IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 2015

SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

Petitioner,
v.
THE HELLWEGIAN TRIBE
Respondent

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Thirteenth Circuit
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT

September 11, 2015

13
Counsel for Respondent

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether a governmental action cannot constitute a substantial burden under RFRA unless it
forces individuals to choose between following the tenets of their religion and receiving a
governmental benefit or coerces them by threatening civil or criminal sanctions to act contrary to
their religious beliefs.

2. Whether the Tribe has standing to challenge the Fish & Wildlife Services new polar bear
tracking regulation.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Authorities ..................................................................................................................... iv
Statement of the Facts .................................................................................................................. 1
Statement of the Case ................................................................................................................... 2
Summary of Argument ................................................................................................................. 2
Argument ....................................................................................................................................... 3
I. Under RFRA, Claimants Self-Define Substantial Burden .................................................... 3
A. Coercion Test is No Longer Used by the Court ..................................................................... 4
B. Congress Enacted RFRA to Eliminate the Coercion Test...................................................... 5
C. The Court is Not Equipped to Make Theological Prescriptions ............................................ 7
II. The Polar Bear Tracking Regulation Affords the Tribe Article III Standing ................... 8
A. The Tribes Spiritual Harm Constitutes Injury In Fact .......................................................... 9
i. The Tribes Spiritual Harm is Concrete .............................................................................. 9
ii. The Tribes Spiritual Harm is Particularized................................................................... 10
B. The Tribes Procedural Challenge is Permitted ................................................................... 11
i. Prudential Requirements are Met ...................................................................................... 11
ii. Application Of The Citizen Suit Provision ....................................................................... 12
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 13

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973) .............................................................................................................. 12
Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (U.S. 1970) .................. 10
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (U.S. 1962)........................................................................ 10, 13
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986) ........................................................................................ 6
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 615 (1961) ............................................................................ 10
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)................................................ 4, 5, 8
Catholic League for Religious & Civ. Rights v. City of San Francisco, 624 F.3d 1043, 1058 (9th
Cir. 2009) .................................................................................................................. 9, 10, 11, 12
Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) ............................................................................... 4, 5, 7
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) .................... 4
Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (U.S. 2001) .................................................. 4
Hellwegian Tribe v. Sec'y of the Interior, 1749 F.3d 42, 43 (13th Cir. 2015) ........ 1, 2, 6, 8, 11, 12
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) ............................................. 3, 9, 10, 11
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn 485 U.S. 439 (1988) .......................... 5, 6, 7
Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Serv., 533 F.3d 1058, 1071 (9th. Cir. 2008) ................. 6, 7
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) ........................................................................................ 4
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (U.S. 1972) ...................................................... 9, 10, 11
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981) ............................... 7
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) .................................................................................. 6, 7
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669
(1973) ....................................................................................................................................... 12
iv

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975) ............................................................................. 11, 12

Wisconsin v. Yoder 406 U.S. 205 (1972) ........................................................................................ 4

Statutes
Endangered Species Act 16 U.S.C. 1540(g) ....................................................................... 2, 3, 9
Religious Freedom Restoration Act 42 U.S.C. ch. 21B ......................................... 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
U.S. Const. amend. I ....................................................................................................................... 2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The Hellwegian Tribe (Tribe) lives on Lexalaska, the largest island in the state of
Alexka. Hellwegian Tribe v. Secretary of the Interior, 1749 F.3d 42, 43 (13th Cir. 2015). The
Tribes sincerely held religious beliefs, established long before any non-Aleutian contact with
Alexka, require the Tribe to hold polar bears as sacred and revere them. Id. at 43. This belief is
based on the Tribes mythology, which includes the story of Cecil the polar bear saving the first
Aleutian family on Lexalaska when they became sick. Id. at 4344. The Tribe members believe
that because of this, they have an obligation to prevent any harm to the polar bears. Id. at 43.
The Tribe reveres the location where Cecil rescued the first Aleutians as sacred. Id. at 44.
The Tribe performs its spiritual and healing ceremonies there. The Hellwegian Tribe believes
that any interference with this site will desecrate it and bring harm to the entire island. Id.
The Department of the Interior (Department) promulgated a rule to begin construction
on a monitoring facility directly on top of this sacred location. Id. The facility will include a
helicopter pad, hangar, maintenance and storage building, living quarters, and medical bay, all of
which will help the Department protect and potentially develop the mineral and energy resources
around the island. This sprawl is necessary for the type of conduct the Department seeks to carry
out, and the Department claims this is the only place on the island that is safe for helicopters to
take off and land. Id.
The Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) has promulgated a rule requiring all polar bears to
be tracked via microchips shot by dart guns. Id. at 45. FWS says this will help protect polar
bears, an endangered species. Id. While the Tribe has not established that any members of the
Tribe have ever seen a polar bear, especially as polar bears migrate north of Lexalaska, the Tribe

