headquarters, where he ‘passed a fee un- comfortable hours until at last the threaten- ing visitors moved off in another direction’. Once again the Stukas swarmed down. Till nightfall,” said de Gaulle, ‘they were to ‘bombard’ us, with formidable effect on our vehicles unable to leave the roads and our artillery out in the open.’ But that afternoon De Gaulle is ordered not to press too hard General Georges ordered de Gaulle not to reas his alask too hard, a my” division ust be used immediately for other taska" Tn the north, the British and French frees withing tom Belg wore nw bee Ting to exert pressure on that side of the Ridaer comider With i thay eventad roa, fears in the German command for the safety Of their now immensely elongated ans ‘The three French mechanised division from Belgium were now collecting near Cambrai, 124 and as a result Rommel was ordered to eon- Solidate his position between there and ‘Arras. So far op he and his VI Panzer Division were concerned, the days of fast- going were over ‘At Vinconnes, Gamolin had at last realised that the German strategy was aiming not at Paris, but ab driving on to the Channel to split in two the Allied armies, And he at last saw—but hideously late in the day—the ‘tempting opportunity offered by the Ger- mans’ over-extendled position in the narrow "corridor" where their infantry wore by now as touch as two to three days behind the Panzers. To the man who had drafted Jotire's order precipitating the Battle of the Marne in September 1914, certain parallels with ‘Kluck’s classic error now seemed apparent. On the morning of the 18th he issued his "Personal and Seoret Instruction No 12'—a classic ofits kind, which intervened for the first time in the now thoroughly depressed The Panzers are poised to lunge at the sea General Goorges's conduct of the battle. It began with the somewhat apologetically tinmilitry: preamble: "Without wishing. to intervene inthe conduct of the bate. jn progress». Under Gamolin’s plan, the noble foros of Army Group 1 withdrawing {rom Belgium were to be tarown against the rear of the Panzers and the motorised in- fantry following them: simultaneously the 2nd and 6th Armies were to bite in from the south, striking towards the Mouse bridge- heads. Gamelin’s instraction ended “ti all ‘question of ime.” Once again, this—and fhe mobility with whieh further time might hhave been guined was something the Allies did not possess. ‘Even from a purely personal point of view, Gamelin’s intervention was too. late, {oF on the night of May 19 Reynaud’s govern- Inont™reconstituted the previous night. to tring im. Pétain as Deputy. Premier—ap- pointed Weygand, just returned from Syria, Ih Gamelins place as Can-C. Weygand, sill remarkably vigorous for ali his 13" years, becepted. the appalling responsibility but added, I do not guarantee success. France, Tooling to the new C-in-C to perform an even greater miracle than these which his ld chief, Foch, had performed in 1914 and 1918, heaved & brie! sigh of relief at the hows. Weygand’s frst act was to cancel Gamolin’s “instruction No 12, He then hastened to the front to form his own con clusions. $0. more precious time was’ 10 be lost For the Germans, May 19 had essentially been a much-needed day of regrouping and eorganisation, with the Panzers mustering their strength on the Somme area, at what hhas come to be known as the ‘rendezvous of May 19. The already overwhelming mass of Klcs’s armour had now been” furthor ‘augmented by Hoepner’s corps, consisting of fro more Panzer. divisions ‘switched as previously plannedtrom the fighting im Belgium. ‘The spearhead tipping’ the 125- rnileslong, ‘Panzer corridor’ ‘was poised for ifs final hunge towards the sea." Rommel, ordered to halt the provious day, managed {o persuade his corps commander, Hoth, to allow him to continue the advance so a5 to coeupy the vitel beights near Arras so frdently fought for in 1914-18. dust before 0200 hours on the 20th, Rommel began to advance again, and after a hard fight with French forces” which succeeded in. infil- trating into his lines of communication~ reached his objective, The rest of the 20ch he spent taking up a defensive position; the next day his first encounter with the British armour was to occur. ‘The decisive action of the day fell, perhaps fairly, to Guderian. Shortly before dawn on the 20th, he pushed forward from his laager fon the Cambrai-Péronne line. At about 0900 ‘hours the I Panzer Division, with Guderian himself once again to the fore, captured Amiens~ the goal denied to Luden” dorft in the last-gasp offensive that had so nearly succoeded in 1918, It was a measure of how light-heartedly Guderian now re- garded the opposition that he took time off {to visit the cathedral. His corps then fol- lowed the direction of the Somme down- stream to Abbeville, By the afternoon it hhad reachad the outskirts of that tow, and the French forces of the 7th Army fighting, fon the Somme were divided from those in tthe north by a gap of 53 miles. At 1900 hours Guderian's II Panzer Division, which had swept through from Albert, went on to cap- ‘ture Abbeville (though protesting they wore out of fuel). An hour later one of ita forward battalions, commanded by a Major Spitia, reached the Channel at Noyelles ‘Almost incredulously the weary German tank crews gazed out over the sea, took in deep TungsPill of the salt air, hugged each other. Since that morning aione they had ‘advanced some 65 miles. In the past mir= aculous ten days they had come over 200 ‘les ae the crow fit had dealt the French army @ mortal blow, and their ‘Panzer eorrider’ had split the Allied forces into two fragments. At OKW headquarters, General Jodi noted in his diary: "The Fahrer is wild with joy. He sees victory and peace within his grasp At the front, Guderian recorded: “On the evening of this remarkable day we did not know in what direction our ‘advance should continue; nor had the Pan- zor group under Kleist rocoived any i structions concerning the further prosecu- on of the offensive.” The German General Staff was amazed, caught off balance. Tt simply could not have happened! Yet. that military layman, that lunatic Hitler, had bboen right aller ail! Now even to the simplest ‘mind, the Way shead was quite clear: Brst the BEF and the French Ist Army in ite pocket north of the "Panzer corridor’ must be annihilated: then the inert, half-defence- less body of the rest of France conquered. ALISTAIR HORNE was oem London a5, eSoalod "in the Gal FeO Sister sna Suuseriond ar see vet in Yous with he RAT EM si RAP in Canada and nied his war survcs a8 captain in he Coldstream Guarda ten rent Sasa Clg Cambri, where frature ard played ra he. read. English international lee hockey, following this ‘vith three years in Germany nam Daily Telegraph ‘correspondent. In 1962 here. Celved’ worldwide acclaim for hls book ‘The Price of Glory: Verdun 1916, whieh was awarded the ‘Hawthornden Prise. ‘This ‘ork was followed three years later with ‘The Fell of Pars, 1870-1871May 10/May 28, 1940 Jean-Léon Charles Although the Low Countries had the best of reasons for suspecting that they were included in the Nazi plan of conquest—for German military plans had fallen into their hands—they still clung to the hope that somehow their neutrality could protect them from the inevitable. But geography had placed them squarely in the Wehrmacht’s path. By moving directly forward across the frontiers in the north, one German army group held the attention of the Dutch and Belgian armies and tempted the French and British forward, while the Panzers of another army group thrust through in the south and reached the seaBlitz in the west At 0130 hours on May 10, the Luftwatfe was laying mines off the British and Dutch coasts, AE dawn German bombers made fierce attacks on Dutch airfields, destroying ‘large number otairerafton the ground, and Army Group B crossod the frontior. "Tho ‘main campaign in the west had opened Supported by the IT Air Fleet, German air borne troops took the bridges of the Moer- dij and various keypoints of the Vesting Holland (in particular Rotterdam airfield), thus blocking the movement of the reserves for the Dutch forward troops. By evening the German XVIII Army had entered Deventer, Arnhem, and Nijmegen without encounter” ing much rosistance—even taking intact one bridge over the Meuse and also penetrating the Peel pasition. This position was pierced the next day together with the Zuld-Willems- vyaart, and at about 1800 hours on May 11 the