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DET NORSKE VERITAS

Report on
QRA for POL IRDs/ depots
BHARATPUR
For
Hindusthan Petroleum Corporation Limited
Mumbai 400 001
Maharashtra, India

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27


Rev 02, 30th Julyy, 2013

DET NORSKE VERITAS


QRA for POL IRD/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK
DET NORKSE VERITAS AS
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QRA for POL IRDs/ depots


Bharatpur
For:
Hindusthan Petroleum Corporation Limited
Gresham Assurance Building, Sir P.M. Road,
Post Box No. 198, Fort,
Mumbai 400 001
Maharashtra, India
Account Ref.:
K Somashekhar Rao, Sr. Manager HSE-O&D
ksr@hpcl.co.in
Date of First Issue:
Report No.:
Revision No.:
Summary:

2013-05-29
12QR1P2-27
02

Project No.
Organisation Unit:
Subject Group:

PP046380
Maritime & Oil and Gas, India
SHE

DNV conducted Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) for HPCL POL IRDs/ depots. This QRA Study aims
to identify Individual and Societal Risk associated with the Bharatpur location. This report presents the
DNVs findings and conclusion from the study.
Prepared by:

Vishalakshi Daine
Consultant

Signature

Verified by

Anil Bhat Avvari


Consultant

Signature

Approved by:

Salian Varadaraja
Project Sponsor

Signature

No distribution without permission from the client or responsible


organisational unit (however, free distribution for internal use
within DNV after 3 years)

Indexing Terms

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organisational unit

Key
Words

QRA

Strictly confidential

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Area

SHE Risk Management

Unrestricted distribution

Market
Segment

Oil & Gas

Rev. No. / Date:


02/30-07-2013

Reason for Issue:


Prepared by:
Verified by
Approved by:
Draft report issued to HPCL
VDAI
AVAB
VASAL
for comments
All rights reserved. This publication or parts thereof may not be reproduced or transmitted in any form or
by any means, including photocopying or recording, without the prior written consent of Det Norske
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Report No.: 12QR1P2-27


Rev 02, 30th July, 2013

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DET NORSKE VERITAS


QRA for POL IRD/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK

Executive Summary
Det Norske Veritas (DNV) conducted a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) study
covering the entire HPCL POL IRDs/ depots. The presentation of results is in line with
UK HSE guidelines. This report presents the DNVs study findings and conclusion from
the study for the Bharatpur.
The overall objective of the QRA study is to quantify the level of individual fatality risks
associated with the Bharatpur; and to demonstrate that the level of risks is in compliance
with the UK HSE guidelines
Based on the QRA study for the Bharatpur, the following conclusions and
recommendations can be drawn:
Area under Study

Tank Farm

Pump House Area

Gantry Operations

Major Hazard

Recommended Control
/Mitigation

Ensure availability of
water spray system in the
tank farm area for
Pool fire and Tank fire are
protecting the tank from
major events in the Tank the external fire
farm area, leading to the
escalation of the fire from Ensure regular
one tank to the another
maintenance procedure to
reduce likelihood of failure
of the valves, flanges and
pipes
Release of pressurized
inventories from the pump Consider providing HC
house may cause severe detectors in Pump house
damage in the Depot area
premises

Fire due to Leak during TT


loading operations. Major
events of pool fire due to
leak or spillage, flash fire
are observed. Hazardous
radiation levels of 12.5
kw/m2 and 37.5 kW/m2 are
observed close to gantry.

As the gantry area is a


high risk
and high consequence
zone, ensure minimum
activity of trucks and
personnel in this area.

Ensure emergency escape


route
is provided and informed
to all

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QRA for POL IRD/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK
Area under Study

Major Hazard

Recommended Control
/Mitigation
gantry and TT crew.

Consider provision of HC
detectors for early
detection of
hazardous leaks.
Ensure training, SOP,
emergency procedures
established and
implemented for all
personnel at gantry.
Ensure PPE usage by all
personnel.
Ensure that the loaded
trucks spend minimum
time near the gantry after
the loading operations

Office Building

Ensure that the loaded


Fire radiation due to leak
trucks spend minimum
from the loaded tanker
time near the gantry after
trucks.
the loading operations

Even though the Individual and societal risk levels of the Bharatpur has been found to be
in ALARP region in assessing with HSE UK risk criteria, In order to maintain the level of
risk at this level, cost effective risk mitigation measures should be implemented to
mitigate the risks to a level that is As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).

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QRA for POL IRD/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK
GLOSSARY
ALARP: As Low As Reasonable Practical
HSE

: Health Safety Environment

IR
JF

: Individual Risk
: Jet Fire

kW/m2 : Kilo Watt per Square Metre, a measure of heat flux or radiant heat
LFL : Lower Flammable Limit
LOC

: Loss of containment

LSIR

: Location Specific Individual Fatality Risk per year

P&ID : Piping and Instrumentation Diagram


PLL

: Potential Loss of Life

QRA

: Quantitative Risk Assessment

UFL

: Upper Flammable Limit

UK HSE: UK Health and safety Executive

VCE

: Vapour Cloud Explosion

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Bharatpur

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive Summary .......................................................................................................... III
1

INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Background ............................................................................................................ 1
1.2 Objectives ............................................................................................................... 1
1.3 Scope of Study ........................................................................................................ 1
1.4 Report Structure ...................................................................................................... 2
1.5 Facility Description................................................................................................. 3
1.6 Input Data ............................................................................................................... 5
1.6.1 Material Inventory ............................................................................................ 5
1.6.2 Process Conditions ........................................................................................... 5
1.6.3 Material Composition ....................................................................................... 5
1.6.4 Weather ............................................................................................................ 5
1.6.5 Ignition Sources................................................................................................ 5
1.6.6 Population ........................................................................................................ 5

RISK ASSESSMENT CRITERIA ................................................................................ 6


2.1 UK HSE criteria...................................................................................................... 6
2.2 Individual Risk Criteria ........................................................................................... 7
2.3 Societal Risk Criteria .............................................................................................. 8

RISK RESULTS ............................................................................................................ 9


3.1 Individual Risk ....................................................................................................... 9
3.2 Societal Risk ......................................................................................................... 11
3.2.1 FN Curve........................................................................................................ 11

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................... 13

REFERENCES ............................................................................................................ 15

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QRA for POL IRD/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK

List of Tables
Table 2-1: Societal Risk Criteria Onsite ............................................................................................................... 8
Table 3-1: LSIR ....................................................................................................................................................... 9

List of Figures
Figure 1-1: Bharatpur Layout ................................................................................................................................. 3
Figure 1-2: Bharatpur Layout .................................................................................................................................. 4
Figure 2-1: ALARP Principle .................................................................................................................................. 6
Figure 2-2: FN Curve and Criterion Line ................................................................................................................ 7
Figure 3-1: Individual Risk Contours for Bharatpur ............................................................................................. 10
Figure 3-2: FN Curve Onsite ................................................................................................................................. 11
Figure 3-3: FN Curve Offsite ................................................................................................................................ 12

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DET NORSKE VERITAS


QRA for POL IRD/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background
Det Norske Veritas (DNV) conducted a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) study
covering the entire HPCL POL IRDs/ depots. The presentation of results is in line with
UK HSE guidelines. This report presents the DNVs study findings and conclusion from
the study for the Bharatpur.

1.2 Objectives
The overall objective of the QRA study is to
- Quantify the level of individual fatality risks associated with the Bharatpur; and
- Demonstrate that the level of risks is in compliance with the UK HSE guidelines

1.3 Scope of Study


DNV has performed the work in accordance to the UK HSE guidelines. Following are the
important aspects of this study:
- Verify the individual and societal risk levels in accordance with UK HSE criteria
- Tabulation of the consequences in terms of:
Distances to radiation levels, Lower Flammability Limit (LFL) and
explosion overpressure for different weather classes according to specific
criteria classes.

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QRA for POL IRD/depot
Bharatpur

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1.4 Report Structure


This report presents:
Section 1

Introduction
This section provides a general introduction of the project, the main
objectives of the QRA study, the scope of study, and the structure of this
report.

Section 2

Risk Assessment Criteria


This action outlines the risk criteria applied in this QRA study.

Section 3

Risk Results
This section provides the risk results due to process hazard

Section 4

Conclusions and Recommendation


This section outlines the overall conclusions of the study and provides the
recommendation to be implemented in order to ensure ALARP
performance in the operation.

Section 5

Reference
This section details the reference used in this QRA.

Annexe 1

QRA Methodology
This appendix explains the QRA methodology applied in this QRA.

Annexe 2

Assumptions Register
The assumptions presented are applied in the modelling and preparation
of the reports/technical notes.

Annexe 3

Failure case and frequency analysis


This appendix defines the failure cases selected for analysis, as well as
the corresponding frequencies.

Annexe 4

Consequence Analysis
This appendix presents outcome of an event in terms of toxic, fire and
explosion.

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Bharatpur

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1.5 Facility Description


The Bharatpur layout is shown in the figure below.
Figure 1-1: Bharatpur Layout

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QRA for POL IRD/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK

Figure 1-2: Bharatpur Layout


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Bharatpur

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s

1.6 Input Data


1.6.1 Material Inventory
Material required for the QRA study is taken from the Mass and Energy balance sheet
provided by the client. The static and dynamic inventory is calculated based on the flow
rate and equipment dimension provided by the client. The inventory details with respect
to vessel and pipelines is given at Annexe 3 - Failure case and frequency analysis.

1.6.2 Process Conditions


The process conditions like temperature and pressure required for the QRA study is taken
from the Mass and Energy balance sheet and Process flow diagram provided by the client.
The details are placed in a table at Annexe 3 - Failure case and frequency analysis.

1.6.3 Material Composition


Material required for the QRA study is taken from the Mass and Energy balance sheet
provided by the client for most of the cases. If the data is not available suitable
representative material is considered as per DNV Technical note 13 and international
standard. This is explained in Assumption Register (Annexe 2) in detail.

1.6.4 Weather
Meteorological data are required at two stages of the QRA. First, various parts of the
consequence modelling require specification of wind speed and atmospheric stability.
Second, the impact (risk) calculations require wind-rose frequencies for each combination
of wind speed and stability class used.

1.6.5 Ignition Sources


In order to calculate the risk from flammable materials, information on the ignition
sources (which are present in the area over which a flammable cloud may drift) is
required.

1.6.6 Population
All the population details are provided to the study and the presence factor is explained with
respect to the unit is given in details in Assumption Register (Annexe 2).

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Bharatpur

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RISK ASSESSMENT CRITERIA

In order to determine acceptability, the risk results are assessed against a set of risk
criteria as per UK HSE criteria.

