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SELF-GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS
FINAL REPORT
International Society for Fair
Elections and Democracy (ISFED)
2014
Tbilisi
International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy has carried out election related projects in 2014 by the support of American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Embassy of the
Kingdom of Netherlands in Georgia and Open Society Georgian Foundation. The contents are the responsibility of
ISFED and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government, Embassy of the Kingdom
of Netherlands and OSGF.
CONTENTS
I ABOUT THE
MONITORING MISSION
4
II KEY
FINDINGS
V. VOTER
LISTS
VI. ELECTION
ADMINISTRATION 16
15
Central Election
Commission (CEC)
III. POLITICAL
CONTEXT
IV. LEGISLATIVE
REFORM
12
23
36
First Round of
the Elections
36
11
16
District and Precinct
Election Commissions
20
IX. PRE-ELECTION
PERIOD
24
Methodology
25
Use of Public
Resources
26
Vote Buying
27
Harassment
28
Physical
Assault
28
Disruption of
Election Campaign
29
30
Participation of
Unauthorized Persons in
Pre-Election
Campaigning
31
Discriminatory
Statements
Made during
Pre-Election
Campaigning
32
Media Environment
33
X. MONITORING OF
PUBLIC MEETINGS
HELD BY PARTIES/
ELECTION SUBJECTS
DURING THE
PRE-ELECTION
PERIOD
34
Second Round of
the Elections
45
First Round of
the elections
Repeat
Elections
Repeat Elections 55
49
50
Second Round of 55
the Elections
XIII. GENDER BALANCE
AMONG
CANDIDATES
NOMINATED FOR
THE ELECTIONS
58
XIV. RECOMMENDATIONS
60
1 ISFED implemented the Election Day reporting by observers with the use of text messages. Mobile groups had tablet computers that allowed them
to promptly provide evidence of violations from election precincts with the use of photo and video recording.
4
FINAL REPORT
KEY FINDINGS
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION
The work of the Central Election Commission and the election administration in general was satisfactory. ISFED criticized individual decisions of the CEC, including those concerning registration of election subjects, recount of invalid
ballots and campaigning by a representative of a religious
organization.
On June 3, 2014, the CEC also adopted a resolution determining grounds for abolishing party election registration,
mediating the risk of abolishment of proportionate party lists
of some of the opposition parties, which promoted compet-
7 See Article 1841 of the organic law of Georgia the Election Code of Georgia
FINAL REPORT
KEY FINDINGS
FINAL REPORT 7
KEY FINDINGS
FINAL REPORT
MEDIA ENVIRONMENT
During the pre-election period leading up to the 2014 local self-government elections, media outlets were able to
freely impart all types of information. Media outlets covered
pre-election meetings and political debates in a fairly balanced manner. Public had equal access to all media outlets,
including those criticizing the authorities. The state authorities
did not pressure journalists or hinder journalistic reporting in
any way, not including several incidents in rural areas, where
the right of journalists to attend events of election candidates
was curtailed.
ELECTION DAY
The ISFEDs assessment of June 15, 2014 local self-government elections has been quite positive considering
that there was a decrease in procedure-type violations
during the polling process compared to both the 2010 lo-
KEY FINDINGS
have affected the final outcome of elections. Notably, compared to the first round of the elections, gaps in summary
protocols significantly decreased during the second round
of the elections. In certain election districts cases of verbal
and physical confrontation between the political party activists were observed in the vicinity of the polling stations.
These instances fell outside the scope of ISFEDs PVT
observation, since they took place outside the polling stations. Noteworthy was a trend of 140 voters at 73 polling
stations of 19 districts10 going to their respective polling
stations only to find that they had not been registered in
voter lists. Out of these 140 voters, 53 stated that they had
cast their vote in the first round of elections on June 15.
POST-ELECTION PERIOD
ISFEDs observers filed total of 238 complaints with precinct
and district election commissions over violations of vote
KEY FINDINGS
10
FINAL REPORT
POLITICAL CONTEXT
III. POLITICAL
CONTEXT
It was expected that elaboration of the Local Self-Government Code and reforming of the Election Code in 2013-2014
would bring about fundamental changes in legislation; however, final outcomes of the reform fall short of the initial ambitious plans announced by the authorities. Notably, a number
of recommendations set forth by the civil sector for introducing important new regulations were not taken into consideration in the process of the reform.
In the run-up to the local self-government elections (February, March, early April), investigating authorities intensified
the practice of summoning individuals actively engaged
in party activities for questioning or bringing charges
against them. On April 14, 2014, the Inter Agency Task
Force (IATF) urged prosecution service to refrain from questioning of individuals directly involved in the pre-election
campaign for the 2014 local self-government elections, in
frames of investigating activities, up until the Election Day,
except when there is an urgent need or a threat of violating
procedural timeframe. Notably, for the local self-government
elections the Prime Minister of Georgia imposed a moratorium on legal proceedings against individuals engaged in
pre-election campaigning, in order to allow each and every
party to carry out their election campaigns11. Despite the moratorium, head of the UNMs campaign office Gigi Ugulava
was arrested during the pre-election period, even though
two days earlier the court had found no reason to restrict
his freedom of movement. The UNM perceived it as political
pressure against competitors.
Applicable law does not envisage the possibility of imposing
moratorium on legal proceedings. Therefore, calling for moratorium was an expression of political will of the authorities in
an attempt to allow all persons engaged in election process-
LEGISLATIVE REFORM
13 Article 169 of the Organic Law of Georgia, the Election Code of Georgia
12
FINAL REPORT
We also welcome establishment of 4% threshold for election of all Sakrebulo members in proportionate system (up
until now, the 4% threshold applied to Tbilisi Sakrebulo
only, while the minimum share of votes required in other
municipalities was 5%);
LEGISLATIVE REFORM
Other
Even though the civil sector recommended that the authorities choose multi-mandate majoritarian districts,
the districts remained single-mandate. Therefore, we
believe that the existing election system fails to ensure that votes are proportionately reflected in mandates and is tailored to the interests of the ruling party.
The purpose of ISFEDs recommendations was to put the
kind of election system in place that would solve problems
New regulations prohibit initiative groups from nominating candidates for offices of Mayor/Gamgebeli, meaning
that independent candidates may not run in elections.
