AGUIRRE vs.

SECRETARY OF JUSTIICE
G.R. NO. 170723, 03 March 2008
FACTS: In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, petitioner Gloria Pilar S. Aguirre (Gloria Aguirre) seeks the reversal of the 21
July 2005 Decision and 5 December 2005 Resolution, both of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 88370, entitled Gloria Pilar S. Aguirre v. Secretary of the Department
of Justice, Michelina S. Aguirre-Olondriz, Dr. Juvido Agatep, Dra. Marissa B. Pascual,
Pedro B. Aguirre and John and Jane Does. Olondriz denied that the prospected,
scouted, facilitated, solicited and/or procured any false statement mutilated or abused
his common law brother, Laureano Aguirre. She further contends that his common law
brother went through a vasectomy procedure but that does not amount to mutilation. Dr.
Agatep contends that the complainant has no legal personality to file a case since she is
only a common law sister of Larry who has a legal guardian in the person of Pedro
Aguirre. He further contends that Vasectomy does not in any way equate to castration
and what is touched in vasectomy is not considered an organ in the context of law and
medicine. The Assistant City Prosecutor held that the facts alleged did not amount to
mutilation; the vasectomy operation did not deprived Larry of his reproductive organ.
Gloria Aguirre then appealed to the Secretary of the DOJ but Chief State Prosecutor
dismissed the petition stating that the Secretary of Justice may motu propio dismiss
outright the petition if there is no showing of any reversible error in the questioned
resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are liable for the crime of mutilation?
RULING: No, the court held that Article 262 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
the penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any
person who shall intentionally mutilate another by depriving him, either totally or
partially, of some essential organ for reproduction. Any other intentional mutilation shall
be punished by prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods. A straightforward
scrutiny of the above provision shows that the elements of mutilation under the first
paragraph of Art.262 of the Revised Penal Code to be 1) that there be a castration, that
is, mutilation of organs necessary for generation; and 2) that the mutilation is caused
purposely and deliberately, that is, to deprive the offended party of some essential organ
for reproduction. According to the public prosecutor, the facts alleged did not amount to
the crime of mutilation as defined and penalized above, i.e., [t]he vasectomy operation
did not in any way deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive organ, which is still very much
part of his physical self.

LI vs. PEOPLE
427 SCRA 217

FACTS: Petitioner Li was charged before the RTC of Makati with the crime of homicide
for the death of Christopher Arugay. The prosecution alleged that Arugay was watching
television at home with his sisters Cristy and Baby Jane, his girlfriend dela Camara and
Baby Janes boyfriend, Tan. They suddenly heard a noise outside. Peering through the
window, they saw Li and a certain Eduardo Sangalang taking a bath completely naked.
The two were facing the house of the Arugays. Enraged, the deceased shouted
something to Li and Sangalang. Then petitioner Li shouted back. An incensed Arugay
went out the house where he was met by petitioner carrying a baseball bat. Li struck
Arugay on the head with the bat, causing Arugay to fall. Li ran back to his house. The
witnesses Tan and dela Camara assisted Arugay and were trying to drag him back to
his house when Li re-emerged, this time with a knife. Li then stabbed Arugay once.
Immediately thereafter, they were able to see Sangalang stab Arugay at least once.

Petitioner Li denies killing Arugay. He contends that he hit first with a baseball bat
Christopher Arugay hitting the latter not on the head but at the right arm which is near
the shoulder. The deceased who is armed with a bolo, retaliated by hacking Li on the
head, causing him to lose his hold on the baseball bat and fell semi-unconscious or
unconscious. In such a condition, it is highly improbable that he was capable of inflicting
the fatal stab wounds on Arugay.

After trial, he was found guilty and sentenced to the penalty of eight (8) years and
one (1) day of Prision Mayor to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of Reclusion Temporal. His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Aggrieved,
Li filed a petition for review, seeking the reversal of his conviction for the crime of
homicide.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be convicted for the crime of slight physical
injury instead of homicide?

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. It ruled that the only injury
attributable to Li is the contusion on the victims right arm that resulted from Li striking
Arugay with a baseball bat. In view of the victims supervening death from injuries which
cannot be attributed to Li beyond reasonable doubt, the effects of the contusion caused
by Li are not mortal or at least lie entirely in the realm of speculation. When there is no
evidence of actual incapacity of the offended party for labor or of the required medical
attendance, the offense is only slight physical injuries.

What transpired during the dawn hours of was an artless, spontaneous street
fight devoid of any methodical plan for consummation. It arose not because of any longstanding grudge or an appreciable vindication of honour, but because the actors were

too quick to offense and impervious to reason. Yet, however senseless this
lethal imbroglio is, a judicious examination of the circumstances must be made to avoid
leaps into hyperbole. Careful scrutiny of the evidence reveals that the criminal
culpability of Li in the death of Arugay was not established beyond reasonable doubt.
Unfortunately, the person who is responsible for the death apparently remains at large.

