REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

FIRST JUDICIAL REGION

TH
4 MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT
San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan
ROMEO OLORESISIMO, Represented by
VIRGILIO RINGOR,
Plaintiff,
-versus-

Civil Case No. 1497 (SF-14)

For: Unlawful Detainer

DIONISIO S. CAJALNE,
Defendant.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
ANSWER
With COUNTERCLAIM
COMES NOW, the defendant and by way of an Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim to the Complaint of Romeo Oloresisimo
represented by Virgilio Ringor, respectfully states that:
I. TIMELINESS
The defendant received the copy of the summons issued by the
Honorable Court dated July 15, 2014 on July 21, 2014. Defendant is filing
his Answer within ten (10) days from receipt of the summons.
II. ADMISSIONS
II.a. The allegations stated in paragraph 2 of the Complaint is
admitted as the same relates to the address of the defendant;
II.b. The allegation stated in paragraph 7 and 8 is admitted in so far
as to the fact that demand letter was sent to the defendant and the same
was received by Alma Bedania, the wife of Brgy. Capt. William A. Bedania,
Sr. but denies the fact as to the personal service of the said demand letter
to the defendant;
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III. SPECIFIC DENIALS

III.a. The allegations stated in paragraph 1 of the Complaint is denied
for lack of knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of the allegation. The plaintiff, Romeo Oloresisimo has no authority to
execute the alleged Special Power of Attorney, considering that he is not
the registered owner of the property. The registered owners of the property
are Leocadio Oloresisimo and Manuela Puler as per the Original Certificate
of Title No. P-51758 and Tax Declaration No. 003 18749. Plaintiff Romeo
Oloresisimo is the brother of Leocadio Oloresisimo hence he is not
even considered as the legal heir (Article 978, Civil Code of the
Philippines) of Leocadio Oloresisimo, in the event of the latters death,
since he will be survived by his wife, Manuela Puler and their child,
Leonard Oloresisimo;
III.b. The allegation stated in paragraph 3 is vehemently denied for
lack of knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
of the allegation. It must be emphasized that there is no Death Certificate
evidencing the fact of death of Leocadio Oloresisimo which was appended
to the Complaint. As per the Original Certificate of Title No. P-51758 and
Tax Declaration No. 003 18749, Leocadio Oloresisimo and Manuela Puler
are the registered owners of the property in question and both are still alive
and presently residing in Canada, thus, such fact alone strips Romeo
Oloresisimo of his authority and legal personality to sue the defendant
making Romeos legal representative, Virgilio Ringor has no authority to
represent him. Assuming arguendo that Leocadio Oloresisimo is already
dead, he is succeeded by his wife, Manuela Puler and their child, Leonard
Oloresisimo. Therefore, plaintiff and his representative have no legal
personality to sue, not being legal heirs. The complaint has no merit, since
plaintiff has no legal personality to sue the defendant, the complaint has no
cause of action against the defendant and the Court therefore acquires no
jurisdiction over the subject matter;
III.c. The allegation stated in paragraph 4 is vehemently denied, since
the defendant has been residing in open, public and continuous possession
and occupation of the property in question for about 42 years since the
1972 and not by mere tolerance of the plaintiff. It must be emphasized that
it was only in the year 2007 when Leocadio Oloresisimo registered the
property in his name as annotated in his Original Certificate of Title, despite
prior knowledge that the defendant has been in possession and occupying
the subject property;
III.d. The allegation stated in paragraph 5 is denied since the
defendant is more than willing to buy the property in question, in fact,
payment was made through the Brgy. Captain of Brgy. Ambalangan Dalin,
San Fabian, Pangasinan;