Germans at last met up with the mator- ised forward units of the 7th French Army fon. the move in the vicinity of Tilburg. Having been surprised while on the move, the French had to withdraw on the next day to the line Broda-St Léonard, merg- ing their movement in with the Belgian Aigposition, The Germans were thus meeting with ‘success, and this suecess continued. On the evening of the next day, the IX Panzer Division joined the Moerdik paratroops, leaving the Dutch command no alternative but to order a withdrawal during the night of the 13UM/I4th to the Vesting Holland Tn order to drive home this success and force The Lunge to the Sea een Tinavos nek gnnerer ope er fala yi bene trea ast Heenan re tonny rine eg sear fa surrender of the Vesting Holland, the Luftwaffe subjected Rotterdam to very heavy bombing “during the afternoon "of the Lith, and threatened to destroy Amsterdam. ‘The ' Hague, and Utrecht if resistance continued Resistance in the Vesting Holland did in fact cease on the evening of the 14th, and at 1145 hours the next day the Dutch army laid down its arms—excopt for a few unite in Zeeland, which were to continue fighting until the 17th, The units of the Dutch navy together with Queen Wilhelmina and her government, crossed to Britain to continue snt there. In the meantime Giraud's 7th Army, now in danger of encirclement, with Grew into Zeeland, Thus, in four days the fice of the Dutch army had been decided at the hands of Kuchler's XVIII Army. "Meanwhile, General von Reichenau’'s VI Army was busy chalking up great successes on the Belgian front. By 0500 hours on May 10, 58 of Belgium's 179 operational aireraft hhad been destroyed on the ground, and the most important centres of communies tion had all been bombed. Chaos reigned in Limburg, The population was panie-stricken, refugees were pouring on to the roads, and even some of the military units were in a State of terror. The news reaching GHQ was unbelievable, ‘The Veldwezelt and Vroon- hhoven bridges on the Albert Canal had ‘apparently already fallen into the hands of the enemy intact, and—most alarming of all—airborne’ troops were landing on the superstructure of the Bben-Emael fort. Here, just at in Holland, vertical envelopment ‘came alsa complete surprise. ‘However, not all the German operations achieved stich immediate success. At Canne, orth of Eben-Emzel, the gliders landed too far from the objective and the bridge '©St Pol 126 Arras ic Cambre vas blown up in time, as were the other bridges on the Albert Canal which the Ger- man had not attacked immediately. Things were rather touch and go at the Maas inidge, however, as the result of'a ruse by ‘hich the Germans prevented the destruc ton ef the Duleh part of the bridge by craneg plied tee maces pee constabulary. The Belgian offeer on guard, Tpever, succeed in blowing Up his ha athe bridge Other more orthodox German operations however, wore ssseseful Paratrope landed between’ the. fist and second echelons of the Belgian "eh Division, holding 19 Iilometre front bohind the’ Albert Canal Stuka dive-bombers harassed the positions feild eoepeccanietet rect proventing any coordinated counterattack Ein venfoally the detancen crumbled. 13 thts way tne Germans succeeded by the end of hay sattng up tn, rida 2 kilometres deep, fed feapecvely by the Veoenhioven and Veldmezelt bridges The Germans cross the Albert Canal ‘The news of the German airborne attacks ‘came like a bombshell, and throughout Bel sium it produced a psychosis among the pop- Ulation Which was fostered unwittingly by the authorities through its warning. of in- filtration by the Fifth Column. Poople saw ‘paratroops’ everywhere, had priests and nnuns arrested, and organised search partis, In this way ‘many military organisations wore to wear themselves out all through the campaign to no purpose, in the pursuit of imaginary enemies.As a recult of their capture of the two bridges, and with the Eben-Emacl fort out of action, the Germans were now strongly tstablished on the left hank of the Albert Canal, although the tanks of Il and 1V Panzer Divisions were held up in Maastricht itself, where the bridges over the Meuse had been blown, until the following day, May 11, by which time a military bridge had been constructed. ‘This bridge, and those of Vroenhoven and Veldwezelt, were bombed on the morning of the 11th by a squadron of Belgian Fairey Battles, each of which carried eight. 50-kg bombs-"a ludicrously small armament in view of the size of these bridges which were heavily defended by anti-aireraft artillery. Ten machines of the 15 sent into the attack were lost on this oeeasion, and later 15. French aireraft carrying 100-kg bombs, followed by 24 Blenheims of the RAF, made other fruitless attacks, hoth with very heavy losses. ‘Meanwhile the German tanks were eross- ing the reconstructed bridge in Maastricht, passing out through the bridgehoads, and eaching Tongres by midday without diff eulty. Once beyond this town they arranged themselves in fan order, and by the after. noon ane formation arrived at’ Waremme, thus threatening Ligge from the rear Tt was at this moment that Hitler pub- lished communiqué. proclaiming, the fall of the Albert Canal and the Eben-Emael fort. There can be no doubt that coming as it di at this particular time the proclama- tion had severe repercussions on Belgian morale and did much to dampen public ‘opinion, many faint hearts seeing in it clear ‘confirmation of German invinelbility Tn actual fact, however, matters wore progressing according to plan and penetra ton of this covering tine had been expected. By dawn on May 10, the Allied armies wore ‘a their way to the main Dyle position, to which the Belgian army began to withdraw ‘on tho 1th and this waa the line of defence ‘which had been eelected in order to fight the defensive battle and to block the enemy ad~ ‘vance, The position as regards the number ‘af forces to the north of the Sambre-Meuse trea clearly favoured the Allies, for they The withdrawal proceeds according to plan hhad almost 40 divisions, including the Bel- fans, against Bock's 0. The loss of the ‘Albert Canal was therefore really no more than a tactical incident compared with shat was to happen 38 hours later between. Sedan and Dinant. Tin the Ardennes seven Panzer divisions hhad been on the move since dawn on the 10th, gaining their main attack positions on the Meuse, Tn the face of this advance across the provincos of Liége and Luxembourg, the Belgian frontier units and the Chasseurs Ardennais destroyed everything as planned (except at: Butgenbach) and fell back accord- ing to orders in a north-westerly direction to make way for the covering troops of the 9th and 2nd French Armies, Some units, not informed of the withdrawal, even man ‘aged seriously to delay the Panzers ‘On the evening of the 10th, the French cavalry met up with the Germans in the Yieinity “of Marche, Saint-Hubert, | and Etalle, but the following day they withdrew ‘across the Meuse. Meanwhile Kleist concen: trated his resources for a spectacular cross ingof the river, which he bogan immediately, thus piereing the centre of the Allied front. It was hore, and not at the Albert Canal, that everything wes at stake forthe Allied ‘While the Belgians were at grips with ar. borne troops on the Albert Canal, the Alliod forces had taken up their positions north of the Meuse in accordance with the Dyle Plan. Proceded by light troops who had arrived the evening before, three British divisions dlug in on the morning of the 1th on the le, between Wavre and Louvain. Blan- dari ary took up yoitons an th rl way between Wavre and Namur, the Prioux Cavalry” Corps, which had preceded it moving on in front to the rivers Mehaigne and Gette, extending the line held by the 2nd Belgian Cavalry Division. There had been some delay in the movement of Blan- chard’s army because the echelons below divisional level had not been acquainted ‘with the Dyle Plan. On May 10 many of the division commanders. were on leave. and their deputies had no knowledge of the secret dossier bofore this date. Meanwhile the Belgian GHQ had also Dogan 0 regroup the army at ho KW" two Liege divisions were also pulled back but not without some difficulty, for the Pan. zers had reached Tangres by midday on the Lith and were threatening the Belgian rear. Fortunately the Germans did not take full advantage of their position and the remnants of the Belgian units where the enemy had broken through retired behind the Gette. This movement, which