PEOPLE vs. OGA

431 SCRA 354

FACTS: At around 2:00 a.m. of August 10, 1998, Ignacio and his wife were awakened
by the loud banging of corrugated GI sheet coming from the barracks of his coconstruction worker which was about 3 meters away. Ignacio and his wife proceeded in
haste to investigate but they were surprised and disarrayed to see his co-worker, herein
appellant, naked on top of their daughter, Irene, who was also naked.
Irene testified that at around 10:00 p.m. of August 9, 1999, the appellant
summoned her to his barracks. Thinking he had the usual errand for her she
approached him. However, appellant suddenly pulled her and laid her on a wooden bed
(papag). The appellant then took off her pants and panty, as well as his clothes. He
inserted his penis into her vagina. It was only at around 2:00 a.m. that she was able to
finally kick the galvanized iron sheet that enclosed the appellants barracks.
Appellant did not deny that he had several intercourse with Irene but interposed
sweetheart story.
ISSUE: Whether or not force and intimidation is attendant in this case?
RULING: Neither was intimidation employed against her. Even if she was pulled down
to the bed, she was not threatened with bodily or physical harm by a knife, bolo or any
object or instrument that the appellant could have employed so as to create a real
apprehension of dangerous consequences or serious bodily harm. Irenes overall
deportment during her ordeal defies comprehension and the reasonable standard of
human conduct when faced with a similar situation. It is unnatural for an intended rape
victim, as in the case at bar, not to make even a feeble attempt to free herself despite a
myriad of opportunities to do so. This constrained us to entertain a reasonable doubt on
the guilt of the appellant.

PEOPLE vs. AGSAOAY

430 SCRA 450

FACTS: For automatic review is the Decision dated November 28, 1997 of the Regional
Trial Court, Urdaneta, Pangasinan in Criminal Cases Nos. U-9332 and U-9333,
convicting Santiago Agsaoay, Jr. y Alvendia, appellant, of two counts of rape (qualified
by relationship and minority) and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death
in each count. He was also ordered to pay the victim, his very own daughter Josephine
Ferrer Agsaoay moral and exemplary damages in each count. Contained in the two
informations charging appellant with rape states that on or about July 15 and 17, 1997
at Barangay Malokiat, municipality of Pozorrubio, province of Pangasinan, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with JOSEPHINE FERRER AGSAOAY, a minor age 17 years old and
accuseds own daughter, against her will and without her consent, to the damage and
prejudice of said JOSEPHINE FERRER AGSAOAY. However, according to the accused,
he always inflicts physical violence on Josephine for going around with different men,the
reason why she charged him with rape. Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted by
counsel, entered a plea of not guilty to the crimes charged. Thereafter, a joint trial on the
merits followed. The accused was convicted by the trial court, hence this petition. The
appellant contends that the trial court erred in giving faith and credence to the testimony
of Josephine Agsaoay.
ISSUE: Is the appellants contention tenable?
RULING: No. The defense endeavors to prove that Josephine is an unchaste young
woman who habitually goes out with different men. Suffice it to state that such
debasement of her character does not necessarily cast doubt on her credibility, nor
does it negate the existence of rape. It is a well-established rule that in the prosecution
and conviction of an accused for rape, the victims moral character is immaterial, there
being absolutely no nexus between it and the odious deed committed Even a prostitute
or a woman of loose morals can be the victim of rape, for she can still refuse a mans
lustful advances.
In a last-ditch effort to exculpate himself from criminal liability, appellant tries to
impute ill-motive to Josephine. We have consistently ruled that parental punishment is

not a good reason for a daughter to falsely charge her father with rape For even when
consumed with revenge, it takes a certain amount of psychological depravity for a
young woman to fabricate a story which would put her own father for the most of his
remaining life in jail and drag herself and the rest of her family to a lifetime of shame. It
bears stressing that the determination of Josephine and her mother in facing a public
trial, unmindful of the resulting humiliation and shame, obviously demonstrates their
genuine desire to condemn an injustice and to have the offender apprehended and
punished. The trial court, therefore, correctly found appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two counts of qualified rape and in imposing the death penalty upon him.

