Casing Design — Review of Design Methodology Review performed for NPD at Statoil ‘The report uses the Snorre P2 well failure as a case by Rock-Well Consultants 2004 Contributors: Bert S. Aadnoy Jan A. Aasen Mike Pollard irik Karstad Report No. RWC 3/04Contents Page ‘Summary 3 1. Project description 4 2. Review of Statoils casing design procedures 5 2.1 Statoil Casing Design Manual 2.2 Methodology, data and software 3. Well failure on Snorre P2 6 3.1 Description of events 3.2 Operational summary 3.3 Inspection of failed casing 4, Analysis of production casing collapse on Snorre P2 W 4.1 Pressure required to collapse casing 4.2 Scenario 1: Pressure testing of PBL 4.3 Scenario 2: Temperature induced B-annulus pressure 44 Scenario 3: Reservoir communication due to cement failure 4.5 What actually happened? A likely scenati 4.6 Discussion and recommendations 5. Summary of review a 6. Recommendations 21 Nomenclature References Appendix A: Laboratory Investigation of Failed Casing on Snorre well P2 Appendix B: Temperature Induced Pressure IncreaseSummary: ‘This report presents an evaluation of Statoil’s methodology for well construction using a well failure from Snorre as a case. The production casing and the production tubing collapsed and had to be replaced. The main reason for the casing collapse is that one joint of weaker pipe ‘was unintentionally placed in the production casing string, The drilling reports from the failed well were inadequate, and it is recommended to improve the reporting of pressure/volumes/temperature for future wells, The quality control of the hardware should also be improved. This includes casing dimensions, grades and connections. ‘The well design manual should be revised. In particular one should consider including personnel competency in the requirements to perform well design.1. Project Description The objective of the project is to investigate the methodology for casing design for several operating companies in Norway. The present report focuses on Statoil, with the Snore platform well P2 failure as a case. The project will evaluate the design manuals, the ‘methodology for data collection, the quality and the use of these in the course of the well design. ‘The background for the project is that the NPD has observed cases where the casing design ‘was the limiting factor for the well at several operating companies. Because one expects a number of HPHT wells is expected in the near future, one wants to identify the design basis ‘each operator uses and to search for improvements. In July 2003 well P2 on Snorre had a well control incident during a workover operation, which was initiated to replace a failed production casing and tubing. It was decided to use this well problem as a case for this report.2, Review of Statoils casing design procedures Statoil recently (ref.1) adapted a new casing design manual that replaced several older ‘manuals. The advantage is one consistent document. The new manual bas the following chapters: 1. Introduction 2. Work Process Requirements 3. Design Process Requirements 4. Acceptance Criteria and Verifications 5. Improvements, Change Requests, etc 6. References App A: Revision/version Log App B: Casing Design Procedure, all Design Categories App C: Additional Design Requirements for Design Category 3 Wells App D: Load criteria Selection ‘The manual reflects today’s practice of well construction. The basic calculations are presented in appendices, whereas most of the manual is devoted to establish a good basis for the design. The manual is comprehensive and reflects a lot of updated experience with Statoil wells, The technical aspects of the manual are good as it define many elements that the oil industry has overlooked in the past. However, the manual appears to be in a draft format. A rewriting with the objective to reorganize and to provide better overview would be an improvement. Below are some ‘comments as seen by an outside observer. Chapter 1.6 Definitions: Refer to other chapters and also to other documents. Some short definitions should be included, otherwise the well designer have to compile reference documents. Chapter 2.1.2: Refers to Design Categories 1 and 2. These are defined in a later chapter 3.6. It is mentioned under 1.6 Definitions, but should be clearly defined at the beginning of the manual. Chapter 3.1: Purpose: "...Corrosion evaluations, and design work related to corrosion are not parts of this document. Any effects of corrosion shall however be included, so that there are sufficient allowances for the corrosion anticipated, without jeopardizing the casing strings integrity". This statement is confusing; please clarify. Chapter 4.2.3: Casing Wear Log: This chapter advocate use of simulation programs or casing wear logs. It is well known that present casing wear models are not particular reliable, and that the casing wear log has a limited resolution. We recommend that a sentence is included that require pressure test for critical casing strings, as this is theonly way to ensure pressure integrity. Remember that the