Unactslized posible things in worlds other than the acual worl, have ofen been deemed “entia non grata"! argely because it i not clear owen they ae or are fot dental, But identity licerally understood is no problem fr ws. Within any one worl, things of every extegory ate indie ‘idute just they aren dhe cual worl things in diferent words ate never identical, by P2. The counterpart relation is our substitute for identi Derween things in diferent woelds® Where some vwould sy chat you ar in several words, in which you hive somewhat diferent properties and some- ‘hae diferent propenies and somewhat diferent things happen to you, prefer to say that you ae in the actual world and no other, but you have coun terparsin several other worlds. Your counterparts resemble you closely in content and context in important respects. They resemble you: more closely than do the other thing in thei worlds But they are not really you. For each of them is in is owa world, and ony you are herein the acta ‘world, Indeed we might say, speaking casually, that your counterparts are you in other worlds, that chy and you ae the sime; bur this sameness {Sno more Fite! identity than the sameness berween you today and you tomorrow. It would be beter to say that your counterparts are men you seo ave bee, bad the world been otherwise “The counterpart elation i relation of similar ity. Sot is problematic ia the way all relations of similarity ae: itis dissimilarities ina muliude of respects, weighted by the importance of the varius expects" and by the degrees ofthe similarities * Camap, Kanger,’ Hintitka* Ksipte,” Mont sr," and others have proposed interpretations of Guanfed medal logic on which one thing is allowed to bein several works. A reader of this persuasion might suspect that he and I differ only ‘ebay that what I call thing ina word is jst what he would calla (hing, world) pair, and thet what fe calle the same thing in several words is just what f would calla class of mutual counter parts, But beware. Our diference isnot jus ver bal for T enjoy a generality he cannot match, ‘The counterpart reiton will not ia general, be an csquivalence relation. So i¢ will not hold just bbenween those of his (thing, world) pais with the sume frst term, no mater how he may eha0a6 19 deny chings between worlds. Te would not have been plausible to postulate thatthe counterpart relation was wansitive. Supe poses in wordy resembles you closely in many resultant of similarities and Counterpart Theory and Quanttied Modal Logic respects, far more closely than anything ele in 2 does. And suppose 1p in world my resembles x, closely, far mote closely than anything ele in = docs. So x is» counterpart of your counterpart x, ‘Yet a1 might not resemble you very claely, and something else in ap might resemble you more closely. If 0, 3158 not your counterpart. I would not have been plausible to postulate that the counterpart relation was symmetric. Sup- pose in world ws is a sort of tend of you and your brother; xy resembles both of you closely, fr ‘ore closely than anything ele in as resembles cither one of you. So sy is your counterpart. But suppose also that the resemblance between x and your brother is far closer than that between 25 ‘and you. Ifso, you are nota counterpart of #5. Te would not have been plausible to postulate that nothing in any world had more than one counterpart in any other world. Suppose 24 snd xq in world 4 are twins; both resemble you closely; both resemble you fit more closely than anything. else in my does; both resemble you ‘equally. Iso, both are your counterparts. Tr would not have been plausible co postulate ‘that no two things in any world had a common counterpart in any other world. Suppase you resemble both the twins x4 and xq far more closely than anything else in the actual world docs. IFs0, you are a counterpart of both. Te would not have been plusible ro postuate that, for any two worlds, anything in one was 2 counterpart of something in the other. Suppase there is something xs in world 2s ~ say, Batman — which does not much resemble anything atu If s0, x5 is mot a counterpart of anything in the sonal word It would not have been plausible to postulate tha, for any two world, anything in one had some counterpart inthe other. Suppose whatever thing in world it is chat resembles you more dlaely than anything else in wy is nevertheless quite ‘unlike you; nothing in my resembles you at all closely. Ifo, you have no counterpart in my IL, Translation Counterpart theory and quantified modal logic seem to have the sume subject matter; seem to provide two sival ways of formalizing our modal iscourse In that case they shouldbe intertranslat- able; indeed they are. Hence I need not give directions for formalising mods discourse diecly ee