PEOPLE vs. JALOSJOS

369 SCRA 179
FACTS: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress
who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and
acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking
that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance
at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the
first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need
for his constituents to be represented.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as

member of House of Representatives?
RULING: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, in
spite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may
be enlarged or restricted by law. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and
members of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution.
The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an
exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its
terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the
operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot
compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate
one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has
constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions
and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man
with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only
elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a
mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

PEOPLE vs. CAMPUHAN

329 SCRA 270

FACTS: April 25, 1996 4 pm: Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of 4-year old Crysthel
Pamintuan, went to the ground floor of their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks for
her 2 children. There she met Rimo Campuhan, helper of Conrado Plata Jr., brother of
Corazon, who was then busy filling small plastic bags with water to be frozen into ice in
the freezer located at the second floor. Then she heard Crysthel cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!"
so she went upstairs and saw Primo Campuhan inside her children's room kneeling
before Crysthel whose pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already removed,
while his short pants were down to his knees and his hands holding his penis with his
right hand. Horrified, she cursed "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed him
several times. He evaded her blows and pulled up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside
who she tried to block his path. Corazon then ran out and shouted for help thus
prompting Vicente, her brother, a cousin and an uncle who were living within their
compound, to chase the Campuhan who was apprehended. They called the barangay
officials who detained. Physical examination yielded negative results as Crysthels
hymen was intact. Campuhan: Crysthel was in a playing mood and wanted to ride on
his back when she suddenly pulled him down causing both of them to fall down on the
floor. RTC: guilty of statutory rape, sentenced him to the extreme penalty of death.
ISSUE:

Whether

or

not

it

was

consummated

statutory

rape.

RULING: NO. MODIFIED. guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to an

indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision
mayor medium as minimum, to fourteen (14) years ten (10) months and twenty (20)
days of reclusion temporal medium as maximum. Costs de oficio.
People v. De la Pea: labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated
Primo's kneeling position rendered an unbridled observation impossible. Crysthel made
a categorical statement denying penetration but her vocabulary is yet as
underdeveloped. Corazon narrated that Primo had to hold his penis with his right hand,
thus showing that he had yet to attain an erection to be able to penetrate his victim the
possibility of Primo's penis having breached Crysthel's vagina is belied by the child's
own assertion that she resisted Primo's advances by putting her legs close together and
that she did not feel any intense pain but just felt "not happy" about what Primo did to
her. Thus, she only shouted "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" not "Aray ko, aray ko! No medical basis to
hold that there was sexual contact between the accused and the victim. For rape to be

consummated, a slight brush or scrape of the penis on the external layer of the vagina
will not suffice. Mere touching of the external layer of the vagina is not the same as
slightest penetration. Accused is only liable for ATTEMPTED RAPE. Further, for rape to
be
consummated,
a
slight
brush
or
scrape
of
the
penis on the external layer of the vagina will not suffice. Mere touching of the external
layer of the vagina is not the same as slightest penetration. Hence, accused is only
liable for ATTEMPTED RAPE.

PEOPLE vs. ECHEGARAY

257 SCRA 581
FACTS: On December 31, 1993, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, entitled, "An Act to
Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the
Revised Penal Code, as Amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes,"
took effect. Between December 31, 1993, when R.A No. 7659 took effect, and the
present time, criminal offenders have been prosecuted under said law, and one of them,
herein accused-appellant has been, pursuant to said law, meted out the supreme
penalty of death for raping his ten-year old daughter. Upon his conviction his case was
elevated to us on automatic review. On June 25, 1996, we affirmed his conviction and
the death sentence.
ISSUE:

Whether or not R.A. [No.] 7659, reimposing the death penalty is

unconstitutional per se:
a. For crimes where no death results from the offense, the death penalty is
a severe and excessive penalty in violation of Article III, Sec. 19(1) of the
1987 Constitution.
b. The death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Article
III, Sec. 11 of the 1987 Constitution.

RULING: The detailed events leading to the enactment of R.A. No. 7659 as unfurled in
the beginning of this disquisition necessarily provide the context for the following
analysis. Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in Congress the
power to re-impose the death penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes". This power is not subsumed in the plenary legislative power of Congress, for it
is subject to a clear showing of "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." The
constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the death penalty entails (1)
that Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes; (2) that Congress
specify and penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance with
the definition or description set in the death penalty bill and/or designate crimes
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case, death can only be
imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in court that characterize
the crime to be heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the death
penalty bill; and (3) that Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be singularly
motivated by "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." In the second whereas

clause of the preamble of R.A. No. 7659, we find the definition or description of heinous
crimes. Said clause provides that: . . . the crimes punishable by death under this Act are
heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their
inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just
civilized and ordered society. Justice Santiago Kapunan, in his dissenting opinion in
People v. Alicando, traced the etymological root of the word "heinous" to the Early
Spartans' word, "haineus", meaning hateful and abominable, which in turn, was from the
Greek prefix "haton", denoting acts so hatefully or shockingly evil. We find the foregoing
definition or description to be a sufficient criterion of what is to be considered a heinous
crime. This criterion is deliberately undetailed as to the circumstances of the victim, the
accused, place, time, the manner of commission of crime, its proximate consequences
and effects on the victim as well as on society, to afford the sentencing authority
sufficient leeway to exercise his discretion in imposing the appropriate penalty in cases
where R.A. No 7659 imposes not a mandatory penalty of death but the more flexible
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Under R.A. No. 7659, the following crimes are
penalized by reclusion perpetua to death: All the crimes mentioned therein are not
capital crimes per se, the uniform penalty for all of them being not mandatory death but
the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

