There is no such thing as a Just war

Helen Tanner LLB PgDip DTH MA

No part of this paper may be re-produced without the permission of the author

Introduction
Just War is an enormous subject and been heavily debated over the
Centuries. This essay briefly looks at the origins of Just War theory and at its
most basic premise; where certain criteria are met, war can be justified. This
notion can, for some, raise the immediate cry that there is no such thing as a
Just war. Next, we will look at the principles of Just war and test the
argument that the language used is so open to misinterpretation by State
actors, that in practice, there is no such thing as a just war either. We will look
at NATOs intervention in Kosovo and ask whether that was an example of a
Just war and note the discrepancy between the notion of justice between
those who fighting a war and those who observe it.
Finally the essay will reflect that if most wars, could arguably be just for those
participating and unjust for objective bystanders where does that leave a
theory aimed at limiting war, and a global community, where millions citizens
are suffering warfare today? Should we abandon the theory altogether? Or,
should we in fact fully embrace the theory as an absolute necessity in our time
and raise its status in International Law, backed up by the formation of
international body who could formally and fairly put to the test a States claims
for justification for going to war ultimately be authorised to stop unjust wars
from even starting.
Origins of Just war Tradition
Initial discussion can be traced back to St Augustine in 1027 who argued that
war could be limited to certain times, hence restricting its impact. St Thomas
Aquinas in the thirteenth Century added the notion that War should only
conducted by legitimate authorities to prevent a greater evil with right
intention. Chivalry towards civilians was added in during medieval times, and
interestingly, alongside Christian development of Just war theory, a similar
notion of Jihad was evolving in the Islamic Tradition.
The framework of Just War that we largely still see today was summarised
by Hugo Grotius in his three books entitled; On the Law of War and Peace
(1625)The books covered principles;Jus ad bellum; on conducting decisions
on whether to go to war,Jus in bello; for how to conduct a war, and jus post
bellum; on what should be done after the war . We will explore these
principles in more detail, but our first look will be at Just wars Founding Belief.

Just War Founding Belief

Just War theory is founded on the belief that war, although abhorrent, can be
limited, and within those limits, justified. It offers guiding principles for those
considering the war option. This basic premise is contested by Pacifists on the
one hand and Realists on the other.

Pacifists believe that war by its nature is organized violence, the deliberate,
systematic causing of death and destruction. 1 and unless one can justify the
actions necessary to waging war, he cannot justify the conduct of war and the
pursuit of its objectives2 Pacifists therefore argue, that war is never morally
acceptable, that due to the destructive nature of modern weaponry the
condition of proportionality could never be met anyway. 3 Kinsella and Carr
4
defend the basic theory of Just war however, by noting, Pacifists are
certainly right to find war morally abhorrent, but there are other morally
abhorrent aspects of humankinds inhumanity that may rival and even surpass
warfare. If so, there may be times when war seems a morally justifiable
response to desperately inhuman conduct. 5
On the other side of the debate sit the Realists. In their world view States are
bound to act in their own interests. A nation has to look after its interests and
nothing else. If one nation attacks another in order to harvest the abundant oil
supply that other nation, the only question the attacker should ask is will the
attack profit us? If the nation under attack is weak militarily, if no one is willing
to come to its aid, and, further if there are few political costs to attacking, then,
yes, it is profitable. 6 Therefore, they oppose Just war precisely because it is
based on moral principles that are simply irrelevant when coming to state
relations. Evans makes a defence to Just war in this regard however by
arguing that though states may well act in their own interests moral and
practical criteria are still necessary to stand as a litmus test to judge wars, and
participation in them. 7

Holmes R.L Can war be Morally justified? The just War Theory pgs 197-233 in Elshtain J B
Just war Theory 1992 Basil Blackwell LTd Oxford p.227
2
3

Holmes RL ibid p.228)

Turner Johnson J Can Modern war be Just? 1984 Yale University press New Haven and
London p.31
4
Kinsella D & Carr C.L The Morality of war; A reader 2007 Lynne Rienner Publishers,
Boulder London p.36
5
Supported by Evans M Just War Theory; a Reappraisal 2005 Edinburgh University Press,
Edinburgh p.206
6
Fotion N Reactions to war; pacifism, Realism, and Just War Theory pgs 15-31 in Valls A &
Held V Ethics in International Affairs 2000 Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc Maryland
p.18
7
Evans M ibid p.207

