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G.R.No.L48889

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RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
FIRSTDIVISION
G.R.No.L48889May11,1989
DEVELOPMENTBANKOFTHEPHILIPPINES(DBP),petitioner,
vs.
THEHONORABLEMIDPAINTAOL.ADIL,JudgeoftheSecondBranchoftheCourtofFirstInstanceof
IloiloandSPOUSESPATRICIOCONFESORandJOVITAVILLAFUERTE,respondents.

GANCAYCO,J.:
Theissueposedinthispetitionforreviewoncertiorariisthevalidityofapromissorynotewhichwasexecutedin
considerationofapreviouspromissorynotetheenforcementofwhichhadbeenbarredbyprescription.
On February 10, 1940 spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte obtained an agricultural loan from the
Agricultural and Industrial Bank (AIB), now the Development of the Philippines (DBP), in the sum of P2,000.00,
PhilippineCurrency,asevidencedbyapromissorynoteofsaiddatewherebytheyboundthemselvesjointlyand
severally to pay the account in ten (10) equal yearly amortizations. As the obligation remained outstanding and
unpaid even after the lapse of the aforesaid tenyear period, Confesor, who was by then a member of the
CongressofthePhilippines,executedasecondpromissorynoteonApril11,1961expresslyacknowledgingsaid
loanandpromisingtopaythesameonorbeforeJune15,1961.Thenewpromissorynotereadsasfollows
I hereby promise to pay the amount covered by my promissory note on or before June 15, 1961.
Uponmyfailuretodoso,Iherebyagreetotheforeclosureofmymortgage.ItisunderstoodthatifI
cansecureacertificateofindebtednessfromthegovernmentofmybackpayIwillbeallowedtopay
theamountoutofit.
Saidspousesnothavingpaidtheobligationonthespecifieddate,theDBPfiledacomplaintdatedSeptember11,
1970intheCityCourtofIloiloCityagainstthespousesforthepaymentoftheloan.
AftertrialonthemeritsadecisionwasrenderedbytheinferiorcourtonDecember27,1976,thedispositivepart
ofwhichreadsasfollows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court renders judgment, ordering the defendants Patricio
Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte Confesor to pay the plaintiff Development Bank of the Philippines,
jointlyandseverally,(a)thesumofP5,760.96plusadditionaldailyinterestofPl.04fromSeptember
17,1970,thedateComplaintwasfiled,untilsaidamountispaid(b)thesumofP576.00equivalent
toten(10%)ofthetotalclaimbywayofattorney'sfeesandincidentalexpensesplusinterestatthe
legalrateasofSeptember17,1970,untilfullypaidand(c)thecostsofthesuit.
DefendantsspousesappealedtherefromtotheCourtofFirstInstanceofIloilowhereininduecourseadecision
wasrenderedonApril28,1978reversingtheappealeddecisionanddismissingthecomplaintandcounterclaim
withcostsagainsttheplaintiff.
AmotionforreconsiderationofsaiddecisionfiledbyplaintiffwasdeniedinanorderofAugust10,1978.Hence
thispetitionwhereinpetitionerallegesthatthedecisionofrespondentjudgeiscontrarytolawandrunscounterto
decisionsofthisCourtwhenrespondentjudge(a)refusedtorecognizethelawthattherighttoprescriptionmay
be renounced or waived and (b) that in signing the second promissory note respondent Patricio Confesor can
bindtheconjugalpartnershiporotherwisesaidrespondentbecameliableinhispersonalcapacity.Thepetitionis
impressedwithmerit.Therighttoprescriptionmaybewaivedorrenounced.Article1112ofCivilCodeprovides:
Art. 1112. Persons with capacity to alienate property may renounce prescription already obtained,
butnottherighttoprescribeinthefuture.
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Prescriptionisdeemedtohavebeentacitlyrenouncedwhentherenunciationresultsfromactswhich
implytheabandonmentoftherightacquired.
ThereisnodoubtthatprescriptionhassetinastothefirstpromissorynoteofFebruary10,1940.However,when
respondent Confesor executed the second promissory note on April 11, 1961 whereby he promised to pay the
amountcoveredbythepreviouspromissorynoteonorbeforeJune15,1961,anduponfailuretodoso,agreed
totheforeclosureofthemortgage,saidrespondenttherebyeffectivelyandexpresslyrenouncedandwaivedhis
righttotheprescriptionoftheactioncoveringthefirstpromissorynote.
ThisCourthadruledinasimilarcasethat
... when a debt is already barred by prescription, it cannot be enforced by the creditor. But a new
contractrecognizingandassumingtheprescribeddebtwouldbevalidandenforceable....1
Thus,ithasbeenheld
Where, therefore, a party acknowledges the correctness of a debt and promises to pay it after the
same has prescribed and with full knowledge of the prescription he thereby waives the benefit of
prescription.2
Thisisnotamerecaseofacknowledgmentofadebtthathasprescribedbutanewpromisetopaythedebt.The
consideration of the new promissory note is the preexisting obligation under the first promissory note. The
statutorylimitationbarstheremedybutdoesnotdischargethedebt.
Anewexpresspromisetopayadebtbarred...willtakethecasefromtheoperationofthestatuteof
limitations as this proceeds upon the ground that as a statutory limitation merely bars the remedy
anddoesnotdischargethedebt,thereissomethingmorethanameremoralobligationtosupporta
promise,towitapreexistingdebtwhichisasufficientconsiderationforthenewthenewpromise
uponthissufficientconsiderationconstitutes,infact,anewcauseofaction.3
... It is this new promise, either made in express terms or deduced from an acknowledgement as a legal
implication, which is to be regarded as reanimating the old promise, or as imparting vitality to the remedy
(which by lapse of time had become extinct) and thus enabling the creditor to recover upon his original
contract.4

