Coercive Diplomacy

Jentleson and Whytlock analyzed Libyas decision on terror weapons using what they
termed coercive diplomacy. Coercive diplomacy refers to the diplomatic technique of using the
threat of force instead of actually using force. Nations will choose to decline negotiations and
deal with the consequences of non-conformity or they will choose to accept the negotiations to
avoid the consequences, whichever leads to the highest cost-benefit ratio. The effectiveness of a
particular coercive strategy depends on the criteria: the coercers credibility to uphold
consequences (coercive credibility), the link between coercers demands and what the target
concedes (reciprocity), and the relationship within the coercers strategy between the scope and
nature of the objectives being pursued and the instruments being used in their pursuit
(proportionality).1

Libya
From the 1980s to 2003, the United States went through three distinct phases of coercive
diplomacy towards Libya. Throughout the phases, the Unites States shifts from a focus on
military force and sanctions (1981-1988), toward a focus on multi-national sanctions (19891998), and finally towards direct talks and negotiations with Libya to achieve an agreement in
2003 (1999-2003)2.
During the first phase, Libya was involved in terrorist attack and actively pursued weapons of
mass destruction. To retaliate, the Reagan administration imposed bans on importing oil and
refined petroleum from Libya. Reagan also targeted Libyas leader Qaddafi indirectly by
bombing his family compound, military camps, and terrorist camps3. Clearly, Reagan was
focused on regime change. This proved ineffective.
Reagans strategy did show coercive credibility by way of his bombings, but his strategy lacked
the other criteria. The Reagan administrations goal was to remove Qaddafi from power in Libya
to stop his pursuit of WMD, while Qaddafi goal was to continue ruling Libya and invest in
WMDs and terrorism: a clear sign that reciprocity was not part of the strategy. The Reagan
administration did not have the means to remove Qaddafi from power, as there was little
international assistance.4

1 Jentleson & Whytock, page 51

2 Jentleson & Whytock, page 50
3 Jentleson & Whytock, page 58

During the first Bush and Clinton administrations, the United States coercive strategy shifted
toward multilateral sanctions and policy change. Bush ended operations to overthrow Qaddafis
rule in Libyra by early 1995 indicating a focus on policy change and maintain proportionality.
Due to the Pan Am and UTA bombing, the United States was able to garner support from Britain
to set demands on Libya terrorism policies. Furthermore, Libya falsely claimed a chemical
weapons plant was destroyed in a fire in fear that the US would bomb it. These two facts show
that the USs strategy meets the coercive credibility criteria as well.5 The USs strategy did not
meet reciprocity, however, as they were not willing to make any negotiations with Qaddafi over
WMDs or reasonably settle the Pan Am bombing cases.6
During phase three, the United States coercive diplomacy strategy successfully integrated all
three criteria for success. Coercive credibility was shown in the invasion of Iraq and in the
United Nations support to impose sanctions on Libya7. By having direct, secret talks with Libya,
the second Bush administration was able to display reciprocity in its diplomatic strategy. And
finally, by keeping a focus on policy change and not regime change, proportionality between
goals and means was preserved8.
Iran
The United States also went through three phases of coercive diplomacy with Iran from 2002
until 2015. During the first phase, coercive diplomacy is successful, but it doesnt last long
because it is missing one criteria. Iran moves towards developing a nuclear program and refuses
to compromise. The United States changes their strategy to be more aggressive and eventually
reaches a conclusion with Iran.
Iran had secretly developed its own uranium enrichment program in the 1990s. In 2002,
the international atomic energy agency conducted inspection the Natanz enrichment plant in Iran
on suspicion of nuclear arms development. Iran made a deal with France, Britain, and Germany
to temporally suspend the enrichment program and disclose all nuclear activities in exchange for
peaceful nuclear technology9. The United States later supported the Paris Agreement in 2005 and
removed condoned Iran applying to be a part of the World Trade Organization. This strategy
4 Jentleson & Whytock, page 60
5 Jentleson & Whytock, page 63-64
6 Jentleson & Whytock, page 65
7 Jentleson & Whytock, page 75
8 Jentleson & Whytock, page 76

meets proportionality, as the United States has the support of other important international
powers, as well as meeting reciprocity by making a deal that reasonably benefits Iran. Coercive
credibility is not present in the USs strategy here however, so the agreement falls apart shortly
afterward10.
The second phase, from 2006 until 2010, the United States and international organization
focused on imposing heavy sanctions on Iran. Through four rounds, these sanctions were
beginning to seriously affect Irans economy11. The United States placed further restrictions on
domestic banks from doing business with Iranian banks. This strategy employs coercive
credibility and proportionality through multilateral sanctions, but does not employ reciprocity as
Iran is still focused on developing a nuclear program.
During phase three, the United States realized that the multilateral sanctions were ineffective in
coercing an Iranian policy change. Direct negotiations with Iran eventually led to an agreement
where Iran could still have their enrichment program, but was restricted to a lower enrichment12.
Finally, all three criteria are met. Coercive credibility and proportionality is met with heavy
multinational sanctions on Iran, and reciprocity is employed because the Iran is allowed to
maintain their program, but under restrictions that leave the US content.

North Koreas Nuclear Behavior

North Koreas nuclear behavior does not clearly fit any of the described models. North Korea
goes through several phases of nuclear development and nuclear restraint13. I believe these
phases can be explained by North Koreas need to be viewed as a legitimate, powerful country
that can stand on its own. Any other country not willing to accept this is North Koreas enemy
and North Korea may respond according to Scott Sagans Security theory.
During the early 1990s, North Korea was moving towards nuclear power. NK felt that they were
threatened by the nuclear super powers and began developing their own nuclear program. When
the US withdrew nuclear weapons from South Korea and the Team Spirit military exercises were
9 Lecture outline on Iran, page 1
10 Katzman, page 19
11 Lecture outline on Iran, page 4
12 Katzman, page 24
13 Lecture notes on North Korea, page 1

stopped, North Korea agrees to a denuclearization accord14. Here, North Korea shows restraint
once South Korea and the United States show respect. However, once the Team Spirit exercises
resume, North Korea lashes out by threatening to leave the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 199315.
Clearly, North Korea it is not respected and resumes on the nuclear path. War nearly breaks out,
and former US President Jimmy Carter visits North Korea personally to speak to Kim Jong-il16.
Kim Jong satisfies Carters requests during the meeting because Kim-Jong views the direct talks
as a form of respect.
North Korea agrees to the Agreed Framework in 1994 in which Pyongyang agreed to give up its
indigenous gas-graphite reactor program for the promise of two [Light Water Reactors] In
2002, the Bush administration canceled the Agreed Framework, and the promise of two Light
Water Reactors, because North Korea was still developing its missile program17. Here, the model
breaks down because North Korea was in talks with the United States, but it was still developing
its WDM powers. However, the United States was failing to follow through on its agreements as
well.
During the end of the second Bush administration, the United States changed diplomatic tactics
with Pyongyang. It finally agreed to direct negotiations with North Korea under the six-party
talks. North Korea agreed to halt its nuclear program during this time18. The United States is
showing acknowledgement of North Koreas new nuclear status, so North Korea is showing
some nuclear restraint. However, in 2009 North Korea made advancements to its nuclear
program, prompted more sanctions by the United Nations19. This goes against the proposed
model as Pyongyang was in talks with Washington, though.

14 Lecture notes on North Korea, page 2

15 Lecture notes on North Korea, page 2
16 Article posted on Lecture notes on North Korea, page 2
17 Hecker, page 46
18 Hecker, page 50
19 Hecker, page 50