Local self-government elections are one of the important
issues to be considered in building a strong and stable
14 Article 58 (11), the new regulation will be enacted after scheduling of the following parliamentary elections in 2016
15 Recommendations about he election system are available for viewing at http://www.electionsportal.ge/uploads/reforms/11/saarchevnosistema_recom_
GEO.pdf
FINAL REPORT 13
LEGISLATIVE REFORM
local self-government. Voters should have a broad variety of choice of candidates, in order to be able to vote for
their favorite candidates, one that is the most acceptable
to them. There may be a number of successful and influential persons at the local level who enjoy popular support but are not affiliated with any of the political parties.
Consequently, these individuals will be deprived from an
opportunity to run for office in elections as independent
candidates. Such prohibition has a clear adverse impact
on the election environment and serves an ambiguous
purpose.
Voter Lists
Other
FINAL REPORT
Notably, the IATF disregarded one important issue composition of the election administration. The issue was on
the agenda of the inter-factional task force set up in March
2013 but it was never discussed, not then and not now. Lack
of time and complexity of the issue was cited as the reason.
Even though a number of new regulations are certainly
astep in the right direction, essential changes in legislation
that would have significantly improved the election environment as civic sector and the public in general had
hoped for - have not been made.
VOTER LISTS
V. VOTER LISTS
The Election Code was amended with the organic law N864,
dated July 25, 2013, introducing new rules of formation for
the unified voter list for the upcoming 2014 local self-government elections. One of the important issues addressed by the
amendment was biometric registration of voters. The Agency
for State Services was tasked with forming/creating the voter
list until March 15, 2014.
In the process of biometric registration of voters, the agency
would first take biometric photos of citizens eligible to vote, after they presented authorized individual with a copy of their ID
cards. The following stage of the process entailed comparison
of the information available in electronic database with information provided by individual citizens during verbal interview.
Verified information would then be copied in the new form.
The aim of the procedures was to verify the information in
the unified list of voters to ensure accuracy of voter lists.
Regulations for forming voter lists were amended once more
under the organic law N2093, dated March 7, 2014. Instead
of biometric registration of voters the Agency for the Development of State Services was tasked with comparing photos
available in the database for verifying voters and eliminating
any duplication in voter lists.17 Voters photos would be incorporated in lists used by registrars. These photos, in addition to
other information, would be used to verify identity of voters arriving at polling stations on the Election Day. Upon detection of
any possible duplication, the agency would examine each individual case and make subsequent decisions, as prescribed
by law. Furthermore, voter registration lists would be printed
with photos, in order for registrars to be able to verify identity
of voters with the use of photos.
We believe that verification of voter identity by photos is
17 See Article 1841 of the organic law of Georgia, the Election Code of Georgia
18 See: http://www.justice.gov.ge/News/Detail?newsId=4567
19 See: http://www.justice.gov.ge/News/Detail?newsId=4567
FINAL REPORT 15
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION
20.See:http://cesko02-01.itdc.ge/ge/mediisatvis-4-ge/pres-relizebi-13-ge/treningi-arasamtavrobo-organizaciebisa-da-saxalxo-damcvelis-ofisis-warmomadgenlebistvis.pag.
21. See information about the web-site at http://map.cec.gov.ge/
22.See:http://www.cesko.ge/ge/mediisatvis-4-ge/pres-relizebi-13-ge/ceskos-saolqo-da-saubno-saarchevno-komisiebis-wevrebma-etikis-kodeqss-moaweres-xeli-3463.page
16
FINAL REPORT
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION
ly present for the period of last two years prior to the day
of scheduling the elections, personally participating in daily habitual life of the country. The court explained that the
law does not allow any exceptions in this regard. Therefore,
long-term tenure abroad to study or for a vacation (exceeding a reasonable period of time during which temporary tenure abroad does not violate the requirement of permanent
residence) is not an exception.
Decision of Poti and Rustavi DECs were appealed with the
CEC but the latter not only failed to adequately interpret the
two-year requirement of residence but it also did not take advantage of the situation to provide a precise interpretation of
applicable Article. Pursuant to para.2, Article 30 of the Election Code, the CEC can adopt a resolution in exceptional cases, from the beginning until the end of elections, if necessity
emerges to resolve issues not defined by law and required for
conducting elections.
Resolution of the CEC on abolishment of election registration of party lists
There have been frequent withdrawals of proportionate
candidates of opposition parties, posing the risk of abolishment of registered party lists in a number of cases during
the pre-election period.24 On June 3, 2014 Vice Prime-Min-
23 Article 34 of the Tax Code of Georgia: 2. During the entire current tax year, a physical person shall be recognized as a tax resident of Georgia if it was
actually located on the territory of Georgia for more than 182 days in any continuous 12-month period ending in this tax year, or was in the Georgian state
service abroad during the tax year. 3. A time shall be considered as the time of actual location on the territory of Georgia during which a physical person has
been located on the territory of Georgia, as well as the time-period which he spent outside the Georgian territory for medical treatment, vacation, business
trip or study.
24 See Chapter III of the report, Alleged Acts of Pressure on candidates
25 http://www.isfed.ge/main/677/geo/
FINAL REPORT 17
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION
ister Kakhi Kaladze urged the CEC to amend the norm that
regulates abolishment of election registration of party lists
when number of candidates on the list falls below legal minimum.25
In response, On June 3, 2014, the CEC adopted a resolution determining the list of cases when a party list can
be abolished if number of candidates on the list falls below
minimum. Pursuant to the resolution, voluntary withdrawal
may not serve as grounds for abolishment of the registration, which has mediated the risk of abolishment of proportionate party lists of some of the opposition parties, which
promoted competitive election environment.
Even though the resolution26 will have a positive impact on
ongoing political and election processes, it conflicts with
para.6, Article 145 of the Election Code that directly stipulates grounds for abolishing election registration of a party
list, without allowing any exceptions. Therefore, such exceptions must be established by the Election Code as opposed to a resolution of the CEC, which is a sub-legal act
and must comply with the Election Code as to a superior
normative act.
FINAL REPORT
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION
representing the Georgian Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox Church should be viewed as political campaigning by
a religious organization, which is prohibited by the Election
Code.
Position of the CEC about recounting invalid ballots
One of the problematic issues detected during the first
28 See: http://www.isfed.ge/main/726/geo/
FINAL REPORT 19
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION
29 See: http://www.cesko.ge/ge/mediisatvis-4-ge/pres-relizebi-13-ge/saubno-saarchevno-komisiebshi-pirveli-sxdoma-gaimarta-1461.page
20
FINAL REPORT
Regrettably, the IATF commenced its work for the 2014 local self-government elections late, in violation of the timeframe prescribed by the law. Pursuant to March 7, 2014
amendments to the Election Code, the IATF should have
been set up and should have commenced its works within
ten calendar days after the enactment of new regulations.