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III.e. The allegation stated in paragraph 6 is also denied for lack of

knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegations stated therein;
III.f. The allegation stated in paragraph 9 is hereby denied for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation stated therein;
III.g. The defendant denied paragraph 10 for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation of the
plaintiff as to the expenses he incurred as there was no previous demand
coming from the registered owner, Leocadio Oloresisimo and his wife,
Manuela Puler to vacate the property in question;
IV. SPECIFIC AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
IV.a. The Complaint should be dismissed since the plaintiff, Romeo
Oloresisimo has no personality to sue the defendant considering that the
registered owners of the property namely, Mr. Leocadio Oloresisimo and
Mrs. Manuela Puler are still alive and living in Canada. It follows therefore
that even the representative of Romeo Oloresisimo, Virgilio Ringor has no
authority to represent the former. Romeo Oloresisimo is the brother of
Leocadio Oloresisimo, even in the event of death of the latter, the realparty-in-interest would be the legal heirs of Leocadio, namely his wife,
Manuela Puler and their child, Leonard Oloresisimo. The complaint has no
cause of action against the defendant and the Court acquires no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case;
IV.b. It must be noted that in civil cases, the burden of proof to be
established by preponderance of evidence, (New Testament Church of God
v. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 266, 269 (1996); Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 204 SCRA 160, 168 (1991)) is on the plaintiff who is the party
asserting the affirmative of an issue. He has the burden of presenting
evidence required to obtain a favorable judgment, (Transpacific Supplies,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 494, 502 (1994); Geraldez v. Court of
Appeals, 230 SCRA 320, 330 (1994); Republic v. Court of Appeals, 182
SCRA 290, 301 (1990)) and he, having the burden of proof, will be
defeated if no evidence were given on either side (Summa Insurance
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 175 (1996);

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IV.c. In light of the general rules of evidence and the burden of proof
in civil cases, as explained by the Supreme Court in Jison v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 124853. February 24, 1998:

"xxx Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has
the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the
burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in a
civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his
favour, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to
controvert plaintiffs prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must
be returned in favour of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the
party having the burden of proof must produce a
preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to
rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the defendants. The concept of
preponderance of evidence refers to evidence which is of
greater weight, or more convincing, that which is offered in
opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth."
(emphasis supplied)

IV.d. One who has no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in action (39 Am Jur 858.) for it is
jurisprudentially ordained that every action must be prosecuted or defended
in the name of the real party in interest. (Sec. 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.) A "real party in interest" is one who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. In the instant case, plaintiff is not a real party in interest
inasmuch as he failed to establish his claim;

In several cases decided by the Supreme Court, to wit: One who has
no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as
party-plaintiff in action for it is jurisprudentially ordained that every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
(Borlongan v. Madrideo, 380 Phil. 215, 224 (2000), citing the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rule 3, Section 2.)

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"Interest" within the meaning of the rules means material interest, an

interest in issue and to be affected by the decree as distinguished from
mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. A real
party in interest is one who has a legal right. Since a contract may be
violated only by the parties thereto as against each other, in an action upon
that contract, the real parties-in-interest, either as plaintiff or as defendant,
must be parties to the said contract. The action must be brought by the
person who, by substantive law, possesses the right sought to be enforced.
Vidal v. Escueta, 463 Phil. 314, 337 (2003);

IV.e. Thus, with the above cited jurisprudence, plaintiff has the burden
of proving his legal personality to sue the defendant considering that the
registered owners are still living. Plaintiff presented no documentary
evidence to prove their fact of death and no evidence was given to prove
the absence of legal heirs of Leocadio Oloresisimo;

IV.f. Defendant is very much interested to purchase the property as

shown by his good faith in making a downpayment in order to acquire the
property in question by means of sale.

The plaintiff, Romeo Oloresisimo represented himself to the

defendant that he is the authority to transfer ownership of the property thus,
the defendant were made to pay two (2) occupants of the property in
question namely, Mrs. Margarita J. Cajalne and Mr. Fernando R. Ringor, in
the amount of Php50,000.000 each in the year 2013. The payments given
to the two (2) occupants are to form part of the purchase price of the
property owned by Leocadio Oloresisimo and Manuela Puler as per
information stated by the plaintiff, Romeo Oloresisimo. Furthermore, the
defendant being in good faith, handed Php20,000.00 to Punong Barangay
Fernando A. Marceno, Punong Barangay of Barangay Ambalangan Dalin,
San Fabian last March 3, 2013 as downpayment on the real property to the
plaintiff, Romeo Oleresisimo, upon the latters representation of his
authority from the registered owners. The receipts are hereto attached as
Annex 1 and series.