became general on the 12th, was covered by rearguards on the Continued on page 129 arAllight German gun is wheeled into position —unlike the French artille geared to mobile warfare 128Invasion of Holland and Belgium (continued) branch canal and the Albert Canal up to Genebos. Meanwhile the Belgian cavalry ‘corps held fast on the Getto, and two French mechanised divisions remained in position con the Mehaigne. ‘During the afternoon of the 12th, when systematic Luftwatfe bombing of the rear communications took place, French positions hetween ‘Tirlemont and Huy successfully held off advance units of the XVI Panzer Corps, but elsewhere along the line the only contact with the Germans was with their Feconnaissance unite ‘The infantry units of the German VI Army were in fact rather slow to fellow up their armoured screen. They thus failed to ex- ploit one or two confused situations —notably the premature abandonmont of some resr~ The Panzers win the first tank battle of the war {Guard postions botweon the Demer and the Sibert Canal and thus pave the Bean command time to avert a teal crisis, More: dover, Reicheneu’s army seemed tobe experi fnatagaifteulty in inking up with Kachier's XVIIE Army’ in the north, and in the zone Ietrgon ema there were ew German trove. “This same afternoon of the 12th contr: ence war held at Casteas, near Mons t= {ended by King Léopol, MDaladier, Gener ts Georges and Billate, and’ Lord Gor's ChietotStaa, Sir Henry Pownall. There ‘vas aire mood af this moment fran offective driganisation of command, and it was now Sigeed that: ‘General Billtte, Commander oft Army Group, will act as delogate of General Georges, Commanderin-Chiet on the north-eant front to. co-ordinate the sections of the Allied frees. Bolgian territory” This vague solwtion, however, Ail did not provide the necessary effective Sommand, ac it was to cause considerable “Tifton iter Indeed, Blot was to find himelt overloaded with work and could do little ‘coordinating’ a0 thot the Belgian command and Lord Gort were left virtually ‘thou directive, “Thus. the pric. paid for unpreparedness rose even higher. At Louvain on the evening oF May 10, for instance, there had been two Avision, one Belgian and one British, each of which’had recetved orders to occupy the Secor: only on May 12, during Une Cantens onforenc, was it decided to give Louvain to the Brtck, Similarly there was virtually no liaison hetieen the Belgians and the Prench Light Mechanised Divison on the’ Gott at tho tory moment the Panzers were attacking in Torco em May 18 twas the solder, Uhrown hastily into ttle amid such confusion, who srere to have to pay for auch mistakes “A this stage the front, almost eomtiuous, san along a part of the Albert Canal, the ‘Winwerbuck Barrier ‘position, Dies” the Cate, and the Mehaigme. At 1100 hots on the Tsthy covered by" Stleadive-bombers fnd by free artillery fire in the area of finan, Merdorp, and Jandrain, an aliack tras led by Il and IV Panaer Divisions. The French Some and H-85 tanks were disposed long the line in stall group ebeir value trasted. by. enorance. of their potential strength when concentrated and by over- confidence in the supericrity of their guns fand their armour. "This, the fire battle of the war tobe fought between tanks, clearly underlined the superiority of the offensive manceuvre—lost from the field of battle for a century—and the advantages of movement over stationary guns, Followed closely by their infantry, the Panzers operated flexibly, surrounding contret of ‘resistance, attacking on the flanks and in the rear, dodging hither and thither when necessary, and infiltrating by ‘another route when one was blocked. ‘By 1745 hours the French position was overrun, and General Prigux decided to fall back with his light mechanised. divisions behind the Belgian anti-tank obstacle of erwez. The heavy losses incurred by these divisions at such an early stage of the cam paign were iretrievable, for this had been the’ only body of tanks on which the com: mand had relied. But on the other hand losses had ‘indeed heen inflicted on the ‘enemy, and the action did at least give the Ast Army, hurrying up behind but delayed by the flood of refugees and by the harrving. cof the Luftwaffe, time to get into position. During that night of May 13/14 the Bel- sian Cavalry Corps fell back to the "KW" position and in the meantime the infantry hhad occupied the battle position. On the evening of the 14th the disposition of the ‘troops was as follows: ‘@ From Broskene al the mouth ofthe Schelde {fo the north of Antwerp the front was held by three divisions of the 7th French Army, Which had heen ordered back from its vain, mmission to Holland, (The offshore islands were being defended by a few French and Dutch units.) The front then ran south-east to the northern outskirts of Louvain, for 50 Kilometres, and this strotch was manned by the Belgian army with three echelons of divisions —eight in the first echelon, three in the second echelon, and two behind the Willobrook Canal, with a general reserve consisting of the Cavalry Corps and the Ist Chasseurs Ardennais Division. fe From Louvain to Wavre the front was Gefended by the British army with five divisions on the Dyle (two in reserve) and four more lying back (one on the Senne, one fon the Dendre, and two on the Sehelde). This ‘deop disposition was designed to enable Lord Gort to carry out delaying manoeuvres, if required, with the minimum of risk. The ‘wisdom of this deployment was to be con firmed later. (@ The front irom Wavre to Namur was man- Red by six divisions of the Ist French Army, ‘with two mechanised divisions in reserve, which were to fight fierce last-minute Covering action in the region of Gembloux Ernage before withdrawing. Two Belgian divisions “defended the Namur position, ‘with the support of the fortress artillery. ‘Thus the front appeared to be firmly held from the Schelde to the Meuse, and the future seemed bright—exeept for the alarm: ing news being received from the southern Meuse area, where dislocation was occurring in the face of Kleis’e armoured attacks Could it be that the Allies had played into the enemy's hands afterall? Certainly the German GHQ was over- Joyed to seo how perfectly its trap had work. fed. Tho pivoting of tho French lst Army Group and its immobilisation had allowed ‘complete freedom of action for the proposed seything operation already started at Sedan, On the evening of May 14 General von Reichenau received the following order: “Attack the enemy position between Louvain ‘and Namur on the 16th, so as to prevent con- ‘olidation ofthe Allied forces in thia position.” But at the same time the possibility of an ‘orderly Allied withdrawal was tobe prevent. fd in view of the potential danger it would pose tothe racing armour in thesouth. Hence the Allied armies were to be both attacked and held in position by aggressive fighting. ‘The Ill and IV Panzer Divisions, together with a number of infantry divisions, there fore attacked the Ist Franch Army, the main thrust being made in the direction of Gem- lous. The French positions withstood the attack in the main, but their paltry reserves, had all been expended in. protecting the southern right flank, whore the break-up of the 9th French Afmy was presenting a ‘serious danger. Further north, the Germans ‘Succeeded in penetrating into Louvain, in ‘the sector of the 3rd British Division com- manded by Major-General B, L. Mont- fomery, but were dislodged by a counter- fttack strongly sustained by artillery early in the afternoon of the 15th, and no other Section of the line was threatened. ‘Things ‘wore thus going quite well for the Allies on the "KW', and it will never be Ienown how Jong this’ disposition could have withstood a frontal attack, for none developed. But the fate of these armies was soon to be settled in the south. On the evening ofthe 15th, realising that the breach in the Sedan front was irromediable, General Billotte made decision of extreme gravity: the Allied forces in Belgium would withdraw to the line of the Schelde snd the old frontier sition. This meant abandoning the Dyle jan and a return to the Schelde project fone of the first solutions contemplated bofore May 10. However inevitable this do- cision may have been, it should have boon communicated immediately to the Belgians ‘and the British—but Lord Gort only learned Of it at 0500 hours on the next day (and then only through an officer whom he had sent to Billotie's HQ and who happened to read