The new regulations were enacted on March 14, 2014, i.e.
after promulgation of the law. Therefore, the IATF should
have been set up prior to March 24, 2014 but the first meeting of the commission was not held until April 11.
The Inter Agency Task Force for Free and Fair Election,
established for the purpose of preventing and responding
to violations of the election legislation of Georgia by public servants30 should have an important role during the
pre-election period. Even though the IATF has no means
for enforcement of its own recommendations, we are under
the impression that the IATF is not interested in the implementation of its recommendations. The IATF has not
presented any report about how its work has contributed to
the improvement of the pre-election environment.
FINAL REPORT
PRE-ELECTION PERIOD
IX.PRE-ELECTION PERIOD
METHODOLOGY
Under the April 10, 2014 Executive Order of the President of
Georgia, elections for representative and executive bodies of
local self-government were scheduled for June 15, 2014.
ISFED launched monitoring of the local self-government elections on April 1; however, the monitoring report also covers
all the developments or incident that occurred before the official announcement of the date of elections, which may have
had a negative or a positive influence on the election environment. ISFED has been carrying out pre-election monitoring for
31 In the process of monitoring ISFED follows Declaration of Global Principles for Nonpartisan Election Observation and Monitoring by Citizen Organizations,
available at http://www.gndem.org/declaration-of-global-principles; while in evaluation it is guided by and shares spirit of OSCE Copenhagen Document.
24
FINAL REPORT
PRE-ELECTION PERIOD
Detecting and acting on political pressure/threats, obstruction of political activities and alleged vote-buying.
LTOs monitored pre-election processes by means of specifically designed e-questionnaires. Prior to the launch of the
monitoring, ISFEDs 73 LTOs attended a two-day training on
pre-election monitoring and reporting methodology. The training was held in two stages.
32 Pursuant to the Election Code of Georgia, implementation of projects from the 60th day prior to the elections through the Election Daym implementation of
projects that were not envisaged in the state/local budget before is prohibited, as well as increaseing and/or establishing the amount of social benefits that were
not envisaged by the Georgian legislation at least 60 days prior to the elections.
33 Conduct of pre-election campaign on the premises of institutions, where such pre-election campaigns are prohibited by the law is punishable with a fine in the
amount of 1000 GEL. Under para.5, Article 45 of the Election Code, conduct of pre-election campaigning is prohibited on premises of institutions of executive
authorities of Georgia.
34 see the information http://www.cesko.ge/ge/mediisatvis-4-ge/pres-relizebi-13-ge/ceskos-gancxadeba-administraciuli-samartaldargvevis-faqttan-dakavshirebit.page
35 See Article 13 of the Law of Georgia on the Structure of the Government, Powers and the Rules of Operation
FINAL REPORT 25
PRE-ELECTION PERIOD
VOTE BUYING
During monitoring ISFED detected cases that involved
transfer of gifts or money to voters, containing signs of
vote buying.
Kareli Gifts for IDP families
On April 17, 2014, Acting Kareli Municipality Gamgebeli Zaza
Guliashvili met with internally displaced persons (IDP). He
is a supporter of the Georgian Dream and was nominated
by the same party as their candidate. Guliashvili provided
gifts to IDP families living in Akhalsopeli, Mokha and Agara
for Easter. He also visited IDP families living in settlements
of Akhalsopeli, Mokhisi and Agara and provided them with
gifts. He also visited the eldest dweller of Akhalsopeli, Olia
Polikashvili and gave her 100 GEL. The information was
reported by Kareli Municipality in social networks36.
Aspindza
Akhmeta
On April 30, Acting Gamgebeli of Akhmeta Municipality
Beka Baidauri, chief of administrative office of Gamgeoba
and head of the local office of the Georgian Dream Democratic Georgia Mamuka Kholegashvili visited Tusheti to provide Easter baskets and medicine to the population.
Acting Gamgebeli and his accompanying individuals were
flown in Tusheti by a helicopter owned by Tusheti Air Company. As winner of the tender announced by the municipality Gamgeoba, Tusheti Air Company has an obligation38 to
provide service to Gamgeoba.
ISFEDs coordinators interviewed Acting Gamgebeli of
Adigeni
During an event held on May 9 Acting Gamgebeli of Adigeni
Municipality Zakaria Endeladze, who is also a candidate of
the coalition Georgian Dream for the office of Gamgebeli
provided each veteran of war with 50 GEL as a gift. He also
invited them to a dinner. He stated that provision of the financial gift had been envisaged in the budget before.40
Batumi
On April 30, 2014, librarians were awarded in frames of the
Library Week in Batumi Library. Acting Mayor and candidate
for the office of Mayor of Batumi Giorgi Armakovi provided
26
FINAL REPORT
PRE-ELECTION PERIOD
awards.
Notably, Giorgi Ermakovi has an active election campaign in
social network (on Facebook). Photos of the event funded
from the budget of Batumi City Hall were posted on the web
page of Giorgi Ermakovi, the candidate. The web page initially entitled as Giorgi Ermakovi Candidate for the office
of Batumi Mayor was changed to Giorgi Ermakovi Official.
Khelvachauri
On May 14, 2014, member of the Non-Parliamentary Opposition Kakha Kukava, Pikria Chikhradze, Merab Ghoghoberidze who is also a number 1 candidate of the election
bloc in Khevachauri list of the party provided foreign assistance to population. Merab Ghoghoberidze is the head of
the Information Center for Combating Corruption in Georgia. In an interview with ISFEDs coordinator he noted that
he participated in the event in his capacity of the head of the
information center. According to Ghoghoberidze, he provided gifts prior to his registration as a candidate; however,
he had already declared his election goals in Khelvachauri
District at that time.
Acts of alleged vote buying detected by ISFED were reflected in pre-election monitoring reports; We also updated the
IATF and the SAO on a periodic basis with the information but they failed to take any further legal actions.
ISFED believes that it is important for the authorities to take
HARASSMENT
To detect any acts of political harassment, ISFED focused
on
Possible harassment against employees of state agencies, political party representatives, election subject
candidates;
Possible restriction of activities of voters, public servants, political parties, election subjects and other persons by means of various types of violence.