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However, when defendant was able to communicate with Leocadio

Oloresisimo and Manuela Puler, stating that Romeo Oloresisimo was not
given any authority to sell their property and that they will come home on
February, 2015 to settle the payment and transfer of the property in their
names, defendant had reservations of releasing any more money to the
plaintiff, Romeo Oloresisimo;

IV.g. The defendant sent a Letter of Intent to Purchase the Property to

Manuela Puler, which is hereto attached as Annex 2 to show that their
good faith and willingness to purchase the property, subject matter of this
case;

IV.h. The plaintiff has been in actual and continuous possession of

the property since 1972, wherein he raised his children and his childrens
children grew up.

For to justify an action for unlawful detainer,

the permission or tolerance must have been present at the

beginning of
the
possession.
Otherwise,
if
the
possession
was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an
improper remedy. (G.R. No. 155432, June 9, 2005)
At the time of the occupancy of the defendant, neither the plaintiff
Romeo Oloresisimo and the registered owners Leocadio Oloresisimo and
Manuela Puler are legally entitled to the property in question. Worded
differently, neither of them (the plaintiff and Leocadio Oloresisimo) could
give permission or tolerance to the defendants possession in the subject
property at the time defendant started occupying the property in the year
1972.

The concept of the word 'tolerance must be expressed such that

tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be
recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer not
of forcible entry" (Ten Forty Realty and Development Corp. v. Cruz, 410
SCRA 484, 490 (2003). The case cannot be considered as an unlawful
6|Page

detainer case, the "tolerance" claimed by plaintiff not being that

contemplated by law in unlawful detainer cases; neither can the case be
considered as one for forcible entry because the entry of defendant was not
alleged to have been by means of force, intimidation, threats, stealth or
strategy.

Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a

valid cause for unlawful detainer or forcible entry, the court has no
jurisdiction over the case;

IV.i. The plaintiff is not entitled to its claim for monthly rentals as there
is no lease agreement requiring defendant to pay rents;

IV.j. The defendant cannot be held liable for the litigation and
miscellaneous expenses because the defendant acted in good faith and
without malice in his dealings with the Leocadio Oloresisimo and Manuela
Puler and even with Romeo Oloresisimo;

Indeed, defendants more than four decades of actual physical

possession of the questioned property deserves to be respected especially
so that plaintiff, Romeo Oloresisimo failed to show that he has the requisite
personality to file the instant case. Justice dictates that defendant who is
now in the twilight years of his life be granted possession of his property
where his children and his childrens children lived during their lifetime, and
where they, will probably spend the remaining days of their life. (G.R. No.
161916, January 20, 2006). Much more, defendant has not yet abandoned
his offer to purchase the property in question;

V. COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIMS
V.a. The allegations in the foregoing paragraphs are re-pleaded and
incorporated by reference in support of defendants Compulsory
Counterclaim;
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V.b. In view of the unfounded, baseless, and malicious complaint filed

by the plaintiff, defendant suffered physical suffering, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings and moral shock, hence he is entitled to moral damages
amounting Twenty Thousand Pesos (Php20,000.00) and exemplary
damages in an amount to be given at the discretion of the Honorable Court.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that

the baseless complaint instituted by the plaintiffs be dismissed for lack of
cause of action and lack of personality on the part of the Romeo
Oloresisimo to sue and judgment be rendered on defendants counterclaim
by ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant the following:

1. Php20,000.00 by way of moral damages;

2. Exemplary Damages in an amount subject to the discretion of hte
Honorable Court.
3. The cost of suit.
Defendant further prays for such other reliefs and remedies proper
and just under the premises.
San Fabian, Pangasinan.
July 31, 2014.
DIONISIO S. CAJALNE
Defendant
Voters ID No. 5533-0038B-L0743DSC10000
Issued at San Fabian, Pangasinan
Copy Furnished:

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Atty. Cristobal Fernandez

San Fabian, Pangasinan
Virgiolo Ringor
Brgy. Ambalangan Dalin
San Fabian, Pangasinan
Explanation: Due to distance and lack of personnel, copy of the foregoing
Answer with Counterclaim is being served to the plaintiffs counsel and the
plaintiff, both at their given address by registered mail in lieu of personal
service.
DIONISIO S. CAJALNE
VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION
I, DIONISIO S. CAJALNE, of legal age, married and a resident of
Brgy. Ambalangan Dalin, San Fabian, Pangasinan, after having been duly
sworn to in accordance with law, depose and say that:
1. I am the defendant in the above-entitled case;
2. I have caused the preparation of the foregoing Answer with
Counterclaim;
3. I have read the contents thereof and the facts stated therein are
true and correct of my personal knowledge and/or on the basis of copies of
documents and records in my possession;

4. I have not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the

same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other
tribunal or agency;

5. To the best of my knowledge and belief, no such action or

proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any
other tribunal or agency;

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6. If I should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has

been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or
any other tribunal or agency, I undertake to report that fact within five (5)
days therefrom to this Honorable Court.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hands this 31 ST day

of July, 2014 in Dagupan City, Pangasinan, Philippines.
DIONISIO S. CAJALNE
Affiant
Voters ID No. 5533-0038B-L0743DSC10000
Issued at San Fabian, Pangasinan
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this ___ day of July, 2014
at __________________, Pangasinan, affiant exhibiting to me his
competent identification papers.

G.R. No. 166875

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
July 31, 2007

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DIGNA CONSUMIDO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. REYNALDO G. ROS, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 33, RAMON SAURA, JR., and FATIMA
SAURA, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The instant Rule 45 petition assails the Decision 1 dated 13 September
2004 and the Resolution2 dated 24 January 2005 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 75285. The appellate courts Decision affirmed the
Regional Trial Courts (RTC) reversal3 of the Metropolitan Trial Courts
(MeTC) judgment4 dismissing the ejectment complaint filed against
petitioner while the Resolution denied her motion for reconsideration. 5
In their ejectment6 complaint before the MeTC of Manila, docketed as Civil
Case No. 170458, respondent spouses Ramon, Jr. and Fatima Saura
averred that sometime in 1995, they entered into two lease contracts with
petitioner Digna Consumido, wherein they leased to her Unit 982 and Unit
980 located on A.H. Lacson Street, Sampaloc, Manila and she, in turn,
undertook to pay rentals at P6,400.00 per month and P6,000.00 per month,
respectively.7
According to respondents, petitioner started defaulting on rental payments
on Unit 982 and Unit 980 in the last quarter of 1996 and August 1997,
respectively. Despite repeated demands, petitioner failed to pay the
accrued rentals and to vacate the leased premises, 8 prompting
respondents to file the complaint. They asked for judgment ordering
petitioner to vacate the premises and pay the accrued rentals
totaling P615,000.00, plus attorneys fees.9
In her Answer,10 petitioner averred that she entered into the said lease
contracts not with respondents but with the late Ramon Saura, Sr., father of
respondent Ramon, Jr. The father organized Villa Governor Forbes
Corporation (VGFC), the administrator of the leased premises, petitioner
added.11
According to petitioner, until June 1999, she religiously paid the rentals to
respondents, who had assumed the administration of the leased premises
after the death of Ramon Saura, Sr., not knowing that as early as 18 April
1995, Sandalwood Real Estate Development Corporation (SREDC) had
already bought the leased premises from VGFC. After discovering that the
leased premises had already been titled to SREDC, petitioner negotiated
with SREDC for her to continue occupancy of the leased premises. 12 Thus,
she claimed that she ignored the demands of respondents for just and legal
grounds.
After summary proceedings, the MeTC rendered a decision 13 on 19 April
2002 dismissing the ejectment suit. The MeTC found that the ownership of
the leased premises had been the subject of a pending litigation between
respondent Ramon Saura, Jr. on one hand and SREDC, VGFC, and the
other heirs of the late Ramon Saura, Sr. on the other. It also found that
SREDC, as successor-in-interest of VGFC, had previously instituted an
ejectment suit against petitioner and other lessees occupying the other
units but the same had been dismissed with finality pending the
11 | P a g e

determination of ownership of the leased premises. Based on the foregoing

and the findings that VGFC was the lessor
and respondents had acted merely as administrators and/or
representatives of VGFC upon the execution of the lease agreements, the
MeTC declared respondents as not the real parties-in-interest. 14
The RTC reversed the MeTC decision.15 Based on its finding that petitioner
continued to remit the rentals to respondents when they assumed
administration of the leased premises after the death of Ramon Saura, Sr.,
it held that respondents were entitled to the material possession of the
leased premises.16 The RTC also found that the leased premises was
previously the ancestral home of respondents, who remained in possession
thereof even after the disputed sale of the leased premises by VGFC to
SREDC.
In its Decision dated 17 September 2002, the RTC disposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED. The
defendant is ordered:
1. To vacate the leased premises;
2. To pay the plaintiffs the rental in arrears for both units the
amount of Php714,800.00 representing the unpaid rentals from
1996 to December 2001, as well as rental that are unpaid, until
the time the defendant has actually vacated the leased
premises;
3. To pay the amount of Php20,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
4. To pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.17
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision 18 on 13 September
2004, dismissing petitioners appeal, and on 24 January 2005, its assailed
Resolution19 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals sustained the RTCs conclusion that the material
possession of the leased premises pertained to respondents as it was
bolstered by petitioners admission that she remitted rentals to them before
she allegedly discovered that respondents were not the registered owners
of the leased premises. It also held that petitioner was precluded from
controverting the title of her landlord, asserting any rights adverse to that
title or setting up any inconsistent right to change the relation existing
between them.20
Hence, the instant petition ascribing the following errors to the Court of
Appeals:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR OF FACT AND LAW WHEN IT
RULED THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE THE REAL PARTIES
IN INTEREST TO FILE THE EJECTMENT SUIT, AS SUCH RULING
IS BASED ON PURE CONJECTURES AND PRESUMPTIONS.
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS HAD THE RIGHT TO EJECT PETITIONER
HAVING ESTABLISHED A BETTER RIGHT OF POSSESSION.21
The crux of the controversy is whether there was a subsisting lease
agreement between petitioner and respondents, which, upon the breach
12 | P a g e

thereof by petitioner, entitled respondents, as the real parties-in-interest, to

institute the ejectment suit. In short, the question is who is the landlord?
Petitioner maintains that respondents instituted the ejectment suit in their
personal capacities and not in representation of the VGFC, the previous
owner of the leased premises.
On the other hand, respondents contend that petitioner is estopped from
asserting that no landlord-lessee relationship exists between them because
petitioner previously admitted in her answer that she religiously remitted
rentals to respondents. They theorize that petitioners act of continuously
remitting rentals to respondents after the death of Ramon Saura, Sr. is an
acknowledgement that respondents are her landlords and successors-ininterest of the late Ramon Saura, Sr.
The petition is meritorious.
One who has no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of
the court as party-plaintiff in action for it is jurisprudentially ordained that
every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party
in interest.22
"Interest" within the meaning of the rules means material interest, an
interest in issue and to be affected by the decree as distinguished from
mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. A real
party in interest is one who has a legal right. Since a contract may be
violated only by the parties thereto as against each other, in an action upon
that contract, the real parties-in-interest, either as plaintiff or as defendant,
must be parties to the said contract. The action must be brought by the
person who, by substantive law, possesses the right sought to be
enforced.23
In an action for unlawful detainer, the real party in interest is the landlord,
vendor, vendee or other person against whom the possession of any land
or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of his
right to hold possession, by virtue of a contract, express or implied.
The records show that petitioner did not enter into the lease agreement
with respondents. Other than their bare allegations, respondents failed to
present sufficient evidence showing that they are the landlords of the
leased premises or its successors-in-interest or are authorized to institute
the ejectment suit in the name of the real party in interest.
The MeTCs finding that VGFC is the landlord appears to be more plausible
under the circumstances. Since a corporation is only a juridical person, it
must act through its officers or agents in the normal course of business.
Petitioner admitted that she entered into the lease contracts with the late
Ramon Saura, Sr. While no written lease agreement was ever submitted in
evidence, it is likely that at the time of the agreement, the late Ramon
Saura, Sr. was acting on behalf of VGFC, which, since 1979, had been the
registered owner of the leased premises before its purported sale to
SREDC, the present registered owner.
That respondents were parties to the lease agreement is not supported by
the evidence on record. Respondents were able to establish only as far as
accepting the rental payments from petitioner. However, this fact alone
cannot vest in them the right of a landlord but of a mere administrator or
representative of the late Ramon Saura, Sr. and/or VGFC. Thus, as pointed
13 | P a g e