In other words, it is premature to demand for a specification of the heinous

elements in each of the foregoing crimes because they are not anyway mandatorily
penalized with death. The elements that call for the imposition of the supreme penalty of
death in these crimes, would only be relevant when the trial court, given the prerogative
to impose reclusion perpetua, instead actually imposes the death penalty because it
has, in appreciating the evidence proffered before it, found the attendance of certain
circumstances in the manner by which the crime was committed, or in the person of the
accused on his own or in relation to the victim, or in any other matter of significance to
the commission of the crime or its effects on the victim or on society, which
circumstances characterize the criminal acts as grievous, odious, or hateful, or
inherently or manifestly wicked, vicious, atrocious or perverse as to be repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just,
civilized and ordered society.

PEOPLE vs. JUMAWAN

G. R. NO. 187495, 21 APRIL 2014

FACTS: Accused-appellant and his wife, were married on October 18, 1975. They lived
together since then and raised their four (4) children as they put up several businesses
over the years. On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging
that her husband, the accused-appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998
at their residence in Phase 2, Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, and that on
December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex
with him. On June 11, 1999, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City
issued a Joint Resolution, finding probable cause for grave threats, less serious
physical injuries and rape and recommending that the appropriate criminal information
be filed against the accused-appellant. On July 16, 1999, two Information for rape were
filed before the RTC respectively docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-668 and Criminal
Case No. 99-669. The Information in Criminal Case No. 99-668 charged the accusedappellant as follows: That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 9,
1998, at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon person did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private
complainant, her wife, against the latter's will.

ISSUE: Whether or not the husband can be guilty of rape.

RULING: WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Edgar Jumawan "GUILTY"
beyond reasonable doubt of the two (2) separate charges of rape and hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each, to pay complainant
Php50,000.00 in each case as moral damages, indemnify complainant the sum of
Php75,000.00 in each case, [P]50,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
The RTC sustained the version proffered by the prosecution by giving greater weight
and credence to the spontaneous and straightforward testimonies of the prosecution's
witnesses. The trial court also upheld as sincere and genuine the two daughters'
testimonies, as it is not natural in our culture for daughters to testify against their own
father for a crime such as rape if the same was not truly committed.

The trial court rejected the version of the defense and found unbelievable the
accused-appellant's accusations of extra-marital affairs and money squandering against
KKK. The trial court shelved the accused-appellant's alibi for being premised on
inconsistent testimonies and the contradicting declarations of the other defense witness,
Equia, as to the accused-appellant's actual whereabouts on October 16, 1998. . A
highlight of the Supreme Courts reasoning is hereunder quoted:

A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled her to be. A

husband who has sexual intercourse with his wife is not merely using a property, he is
fulfilling a marital consortium with a fellow human being with dignity equal to that he
accords himself. He cannot be permitted to violate this dignity by coercing her to
engage in a sexual act without her full and free consent. Surely, the Philippines cannot
renege on its international commitments and accommodate conservative yet
irrational notions on marital activities that have lost their relevance in a progressive
society.

It is true that the Family Code, obligates the spouses to love one another but this
rule sanctions affection and sexual intimacy, as expressions of love, that are both
spontaneous and mutual and not the kind which is unilaterally exacted by force or
coercion.
Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy between a husband
and wife excludes cruelty and coercion. Sexual intimacy brings spouses wholeness
and oneness. It is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a deep
sense of spiritual communion. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation
and ensures the continuation of family relations. It is an expressive interest in each
others feelings at a time it is needed by the other and it can go a long way in deepening
marital relationship. When it is egoistically utilized to despoil marital union in order to
advance a felonious urge for coitus by force, violence or intimidation, the
Court will step in to protect its lofty purpose, vindicate justice and protect our laws and
State policies. Besides, a husband who feels aggrieved by his indifferent or uninterested
wifes absolute refusal to engage in sexual intimacy may legally seek the courts
intervention to declare her psychologically incapacitated to fulfil an essential marital
obligation. But he cannot and should not demand sexual intimacy from her coercively or
violently. That a husband can be guilty of rape if he has sexual intercourse with his wife
without her consent is consistent with the rule that a spouses right to have sexual
intercourse with his wife cannot be enforced in Court. If the husband cannot use the
courts to compel a wife to have sexual intercourse with him, then surely the husband
cannot use the existence of the marital relationship per se to exculpate himself from
criminal liability for rape.