Just War Principles

JUS AD BELLUM
According to the Just war Tradition the moral right to wage a war comes with
meeting the following conditions;8
1. Just cause; the cause must be to confront real and certain danger 9 or to
secure basic human rights. Of all the conditions, controversy centres
particularly on that of just cause. Holmes summarises the concerns by
pointing out that nations may resort to war when they believe they have a just
cause.it is always the nation proposing to resort to war that is the judge of
whether it has justice on its side there is no correcting mechanism by which
to detect errors.10 Hence, arguably, any side who believes they have a just
cause can claim it, making a mockery of it as a restraining condition. 11
2. Competent Authority ;Within Just war theory, it is in effect only states or
the UN that can wage a just war. Secessionist movements, private groups or
individuals, terrorist organisations, or rebellions would not satisfy the criteria.
3. Comparative Justice; This principle is to remind anyone thinking of
waging to war to use only limited means to pursue its objectives, and to
remain aware that the other party to the conflict may also consider they have
just cause. Therefore restraint is encouraged, and belief in one side having
8

Mark Evans has produced a nice summary of the Just war theory. Please see appendix 1
for more detail.
9

Valls A & Held V Ethics in International Affairs 2000 Rowman and Littlefield Publishers
Inc Maryland p.68)
10
Holmes ibid p.220
11

Under International Law, as stated in the UN charter there are only two situations which class as just
cause and are legitimate exceptions to its ..presumptive prohibition of the use of forceThese are; (1)
force authorised by the UN Security Council (charter, arts.39, 42) and force necessary in self-defence
to an armed attack (charter, arts 51)
Self defence can, in limited circumstances (Caroline case 1837) include pre-emptive strike. Pre-emptive
military action is undertaken to eliminate an immediate and credible threat of grievous harm . Those
acting pre-emptively believe that an adversary is about to attack, that the assault is inevitable, and that a
pre-emptive strike can eliminate the threat or at least reduce the harm that the anticipated assault would
cause. Crawford N C The Justice of Preemtion and Preventive war Doctrines pgs 25-49 in Evans M
Just War Theory a Reappraisal 2005 Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh p25
Ideas around Pre-emptive and Preventive war have come to the fore in the Just War debate since the
recent war in Iraq, and the War on Terror. It is generally considered that the US Administration, in
response to the 9/11 attacks has blurred the distinction between pre-emption and prevention; Unlike preemptive war A preventive war is undertaken when a state believes that war with a potential adversary is
possible or likely at some future date and that, if it waits, it will lost important military advantages. In this
case, the threat is not imminent or even certain to materialise in the near future. Crawfird ibid p.26 The
crucial factor that the danger is not imminent, and the US recent actions are fuelling fear that a move
towards preventive war pushes the argument of self-defence to a point of meaninglessness and
dangerous international de-stabilisation. As Rengger points out the pull of preventive war represents
perhaps the subtlest attack on the essential raison detre of the tradition yet witnessed. Rengger N The
greatest treason? On the subtle temptations of preventative war International Affairs 84; 5 (2008) 949961 p.949

absolute justice on its side is discouraged. As Elshtain points out Every

party to a conflict should acknowledge the limits of its just cause and the
consequent requirement to use only limited means in pursuit of its objectives.
12

4 Right Intention;This principle relates to just cause, and says that the
waging of war must be motivated by the just cause and not be secretly for
another reason, that is not just. 13
5.Last resort;This principle says that war should only be resorted to after all
peaceful means have been exhausted.
6.Probability of success;This principle is about making an assessment
before commencing warfare, that there is a good possibility of achieving the
desired outcome.
7.Proportionality;This principle relates to the idea that the cost of waging the
war to human life, economic and environmental must be in proportion to the
expected positive outcomes. 14
8.Discrimination ;This principle says that the intention in waging the war
should not be to directly target civilian and non-combatants.

Jus in Bello;The principles of Proportionality and discrimination also come

into to play when looking at what should be done to limit war once it has
begun; Proportionality in this context relates to the kind of force used. It refers
in particular to the just treatment of prisoners of war, and civilians and that
respect should be paid to international law in these respects e.g the Geneva
and Hague Conventions. Discrimination is the principle of not targeting
directly civilians or those not directly participating in the war, and to avoid
casualties wherever possible. However, the principle of double effect does
acknowledge that there will be civilian deaths inevitably as a consequence of
war, and that this in itself does not render the war unjust.

Jus post bellum; After the war has ended the moral requirement to
complete it is through commitment to create and agree to terms of peace
which seek to address the initial injustice prompting the war in the first place,
to materially contribute to reconstruction, and to participate in processes of
reconciliation aimed at providing a sustainable peace in future.

