Power to decide on all question affecting elections EXCEPT suffrage

1. Domino vs. Comelec

Facts:
Domino filed his COC for representative in a district. He indicated that he resided in the
constituency where he seeks ti be elected for 1yr and 2mos. Immediatelypreceding the election.
Private respondent filed a petition to see the cancellation of Dominos COC on the ground that: is
not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks election.
Issues:
Whether or not the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City declaring petitioner as
resident of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final,conclusive and binding upon the whole world,
including the Commission on Elections.
Whether or not petitioner herein has resided in the subject congressional district for at least one (1)
year immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections; and
Whether or not respondent COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition a quo for the disqualification
of petitioner.
Ruling:
1. The COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code,
over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. In the exercise of the
said jurisdiction, it is within the competence of the COMELEC to determine whether false
representation as to material facts was made in the certificate of candidacy, that will
include, among others, the residence of the candidate.
The determination of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the exclusion
proceedings as to the right ofDOMINO to be included or excluded from the list of voters in
the precinct within its territorial jurisdicton, does not preclude the COMELEC, in the
determination of DOMINO's qualification as a candidate, to pass upon the issue
ofcompliance with the residency requirement.
The proceedings for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of voters are summary in
character. Thus, the factual findings of the trial court and its resultant conclusions in the
exclusion proceedings on matters other than the right to vote in the precinct within its
territorial jurisdiction are not conclusive upon the COMELEC. Although the court in inclusion
or exclusion proceedings may pass upon any question necessary to decide the issue raised
including the questions of citizenship and residence of the challenged voter, the authority to
order the inclusion in or exclusion from the list of voters necessarily caries with it the power
to inquire into and settle all matters essential to the exercise of said authority. However,
except for the right to remain in the list of voters or for being excluded therefrom for the
particular election in relation to which the proceedings had been held, a decision in an
exclusion or inclusionproceeding, even if final and unappealable, does not acquire the nature
of res judicata.In this sense, it does not operate as a bar to any future action that a party
may take concerning the subject passed upon in the proceeding.
Thus, a decision in an exclusion proceeding would neither be conclusive on the voter's
political status, nor bar subsequent proceedings on his right to be registered as a voter in
any other election.
Moreover, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in its 18 January decision exceeded its
jurisdiction when it declared DOMINO a resident of the Province of Sarangani, approved and
ordered the transfer of his voter's registration from Precinct No. 4400-A of Barangay Old
Balara, Quezon City to precinct 14A1 of Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani. It is not
within the competence of the trial court, in an exclusion proceedings, to declare the
challenged voter a resident of another municipality. The jurisdiction of the lower court over
exclusion cases is limited only to determining the right of voter to remain in the list of voters
or to declare that the challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the precint in which he is
registered, specifying the ground of the voter's disqualification. The trial court has no power
to order the change or transfer of registration from one place of residence to another for it is

the function of the election Registration Board as provided under Section 12 of R.A. No.
8189.
The only effect of the decision of the lower court excluding the challenged voter from the list
of voters, is for the Election Registration Board,upon receipt of the final decision, to remove
the voter's registration record from the corresponding book of voters, enter the order of
exclusion therein, and thereafter place the record in the inactive file.
2. We hold in the negative.
Records show that petitioner's domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos
Sur and that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St.
Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the
position of representative of the 3rd District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election.
Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his "residence" in Quezon City
and has established a new "domicile" of choice at the Province of Sarangani.
A person's "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost
until a new one is established. To successfully effect a change of domicile one must
demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
which correspond with the
purpose. In other words, there must basically be animusmanendi coupled with animusnon
revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite
period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place
chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not adequately support a
change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of DOMINO's intention to reside in
Sarangani but it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment
of one's original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no
matter how long, without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of
domicile. 30 Thus the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot located in the province
of Sarangani, i.e., 15 January 1997, cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances,
as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement.
Further, Domino's lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is further
strengthened by his act of registering as voter in one of the precincts in Quezon City. While
voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of residence
especially in this case where DOMINO registered in his former barangay.