2.1 UK HSE criteria


Following points details the UK HSE guidelines:
- An individual risk below 1 x 10-6 fatalities per year is considered as acceptable for
both plant workers and public. An individual risk above 1 x 10-4 fatalities per year for
public is considered as unacceptable and an individual risk above 1 x 10-3 fatalities
per year for workers is considered unacceptable. Between these limits the risk is
considered as ALARP (As Low as Reasonably Practicable). An indication of this is
shown in the below figure
Figure 2-1: ALARP Principle

- Societal risk can be represented by FN curves, which are plots of the cumulative
frequency (F) of various accident scenarios against the number (N) of casualties
associated with the modeled incidents. The plot is cumulative in the sense that, for
each frequency, N is the number of casualties that could be equaled or exceeded.
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QRA for POL IRD/depot
Bharatpur

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s

Often casualties are defined in a risk assessment as fatal injuries, in which case N is
the number of people that could be killed by the incidents.
Figure 2-2: FN Curve and Criterion Line

2.2 Individual Risk Criteria


The UK HSE Individual Risk Criteria was considered to assess the risk for HPCL POL
IRDs/ depots. Individual risk above 10-3 per annum for any person shall be considered
intolerable and fundamental risk reduction improvements are required.
Risk criteria for Individual Risk for on-site are as follows:
- Individual risk levels above 1 x 10-3 per year will be considered unacceptable and
will be reduced, irrespective of cost
- Individual risk levels below 1 x 10-6 per year will be broadly acceptable
- Risk levels between 1 x 10-3 and 1 x 10-6 per year will be reduced to levels as low as
reasonably practicable (ALARP). That is the risk within this region is tolerable only
of further risk reduction is considered impracticable because the cost required to
reduce the risk is grossly disproportionate to the improved gained

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QRA for POL IRD/depot
Bharatpur

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s

2.3 Societal Risk Criteria


When considering the risk associated with a major hazard facility, the risk to an
individual is not always an adequate measure of total risks; the number of the individuals
at risk is also important. Catastrophic incidents with the potential multiple fatalities have
a little influence on the level of risk but have a disproportionate effect on the response of
society and impact of company reputation.
The concept of societal risk is much more than that for individual risk. A number of
factors are involved which make it difficult to determine single value criteria for
application to a number of different situations. These factors include;
- The hazard, the consequential risks and the consequential benefits
- The nature of assessment
- Factors of importance to the company, government, regulators and authorities, public
attitudes and perception and aversion to major accident
Societal risk is the relationship between frequency of an event and the number of people
affected. Societal risk from a major hazard facility can thus be expressed as the
relationship between the number of potential fatalities N following a major accident and
frequency F at which N fatalities are predicated to occur. The relationship between F and
N, and the corresponding relationship involving F, the cumulative frequency of events
causing N or more fatalities, are usually presented graphically on log-log axis.
DNV has used following societal risk criteria. Societal risk should not be confused as
being the risk to society or the risk as being perceived by society. The word societal is
merely used to indicate a group of people and societal risk refers to the frequency of
multiple fatality incidents, which includes workers and the public. Societal risk is usually
represented by an FN (Frequency Number of Fatality) curve.
Table 2-1: Societal Risk Criteria Onsite
Maximum Tolerable
Intercept With N=1

Negligible
Intercept With N=1

10-2

10-4

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QRA for POL IRD/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK
s

RISK RESULTS

3.1 Individual Risk


Location specific individual risk (LSIR) is used to indicate the risk at a particular
location. It is the risk for a hypothetical individual who is positioned there for 24 hours
per day, 365 days per year. It is a standard output from a QRA. In onshore studies, the
geographical variation of LSIR may be represented by iso-risk contour plots and used for
land-use planning. In offshore studies, an LSIR value is normally computed for each
separate module on the installation. Since in reality people do not remain continually at
one location, this is not a realistic risk measure.
Table 2.1 presents the LSIR
Table 3-1: LSIR
S.No

Location

LSIR

Remarks

1
2
3
4

D.G Control room


Gantry
Office Building
Workers change room

5.62E-07
7.38E-07
3.60E-06
3.34E-06

Acceptable
Acceptable
Acceptable
Acceptable

Table 3-2: Major Risk Contributors to office building


S.No

Location

Risk/yr

1
2
3
4
5

Large Leak from MS Tanker


Large Leak from SKO Tanker
Large Leak from HSD Tanker
Medium leak from MS Tanker
Medium leak from SKO Tanker

8.42E-07
7.22E-07
6.25E-07
3.91E-07
2.97E-07

23.40
20.08
17.39
10.88
8.27

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QRA for POL IRD/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK
Figure 3-1: Individual Risk Contours for Bharatpur

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QRA for POL IRD/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK

3.2

Societal Risk

3.2.1 FN Curve
FN curve defines the societal risk. It represents the relationship between the frequency
and the number of people suffering a given level of harm from the realisation of specified
hazards. It is usually taken to refer to the risk of death and usually, expressed as a risk per
year.
The following figure presents the onsite societal risk FN Curve for Bharatpur. The blue
line represents the upper limit of risk and the green line represents the lower level of
risk. The region between this two represents the risk in the ALARP (AS LOW AS
REASONABLY PRACTICABLE) region. The region beyond the blue line indicates the
unacceptable region and the region below blue line represents the broadly acceptable
region. The red line represents the level of societal risk that has been realised around
Bharatpur.
Figure 3-2: FN Curve Onsite

The following observation can be drawn:

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QRA for POL IRD/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK
- Compared to the UK HSE risk criteria, the FN Curve shows that societal risk is within
the Acceptable region and does not exceed the unacceptable criteria.

FN Curve Offsite
No Risk curve found for offsite population

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QRA for POL IRD/depot
Bharatpur

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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS


Area under Study

Tank Farm

Pump House Area

Gantry Operations

Major Hazard

Recommended Control
/Mitigation

Consider providing water


spray system in the tank
farm area for protecting
Pool fire and Tank fire are
the tank from the external
major events in the Tank
fire
farm area, leading to the
escalation of the fire from Ensure regular
one tank to the another
maintenance procedure to
reduce likelihood of failure
of the valves, flanges and
pipes

Release of pressurized
inventories from the pump
house may cause severe
damage in the Depot
premises

Consider providing HC
detectors in Pump house
area
Dyke should be provided
to the pumps to limit pool
formation of the release
inventory

As the gantry area is a


high risk
and high consequence
zone, ensure minimum
Fire due to Leak during TT activity of trucks and
loading operations. Major personnel in this area.
events of pool fire due to
leak or spillage, flash fire
are observed. Hazardous
radiation levels of 12.5 Ensure emergency escape
kw/m2 and 37.5 kW/m2 are route
is provided and informed
observed close to gantry.
to all
gantry and TT crew.
Consider provision of HC
detectors for early
detection of
hazardous leaks.

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QRA for POL IRD/depot
Bharatpur

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Area under Study

Major Hazard

Recommended Control
/Mitigation
Ensure training, SOP,
emergency procedures
established and
implemented for all
personnel at gantry.
Ensure PPE usage by all
personnel.
Ensure that the loaded
trucks spend minimum
time near the gantry after
the loading operations

Office Building

Ensure that the loaded


Fire radiation due to leak
trucks spend minimum
from the loaded tanker
time near the gantry after
trucks.
the loading operations

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QRA for POL IRD/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK

REFERENCES
- Methods for the calculation of physical effects due to releases of hazardous
materials (liquids and gases) TNO Yellow Book, CPR 14E, 2005
- A Flack / B Bain / T Lindberg / J R Spouge Process Equipment Failure
Frequencies Rev. 04, October 2009 for Process Pipes, Pumps, Atmospheric
Storage Tank
- CCPS, Guidelines for Consequence Analysis of Chemical Releases, American
Institute of Chemical Engineers, 1999.
- Lees, F. P., Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Butterworth-Heinemann,
1996
- Oil Industry Safety Directorate (OISD), First Edition, August 2007.
- Robin Pitblado, Andreas Flack, Phil Crosthwaite, David Worthington,
Consequence Handbook, Report no.:70037714, August 2008
- TNO, Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment, The Purple Book, 2009

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Det Norske Veritas:


Det Norske Veritas (DNV) is a leading, independent provider of services for managing risk with
a global presence and a network of 300 offices in 100 different countries. DNVs objective is to
safeguard life, property and the environment.
DNV assists its customers in managing risk by providing three categories of service:
classification, certification and consultancy. Since establishment as an independent foundation
in 1864, DNV has become an internationally recognised provider of technical and managerial
consultancy services and one of the worlds leading classification societies. This means
continuously developing new approaches to health, safety, quality and environmental
management, so businesses can run smoothly in a world full of surprises.

Global impact for a safe and sustainable future:

Learn more on www.dnv.com

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Annexe 1
QRA Methodology

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QRA for POL terminal/depot
Bharatpur

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Table of Contents
1

QRA METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................... 1


1.1 Introduction to Risk Assessment ............................................................................. 1
1.2 What is QRA?......................................................................................................... 2
1.3 Key Components in QRA ....................................................................................... 2

QRA APPROACH ......................................................................................................... 5


2.1.1 Hazard Identification ........................................................................................ 5
2.2 Consequence Modelling/Phast Software ................................................................. 6
2.3 Frequency Analysis................................................................................................. 7
2.4 Risk Calculation/PHASTRISK Software................................................................. 7
2.4.1 Built-In Event Trees ......................................................................................... 7
2.4.2 Atmospheric Condition................................................................................... 10
2.4.3 Risk Presentation: ........................................................................................... 10

QRA SOFTWARE TOOL ........................................................................................... 12

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List of Tables
Table 2-1: Explosion Overpressure Effects ............................................................................................................. 6
Table 2-2: Effects of Thermal Radiation ................................................................................................................. 7
Table 3-1 PHAST RISK Default Vulnerability Parameters .................................................................................. 17

List of Figures
Figure 1-1: QRA methodology ................................................................................................................................ 3
Figure 1-2: ALARP Principle .................................................................................................................................. 4
Figure 2-1 : Event Tree 1 Continuous Vapour Release ........................................................................................ 8
Figure 2-2: Event Tree 2 Continuous Release with Rainout ................................................................................ 8
Figure 2-3: Event Tree 3 Instantaneous Vapour Release ...................................................................................... 9
Figure 2-4: Event Tree 4 Instantaneous Release with Rainout ............................................................................. 9

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QRA for POL terminal/depot
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QRA METHODOLOGY

1.1 Introduction to Risk Assessment


This section is presented to assist the reader who is not familiar with the terms used in
this document and for those who are familiar to confirm DNV understanding of the terms
and their application in the context of this document. An oil & gas facility has the
potential to cause harm such as:
-

Sickness, injury or death of workers and people in the surrounding community


Damage to property and investments
Degradation of the physical and biological environment
Interruption to production and disruption of business

A state or condition having the potential to cause a deviation from uniform or intended
behaviour which, in turn, may result in damage to property, people or environment, is
known as hazard. Thus a scraper trap is a hazard because it has the potential to cause a
fire; processes such gas compression is a hazardous activity because it has the potential to
cause fires and explosions. The word hazard does not express a view on the magnitude
of the consequences or how likely it is that the harm will actually occur. A major
hazard is associated with Loss of Containment and has the potential to cause significant
damage or multiple fatalities. Again, the term does not imply that such events are likely.
Incidents are the actual realization of a hazard, i.e. an event or chain of events, which has
caused or could have caused personal injury, damage to property or environment. They
are sudden unintended departures from normal conditions in which some degree of harm
is caused. They range from minor incidents such as a small gas leak to major accidents
such as Flixborough, Mexico City, Bhopal, Pasadena, Texas City, etc. Sometimes, the
more neutral term event is used in place of the more colloquial term incident. For
flammable incidents, ignition has to take place for a hazard to be realized.
Risk is the combination of the likelihood and the consequences of such incidents. More
scientifically, it is defined as the likelihood of a hazard occurrence resulting in an
undesirable event. The likelihood may be expressed either as a frequency (i.e. the rate of
events per unit time) or a probability (i.e. the chance of the event occurring in specified
circumstances). The consequence is defined as an event or chain of events that result from
the release of a hazard. The impact or effect is the degree of harm caused by the event.
Safety is the inverse of risk. The higher the risk for an occupation or installation, the
lower is its safety. The popular understanding of safety sometimes appears to be zero
risk, but this is impossible in an intrinsically hazardous activity such as oil and gas
production.