12

Elshtain J B Just war Theory 1992 Basil Blackwell LTd Oxford

Elshtain ibid p.100
14
Elshtain ibid p.101
13

Was Kosovo a Just War

So, now let us look at a real war, initiated by NATO in Kosovo in 1999, and
see whether it passes the Just War test as a legitimate war to have waged,
or whether in fact it falls more comfortably as an unjust war hiding under the
just war banner, whose language is so vague and open to interpretation,15
that NATO was enabled as power to do what power can do. 16
Context
In the 21st Century we inhabit a World made up of Sovereign States. Since
1648, and the Peace of Westphalia, the international norm has been to
respect the sovereignty of States and not to interfere in their affairs. This was
strongly supported by the UN general Assembly in 1970 who stated No State
or groups of states have the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any
reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state. 17

15

Further criticisms based on how the principles can be interpreted to suit a parties
interests include; The basic premise of war in the theory is too vague and is therefore
seriously undermined; Evans Evans M p205)argues that due to the changing nature of War
throughout history that the theory is open to debate as to what actually defines war to justify use of the
guideline postulated within Just war. His suggestion is to change the basic premise of the theory away
from war, towards violence; it seems apposite to think of just war theory as a particular type of just
violence theory, which may in large part mirror just war theorys moral criteria.
Just war theory too abstract to deal with reality of conflict; Gorry (Gorry J p.178) is critical of the
Just war theory and points out that in practice the principles put forth in ad bellum can be in conflict with
those in bello. Fotion adds to this point by arguing that because there are no clear statements within
the theory that tell us whether one or another principle should receive priority or extra weight,,,,these
principles have no more than a checklist status when it comes to theory application (Fotion N p.28)
Fotion also believes the theory fails to address the real ethical dilemmas that exist for the armed forces.
(Fotion N p.30) However Turner Johnson (Turner Johnson A p15) counters this by pointing out that
actually the Just war tradition has come about and is informed precisely by real wars on the ground and
the dilemmas they create. Evans goes a step further in defending the theory; For all its problems, the
theory seems to raise all of the questions it is appropriate to raise about the morality of war and it
organises them in an integrated structure that it seems hard to better (Evans M p.221)
competent authority definition is flawedValls (VAlls p.71) argues however, that one error with this
condition is the flawed assumption that States always legitimately represent their citizens. He argues
that at times the movements listed above, may actually have far greater claim to be representative of the
population than the State, and yet they could never come under the umbrella of waging a just war.
Concept of right intention is limited;Limitations of such a principle is how is one to judge the
intention of someone else? How could one know what the true motivating factor is in someones act of
going to war? The truth is there is no absolute litmus test that could reveal the motivator of a states
decision to go to war but it is nevertheless a guiding principle encouraging right motivation.
last resort is limited;There are two points to make here. Firstly, who can judge whether all peaceful
means have been exhausted or not? Valls argues a test could be whether peaceful means have been
tried a reasonable number of times, and have been given a reasonable amount of time to work. (Valls A

p.73) However, Elshtain also points out that we currently lack an organisation, recognised
internationally with enough authority to take on the role of pre-conflict mediation between
states. (Elshtain p.100)
16

Booth K Ten Flaws of Just Wars pgs 314-324 in Booth K The Kosovo Tragedy; the
human Rights Dimensions 2001 Frank Cass Publishers Oregon
(Booth K p.317)
17
UN General Assemblys 1970 Declaration on principles of International law concerning
friendly relations and Co-operation Among states (Resolution 2635)

However, as Evan argues Even the strongest supporters of state sovereignty

will admit today that no state holds unlimited power to do what it wants to its
own people. It is now commonly acknowledged that sovereignty implies a dual
responsibility; externally, to respect the sovereignty of other states, and
internally, to respect the dignity and basic rights of all the people within the
state. 18 Humanitarian intervention assumes that there may be situations
where a State is not respecting the basic human rights of its own people, and
therefore action may be required to protect those citizens.19
Humanitarian intervention was the banner under which NATO claimed its
Just Cause to initiate a 78 day air military campaign against the Former
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). In his address to the American People
President Clinton explained the reasons for the humanitarian intervention;
We act to protect thousands of innocent people in Kosovo from a mounting
military offensive. We act to prevent a wider war; to diffuse a powder keg at
the heart of Europe that has exploded twice before in this century with
catastrophic results. And we act to stand united with our allies for peace. By
acting now we are upholding our values, protecting our interests and
advancing the cause of peace 20 A British Government spokesman claimed
that the action being taken was legal and was an exceptional measure to
prevent and overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe. 21
18