41 See NGOs respond to reports on pressure on candidates in eleven election districts at http://www.isfed.ge/main/655/geo/
42 See TI Georgia and ISFED react to recent pre-election developments at http://www.isfed.ge/main/685/geo/
FINAL REPORT 27
PRE-ELECTION PERIOD
ties by means of harassment, intimidation as well as various agreements. According to party reports, candidates
were threatened to have their family members dismissed
from work, promised to conclude a plea bargain with their
defendant relatives, candidates received phone calls from
blocked numbers demanding that they withdraw. As to victims themselves, they generally chose not to specify who
exerted the pressure.
Withdrawals became a trend. In addition to the fact that
law enforcement and investigating authorities failed to take
any adequate further actions, on May 31 the Prime Minister made a statement saying that the Georgian Dream will
not allow victory of any other political force in any of the
regions. We believe that constructive competition is one of
the prerequisites for fair elections, which is why these statements somehow promote getting rid of competitors at the
local level by one way or another.
Official response to alleged acts of pressure against candidates was rather inadequate and ineffective. The Interior
Ministry rejected the allegations and any involvement of police officers without any investigation. Following a number
of statements and calls made by NGOs the Prosecutors Office stated that investigation was launched in 4 cases only
as in 76 cases out of 80 allegations were not upheld.43
In addition to the fact that harassment and pressure are
qualified as crime, subsequent withdrawals of candidates
could have caused abolishment of party lists44 , creating
a reasonable suspicion that pressure against opposition
candidates aimed to have them removed from registration;
however, the CECs decision eliminated the threat.45
PHYSICAL ASSAULT
ISFEDs reports reflected 5 acts of alleged physical assault detected during the pre-election period, including
three against the UNM leaders46 and two involving a con-
43 Statement of the prosecution service on alleged pressure against election subjects http://pog.gov.ge/geo/news?info_id=501
44 Para.6, Article 145 of the Election Code of Georgia regulates abolishment of election registration of party lists. In particular, subparagraph f stipulates that one of the grounds for abolishment of the election registration is when no later than two days prior to the elections, number of candidates on the registered
party list is below the legal minimum. (If number of voters in election precinct is over 75 000, proportionate list should include minimum 15 candidates; if it is below 75 000, minimum 10 candidates). nformation about the decision of the CEC is available in the Chapter on Election Administration, p.18Assault on
MP Nugzar Tsiklauri, Gigi Ugulava and Zurab Chiaberashvili. For additional information visit http://www.isfed.ge/main/569/geo/; http://www.isfed.ge/main/577/geo/ p.15; http://www.isfed.ge/main/684/geo/ p.18.
45 Information about the decision of the CEC is available in the Chapter on Election Administration, p.18
46 Assault on MP Nugzar Tsiklauri, Gigi Ugulava and Zurab Chiaberashvili. For additional information visit http://www.isfed.ge/main/569/geo/; http://www.isfed.ge/main/577/geo/ p.15; http://www.isfed.ge/main/684/geo/ p.18.
47 See Transparency International Georgia and International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED) react to recent incident in Zugdidi at http://www.isfed.ge/main/694/geo/
48 See the information at: http://www.isfed.ge/main/694/geo/
49 See the information at: http://www.isfed.ge/main/684/geo/
28
FINAL REPORT
PRE-ELECTION PERIOD
lieve that proceedings instituted by the law enforcement authorities based on Article 125 of the Criminal Code of Georgia was not right, as the case involved illegal disruption of
pre-election campaign and therefore, contained signs of
crime envisaged by Article 161 of the Code.
50 See second and third reports of ISFEDs pre-election monitoring at: http://www.isfed.ge/main/607/geo/ ; http://www.isfed.ge/main/684/geo/
51 See ISFEDs third pre-election monitoring report, p. 12 : http://www.isfed.ge/main/684/geo/
FINAL REPORT 29
PRE-ELECTION PERIOD
ARRESTS
The pre-election period was coupled with arrests and summons for questioning of persons engaged in active political
work. During the early stage of the monitoring ISFED detected 6 such cases.54
On April 14, pursuant to the recommendation issued by
the IATF, the authorities expressed their political will and
52 See assessment of the pre-election period of the second round of the local self-government elections, p.12: http://www.isfed.ge/main/684/geo/
53 See assessment of the pre-election period of the second round of the local self-government elections, p.5: http://www.isfed.ge/main/740/geo/
54 On February 10, 2014, prosecution service arrested Khoni Municipality Gamgebeli Zurab Jibukhia and his deputy Besarion Chelidze on charges of abuse of official power; in particular, the case involves illegal cutting of trees in Khoni Municipality in 2010. According to the UNM, Zurab Jibukhaia was supposed
to be their candidate in local self-government elections for the position of Gamgebeli. The detention means that he will not be able to participate in the pre-election campaign. Statement released by the prosecution service said that Deputy Chairperson of Dusheti Sakrebulo Zurab Otiashvili was arrested for
accepting bribe. The UNM believes that Otiashvilis arrest has to do with his party activities, as he had been nominated as a possible candidate in primary elections scheduled. On March 28 at 19:00, Trustee of Khala Village Malkhaz Diasamidze was arrested by the investigating office of the Ministry of Finance
of Georgia in his own office. He is a supporter of the UNM and one of the candidates for office of a majirotarian member of Sakrebulo in local self-government elections. Diasamidze has been charged with taking illegal ownership of state subsidies allocated for citrus in 2013.
55 See April 14, 2014 recommendation of the IATF: http://goo.gl/Gvpr0T
56 See the statement of Tbilisi City Court: http://tcc.gov.ge/index.php?m=443&newsid=629
30
FINAL REPORT
PRE-ELECTION PERIOD
57 See the information at: http://cec.gov.ge/uploads/other/27/27931.pd On May 19, 2014, member of Gurjaani PEC N5 Besarion Todiashvili participated in pre-election campaigning in favor of a candidate of the coalition Georgian Dream for office of Gamgebeli, Givi Gergidze.
58_On May 19, 2014, member of Gurjaani PEC N5 Besarion Todiashvili participated in pre-election campaigning in favor of a candidate of the coalition Georgian Dream for office of Gamgebeli, Givi Gergidze. _On May 23, member of Gurjaani DEC N12 Tornike Tsintsalashvili,
the National Forums proxy in the commission, demanded that chairpersons of Kachredi PECs N36 and 37 Khatia Burduladze and Tamar Lazashvili take photos of voter lists at the polling station in order to estimate the number of voters who would vote in favor of a
majoritarian candidate of the coalition and Gamgebeli Emzar Jikurishvili. _As reported by ISFEDs coordinator, Member of Krtsanisi DEC N30, Genadi Khshiani participated in disruption of meeting of the election bloc UNM in the village of Ponichala on May 31.