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1.2

What is QRA?

Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) is a means of making a systematic analysis of the


risks from hazardous activities, and forming a rational evaluation of their significance, in
order to provide input to a decision-making process.
QRA is sometimes called probabilistic risk assessment term originally used in the
nuclear industry. The term Quantified Risk Assessment is synonymous with QRA as
used here. The term quantitative risk analysis is widely used, but strictly this refers to
the purely numerical analysis of risks without any evaluation of their significance.
QRA is probably the most sophisticated technique available to engineers to predict the
risks of accidents and give guidance on appropriate means of minimizing them.
Nevertheless, while it uses scientific methods and verifiable data, QRA is a rather
immature and highly judgmental technique, and its results have a large degree of
uncertainty. Despite this, many branches of engineering have found that QRA can give
useful guidance. However, QRA should not be the only input to decision-making about
safety, as other techniques based on experience and judgment may be appropriate as well.

1.3

Key Components in QRA

The study is based on the premises of a traditional Quantitative Risk Assessment. The key
components of QRA are explained below, and illustrated in Figure 1-1.
The first stage in a QRA is defined as system definition where the potential hazards
associated with a facility or activities are to be analyzed. The scope of work for a QRA
should be to define the boundaries for the study, identifying which activities are to be
included and which are excluded, and which phases of the facilitys life are to be
assessed. The hazard identification consists of a qualitative review of possible accidents
that may occur, based on previous accident experience or judgment where necessary.
There are several formal techniques for this, which are useful in their own right to give a
qualitative appreciation of the range and magnitude of hazards and indicate appropriate
mitigation measures. This qualitative evaluation is described in this guide as hazard
assessment.

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In a QRA, hazard identification uses similar techniques, but has a more precise purpose
defining the boundaries of a study in terms of materials to be modelled, release conditions
to be modelled, impact criteria to be used, and identifying and selecting a list of failure
cases that will fully capture the hazard potential of the facilities to be studied. Failure
cases are usually derived by breaking the process system down into a larger number of
sub- systems, where failure of any component in the sub-system would cause similar
consequences. In pipeline case, this can be performed by breaking the line into sections
depending on availability of isolation valves along the line.
Figure 1-1: QRA methodology

Once the potential hazards have been identified, the frequency analysis estimates how
likely it is for the accidents to occur, based on the type and number of equipment
components included in the defined failure cases. The component failure frequencies to
be used are usually derived from an analysis of historical accident experience, or by some
form of theoretical modelling.

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In parallel with the frequency analysis, consequence modelling evaluates the resulting
effects if the accidents occur, and their impact on people, equipment and structures, the
environment or business, depending on the defined scope of the QRA study. Estimation
of the consequences of each possible event often requires some form of computer
modelling. Consequence analysis requires the modelling of a number of distinctive
phases, i.e. discharge, dispersion, fires and explosions (for flammable materials).
Closely liaised with the consequence assessment is the impact assessment, i.e. how does
the fire, explosion or toxic cloud affect human beings. When the frequencies and
consequences / impact of each modelled event have been estimated, they can be
combined to produce risk results. Various forms of risk presentation may be used,
commonly grouped as follows:
- Individual risk - the risk experienced by an individual person
- Group/Societal risk - the risk experienced by a group of people exposed to the
hazard
The next stage is to introduce criteria, which are yardsticks to indicate whether the risks
are acceptable, or to make some other judgment about their significance. Risk assessment
is the process of comparing the level of risk against a set of criteria as well as the
identification of major risk contributors. The purpose of risk assessment is to develop
mitigation measures for unacceptable generators of risk, as well as to reduce the overall
level of risk to As Low as Reasonably Practical (Figure 1-2).
Figure 1-2: ALARP Principle

Unacceptable
Region

High Risk

Broadly acceptable
only if risk reduction
is impracticable or if
its cost is grossly
disproportionate to
the improvement
gained

ALARP
Region

Broadly
Acceptable
Region

Given immediate
attention and a response
developed commensurate
with the scale of the threat

Low
Risk

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Necessary to
maintain assurance
that risk remains
at this level

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QRA APPROACH

2.1.1 Hazard Identification


Hazard identification is the structured study of a plant in order to produce a list of
foreseeable, potentially hazardous releases. In a plant, there is a wide range of substances
that, if released, could cause injury or fatality. The hazards applicable for the plant have
been identified through:
- Knowledge transfer from other risk assessments for boosting station plants carried
out by DNV within the applicable confidentiality constraints
- Site specific parameters
- The selection of appropriate hazards considered a range of issues, including:
Nature of potential hazards
Position of plant in relation to the surrounding community
Complexity of the process
DNV has concentrated on the flammable hazards.
A list of the main process streams is defined from the Process Flow Schemes (PFS). Of
these, some were considered to be non-hazardous (e.g., water streams) or only likely to
give a local hazard (e.g., small pool fires), and were not analyzed further. The streams
identified to be hazardous were further analyzed in the QRA.
The range of possible releases for a given stream covers a wide spectrum, from a pinhole
leak up to a catastrophic rupture (of a vessel) or full bore rupture (of a pipe). It is both
time-consuming and unnecessary to consider every part of the range; instead, a finite
number of failure cases are generated to characterize each unit. The number of specific
cases and the distribution of the cases in terms of the size which are analyzed
quantitatively take into account the potential consequences and the format of the
frequency data that are being used.

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2.2

Consequence Modelling/Phast Software

The consequence analysis is performed using DNV proprietary software PHAST. PHAST
is a consequence and impact assessment module integrated within DNV risk calculation
software PHASTRisk. PHAST calculates wide range of possible consequences from the
LOC events, including:
-

Jet Fire, causing thermal radiation impact


Pool Fire, causing thermal radiation impact
Flash Fire, causing thermal radiation impact within the flammable cloud envelope
Explosion, causing overpressure impact

Various factors affecting the extent of consequence are also considered within the
PHAST model which includes:
- Atmospheric conditions, including solar radiation flux, ambient temperature,
humidity and wind speed/direction as well as weather stability
- Release location
- Release orientation
Detailed findings of the consequence analysis for selected failure cases are presented in
Section 6. The qualitative levels of explosion and heat radiation effects are described in
Table 2-1 and

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Table 2-2 respectively are used to assess the likelihood of harm to people or the
likelihood of further loss of containment and / escalation as per DNV Technical note.
Table 2-1: Explosion Overpressure Effects
Overpressure (bar)

Effects Within Zone

0.02

10% window glass broken

0.05

Window glass damage causing injury

0.1

Repairable damage to buildings and house facades

0.2

Structural damage to buildings

0.35

Heavy damage to buildings and process equipment

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Table 2-2: Effects of Thermal Radiation
Radiation Intensity
(kW/m2)
37.5
25

Minimum energy required to ignite wood at indefinitely long


exposures (non piloted)

12.5

Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood,


melting plastic tubing

9.5

Pain threshold reached after 8 sec, second degree burns after


20 sec

Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to reach cover


within 20 s, however blistering of the skin (second degree
burns) is likely; 0% lethality

1.6

2.3

Observed Effect
Sufficient to cause damage to process equipment

Will cause no discomfort for long exposure

Frequency Analysis

The failure frequencies for the scenarios developed are obtained from DNVs Technical
Notes (TN 14).

2.4

Risk Calculation/PHASTRISK Software

As mentioned earlier, DNV proprietary software PHASTRisk is used for the main risk
calculation in the study. PHASTRisk combines consequence results from the PHAST
module with a range of risk-related information in order to produce risk results.

2.4.1 Built-In Event Trees


PHASTRisk has 4 built-in consequence outcome event trees, i.e. continuous vapour
release, continuous release with rain-out1, instantaneous vapour release,
release with rain-out. These event trees are presented in
to
. It is noted that No Ignition event leads to No Effect for flammable-only material
release.

Rain-out occurs if liquid drops suspended in a vapour cloud, following a pressurized


release of liquid or gas, drop to the ground. Rain-out will occur when the droplets loose
their initial (release) momentum and gravity prevails
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Figure 2-1 : Event Tree 1 Continuous Vapour Release

Figure 2-2: Event Tree 2 Continuous Release with Rainout

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Figure 2-3: Event Tree 3 Instantaneous Vapour Release

Figure 2-4: Event Tree 4 Instantaneous Release with Rainout

PHAST RISK also accounts for a short-duration continuous release, an event where a
continuous release lasts for relatively short duration and hence gives effects similar to an
instantaneous release. Release duration of 20 seconds is used as the cut-off time to
consider continuous release giving instantaneous effects.

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Further, in the event of an instantaneous vapour release, PHASTRisk models the event as
a pure fireball, in which the thermal radiation impact defines the level of human fatality,
discounting the overpressure wave which may accompany the event.
Various probability factors which will determine the route of event within the event trees
are also determined in the PHASTRisk model. These include:
Immediate Ignition: This is directly specified and will be different depending on the size
of the release.
Delayed ignition: This is a calculated value within PHASTRisk, unique to each release
case and release direction. The calculation is based on the strength, location and presence
factor of all ignition sources specified, and the extent and duration of dispersing
flammable vapour clouds being exposed to those sources. Delayed ignition sources can be
modelled as point sources (e.g. ground flares), line sources (roads, power lines) or area
sources (e.g. to cater for background sources posed by a variety of human activity).
Fireball / flash fire / explosion probability in the event of immediate ignition of
instantaneous release. This is directly specified in PHASTRisk. Flash fire/explosion
probability in the event of delayed ignition. This is also directly specified in PHASTRisk.
Entire Complex has been considered as Ignition source with ignition probability 0.09 and
operating probability 1 as per DNV Technical Note.

2.4.2 Atmospheric Condition


Variation in wind direction defines the apparent orientation of consequences. PHASTRisk
accounts for the different wind directions from the wind distribution probability input and
combine the values into the risk calculation. Atmospheric conditions, which include
temperature and humidity, are also addressed.

2.4.3 Risk Presentation:


Risk would be presented in terms of Individual and Societal (group).
Individual Risk per Annum (IRPA) is the annual frequency that any individual in a
specific worker group becomes a fatality. Individual risk criteria are intended to ensure
that individual workers are not exposed to excessive risk levels on an installation. They
are largely independent of the number of workers exposed, and hence in principle may be
applied to different situations.
Location specific individual risk (LSIR) is used to indicate the risk at a particular
location. It is the risk for a hypothetical individual who is positioned there for 24 hours
per day, 365 days per year. It is a standard output from a QRA. In onshore studies, the
geographical variation of LSIR may be represented by iso-risk contour plots and used for
land-use planning. In offshore studies, an LSIR value is normally computed for each
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separate module on the installation. Since in reality people do not remain continually at
one location, this is not a realistic risk measure.
IRPA = LSIR x presence factor
Risk is defined as the product of the consequences (here measured as harm to people) and
the likelihood of occurrence (i.e. an expected rate of occurrence per year). Societal (or
group) risk measures the risk of an operation to the company, the industry or a
community. There are several ways of presenting societal risk, but the measure, which is
found to be most useful for offshore installations, is the Potential Loss of Life (PLL).
PLL is defined as the long term average number of fatalities per year due to a specific
cause and can be expressed mathematically as:
PLL = f . N
Where:

= sum for all outcomes


f = frequency of an outcome (per year)
N = number of fatalities caused by the outcome
Potential Loss of Life (PLL) is the measure of the average number of statistical fatalities
that may be expected within a given time period. "PLL per year" is another term for
annual fatality rate. Potential loss of life (PLL) is a societal or group risk measure and is
typically used in cost benefit analysis for assessing remedial measures, or for comparing
alternatives during the design stages of any project. There is no acceptance criterion for
PLL.

