a

b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i
j
k
l
m
n
o

Kuroda vs Jalandoni 83 SCRA 171

Yamashita vs Styer 75 Phil 563
Kookooritchkin vs Solicitor General 81 Phil 435
Paquete Haban 175 US 677, 1900
Ko Kim Chan vs Valdez Tan Keh GR No. L-5, September
17 1945
Gonzales vs Hechanova GR No, L-21897, October 22,
1963
Ichong vs Hernandez GRNo 7995, May 31 1957
North Sea Continental Shelf Case, IC Reports 1969
Military & Parliamentary Activities in and against
Nicaragua(Nicaragua vs US, ICJ Reports 1986
Asylum Case, ICJ Reports 1950
Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory
(Purtogal vs India)
Diversion of water from the Meuse (Netherlands vs
Belgium)
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (UK vs Ireland) ICJ Reports
1973
Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Company Case, ICJ
Report 1970
Mejoff v Director of Prisons 90 Phil 70 1951

G.R. No. L-2662

March 26, 1949
SHIGENORI KURODA vs. Major General
RAFAEL JALANDONI,
FACTS: Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a LieutenantGeneral of the Japanese Imperial Army and
Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial
Forces in The Philippines during a period covering
1943 and 1944 who is now charged before a
military Commission convened by the Chief of
Staff of the Armed forces of the Philippines with
having unlawfully disregarded and failed "to
discharge his duties as such command, permitting
them to commit brutal atrocities and other high
crimes against noncombatant civilians and
prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in
violation of the laws and customs of war"
comes before this Court seeking to establish the
illegality of Executive Order No. 68 of the
President of the Philippines: to enjoin and prohibit
respondents Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port
from participating in the prosecution of
petitioner's case before the Military Commission
and to permanently prohibit respondents from
proceeding with the case of petitioners.
The petitioner tenders the following principal
arguments.
First. "That Executive Order No. 68 (a law
establishing a National War Crimes Office
prescribing rule and regulation governing the trial
of accused war criminals) is illegal on the ground
of the fact that the Philippines is not a signatory
nor an adherent to the Hague Convention on
Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and
therefore petitioners is charged of 'crimes' not
based on law, national and international." Hence
petitioner argues "That in view off the fact that
this commission has been empanelled by virtue of
an unconstitutional law an illegal order this
commission is without jurisdiction to try herein
petitioner."
Second. That the participation in the
prosecution of the case against petitioner before
the Commission in behalf of the United State of
America of attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert
Port who are not attorneys authorized by the
Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines is
a diminution of our personality as an independent
state and their appointment as prosecutor are a
violation of our Constitution and Rules of Court for
the reason that they are not qualified to practice
law in the Philippines.
Third. That Attorneys Hussey and Port have no
personality as prosecution the United State not
being a party in interest in the case.
ISSUES:
1) Is Executive Order No. 68 unconstitutional

2)

Can American attorneys Hussey and Port

authorized
to
participate
in
the
prosecution

HELD:
1) No, it is valid and constitutional. Article 2 of
our Constitution provides in its section 3, that
The Philippines renounces war as an
instrument of national policy and adopts the
generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the of the nation.
It is a generally accepted principle of
international law that all those person,
military or civilian, who have been guilty of
planning preparing or waging a war of
aggression and of the commission of crimes
and offenses consequential and incidental
thereto in violation of the laws and customs of
war, of humanity and civilization are held
accountable therefor. Consequently in the
promulgation and enforcement of Execution
Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines
has acted in conformity with the generally
accepted and policies of international law
which are part of the our Constitution.
War is not ended simply because hostilities
have ceased. After cessation of armed
hostilities, an important incident is the
adoption of measure by the military
command of seize and subject to disciplinary
measure those enemies who have violated
the law of war. Consequently, the President as
Commander in Chief is fully empowered to
consummate this unfinished aspect of war
namely the trial and punishment of war
criminal
through
the
issuance
and
enforcement of Executive Order No. 68.
Petitioner argues that respondent Military
Commission has no Jurisdiction to try
petitioner for acts committed in violation of
the Hague Convention and the Geneva
Convention because the Philippines is not a
signatory to the first and signed the second
only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the
rules and regulation of the Hague and
Geneva conventions form, part of and are
wholly based on the generally accepted
principals of international law. In facts these
rules and principles were accepted by the two
belligerent nation the United State and Japan
who were signatories to the two Convention,
Such rule and principles therefore form part
of the law of our nation even if the Philippines
was not a signatory to the conventions
embodying them for our Constitution has
been deliberately general and extensive in its
scope and is not confined to the recognition
of rule and principle of international law as
continued inn treaties to which our
government may have been or shall be a
signatory.