FINAL REPORT 31
PRE-ELECTION PERIOD
We believe that in order to ensure secular state government, it is important to observe the principle that the state
and the church are independent from one another. Therefore, we believe that representatives of Georgian Orthodox
Church as well as other religious organizations should refrain from making campaigning calls. The purpose of the
foregoing provision is to ensure independence of the election process and disassociate it from religion, in order for
each and every citizen to be able to express his/her own will
freely, without any influence.
The norm of the Election Code strictly stipulating the prohibition of pre-election campaigning by certain subjects aims
at protecting electoral process from the influence of religious figures, which is highly probable in Georgia considering the high public confidence and authority enjoyed by
religious organizations. Independence of election process
is an important precondition for the development of democratic and secular state.
59 Pursuant to para.21, Article 8 of the organic law of Georgia the Election Code, A member of the election commission is not the representative of his appointer/voter. He/she shall be independent in his/her activities and shall act only in accordance with the Constitution of
Georgia, law and relevant legal acts. Any pressure upon the member of the election commission, or interference in his/her activities, with the aim of influencing his/her decision shall be prohibited and is punishable by law.
60 Para.4g, Artile 45 of the Election Codef
32
FINAL REPORT
PRE-ELECTION PERIOD
MEDIA ENVIRONMENT
During the pre-election period, media outlets were able to
freely impart all types of information. Media outlets covered
pre-election meetings and political debates in a fairly balanced manner. Public had equal access to all media outlets,
including those criticizing the authorities, unlike the 2012
parliamentary elections, where majority of cable networks refused to include within their scope of coverage broadcasters
critical of the authorities. Access to the latter was improved
after official legal enactment of Must Carry and Must Offer
regulations.
The state authorities did not pressure journalists or hinder
journalistic reporting in any way, not including several incidents in rural areas, where the right of journalists to attend
events of election candidates was curtailed.
50
Abuse of public
resources
Pressure-intimidation
Vote buying
Arrest
Participation of Unauthorized
Persons in Pre-Election
Campaigning
Interference with
journalistic activities
4
Disruption of
Election Campaign
5
Physical
violence
Damage of campaign
materials
10
Discriminatory
statements
FINAL REPORT 33
MONITORING OF PUBLIC MEETINGS HELD BY PARTIES/ELECTION SUBJECTS DURING THE PRE-ELECTION PERIOD
34
FINAL REPORT
MONITORING OF PUBLIC MEETINGS HELD BY PARTIES/ELECTION SUBJECTS DURING THE PRE-ELECTION PERIOD
COORDINATORS OF ISFED HAVE ATTENDED 1471 PUBLIC MEETINGS HOLD BY POLITICAL PARTIES
AND CANDIDATES IN ALL MUNICIPALITIES (REPORTING PERIOD APRIL 1-JULY 11, 2014)
766
766
311
153
NON-PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION-
52
311
42
32
153
61
61
32
42
52
54
FINAL REPORT 35
ELECTION DAY
ISFED monitored total of 1030 election precincts throughout 73 election districts of Georgia. Out of 1030 static observers 300 were stationed on randomly selected election
precincts throughout Georgia, while 349 static observers
were deployed in randomly selected election precincts in
Tbilisi and 9 static observers were deployed in Tbilisi election precincts adapted to the needs of persons with disabilities, which had not been included in representative sample.
In 11 self-governing cities61 ISFED deployed 372 static ob-
61 11 self-governing cities Rustavi, Gori, Mtskheta, Poti, Akhaltsikhe, Ambrolauri, Zugdidi, Ozurgeti, Batumi, Kutaisi, Telavi
36
FINAL REPORT
ELECTION DAY
servers in all election precincts. In addition to static observers, ISFEDs Election Day monitoring mission was also
composed of 80 mobile groups, 73 district observers, 20
lawyers and 20 operators.
During the first stage of preparations for the Election Day,
ISFED elaborated monitoring methodology, the system of
reporting and communication, database, monitoring templates, instructions, guidelines and other election materials. During the second stage of the preparations, ISFED
recruited 22 trainers and conducted the following types of
training:
MONITORING METHODOLOGY
ISFEDs Election Day observation was based on the Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) methodology62. Several days before the elections ISFED conducted simulation of the whole
PVT process, aimed at testing whether the program runs
well and whether observers are able to communicate information via text messages comprehensively and effectively.
The simulation was a success as 98% of its observers were
able to report to ISFED.
62 By using PVT methodology on the Election Day, ISFED was able to collect quantitative and qualitative data from a randomly selected precincts and analyze the information; assess the whole process of the Election Day in a systematic and
unbiased manner, including opening of polling staitons, voting, closing of polling stations, counting of votes and tabulation of results; receive fact-based information and take further actions the with the aim of improving the process; detect errors/
violations during opening of polling stations, polling process and counting of votes; generalize information received from randomly selected election precincts to eleciton precincts throughout country; verify official results of the Election Day.
63 ISFED, GYLA and TI-Georgia
FINAL REPORT 37
ELECTION DAY
KEY FINDINGS
The ISFEDs assessment of June 15, 2014 local self-government elections has been quite positive considering that there
was a decrease in procedure-type violations during the polling process compared to both the 2010 local self-government
elections and the 2013 presidential elections. Notably, unlike
the previous elections some important violations have been
found at several polling stations including physical violence,
ballot box stuffing and taking illegal hold of/damaging materials. Considering that the scale of such incidents was limited
and the election administration took further actions in response
by annulling results at polling stations concerned, these violations have not had any impact on final Election Day results.
Further, unlike previous elections we did not detect any disturbing gaps in the first round of the elections, with respect to
voter lists. However, we did find a new trend of election subjects being present at polling stations with a status of a proxy
or an observer. We also detected acts of illegal campaigning
at election precincts. Notably, we found one important trend in
the process of drawing up of summary protocols high percentage rate of invalid ballots and high number of errors in
summary protocols64.
PVT RESULTS
Opening and setting up of polling stations
Based on the information provided by ISFEDs observers,
the opening process has improved as compared to the 2013
Presidential Election. All ISFED observers had the opportunity
to access and monitor all of their polling stations. 97.7% of
polling stations were ready to receive voters by 8:00am, while
in 2013, 95.7% of stations were ready by 8:00am. This is similar to the 2010 local elections, when 99.8 % of polling stations
were ready for voting. ISFED received reports on the opening
of polling stations from 99.7 % of PVT observers.