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QRA SOFTWARE TOOL

The basis for this QRA study is DNVs proprietary risk modelling software, PHAST
RISK software version 6.7.
The PHAST RISK software has been in existence since the 1970s, and has been under
continual development and improvement ever since, which is managed by DNVs
London-based software development division.
An electronic database of approximately 1400 materials is available to the PHAST RISK
software, with the material properties regularly reviewed and if required re-adjusted,
based on the latest available data. The PHAST RISK consequence modelling results (for
each material) are regularly reviewed and where required re-calibrated, based on the latest
available accident and test data.
The PHATS RISK software will calculate dispersion and consequence modelling results
for all specified weather classes and wind speeds with the failure case specified release
frequency data, specified weather class, wind speed, wind directional probability data,
specified immediate ignition probability data, software calculated delayed ignition
probability data, built-in event tree alternate consequence outcome branch probability
data, fatal impact probability data for each alternate consequence outcome (e.g. jet fire,
flash fire, explosion), based on the specified consequence impact criteria levels, and
specified population data by location, to produce individual and societal risk results, as
required.
This PHAST RISK modelling software requires the following inputs to be able to
produce risk results:
- Import an electronic map of the study area, on which individual fatality risk
contour results may be produced.
- The electronic map may be programmed in PHAST RISK to:
- Superimpose all on-site and off-site populations within the study area by
location, and specifying the day / night number of people for each location.
- Superimpose all potential ignition sources within the study area, which may
cause delayed ignition of a flammable release.

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Delayed ignition sources may be specified as point sources (e.g. flares, fired
heaters, diesel-generators, and transformers), area sources (e.g. welding work
shops) or line sources (e.g. roads, railway lines, and overhead power lines). Each
ignition source carries additional specification in terms of presence factor and
ignition source strength (probability of ignition per unit time, when in contact with
a flammable vapour cloud between LFL and UFL). The actual delayed ignition
probability of any release is calculated by PHAST RISK, based on the dispersion
modelling results and event duration.
The immediate ignition probability associated with each flammable failure case is
a risk analyst programmed value, based on historical ignition data, which varies
with leak size and release phase (Gas / Liquid / 2-Phase) (the larger the leak
vapour flow rate, the higher the ignition probability, typically varying from 1% to
30%, unless above auto ignition, then 100%).
Prepare and import weather class, wind speed and wind direction probability data
for the study area. Normally separate day / night, weather class, wind speed, wind
directional probability files are entered into PHAST RISK, most often broken
down into 16 wind directions.
Enter all identified failure cases, which are defined in terms of: Location, Material
released, Quantity released (or release duration), Temperature, Pressure, Leak
size, Leak direction (e.g. horizontal, vertical), Leak elevation, Leak frequency and
Immediate ignition probability.
Each failure case calculation in PHAST RISK starts with discharge modelling.
Based on release duration and release phase (gas, liquid, 2-phase), PHAST RISK
directs the dispersion and consequence calculations to one of 4 alternate, built-in
consequence outcome event trees (continuous vapour release, continuous release
with rain-out, instantaneous vapour release, instantaneous release with rain-out),
where each event tree branch probability carries default values, which may be reprogrammed by the risk analyst.
PHAST RISK will then calculate all alternate consequence outcomes (e.g. jet fire,
explosion) of the event tree selected, in terms of hazard range and event duration
(where applicable), for each weather class / wind speed combination.

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So far the calculations performed in PHAST RISK only relate to the alternate
consequence outcomes and the consequence hazard ranges, for each specified
failure case. To produce risk results, PHAST RISK will perform impact frequency
calculations, using the failure case specified leak frequency as starting point.
Frequency aspects of the risk calculations relate to the:
Risk analyst defined failure case leak frequency.
Weather class, wind speed and wind directional probability, for each of the 16
wind directions.
Specified immediate ignition probability and PHAST RISK calculated delayed
ignition probability. The delayed ignition probability calculation is based on the
strength and location of all specified ignition sources and the failure case
dispersion hazard range, combined with vapour cloud persistence (duration).
PHAST RISK selected event tree and branch probabilities, for each alternate
consequence out come.
Fatal Impact probability for each alternate consequence outcome. This is based on
the PHAST RISK calculated magnitude of each consequence and the PHAST
RISK default impact probability criteria or risk analyst specified impact criteria
for that type of consequence.
Location and number of people (or equipment) within hazard area for societal risk
results, with separate calculations for day and night, indoors and outdoors.
PHAST RISK performs its individual and societal risk calculations based on a 200
x 200 grids (40,000 points), with the grid point spacing automatically varied,
based on the consequence hazard range results.
For each release case, PHAST RISK takes the failure case release frequency as
initial input, multiplies this by the first weather class / wind speed probability, for
the first of 16 wind directions.
PHAST RISK takes this result and multiplies it by the immediate ignition
probability, while also separately multiplying this result by the PHAST RISK
calculated delayed ignition probability.

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These 2 results are multiplied by the first of the event tree consequence branch
probabilities, relating to immediate or delayed ignition branch path.
PHAST RISK takes the calculated consequence hazard range and verifies which
grid points are within the consequence hazard area. For each grid point within
range PHAST RISK then calculates the magnitude of the consequence at each grid
point (e.g. explosion overpressure at a particular grid point may be 3psi).
The calculated consequence magnitude at each grid point is then compared to the
PHAST RISK programmed impact criteria level, and the likelihood of fatality or
damage calculated, based on the impact probability criteria specified in PHAST
RISK, for the type of consequence and the magnitude of the consequence.
This calculation is repeated for each event tree alternate consequence outcome at
each grid point, for that weather class / wind speed and wind direction, and the
result added to the previous risk level, at each grid point.
The above calculations are then repeated for each of the 16 wind directions,
cumulatively adding to the risk level at each grid point.
The above calculations are repeated for all day / night weather classes, wind
speeds and wind directions, cumulatively adding these risk results at each grid
point.
Once all risk calculations at these grid points have been completed for the first
failure case, the next failure case will be calculated, again adding all results
cumulatively at each grid point. This is repeated until all failure cases have been
calculated, while PHAST RISK also tracks the risk contribution made by each
failure case at each grid point.
Once completed, PHAST RISK produces individual risk contour results by
linking points of equal risk, based on the pre-specified levels of individual fatality
risk (or equipment damage) to be plotted, and using linear interpolation between
relevant grid points. The risk contour results are super imposed on the electronic
site map, entered in the PHAST RISK software.
PHAST RISK can also produce societal risk results by comparing the calculated
level of individual risk at all 40,000 grid points, and combining this with the
number of people indoors and outdoors, entered by the risk analyst by location.

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The above discussion demonstrates that the meteorological data, ignition data and
population data entered into the PHAST RISK software are critical to the risk
results.
Note that with default settings the risk modelling within PHAST RISK aims to
produce conservative offsite fatality risk results. This is in line with the intention
of performing a QRA as per the Guidelines for QRA Study (Revision April
2008) for a purpose of land-use planning. This is achieved by the build-in but
programmable parameter settings, which include:
Indoor & outdoor people fatality impact criteria levels, for each alternate
consequence outcome. For flammable releases the alternate consequences would
be spill fires, fire balls, jet fires, flash fires and vapour cloud explosions (VCEs),
each with predefined values for the impact levels that will affect people. For jet
fires, pool fires and fire balls the varying percentage fatalities (with distance) is
calculated based on the Eisenberg Probit equation. For flash fires the LFL
envelope is used and for VCE overpressure two impact criteria levels are used, 1.5
psi (0.1 barg) and 5 psi (0.34 barg).
For jet fires, pool fires and fire balls the varying percentage fatalities (with
distance) is calculated based on the Eisenberg Probit equation. For flash fires the
LFL envelope is used and for VCE overpressure two impact criteria levels are
used, 0.5(0.034) psi, 1.0 psi (0.068 barg) and 5 psi (0.34 barg).
4 built-in event trees (Continuous No Rain Out; Continuous With Rain Out;
Instantaneous No Rain Out; Instantaneous With Rain Out) that are automatically
selected based on the type of material and the release conditions. Each event-tree
assigns a split between alternate consequence outcomes (spill fires, fire balls, jet
fires, flash fires, VCEs and no hazard), based on the immediate ignition, delayed
ignition and no ignition probabilities.
People vulnerability criteria, which pre-determines the fraction of fatalities
resulting indoor & outdoor from being exposed to specific consequence outcomes
for a specified duration, or to one or more specified criteria levels. The normal
default people fatal fraction impact criteria used in PHAST RISK are shown in the
below table.

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Table 3-1 PHAST RISK Default Vulnerability Parameters

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Annexe 2
Assumption Register

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Table of Contents

RISK CALCULATION TOOL ..................................................................................... 1

METEOROLOGICAL DATA ...................................................................................... 2


2.1 Day Weather Class.................................................................................................. 2
2.2 Night Weather Class ............................................................................................... 2

IGNITION ...................................................................................................................... 4
3.1.1 Identification of Ignition Sources ...................................................................... 5

POPULATION ............................................................................................................... 5

MATERIAL COMPOSITION ...................................................................................... 5

IMPACT CRITERIA..................................................................................................... 6
6.1 Jet fire, pool fire and fireball ................................................................................... 6
6.2 Flash fire................................................................................................................. 6
6.3 Explosion................................................................................................................ 6

RELEASE SIZES........................................................................................................... 7

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RISK CALCULATION TOOL

The risk analysis within this study is conducted using DNV Softwares Phast Risk
program Version 6.7, which is an industry standard method for carrying out QRA of
onshore process and pipelines (chemical and petrochemical) facilities.

- Phast Risk allows efficient identification of major risk contributors, so that time
and effort can then be directed to mitigating these highest risk activities.
- Phast Risk analyses complex consequences from accident scenarios, taking
account of local population, land usage and weather conditions, to quantify the
risk associated with the release of hazardous materials.
- Phast Risk incorporates the industry standard consequence modeling of Phast.

Phast Risk is intended as a set of models for risk analysts to enable them to provide
timely, accurate and appropriate advice on safety related issues. It models all stages of a
release from outflow through a hole or from a pipe end, through atmospheric dispersion,
rain-out and re-evaporation of liquid, to thermal radiation from fires, explosion
overpressures and toxic lethality. PhastRisk combines recognized and validated models
for the various physical phenomena, automatically selecting the appropriate model
depending on the circumstances of the release. It provides an experienced risk analyst
with a tool that allows them to focus their attention and experience on the real problem
areas rather than the administration of large quantities of data.

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METEOROLOGICAL DATA

Data on the wind speed and stability category have been obtained from the client and this
will be used for this particular QRA study. There are two different weather classes for
Day and Night which are listed below:

2.1 Day Weather Class


- D11 : D stability (neutral) and 11 m/s wind speed.
- B2 : B stability (Unstable) and 2 m/s wind speed.