2)

Furthermore when the crimes charged against

petitioner were allegedly committed the
Philippines was under the sovereignty of
United States and thus we were equally
bound together with the United States and
with Japan to the right and obligation
contained in the treaties between the
belligerent countries. These rights and
obligation were not erased by our assumption
of full sovereignty. If at all our emergency as a
free state entitles us to enforce the right on
our own of trying and punishing those who
committed crimes against crimes against our
people. In this connection it is well to
remember what we have said in the case
of Laurel vs. Misa (76 Phil., 372):
. . . The change of our form government
from Commonwealth to Republic does not
affect the prosecution of those charged
with the crime of treason committed
during then Commonwealth because it is
an offense against the same sovereign
people. . . .
By the same token war crimes committed
against our people and our government
while we were a Commonwealth are
triable and punishable by our present
Republic.
Yes. Military Commission is a special military
tribunal governed by a special law and not by
the Rules of court which govern ordinary civil
court. There is nothing in Executive Order No.
68 which requires that counsel appearing
before said commission must be attorneys
qualified to practice law in the Philippines in
accordance with the Rules of Court. In facts it
is common in military tribunals that counsel
for the parties are usually military personnel
who are neither attorneys nor even possessed
of legal training.
Secondly the appointment of the two
American attorneys is not violative of our
nation sovereignty. It is only fair and proper
that United States, which has submitted the
vindication of crimes against her government
and her people to a tribunal of our nation
should be allowed representation in the trial
of those very crimes. If there has been any
relinquishment of sovereignty it has not been
by our government but by the United State
Government which has yielded to us the trial
and punishment of her enemies. The least
that we could do in the spirit of comity is to
allow them representation in said trials.

3)

Alleging that the United State is not a party in

interest in the case petitioner challenges the
personality of attorneys Hussey and Port as
prosecutors. It is of common knowledge that
the United State and its people have been
equally if not more greatly aggrieved by the
crimes with which petitioner stands charged
before the Military Commission. It can be
considered a privilege for our Republic that a

leader nation should submit the vindication of

the honor of its citizens and its government to
a military tribunal of our country
The Military Commission having been
convened by virtue of a valid law with
jurisdiction over the crimes charged which fall
under the provisions of Executive Order No.
68, and having said petitioner in its custody,
this Court will not interfere with the due
process of such Military commission.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
Executive Order No. 68., is, therefore, null and
void, because, though it the President of the
Philippines usurped power expressly vested by
the Constitution in Congress and in the Supreme
Court.
The respondents suggest that the President of the
Philippines issued Executive Order No. 68 under
the emergency power granted to him by
Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 620, and Commonwealth
Act No. 671

G.R. No. L-129

December 19, 1945
TOMOYUKI YAMASHITA vs WILHELM D.
STYER, Commanding General, United States
Army Forces, Western Pacific,
FACTS:
Tomoyuki Yamashita, erstwhile commanding
general of the 14th army group of the Japanese
Imperial Army in the Philippines, and now charged
before an American Military Commission with the
most monstrous crimes ever committed against
the American and Filipino peoples, comes to this
Court with a petition for habeas corpus and
prohibition against Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer,
Commanding General of the United States Army
Forces, Western Pacific. It is alleged therein that
petitioner after his surrender became a prisoner
of war of the United States of America but was
later removed from such status and placed in
confinement as an accused war criminal charged
before
an
American
Military
Commission
constituted by respondent Lieutenant General
Styer; and he now asks that he be reinstated to
his former status as prisoner of war, and that the
Military Commission be prohibited from further
trying him, upon the following grounds:
(1) That the Military Commission was not
duly constituted, and, therefore, it is
without jurisdiction;
(2) That the Philippines cannot be considered
as an occupied territory, and the Military
Commission cannot exercise jurisdiction
therein;
(3) That Spain, the "protecting power" of
Japan, has not been given notice of the
implementing trial against petitioner,
contrary to the provisions of the Geneva
Convention of July 27, 1892, and
therefore, the Military Commission has no
jurisdiction to try the petitioner;
(4) That there is against the petitioner no
charge of an offense against the laws of
war; and
(5) That the rules of procedure and evidence
under which the Military Commission
purports to be acting denied the
petitioner a fair trial.
ISSUE:
HELD:
We believe and so hold that the petition
for habeas corpus is untenable. It seeks no
discharge of petitioner from confinement but
merely his restoration to his former status as a
prisoner of war, to be interned, not confined. The
relative difference as to the degree of
confinement in such cases is a matter of military
measure, disciplinary in character, beyond the
jurisdiction of civil courts.
Neither may the petition for prohibition prosper
against Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer. The military
Commission is not made party respondent in this
case, and although it may be acting, as alleged,
without jurisdiction, no order may be issued in