All observers (100%) of ISFED were free to observe the opening process, compared to 99.8% of polling stations during the
2013 elections.
In absolute majority of polling stations, no significant violations
were detected during the opening. This is similar to the 2013
presidential elections.
64 http://www.isfed.ge/main/726/geo/
38
FINAL REPORT
Opening procedures
98.7%
of polling stations were ready
for voting by 08:00 am
Polling Station
ELECTION DAY
IN
97.3%
The secrecy of vote was ensured at 96.3% of the polling stations. In this case there is no statistically significant difference
between this figure and the figure of 2010. When comparing to
the national figure, the secrecy of the vote was secured slightly
less often in the Poti and Ozurgeti self-governing cities.
There was intimidation or pressure in only 1.3% of polling
stations. The situation in all self-governing cities also reflects
this positive trend.
37.1%
31%
36%
37%
18%
49%
42
Tbilisi
Kutaisi
Rustavi
Batumi
Poti
Ozurgeti
Akhaltsikhe
The process went mainly well, but there were minor shortcomings in 17.4% of polling stations.
The Process of Vote Counting
42%
34%
35%
66%
55%
Telavi
Zugdidi
Gori
Ambrolauri
Mtskheta
ELECTION DAY
PVT
projection
45.89%
0.65%
27.99%
0.67%
12.85%
0.42%
5.30%
0.21%
2.52%
0.12%
2.27%
0.11%
1.17%
0.08%
0.50%
0.06%
0.38%
0.06%
0.34%
0.05%
0.33%
0.09%
0.21%
0.18%
0.13%
0.04%
0.10%
0.02%
FINAL REPORT
Margin of
error 65
ELECTION DAY
FINAL REPORT 41
ELECTION DAY
PVT
Margin of
projections error 66
46.15%
0.56%
26.02%
0.63%
10.41%
0.36%
0.26%
1.99%
0.11%
1.51%
0.10%
1.19%
0.11%
0.10%
0.58%
0.06%
0.40%
0.10%
0.39%
0.06%
0.22%
0.04%
0.21%
0.02%
0.14%
0.02%
0.12%
0.02%
0.12%
0.02%
0.11%
0.05%
0.10%
0.02%
0.16%
42
FINAL REPORT
ELECTION DAY
ELECTION DAY
44
FINAL REPORT
ELECTION DAY
Figures did not reconcile in up to 500 summary protocols. In a number of cases summary protocols were
enclosed with correction protocols at polling stations;
however, in majority of cases DECs and the CEC failed
to enclose summary protocols with correction or explanatory protocols in a timely manner;
One or more data had been corrected in over 50 summary protocols. The highest number of corrected summary protocols (24) was found in Samtskhe-Javakheti
Region, in Akhalkalaki and Akhaltsikhe districts in particular;
The remaining 7 electoral districts (Batumi, Poti, Kobuleti, Telavi, Kvareli, Martvili, Tianeti), where ISFED
conducted mobile observation.
Monitoring Methodology
Similar to the first round of the elections, ISFED implemented monitoring of the second round of the local self-government elections using the Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT)
methodology. There were SMS and incidents centers operating at the central office, manned by 15 operators and
15 lawyers.
For keeping public updated about the second round of the
elections, ISFED held the following 4 press-conferences:
FINAL REPORT 45
ELECTION DAY
Key Findings
ISFED believes that the second round of local self-government elections set an important precedent in the electoral
history of Georgia. The necessity of the second round in
these elections proved that a competitive electoral environment is forming in Georgia, which means that no party,
including the ruling one, is guaranteed a victory in the first
round. We think that the aforementioned set a higher standard for conducting democratic elections in the country.
As to ISFEDs assessment of the Election Day, based on
the analysis of the information received through PVT methodology ISFED concludes that the voting and vote count
processes were conducted in a calm environment. However, unfortunately, cases of verbal and physical confrontation
between the political party activists were observed in the
vicinity of the polling stations. These instances fell outside
ISFEDs PVT observation area, since they took place outside the polling stations. Noteworthy was a trend of 140 voters at 73 polling stations of 19 districts67 going to the polling
stations only to find out that they were not registered in the
voters lists. Out of these 140 voters, 53 stated that they had
cast their vote in the first round of elections on June 15.
PVT Results
Opening and setting up of polling stations
Based on reports from ISFEDs observers, the process of
opening of polling stations has improved in self-governing
cities compared to the first round of the 2014 local self-government elections. No major violations were found in the
process of opening and setting up of most part of the polling
stations in self-governing cities and municipalities where
ISFED implemented observation. However, ISFED detected ballot stuffing at election precinct N36 of Khulo Election
District, as well as minor procedural violations in several
election precincts.
All but one observer of ISFED had an opportunity to monitor
the process of opening of polling stations in all self-governing cities and municipalities.
Majority of polling stations were ready to receive voters
by 8:00am 99.4% of polling stations in Tbilisi, 83.3%
in Mtskheta, 96.3% in Khoni, 97.3% in Tkibuli as well as
self-governing cities of Gori, Rustavi and Ozurgeti, and almost all communities of Lanchkhuti, Khulo, Akhmeta, Baghdati, Terjola.
Opening procedures
The polling station was ready
for the first voter
by 8:00 am
Tbilisi - 99.4%
Mtskheta - 83.3%
Khoni - 96.3%
Tkibuli - 97.3%
Polling Station
Gori
Terjola
Akhmeta
Ozurgeti
Khulo
Baghdati
Lanchkhuti
Rustavi
100%
election precincts violations of inking and vote secrecy procedures were detected; however, these irregularities were
often mediated by means of verbal reproof.
67 Rustavi (17 PECs), Gldani (7 PECs), Isani (6 PECs), Samgori (6 PECs), Gori (6 PECs), Akhmeta (5 PECs), Saburtalo (4 PECs), Nadzaladevi (4 PECs), Khulo (4 PECs), Ozurgeti
(3 PECs), Vake (2 PCs), Krtsanisi (2 PECs) and per one precinct in Mtatsminda, Chugureti, Terjola, Baghdati, KHoni, Tkibuli and Lanchkhuti election districts
46
FINAL REPORT
ELECTION DAY
All voters in self-governing cities of Rustavi, Mtskhketa, Gori, Ozurgeti and in municipalities of Akhmeta,
Lanchkhuti, Terjola, Tkibuli voted with proper identification documents. Rate of such voters was in Tbilisi XXX,
96.7%, in Baghdati and 96.3% in Khulo.