Evans G & Sahnoun M The Responsibility to protectt pgs 206-213 in Kinsella D & Carr C.L
2007 The Morality of war; A reader Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder London
Evans G and Sahnoun M p.208
19

Humanitarian Intervention is now regulated under the doctrine of Responsibility to protect

(R2P). This was adopted by the UN Security Council following the World Summit in 2005. It
makes an exception to State Sovereignty, whereby in certain circumstances a state would be
considered to be failing in its responsibility to its citizens. In this case it comes within the
responsibility of the International Community to protect those citizens ideally by peaceful
means, but ultimately sanctions force. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1674
"Reaffirm the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome
Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity" and commits the Security Council to action to

protect civilians in armed conflict. Critics of R2P as a policy argue that is a cloak hiding the
real motivations of governments to pursue self interest and is a hidden form of imperialism.
Not only that, but it has the potential to undermine international security and is unlikely to
succeed where lack of knowledge on the ground can mean that even good intentions can
mean that interventions can do more harm than good. (Caney s p.122) Nardin counter argues
that There are practical reasons for suggesting the international community should authorize
humanitarian interventions. Such interventions may, for example, be more likely
than
unilateral actions to benefit from collective wisdom and to gain wide support. But to insist on
such authorization is to presume a degree of justice and effectiveness at the supranational
(
level that the world has not yet achieved. Nardin T p203)

20

21

Clintons reasons for going to war BBC world news Thursday, March 25, 1999

Cited in Chesterman s Chesterman S Just War or Just Peace Humanitarian Intervention

and International Law 2001 Oxford University Press Oxford

Certainly the general public in both the UK and US were in little doubt of the
rightness of the humanitarian cause and the need for action. The media
showed daily pictures of ethnic Albanian refugees looking traumatised as they
walked, possessions on their backs, across the border to Albania for safety
from Milosovic vile oppression22
However, others were more cynical of NATOs motivations and queried
whether they had the right intention in their military intervention. Cynicism
fell at NATOs feet because of its failure to act in numerous other situations
where human rights abuses were occurring. 23 Booth argues that if
governments are not passably consistent, their claim to be humanitarian
crusaders in any circumstances is compromised. This selective morality is
another version of ethnic cleansing. NATO are even accused of making
matters in Kosovo worse; the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, which was
manageable prior to the war was enormously exacerbated by the bombing of
Kosovo. 24 Many argue that the real motivation for the airstrikes was
anything ranging from distraction away from the Lewinsky affair, redefintion of
NATOs role on the international circuit, to boosting the US war economy.
The war in Kosovo was the first time States claimed humanitarian grounds
without Security Council authority, In terms of the principle of Competent
Authority only the UN had official legal authority to stop war crimes in
Yugosavia. And even if the crisis was such to warrant independent action,
NATO itself, was created as a purely defensive body to protect a Member who
was being attacked or was in imminent danger of being attacked. In the case
of Kosovo this was evidently not the case and Buchanan is scathing in his
attack of NATO ;NATO was created to defence western Europe against
soviet aggression, not to serve as the air arm of some highly suspect Kosovo
Liberation army in its war of secession from the former Yugoslavia. 25
On the condition of probability of success one only has to take a brief look at
Kosovos history to question whether force, especially external, was likely to
draw to a sustainable and peaceful conclusion in a conflict between ethnic
Albanians and ethnic Serbs which has been flowing for over 700 years.26Also,
in assessing whether the airstrikes would actually bring about the desired
political achievements, it would seem NATO did not anticipate the strength of
bad feeling by the general Serbian population for its targeting of
their
p212
22
th
Tony Blair BBC World news Thursday 25 March 1999
23
Columbus ibid p.13
24
Booth ibid p.323
25
Patrick Buchanan March 22 1999 as cited in Columbus ibid p.44
26
There is no doubt that the relationship between Kosovo and Serbia has been fraught with
difficulty historically. (Columbus F p.13) Tensions go back at least to the 1300s, and are
underpinned by the conflicting desires between the ethnic Albanians to see Kosovo as part of
a greater Albania, and of the ethnic Serbs to retain Kosovo as part of the
Serban
motherland due to its historical, religious and cultural significance. The intricacies of the
conflict are extremely complex, but much blood has been shed on Kosovo soil, and many
people from both populations have been expelled in huge numbers at different times by the
other (and outside forces).

infrastructure and loss of civilian life.27 This targeting by airstrike, and the
failure to commit ground troops was also highly contested in its legality as the
net effect of NATOs strategy was such as to transfer risk from combatants to
civilians on the ground. 28
From this brief look at Kosovo what can we learn? What is striking is that from
Natos point of view they were fighting a just war. However, from others
viewpoint the war was highly unjust. Therefore, the example gives weight to
the argument that A justified war, however, is not necessarily a just war. 29.