PEOPLE vs. TAN

G.R. NO. 177566, MARCH 26, 2008

FACTS: At about 8:30 p.m. of 8 September 1997, Ruiz Saez Co (Ruiz) was taking his
meal in a store located just outside his companys premises in Barrio Mamatid,
Cabuyao, Laguna. He noticed three vehicles parked in front of the store a green
Nissan Sentra car, a black Honda Civic car and a red L-300 van. Suddenly, a man
alighted from the Nissan Sentra car and aimed a gun at him. He tried to escape and
started running towards the company plant when two (2) armed men alighted from the
L-300 van and blocked his way. Ruiz was then forcibly boarded into the black Honda
Civic car. Inside the car, he was handcuffed and made to stoop down. After driving for
about an hour, Ruiz was led out of the car, brought inside a house, and locked into a
room. A certain Ka Rudy told him that he had just been kidnapped in exchange for P40
Million for his freedom.
Meanwhile, at around 9:00 p.m. of the same day, Mrs. Sonia Co (Sonia) received
a call from the vice mayor of Cabuyao, Laguna that her son had been kidnapped. She
immediately called then Vice-President Joseph Estrada to seek assistance. The latter
referred the matter to General Panfilo Lacson (Lacson) who in turn instructed Police
Officer Senior Superintendent Cesar Mancao (Mancao) to dispatch teams to monitor the
alleged kidnappers. At 2:30 a.m. of the following day, Sonia finally received a call from
the alleged kidnapper who identified himself as Ka Rudy. The latter confirmed that Ruiz
was in his custody. On his second call, Ka Rudy asked for a P40 Million ransom, which
amount was lowered to P1.2 Million after negotiations. During Ruizs captivity, he was
also blindfolded and handcuffed but was allowed to go to the bathroom accompanied by

his kidnappers. On 14 September 1997, Mancao received a tip from an anonymous

female caller that the persons responsible for the kidnapping of Ruiz were the callers
husband and the latters girlfriend; and that Ruiz was being kept in a house somewhere
in Palmera Homes Subdivision, Taytay, Rizal. A team was dispatched to said area the
following morning and surveillance was thereafter conducted.
Appellants maintained that among the circumstances allegedly established by
the prosecutions evidence, the only link to the accused is that they were all arrested at
the place where the kidnap victim was rescued. Appellants argued that the
circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution failed to prove that they conspired
and actually participated in the kidnapping of the victim. Furthermore, appellants
contended that mere presence at the crime scene cannot be considered as proof of
conspiracy. All told, appellants proffered that their guilt was not established beyond
reasonable doubt; hence, they must be acquitted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellants were guilty of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention?
RULING: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED in that appellants
Rosalinda Trapago Tan a.k.a. Kaye Suarez Palino, Maria El Felasol Flores a.k.a. Mae
Felasol Flores, Armando Panaguiton De Luna, Benito Feolog Felazol, Eduardo
Frondozo Felazol, Angelito Ang Diego, and Roberto Tolentino are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of kidnapping and serious illegal detention. By virtue of this
modification, and not Republic Act No. 9346, the imposition of the penalty of reclusion
perpetua on each of the appellants in the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.

PEOPLE vs. RODRIGO

G.R. NO. 173022, JANUARY 23, 2007

FACTS: On 10 September 1996, Oliver Caparas (Oliver), then 13 years of age, was
waiting for a ride to school in a corner near his house in Matimbo, Malolos, Bulacan,
when four (4) men forcibly seized and boarded him into a car. While inside the car, he
was blindfolded. He was later transferred to a van. 1[4] The van, tailed by a car, traveled
to Baguio. While there, they slept overnight inside the van in a parking lot.
The following day, Eleazar Caparas (Eleazar), the father of Oliver, received a call
from the kidnappers initially asking for P10 million ransom in exchange for the release of
Oliver. In the meantime, the kidnappers proceeded to Bonitas Resort in Pangasinan.
Oliver was then brought to a room and his blindfold removed. He stayed inside the
room for one (1) week. During his stay, a woman, later identified as Lanie dela Cruz
(dela Cruz), took care of him by feeding him three (3) times a day. After three (3) days of
negotiation, the kidnappers agreed to lower the ransom to P1.7 million. On 17
September 1996, Pedro Navarro (Pedro), an uncle of Oliver, was instructed by Eleazar
Caparas to deliver the ransom money. After receiving a call from the kidnappers, he
proceeded to follow the instructions on the drop-off. He eventually gave the money to a
man whom he would later describe as mestizo, 55 or 56 feet tall and wearing
sunglasses. Later that night, Oliver was made to board the same van and brought to
the Petron Gas Station in Meycauayan Highway. Upon alighting from the van, he was
1