objective of wear assessment often is to define reduction in pressure integrity of the casing string. Chapter 5: Improvements, Change requests etc.: "It is the privilege and obligation of anyone using this document to propose and argument for changes that will improve the document content, any of the activities described herein, or any of the results from the activities described herein." This is a very good statement showing that the objective is a manual that is always updated, and that constructive criticism is welcome. Chapter 6: References: (5) Ref. 5 is no longer in use". What is ref. 5? App. B: Casing Design Procedure, all Design Categories: Please refer to comment above about casing wear. It is not the wear that is the problem; itis the reduced pressure integrity of the casing. App. D: Load Criteria Selection. 22 footnotes are provided for 3 tables. Rewriting could reduce the number of footnotes. ‘Ata more general level, the manual defines three design categories. It also requires particular data programs to be used, without identifying the limitations of these data programs. An altemative approach would be to define design categories as degree of complexity of the wells. A Design Category 3 well would then be a critical well. Following this line of thought, one could use standard programs for Design Category 1 wells, whereas a Design Category 3 well would require a specialist approach. In other words: The ‘manual do not require a given competence, it only requires certain programs to be used. The altemative approach would be to define the competence requirements for the design engineer, and let him or her use the best software that is currently available. To define competency, a system is required based on education, experience and ability. ‘The manual would also benefit ifa subject index were included. ‘The manual provides both requirements and guidelines, but these are not clearly separated. The layout can be improved to give better overview. 2.2 Methodology, data and software Statoil has adopted certain data programs for company use. In the manual chapter 2.1.2 are the following definitions: "The following computer software shall be used for casing design worl Landmark's StressCheck™: For Design Category 1 and 2 casing design. -Landmark's Wellcat™: For temperature calculations in Design Category 2 and complete casing design in Design Category 3-wells, and for Annulus Fluid Expansion calculations (AFE). -Maurer Eng.'s CWear™: For casing wear simulations.-Kick Cale: for minimum kick tolerances, available from BoB Extranet. ‘Landmarks Wellcat™ may also be used for Design Category | and 2 wells, then offering reduced minimum Design Factor requirements for connections exposed to compression loads due to its far more accurate temperature simulation capacity. (Ref. Chapter 4.1 Minimum Acceptance Criteria for Casing design, table Minimum Safety Factors/Design Factors, note 3.)" The two first programs listed above are used by most major oil companies, and are considered current industry standard, All programs are used and accepted in the oil industry. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, Statoil defines data programs to be used rather than competency of the designer. The advantage is that all people use the same programs, thereby improving communications. A Design Category 3 should require a specialist. In other words: People make good decisions, not computer programs. Reference 2 is a study performed for Statoil of the well design on Kristin. The project was verification of the well design, which used Wellcat™. Of the several observations made in that study it was found that Wellcat used the linear Sorelle model as equation of state for the mud, Newer models with improved accuracy exist today. By requiring that certain computer programs must be used, important improvements can therefore be overlooked. ‘The manual (ref. 1) could also be improved by a better distinction between ordinary wells and HPHT wells. Wellhead growth due to thermal expansion is also an issue that has shown increased importance the last few years. ‘A good well design requires a good design basis. Some important elements are prognosis for ‘overburden stress, pore pressure and the fracturing pressure. Statoils casing Design Manual is, not covering these factors, and we assume that they are covered in other intemal documents. The Drilling Program (ref. 3) presents curves for the prognosis. Based on the many wells that have been drilled on Snorre, the curves reflect current knowledge. This report will not review these other intemal documents further.3. Well failure on Snorre P2 3.1 Description of events During the perforation job on well Snorre P2, gas was detected in the drilling module, and the evacuation procedures were initiated. The problem was resolved, with no harm to people. Ref. 4 gives an analysis of this event, but it is beyond the scope of this report to deal with the operational procedures. Rather we will investigate the underlying technical aspects that led to this incident. ‘The 9-5/8 