these case proceedings requiring it to refrain from

trying the petitioner.
Furthermore, this Court has no jurisdiction to
entertain the petition even if the commission be
joined as respondent. As we have said in Raquiza
vs. Bradford (pp. 50, 61, ante), ". . . an attempt of
our civil courts to exercise jurisdiction over the
United States Army before such period (state of
war) expires, would be considered as a violation
of this country's faith, which this Court should not
be the last to keep and uphold." (Emphasis
supplied) We have said this in a case where
Filipino citizens were under confinement, and we
can say no less in a case where the person
confined is an enemy charged with the most
heinous
atrocities
committed
against
the
American and Filipino peoples.
True that the rule was made applicable in time of
war, and there is a conflict of opinion as to
whether war has already terminated. War is not
ended simply because hostilities have ceased.
After cessation of armed hostilities, incident of
war may remain pending which should be
disposed of as in time of war. "An important
incident to a conduct of a war is the adoption of
measure by the military command not only to
repel and defeat the enemies but to seize and
subject to disciplinary measures those enemies
who in their attempt to thwart or impede our
military effort to have violated the law of the war."
(Ex parte Quirin, 317 US., 1; 63 Sup. Ct., 2.)
Indeed, the power to create a Military Commission
for the trial and punishment of war criminals is an
aspect of waging war. And, in the language of a
writer, a Military Commission "has jurisdiction so
long as a technical state of war continues. This
includes the period of an armistice, or military
occupation, up to the effective date of a treaty
agreement." (Cowles,Trial of War Criminals by
Military Tribunals, American Bar Association
Journal, June, 1944.)
Upon the other hand, we have once said
(Payomo vs. Floyd, 42 Phil., 788), and this
applicable in time of war as well as the time of
peace that this Court has no power to review
upon habeas corpus the proceedings of a military
or naval tribunal, an that, in such case, "the single
inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction. That being
established, the habeas corpus must be denied
and the petitioner discharged." (In re Grimley, 137
U.S., 147; 11 Sup. Ct., 54; 34 La. ed., 636.)
Following this rule in the instant case, we find that
the Military Commission has been validly
constituted and it has jurisdiction both over the
person of the petitioner and over the offenses
with which he is charged.
The Commission has been validly constituted by
Lieutenant General Styer duly issued by General
Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief, United
States Army Force Pacific, in accordance in
authority vested in him and with radio
communication from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as
shown by Exhibits C, E, G, and H, attached by
petition. Under paragraph 356 of the Rules of the
Land Welfare a Military Commission for the trial

and punishment of the war criminals must be

designated
by
the
belligerent.
And
the
belligerent's representative in the present case is
none other than the Commander in Chief of the
United States Army in the Pacific. According to the
Regulations Governing the Trial of the War
Criminals in the Pacific, attached as Exhibit F to
the petition, the "trial of persons, units and
organizations accused as a war criminals will be
the Military Commissions to be convened by or
under the authority of the Commander in Chief,
United States Army Forces, Pacific." Articles of
War Nos. 12 and 15 recognized the "Military
Commission" appointed by military command as
an appropriate tribunal for the trial and
punishment of offenses against the law of the war
not ordinarily tried by court martial. (Ex
parte Quirin, supra.) And this has always been the
United States military practice at since the
Mexican War of 1847 when General Winfield Scott
took the position that, under the laws of war, a
military commander has an implied power to
appoint and convene a Military Commission. This
is upon the theory that since the power to create
a Military Commission is an aspect of waging war,
Military Commanders have that power unless
expressly withdrawn from them.
The Military Commission thus duly constituted has
jurisdiction both over the person of the petitioner
and over the offenses with which he is charged. It
has jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner
by reason of his having fallen into the hands of
the United States Army Forces. Under paragraph
347 of the Rules of the Land Warfare, "the
commanders ordering the commission of such
acts, or under whose authority they are
committed by their troops, may be punished by
the belligerent into whose hands they may fall."
As to the jurisdiction of the Military Commission
over war crimes, the Supreme Court of the United
States said:
From the very beginning of its history this
Court has recognized and applied the law
of war as including that part of the law of
nations which prescribes, for the conduct
of war, the status rights and duties and of
enemy nations as well as of enemy
individuals. By the Articles of War, and
especially Article 15, Congress has
explicitly provided, so far as it may
constitutionally do so, that military
tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try
offenders or offenses against the law of
war in appropriate cases. Congress, in
addition to making rules for the
government of our Armed Forces, has
thus exercised its authority to define and
punish offenses against the law of nations
by sanctioning, within constitutional
limitations, the jurisdiction of military
commissions to try persons and offenses
which, according to the rules and
precepts of the law of nations, and more
particularly the law of war, are cognizable