given P500.00 and was told that he would be fetched by his uncle inside a canteen in
the gas station.2[11] At around 1:00 a.m. of 18 September 1997, the kidnappers called
Eleazar again and asked them to go to the Petron Gas Station located between
Meycauayan and Marilao along the Expressway. Upon arriving at the Petron Station at
3:00 a.m, Pedro Navarro saw Oliver eating inside the canteen and brought him home
where he was reunited with his father.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellants are guilty of kidnapping with ransom?
RULING: Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of kidnapping is
committed with the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (1) that the offender
is a private individual; (2) that he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives
the latter of his liberty; (3) that the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4)
that in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a)
that the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than five (5) days; or (b) that it is
committed simulating public authority; or (c) that any serious physical injuries are
inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d)
that the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. It is evident
from the testimonies of the witnesses that the essential elements of kidnapping were
present. First, appellants are private individuals. Second, Oliver was abducted by four
(4) armed men. Third, he was detained in a house in Pangasinan against his will.
Fourth, the detention lasted for seven (7) days. Fifth, Oliver Caparas was a minor at the
time of the kidnapping incident.
Platas alibi is patently weak, considering that the alibi is corroborated by his wife, and
a wife is generally perceived to be partial to her husband. Likewise, the testimony of
Esther Guevarra is unavailing. To establish alibi, the accused must not only show that
he was in a place other than the situs of the crime at the time it was committed, such
that it was physically impossible for him to have committed the same. Granting that
Plata had religiously fetched the children of Ester at 11:30 a.m. every weekday, still it is
highly probable for him to have been physically present at the scene of the crime at the
time of the abduction. The distance between Malolos and Bulacan, Bulacan can be
negotiated with a 15-minute ride. At all events, appellants alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the kidnap victim himself, who has no motive to falsely testify.
We affirm the award of actual damages amounting to P1,700,000.00 representing the
amount of ransom money, as well as that of moral damages of P100,000.00,
conformably with jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. The penalties on appellants Rey Plata and Feliciano Fajardo, Jr.
are both reduced to reclusion perpetua, to which they are accordingly sentenced,
without eligibility for parole.

MADSALI, et al vs. PEOPLE

G.R. NO. 179570, FEBRUARY 4, 2010
FACTS: In Criminal Case No. 12281, Sajiron Lajim (Sajiron) and Maron Lajim (Maron)
were charged with the crime of abduction with rape in an Information dated March 17,
1995, which reads:
That on or about the 1st day of July, 1994, in Barangay Malitub, Municipality of
Bataraza, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating together and helping one
another and by means of force, threat, violence and intimidation, while armed with a
bladed weapon known as Badong, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take and carry away one AAA, a girl of 16 years of age, against her will and consent and
brought to the forest and on the occasion thereof the said accused by means of force,
threat, violence and intimidation, and while armed with a knife, accused Sahiron Lajim,
with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with said AAA, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
That on the occasion of the said Rape, accused Maron Lajim helped Sahiron Lajim by
acting as look-out during the commission of the said crime.

In Criminal Case No. 12309, Egap Madsali (Egap) and Sajiron Lajim (Sajiron)
were charged with the crime of serious illegal detention in an Amended Information 3[5]
dated August 28, 1995, which reads:

That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1994 in the morning up to December 15, 1994, at
Barangay Malitub, Municipality of Bataraza, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring,

confederating together and mutually helping one another, with the use of force, violence
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and detain
AAA, an unmarried woman under 15 years of age in the house of Egap Madsali thereby
depriving said AAA of her liberty all against her will and as a result of that illegal detention,
said AAA was not able to go home to her mother for a period of more than five (5)
months.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellants were guilty for the commission of crime of
abduction with rape?
RULING: WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00475 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows:
(a) In Criminal Case No. 12281, accused Sajiron Lajim and Maron Lajim are
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention with rape under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and to pay jointly and severally, the
offended party AAA, the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P75,000.00 as
moral damages. Accused Sajiron Lajim is further ordered to support the offspring born
as a consequence of the rape. The amount of support shall be determined by the trial
court after due notice and hearing, with support in arrears to be reckoned from the date
the appealed decision was promulgated by the trial court; and
(b) In Criminal Case No. 12309, accused Sajiron Lajim is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the amounts of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.

PEOPLE vs. SILONGAN

401 SCRA 459
FACTS: The appellants in this case, who are a Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
and Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) rebel surrenderees, were convicted in the
Regional Trial Court for the crime of kidnapping with Serious Illegal Detention of
Alexander Saldaa and his three companions. The four victims were taken to a
mountain hideout and the appellants demanded ransom money for their release.
Alexander was detained for six months until he was finally released.
ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of kidnapping committed by the accused should be
absorbed in rebellion?
RULING: As regards the argument that the crime was politically motivated and that
consequently, the charge should have been rebellion and not kidnapping, we find the
same likewise to be without merit. As held in Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Zamboanga Del Norte vs. CA, the political motivation for the crime must be shown in
order to justify finding the crime committed to be rebellion. Merely because it is alleged
that appellants were members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front or of the Moro
National Liberation Front does not necessarily mean that the crime of kidnapping was
committed in furtherance of a rebellion. Here, the evidence adduced is insufficient for a
finding that the crime committed was politically motivated. Neither have the appellants
sufficiently proven their allegation that the present case was filed against them because
they are rebel surrenderees. This court has invariably viewed the defense of frame-up
with disfavor. Like the defense of alibi, it can be just as easily concocted.