in. production casing is installed in two operations. The bottom section is landed from 2515 m to 4815 mTVD and cemented in place. Then the upper part of the production casing is landed on a PBR, which provides a seal. This is called a tieback solution. Repeated pressure tests were performed after installation because the pressure could not be a This indicated a leak in the system. This leak could be at any location; at the PBR, in a casi ‘connection or in the surface equipment. The surface equipment was thoroughly checked ad eliminated. Finally, a couple of acceptable pressure tests were performed and the well was completed for production. ‘The well was set on production. At a later point in time it was discovered that the production casing had collapsed at a depth of about 700m. It was decided to pull out and replace the tieback string. To equalize the pressures in the A- and B- annuli, it was decided to perforate the production casing at 385 m before retrieving the tieback string, This is the time at which the gas leakage occurred. The tieback string was changed according to the plan, and the well is now back in production. In the following, the daily drilling reports for the installation phase of the production casing will be reviewed.3.2 Operational summary (ref.5) Well 34/7-P-2 Events Summary - 9 5/8” Liner & Tieback Event ‘Comment ‘When running liner, tight hole experienced between 4595 m and 4650 m. 45 ton down weight max. Had to rotate liner through with 29 kNm. ‘New Vam connections not ideal for working string/taking weight. Weaker under compression. Landed and cemented. I" wiper plug sheared 1800 strokes late (20m"!). “Torque peak of 50 kNm when string stalled out when cement in annulus. Free rotating torque on wiper trip at liner hanger depth 7-8 kNm. Tiner actually saw ca. 42 KNm torque when stall occurred ‘Need cement calculations to see if volumes correct ‘No comment on errors in report ‘Set liner hanger packer all went OK. 80 MT overpull to release running tool ‘When running tieback string, had to POO, with 8 joints to re-check torque No details on whether under or over torque. None laid out so assume all OK ‘Stung into PBR circulating as normal. Displaced annulus to 1.1 s.g. brine reverse circulating. Reverse circulating is down annulus and up tieback string, ‘Pumped 3 m° spacer, 62.5 m* 1.1 sg brine, 50.8 m° 1.6 sg mud Tfreverse circulating, the 1.6 sg mud would be left in the annulus of the tie back string. Volumes need to be checked. Unsure why mud pumped unless to get rid of slops/poor quality mud. ‘Observed 65 bar on annulus side when completed circulating. Tndicated heavy fluid on pipe side (rather ‘than annulus). Indicates that they were not reverse circulating (2) Stung into PBR, sheared no-go and landed casing hanger OK. Inflow tested annulus side. Drill pipe open to atmosphere. Inflow test OK Implies that heavy fluid in tieback string (?) Set seal assembly. Running tool came off seal assembly after 4 tums. Re-engaged R/T and set seal assembly. Failed 345 bar pressure test Pressuring up annulus above R/T. Leaking through to the 9 5/8” x 13 3/8" annulus or surface system leak. Pressure tested surface lines — failed test. Cement unit also failed test. No obvious leak con surface lines. Flushed surface lines and attempted to retest seal assembly. Dropped 5 bar in 15 minutes G45 bar test) “Test obviously initially accepted, then changed minds and RTH with seal assembly retrieving tool Re-tested seal assembly to 345 bar — test accepted. ‘After I hr, drop trend of I bar/10 min Lost 4 anti rotation dogs from R/T. Washed and worked junk basket in wellhead area — retrieved all dogs.‘Set 9 5/8” lockdown assembly To lock 9 5/8” in place. Tested well to 345 bar. Loss trend 1.4 bar/30 min after 70 min, decreasing trend During plugging before pulling drilling riser, set Typhoon packer, tested to 200 bar from below — OK. ‘No details of volumes. Packer set at 405.8 m (seabed at ca, 368 m) Displaced riser to seawater. Used a base oil spacer, therefore probably OBM in riser Pressure tested Typhoon packer to 320 bar for 15 minutes from above - OK Prior to running completion, displaced well to 1.46 s.g. K-formate brine 1.51 sg, kill pill 29m") placed over depth to be perforated High drill string vibrations when POOF. Perforated. Had to shut-in and circulate out as. Ran completion string — filled string with 1.23 s.g. K-formate brine Different weight to that in well Landed and performed test between seals on Well not exposed to this test pressure. surface tubing hanger _ Set production packer and pressure tested | 1.23 s.g. K-formate brine in completion ‘completion string to 395 bar string, 1.46 s.g. on outside Bled off tubing pressure to 200 bar, closed ‘TRSCSSSV bled of tubing pressure to 130 bar to inflow test TRSCSSSV to 70 bar differential pressure Pressure up annulus to 200 bar to test production packer from above and tubing hanger from below. Test OK — verified with gauge (accuracy? full scale deflection?) Continued to pressure up to 345 bar. Pressure dropped 6 bar in 8 minutes. Repeated