by such tribunals. (Ex parte Quirin, 317

U.S. 1, 27-28; 63 Sup. Ct., 2.)
Petitioner is charged before the Military
Commission sitting at Manila with having
permitted members of his command "to commit
brutal atrocities and other high crimes against the
people of the United States and of its allies and
dependencies, particularly the Philippines," crimes
and atrocities which in the bills of particulars, are
described as massacre and extermination of
thousand
and
thousands
of
unarmed
noncombatant civilians by cruel and brutal
means, including bayoneting of children and
raping of young girls, as well as devastation and
destruction of public, or private, and religious
property for no other motive than pillage and
hatred. These are offenses against the laws of the
war as described in paragraph 347 of the Rules of
Land Warfare.
It is maintained, however, that, according to the
Regulations Governing the Trial of War Criminals
in the Pacific. "the Military Commission . . . shall
have jurisdiction over all of Japan and other areas
occupied by the armed forces commanded by the
Commander in Chief, United States Army Forces,
Pacific" (emphasis supplied), and the Philippines is
not an occupied territory. The American Forces
have occupied the Philippines for the purpose of
liberating the Filipino people from the shackles of
Japanese tyranny, and the creation of a Military
Commission for the trial and punishment of
Japanese war criminals is an incident of such war
of liberation.
It is maintained that Spain, the "protecting power"
of Japan, has not been given notice before trial
was begun against petitioner, contrary to the
provisions of the Geneva Convention of July 27,
1929. But there is nothing in that Convention
showing that notice is a prerequisite to the
jurisdiction of Military Commissions appointed by
victorious belligerent. Upon the other hand, the
unconditional surrender of Japan and her
acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam
Ultimatum are a clear waiver of such a notice. It
may be stated, furthermore, that Spain has
severed her diplomatic relation of Japan because
of atrocities committed by the Japanese troops
against Spaniards in the Philippines. Apparently,
therefore, Spain has ceased to be the protecting
power of Japan.
And, lastly, it is alleged that the rules of
procedure and evidence being followed by the
Military Commission in the admission of allegedly
immaterial or hearsay evidence, cannot divest the
commission of its jurisdiction and cannot be
reviewed in a petition for the habeas corpus. (25
Am. Jur., 218; Collins vs. McDonald, 258 U. S. 416;
66 Law. ed., 692; 42 Sup. Ct., 326).
Separate Opinions
OZAETA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I dissent, however, from the portion of the opinion
of the Court which cites and applies the
case Raquiza vs. Bradford , to the effect that an
attempt of our civil court to exercise jurisdiction