2.2 Night Weather Class


- D11 : D stability (neutral) and 11 m/s wind speed.
- F3

: F stability (very stable) and 3 m/s wind speed.

This distribution is combined with the wind rose information to generate likelihood for
the wind to be from a particular direction and of a specified speed and stability.
Table 2-1: Wind Speed Distribution (Day)

Wind Direction
N
NE
E
SE
S
SW
W
NW
Calm

Weather Categories
3B
5D
0.042958904
0.00460274
0.042958904
0.00460274
0.104328767
0.011178082
0.024547945
0.002630137
0.006136986
0.000657534
0.018410959
0.001972603
0.085917808
0.009205479
0.110465753
0.011835616
0.177972603
0.019068493

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Table 2-2: Wind Speed Distribution (Night)

Wind Direction
N
NE
E
SE
S
SW
W
NW
Calm

Weather Categories
3B
5D
0.060931507
0.005041096
0.038082192
0.003150685
0.060931507
0.005041096
0.038082192
0.003150685
0.022849315
0.001890411
0.060931507
0.005041096
0.167561644
0.013863014
0.190410959
0.015753425
0.121863014
0.010082192

Referring to the same study, the following meteorological parameters will be applied:
An average ambient condition as follow is used in the study:
- Atmospheric temperature

: 15-25C

- Surface temperature

: 15-25C

- Humidity

: 70%

- Solar radiation flux

: 0.5kw/m2 for day and 0kw/m2 for night

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IGNITION

In order to calculate the risk from flammable materials, information on the ignition
sources (which are present in the area over which a flammable cloud may drift) is
required. For each ignition source considered, the following factors need to be specified:
Presence Factor
This is the probability that an ignition source is active at a particular location.
Ignition Factor
This defines the strength of an ignition source. It is derived from the probability
that a source will ignite a cloud if the cloud is present over the source for a
particular length of time.
- Location
-

The location of each ignition source must be specified on the site layout. This allows the
position of the source relative to the location of each release to be calculated. The results
of the dispersion calculations for each flammable release are then used to determine the
size and mass of the cloud when it reaches the source of ignition.
If these factors are known for each source of ignition considered, then the probability of a
flammable cloud being ignited as it moves downwind over the sources can be calculated.
The data is entered into the risk quantification software, namely PHAST RISK, for each
source (as that used for population data). The PHAST RISK software then calculates
equivalent combined ignition factors and presence factors for all sources based on its
location on the map.
Ignition sources in a QRA study may be of 3 types:
Point sources

Known specific sources such as flares, workshops, etc.

Line sources

Roads, railways, electrical transmission lines.

Area sources

Population, industrial sites where location of specific ignition


sources is unknown.

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3.1.1 Identification of Ignition Sources


The ignition sources identified for the proposed expansion project are near-by Industrial
plants and onsite ignition sources like hot machinery surfaces, electrical sources. No
specific field survey is performed for the neighbouring industrial plants in this risk study;
however, generally a process petro-chemical plant has various types of ignition sources
on-site, e.g. hot work, hot surface, flare, turbine, compressor and vehicles movement etc.
In summary, the ignition sources considered in this QRA study are listed below:

- It is assumed that stringent ignition control is maintained, as is the standard


prevailing in the HPCL Bharatpur
- Entire Complex has been considered as Ignition source with ignition probability
0.9 and operating probability 0.1 as per DNV Technical Note.

POPULATION

A representative estimate of the exposed populations is sufficient to determine the


acceptability of societal risks by determining the order of magnitude of potential fatalities
within a population group.
The basis of the population assigned to the facility will be based on the data given by
HPCL Bharatpur. Further analysis of the population will be conducted in order to define
various factors associated with the population presence, e.g. day/night variation, fraction
of time spent indoor etc.

MATERIAL COMPOSITION

The material composition used for the study is provided by HPCL Bharatpur.

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IMPACT CRITERIA

The following impact criteria are used.

6.1 Jet fire, pool fire and fireball


Two sets of criteria are used to determine impact from combination of these events. Areas
exposed to radiation levels of 37.5 kW/m2 are assumed to give 100% fatality level. The
fatality levels in areas exposed to lower radiation levels are determined using the
following Probit function.
Pr = -36.38 + 2.56 ln(I1.333 . t)
Where:
Pr : Probit
I
: thermal radiation level in W/m2
t
: exposure duration in second
The maximum exposure duration for these events is set to 20 seconds.
This is assumed as the time that someone will remain within the
radiation envelope before attempting to escape.

6.2 Flash fire


The area within the LFL envelope of flammable vapor cloud is used as single value
criteria and it is assumed that this area gives 100% fatality level.

6.3 Explosion
The study applies the TNT Correlation Model which utilizes two fixed coefficients to
establish ranges to specified damage levels (these coefficients are 0.03 for heavy damage
to buildings and 0.06 for repairable damage to buildings). These damage levels are not
explicitly associated with overpressure levels but are generally considered to be
equivalent to 0.3 and 0.1 bar for heavy and repairable damage, respectively. The damage
levels are used as single criteria to establish the human fatality rate.
Fatality modification factors are also applied and are combined with the above impact
criteria to produce the final fatality rate resulted from each type of consequence. Separate
factors are used for people being outdoors at the time of the event and for people inside a
building. The parameters considered for Explosion are following:
- Explosion location criterion: Cloud Centroid
- The minimum explosive mass considered: 100 Kg.
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RELEASE SIZES

The following representative leak sizes have been applied:


Release Sizes:
- Small release through 5 mm equivalent hole, representative of 3 to 10 mm hole
sizes.
- Medium release through 25 mm hole, representative of 10 to 50 mm hole sizes.
- Large release through 100 mm hole, representative of 50 to 100 mm hole sizes.
- Catastrophic Rupture at vessel diameter/ Full bore release at pipeline diameter,
representative of releases larger than 150mm.

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Annexe 3
Frequency Analysis

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Table of Contents
1

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION ...................................................................................... 3


1.1

Failure case scenarios ............................................................................................. 3

1.2

Continuous Releases ............................................................................................... 5

1.3

Instantaneous Releases............................................................................................ 5

1.4

Events which could lead to a Release ...................................................................... 5

1.5

Failure Cases .......................................................................................................... 6

1.6

Release duration ..................................................................................................... 8

FREQUENCY DISCUSSION ....................................................................................... 8

List of Tables
Table 1-1 : Failure case scenarios ............................................................................................................................ 3
Table 1-2 : List of Failure Cases ............................................................................................................................. 6
Table 2-1 : Failure frequencies of the identified scenarios ...................................................................................... 9

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HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

1.1 Failure case scenarios


Following scenarios have been identified for the Bharatpur
Table 1-1 : Failure case scenarios
Sr. No
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Failure Case
TK-1
TK-2
TK-3
TK-4
TK-5
TK-6
TK-7/UG
TK-8/UG
TK-9/UG
TK-10
TK-11
TK-12
TK-13
TK-14
TK-15
TK-16
TK-17
TK-18
HSD Pump_2400 LPM
SKD Pump_1200 LPM
MS Pump 2400 LPM
Receipt Pipeline to Tank MS
Receipt Pipeline to Tank HSD
Receipt Pipeline to Tank SKO

Material
Handled
HSD
HSD
SKO
SKO
MS
MS
MS
MS
HSD
WATER
WATER
HSD
HSD
MS
MS
MS
HSD
HSD
HSD
SKO
MS
MS
HSD
SKO

Temp
ambient
ambient
ambient
ambient
ambient
ambient
ambient
ambient
ambient
ambient
ambient
ambient
ambient
ambient
ambient
ambient
ambient
ambient
ambient
ambient
ambient
ambient
ambient
ambient

Pressure
atmospheric
atmospheric
atmospheric
atmospheric
atmospheric
atmospheric
atmospheric
atmospheric
atmospheric
atmospheric
atmospheric
atmospheric
atmospheric
atmospheric
atmospheric
atmospheric
atmospheric
atmospheric
2.5bar
2.5bar
2.5bar
2.5bar
2.5bar
2.5bar

25

pl from tank to pump house_MS

MS

ambient

2.5bar

26

PL from tank to pump


house_HSD

HSD

ambient

2.5bar

27

PL from tank to pump


house_SKO

SKO

ambient

2.5bar

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Sr. No

Failure Case

Material
Handled

Temp

Pressure

28

PL from pump house to


gantry_MS

MS

ambient

2.5bar

29

PL from pump house to


gantry_SKO

SKO

ambient

2.5bar

30

PLfrom pump house to


gantry_HSD

HSD

ambient

2.5bar

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1.2 Continuous Releases


If ignited immediately, a continuous release will form a jet fire. If ignition is delayed, a
flammable cloud would be formed and drifted with the wind. In such situation, if the
cloud is ignited (after some delays), a flash fire or Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) may
result, depending upon the degree of congestion within area and energy strength of the
ignition source.

1.3 Instantaneous Releases


An instantaneous release would result from catastrophic rupture of a storage vessel (such
as the storage cylinders, the trailers etc.) or reactors. If ignition is immediate, a fireball
may be formed depending on the nature of the material. If ignition occurs after some
delay similar to continuous release, a flash fire or VCE may be the consequence.

1.4 Events which could lead to a Release


Releases can be caused by:
- Impact event;
- Natural event (e.g. tide, waves, tsunamis, strong winds);
- Failure or leak from other equipment, pipe-work or fittings;
- Internal explosion in ship;
- Incorrect operation;
- Release occasioned from other operations or maintenance;
- Vandalism/sabotage

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1.5 Failure Cases


The failure cases with the hole sizes considered for each of the release is as follows
Table 1-2 : List of Failure Cases
Sr. No

Failure Case

Hole Size (mm)


Small

Medium

Large

Cata/ FBR

Tank
Fire
Tank
Fire

TK-1

5mm

NA

100 mm

catastrophic
Rupture

TK-2

5mm

NA

100 mm

catastrophic
Rupture

Tank
Fire

TK-3

5mm

NA

100 mm

catastrophic
Rupture

Tank
Fire
Tank
Fire

TK-4

5mm

NA

100 mm

catastrophic
Rupture

TK-5

5mm

NA

100 mm

catastrophic
Rupture

Tank
Fire

TK-6

5mm

NA

100 mm

catastrophic
Rupture

Tank
Fire

TK-7/UG

5mm

NA

NA

catastrophic
Rupture

NA

TK-8/UG

5mm

NA

NA

catastrophic
Rupture

NA
NA

TK-9/UG

5mm

NA

NA

catastrophic
Rupture

10

TK-10

5mm

NA

100 mm

catastrophic
Rupture

Tank
Fire

11

TK-11

5mm

NA

100 mm

catastrophic
Rupture

Tank
Fire

12

TK-12

5mm

NA

100 mm

catastrophic
Rupture

Tank
Fire

13

TK-13

5mm

NA

100 mm

catastrophic
Rupture

Tank
Fire

14

TK-14

5mm

NA

100 mm

catastrophic
Rupture

Tank
Fire

15

TK-15

5mm

NA

100 mm

catastrophic
Rupture

Tank
Fire

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Sr. No

Failure Case

Hole Size (mm)


Small

Medium

Large

Cata/ FBR

Tank
Fire

16

TK-16

5mm

NA

100 mm

catastrophic
Rupture

Tank
Fire

17

TK-17

5mm

NA

100 mm

catastrophic
Rupture

Tank
Fire

18
19
20
21

5mm
NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA
NA

100 mm
NA
NA
NA

catastrophic
Rupture
FBR
FBR
FBR

Tank
Fire
NA
NA
NA

5mm

25mm

100 mm

FBR

NA

5mm

25mm

100 mm

FBR

NA

24

TK-18
HSD Pump_2400 LPM
SKD Pump_1200 LPM
MS Pump 2400 LPM
Receipt Pipeline to
Tank MS
Receipt Pipeline to
Tank HSD
Receipt Pipeline to
Tank SKO

5mm

25mm

100 mm

FBR

NA

25

pl from tank to pump


house_MS

5mm

25mm

100 mm

FBR

NA

26

PL from tank to pump


house_HSD

5mm

25mm

100 mm

FBR

NA

27

PL from tank to pump


house_SKO

5mm

25mm

100 mm

FBR

NA

28

PL from pump house to


gantry_MS

5mm

25mm

100 mm

FBR

NA

29

PL from pump house to


gantry_SKO

5mm

25mm

100 mm

FBR

NA

30

PLfrom pump house to


gantry_HSD

5mm

25mm

100 mm

FBR

NA

22
23

NA stands for Not Applicable

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1.6 Release duration


Release duration of 600 seconds is chosen for this study. This includes the time to detect,
isolate and the subsequent blow down (if possible) of the node from which leak occurs.
After the leak is detected and the section is isolated it is understood that no more
inventory is entering the section.

FREQUENCY DISCUSSION

Estimation of the likelihood of occurrence of each of the failure cases modelled has been
done based on historical failure frequencies of process equipment. The historical failure
data are based on an extensive research by DNV on several failure frequency databases
worldwide. DNV has ensured that the most reputable, comprehensive and appropriate
data are selected for each of the equipment failure frequencies quoted.
The below Table shows the failure frequencies that are considered for the failure case
scenarios

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Table 2-1 : Failure frequencies of the identified scenarios
Case Description

Small

Medium

Large

FBR

2.50E-03

1.00E-04

5.00E-06

2.00E-03

3.80E-04

4.30E-05

8.40E-06

1.00E-05

9.00E-07

1.10E-06

2.50E-07

5.60E-08

9.00E-07

1.10E-06

2.50E-07

5.60E-08

3.00E-05

HSD, SKD, MS loading arm Failure

7.80E-03

1.80E-02

7.10E-03

1.40E-03

HSD,SKD, MS Road Tanker Failure

9.00E-05

9.00E-05

1.00E-05

5.00E-07

Atmospheric Storage tank Failure


Underground Tank Failure
Pipeline from Tank to Pump House
Receipt Lines to Tanks
HSD, SKD, Ethanol, MS pump failure

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Annexe 4
Consequence Analysis

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Table of Contents
1

CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT ................................................................................ 4


1.1 Pool Fire ................................................................................................................. 5
1.2 Jet Fire .................................................................................................................... 6
1.3 Flash Fire ................................................................................................................ 7
1.4 Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE).............................................................................. 8

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List of Tables
Table 1-1 : Consequence Results............................................................................................................................. 9

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CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT

For each defined failure case for the POL Terminal Bharatpur, the consequence
modelling is carried out to determine the potential effects of releases, the results of which
are discussed in terms of hazard distances.
The corresponding consequences in terms of flammable and explosive effects are
modelled and analysed by using PHAST RISK software version 6.7. The flammable
consequences that may potentially arise from failure of equipments or lines are:
- Jet fires;
- Flash fires;
- Fireball; and/or
- Explosions.
The hazard distances for each event depend on the leak size, operating conditions,
weather conditions, the release location, the release conditions and the dispersion
characteristics as calculated by the PHAST RISK software. Each failure case is entered
into PHAST RISK software, where the corresponding consequences and risk impact are
calculated, based on built-in programmable event trees.
The dispersion of gas releases from different hole sizes are modelled using state-of-art
methods. For flammable and explosive consequence, the effect zones for the various
possible outcomes of such a release are determined for both early and delayed ignition
presents the consequence hazard distances for the failure case scenarios identified in the
POL Terminal Bharatpur.
Consequence distances for the following weather conditions have been evaluated in the
tables below,
- D11 : D stability (neutral) and 11 m/s wind speed.
- F3

: F stability (very stable) and 3 m/s wind speed.

- B3 : B Stability (Unstable) and 3 m/s wind speed

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The consequence analysis is performed using DNV proprietary software PHAST. PHAST
is a consequence and impact assessment module integrated within DNV risk calculation
software PHAST Risk. The following descriptions are based on the different hazard types
modeled, which are jet fires, flash fires, vapor cloud explosions, pool fires.

1.1

Pool Fire

A pool fire in the open air and in an enclosed area may take place when there is an
ignition of a liquid spill which is released on a horizontal, solid surface in the open air or
within an enclosure. A liquid pool fire can be either fuel controlled or ventilation
controlled.
In general terms, outside pool fires rarely cause fatalities as the time between when the
fire starts until the time when the fire is fully developed is usually sufficient for people to
escape. If there are fatalities, these tend to be people caught within the pool itself or later
fire fighting personnel in the event of a boil-over (due to burning oil not thermal
radiation).
The extent of the consequence of a Pool fire is represented by the thermal radiation
envelope. Three levels of radiation are presented in this report, i.e.:
- 4 kW/m2; this level is sufficient to cause personnel if unable to reach cover
within 20s; however blistering of the skin (second degree burn) is likely; 0:
lethality.
- 12.5 kW/m2; this level will cause extreme pain within 20 seconds and
movement to a safer place is instinctive. This level indicates around 6% fatality
for 20 seconds exposure.
- 37.5 kW/m2; this level of radiation is assumed to give 100% fatality.
In Case of tanks small, medium leaks are considered from the fittings around the tanks
like flanges, valves etc, and tank fire and bund fire scenarios are considered as the worst
case scenarios. Table 1-1 below summarises representative failure cases with the
associated pool fire consequence results.

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1.2

Jet Fire

A jet fire may result from ignition of a high-pressure leakage of gas from process plants
or storage tanks. Jet fires are characterized by a high momentum jet flame that is highly
turbulent. The flame is lifted above the exit opening from which the gas is discharged
generally at high pressure. This distance appears because the combustion process can
only take place when the flow velocity is reduced sufficiently to allow stable combustion.
Another feature of such fires is the high entrainment of air into the flame plume due to
the highly turbulent flame.
The extent of the consequence of a Jet fire is represented by the thermal radiation
envelope. Three levels of radiation are presented in this report, i.e.:
- 4 kW/m2; this level is sufficient to cause personnel if unable to reach cover
within 20s; however blistering of the skin (second degree burn) is likely; 0:
lethality,
- 12.5 kW/m2; this level will cause extreme pain within 20 seconds and
movement to a safer place is instinctive. This level indicates around 6% fatality
for 20 seconds exposure.
- 37.5 kW/m2; this level of radiation is assumed to give 100% fatality.
Jet fires are a direct hazard to people and structures caught within the flame envelope or
exposed to high thermal radiation levels. This scenario is considered for the whole
boosting station in which material is handled at the significant pressures. Table 1-1 below
summarises representative failure cases with the associated jet fire consequence results.

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1.3

Flash Fire

A flash fire is the non-explosive combustion of a flammable vapour cloud resulting from
a release of volatile material into the open air, which, after mixing with air, ignites. The
flame initially propagates slowly, often 10m/s or less, and in the Shell Maplin Sands
experiments often was unable to overcome the wind speed to flash back to the source.
However, where congestion or confinement exist, flame speeds can accelerate to
hundreds of m/s and overpressure effects will result.
The cloud burns as a flash fire and the major hazard to people and to equipment
(especially control cabling) is for those within the burning envelope (including those who
might be above on elevated structures). Flame duration and intensity for most flammable
clouds are insufficient to cause a significant thermal radiation hazard outside the flame
envelope. The literature provides little information on the effects of thermal radiation
from flash fires, probably because thermal radiation hazards from burning vapour clouds
are considered less significant than possible blast effects. Furthermore, flash combustion
of a vapour cloud normally lasts no more than a few tens of seconds. Propane
experiments (Maplin) gave average flame speeds of up to about 12 m/s. higher transient
flame speeds, up to 28 m/s were observed in one instance. Pool Fire Formation of pools is
also likely, particularly for materials that have high boiling points. Flash calculations
were conducted to consider the vaporization of light components in the streams,
especially for high pressure or high temperature process conditions. Flashed vapor and
light component releases will behave as jets, with jet fire and vapor cloud impacts
modelled in the same way as for gas releases, as set out in the previous sections.
The extent of the consequence of a flash fire is represented by the flash fire envelope, i.e.
the maximum dispersion distance of the flammable cloud at LFL concentration.
Table 1-1 below summarises representative failure cases together with their flash fire
consequence results.

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1.4

Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE)

Due to the large volume of flammable materials and highly flammable material with
higher proportion of the more volatile components, there is significant potential for
Vapour Cloud Explosion Events (VCE) in case any ignition source is not available
immediately.
Maximum flammable fuel volume for prediction of explosion overpressure effects
estimated to be considerable based on flow rate, isolation time (10 mins), time for
vaporization and probability of VCE scenario.

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Table 1-1 : Consequence Results
Description
TK-1 &2

TK-3&4

Accident Scenario
Small

Event
Flash Fire
Pool Fire

Large

Flash Fire
Pool Fire

Catastrophic Rupture

Flash Fire
Pool fire

tank Fire

Pool fire

Small

Flash Fire
Pool Fire

Large

Impact criteria
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2

Flash Fire
Pool Fire

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Consequence Distance(m)
B3m/s
D 11m/s

F 3m/s

3.2

3.4

2.9

7
11.3
15.7
7.1
26.2
35
76.7
54.9
37.4
38.7
92
NR
18
42

9.6
13.4
16.9
7.1
26.2
36
82
97
37.4
93
157
NR
21
46

6.8
11.1
15.4
7.1
26.2
35
76.7
73
37.4
38.7
92
NR
18
42

2.9

3.2

2.6

6.4
11.2
15.7
11
23.3
30.9

8.8
13.4
17
7.6
23.3
32

6.2
11
15.4
11
23.3
30.9

DET NORSKE VERITAS


QRA for POL terminal/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK
Description

TK-5&6

Accident Scenario

Event

Catastrophic Rupture

Flash Fire
Pool fire

tank Fire

Pool fire

Small

Flash Fire
Pool Fire

Large

Flash Fire
Pool Fire

Catastrophic Rupture

Flash Fire
Pool fire

tank Fire

Pool fire

Impact criteria
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27


Rev 02, 30th July, 2013
Page 10

Consequence Distance(m)
B3m/s
D 11m/s
73.3
85.4
21.1
30.7
37.4
37.4
38.9
41
97
115
6
6
19
23
31
33

F 3m/s
73.3
24
37.4
38.9
97
6
19
31

2.8

2.9

6.4
11.4
16
24.9
23
29.7
74.5
47.6
37.5
38.7
99.7
6
19
32

8.8
13.8
17.4
17.4
23
31.7
88.6
67.7
37.5
41
120
6
24
34

6.1
11
15.8
27.7
23
29.8
74.6
50.6
37.5
38.7
99.7
6
19
32

DET NORSKE VERITAS


QRA for POL terminal/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK
Description