PEOPLE vs. SURIAGA

381 SCRA 159
FACTS: Edwin Ramos was cleaning the car of his older brother, Johnny who was taking
care of his 2-year old daughter, Nicole, playing inside the car. Suriaga, a cousin of the
Ramos brothers, arrived. Hewas accompanied by hislive-in-partner Rosita. Suriaga
requested Edwin if he could drive the car, butthe latter declined, saying he did nothave
the keys. Meanwhile, Johnny returned to his house becausea visitor arrived. At this
instance, Rosita held Nicole and cajoled her. Rosita asked Edwin if she couldtake
Nicole with her to buy barbeque. Having been acquainted with Rosita for a long time
and becausehe trusted her, Edwin acceded. When Rosita and the childleft, Suriaga
joined them. More than an onehour has passed but the two failed to return with Nicole.
Edwin,Johnny and his wife, Mercedita, thenbegan searching but they could not find their
daughter and Rosita. Nicoles grandfather then receivea call from Suriaga asking for
ransom in the amount of P100,000.00. Johnny immediately reported thecall to the
PACC Task Force. The next day,Suriaga called Mercedita, introduced himself and asked
herif she and her husband would give the amount to which the latter responded in the
positive. Suriaga instructed Mercidita as to the how the money should be delivered to
him with a warning that if she will not deliver the money,her daughter would be placed in
a plastic bag or thrown in a garbage can. Thereafter, with the cash money, and while
being tailed by PACC agents, Mercida proceeded to deliver the money to Suriaga. The
PACC agents arrested Suriaga and his companion Isidera after Mercida gave the
money to them. Prior thereto, Nicole was rescued in a shanty where Rositas sister
lived.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was guilty of Kidnapping with ransom?

RULING: The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the
victims liberty, coupled within dubitable proof of the accuseds intent to effect the same.
And if the person detained is a child, the question that needs to be addressed is
whether there is evidence to show that in taking the child, there was deprivation of the
childs liberty and that it was the intention of the accused to deprive the mother of the
childs custody. Undoubtedly, the elements of kidnapping for ransom have been
sufficiently established by the prosecution considering the following circumstances:
1) Appellant, a private individual, took the young Nicole without personally seeking
permission from her father.
2) Appellant took the girl and brought her to a shanty where Rositas sister lived, without
informing her parents of their whereabouts;
3) He detained the child and deprived her of her liberty by failing to return her to her
parents overnighted the following day; and
4) He demanded a ransom of P100,000.00 through telephone calls and gave
instructions where and how it should be delivered.

PEOPLE vs. LLAGUNO

285 SCRA 124

FACTS: Accused Llaguno, along with several others, were charged with Kidnapping
with Murder when they allegedly kidnapped and detained Bienvenido Mercado, and
while under detention, shot and killed said victim. Although charged with kidnapping with
murder, the accused was only convicted for murder and not for serious illegal detention.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was guilty of Kidnapping with murder?
RULING: The Court found the accused guilty only for serious illegal detention and not
for murder. It held that the Trial Court erred in convicting the accused for murder when
the circumstances do not clearly and sufficiently prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
accused was guilty of murder. Parenthetically, when the prosecutions case is anchored
only on circumstantial evidence, all the circumstances must be consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty of the crime sought to be proven, and no other. In
addition, the circumstances under consideration must not support any rational
hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the accused. Consequently, appellant may
not be held criminally liable for killing the victim. The TC also erred in finding the
accused not guilty of serious illegal detention as the period of detention was less that 5
days. The evidence presented by the prosecution, which was sustained by the trial
court, clearly established that appellant had in fact detained the victim without authority
to do so. At this juncture, we deem it significant to reiterate that the trial court merely
made a finding that appellant could not be convicted of serious illegal detention for the
sole reason that the victims detention did not exceed five days. The court a quo,
however, found that appellant illegally detained the victim for at least one day, which act
by itself constitutes slight illegal detention. Besides, the trial court appreciated the act
constituting slight illegal detention as a qualifying circumstance, i.e., employing means
to weaken the defense. While we find no proof beyond reasonable doubt to sustain a

conviction for murder, the records indisputably prove culpability for slight illegal
detention.