Reflections
I wholeheartedly agree that there is no such thing as a just war. And, I
wholeheartedly agree that all wars are just if I am able to put myself in the
position of the warrior. From an objective standpoint everything about the
theory of Just War is open to debate, and is morally questionable. And we
could look to any war that has ever been fought and find reasons to find it
morally abhorrent and unjust in certain aspects. But the dilemma remains that
for the warrior, there is just cause to fight, and as long as this is so surely
warfare will continue to exist.
Conclusion
So, what of Just war theory? Clearly, as it stands, it leaves considerable
manoeuvre for interpretation, and as there are so many people claiming to be
waging Just wars something is amiss. However, I am swayed by Evans
argument that Just war is a Non-ideal theory so called because the goal
for a just war is a just peace. In the ideal world there would be no war.The
fact that we need a just war theory arises form the assumption that, in our
non-ideal world, war might at times be morally unavoidable. 30
With this in mind if most wars, could arguably be just for those participating
and unjust for observers isnt it time to fully embrace the theory as an absolute
necessity, raise its status and clarify it in International Law, and back it with
the formation of an international body who could formally and fairly put to the
test a States claims for justifiably going to war, and ultimately be authorised to
stop unjust wars from even starting? Isnt that preferable to endless fighting
between warriors all with just cause until taking an eye for an eye leaves us
all blind?

27

Gorry J Just War or Just war? The future(s) of a tradition Politics (2000) 20 (3) pp 177183 p180-181
28
Gorry J ibid p.180 supported by Walzer M Arguing About War; 2004 Yale University Press;
New Haven and London
2004 p.103)
29
30

Elshtain ibdi p.223

Evans M ibid p.9

APPENDIX 1
JUST WAR THEORY; A REPRESENTATIVE STATEMENT
Mark Evans p.12 & 13 Just war Theory; a Reappraisal
..
1. Jus ad bellum; to have the moral right to wage war, the following
conditions must be respected;
a) the cause is just;
b) the justice of the cause is sufficiently great as to warrant warfare and
does not negate countervailing values of equal or greater weight;
c) on the basis of available knowledge and reasonable assessment of the
situation, one must be as confident as one reasonably can be of
achieving ones just objective without yielding longer-term
consequences that are worse that the status quo;
d) warfare is genuinely the last resort; all peaceful alternatives which may
also secure justice to a reasonable and sufficient degree have been
exhausted;
e) ones own moral standing is not decisively compromised with respect
to the waging of war in this instance;
f) even if the cause is just, the resort to war is actually motivated by that
cause and not some other (hidden) reason;
g) one is a legitimate, duly constructed authority with respect to the
waging of war; one has the right to wage it;
h) one must publicly declare war and publicly defend that declaration on
the basis of a)-g), and subsequently be prepared to be politically
accountable for the conduct and aftermath of the war, based on the
criteria of just in bello and just post bellum.
2. Jus in Bello; to fight the war justly, one must employ;
i)discrimination in the selection of targets; avoiding the direct targeting of
those not directly participating in the immediate conduct of war, and taking
all reasonable measures possible to avoid casualties among such nonparticipants.
i2) Doctrine of double effect; the foreseeable deaths of innocents do not
render a war unjust as long as they are not directly intended as the object
of policy but are the unavoidable side-effects of a use of force justified by
the other criteria of the theory
j)Proportionality in the use of force required to secure the objectives;
k) just treatment of all non-combatants; by which is intended prisoners of
war as well as non-combatants in the wider arena of war
l) one must observe all national and international laws governing the
conduct of war which do not fundamentally conflict with the theorys other
moral requirements
3.Jus post bellum; to secure the justice sought in the resort to war, one
must be prepared to ;

m)help to establish peace terms which are proportionally determined to

make the peace just and stable as well as to redress the injustice which
prompted the conflict;
n) take full responsibility for ones fair share of the material burdens of the
conflicts aftermath in constructing a just and stable peace;
o)take full and proactive part in the processes of forgiveness and
reconciliation that are central to the construction of a just and stable
peace.
Supreme Emergency Exemption; in a situation of supreme emergency only,
one may wage a war in a way