However, the court a quo held that in signing the promissory note alone, respondent Confesor cannot thereby
bindhiswife,respondentJovitaVillafuerte,citingArticle166oftheNewCivilCodewhichprovides:
Art.166.Unlessthewifehasbeendeclaredanoncomposmentisoraspendthrift,orisundercivil
interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real
property of the conjugal partnership without, the wife's consent. If she ay compel her to refuses
unreasonablytogiveherconsent,thecourtmgrantthesame.
Wedisagree.UnderArticle165oftheCivilCode,thehusbandistheadministratoroftheconjugalpartnership.As
suchadministrator,alldebtsandobligationscontractedbythehusbandforthebenefitoftheconjugalpartnership,
are chargeable to the conjugal partnership. 5 No doubt, in this case, respondent Confesor signed the second
promissorynoteforthebenefitoftheconjugalpartnership.Hencetheconjugalpartnershipisliableforthisobligation.

WHEREFORE, the decision subject of the petition is reversed and set aside and another decision is hereby
renderedreinstatingthedecisionoftheCityCourtofIloiloCityofDecember27,1976,withoutpronouncementas
tocostsinthisinstance.Thisdecisionisimmediatelyexecutoryandnomotionforextensionoftimetofilemotion
forreconsiderationshallbegranted.
SOORDERED.
NarvasaandCruz,JJ.,concur.
GrioAquino,J.,tooknopart.

Footnotes
1Villaroelvs.Estrada,71Phil.140.
2Tauchvs.Gondram,20Labor.Ann.156,citedonpage7,Vol.4,Tolentino'sNewCivilCodeofthe
Philippines.
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3Johnsonsvs.Evasions,50Am.Dec.669.
4Mattinglyvs.Boyd,20How(US)128,15Led845St.Johnvs.Garrow,4Port.(Ala)223,29Am.
Dec.280.AmericanJurisprudenceVol.34,page233(StatuteofLimitations).
5Article161(l),CivilCode.
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

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