3.

While, Domino's intention to establish residence in Sarangani can be gleaned from the fact
that be bought the house he was renting on November 4, 1997, that he sought cancellation
of his previous registration in Qezon City on 22 October 1997, 34 and that he applied for
transfer of registration from Quezon City to Sarangani by reason of change of residence on
30 August 1997, 35 DOMINO still falls short of the one year residency requirement under the
Constitution.
In showing compliance with the residency requirement, both intent and actual presence in
the district one intends to represent must satisfy the length of time prescribed by the
fundamental law. 36 Domino's failure to do so rendered him ineligible and his election to
office null and void. 3
DOMINO's contention that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction in the present petition is bereft
of merit.
As previously mentioned, the COMELEC, under Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code,
has jurisdiction over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. Such
jurisdiction continues even after election, if for any reason no final judgment of
disqualification is rendered before the election, and the candidate facing disqualification is
voted for and receives the highest number of votes 38 and provided further that the winning
candidate has not been proclaimed or has taken his oath of office.
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress as

provided under Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution begins only after a candidate has
become a member of the House of Representatives.
The fact of obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not automatically vest
the position in the winning candidate. 41 A candidate must be proclaimed and must have
taken his oath of office before he can be considered a member of the House of
Representatives.
DOMINO was not proclaimed as Congressman-elect of the Lone Congressional District of the
Province of Sarangani by reason of a Supplemental Omnibus Resolution issued by the
COMELEC on the day of the election ordering the suspension of DOMINO's proclamation
should he obtain the winning number of votes.
Cosidering that DOMINO has not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in the Lone
Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani he cannot be deemed a member of the
House of Representatives. Hence, it is the COMELEC and not the Electoral Tribunal which has
jurisdiction over the issue of his ineligibility as a candidate.
Sarmiento v. Comelec
Section 3, subdivision C, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc. (Emphasis supplied).
It is clear from the abovequoted provision of the 1987 Constitution that election cases include preproclamation controversies, and all such cases must first be heard and decided by a Division of the
Commission. The Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the authority to hear and decide the
same at the first instance. In the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE, pre-proclamation cases are
classified as Special Cases 1 and, in compliance with the above provision of the Constitution, the
two (2) Divisions of the Commission are vested with the authority to hear and decide these Special
Cases.
Indisputably then, the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, when it resolved the appeals of petitioners in the abovementioned Special Cases without
first referring them to any of its Divisions. Said resolutions are, therefore, null and void and must be
set aside. Consequently, the appeals are deemed pending before the Commission for proper
referral to a Division.
All pre-proclamation cases pending before the Commission shall be deemed terminated at the
beginning of the term of the office involved and the rulings of the boards of canvassers concerned
shall be deemed affirmed, without prejudice to the filing of a regular election protest by the
aggrieved party. However, proceedings may continue when on the basis of the evidence thus far
presented, the Commission determines that the petition appears meritorious and accordingly issues
an order for the proceeding to continue or when an appropriate order has been issued by the
Supreme Court in a petition for certiorari.
Pangarungan vs. Comelec
The fact that the COC and SOV have not been regularly prepared, as such the same could not be
made as a sound basis indetermining the true and genuine results of the votes casts (sic) for the
municipal and provincial candidates in Madama.
In view of the foregoing, the physical examination of the Comelec's copy of the determine its
genuineness and authenticity. That such an examination would not be in disregard of the summary
nature of a
pre-proclamation proceeding nor (sic) the provisions of Sec. 15 of RA 7166 with respect to the