members claim that shooting a polar bear with a foreign substance violates their religious beliefs,
and that they will attempt to prevent the shooting of polar bears with these dart guns. Id.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Tribe brought suit in the district of Alexka on two counts: (1) the Departments
building of the monitoring station violated the Tribes Free Exercise rights under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 42 U.S.C. ch. 21B and (2) the Secretary of the Interior
(Secretary), through the FWS, violated the rulemaking procedure by not consulting the best
scientific data available when deciding to track the polar bears via microchip. Hellwegian Tribe
1749 F.3d at 42. This second claim is authorized by the Endangered Species Act citizen suit
provision. 16 U.S.C. 1540(g). The district court entered judgment on the merits against the
Tribe regarding its RFRA claim and dismissed the claim against FWS for lack of standing.
Hellwegian Tribe 1749 F.3d at 4243. The Tribe appealed to the Thirteenth Circuit, who
remanded to the District of Alexka to enter judgment in favor of the Department on the RFRA
claim and to continue on the merits of the claim against the Secretary. Id. at 43.
The Secretary, Petitioner, appeals the Thirteenth Circuits order granting standing to the
Tribe, Respondent, and requests that the Court affirm the Thirteenths Circuit denial of the
Tribes RFRA claims.
The Tribe, Respondent, appeals the Thirteenth Circuits order denying its RFRA claim
and requests that the Court affirm the Thirteenth Circuits grant of standing.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The First Amendment provides that Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . . U.S. Const. amend. I. In
order to determine what prohibits the free exercise of religion, the Court looks to RFRA. In order
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for the Court to consider a Free Exercise claim, complainants must prove that a government
action has substantially burdened their free exercise of religion. The Thirteenth Circuit
improperly applied the coercion test because: (1) this Court no longer uses that test; (2)
RFRAs purpose is eliminating ideas at the crux of the coercion test; and (3) this Courts
jurisprudence requires complainants to self-identify the burden on their own religion. The Court
should reverse the Thirteenth Circuits incorrect reading of RFRA.
In order to have Article III standing to challenge the polar bear tracking rule promulgated
by the FWS, the Tribe must prove that they have an injury in fact, and that the injury is both
concrete and particularized. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). The Tribe
has this concrete, particularized injury because of the polar bear tracking rule which desecrates
the Tribes sacred animal. The Tribes procedural challenge is permitted because the prudential
requirements are met. Even if there were a barrier of generalized grievance, the citizen suit
provision of the Endangered Species Act gets rid of the prudential limitation for the Tribe.
1540(g). The Court should affirm the Thirteenth Circuits finding of standing for the Tribe.
ARGUMENT
I. UNDER RFRA, CLAIMANTS SELF-DEFINE SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN
Since the passage of RFRA, this Court no longer uses the coercion test to evaluate Free
Exercise claims because the case law containing the coercion test is the basis for the case that
Congress specifically responded to in RFRA. Therefore the coercion test is not an appropriate
weighing mechanism for this Court to use. Since the Court cannot and has refused to make
doctrinal interpretations regarding the severity of a limitation on any claimants religion, the
Court should defer to the Tribes claim of a substantial burden and evaluate the remainder of the
strict scrutiny test laid out in RFRA.
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A. Coercion Test is No Longer Used by the Court

RFRA was passed by Congress in 1993 in response to this Courts shifting view toward
Free Exercise claims. This shift culminated in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990) (limiting Free Exercise claims only to those laws that specifically target religion). The
Court now looks to RFRA when evaluating Free Exercise claims. See generally Good News Club
v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (U.S. 2001) (allowing religious student groups equal access to
school space after hours); Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S.
418 (2006) (determining that the government was justified in applying the controlled substances
act to religious use of hoasca); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)
(providing an exemption for certain companies to the Affordable Care Acts (ACA) requirement
that insurance coverage include certain types of contraception). Under RFRA, the government
may not substantially burden the free exercise of religion unless it proves that the burden is in
the furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of
furthering that interest. 2000bb1(b). RFRA does not define substantial burden, but tells the
Court to look to pre-Smith jurisprudence to determine the best definition 2000bb(5).
When the Court has previously examined Free Exercise claims, coercion is frequently at
play (see, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (denial of employment benefits);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (mandatory school attendance for Amish children)).
However, the Thirteenth Circuit erred in assuming that because some cases have involved a
coercive element, therefore a plaintiff must claim a coercive element in order to prevail on a Free
Exercise claim.
In Hobby Lobbythe most recent application of RFRA by the Courtthe Court rejected
the idea that coercion is the only way for a plaintiff to prove a substantial burden. 134 S. Ct. at
4