over the United States Army would considered as

a violation of this country's faith. The decision of
Raquiza case, from which I dissented, was based
mainly of the case of Coleman vs. Tennessee, in
which was mentioned merely by way of argument
the rule of international law to effect that a
foreign army, permitted to march through a
friendly country to be stationed in it, by
permission of its government or sovereign, is
exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of
the place. After reviewing the facts and the ruling
of the court in the Coleman case, I said in my
dissenting opinion in the Raquiza case the
following:
. . . Thus it is clear that the rule of
international
law
above
mentioned
formed no part of the holding of the court
in the said case.
Neither can such rule of international law
of itself be applicable to the relation
between the Philippines and the United
States, for the reason that the former is
still under the sovereign of the latter. The
United States Army is not foreign to the
Philippines. It is here not by permission or
invitation of the Philippine Government
but by right of sovereignty of the United
States over the Philippines. It has the
same right to be here as it has to be in
Hawaii or California. The United States
has the same obligation to defend and
protect the Philippines, as it has to
defend and protect Hawaii or California,
from foreign invasion. The citizens of the
Philippines owe the same allegiance to
the United States of the America as the
citizens of any territory or States of the
Union.
That the case of Coleman vs. Tennessee was
erroneously invoked and applied by this Court in
the case ofRaquiza vs. Bradford, was admitted by
Mr. Wolfson, the attorney for Lieutenant Colonel
Bradford, who, notwithstanding the judgment in
favor of his client, moved this Court to modify the
majority opinion "by eliminating all reference to
the case of Coleman vs. Tennessee (97 U.S. 509).
because, as well pointed out in both dissenting
opinions, said case has no application whatever to
the case at bar." .
The rule of international law mentioned in the
Coleman case and erroneously applied by analogy
in the Raquiza case, has likewise no application
whatever to the case at bar. A mistake when
repeated only becomes a blunder.

G.R. No. L-1812

August 27, 1948
EREMES KOOKOORITCHKIN, petitioner,
vs.
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, oppositor.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A.
Gianzon and Solicitor Florencio Villamor for
appellant.
L. D. Lockwood and Manuel O. Chan for appellee.
FACTS: In August, 1941, appellee filed with the
lower court a petition for naturalization,
accompanied with supporting affidavits of two
citizens, copy of a declaration of intention sworn
in July, 1940, and proper notice of the hearing.
The petition was finally set for hearing on
December 18, 1941, but it was held on that date
because the province was invaded by the
Japanese forces on December 14, and the case
remained pending until the records were
destroyed during the military operations for
liberation in March, 1945. The case was declared
reconstituted on May 10, 1947, and the evidence
was presented on August 28 and September 30,
1947. On the same day resolution was issued
granting the petition.
Although appellant was represented at the
hearing and cross-examined the witnesses for the
petitioner, he did not file an opposition or
presented any evidence.
The lower court made the findings of fact in the
following paragraphs of its resolution:
Eremes Kookooritchkin applies for Philippine
citizenship naturalization under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act 473, as amended by Act 535.
The records shows that in August, 1941, he filed
his petition for naturalization supported by the
affidavits of ex-Judge Jaime M. Reyes and Dr.
Salvador Mariano, both residents of Camarines
Sur. In the preceding year, in July, 1940 to be
precise, he filed his declaration of intention to
become a citizen of this country. Notice of the
hearing was published as required by law.
It was established at the hearing that the
petitioner is a native-born Russian, having first
seen the light of day on November 4, 1897 in the
old City of St. Petersburg, Russia. He grew up as a
citizen
of
the
defunct
Imperial
Russian
Government under the Czars. World War I found
him in the military service of this Government. In
1915 he volunteered for the Imperial Russian
navy and was sent to the Navy Aviation School.
He fought with the Allies in the Baltic Sea, was
later transferred to the eastern front in Poland,
and much later was sent as a navy flier to Asia
Minor. In the latter part of the war, but before the
Russian capitulation, he was transferred to the
British Air Force under which he served for
fourteen months. When the revolution broke out
in Russia in 1917, he joined the White Russian
Army at Vladivostok and fought against the
Bolsheviks until 1922 when the White Russian