the order there before its dispatch). ‘The order ddid not reach the Belgiane until 1000 hours that morning, on the initiative of the Bel- ‘ian liaison mission, ‘The Belgians grested the order with bit- terness. To quote the Belgian Deputy Chief The Belgians and British are ordered to withdraw of Staff, General Derousseaux: ‘Tt came like 4 shot Gut of the blue, and, with the subse quent surrender, it is my worst memory of the campaign. The General Staff seas stun- ned by it. We had to shake ourselves back into aetion and make the necessary prepara: ‘ons for execution of this order” "The Belgian and British armies now had to carry out an extensive withdrawal over a distance of over 50 miles. The conditions ‘were quite favourable, because the enemy ‘Was nol yet in a position to mount a system- die attack on the retiring forces, and more: over was deprived, from May 16 onwards, of the XVI Panzer Corps, which had moved south to take part in the great armoured envelopment. ‘The withdrawal of the northorn section of the Belgian forcesand the whole British force ‘ook place that night in three stages, and 129Invasion of Holland and Belgium (continued) was covered by rearguards installed on the ‘waterways along the route—the Willebrock Canal, the Senne, and the Dendre. It also became necessary’ to protect the northern flank of the withdrawal, as the French th Army Division had boon ordored south from the mouth of the Schelde. As they cut at right angles across the British and Bel- ian lines of withdrawal, they created such ehaos “That, they" themelve, eventually broke up and their commander, General Giraud, was captured on May 18 by a Ger- ‘man patrol. Their place on the northern flank ‘was taken by the Belgian Cavalry Corps operating in the Wass country. The two Belgian fortress divisions at Namur were ordered to make their way towards Ghent; the other force to the north, the Ist French Army, withdrew to the Schelde ex- tended by tho Sensoo, on a line Mauldo- Bouchain-Arleux, thus evacuating Belgian tervitory. ‘The Germans followed the withdrawal at f respectful distance. According to General von Bock, he was continuously restrained by Halder, who was anxious to limit the role of the VI' Army to that of ‘protecting the right flank’. Indeed, a surpeising slackness ‘was evident in most of the units of the Ger- man VI Army. They did not resume any systematic attack before the 17th, for they were actually hampered a good deal by the abseneo of bridging equipment; General von Bechtolsheim confessed. after the war to Captain Liddell Hart: "The only real diff- culty was the crossing of rivers and canals— not from opposition, When the XVI Panzer Corps was taken away, most of the bridging units went with il. 2 ‘Action did take placo however on the Nethe, the Rupel, the Willebrock Canal, the Schelde—where surprise crossing ‘was effected by the Germans at Antwerp on May 19—and on the Dendre, where the 1st Chasseurs Ardennais Division was involved in bitter fighting. "The atmosphere was grim at the now Belgian HQ in Bruges during these times. ‘The King had had them installed in an old and uncomfortable castle, in a remote position at the end of a lane and surround. Acrisis of confidence inthe Allied Command fed by water. Only the operations section hhad proper quarters in which to work, the other sections making do in the entrance hhall. Te was impossible to cheek the alarming rumours circulating at once, because of the lack of adequate communications. But as these improved confidence was renewed for a timo, After all, the withdrawal could be ‘sid to have gone off without a hitch~ which ‘was betier than had been expected. ‘On May 20 the Belgian army bold the front from Terneuzen to Oudenarde, with 11 divisions in the line and seven in' reserve, ‘The British army. was. positioned on the Schelde from Oudenarde to the frontier, with seven divisions in the front and one in Feserve, Anxious aboul his communications fan with little news reaching him of the position on his right flank, Lord Gort. now Fesolved to reinsure this sector himself. He 130 installed units on the Searpe, around Arras, snd on the La Basse Canal behind the Ist French Army, as well as other small forces ‘long the canal Might up to the coast, thus fgiving himself some measure of all-round protection, ‘The British Commander's unease was quite understandable, in view of tho atmosphere prevailing at this time in the French GHQ, Where, it seemed, nobody fully understood the scale of the disaster. A crisis of con- fidence therefore arose, one which was to ‘grow incessantly during the next few days. ‘Meanwhile in France, General Gamelin hhad been dismissed from office on May 19 at the very moment of issuing orders for a counteroffensive on the flank of the Panzer breakthrough. As it happened, these orders were futile, because of the impossibility of assembling’ anything like an effective ‘mass ff mancetvra’ in the short time available, ‘There were, in fact, no reserves left worshy of the name, as Winston Churchill had noted fn the 16th during his vit to Paris. "The ageing General Weygand now re placed Gamelin as French Commander-in- Chief; his frst acts on assuming office were reer instructions for & ‘counteroffensive, and to fly over to the front fon the morning of the 21st to see for himself hhow things were going. In this he ignored fone essential point, which was that the TL Panzer Division had reached Abbeville at 2100 hours the previous evening, and so the tencirelement of the Allied forces to the north ‘was now complete. ‘Amid the turmoil on May 20, General Iron side, Chie? of the Imperial General Staff, visited Lord Gort and General Billotte and conferred with them. Just a8 ignorant of the ion as Weygand, he gave Lard Gert the ‘order to open up the road to Amions by sheer force, if possible in conjunction with the French and the Belgians, and so restore con- ‘inuation of a single Allied front. ‘At first sight this order appeared logical: certainly between May 18 and 21. the Panzers, too far ahead of the infantry, were highly vulnerable to altace, and « gap had formed in their rear. Hitler's ill-advised decision to reverse the roles assigned to his Xl and II Armios had delayed the arrival of the support troops by two days. Neverthe less, however good Ironside's idea was (itd actually been mentionad earlier by Gamelin, ‘and was finally to be adopted by Weygandon his own) the time and the resources required for it were sadly lacking. For his pari, Gort reckoned simply on carcying out an operation around Arras with 8 limited objective, using his Sth and 50th Divisions ‘and his armoured brigade (all sadly depleted by this time), under the eom- ‘mand of General Franklyn, The latter had also agreed to concert his attack with one by Generals Blanchard and Priowx, the French even hoping to make a thrust to- wards Cambrai, there linking up with the new French Sr Army Group, which was preparing to attack on May 23 from the west. However, the actual attack, which began at 1400 hours on the 21st, was only on a ‘mall scale. ‘The British moved olf on their own a8 the French had not completed their forming up, and General Martel, who was in command of the assault, could mount a raid of only throo infantry’ battalions and 74 tanks—58 of which were light ones. Never~ theless, the operation, carried out forcefully, came as_a complete ‘shock to the forward lunits of General Rommels division and the Totenkopf (‘Death’s-head’) group. It gained 16 kilometres and destroyed a large number of enemy tanks, before being blocked at about 2000 hours by large-scale Stuka attacks, in the face of which Martel was forvod to withdraw his forces that evening. mand was staggering, The surprise had been such that Rommel signalled that evening. "Very heavy fighting took place between 1530 and 1900 hours with hundrede of enemy tanks and their supporting infan- try .