277677. While not an argument made by the government, an amici pointed out that Hobby
Lobby could potentially have avoided the financial penalties imposed by the ACA if it had
simply stopped providing health insurance all together. Id. The Court said they were not deciding
the case on this argument, but if it was, it would find the argument it unpersuasive. Id.
B. Congress Enacted RFRA to Eliminate the Coercion Test
The Thirteenth Circuit improperly relied on Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Assn 485 U.S. 439 (1988). While Congress did not cite Lyng by name in RFRA,
Congress sought to invalidate Smith, which virtually eliminated the requirement that the
government justify burdens imposed on religious exercise by laws neutral toward religion, Id.
When Smith reached this conclusion, it relied heavily on Lyng, citing Lyng for the proposition
that [t]he government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful
conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, cannot depend on measuring
the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual development. Lyng,
supra, at 451. Smith 494 U.S. at 885.
Lyng focuses on the word prohibit in the Free Exercise Clause, and creates a rule nearly
as severe as the one advanced in Smith. Lyng 485 U.S. at 451. Instead of trying to determine
whether the harm is substantial, Lyng acknowledges that the logging and road-building projects
at issue in this case could have devastating effects on traditional Indian religious practices. Id.
The Court in Lyng then goes on to say that government simply could not operate if it were
required to satisfy every citizen's religious needs and desires. Id. at 452. RFRA acknowledges
this tension, which is why a substantial burden prong is not the sum and substance of RFRAs
test. The substantial burden prong merely allows a claimants to bring a Free Exercise claim as

long as they can show some nexus between the governments action and their religion. To return
to Lyngs coercion test would frustrate the entire goal of RFRA.
In Lyng, the Court relies on Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986) and United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). Both of these cases lay the foundation for the flawed assumption that a
violation of the Free Exercise Clause requires antagonism by Congress towards religion
generally. Bowen 476 U.S. at 708.
If the Court in Lyng had applied RFRAs Free Exercise test, the Court likely could still
have found for the government, since the government had a compelling interest not to leave two
existing segments of road to deadend in the middle of a National Forest. Lyng 485 U.S. at 454.
Furthermore, the government had achieved these ends by the least restrictive means.
No sites where specific rituals take place were to be disturbed. . . .[T]he route selected
by the Regional Forester. . .the farthest removed from contemporary spiritual sites; thus,
the adverse audible intrusions associated with the road would be less than all other
alternatives. . . .[T]en specific steps were planned to reduce the visual impact of the road
on the surrounding country. Id.
The Tribe does not dispute that in order [t]o maintain an organized society that
guarantees religious freedom to a great variety of faiths requires that some religious practices
yield to the common good. Lee 455 U.S. at 259. However, the determination of whether a
religious practice must yield to the common good needs to happen during the evaluation of strict
scrutiny, not when determining the burden placed on the claimant.
The Thirteenth Circuit further erred by relying on Navajo Nation v. United States Forest
Serv., 533 F.3d 1058, 1071 (9th. Cir. 2008) (en banc) to define substantial burden. Hellwegian
Tribe 1749 F.3d at 46. Navajo Nation makes two key mistakes when evaluating Free Exercise
claims. First, Navajo Nation relies on Lyng, saying that the decision is on point. 533 F.3d at
1071. While the Court correctly identifies similar facts in the broadest sense between the two
6