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bacevic A.J & Cohen E.A War over Kosovo; Poloitics and Strategy in a
Global age.2001 Columbia University press new York
Booth K The Kosovo Tragedy; the human Rights Dimensions 2001 Frank
Cass Publishers Oregon
Booth K Ten Flaws of Just Wars pgs 314-324 in Booth K The Kosovo
Tragedy; the human Rights Dimensions 2001 Frank Cass Publishers Oregon
Buckley W J Kosovo ; Contending voices on Balkan Interventions2000 Wm
B. Eerdmans Publishing Co
Caney S Human Intervention and State Sovereignty pgs 117-131 in Valls A
& Held V Ethics in International Affairs 2000 Rowman and Littlefield
Publishers Inc Maryland
Chomsky N The New Military Humanism; Lesons from Kosovo1999 Pluto
Press London
Chesterman S Just War or Just Peace Humanitarian Intervention and
International Law 2001 Oxford University Press Oxford
Crawford N C The Justice of Preemtion and Preventive war Doctrines pgs
25-49 in Evans M Just War Theory a Reappraisal 2005 Edinburgh University
Press, Edinburgh
Columbus F (eds)Kosovo-Serbia; A Just war? 1999 Nova Science
Publishers, Inc new York
Dinstein Y The legal status of war pgs 99-106 in Kinsella D & Carr C.L
2007 The Morality of war; A reader Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder
London
Elshtain J B Just war Theory 1992 Basil Blackwell LTd Oxford
Evans G & Sahnoun M The Responsibility to protectt pgs 206-213 in
Kinsella D & Carr C.L 2007 The Morality of war; A reader Lynne Rienner
Publishers, Boulder London
Evans M Just War Theory; a Reappraisal 2005 Edinburgh University Press,
Edinburgh
Fixdal M & Smith D Humanitarian Intervention and Just War Mershon
International studies review, Vol 42, No 2 (Nov 1998) pp 283-312
http;//www.jstor.org/stable/254418 Accessed 15/11/2008
Fotion N Reactions to war; pacifism, Realism, and Just War Theory pgs 1531 in Valls A & Held V Ethics in International Affairs 2000 Rowman and
Littlefield Publishers Inc Maryland
Gorry J Just War or Just war? The future(s) of a tradition Politics (2000) 20
(3) pp 177-183
Holliday Ian When is a Cause Just? Review of International Studies (2002)
28, 557-575
Holmes R.L Can war be Morally justified? The just War Theory pgs 197-233
in Elshtain J B Just war Theory 1992 Basil Blackwell LTd Oxford
Kinsella D & Carr C.L The Morality of war; A reader 2007 Lynne Rienner
Publishers, Boulder London
Middleton Murry J The Necessity of Pacifism 1937 Jonathan Cape
London Toronto

Nardin T The Moral Basis of Humanitarian Intervention pgs 196-205 in

Kinsella D & Carr C.L 2007 The Morality of war; A reader Lynne Rienner
Publishers, Boulder London
Orend B Is There a Supreme Emergency Exemption?pgs 134-153 in Evans
M Just War Theory a Reappraisal 2005 Edinburgh University Press,
Edinburgh
Patterson E Just war in the 21st century; Reconceptualizing Just war Theory
after September 11; International Politics 2005, 42 (116-134) www.palgravejournals.com/ip
Rengger N The greatest treason? On the subtle temptations of preventative
war International Affairs 84; 5 (2008) 949-961
Roberts R Just war Psychology and Terrorism 2007 PCCS Books Ross-onwye
Turner Johnson J Can Modern war be Just? 1984 Yale University press
New Haven and London
Valls A & Held V Ethics in International Affairs 2000 Rowman and Littlefield
Publishers Inc Maryland
Valls A Can Terrorism be Justified?pgs 65-79 in Valls A & Held V Ethics in
International Affairs 2000 Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc Maryland
Walzer, M Arguing About War; 2004 Yale University Press; New Haven and
London
Walzer M Just and Unjust wars; A moral Argument with Historical Illustrations
1977 (4thed) Basic Books new York
Welch D Morality and the national Interest pgs 3-12 in Valls A & Held V
Ethics in International Affairs 2000 Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc
Maryland