Congressional race as the COMELEC has been given ample power "to decide all questions affecting
election returns including the verification of the number of votes received by opposing candidates
in the election returns as compared to the statement of votes in order that the true will of the
people is known." If there is clear evidence of discrepancy between the number of votes for a
precinct as compared to the number of votes the candidates actually received during the counting
at the precinct, it is the duty of the COMELEC to see to it that the matter should be verified from the
election returns as a pre-proclamation controversy. It cannot wash its hands by asking the
candidates to bring the matter to the electoral tribunal as an election protest. (Villamoyo vs.
Comelec, G.R. No. 79646-67, November 13, 1987).
Since the Commission has the power to direct that only genuine election returns and certificates of
canvass be considered (Ong vs. Comelec, 22 SCRA 241), in the exercise of its constitutional power,
the Commission may look, into the election returns of the Municipality of Madamba, Lanao
del Sur. This is the most speedy and inexpensive remedy to settle this controversy.
Diocese of Bacolod vs. Comelec
Facts:
The Diocese posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian
Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size. They
were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the
message "IBASURA RH Law" referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No.
10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. 4This tarpaulin contains the heading
"Conscience Vote" and lists candidates as either "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay" with a check mark, or
"(Pro-RH) Team Patay" with an "X" mark.5 The electoral candidates were classified according to their
vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. 6
The election officer ordered the tarpaulins removal for being oversized.
Petitioners allege that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the notice51 dated February 22,2013 and letter52 dated February 27,
2013 ordering the removal of the tarpaulin.53 It is their position that these infringe on their
fundamental right to freedom of expression.
ISSUES: (5)
I.
WHETHER THE 22 FEBRUARY 2013 NOTICE/ORDER BY ELECTION OFFICER MAJARUCON AND THE 27
FEBRUARY 2013 ORDER BY THE COMELEC LAW DEPARTMENT ARE CONSIDERED JUDGMENTS/FINAL
ORDERS/RESOLUTIONS OF THE COMELEC WHICH WOULD WARRANT A REVIEW OF THIS COURT VIA
RULE 65 PETITION[;]
A. WHETHER PETITIONERS VIOLATED THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS DOCTRINE AND
JURISPRUDENTIAL RULES GOVERNING APPEALS FROM COMELEC DECISIONS;
B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE AFOREMENTIONED ORDERS ARE NOT
CONSIDERED JUDGMENTS/FINAL ORDERS/RESOLUTIONS OF THE COMELEC, WHETHER
THERE ARE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WOULD ALLOW THIS COURT TO
TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE[;]
II.
WHETHER IT IS RELEVANT TODETERMINE WHETHER THE TARPAULINS ARE "POLITICAL
ADVERTISEMENT" OR "ELECTION PROPAGANDA" CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONER IS NOT A
POLITICAL CANDIDATE[;]
III.

WHETHER THE TARPAULINS ARE A FORM OR EXPRESSION (PROTECTED SPEECH), OR ELECTION

PROPAGANDA/POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT[;]
A. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE TARPAULINS ARE A FORM OF EXPRESSION,
WHETHER THE COMELEC POSSESSES THE AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE SAME[;]
B. WHETHER THIS FORM OF EXPRESSION MAY BE REGULATED[;]
IV.
WHETHER THE 22 FEBRUARY 2013 NOTICE/ ORDER BY ELECTION OFFICER MAJARUCON AND THE 27
FEBRUARY 2013 ORDER BY THE COMELEC LAW DEPARTMENT VIOLATES THE PRINCIPLE OF
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE[;] [AND]
V.
WHETHER THE ACTION OF THE PETITIONERS IN POSTING ITS TARPAULIN VIOLATES THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE.

RULING:
1.