with same result Pressure in tubing ~ 280 bar. ‘No volumes given Checked surface lines and continued to attempt to test annulus, Same leak rate Pressured up ca. 10 times with same result While discussing problems, pressure dropped from 345 to 303 bar in 2 brs Bled off pressure in annulus to 23 bar. ‘Tubing pressure now 206 bar. Observed Pressure in annulus increased to 29 bar over 30 min, pressure in tubing dropped to 201 bar in same period Leak from tubing to annulus? Checked to see if leakage was past surface tubing hanger ~ negative Pressured up annulus to 345 bar ~ dropped 14.5 bar in 65 min. Bled off pressure in annulus to 30 bar, pressured up tubing to 345 bar/25 min. pressure dropped1.5 bar, annulus pressure increased by 2 bar. Bled off tubing pressure t0 208 bar 10Bled of annulus pressure to 25 bar (tubing 210 bar), Pressured up annulus in stages of 25, bar to 225 bar. Tubing pressure 245 bar ‘Observed well, annulus 225 bar to 197 bar over 4 hrs. Tubing dropped from 248 bar to 240 bar in same period Dropping on both sides ~ Teak not from annulus to tubing (2) Pressured up annulus to 225 bar. Tubing pressure 245 bar To2 liters pumped Bled off annulus to 20 bar. Tubing 200 bar. ‘Observed well. Annulus pressure increased 10 26 bar, tubing decreased to 189 bar Over ca. 10 hrs Pressured up tubing to 200 bar. Pressured up annulus to 345 bar. Pressure drop at 325 bat. ‘Annulus pressure dropped 5 bar/6 min. pressured up to 345 bar 15 times. Pressure dropped 1.7 bar last 6 min, Pressure up to 345 5 more times. Initially pressure dropped 3.5 bar/9 minutes, finally 3.5 bar in 12 min. Loss rate gradually decreasing. 1500 liters pumped Repeatedly pressured up to 345 bar (7.5 hrs). Final test accepted 1.6 bar drop over 15 min. Rate of pressure drop decreasing with time. 1700 litters pumped Bled off pressure from 338 bar to 258 bar, 145 bar and 92 bar. Observing at cach stage. Pressures stable Stable (2) Equalized tubing pressure (from 195 bar). Bled down annulus pressure from 92 bar to 0. Bled off tubing pressure No volumes given Volume behind 9 5/8” tieback — (2415 —368) = 2047 m x 30.14 m= 62m’ Volume 5 '4” tubing x 9 5/8” casing annulus = ca. 94 m° ‘Main comments: 1. Poor reporting, not enough pumped and bled back volumes included. 2. Production packer set at 4369 m. Much of the finer is thus exposed above the production packer. Liner has New Vam connections, which are notoriously weak in ‘compression. Liner had to be worked down with 45 tons down weight and rotation (29 Nm). In addition, when the rotating liner stalled out when cementing a peak of 50 Nm was seen at surface, Free rotating torque at liner hanger setting depth (on previous wiper trip) was 7-8 kNm, This means that at stall, the top liner joints were exposed to 42 kNm. ul3. The report stated that they pumped in 1.1 s.g, brine followed by 1.6 mud reverse circulating. This means pumping down the annulus and up the tieback string. If this is ‘tue then we have 1.6 s.g. mud behind the tieback string and 1.1 s.g. brine inside the casing. We do not, however, believe that they were reverse circulating, as it makes no sense to do this, and the statement that they had 65 bar annulus pressure when they stopped circulating. This would only happen if we had heavy mud in the casing. 4, Seal assembly test dubious (1 bar drop in 10 min), possibly relevant when testing later in the programme, 5. Tried to follow all the pressure testing. If we Took atthe last series of pressure testing, where the annulus was repeatedly being pressured up, 3.2 m° of fluid was pumped. Volume behind 9 5/8” casing string is ca. 62m. Volume S” tubing x9 5/8” annulus ca. 94 m?. Total volume ca, 146 m”, Using a rule of thumb of 0.5 m° to pressure up 100m? by 100 bar, to pressure up 150 m° to 345 bar it should take 0.5 x 1.5x 3.45 = 2.5 m’. 3.2 m’ does seem a bit much as possibly more than this was pumped in to the tieback annulus. A slightly more accurate calculation may reveal more, 6. Could a trapped pressure of 345 bar, then temperature expansion due to production ‘cause a high enough pressure? The problem is that the leak point must act as a one- way valve. 7. New Vam connections were torqued up to a maximum of 23.6 kN during installation. However, to land the string, a maximum torque of 50 kNm was applied to the casing. The couplings are loaded beyond manufacturers specifications, which set maximum torque to 21.5 kNm. 3.3 Inspeetién of failed casing (One was unable to pull the production tubing alone, and had to pull the production tubing and the tieback production casing in one operation. The reason was that the tubing was stuck inside the casing. The pipes were sent to Red Baron and cut open. Only one length of casing was collapsed. The following measurements were taken of the failed casing. Table 3.1: Measurement of failed casing. Maximum | Minimum Pipe Initial OD (mm) | deformed OD | deformed OD | 4, MavMin. (ram) (um) == 3-5/8 in, casing 2a 300 200 13 Sin tubing 7 174 142 1.23 2Figures 3.1-3.3 shows pictures of the failed casing. ‘Figure 3.2: Failed casing 13