Army was overwhelmed by the Bolsheviks. As he

refused to join the Bolshevik regime, he fled by
sea from Vladivostok to Shanghai and from this
Chinese port he found his way to Manila, arriving
at this port as a member of a group of White
Russians under Admiral Stark in March, 1923. He
stayed in Manila for about seven months, then
moved to Olongapo, Zambales, where he resided
for about a year, and from this place he went to
Iriga, Camarines Sur, where he established his
permanent residence since May, 1925. He has
remained a resident of this municipality, except
for a brief period from 1942 to July, 1945, when
by reason of his underground activities he roamed
mountains of Caramoan as a guerrilla officer. After
liberation he returned to Iriga where again he
resides up to the present time.
The applicant is married to a Filipino by the name
of Concepcion Segovia, with whom he has one
son named Ronald Kookooritchkin. He is at
present studying in Saint Agnes Academy, at
Legaspi, Albay, a school duly recognized by the
Government.
The applicant is shop superintendent of A. L.
Ammen Transportation Company, with about
eighty Filipino employees working under him. He
receives an annual salary of P13,200 with free
quarters and house allowance. He also owns
stocks and bonds of this and other companies.
The applicant speaks and writes English and the
Bicol dialect. Socially he intermingles with the
Filipinos, attending parties, dances and other
social functions with his wife. He has a good moral
character and believes in the principles
underlying the Philippine Constitution. He has
never been accused of any crime. On the other
hand, he has always conducted himself in a
proper and irreproachable manner during his
entire period of residence in Camarines Sur, in his
relations with the constituted authorities as well
as with the community.
Although he could have lived in ease by
maintaining good relations with the enemy by
reason of his being Russian-born during the years
preceding the declaration of war by Russia against
Japan, the applicant of his own volition chose to
cast his lot with the guerrilla movement and
fought the enemy in several encounters in the
Province of Camarines Sur. He belonged to the
guerrilla outfit of Colonel Padua with rank of
major. Upon the arrival of the forces of liberation
he was attached to the American Army from April
to June, 1945.
Although a Russian by birth he is not a citizen of
Soviet Russia. He disclaims allegiance to the
present Communist Government of Russia. He is,
therefore, a stateless refugee in this country,
belonging to no State, much less to the present
Government of the land of his birth to which he is
uncompromisingly opposed. He is not against
organized government or affiliated with any

association which upholds and teaches doctrine

opposing all organized governments. He does not
believe in the necessity or propriety of violence,
personal assault or assassination for the success
or predominance of his ideas. Neither is he a
polygamist or a believer in the practice of
polygamy. He is not suffering from any mental
alienation or incurable contagious disease.
Appellant assigns four errors in the appealed
resolution. We will consider them separately.
I
Appellant claims that the lower court erred in not
finding that the declaration of intention to become
a Filipino citizen filed by appellee is invalid and
insufficient as a basis for the petition of
naturalization. The question calls for the
application of the following provision of section 5
of the Revised Naturalization Law:
No declaration shall be valid until entry for
permanent residence has been established and a
certificate showing the date, place and manner of
his arrival has been issued.
Appellant alleges that no documentary or
testimonial evidence was introduced to establish
the fact that appellee had lawfully been admitted
into the Philippines for permanent residence.
In the reconstituted declaration (page 11, record
on appeal) the following can be read:
I arrived at the Port of Manila on or about the first
day of March, 1923, as shown by the attached
certificate of arrival or landing certificate of
residence.
The records of the Bureau of Justice, where the
declarations of intention to become a Filipino
citizen were filed, had been lost or destroyed
during the battle for the liberation of Manila, and
the certificate alluded to has not been
reconstituted.
Appellant's contention that attachment of the
certificate of arrival is essential to the validity of a
declaration finds no support in the wordings of the
law, as the above-quoted section 5 of
Commonwealth Act no. 473 uses the words "has
been issued.
Appellee suggests that we would not consider the
question here raised by appellant, the latter
having failed to raise it in lower court and points
out that there is testimonial evidence showing
appellee's arrival March, 1923, and that he was
lawfully admitted for permanent residence, and
the testimony of petitioner has not been refuted.
Appellee's alleges that the office of the President
has certified that it is a matter of record that
petitioner was one of the Russian refugees who
entered the Philippines under the command of
Admiral Stark, the facts regarding arrival of the
latter fleet being a matter of common knowledge,
widely publicized in the newspapers at the time,
of which this Court may properly take judicial
notice under section 5 of Rule 123. When the fleet
entered the Philippine waters, it was met by a