cases, (both Lyng and Navajo Nation are about the government doing something to sacred tribal
land), the Court does not discuss Lyng as a precursor to Smith, which is essential to RFRA
analysis. When the Ninth Circuit treated Lyng as good law, it ignored the purpose of RFRA and
its compelling interest test. Second, the Court attempts to make a theological judgment that the
snow in Navajo Nation does not burden religion because it only affects subjective, emotional
religious experience. 533 F.3d at 1070. However, none of this Courts Free Exercise cases postRFRA require an objective evaluation of religious burden. On the contrary, the Court specifically
declines to make those types of theological determinations.
C. The Court is not Equipped to Make Theological Prescriptions
This Court has avoided making religious doctrinal judgments regarding the sincerity of a
belief at the heart of a Free Exercise claim. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Empt Sec.
Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981) ([I]t is not within the judicial function and judicial competence
to inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow worker more correctly perceived the commands of
their common faith. Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.); Lee 455 U.S. at 257 (It
is not within "the judicial function and judicial competence," however, to determine whether
appellee or the Government has the proper interpretation of the Amish faith. . . .) (internal
citations omitted); Lyng 488 U.S. at 457458 ([T]he dissent's approach would require us to rule
that some religious adherents misunderstand their own religious beliefs. We think such an
approach. . .would cast the judiciary in a role that we were never intended to play.); Smith 494
U.S. at 886887 (It is no more appropriate for judges to determine the "centrality" of religious
beliefs before applying a "compelling interest" test in the Free Exercise field, than it would be for
them to determine the "importance" of ideas before applying the "compelling interest" test in the
free speech field. What principle of law or logic can be brought to bear to contradict a believer's
7

assertion that a particular act is "central" to his personal faith?); Hobby Lobby 134 S.Ct. at 2778
(This argument dodges the question that RFRA presents (whether the HHS mandate imposes a
substantial burden on the ability of the objecting parties to conduct business in accordance with
their religious beliefs) and instead addresses a very different question that the federal courts have
no business addressing (whether the religious belief asserted in a RFRA case is reasonable).).
It would be equally inappropriate for the Court to attempt to parse between what is a
burden, a significant burden, and a substantial burden. All parties agree that a burden
exists, and that this construction will make it impossible for [the Tribe] to properly worship and
engage in religious rituals. Hellwegian Tribe 1749 F.3d at 47. It is not for the Court to make the
theological determination of the nature or seriousness of this burden, as long as the claimants
have established that it does indeed burden their religion. The showing by the Tribe that these
actions will negatively affect the faiths of many of the Tribes members is enough for the
Court to move into the compelling governmental interest and narrowly tailored prongs of
RFRAs Free Exercise test. Id.
In this case, the question of substantial burden is not whether the Tribe should be satisfied
with the government extending the opportunity to visit the valley it holds sacred, but rather
whether or not this action impedes members of the Tribe from practicing their religion in
whatever manner they desire.
II. THE POLAR BEAR TRACKING REGULATION AFFORDS THE TRIBE ARTICLE
III STANDING
The spiritual harm created by the Fish and Wildlife Services polar bear regulation
satisfies the case or controversy requirement of Article III standing. Specifically, through

this concrete and particularized harm the Tribe suffered an injury in fact. The direct, concrete
nature of the harm and ESA 1540(g) satisfy prudential standing requirements.
A. The Tribes Spiritual Harm Constitutes Injury in Fact
The Tribe is bringing suit against FWS for spiritual harm caused by the polar bear
tracking program. Analyzing the Courts threshholds for aesthetic harm and expansion of noneconomic injury in fact indicate that spiritual harm is a cognizable interest for the purpose of
standing. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562 (citing Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734).
i. The Tribes Spiritual Harm Is Concrete
In Lujan, the Court explains that harm stemming from aesthetics is a cognizable interest
for the purpose of standing. Id. This threshold stemmed from the government permitting
development in Sequoia National Park that would adversely affect the scenery, natural and
historic objects and wildlife of the park and would impair the enjoyment of the park for future
generations. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972). The Tribe equates this noneconomic aesthetic harm to that of non-economic spiritual harm under the Establishment Clause.
Though the Establishment Clause is usually violated through governmental expressions
of sentiment toward a particular religion, [t]he Court has assiduously avoided limiting its
doctrines to endorsement, by saying "endorsement or disapproval," so disapproval is as much a
violation as endorsement. Catholic League for Religious & Civ. Rights v. City & County of San
Francisco, 624 F.3d 1043, 1058 (9th Cir. 2009). The polar bear regulation disapproves of the
Tribes religion, since it desecrates that which they hold most sacred: the polar bear. "The
concept of a 'concrete' injury is particularly elusive in the Establishment Clause
context. . .because the Establishment Clause is primarily aimed at protecting non-economic
interests of a spiritual, as opposed to a physical or pecuniary, nature." Id. at 1049. When relating
9