PEOPLE vs. DADLES

278 SCRA 708
FACTS: The accused Dadles was charged with kidnapping two farmers, Tehidor and
Alipan, along with their sons, in Barangay Amontay, Binalbagan, Negros Occidental.
The accused denied the charges stating that on the night of the alleged kidnapping, he
had fallen asleep at the home of one of the defense witness after a night of drinking.
The RTC rendered a decision conviction the accused of 2 counts of kidnapping and
serious detention.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred on convicting Dadles of 2 counts of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention?
RULING: The accused argued that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses fail to
make out a case for kidnapping, referring to particular witness testimony that he
believed showed that the victims were not deprived of their liberty because they went
with the Dadles and his companions peacefully without being subjected to threats and
coercion. The SC disagreed, stating that the victims hands were not tied nor guns
poked at their sides when they were taken by the appellants group do not conclusively
preclude the deprivation of their liberty. The circumstances surrounding the taking of
Salvador and Antonio, particularly the appellant and his companions previous conduct in
kidnapping victims Alipio and Dionisio, plainly demonstrate their intent to likewise
deprive Salvador and Antonio of their liberty. The Court likewise added that the
general rule is that evidence is not admissible which shows or tends to show, that the
accused in a criminal case has committed a crime wholly independent of the offense for
which he is on trial. It is not competent to prove that he committed other crimes of a like
nature for the purpose of showing that he would be likely to commit the crime charged in
the indictment. Where a person is charged with the commission of a specific crime,
testimony may be received of other similar acts, committed at about the same time, for
the purpose only of establishing the criminal intent of the accused. The Court found that
both incidents of kidnapping were related in that proof of one kidnapping tends to prove
the other, thereby establishing the accuseds intent to deprive the victims of their liberty.

PEOPLE vs. ROLUNA

231 SCRA 448
FACTS: Eight people, including accused Roluna were charged with kidnapping with
murder. Witnesses claimed that they saw victim Anatalio Moronia stopped by accused
and several others. The victim was alleged to have been threatened with firearms
andhand bound behin his back. The accused claimed that he was taking care of an ill
relative at the time of the kidnapping. The RTC found Roluna guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the complex crime of Kidnapping with murder. The accused raised that the

body of the victim has not surfaced and that the unexplained disappearance cannot be
blamed on him as there is all possibility that the victim may still be alive.
ISSUE: Was the death of the victim sufficiently proved and may the accused be held
liable or it?
RULING: The Rules of Court provides that the death shall be presumed if a person who
has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been
known for four years. However, the SC decided that there were insufficient
circumstances to hold the accused responsible for the death of the victim. The
testimony of the witnesses stating that the victims hands were bound by a companion
of the accused is not enough to prove that the accused killed him. The conviction of
accused-appellant for the serious crime of kidnapping with murder cannot be allowed to
rest on the vague and nebulous facts established by the prosecution. As discussed
earlier, the evidence presented by the prosecution surrounding the events of that fateful
day are grossly insufficient to establish the alleged liability of accused-appellant for the
death of Moronia. The SC thus decided that Since none of the circumstances
mentioned in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (kidnapping with serious illegal
detention) was proved and only the fact of kidnapping of Anatalio Moronia was
established, we find that the crime committed is slight illegal detention under Article 268
of the Revised Penal Code.

PEOPLE vs. PASTRANA

387 SCRA 342

FACTS: Erma Postejo, a domestic helper in Canada, is the mother of Jenny, Doroteo,
Aresola and 9-year old Willy Garpen, Jr. her son by a common-law relationship. She
was introduced to accused-appellant Rubi-Rose who offered to work on the processing
of Willys travel documents to Canada. Rubi-Rose asked for P 18,300.00 as processing
fee. Later on, accused-appellant informed Erma that Willy was suffering from bronchitis.
Erma sent P 5,610.00, P 3,000.00 to be given to Doroteo and the remaining balance
should pay for Willys medical treatment. Then on March 16, 1997, accused-appellant
fetched Willy and Aresola from their home in Caloocan and brought them in Tondo.
Aresola went home and Willy was left in Tondo. Accused-appellant was asking Erma for
sums of money which Erma refused to transmit.

March 27, 1997, accused-appellant informed Doroteo that Willy was missing and
that he was last seen playing inside her apartment. Erma returned to the Philippines to
look for her son. Erma found out that Willy was never treated for any illness. Accusedappellant vehemently denied the charges against her but the trial court found her guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor under
Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused the crime of
kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code?
RULING: No, the Court ruled that Kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article
270 of the Revised Penal Code has two essential elements, namely: (1) the offender is
entrusted with the custody of a minor person; and (2) the offender deliberately fails to
restore the said minor to his parents or guardians. What is actually being punished is
not the kidnapping of the minor but rather the deliberate failure of the custodian of the
minor to restore the latter to his parents or guardians. The word deliberate as used in
Article 270 must imply something more than mere negligence - it must be premeditated,
headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong.
In the final analysis, the issue posed here is the credibility of witnesses. As
consistently ruled by the Court, we will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in
determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears on record some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of
which has been misinterpreted. Factual findings of the trial court, especially on the
credibility of witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect. This is so because the
trial court has the advantage of observing the witnesses through the different indicators
of truthfulness or falsehood. In the instant case, there is no reason for us to disregard
the trial courts finding that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are entitled to
full faith and credit.