Velie > Fe) (Everything actual isan F) Sy (Wy & Belay & Fs) (Some possible world contains an F) Vora (Wy & Tey & Cxx-> Pi) (Every counterpart of s, in any world, isan F) Yells D. Fe 3 Yyy¥eu(IHy & Fey & Ce > Fu) (EF anything is a counterpart of an actual F, thea i ie an P) Yoivi(iPn & fey & Coie. Bie (Wyn & Ino & Crim & Fe) (Every counterpart of has 4 counterpart which isan F) ‘The reverse translation, from sentences of coun Cerpart theory to sentences of quantified modal logie, ean be done by finite search whenever it can be done at all. For if 2 modal sentence > is the translation of a sentence 6 of counterpart theory, then y must be shorter than @ and é ‘must contain no predicates or variables notin ¢. But not every sentence of counterpart theory isthe translation of a modal sentence, or even an equiva lent of the transition of a modal sentence, For instance, our postulates PI-P7 are not. Ie may distur us thae the tanshtion of WeC0y(x=)) (everything actual necessarily exists) comes out true even if something actual Jacks a counterpart in some world, To avoid this, we might be tempted to adopt the alternative translation scheme, brought to my attention by David Kaplan, in which T2iand T2jare replaced by Tas (Oem BylInB, & Cyr & Coty & Oy -%)) 1)" is VB(WB, > 3n- & TBs & THs ean 05)? is 3BL( & V9, Waals & Cay 8. 8 Lig & Ye din---2)) with heterogeneous rather than homogeneous quantifiers. Out of the frying pan, into the fre: with T2}', 2eO(x # 2) (something actual is pos- sibly non-selFidentical) comes out true unless everything actual has a counterpart in every Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic world! We might compromise by tking "T2’ and Taj, but at the price of sacrificing the ordinary duality of necessiy and possbiliy.* So T chose take T2 and TH UL Essentialism Quine has often warned us that by guantfyng past smodal operators we commit ounsves to the vew that “an object, of tslf and by whatever name or one, must be seen as having sme of is tats aecesarily and others contngealy, despite the face that the latter tats follow ust s analytically from some ways of specifying the object as the former trite do ftom other ways of specifying i This so-called “Arstoteiznescntialism” the doctrine of essences nat relive to speiica- ions ~ “should be every bt at congenial to (the champion of quantified modal log) as quantified modal opie al Agreed. Essentiaism is congenial, We do have a vay of yng that an atebute isan essential ate bute ofan object ~ estential reuse of ow the abject happens to have been speed and regard- less of whether the attribute follows analytically fiom any oral specification ofthe abject. Consider the arwibue expresed by = L-place sentence g and the objet denoted by a singular term (To say char this aru is an ese ante of this object ist assert the talon of aes, ‘But wehave not yet considered how to tanslatea smodal sentence containing a singular term For we know that any singular trm { may be treated asa description ra(Ga) (although een only by leting W contain some arc predate made from a proper name); and we know thst any description tay be eliminated by Russells comes) defin- jton. Our translation scheme di not take aczount of singular terme beens they need never goss in the primitive notation of quantified modal logic. ‘We must always eliminate singular terms before translating afterwards, if we The, we ean restore them. ‘There is just one hitch: before eliminating = description, we must asin its scope. Different hoes of scope will n general kad to nonequva- Jent translations. This is so even ifthe eliminated Altscipton denotes precely coe thing in the sctal word and in evry possible word. “aking Cs description ra(¥) and asgning itnareow scope, our sentence C]6¢isiterpreted as >