spiritual harm to physical interests courts have held that [t]he "contact" that matters is in the
mindacquisition of the knowledge that the government endorses (or condemns) a religion. Id.
at 1052.
However, the trend of cases. . .has been toward recognizing that injuries other than
economic harm are sufficient to establish Article III standing. Sierra Club 405 U.S. at 738. To
this end the Court has made clear that this sort of harminjury to interests of a spiritual
naturecan suffice to establish an "injury in fact" for purposes of Article III standing. Assn of
Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (U.S. 1970) (citing Abington
School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203).
ii. The Tribes Spiritual Harm is Particularized
Injury in fact requires that the spiritual harm caused by the polar bear tracking
regulation be particularized or, put another way, affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual
way Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562. This boils down to whether the appellants have alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the Court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions. . . . Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (U.S. 1962).
To understand the personal and individual way this regulation harms the Tribe,
standing only requires that good-faith religious beliefs are hampered. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599, 615 (1961). It does not require an inquiry into the sincerity of the Tribes beliefs. Id.
This threshold is met because the polar bear is sacred to the Tribe. The violation of the
autonomous sanctity of the ursine is directly disturbed by the tracking regulation. Hellwegian
Tribe 1749 F.3d at 43. By not acknowledging this personal and individual spiritual upheaval
faced by the Tribe, the dissent incorrectly applies Footnote 1 of Lujan. Hellwegian Tribe 1749
10

F.3d at 58 (Luna, J., dissenting).

The physical proximity requirement, as outlined in Lujan and Sierra Club, is inapposite
here. The Court found in Lujan and Sierra Club that it needs more than procedural injury to
establish entitlement. While the respondents in Lujan and Sierra Club were not directly affected
outside their interest in the subject, that is not the case here. The Tribe has both procedural injury
and a concrete and particularized interest in protecting the autonomous sanctity of their sacred
polar bear as outlined above.
Lastly, the dissent mischaracterizes Valley Forge as a bar on learning of harm through
news. Hellwegian Tribe 1749 F.3d at 5859. A closer inquiry reveals that psychological
consequences, while not sufficient if garnered through viewing disagreeable conduct alone,
establish entitlement where they [are] produced by the government condemnation of ones own
religion. Catholic League 624 F.3d at 1052. This condemnation exists here, and therefore the
Tribe has suffered a particularized injury.
B. The Tribes Procedural Challenge Is Permitted
The Tribe brings suit under the Endangered Species Act 1540(g). This citizen suit
provision grants express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential
standing rules. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). After bypassing the generalized
grievance prudential limitation, the Tribe is able to establish Article III standing through its
concrete and particularized injury.
i. Prudential Requirements Are Met
U.S. v. SCRAP established that standing is not to be denied simply because many people
suffer the same injury. 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973). Lujon reiterated this, holding that though
procedural injury is not always enough, when sufficiently linked with a concrete, particularized
11

interest it establishes entitlement. Though felt by many, the harm to polar bears is not a general
grievance because only the members of the Tribe are particularly affected due to its religious
beliefs.
Warth reinforces this by explaining that the Court normally bars general grievance(s)
that are shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens. Here the Tribes
interest and concrete injury not shared by all or a large class of citizens, since they are one of a
small number of people who hold this valley and the polar bears sacred. Hellwegian Tribe 1749
F.3d at 4243.
ii. Application Of The Citizen Suit Provision
Even if Congress waives the prudential limitation on generalized grievances, the Tribe
still needs to satisfy Article III standing requirements. First, the Endangered Species Act
1540(g) grants the respondents citizen suit status. This removes the prudential limitation on
generalized grievances. Second, Warth explains that while Congress may enact citizen suit
provisions, allowing potential litigants a way around prudential limitations, the litigants still
must allege a distinct and palpable injury to [themselves]. Warth 422 U.S. at 501. Due to the
Tribes sincerely held religious beliefthat polar bears are divinea concrete and particularized
injury exists. This injury, enough to establish entitlement, satisfies the injury in fact element of
Article III standing. See Catholic League 624 F.3d at 104950. (The Court treated standing (and
therefore the concreteness element of standing) as sufficient in all of these cases, even though
nothing was affected but the religious or irreligious sentiments of the plaintiffs.).1
It would not be necessary to decide whether appellants' allegations. . .will, ultimately,
entitle them to any relief, in order to hold that they have standing to seek it. If such
impairment does produce a legally cognizable injury, they are among those who have
sustained it. . . .They are entitled to a hearing and to the District Court's decision on their
1

Catholic League n. 1019.

12

claims. Baker at 208 (internal quotations omitted).

The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. Id. (citing Marbury v. Madison, 1
Cranch 137, 163 (1803)).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Respondent requests this Honorable Court to reverse the
decision of the Thirteenth Circuit in regard to respondents RFRA claim and affirm the
Thirteenth Circuits finding of standing for Respondent.

Respectfully Submitted,
13
Counsel for Respondent

13