At absolute majority (100%) of polling stations in Rustavi, Mskheta and Gori self-governing cities as well as
Akhmeta and Terjola municipalities, inking was always
properly checked. In Tbilisi, the procedure was performed at 98% of polling stations, at 98.8% in Rustavi,
97.4% in Lanchkhuti, 97.3% in Tkibuli, 96.4% in Khoni
and 92.6% in Khulo.
34.4%
34%
40%
51%
47%
49%
Tbilisi
Rustavi
Gori
Ozurgeti
Mtskheta
Akhmeta
52%
45%
54%
42%
62%
50%
Lanchkhuti
Baghdati
Terjola
Tkibuli
Khoni
Khulo
ELECTION DAY
PVT
MOE
72.1%
0.7%
27.9%
0.7%
FINAL REPORT
N DAY
ELECTION DAY
REPEAT ELECTIONS
The International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED) monitored the June 29, 2014 repeated local
self-government elections in all 9 districts71. The ISFEDs
observation mission consisted of 14 static observers, 9
district observers and 4 mobile teams.
ELECTION DAY
71 Marneuli (#25,#57); Tetritskaro (#5); Dusheti (#4,#6,#47,#52); Akhalkalaki (#1); Khoni (#22); Tkibuli (#2,#5); Zugdidi (#32); Batumi (#103); Kobuleti (#34).
FINAL REPORT 49
72 Number of complaints was not equal to the number of violations as in some cases one complaint was filed over more than one violation
50
FINAL REPORT
NAND
DAYPOST-ELECTION
AND POST-ELECTION
COMPLAINTS
COMPLAINTS
16 with PECs and 161 with DECs. Two complaints were filed
in court. In its complaints ISFED was mostly seeking elimination of violation detected, holding chairperson, secretary and
other members of relevant election commission liable.
Complaints filed with PECs
ISFED filed 16 complaints with PECs over violations of vote
counting procedures. In 6 cases violations were remedied
while in the remaining 10 cases PEC concerned failed to
take any further actions. As a result, complaints seeking imposition of liability on relevant PEC chairpersons and other
members were filed in DECs.
Complaints were filed with PECs over the following types of
violations:
Casting of vote without applying/checking indelible ink
#97 election precinct of Batumi #79 Election District, #7 election precinct of Kaspi #30 Election District (2 facts), #16 election precinct of Chughureti #7 Election District, #34 election
precinct of Akhaltsikhe #37 Election District.
Restricting observers rights illegally - #27 election precinct of Terjola #49 Election District, #9 election precinct of
Lanchkhuti #61 Election District, #53 election precinct of
Zugdidi #67 Election District.
Casting of vote with improper voter identification: with
birth certificate or without ID card - #3 election precinct of
Gori #32 Election District, #74 election precinct of Zugdidi
#67 Election District.
Presence of unauthorized persons at election precincts
- #47 election precinct of Isani #5 Election District, #19 election precinct of Kobuleti #81 Election District.
Pre-made signatures in voter lists of #58 election precinct Isani #5 Election District.
Improper documentation- #6 election precinct of Batumi
#79 Election District.
Other types of violations, like interference with the work of
election commission #6 election precinct of Batumi Election
District and #8 election precinct of Khelvachauri #83 Election
District.-
restriction of observers
rights
unathorized persions at
the polling stations
other violations
pre-made signatures of
voters in the list voters list
improper processing
of election documentation
68
partially
satisfied
49
rejected
left unexamined
36
8
Illegal restriction of observers rights #24 election precinct of Krtsanisi #4 Election District; #64 election precinct
of Nadzaladevi #9 Election District; #27 election precinct of
Terjola #49 Election District; #9 election precinct of Lanchkhuti #61 Election District; #12 election precinct of Martvili
#65 Election District; #53 election precinct of Zugdidi #67
Election District; #30, #61 and #66 election precincts of
Batumi #79 Election District;
Campaigning 63 election precinct of Rustavi #20 Election District #; #26 election precinct of Kaspi #30 Election
District; #24 election precinct of Lanchkhuti #61 Election
District; #13 election precinct of Batumi #79 Election District.
Voting with improper voter identification: with drivers
license, birth certificate, copy of an ID card or without an ID
Card #14 election precinct of Mtatsminda #1 Election District; #19 election precinct of Vake #2 Election District; #77
election precinct of Samgori #6 Election District; #18 election precinct of Akhmeta #18 Election District; #1 and #3
election precincts of Gori #32 Election District; #20 election
precinct of Kareli #33 Election District; #11 and #76 election
precincts of Batumi #79 Election District; #74 election precinct of Zugdidi #67 Election District.
Casting a vote without applying/checking indelible ink
#16 election precinct of Chughureti #7 Election District; #7
election precinct of Kaspi #30 Election District; #6 election
precinct of Akhaltsikhe #37 Election District; #47 Election
District of Mestia #1 election precinct; #59 election precinct
of Batumi #79 Election District.
Presence of unauthorized persons at election precincts
#47 election precinct of Isani #5 Election District; #38
election precinct of Shuakhevi #82 Election District.
Vandalizing election materials/physical violence #22
election precinct of Khoni #55 Election District.
.
Ballot fraud #33 election precinct of Chokhatauri #62
Election District.
Pre-made signatures in voter list #58 election precinct
of Isani #5 Election District; #8 election precinct of Chokha52
FINAL REPORT
Violation of vote casting regulations #74 election precinct of Kutaisi #59 Election District.
Violating ballot secrecy #26 election precinct of Kaspi
#30 Election District.
Illegally stopping the process of polling #34 election
precinct of Kobuleti #81 Election District.
Refusing to provide access to a copy of summary protocol #84 election precinct of Zugdidi #67 Election District.
Gaps in voter list #24 election precinct of Kaspi #30
Election District.
Number of election subjects and invalid ballot papers
do not match with the number of voter signatures - #11
election precinct of Isani #5 Election District; #11 election
precinct of Chughureti #7 Election Di strict; #18, #28 and
#50 election precincts of Telavi #17 Election District; #14
and #17 election precincts of Kaspi #30 Election District;
#46 election precinct of Gori #32 Election District; #30 election precinct of Kareli #33 Election District; #12 election precinct of Adigeni #38 Election District; #19 election precinct
of Khoni #55 Election District; #5 election precinct of Tkibuli #57 Election District; #3, #12, #27, #29, #43, #44, #54,
#58, #78, #79, #87 and #99 election precincts of Kutaisi
#59 Election District; #2 election precinct of Ozurgeti #60
Election District; #11 and #82 election precincts of Zugdidi
#67 Election District; #76, #85 and #101 election precincts
of Batumi #79 Election District; #6 and #19 election precincts of Kobuleti #81 Election District; #26 and #38 election
precincts of Khelvachauri #83 Election District.
Correcting data in summary protocols illegally #48
election precinct of Isani #5 Election District; #94 election
precinct of Gldani #10 Election District; #78, #94 and #104
election precincts of Gori #32 Election District; #2 and #20
election precincts of Akhaltsikhe #37 Election District; of
#15 election precinct Aspindza #39 Election District; #22,
Election District; #24 and #39 election precincts of Dmanisi #24 Election District; #14 election precinct of Kaspi #30
Election District; #10 election precinct of Gori #32 Election
District; #26 election precinct of Kareli #33 Election District;
#26 election precinct of Khashuri #35 Election District; #28,
#30 and #32 election precincts of Akhaltsikhe #37 Election District; #40 election precinct of Kutaisi #59 Election
District; #35 election precinct of Lanchkhuti #61 Election
District; #6 and #20 election precincts of Chokhatauri #62
Election District; #18 election precinct of Zugdidi #67 Election District; #16 election precinct of Tsalenjikha #68 Election District; #68 election precinct of Batumi #79 Election
District; #6, #19, #20 and #33 election precincts of Kobuleti
#81 Election District; #29, #43 and #46 election precincts
of Shuakhevi #82 Election District; #26 election precinct of
Khelvachauri #83 Election District.
FINAL REPORT 53
precinct of Chokhatauri #62 Election District; #1 election precinct of Poti #70 Election District; #50, #61 (2 facts) and #66
election precincts of Batumi #79 Election District; #8 election
precinct of Khelvachauri #83 Election District.
Statistics of violations over which ISFED filed complaints with DECs:
improperly drawing up
summary protocols
49
34
other violations
25
19
18
17
10
agitation
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
54
FINAL REPORT
ELECTION
ELECTION
DAY
NAND
DAYPOST-ELECTION
AND POST-ELECTION
COMPLAINTS
COMPLAINTS
In one case Tsalenjikha DEC drew up a protocol of administrative violations. Court upheld the protocol and imposed
fine on PEC N2 chairperson for making illegal corrections in
summary protocol.
REPEAT ELECTIONS
There were no major irregularities reported during the June
29 repeat elections, possibly due to a small scale of the
elections. ISFEDs observers recorded 3 reproofs in the
Polling Day logbook. Election administration took further
actions in a timely manner and ISFED no longer filed subsequent complaints. In particular, irregularities were detected at polling station N4 of Dusheti Election District N28 and
election precinct N1 of Akhalkalaki Election District N40
improper documentation, as well as election precinct N34
of Kobuleti Election District N81 presence of unauthorized
persons at the polling station.
ISFED filed two complaints with DECs over presence of unauthorized persons at election precinct N1 of Akhalkalaki
Election District N40 and election precinct N34 of Kobuleti
Election District N81. Complaints sought imposition of disciplinary liability on relevant PEC members. None of the
claims were granted.
other violations=
56
FINAL REPORT
NAND
DAYPOST-ELECTION
AND POST-ELECTION
COMPLAINTS
COMPLAINTS
28
12
other violations
ballot stuffing
coreection of summary protocols
restriction of observers rights
violation of the secrecy of vote
violation of regulations for sealing
materials
not validating ballots
not checking ink
not casting lots
violation of rule for casting lots
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ISFED filed one complaint with Tbilisi City Court seeking annulment of Vake DEC. The complaint was rejected by the
court.
Demands made in complaints filed by ISFED
In three of its complaints ISFED demanded annulment of
portable ballot box; one claim was rejected. One complaint
demanded annulment of ballots; it was granted. 3 complaints
demanded actions be made in response to a violation; only
one claim was granted.
With most of its complaints filed with DECs, ISFED demanded imposition of liability on election commission members.
Based on violations identified by ISFED, 64 members of
commission were ordered to a disciplinary liability, including
13 commission chairpersons. In 29 cases disciplinary measure taken was reproof; further, in 29 cases warnings were
issued; in 6 cases salary of PEC members were retained,
including in full in two cases.
FINAL REPORT 57
FINAL REPORT
Majoritarian
92
15
Proportional
85
Female
Male
SBALANCE
NOMINATED
AMONG
FOR CANDIDATES
THE ELECTIONS
NOMINATED FOR THE ELECTIONS
Mayor
Gamgebeli
12
1
58
Female
Male
Based on the results of 2014 local self-government elections, women account for 15% of Sakrebulo members
elected through proportionate election system and 8% of
Sakrebulo members elected through majoritarian election
system. As to women Mayoral candidates, none of them
were able to win the elections, while in Mayoral races only
one women was elected to the office. There are total of
2083 members of Sakrebulo throughout Georgia and women account for 11,62%. There has been an improvement
from 2010, when 88,9% of Sakrebulo members were men
and women accounted only for 11,1%.75
RECOMMENDATIONS
XIV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Changes to be made in the Election Code: continue
working to improve election legislation and election environment. The local self-government elections have clearly
illustrated that ambiguous and vague norms exist in the
Election Code e.g. in terms of residency requirements
for candidates for offices of Mayor/Gamgebeli prescribed
by the Election Code, which due to the general nature of
the norm itself was differently interpreted by the election
administration, political parties and civil society.
Initiative groups should be allowed to nominated candidates for offices of Mayor/Gamgebeli, which will promote
competitive election environment and increase diversity of
voters choice by allowing independent candidates to run
for office.
FINAL REPORT
For the Inter-Agency Task Force for Free and Fair Elections:
-Changes should be made in the IATF regulations with the
aim of ensuring that IATF members are prohibited from
pre-election campaigning and agitation;
-The IATF should strictly and systematically monitor implementation of its recommendations;
- Within the scope of its powers, the IATF should respond
RECOMMENDATIONS
to violations in a timely manner, closely follow implementation of its recommendations and publicize ways in which its
recommendations contribute to the improvement of election
environment.
Representatives of religious organizations: refrain
themselves from any public actions that contain signs of
political agitation.
MENDATIONS RECOMMENDATIONS
FINAL REPORT 61