Issue is not relevant to the topic

2. A.
COMELEC had no legal basis to regulate expressions made by private citizens
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that they had
the power to regulate the tarpaulin.113 However, all of these provisions pertain to candidates
and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do theybelong to any
political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the
preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
The power of the Commission regulating the posting of campaign materials only apply to
candidates and political parties, and petitioners are neither of the two.
These provisions show that election propaganda refers to matter done by or on behalf
of and in coordination with candidates and political parties. Some level of coordination
with the candidates and political parties for whom the election propaganda are released
would ensure that these candidates and political parties maintain within the authorized
expenses limitation.
The tarpaulin was not paid for byany candidate or political party. 125 There was no allegation that
petitioners coordinated with any of the persons named in the tarpaulin regarding its posting. On the
other hand, petitioners posted the tarpaulin as part of their advocacy against the RH Law.
True, there is no mention whether election campaign is limited only to the candidates and political
parties themselves. The focus of the definition(of the term election campaign) is that the act must
be "designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public
office."
In this case, the tarpaulin contains speech on a matter of public concern, that is, a statement of
either appreciation or criticism on votes made in the passing of the RH law. Thus, petitioners invoke
their right to freedom of expression.
B.

The violation of the constitutional right to

freedom of speech and expression

Several theories and schools of thought that strengthen the need to protect the basic
right to freedom of expression:
First, this relates to the right ofthe people to participate in public affairs, including the
right to criticize government actions.
Second, free speech should be encouraged under the concept of a market place of
ideas. This theory was articulated by Justice Holmes in that "the ultimate good desired
is better reached by [the] free trade in ideas:"165
Third, free speech involves self-expression that enhances human dignity. This right is "a
means of assuring individual self-fulfillment,"170 among others.
Fourth, expression is a marker for group identity. For one, "[v]oluntary associations
perform [an] important democratic role [in providing] forums for the development of
civil skills, for deliberation, and for the formation of identity and community spirit[,]
[and] are largely immune from [any] governmental interference."
Fifth, the Bill of Rights, free speech included, is supposed to "protect individuals and
minorities against majoritarian abuses perpetrated through [the] framework [of
democratic governance]."
Lastly, free speech must be protected under the safety valve theory. 179 This provides
that "nonviolent manifestations of dissent reduce the likelihood of violence[.]"
C.
We distinguish between politicaland commercial speech. Political speech refers to speech "both
intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue," 200 "foster[ing]
informed and civicminded deliberation."201 On the other hand, commercial speech has been
defined as speech that does "no more than propose a commercial transaction."
While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political
parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for
or posted "in return for consideration" by any candidate, political party, or party-list
group.
D.

Re: Personal Opinions regarding candidates

It is clear that this paragraph (definition of the term political advertisement or election
propaganda) suggests that personal opinionsare not included, while sponsored messages are
covered.
Personal opinions, views, and preferences for candidates, contained in blogs shall not be considered
acts of election campaigning or partisan politicalactivity unless expressed by government officials
in the Executive Department, the Legislative Department, the Judiciary, the Constitutional
Commissions, and members of the Civil Service.
In any event, this case does not refer to speech in cyberspace, and its effects and parameters
should be deemed narrowly tailored only in relation to the facts and issues in this case.
Some cited cases:
Osmea v. COMELEC

216

This court mentioned how "discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of
candidates in an election are essential to the proper functioning of the government established by
our Constitution."217
As pointed out by petitioners, "speech serves one of its greatest public purposes in the context of
elections when the free exercise thereof informs the people what the issues are, and who are
supporting what issues."218 At the heart of democracy is every advocates right to make known
what the people need to know,219 while the meaningful exercise of ones right of suffrage includes
the right of every voter to know what they need to know in order to make their choice.
Adiong v. COMELEC
We have adopted the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide
open and that it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials. Too many restrictions will deny to people the robust, uninhibited,
and wide open debate, the generating of interest essential if our elections will truly be free, clean
and honest.
We have also ruled that the preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost
respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful
the equally vital right of suffrage.221(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Speech with political consequences isat the core of the freedom of expression and must be
protected by this court.
The right to freedom of expression isindeed not absolute. Even some forms of protected speech are
still subjectto some restrictions. The degree of restriction may depend on whether the regulation
is content-based or content-neutral.223 Content-based regulations can either be based on the
viewpoint of the speaker or the subject of the expression.
The regulation may reasonably be considered as either content-neutral or contentbased.227 Regardless, the disposition of this case will be the same. Generally, compared with other
forms of speech, the proposed speech is content-based.
Size limitations during elections hit ata core part of expression. The content of the tarpaulin is not
easily divorced from the size of its medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the clear
and present danger rule as measure. The latter will pass constitutional muster only if justified by a
compelling reason, and the restrictions imposed are neither overbroad nor vague.
Under this rule, "the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high."230 "Only when the challenged act has
overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government
having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality." 231
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation. There is no
compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulinas to justify
curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the
right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the
tarpaulin does not affect anyone elses constitutional rights.
On the first requisite, it is not within the constitutional powers of the COMELEC to regulate the
tarpaulin. As discussed earlier, this is protected speech by petitioners who are non-candidates. On
the second requirement, not only must the governmental interest be important or substantial, it
must also be compelling as to justify the restrictions made.
First, Adiong v. COMELEC has held that this interest is "not as important as the right of [a private
citizen] to freely express his choice and exercise his right of free speech." 258 In any case, faced with