Governor General Wood who, later, took the

matter up with the authorities in Washington in
lengthy correspondence, and the 1,200 persons
manning the fleet were allowed to land and to
remain in the Philippines or proceed to other
countries, except about 800 who were allowed to
go to the United States and given free
transportation on the naval transport "Merritt."
The ships of the fleet were sold in the Philippines.
The undisputed fact that the petitioner has been
continuously residing in the Philippines for about
25 years, without having been molested by the
authorities, who are presumed to have been
regularly performing their duties and would have
arrested petitioner if his residence is illegal, as
rightly contended by appellee, can be taken as
evidence that he is enjoying permanent residence
legally. That a certificate of arrival has been
issued is a fact that should be accepted upon the
petitioner's
undisputed
statement
in
his
declaration of July, 1940, that the certificate
cannot be supposed that the receiving official
would have accepted the declaration without the
certificate mentioned therein as attached thereto.
We conclude that petitioner's declaration is valid
under section 5 of the Naturalization Law, failure
to
reconstitute
the
certificate
of
arrival
notwithstanding.
What
an
unreconstituted
document intended to prove may be shown by
other competent evidence.
II
The second assignment of error touches upon two
questions, that the lower court erred (1) in not
finding that appellee has not established a legal
residence in the Philippines, and (2) in not finding
that he cannot speak and write any of the
principal Philippine languages.
The first question has already been disposed of in
the above discussion. Perusal of the testimonies
on record leads to the conclusion that petitioner
has shown legal residence in the Philippines for a
continuous period of not less than ten years as
required by section 2 of Commonwealth Act No.
473.
As to the next question, appellant alleges that in
the oral test at the hearing, it was demonstrated
that petitioner has only a smattering of Bicol, the
Filipino language that petitioner alleges to know,
and he cannot speak it as he was not able to
translate from English to Bicol questions asked by
the court and the provincial fiscal, although, in the
continuation of the hearing on September 30,
1947, "surprisingly enough, he succeeded
answering correctly in Bicol the questions
propounded by his counsel, however, he fumbled
and failed to give the translation of such a
common word as 'love' which the fiscal asked of
him.
The lower court made the finding of fact that
applicant speaks and writes English and Bicol and
there seems to be no question about the

competency of the judge who made the

pronouncement, because he has shown by the
appealed resolution and by his questions
propounded to appellee, that he has command of
both English and Bicol.
The law has not set a specific standard of the
principal Philippine language. A great number of
standards can be set. There are experts in English
who say that Shakespeare has used in his works
15,000 different English words, and the King's
Bible about 10,000, while about 5,000 are used by
the better educated persons and about 3,000 by
the average individual. While there may be
persons ambitious enough to have a command of
the about 600,000 words recorded in the
Webster's International Dictionary, there are
authorities who would reduce basic English to a
few hundred words. Perhaps less than one
hundred well selected words will be enough for
the ordinary purposes of daily life.
There is a reason to believe that the lower court's
pronouncement is well taken considering the fact
that, after he was liberated in 1942 from the
Japanese in the Naga prison, petitioner joined the
guerrilla in the Bicol region, took part in
encounters and skirmishes against the Japanese,
and remained with the guerrilla until the
Americans liberated the Bicol provinces. If
appellee with his smattering of Bicol was able to
get along with his Bicol comrades in the
hazardous life of the resistance movement, we
believe that his knowledge of the language
satisfies the requirement of the law.
But appellant contends that there is no piece of
positive
evidence
to
support
petitioner's
allegation that he can write too in the Bicol
language. There, is, however, on record
circumstantial evidence from which it can be
concluded that petitioner ought to know also how
to write Bicol. We know that Bicol, as all the
important Philippine languages, uses the same
alphabet used in English, and it is much easier to
write Bicol than English, because it is phonetic.
Vowels and consonants have in them single and
not interchangeable phonetic values, while
English words deviate very often from the basic
sounds of the alphabet. The ability to write cannot
be denied to a person like petitioner, who has
undergone the exacting technical training to be
able to render services as flier in the Russian
Naval Squadron in the Baltic Sea and in the British
Air Forces during the first World War. The
difference between the Cyrillic alphabet, as now
used by Russians, and our Roman alphabet,
cannot weigh much to deny petitioner the ability
to use the latter. A person who has shown the
command of English which can be seen in his
testimony on record can easily make use of an
alphabet of twenty or more letters universally
used in this country where he has been residing
continuously for 25 years.