«’, and panie set in at the German GHA, for the British forces were estimated fat five divisions! Hitler undoubtedly felt himself at bay, and sent Keitel to the site of the attack, where the whole disposition was revised. The Vand VII Panzer Divisions with the Totenkopf and Schutzen motorised brigades remained in. position as if mes- merised by events—while the VI and VIII Panzer Divisions countermarched in an easterly direction. ‘Moreover, from this moment onwards the German conduct of operations became ner- General Weygand plans his counterattacks vous. Rundstedt was lator to say that the Arras attack was the only Allied action which inspired any fear in him in May 1940, land certainly the élan of the Panzer force was badly shaken, ‘They made no more mass attacks after this date and it certainly seems that the action by the ‘Frank Force’ sowed the seeds of the success of Dunkirk. Tt was on this same afternoon, May 21, in thedrawing-roomof the Chatellenie d"¥pres, that Goneral Weygnnd called the fist it ‘was also to be the last—conference of the Belgian, French, and British eommanders- in-chief of the eaimpaign General Weygand had had some difficulty in reaching Ypres himself, for after leaving le Bourget he had touched down near Béthune at 0940 hours to find the airfield utterly deserted: it had been evacuated two days enrlier. ‘I was thus alone in the country with my ADC, Weygand writes, "with no means of contacting these expecting me." He decided to fly on to Calais airport, which ‘Was still functioning, and there ho lended at 1300 hours. Once there a telephone call Drought a car to take him finally to Ypres, Dut he found that only King Léopold and his military adviser, General Van Overstracten, hhad arrived. Billotte came in later, but Lord Gort was not in time to meet, Weygand at all ‘Without delay, Weygand presented his plan: hhis object was to close the present broach by simultaneous counterattacks from both north and south—from the encircled foreas' and from those on the Somme. This required a withdrawal of the Belgian troops to the Yser in order to gather enough units for the counterthrust, and in any case he eonsidered that the” Belgian army had ‘stayed too long in the east’. General Van Overstraeten, however, was against thi plan. ‘Tho ow withdrawal will have Serious effect on morale,” he said. "The Yser Position is not prepared, the rear is para lysed by hundreds of thousands of refugees, the Belgian army is weary and some ofits ‘units are breaking up. Our army will put up Continued on page 183Below: Stuka strafes refugees. Below right: Refugees block French armour. Kottom: Waffen SS troops in BelgiumInvasion of Holland and Belgium (continued) 2 good fight in ita present disposition, but if Sian to undertake a. further extensive withdrawal, can’t guarantee anything” 1m the course of the conversation which followed, it suddenly became apparent that Weygand ‘was unaware that the Germans bad actually reached Abboville the previous evening, and. this unexpected news com- Plataly disconcerted ‘him. Moreover, in the fneantime Billote had arrived and gave a realistic account of the disastrous. position of bis army group, which made it clear that the British army was now the only effective tifensive instrument to hand. Weygand him- Self then admitted. the difieuliy of with: drawing the Belgians to the “Yaer, and ‘greed to their remaining on the Ghent- ‘Ternewzen Canal, and the Schelde, provided that British divisions earmarked for the counterattack could be relieved foc he sil felt that only by this counterattack could the situation be saved. Te'now remained only to porsuade Lord Gort ‘to agroo to the plan—but hy the Lime be finally arrived at. Yprea, General Wey- gand had been forced to leave, for he bad promised Reynaud, the Franch President of the Counei, that he would return to Paris that evening. Lord Gort brought nows that the Germans had crossed the Schelde near Oudenarde. In his opinion « withdrawal to the Lys was now" inevitable especially Since the water level of the Schelde bad fallen dangerously low, a result of flooding operations carried out upstream bythe French in an effort to check the German aulvanee. Lord. Gort algo thought the Allies incapable of mounting « strong and imme- iste countaroflensve, for tho British divi- Sons were strung out over ineredibly broad fronts) while the French armies were already cut t0 shreds ‘When the discussions ended around 2000 hours, ic had been deeded to move the Allied forces to anew front manced by Valenei tennes, the French Schelde (the Bscaut, the ‘old frontier pestion from Maulde to Halisin, fnd the Lya. The Belgians and the French ‘were to relieve three of the British divisions, but even then no more than five dvistong ould be mustered for the ofensive 40 the south, decided on forthe 23rd ‘Unfortunately, this already delicate situa- tion’ was "now ‘made even” worse. While returning to his HQ from the conference, General Billotte was fatally injured in a oad accident and thus the principal figure Gf the conference vaniahed from the scone ‘without being able to give his orders: it was oon the following day before his successor at lat “Army Group, General Blanchard, earned of the decisions made at the con” ference, and the steps which had heen taken. [As it happened, further co-ordination proved impossible. Events moved. 20 fait that Generals "Weygand and’ Blanchard were Unable to exereise any control over the orthern forces, and each army thus oper ‘ied separataly forthe rest of the eam he Baar ad herlre covered the 38 kilometres. separating Bastogne trom the coart in barely ten days. ‘Their sevthing ‘Operation, conducted up to May 21. with Femarkeble. adroizness, completely routed {heir opponents yet despite this impetus, the Gorman forces were still Uo take. 16 more days to, cover the last’ 30 miles between ‘Abbeville and Dunkile Nevertheless, during tho night of May 22/23 at the German GHQ, General von Brauchitsch summed up the situation cor- rectly, fearing little from the Allied armies, and ordering his army’ groups to continue vigorously with the envelopment. Army ‘Group A was to swing rapidly northwards to ‘2 line through Armentibres, Ypres, and Ostend; Army Group B was to wheel its left flank around to face the north, thus streng- thening the walls of the trap. General von Rundstedt, commander of Army Group A, showed no enthusiasm for a ‘move northwards, however. Disturbed by the deployment of the reformed French 7th Army, now on his southern flank, and by the ‘Arras counterattack, he decided on the even ing of the 23rd, in conjunction with Kleist, to regroup his armour on the line Gravelines, Saint-Omer, Béthune —where it temporarily halted. This at least gave the British another day in which to strengthen dofences along their western flank ‘That same evening of May 23, Brauch- itgeh at the German GHQ, totally’ unaware of Rundstedt’s decision, resolved to transfer Klage's army. from." Rundstedi’s Army Group A to Rock's Army Group B, thus placing under a single command all units Charged with the task of Hquidating the ‘encircled pocket of Allied forees. The order ‘was to come into force at 2000 hours on the following day, and may well have sealed the fate of the Allies. But at this point Hitler intervened. At 1130 hours on May 24, on a visit to Rundstedt's HQ at Charleville, he Tearned ‘of Brauchitach's instruction and straightaway cancelled it—not only approv- Hitler intervenes to halt Rundstedt’s armour ing Rundstedt’s decision to halt the armour, Dut also giving orders for the halt to be made permanent and not temporary. “Meanwhile the pocket of encircled Allied forces was proceeding with the withdrawal docided on at Ypres. ‘The British army ro- established itself on a line marked by Maulée and Halluin (which it had occupied before May 10) and on the Lys up to Menin. ‘Threatened with encirclement at Arras, General Franklyn took shelter behind the ‘eanal line’ along the western lank of the pocket. The Belgian army withdrew in two stages to behind the Lys and the branch canal from Deynze to Heist on the coast, covered by units left in the Ghent bridge: Jhead and on the Terneuzen Canal. Behind the front conditions were becoming impos- sible, for the obstruction caused by the mass Of flceing refugees, the bombing raids all ‘long tho coast, and the first hasty stages of evacuation were al contributing to the ‘Twelve divisions of German Army Group B were now assembled for the ‘last round? of the battle, General yon Kuchler’s XVII Army, extricated from the. Netherlands, regrouped on the line of the Terneuzen Canal, which it crossed on the afternoon of May 28: That evening the Germans were in position all. slong t ‘and were in- Figaling nto the Ghont leideahoad which ‘was thon to be abandoned. In addition, the Tiuftwaffe had by now achieved complete ‘command of the air. "By dawn on the 24th the Belgian army was arranged in an are 95 kilometres long, ox- tending from Menin to the sea and in contact exnyter with tery, The en SEW aa a egies Geter ie ie Bianca sere ta an an So ae Soe. ten eeitie enet nes hic ti tts ona ed Sit tel a,b oe TE Sata in og esi Re Se rear icenea aries eS totnd fame Sake oe STS Ea sarin eee ee tts fiber a ain Been oa narneres ATi aging ie ares eat eens aes one eta’ gy aie Chee ng Be sara palace ie octane Psa Cae eee i ee Ra Sn ‘Re? Re HeAah eh Se cee ere ae See Se Sicha ae Se anes te tee i tana an ct oet he Smear eee Se ener niki ore Spy ee ac a reserves should not have been engaged so Sian ah Ti et ny eked he degra ge Te cy ars pa fund piel te Coasts tne eet ere rn a Sinckieg ern is tt tl SORA eatettierascae Tiseiaamaiia ice ae Sr nog ee pesca ee Sag a et dy Ed Settee we fen in al et Se tay as by ng sine Pe eas ee ah ee Beste AERA Su Mig apa Son ee nt bye oe ez ttre oe a ine (ap Wetec aod ‘proclamation pathétique’ to the troops: “The Fee er tele ind” We Saath wie tat Taghnd wittnehe Casa oy ee ado sn Seulatyen them dy ae ier, Sie ate ei tae) "ai any Bde Sa ve ttl nel roe fence St So c's ea Fee ae eerie, oo ere cris ant del onde fete Sr suerte Pap oneal eee et De nag “i sn red sat te stay Ws kar te pin ea Seated Tet erat ET Talat fo 8 oon Continued on page 136 133Invasion of Holland and Belgium (continued) deep, and the other on both sides of Deynze, Sidlometres wide and 3 kilometres deep, ‘The hours of the Belgian army were now numbered, and on the following day, May 26, the fatal erisis loomed up. In the west, the Germans attacked at dawn, with venom, ona line between Gheluwe and Iseghem. The Mandel Canal was crossed near lngel- rmunster, and the two bridgeheads set up the provious day wore thus unitod, while further Away to the north, the Deynze-Heist branch The Admiralty signals ‘Operation Dynamo must begin’ canal was forced above Eaklo, The air was never empty of German aircraft, which now terrorised the rear areas, bombing Roulers, ‘Tiolt, ‘and Ostend, and dispersing the population and choking the ‘roads. with Beeing refugees. ‘Appeals for reinforcement streamed into the GH, whieh now had to contend with danger on six different fronts. ‘There were nly the remnants of three divisions in reserve, and. all had suffered rough treat mont in the last few days. The 3rd Division, for example, could muster only 1,250 men all its heavy weapons had been chandoned or destroyed in battle, and the merging of tunite within the division created imextr cable confusion, making the job of exercising ‘command increasingly more dificult. Tt was in fact a matier of surprise that there was still a continuous front—but all though the Germans had made effecti breaches at many points, each time the ‘opening had been plugged ai the last minute. ‘On the afternoon of May 26 the King Blanchard the following mess gian command requests you to inform the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies that the situation of the Belgian army is fgrave and the Belgian command intends to tontinue the fight to the very end. Neverthe- Togs, the Limits of resistance have now practi cally been reached” Lord Gort had also been told that ‘the Belgians now have no foress available to block the advance on Ypres. The idea of withdrawal to the Ysor should therefore be Gisoounted, for it would destroy our units more rapidly than a battle, and without loss a the enemy, The order has been given to extend the inundations tothe east bank ofthe Yer, prolonged by the Yperlée, but it should be noted that the waters will only rise slowly because we are now in the period of low tides, Meanwhile the Britich command had taken the ultimate decision, At 1857 hours the Admiralty signalled ‘Operation Dynamo ‘must bogia’ the signal to begin evacuating troops from tho Belgian and French coasts Tt was in these tragic circumstances that the last day of fighting of the Belgian army dawned, ‘The main weight of the German fattack was now concentratedon the centre af the Belgian front, towards Tielt, where an opening 5 miles wide was breached by the tend of the morning. There were no means for plugging this breach, eo the road to Bruges ‘Was open. King Léopold then sent the following message to Lord Gort at 1230 hours on May 21: “The army is very discouraged. It has been fighting continuously for four days under intensive bombardment, and. the moment, Is approaching when ‘it will be tunable to continue the fight. In theso cir cumstances, the King will find himself forced to'surrender to avoid a collapse.’ The French military mission also received a warning in this voin at 1430 hours. ‘Very early that same morning, Admiral Keyes, head of the British military mission to Belgium, had passed on a message from the King of England to King Léopold urging him to leave Belgium and eontinue to lead Belgian resistance from England. The latter had retired immodiatoly he received this, with Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother, and shortly afterwards he informed ‘Admiral Keyes that this was simply a repe- tition of the arguments which his own sisters had used a few days earlier. King fopold and the Queen Mother had stead= stly resolved to stay in Belgium. Keyes then wont to La Panno, where he telephoned Churchill, telling him of King Léopold’s decision and reporting that the Belgian army was incapable of continuing the resis- tance further, even for a single day. ‘At 1600 hours the Belgian command eon- cluded that since all their fighting power was now exhausted, the dispatch of a truce mis- Sion would gain for their allies «litle extra The Filhrer demands unconditional surrender time: the night of May 27/28 and part of the morning of the 28th—which was, as it hap. pened, exactly what would have been gained by continuing the struggle, but in that case a the cost of catastrophic dislocation. ‘The heads of the Allied missions. were immediately informed that a truce mission was leaving to learn the conditions of cessation of hostilities between the Belg land the German armies. The French General Champon protested because the Allios had not been called in to state their views and inhis opinion the negotiations should only be ewan by common consent But he was told that the mission waa being sent simply to fenquire the ‘condition for'a suspension of hms. Nevertheless, at 1890 hours Champan Sent a tologram to General Weygand, who thon sont toGeneral Blanchard the following Instructions The French and’ British governments are agreed to order General Blanchard and Lord. Gore to. defend. the honor of thotr lag by easing them: selves completely rom the Belgian army." ‘AL 1700 hours. Major-GeserelDerous seats, the Belgian Deputy Chiefof Sta had left for the German lines. By a devious and protracted route he eventually reached the command post of an army corps general, wo passed of is message directly to the German GHQ. The reply was cleat and to the point. the Pihrer demanded uncondi= {ional surrender Tt was 2980 hours before General Derous- seaur got back to the Belgian GH by the fame devious route and after an eventful journey. At 2300 hours King Léopold in onjunction with his Chief of Generel Saf, decided to ooepé the conditions end pro posed that the gease-fre should come tnto {poration nt 0400 hours on May 28. Mean- while the 60th Freneh Division, still under Belgian command, was moved across the ‘Yeer by trucks and that evening the French nilitary mistion left the Belgian GH for La Panne. 2 iz "Admiral Keyes, who had also gone to La Panne to inform London of what was hap pening, returned to see King. Léopold tn Bruges af 2900 hours, witha new and press- ing invitation from Chore gota Eng land"'When the King again dedlined, the ‘Admiral took his leave and went to Niu. torr, where Colonel Davy awaited him, and there the Admiral and his staf searched for means of departure. They found fehing vessel, but soon afterwards heard the engines of a torpedo-boat, so the name Keyes’ was signalled by means of a torch, and the next instant three torpedo-boals Pulled in. The mission's vebicles were then riven into the deep wators of the port, and by dawn the British military mission to Belgium was on its way ta Harwich. ‘Firing coased along the Belgian front at Germans receive Rotterdam's surrender 0400 hours on May 28, 1940, excopt in the Roulers-Ypres sector, where ‘units without communications continued fighting for two ‘more hours. ‘At 1030 hours the Belgian command re ceived a message from the German High Command—via its truce ‘mission at the ‘command post of General von Reichenau, hear Renaix—requesting unhindered. pas Sage for German columns in the direction of the sea. A copy of this message was sent immediately by dispatch-rider to the French mission at La Panne~telephone communi ations being out of order—but it was Drought back, as General Champon had already left Belgium. By 1100 hours the Ger- man eolumns were moving towards Dixmude ‘and Ostend. From then on the only resistance to Bock’s forces in the area from Nieuport to Comines ‘was to come from General Alan Brooke's 2nd Corps, reinforced by the British 3rd ‘and 4th Divisions, the artillery of the British ‘Tet Corps, and the 60:h Freneh Division. ‘And it’ was here, on the ground where thousands ‘of British soldiers of the First World War iay buried, that the heroic ofence of the Dunkirk perimeter began. TEAN-LEON CHARLES was born at Quaregnon, Belgium, in 1922 and studied int the "Athénée. Royal (at Antwerp) and atthe Flom nace § Daring the L ‘war hoserved in the Belgian Resistance Intelligence (Groupe Bayard), and was, mentioned in dispatches and ‘Gecorated. At the liberation he volunteered for the Belgian infantry as 4 ‘and in 1960 he passed into t reserve, where he fa now a major. From 1969 to 1955 J. L Charles was Professor of Milliary History and Tactics at the Pre- Daratory School for Sccond-Lieutenants {ind from 1957 to 1963 he taught history at the Royal Miltary School in Brussels, ‘where he became Deputy-Professor in Historical eritque, military history, and contemporary. history. In 1962 he was awarded his doctoraie in philosophy and Tettors bythe University of Liege. He Is the author of numerous articles on military? historical subjects. ‘The centre of Rotterdam was destroyed by an artillery and air bombardment ‘on May 14, 1940‘The Stukas have passed and the infantry move into 138+L ERICH RAEDER Cin of the navy and one ff the few men who. dared {fangs ‘with the Fire. ‘Though ot first he Aattered Mier in order to" goin 5 Pewerfll navy, he venta ‘ly fell out with him over the use of the nay in the svar, and, to Hitler's annoy ‘nee, ultimately” insisted (on his resignation being seve, 2 ALFRED ROSENBERG Editor af the Nazi daily news: bper Valischer Beobachier National Observer? and ree gril the pry ent senbere gained Hitler's fdmiretion for his theories ff Nordle racial supremacy, ‘Though the Fuhyer ater ad- sited that he hd no. more than glanood at Rosonber pious writings about race, fhe peeado-philsopher was hailed a the prophet of the ew tact ofder andi ices became baste Nos dectine The humene ideals of Chrntian Europe’ wrote Rowenberg, Norm useless reed 3 ARTHUR SEVSS-INQUART Tint became prominent as leader ofthe Natsonal Social ‘ssn Austria, Ar ambitious one in" Austria, and tan aged to trick the Austrian Chancellor neo. trusting tie One of is Bret moves fe Agetrian Minister of Socurity was to roleare all Nane from’ prison. More than anyone els, he paved the way for the Nazi take- vers Continued to. boa frataful and. fathful Nasi, lind fom 1940 to 1048 was Reich Commissioner for the Netherlands 4JULIUS STREICHER Probably the post serve ‘henetmen, Rarely seen pone, without & Whip. "An obwesive anti Semie. His newspaper Der Sturmer (The. Stormer) published cbsecne tilustrated frticles purporting. to. te- weal Jewish depravity. Be Tere the Nane came to power, Julius Stroichor war in" clementary-echool tetcher, ‘5 RUDOLF HESS: Served inthe same regiment fi Hider during the First, World War. Bectme one of the early members of the Nas Party and accompacied Hitler to Landsberg Prison, whore he helped with the Thantseript of Mein Kamp ‘Was offically Hitlr's socre- tary and Ir hi, cel. ‘Apparently without humour, fhe wa one of the few men Miler” rusted~unti May 1941, when he made a sens tional slo fight to Scotland, Seemingly in order to per Stade Betain to cooperate ‘with Hilor against Rasa MEN WHO WORKED FOR HITLER A system so grotesque as Nazism needed grotesque characters to administer it; a system so absolute needed a high proportion of sycophants and flunkies. But intelligence and brains were also needed, and these were not lacking. Here are some of the ‘men who helped to shape the Third Reich Hitler thereupon pronounced him mad. FRANZ VON PAPEN Aristocrat, ambitions, and ‘2 devout Homan Catholic, Papen war nevertheless quite willing to be used by Hitler"when Hitler needed a respoctable front. He had frie eld the position ot Chancellor in 1988, but after thant of he Nee appily undertook suberdin- sts roles During the Tatlar part of the war he was Ger fan ambassador to Turkey, ‘REINHARD HEYDRICH Nicknamed “The Hangman Hoyérich war” Himmler’ deputy. Most Germans re fared him as even more a ferupulous than the Gestapo Ghief himsalf, and he could bh rolied upon to carey out the most. human tase. With Goobbels he engineered the infamour Crystal Ni pogrom. Before the Nazis Exe to power, he had been cashed rom hey for ‘Scandalous eondvet, bat be was no coward. He would thten leave his post with the B55'to fy withthe Laftwatfo, fad was once wounded over ‘sel but managed to force: {and Behind Gerstan lines, eee ADOLF HITLER 10 HJALMAR SCHACHT Brillant and ambitions ‘soonomist, President of the Relenabanie 1924-20" and 188338." Supported “Filer, though not # Nasi. Despite this Hitler appointed him Minister of “Beonamics in 41504." Master-mindod spec: tacular recovery of Gorman sconomy. Felt” Hider” was fing to fast and too mck fess, and much to Bitler's lnnoyande resigned in 1038, 19 WILHELM KEITEL Appointed Chietaf Stal? of the High Command of the ‘Armed. Foroes in 1908, fosition which beheld tothe fd. Had litle real power, find once complained. that the only perwon he cul give fedora tg waa bie baling A fonteal fizure only because of his proximity to Hitler, fand the detailed sdminiatra tion for which he was Te Spanalbe. 42 KONSTANTIN VON NEURATH Easy-going, complacent, but Inteligent carver eiplomat with ‘considerable prostigo mand out of Germany. After We dismissal” as. Foreign ‘Minister in 1928, still sup ported Titer, Was appointed Protector of Bohemia nd arava 0-0 and es inthis. ‘pst by Hryrieh. Involved {ater ‘opposition to Hitler. 13 WERNER VON BLOMBERG From 1903, to. 1998 Ger rman C-in-c of the. Wehr macht, during which time Ihe tried to infuse the Gorman army’ with ‘his ‘concept of “chivalry in war Wider. owed mush to" his Support in early days, but the army” referred to" ia eontemptuously as ‘robber Wom’ even 20. he opposed Hider in 1998, Hiuer then Fenounoed im, and frond his resignation over his un- fortunate marriage to an ex rsteuta and stipteses ste, Blomberg. ved im obscurity. with his wife throughout the war. 14 WALTHER VON BRAUCHITSCH Gin€ Garman sey 198 suecearor to. Fritch. ‘Ainough repected by te ‘army, vas more amenable to ‘Hider than his predecessor. ‘Uncommitted during. army plot ta depese Hitler ax ime er Caech crisis, Reshgned over failures i Russian com ign, during which Hitler Ervusily described. him a5 “a'vain, cowardly weet ts eauoua Von'scHinace T) Nazify the German youth Hitler chose # hand ome’ young man of 29 with great driving ‘free. Behiragh was not only an Sperte organ wa So an aepiring poet who Dralsed the Fuhrer as his fenius, grazing’ the stars Sohinachls macher "was American. Ironically, mong iin nestor wee. eo Saatores ofthe Declar fon of Independence. 16 WILHELM FRICK ‘A useful cog in the Nazi ‘machine. “Compered with Hitler's othor adhorents, the Minister ofthe Intrior was ‘bland personality. pion ‘German sill servant noted for ne eciency 17 MARTIN BORMANN Bormann became Hitie’s secretary. alter Hess's dee ‘ection: Like his predecesor he eave unswerving byally to ‘the. Fuhrer, ahd con sequently managed to Keep His trust throughout the war Like that of many of Hitler's fonfederates, his past wat ‘dubious, and he had eerved a yoar in prison for his part ins poteal murder 139SOON ANY OO) Himmler believed he was laying the found: ations. for a. mighty empire of Germano. Nordic peoples which would stretch from the ‘Atlanti¢ tothe Urals It was upon the narrow shoulders of Hein- ‘Himmler that Hitler placed the res- Joosibiliey for hit suprome rine agaist tumanity, It was Himmler who carried the ‘Nazi racial policy to its ultimate conclusion: ‘the displacement of unwanted people from a sovealled “Aryan’ society, and their exter- imination—on a scale hitherto unknown in human history—at centres ‘designed for ‘murder and ingineration. Himmler was born in 1900 into a most respected Catholic family and named after Princo Heinrich of Bavaria, to whom his father had been a tutor. As a schoolboy during the First World War he was an en thusiastic follower of the German. army's ogress, and was completing his instruction {evan officer cadet when the war came to an fend. ‘Then be studied agriculture; but in Spite of fis weak constitution he remained ‘obsessed by the desire to be a soldier, and Joined the Nazi Party in 1923 just in'time to hold « flag during the abortive Munich Pusch, On the re-formation of the port, his difi sence and loyalty were rewarded when he ‘was appointed Deputy Leader of the $5, the bodyguards formed originally to accompany speakers to the Nazi rallies and protect them fn the platform when their speeches led to Violence. Himmler supplemented his modest salary by running @ small-holding near Munich with the help of his wife, Marga, a former nurse who. shared his interest in ‘country life and his fetish for herbal medi cine. In 1929, at the age of only 26, he became Reichsfihrer of the 88, a title he was to make infamous throughout the world in little more than a dozen years. Himmler was essentially a desk worker with a pedantic head for detail. He compen- Sated. for “his own physical deficiencies through his obsession with racial. purity and the athletie prowess of his men. The 83 became the black-uniformed elite, the men who, though initially few in numbers, were to reinearnate the Order of Teutonic Knights of old. Himmler saw himself as Grand Master of this new Teutonic order. However widely men (and later women) were recruited who fell short of this ideal, hie never abandoned hhis conviction that the $8 should set the paizern to which Nordic rman aspired. As early ax 1991 he instituted 42 marriage code for the SS that forbade any tan to tale a bride who could not prove the purity of her Aryan blood for a couple of Eenturies. $8 bride schools were established to prepare chosen girs for their high ealling 1 future Aryan mothers; and fr unmarried ‘women with unborn babies of good stock, Himmler established the Lebensborn (Foun: {ain of Life) maternity institutions to ensure their welfare and the care of their children when they were born to the German race. Himmlers racial pedantry, like that of Hitler, had been picked up from many sourees. The writings of fanatics such aa the Comte de Gobineau and Houston Stewart Chamberlain (an Englishman who was even tually naturalised in Germany and died in 1927) had singled out the Nordic race as representing the ideal human being, while the 19th-contury German philosopher Hogel 140 Inad advocated rai sate ‘More specifically the parts’s own ‘theor- ists, Walther Darré-and Alfred Rosenberg, had’ maintained that purity of blood and altachinent tothe sll were the ground-roota from which a strong and healthy Germany, based on a soldier-pessant stock, could rise todominate the continent of Europe and uli Imately the world. To this the ge-politicians s5ied ih aim Ener, he exe Sion of Cormany’s rightfal living space’ at the expense ofthe ‘subshuman’ races to the ent THimmler’s scquisition of power was achioved by doviews and ate means. He gradually tock control of the Gestapo, the Secret police foree founded by Giving." And In oohae was, after ally a police tate, the eichafhrer’of the S8 must necesearily become more powerful than any minister oF departmental chief ‘The force at Himmler’ disposal in 1929 had been only 280 men, but by 1885 the SS had grown toa force of some ‘unity within the nation- 200,000—a formidable. independent army ‘whose aetivities went virtually unchecked In 1996. Eimmler's Gestapo was estab- lished as the national security police, wit powors whieh lay outside any’ normal juri- ical control. With the SS, it supervised tho [gnols nd concentration campe where poli- Heal sanctions ware imposed, and between them the SS and the Gestapo became the spearhead of the Nazi terror. The $8 men of the Death’s-head Unit were trained at Dachau concentration eamp to practise extremes of ruthless discipline on. tho prisoners in their chargo. Himmler’s bureaucratic, clericlike man- nor was no asset to a man of his rank and power. He had no real capacity for loader- hip, though he always longed to lead. He ould not look on SS violence without blench- ing, and he was by nature indecisive when ‘any issue was in doubt. For Hitler, he repre- sented the perfect steward, accepting un- complainingly the worst. ‘tasks. be was faasigmed. Those aspects of his authority for which he was least suited he delegated to Reinhard Heydrieh, the most ruthless and ambitious of his young SS officers Heydrich, blond and Nordic, was an athlete and violinist a fighter pilot and a rake. He hhad joined the ranks of the SS in 1931 at the age of 27. He became Himmler's alter ego, fand even a rival for the Fuhrer’s favour. ‘The order to devise an effective ‘inal solu- tion’ for the European Jews was sent to Heydrich, and not to Himmler, hy Géring in July 1941. Had Heydrich not boon assas- inated by Czech agents sent from Britain in 1942, his ruthless, sadistic energy might well have led to his supplanting Himmler altogether in the years that lay ahead. For there can be no question that Himm- ler, with his nervous ‘stomach pains, be- ccame less and less effective as his’ per- vvasive powers increaaed. He could certainly: speak out like a tough headmaster when his senior officers were convened, and he had @ Kind of negative obstinacy ‘which helped maintain the legend of his authority. In planning hie administration, he took. from Hitler the wasteful poliey of ‘divide and rule’ 0 that men upon his staff who were more Gecisive or ruthless than himself wasted thelr evil energiet intriguing against each other rather than against him. Yet while mea like Géring or even Goebbels were con- cerned with the more immediate extension of their own power, Himmlor sustained him- belf with his ultimate visions of the pon- Germanic world. He kept in the background, ‘mostly out of the public eye, and sat about the momentous task of drawing Europe's Germanic stock together at the expense of the lives of Jews and Slavs. Ae the direct result of Himmler's activity and that of the specialist killers at his command, over 10,000,000 people were to lose their lives after 1941, while large numbers of German- speakers were uprooted and brought west- wards, As he talked lo his Finnish masseur ‘and confidant, Felix Kersten, Himmler out- Tinod the future that the war and his exter- ‘mination plan would bring. A vast opening- up of territory would. give every German soldier and civilian his tract of Gorman land, while German military might would create 2 great defensive wall against the hostile ‘subsbuman’ races bayond the Urals further east. Even office and industrial workers ‘would till the land in their spare time. Ger~ many, having crushed the Communist re- fimo, would turn the Russian empire into 8 dominion under her own direct control. Britain and America, he assumed, would ultimately” ally. themselves with Germany ‘and share in this control, while establishing their own elite from the Nordic peoples in their states. A traditional religion, he main- tained, would be revived to show the Nordic link with the higher being he called God, while be himself, among many great re- Sponsibilities, would become the Nazi Minister for Roligious Afairs, with all Europe for his parish. He had already instituted simple pagan marriage rites for hhis SS men, and a special Christmas core- mony which refleciod his beliefs. But any final conflict with the established churches, he added, must be postponed until the dream of Nazi domination of the world was closer to fulfilment. It was this same basie thinking was finally to divert Hitler from the Invasion of British shores: he hoped ta eon- vert Britain into an ally for his great battle in the east. For him the most bitter struggle lay not with Britain, but with the Bolshevist- Jewish Say comple linked up in hie ming low to his ambitions was en the Western Allies. and Stalin's Communist rogime. For Hitler always hoped that when Moscow fell in flames, Britain, left un- conquered, would freely acknowledge hi supremacy. Then of her own free will she would join his great confedoration of the Nordic nation-states and become his faithful ally in the domination of the worldBuild your weekly parts of History of the Second World War into a set of impressive library volumes HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR BINDERS Keep your copies of History of the Second World War in mint condition. Binders have been specially designed to turn your collection into a permanent and easy-to-use work of reference. 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