both rights to freedom of speech and equality, a prudent course would be to "try to resolve the
tension in a way that protects the right of participation."259
Second, the pertinent election lawsrelated to private property only require that the private property
owners consent be obtained when posting election propaganda in the property. 260 This is consistent
with the fundamental right against deprivation of property without due process of law. 261 The
present facts do not involve such posting of election propaganda absent consent from the property
owner. Thus, this regulation does not apply in this case.
The third requisite is likewise lacking. We look not only at the legislative intent or motive in
imposing the restriction, but more so at the effects of such restriction, if implemented. The
restriction must not be narrowly tailored to achieve the purpose. It must be demonstrable. It must
allow alternative avenues for the actor to make speech.
In this case, the size regulation is not unrelated to the suppression of speech. Limiting the
maximum sizeof the tarpaulin would render ineffective petitioners message and violate
their right to exercise freedom of expression.
The COMELECs act of requiring the removal of the tarpaulin has the effect of dissuading
expressions with political consequences. These should be encouraged, more so when
exercised to make more meaningful the equally important right to suffrage.
III. Freedom of Expression and Equality
The message of petitioners in thiscase will certainly not be what candidates and political parties will
carry in their election posters or media ads. The message of petitioner, taken as a whole, is an
advocacy of a social issue that it deeply believes. Through rhetorical devices, it communicates
the desire of Diocese that the positions of those who run for a political position on this social issue
be determinative of how the public will vote. It primarily advocates a stand on a social issue; only
secondarily even almost incidentally will cause the election or non-election of a candidate.
Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by persons who are not
candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party which are, taken as a
whole, principally advocacies of a social issue that the public must consider during elections is
unconstitutional. Such regulation is inconsistent with the guarantee of according the fullest
possible range of opinions coming from the electorate including those that can catalyze candid,
uninhibited, and robust debate in the criteria for the choice of a candidate.
Caveat-This does not mean that there cannot be a specie of speech by a private citizen which will not
amount toan election paraphernalia to be validly regulated by law.
Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches into speech of
persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party if they are not
candidates, only if what is regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for its
principal object the endorsement of a candidate only. The regulation
(a) should be provided by law,
(b) reasonable,
(c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the opportunity of all candidates to be
heard and considering the primacy of the guarantee of free expression, and
(d) demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that object.
The regulation must only be with respect to the time, place, and manner of the rendition of the
message. In no situation may the speech be prohibited or censored onthe basis of its content. For
this purpose, it will not matter whether the speech is made with or on private property.

A fixed size for election posters or tarpaulins without any relation to the distance from the intended
average audience will be arbitrary. At certain distances, posters measuring 2 by 3 feet could no
longer be read by the general public and, hence, would render speech meaningless. It will amount
to the abridgement of speech with political consequences.
IV.