Accident Scenario

Event

Impact criteria

TK-7&8 /UG

Small

Flash Fire
Pool Fire

Catastrophic Rupture

Flash Fire
Pool fire

Small

Flash Fire
Pool Fire

LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2

TK-9/UG

TK-12

Catastrophic Rupture

Flash Fire
Pool fire

Small

Flash Fire
Pool Fire

Large

Flash Fire
Pool Fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27


Rev 02, 30th July, 2013
Page 11

Consequence Distance(m)
B3m/s
D 11m/s
NR
NR
3
4
7
7.9
11
11
21.4
26.5
33.3
33.3
35
38
91
111

F 3m/s
NR
3
7
11
18.5
33.3
35
91

NR

NR

NR

6
9.5
21.4
33.3
35
91

6.7
9.3
26.5
33.3
38
111

6.3
9.5
18.5
33.3
35
91

2.9

2.6

6.5
10.5
14.5
5.9
23.8
31.5

8.9
12.4
15.5
5.9
23.8
32.6

6.3
10.2
14
5.9
23.8
31.5

DET NORSKE VERITAS


QRA for POL terminal/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK
Description

TK-13

Accident Scenario

Event

Catastrophic Rupture

Flash Fire
Pool fire

tank Fire

Pool fire

Small

Flash Fire
Pool Fire

Large

Flash Fire
Pool Fire

Catastrophic Rupture

Flash Fire
Pool fire

tank Fire

Pool fire

Impact criteria
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27


Rev 02, 30th July, 2013
Page 12

Consequence Distance(m)
B3m/s
D 11m/s
70.5
79.2
22.7
33.8
37.4
37.4
38.7
41
92
104
6
6
17.5
20.5
28
29

F 3m/s
70.5
26.5
37.4
38.7
92
6
17.5
28

3.2

3.4

2.9

7.8
11.3
15.7
7.1
26.2
35
76.7
48.6
37.4
38.7
92
NR
18
38.7

9.6
13.4
16.9
7.1
26.2
36
86
84
37.4
85
149
NR
22
42

6.8
11
15.4
7.1
26.2
35
76.7
63.9
37.4
38
92
NR
18
38.7

DET NORSKE VERITAS


QRA for POL terminal/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK
Description

Accident Scenario

Event

Impact criteria

TK-14

Small

Flash Fire
Pool Fire

LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2

TK-15

Large

Flash Fire
Pool Fire

Catastrophic Rupture

Flash Fire
Pool fire

tank Fire

Pool fire

Small

Flash Fire
Pool Fire

Large

Flash Fire
Pool Fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27


Rev 02, 30th July, 2013
Page 13

Consequence Distance(m)
B3m/s
D 11m/s

F 3m/s

2.8

3.1

2.6

6.4
11.4
16
24.9
23
29.7
74.5
24.9
23
29.7
74.5
6
19
32.4

8.8
13.8
17.4
17.4
22.9
31
88.6
17
23
31.7
88.6
6
24
34.9

6.1
11
15.8
27.7
23
29.8
74.6
27.7
23
29.8
74.6
6
19
32.4

3.3

3.5

7.1
12.7
17.8
31.4
26.2
35
83

9.8
15.3
19.4
23.4
26
36.4
98

6.8
12.4
17.5
35.2
26.3
35
83

DET NORSKE VERITAS


QRA for POL terminal/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK
Description

TK-16

TK-17&18

Accident Scenario

Event

Impact criteria

Catastrophic Rupture

Flash Fire
Pool fire

tank Fire

Pool fire

Small

Flash Fire
Pool Fire

LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL

Large

Flash Fire
Pool Fire

Catastrophic Rupture

Flash Fire
Pool fire

tank Fire

Pool fire

Small

Flash Fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27


Rev 02, 30th July, 2013
Page 14

Consequence Distance(m)
B3m/s
D 11m/s
104
170
37.4
37.4
38.7
86.4
99.7
166
NR
NR
17.9
20.9
47.3
53.9

F 3m/s
141
37.4
38.7
99.7
NR
17.9
47.3

3.2

3.3

2.9

6.9
12.4
17.3
29.5
25.4
33.8
80.7
75
37.4
38.7
99.7
NR
18
41

9.4
14.9
18.8
21.6
25.4
35
95
118
37.4
41
120.7
NR
23.8
45.7

6.6
12
17
33
25.4
33
81
97
37.4
38.7
99.7
NR
18.3
41

3.2

3.7

DET NORSKE VERITAS


QRA for POL terminal/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK
Description

HSD Pump

Accident Scenario

Event

Impact criteria

Pool Fire

37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2

Large

Flash Fire
Pool Fire

Catastrophic Rupture

Flash Fire
Pool fire

tank Fire

Pool fire

Rupture

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

SKo Pump

Rupture

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27


Rev 02, 30th July, 2013
Page 15

Consequence Distance(m)
B3m/s
D 11m/s
6.7
9.2
10.8
12.9
15
16
6.3
6.3
24.7
24.7
32.9
34
72.9
81.9
6.3
6.3
24.7
24.7
32.9
34
72.9
81.9
6
6
17.5
20.5
28
29
19
19.8
3.2
3.1
4.6
4.4
6.4
6.2
19.5
19.5
40.9
43.2
74.7
82.3
19.4
20.3
42
38.5

F 3m/s
6.4
10.5
15
6.3
24.7
32.9
72.9
6.3
24.7
32.9
72.9
6
17.5
28
19.4
3.1
4.5
6.2
19.5
40.3
74
18.6
40.8

DET NORSKE VERITAS


QRA for POL terminal/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK
Description

Accident Scenario

Event

Impact criteria
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2

Pool fire

MS Pump

Rupture

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

Ethanol Pump

Rupture

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

Receipt Pipeline to
Tank MS

Small

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27


Rev 02, 30th July, 2013
Page 16

Consequence Distance(m)
B3m/s
D 11m/s
52.4
49
69.7
67
19.3
19.3
41
43.4
78.7
89.8
44.5
51.5
65
58.8
81.1
74.9
108
102
19.1
19.1
41.4
43.9
80.5
93.4
19.1
19.8
3.2
3.1
4.6
4.4
6.4
6.2
27
27.8
38
43.8
51.5
54.5
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR

F 3m/s
50.8
67.5
19.3
40.3
77.9
46.5
63.1
78.7
104
19.1
40.6
79.7
18.4
3.1
4.5
6.2
26.3
37.3
50.8
NR
NR
NR
NR

DET NORSKE VERITAS


QRA for POL terminal/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK
Description

Accident Scenario

Medium

Event

Impact criteria

Pool fire

37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

Large

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

Line Rupture

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27


Rev 02, 30th July, 2013
Page 17

Consequence Distance(m)
B3m/s
D 11m/s
4.4
5.5
11.6
13
18
18.3
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
8.9
8.9
18.3
23.2
42
46.7
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
19.2
19.2
21.7
23.4
60.8
72.9
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
19.3
19.3
21.7
23.2

F 3m/s
4.4
11.6
18
NR
NR
NR
NR
8.9
18.3
42
NR
NR
NR
NR
19.2
21.7
60.9
NR
NR
NR
NR
19.3
21.7

DET NORSKE VERITAS


QRA for POL terminal/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK
Description

Receipt Pipeline to
Tank HSD

Accident Scenario

Small

Event

Impact criteria
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

Medium

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

Large

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

Catastrophic Rupture

Flash Fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27


Rev 02, 30th July, 2013
Page 18

Consequence Distance(m)
B3m/s
D 11m/s
60.9
73
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
4.4
5.5
11.6
13
18
18.3
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
8.9
8.9
18.3
23.2
42
46.7
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
19.2
19.2
21.7
23.4
60.8
72.9
NR
NR

F 3m/s
60.8
NR
NR
NR
NR
4.4
11.6
18
NR
NR
NR
NR
8.9
18.3
42
NR
NR
NR
NR
19.2
21.7
60.9
NR

DET NORSKE VERITAS


QRA for POL terminal/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK
Description

Accident Scenario

Event

Impact criteria

Jet Fire

37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2

Pool fire

Receipt Pipeline to
Tank FO

Small

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

Medium

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

Large

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27


Rev 02, 30th July, 2013
Page 19

Consequence Distance(m)
B3m/s
D 11m/s
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
19.2
19.2
21.7
23.4
60.8
72.9
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
4.4
5.5
11.6
13
18
18.3
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
8.9
8.9
18.3
23.2
42
46.7
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR

F 3m/s
NR
NR
NR
19.2
21.7
60.9
NR
NR
NR
NR
4.4
11.6
18
NR
NR
NR
NR
8.9
18.3
42
NR
NR
NR

DET NORSKE VERITAS


QRA for POL terminal/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK
Description

Accident Scenario

Event

Impact criteria
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2

Pool fire

Line Rupture

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

Receipt Pipeline to
Tank SKO

Small

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

Medium

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire
Report No.: 12QR1P2-27
Rev 02, 30th July, 2013
Page 20

Consequence Distance(m)
B3m/s
D 11m/s
NR
NR
19.2
19.2
21.7
23.4
60.8
72.9
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
19.2
19.2
21.7
23.4
60.8
72.9
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
4.4
5.5
10
10.9
15.4
15.3
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
7.6
7.6

F 3m/s
NR
19.2
21.7
60.9
NR
NR
NR
NR
19.2
21.7
60.9
NR
NR
NR
NR
4.4
10
15.4
NR
NR
NR
NR
7.6

DET NORSKE VERITAS


QRA for POL terminal/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK
Description

Accident Scenario

Large

Event

Impact criteria
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

Line Rupture

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

pl from tank to
pump house_MS

Small

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27


Rev 02, 30th July, 2013
Page 21

Consequence Distance(m)
B3m/s
D 11m/s
18.8
23.5
31.8
33.8
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
7.6
7.6
18.8
23.5
31.8
33.8
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
7.6
7.6
18.8
23.5
31.8
33.8
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
4.4
5.5
11.6
13
18
18.3

F 3m/s
18.8
31.8
NR
NR
NR
NR
7.6
18.8
31.8
NR
NR
NR
NR
7.6
18.8
31.8
NR
NR
NR
NR
4.4
11.6
18

DET NORSKE VERITAS


QRA for POL terminal/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK
Description

Accident Scenario

Event

Impact criteria

Medium

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2

Pool fire

Large

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

Line Rupture

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

PL from tank to
pump house_HSD

Small

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27


Rev 02, 30th July, 2013
Page 22

Consequence Distance(m)
B3m/s
D 11m/s
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
8.9
8.9
18.3
23.2
42
46.7
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
19.2
19.2
21.7
23.4
60.8
72.9
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
19.3
19.3
21.7
23.2
60.9
73
NR
NR
NR
NR

F 3m/s
NR
NR
NR
NR
8.9
18.3
42
NR
NR
NR
NR
19.2
21.7
60.9
NR
NR
NR
NR
19.3
21.7
60.8
NR
NR

DET NORSKE VERITAS


QRA for POL terminal/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK
Description

Accident Scenario

Event

Impact criteria
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2

Pool fire

Medium

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

large

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

Line Rupture

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27


Rev 02, 30th July, 2013
Page 23

Consequence Distance(m)
B3m/s
D 11m/s
NR
NR
NR
NR
4.4
5.5
11.6
13
18
18.3
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
8.9
8.9
18.3
23.2
42
46.7
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
19.2
19.2
21.7
23.4
60.8
72.9
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR

F 3m/s
NR
NR
4.4
11.6
18
NR
NR
NR
NR
8.9
18.3
42
NR
NR
NR
NR
19.2
21.7
60.9
NR
NR
NR
NR

DET NORSKE VERITAS


QRA for POL terminal/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK
Description

PL from tank to
pump house_FO

Accident Scenario

Small

Event

Impact criteria

Pool fire

37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

Medium

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

large

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27


Rev 02, 30th July, 2013
Page 24

Consequence Distance(m)
B3m/s
D 11m/s
19.2
19.2
21.7
23.4
60.8
72.9
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
4.4
5.5
11.6
13
18
18.3
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
8.9
8.9
18.3
23.2
42
46.7
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
19.2
19.2
21.7
23.4

F 3m/s
19.2
21.7
60.9
NR
NR
NR
NR
4.4
11.6
18
NR
NR
NR
NR
8.9
18.3
42
NR
NR
NR
NR
19.2
21.7

DET NORSKE VERITAS


QRA for POL terminal/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK
Description

Accident Scenario

Line Rupture

Event

Impact criteria
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

PL from tank to
pump house_SKO

Small

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

Medium

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

large

Flash Fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27


Rev 02, 30th July, 2013
Page 25

Consequence Distance(m)
B3m/s
D 11m/s
60.8
72.9
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
19.2
19.2
21.7
23.4
60.8
72.9
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
4.4
5.5
11.6
13
18
18.3
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
8.9
8.9
18.3
23.2
42
46.7
NR
NR

F 3m/s
60.9
NR
NR
NR
NR
19.2
21.7
60.9
NR
NR
NR
NR
4.4
11.6
18
NR
NR
NR
NR
8.9
18.3
42
NR

DET NORSKE VERITAS


QRA for POL terminal/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK
Description

Accident Scenario

Event

Impact criteria

Jet Fire

37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2

Pool fire

Line Rupture

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

PL from pump
house to gantry_MS

Small

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

Medium

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27


Rev 02, 30th July, 2013
Page 26

Consequence Distance(m)
B3m/s
D 11m/s
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
19.2
19.2
21.7
23.4
60.8
72.9
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
19.3
19.3
21.7
23.2
60.9
73
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
4.4
5.5
11.6
13
18
18.3
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR

F 3m/s
NR
NR
NR
19.2
21.7
60.9
NR
NR
NR
NR
19.3
21.7
60.8
NR
NR
NR
NR
4.4
11.6
18
NR
NR
NR

DET NORSKE VERITAS


QRA for POL terminal/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK
Description

Accident Scenario

Event

Impact criteria
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2

Pool fire

large

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

Line Rupture

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

PL from pump
house to
gantry_SKO

Small

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire
Report No.: 12QR1P2-27
Rev 02, 30th July, 2013
Page 27

Consequence Distance(m)
B3m/s
D 11m/s
NR
NR
8.9
8.9
18.3
23.2
42
46.7
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
19.2
19.2
21.7
23.4
60.8
72.9
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
19.3
19.3
21.7
23.2
60.9
73
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
4.4
5.5

F 3m/s
NR
8.9
18.3
42
NR
NR
NR
NR
19.2
21.7
60.9
NR
NR
NR
NR
19.3
21.7
60.8
NR
NR
NR
NR
4.4

DET NORSKE VERITAS


QRA for POL terminal/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK
Description

Accident Scenario

Medium

Event

Impact criteria
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

large

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

Line Rupture

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27


Rev 02, 30th July, 2013
Page 28

Consequence Distance(m)
B3m/s
D 11m/s
11.6
13
18
18.3
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
8.9
8.9
18.3
23.2
42
46.7
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
19.2
19.2
21.7
23.4
60.8
72.9
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
19.3
19.3
21.7
23.2
60.9
73

F 3m/s
11.6
18
NR
NR
NR
NR
8.9
18.3
42
NR
NR
NR
NR
19.2
21.7
60.9
NR
NR
NR
NR
19.3
21.7
60.8

DET NORSKE VERITAS


QRA for POL terminal/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK
Description

Accident Scenario

Event

Impact criteria

PLfrom pump house


to gantry_HSD

Small

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2

Pool fire

Medium

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

large

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

Line Rupture

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27


Rev 02, 30th July, 2013
Page 29

Consequence Distance(m)
B3m/s
D 11m/s
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
4.4
5.5
11.6
13
18
18.3
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
8.9
8.9
18.3
23.2
42
46.7
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
19.2
19.2
21.7
23.4
60.8
72.9
NR
NR
NR
NR

F 3m/s
NR
NR
NR
NR
4.4
11.6
18
NR
NR
NR
NR
8.9
18.3
42
NR
NR
NR
NR
19.2
21.7
60.9
NR
NR

DET NORSKE VERITAS


QRA for POL terminal/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK
Description

Accident Scenario

Event

Impact criteria
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2

Pool fire

PLfrom pump house


to gantry_FO

Small

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

Medium

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

large

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27


Rev 02, 30th July, 2013
Page 30

Consequence Distance(m)
B3m/s
D 11m/s
NR
NR
NR
NR
19.2
19.2
21.7
23.4
60.8
72.9
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
4.4
5.5
11.6
13
18
18.3
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
8.9
8.9
18.3
23.2
42
46.7
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR

F 3m/s
NR
NR
19.2
21.7
60.9
NR
NR
NR
NR
4.4
11.6
18
NR
NR
NR
NR
8.9
18.3
42
NR
NR
NR
NR

DET NORSKE VERITAS


QRA for POL terminal/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK
Description

Accident Scenario

Line Rupture

Event

Impact criteria

Pool fire

37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

Loading Arm

Small

Flash Fire
Jet fire

Pool fire

Medium

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27


Rev 02, 30th July, 2013
Page 31

Consequence Distance(m)
B3m/s
D 11m/s
19.2
19.2
21.7
23.4
60.8
72.9
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
19.2
19.2
21.7
23.4
60.8
72.9
3.3
3.7
NR
2.1
3.7
3.4
5.2
4.7
5.9
9
9.4
12.1
12.5
14.6
6
6.7
12.6
11.7
15.5
14.6
20.3
19.5
8.7
10.3
12.1
13.4

F 3m/s
19.2
21.7
60.9
NR
NR
NR
NR
19.2
21.7
60.9
3.6
NR
3.7
5.2
6.3
9.7
12.8
6
12.6
15.5
20.3
8.7
12.2

DET NORSKE VERITAS


QRA for POL terminal/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK
Description

Accident Scenario

Line Rupture

Event

Impact criteria
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

HSD Tanker

Small

Flash Fire
Pool fire

Medium

Flash Fire
Pool fire

Large

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27


Rev 02, 30th July, 2013
Page 32

Consequence Distance(m)
B3m/s
D 11m/s
15.3
15.8
25.7
22.6
36.3
35.8
44.7
45
58.9
60.8
12.2
11.9
15.7
15.1
18.9
17.6
3.3
3.7
11.5
13.3
22.2
29.3
36.1
40
6.1
6.7
31.9
31.9
39.5
41.2
86.5
97.9
8.7
8.8
NR
NR
1.3
1.8
2.6
2.9
31.8
31.8
41.9
43.3
88.9
99.9

F 3m/s
15.3
24.5
37.5
46.4
61
12.3
15.8
19
3.6
11.8
22.5
36.5
6.2
31.9
39.62
86.6
8.7
NR
1.4
2.7
31.8
41.9
88.9

DET NORSKE VERITAS


QRA for POL terminal/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK
Description

MS Tanker

Accident Scenario

Event

Impact criteria

Tank Rupture

Flash Fire
Pool fire

Small

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2

Pool fire

Medium

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

Large

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire
Report No.: 12QR1P2-27
Rev 02, 30th July, 2013
Page 33

Consequence Distance(m)
B3m/s
D 11m/s
14.7
17.8
31.9
31.9
35.9
40.94
82.9
97.55
3.3
3.7
NR
2.1
3.7
3.4
5.2
4.7
10.2
11.9
22.5
30.7
38.45
41.9
28
13.5
12.6
11.7
15.5
14.9
20.3
19.5
27.8
27.8
35.4
35.4
84.8
97
42
28
30
30.7
37.6
38.5
49.4
51.9
31.3
31.3

F 3m/s
13.3
31.9
35
82.11
3.6
NR
3.8
5.3
10.4
22.8
38.3
23
12.9
15.9
20.7
27.8
34.5
83.4
36
31.6
39
51.2
31.3

DET NORSKE VERITAS


QRA for POL terminal/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK
Description

SKO Tanker

Accident Scenario

Event

Tank Rupture

Flash Fire
Pool fire

Small

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Impact criteria
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2

Pool fire

Medium

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Pool fire

Large

Flash Fire
Jet Fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27


Rev 02, 30th July, 2013
Page 34

Consequence Distance(m)
B3m/s
D 11m/s
41.3
42.7
95
113
25.7
43
31.6
31.6
34.7
38.6
88.7
109.6
3.3
3.8
NR
NR
1.7
1.5
3
2.8
10.9
12.7
22.3
30.9
38.5
42.7
16
8
7.7
7.1
9.7
9.11
12.7
12.2
30.3
30.3
37.6
39.3
88.1
102
12.7
10.4
19.3
19.5
23.85
24.53

F 3m/s
41.2
94.98
26
31.6
34.7
88.7
3.6
NR
1.8
3.1
11.2
22.7
38.6
14
7.9
9.9
12.9
30.3
37.4
87.5
12.6
20
24.57

DET NORSKE VERITAS


QRA for POL terminal/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK
Description

Accident Scenario

Event

Impact criteria
4 kW/m2
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2
LFL
37.5kW/m2
12.5kW/m2
4 kW/m2

Pool fire

Tank Rupture

Flash Fire
Pool fire

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27


Rev 02, 30th July, 2013
Page 35

Consequence Distance(m)
B3m/s
D 11m/s
31.2
32.98
31.5
31.5
41.6
43
93.4
109
11.5
14.3
31.7
31.7
34.9
39
86.9
105

F 3m/s
32.45
31.5
41.6
93.4
10.9
31.7
86
34.3

DET NORSKE VERITAS


QRA for POL terminal/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK

Figure 1: Flash fire damage distance due to catastrophic rupture of TK-1 at 3F weather condition

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27


Rev 02, 30th July, 2013
Page 36

DET NORSKE VERITAS


QRA for POL terminal/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK

Figure 2: Pool fire damage distance due to catastrophic rupture of TK-1 at 3F weather condition

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27


Rev 02, 30th July, 2013
Page 37

DET NORSKE VERITAS


QRA for POL terminal/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK

Figure 3: Flash fire damage distance due to catastrophic rupture of TK-13 at 3F weather condition

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27


Rev 02, 30th July, 2013
Page 38

DET NORSKE VERITAS


QRA for POL terminal/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK

Figure 4: Pool fire damage distance due to catastrophic rupture of TK-13 at 3F weather condition
Report No.: 12QR1P2-27
Rev 02, 30th July, 2013
Page 39

DET NORSKE VERITAS


QRA for POL terminal/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK

Figure 5: Flash fire damage distance due to catastrophic rupture of TK-15 at 3F weather condition

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27


Rev 02, 30th July, 2013
Page 40

DET NORSKE VERITAS


QRA for POL terminal/depot
Bharatpur

MANAGING RISK

Figure 6: Pool fire damage distance due to catastrophic rupture of TK-15 at 3F weather condition

Report No.: 12QR1P2-27


Rev 02, 30th July, 2013
Page 41