III
Appellant contends that the lower court erred in
finding appellee stateless and not a Russian
citizen and in not finding that he has failed to
establish that he is not disqualified for Philippine
citizenship under section 4 (h) of the Revised
Naturalization Law.
It is contended that petitioner failed to show that
under the laws of Russia, appellee has lost his
Russian citizenship and failed to show that Russia
grants to Filipinos the right to become a
naturalized citizens or subjects thereof. The
controversy centers on the question as to whether
petitioner is a Russian citizen or is stateless.
Petitioner testified categorically that he is not a
Russian citizen and that he has no citizenship. His
testimony
supports
the
lower
court's
pronouncement that petitioner is a stateless
refugee in this country.
Appellant points out that petitioner stated in his
petition for naturalization that he is citizen or
subject of the Empire of Russia, but the Empire of
Russia has ceased to exist since the Czars were
overthrown in 1917 by the Bolshevists, and the
petitioner disclaims allegiance or connection with
the Soviet Government established after the
overthrow of the Czarist Government.
We do not believe that the lower court erred in
pronouncing
appellee
stateless.
Appellee's
testimony, besides being uncontradicted, is
supported by the well-known fact that the
ruthlessness of modern dictatorship has scattered
throughout the world a large number of stateless
refugees or displaced persons, without country
and without flag. The tyrannical intolerance of
said dictatorships toward all opposition induced
them
to
resort
to
beastly
oppression,
concentration camps and blood purges, and it is
only natural that the not-so-fortunate ones who
were able to escape to foreign countries should
feel the loss of all bonds of attachment to the
hells which were formerly their fatherland's.
Petitioner belongs to that group of stateless
refugees.
Knowing, as all cultured persons all over the world
ought to know, the history, nature and character
of the Soviet dictatorship, presently the greatest
menace to humanity and civilization, it would be
technically fastidious to require further evidence
of petitioner's claim that he is stateless than his
testimony that he owes no allegiance to the
Russian Communist Government and, is because
he has been at war with it, he fled from Russia to
permanently reside in the Philippines. After
finding in this country economic security in a
remunerative job, establishing a family by
marrying a Filipina with whom he has a son, and
enjoying for 25 years the freedoms and blessings
of our democratic way of life, and after showing
his resolution to retain the happiness he found in
our political system to the extent of refusing to

claim Russian citizenship even to secure his

release from the Japanese and of casting his lot
with that of our people by joining the fortunes and
misfortunes of our guerrillas, it would be beyond
comprehension to support that the petitioner
could feel any bond of attachment to the Soviet
dictatorship.
IV
The fourth and last assignment of error need not
be discussed, it being only a sequel of the other
assignments and has necessarily been disposed
of in their discussion.
The appealed resolution is affirmed.
Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla and
Tuason, JJ., concur.

U.S. Supreme Court

The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900)
The Paquete Habana
Nos. 895-896
Argued November 7-8, 1899
Decided January 8, 1900
175 U.S. 677 (1900)
APPEALS FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
UNITED
STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
FLORIDA
In April 1898 two fishing vessels, the Paquete
Habana and the Lola, separately left Cuban ports
in Havana in order to fish. The two vessels were
eventually captured by US Naval vessels as part
of Admiral William T. Sampson's blockade of Cuba,
who was ordered to execute the blockade 'in
pursuance of the laws of the United States, and
the law of nations applicable to such cases.' The
vessels were placed within Cuba's territorial
waters at the onset of the SpanishAmerican War
and then taken to Key West, where both vessels
were eventually auctioned by the district court.
Both vessels were valued under the price of
$2,000(US) and were thus not originally thought
to be exempt from seizure.
Admiral Sampson justified the seizures by stating
that most fishing vessels, flying under the Spanish
banner were manned by excellent seamen, "liable
for further service" as naval reserves, an asset
that could eventually be used against US interests
in the Spanish-American War.
The owners of the vessels however made an
appeal to the circuit courts, citing a long held
tradition by nations of exempting fishing vessels
from prize capture in times of war. This "tradition",
a primary example of customary international law,

dates back from an order by Henry IV in 1403,

and has more or less been observed by a large
majority of States ever since.
At the time of capture both vessels had no
evidence of aiding the enemy, and were unaware
of the US naval blockade. No arms were found on
board, and no attempts were made to either run
the blockade or resist capture.
The court's decision and merits[edit]
The United States Supreme Court cited lengthy
legal precedents established to support the
existence of a customary international law that
exempted fishing vessels from prize capture,
dating all the way back to ancient times and
occurring repeatedly between Great Britain and
France. In 1403, King Henry IV of England issued
his officers leave fisherman alone during times of
war. He then signed a treaty with France
reaffirming this act between both parties. Again in
1521 between Emperor Charles V and Francis I of
France a treaty was assigned. This treaty was
invoked due to a desperate rise in the markets for
herring. With the war between the two countries
raging on, fisherman dared not venture out to
sea. Therefore, a treaty was necessary on both
accounts to prevent starvation among those who
relied upon cheap herring, namely the lower
classes. Situations similar to this continued to
crop up throughout history prior to the Paquete
case. Using this as a basis for customary law, the
court then eventually found the capture of both
vessels as "unlawful and without probable cause",
reversed the District Court's decision, and ordered
the proceeds of the auction as well as any profits
made from her cargo to be restored to the
claimant, "with damages and costs".
Fuller's dissent[edit]