Right to property

Even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin remains the private property
of petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise protected by the Constitution.
The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation but when this right is joined
by a "liberty" interest, the burden of justification on the part of the Government must be
exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not met in this case.
Respondents have not demonstrated thatthe present state interest they seek to promote justifies
the intrusion into petitioners property rights. Election laws and regulations must be reasonable. It
must also acknowledge a private individuals right to exercise property rights. Otherwise, the due
process clause will be violated.
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 and the Fair Election Act intend to prevent the posting of
election propaganda in private property without the consent of the owners of such
private property. COMELEC has incorrectly implemented these regulations. Consistent
with our ruling in Adiong, we find that the act of respondents in seeking to restrain petitioners from
posting the tarpaulin in their own private property is an impermissible encroachments on the right
to property.
V. Tarpaulin and its message are not religious speech
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. Noreligious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.
There are two aspects of this provision.321 The first is the nonestablishment clause.322 Second is the
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship. 323
The second aspect is atissue in this case.
Clearly, not all acts done by those who are priests, bishops, ustadz, imams, or any other religious
make such act immune from any secular regulation.324 The religious also have a secular existence.
They exist within a society that is regulated by law.
Definitely, the characterizations ofthe religious of their acts are not conclusive on this court.
Certainly, our powers of adjudication cannot be blinded by bare claims that acts are religious in
nature
The same may be said of petitioners reliance on papal encyclicals to support their claim that the
expression onthe tarpaulin is an ecclesiastical matter. With all due respect to the Catholic faithful,
the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this court. The position of the
Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by
one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of
candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubtas to its nature as speech with political
consequences and not religious speech.

A Final Note

COMELECs general role includes a mandate to ensure equal opportunities and reduce spending
among candidates and their registered political parties. It is not to regulate or limit the speech of
the electorate as it strives to participate inthe electoral exercise.
Embedded in the tarpaulin, however, are opinions expressed by petitioners. It is a specie of
expression protected by our fundamental law. It is an expression designed to invite attention, cause
debate, and hopefully, persuade. It may be motivated by the interpretation of petitioners of their
ecclesiastical duty, but their parishioners actions will have very real secular consequences.
Certainly, provocative messages do matter for the elections.
What is involved in this case is the most sacred of speech forms: expression by the electorate that
tends to rouse the public to debate contemporary issues. This is not speechby candidates or
political parties to entice votes. It is a portion of the electorate telling candidates the conditions for
their election. It is the substantive content of the right to suffrage.
This. is a form of speech hopeful of a quality of democracy that we should all deserve. It is
protected as a fundamental and primordial right by our Constitution. The expression in the medium
chosen by petitioners deserves our protection.
Pungutan vs. Abubakar
Facts:
Abubakar and the other candidates alleged that in the towns of Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk, no
elections were in effect held in view of massive violence, terrorism and fraud. Pungutan denied this
and said the election was valid.
Comelec: that the returns from Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk are spurious returns or manufactured
returns and no returns at all and that the elections in said municipalities are sham. The Commission
is of the opinion that the elections in said municipalities were just as bad if not worse than the
elections in Karomatan, Lanao del Norte. Actually no elections were held in said municipalities as
the voting was done by persons other than the registered voters while armed men went from
precinct to precinct, prepared the ballots and dictated how the election returns were to be
prepared. The same reasons which compelled the Commission to reject the returns from Karomatan
and to consider said returns as no returns at all or spurious or manufactured returns not one notch
above returns prepared at gunpoint.
By majority vote of the members of the Commission to direct the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Sulu to reconvene in Jolo and complete the canvass excluding from said canvass the returns from
the towns of Siasi, Parang, Tapul, and Luuk and to proclaim the 3rd winning candidate at 5:00 P.M.
on May 28, 1971, unless restrained by the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
WON the COMELEC exceeded its constitutional power by encroaching on terrain properly judicial,
the right to vote being involved.
Ruling:
1.