out by the MeTC, respondents cannot institute the ejectment suit in their
personal capacities. They must present their authority to prosecute the
ejectment suit in the name of the real party in interest. This respondents
failed to do.
In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his case by
a preponderance of evidence. If he claims a right granted or created by law,
he must prove his claim by competent evidence. He must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of his
opponent.24 And he, having the burden of proof, will be defeated if no
evidence were given on either side.25
Respondents as plaintiffs in the action for unlawful detainer had the burden
of proving their allegations inasmuch as they claim that they were parties to
the lease contracts. Respondents failed miserably to meet the burden of
proof.
Respondents argue that petitioner is estopped from denying the landlordlessee relationship between the parties because of her admission that she
paid rentals to respondents in her belief that the former were the owners of
the premises.
For estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto must be unequivocal
and intentional because, if misapplied, estoppel may become a tool of
injustice.26 Estoppel is a principle that, as a rule, can be invoked only in
highly exceptional and legitimate cases.27 The essential elements of
estoppel in respect to the party claiming it are: (a) lack of knowledge and of
the means of knowledge of the truth as the facts in question; (b) reliance, in
good faith, upon the conduct or statements of the party to be estopped; and
(c) action or inaction based thereon of such character as to change the
position or status of the party claiming the estoppel, to his injury, detriment,
or prejudice.28
The first element is absent in the instant case. Respondents cannot claim
estoppel against petitioner because they knew fully well that they were
accepting rentals from petitioner in their capacity as mere administrators of
the leased premises or only on behalf of the late Ramon Saura, Sr. and/or
VGFC. Respondents cannot assert that they did not know for a fact that
they were never parties to the lease agreement. The fact that petitioner
initially thought respondents were the owners of the leased premises does
not put her in estoppel because respondents were expected to know in
what capacity they accepted the payments.
Neither is petitioner estopped in denying respondents title. The conclusive
presumption set forth in Rule 131, Section 2(b) 29 of the Rules of Court
applies only when the landlord and tenant relationship has been sufficiently
established. In the case at bar, this is precisely the issue to be resolved as
petitioner has consistently alleged that there was no lease agreement
between the parties. Moreover, respondents themselves have not asserted
ownership over the leased premises, the truth of the matter being that
respondents were never the registered owners of the leased premises.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED
and the Decision dated 13 September 2004 and Resolution dated 24
January 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75285 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
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Branch 28 of Manila in Civil Case No. 170458 is REINSTATED. Costs

against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Chairperson, Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 13-20. Penned by Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., J., and
concurred in by Salvador Jr. Valdez, Jr., Chairperson of the Ninth
Division, and Vicente Q. Roxas, JJ.
2
Id. at 9.
3
Id. at 121-125.
4
Id. at 72-75.
5
Id. at 63-70.
6
Id. at 98-102.
7
Id. at 99.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 101.
10
Id. at 103-107.
11
Id. at 103-104.
12
Id.
13
Supra note 4.
14
Id. at 124.
15
Supra note 3.
16
Id. at 74.
17
Id. at 75.
18
Supra note 1.
19
Supra note 2.
20
Id. at 19.
21
Id. at 53.
22
Borlongan v. Madrideo, 380 Phil. 215, 224 (2000), citing the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 3, Section 2.
23
Vidal v. Escueta, 463 Phil. 314, 337 (2003).
24
Umpoc v. Mercado, G.R. No. 158166, January 21, 2005, 449 SCRA
220, 238.
25
Borlongan v. Madrideo, 380 Phil. 215, 223 (2000), citing Summa
Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 175 (1996).
26
Duero v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 12, 21 (2002), citing La Naval
Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 103200, 236
SCRA 78, 87-88 (1994).
27
Arcelonia v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 250, 284 (1997).
28
Id.
29
SEC. 2. Conclusive presumptions. The following are instances of
conclusive presumptions:
xxxx
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the
time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant
between them.
15 | P a g e

16 | P a g e