There is no merit to the contention that respondent Commission is devoid of power to

disregard and annul the alleged returns from 107 precincts of Siasi, 56 precincts of Tapul,
67 precincts of Parang and 60 precincts of Luuk for being spurious or manufactured.

We find and so hold that the election returns from the 42 precincts in question were prepared under
circumstances conclusively showing that they are false, and are so devoid of value as to be
completely unworthy of inclusion in the canvass. We have no alternative but to affirm the
Comelec's finding that they are spurious and manufactured." 15 Nor is it to be lost sight of that the
power to reject returns of such a character has been exercised most judiciously. Even a cursory
perusal of the mode and manner of inquiry conducted by respondent Commission resulting in the

challenged resolution should suffice to remove any doubt as to the absence of any impropriety or
improvidence in the exercise of such a prerogative. Clearly, there was care and circumspection to
assure that the constitutional objective of insuring that an election be "free, orderly and honest" be
realized. If, under the circumstances disclosed, a different conclusion were arrived at, then certainly
there is a frustration of such an ideal. Moreover, this Court has not displayed any reluctance in
yielding the imprimatur of its approval to the action taken by respondent Commission in the
discharge of its constitutional function of the enforcement of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections.
As was so well put by Justice, later Chief Justice, Abad Santos: "The Commission on
Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in
our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered
with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible
organization. The Commission may err, so may this Court also. It should be allowed
considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the
accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created -- free, orderly and
honest elections. We may not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are
clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court should not
interfere." 18 The same approach is reflected in the opinion of the Chief Justice in Lucman v.
Dimaporo when as he pointed out if "pursuant to our Administrative Law, the findings of fact
of administrative organs created by ordinary legislation will not be disturbed by courts
of justice, except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of
such findings ... there is no reason to believe that the framers of our Constitution intended to place
the Commission on Elections created and explicitly made 'independent' by the Constitution itself
on a lower level than said statutory administrative organs; ... ."
2.

The right to vote has reference to a constitutional guarantee of the utmost significance.
It is a right without which the principle of sovereignty residing in the people becomes
nugatory.

How such a right is to be exercised is regulated by the Election Code. 22 Its enforcement under
the Constitution is, as noted, vested in respondent Commission. Such a power, however, is
purely executive or administrative. So it was characterized by the Chief Justice in Abcede v.
Imperial: 23 "Lastly, as the branch of the executive department although independent of the
President to which the Constitution has given the 'exclusive charge' of the 'enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections,' the power of decision of the
Commission is limited to purely 'administrative questions.' ...."
If the exclusion of the returns from the four towns in Sulu involved a question as to such a right,
then, clearly, what the Commission did was beyond its competence. Such is not the case
however. What is deemed outside such a sphere is the determination of whether or not a
person can exercise or is precluded from exercising the right of suffrage. Thus, the
question of inclusion or exclusion from the list of voters is properly judicial. 24 As to whether
or not an election has been held is a question of a different type. It is properly within the
administrative jurisdiction of respondent Commission. If, as is our decision, no such voting did
take place, considering the massive irregularities that attended it in the four towns, then the
exclusion of the alleged returns is not tainted by infirmity. In that sense, the second issue raised
by petitioner that in so acting the respondent Commission exceeded its constitutional power by
encroaching on terrain properly judicial, the right to vote being involved, is likewise to be
resolved against him.
Montejo vs. Comelec
Facts:
Petitioner Cirilo Roy G. Montejo, representing the First District of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of
section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 of the COMELEC, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on
the ground that it violates the principle of equality of representation. He seeks to transfer the
municipality of Tolosa from his district to the Second District of the province. Apostol, representing
the Second District, vigorously opposed the inclusion ofTolosa in his district.

The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite held on May 11, 1992. As a consequence of the conversion, eight (8) municipalities of the
Third District composed the new province of Biliran, i.e., Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran,
Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi, and Naval. A further consequence was to reduce the Third District to
five (5) municipalities with a total population of 145,067 as per the 1990 census.
To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, it promulgated Resolution No.
2736 where, among others, it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and
the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte. The composition of
the First District which includes the municipality of Tolosaand the composition of the Fifth District
were not disturbed.
Petitioner Montejo filed a motion for reconsideration calling the attention of respondent COMELEC,
among others, to the inequitable distribution of inhabitants and voters between the First and
Second Districts. He alleged that the First District has 178,688 registered voters while the Second
District has 156,462 registered voters or a difference of 22,226 registered voters. To diminish the
difference, he proposed that the municipality of Tolosa with 7,7000 registered voters be transferred
from the First to the Second District.
In this petition, petitioner insists that Section I of Resolution No. 2736 violates the principle of
equality of representation ordained in the Constitution.
Ruling:
We find section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 void.
The basic powers of respondent COMELEC, as enforcer and administrator of our election laws, are
spelled out in black and white in section 2(c), Article IX of the Constitution. Rightly, respondent
COMELEC does not invoke this provision but relies on the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution as the source of its power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the
power to make laws. The Ordinance is entitled "Apportioning the Seats of the House of
Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines to the Different Legislative Districts in Provinces
and Cities and the Metropolitan Manila Area." Its substantive sections state:
Sec. 1. For purposes of the election of Members of the House of Representatives of
the First Congress of the Philippines under the Constitution proposed by the 1986
Constitutional Commission and subsequent elections, and until otherwise provided by
law, the Members thereof shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila Area as follows:
xxxxxxxxx
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor
adjustments of the reapportionment herein made.
Sec. 3. Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population
may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in
the immediately following election to at least one Member or such number of
Members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and
according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the
Constitution. The number of Members apportioned to the province out of which such
new province was created or where the city, whose population has so increased, is
geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on
Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days
before the election. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly then, the Constitutional Commission denied to the COMELEC the major power of legislative
apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only empowered the

COMELEC "to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment herein made." The meaning of the
phrase "minor adjustments was again clarified in the debates 17 of the Commission, viz.:
MR. DAVIDE. We should not set a time limit unless during the period of amendments
a proposal is made. The authority conferred would be on minor corrections or
amendments, meaning to say, for instance, that we may have forgotten an
intervening municipality in the enumeration, which ought to be included in one
district. That we shall consider a minor amendment.
Can it be possible that one municipality in a district be transferred to another district
and call it a minor adjustment?
MR. DAVIDE. That cannot be done, Mr. Presiding Officer. Minor, meaning, that
there should be no change in the allocations per district. However, it may
happen that we have forgotten a municipality in between which is still in the territory
of one assigned district, or there may be an error in the correct name of a particular
municipality because of changes made by the interim BatasangPambansa and the
Regular BatasangPambansa. There were many bataspambansa enacted by both the
interim and the Regular BatasangPambansa changing the names of municipalities.
MR. DE CASTRO. So, the minor adjustment may be made only if one of the
municipalities is not mentioned in the ordinance appended to, and it will be up for the
COMELEC now to adjust or to put such municipality to a certain district.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer. For instance, we may not have the data
regarding a division of a municipality by the interim BatasangPambansa or the
Regular BatasangPambansa into two municipalities, meaning, a mother municipality
and the new municipality, but still actually these are within the geographical district
area.
MR. DE CASTRO. So the minor adjustment which the COMELEC cannot do is
that, if, for example, my municipality is in the First District of Laguna, they
cannot put that in any other district.
MR. DAVIDE. That is not even a minor correction. It is a substantive one.
Consistent with the limits of its power to make minor adjustments, Section 3 of the Ordinance did
not also give the respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative
district to another district. The power granted by Section 3 to the respondent COMELEC is
to adjust the number of members (not municipalities) "apportioned to the province out of which
such new province was created. . . ."
Prescinding from these premises, we hold that respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated section 1 of its
Resolution No. 2736 transferring the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District
and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte.