34 Republic vs.

de Knecht [GR 87335, 12 February 1990]

Facts: On 20 February 1979 the Republic of the Philippines filed in the Court of First Instance (CFI)
of Rizal in Pasay City an expropriation proceedings against the owners of the houses standing
along Fernando ReinDel Pan streets among them Cristina De Knecht together with Concepcion
Cabarrus, and some 15 other defendants (Civil Case 7001-P). On 19 March 1979, de Knecht filed
a motion to dismiss alleging lack of jurisdiction, pendency of appeal with the President of the
Philippines, prematureness of complaint and arbitrary and erroneous valuation of the properties.
On 29 March 1979 de Knecht filed an ex parte urgent motion for the issuance by the trial court of
a restraining order to restrain the Republic from proceeding with the taking of immediate
possession and control of the property sought to be condemned. In June 1979, the Republic filed
a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession of the property to be expropriated on the
ground that it had made the required deposit with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) of 10% of
the amount of compensation stated in the complaint. In an order dated 14 June 1979 the lower
court issued a writ of possession authorizing the Republic to enter into and take possession of
the properties sought to be condemned, and created a Committee of three to determine the just
compensation for the lands involved in the proceedings. On 16 July 1979, de Knecht filed with
this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition (GR No. L-51078) and directed against the order
of the lower court dated 14 June 1979 praying that the Republic be commanded to desist from
further proceeding in the expropriation action and from implementing said order. On 30 October
1980, the Supreme Court rendered a decision, granting the petition for certiorari and prohibition
and setting aside the 14 June 1979 order of the Judge Bautista.
On 8 August 1981, Maria Del Carmen Roxas Vda. de Elizalde, Francisco Elizalde and Antonio
Roxas moved to dismiss the expropriation action in compliance with the dispositive portion of the
aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court which had become final and in order to avoid further
damage to latter who were denied possession of their properties. The Republic filed a
manifestation on 7 September 1981 stating, among others, that it had no objection to the said
motion to dismiss as it was in accordance with the aforestated decision. However, on 2
September 1983, the Republic filed a motion to dismiss said case due to the enactment of the
Batas Pambansa 340 expropriating the same properties and for the same purpose. The lower
court in an order of 2 September 1983 dismissed the case by reason of the enactment of the said
law. The motion for reconsideration thereof was denied in the order of the lower court dated 18
December 1986. De Knecht appealed from said order to the Court of Appeals wherein in due
course a decision was rendered on 28 December 1988, setting aside the order appealed from
and dismissing the expropriation proceedings. The Republic filed the petition for review with the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether an expropriation proceeding that was determined by a final judgment of the
Supreme Court may be the subject of a subsequent legislation for expropriation.
Held: While it is true that said final judgment of the Supreme Court on the subject becomes the
law of the case between the parties, it is equally true that the right of the Republic to take
private properties for public use upon the payment of the just compensation is so provided in the
Constitution and our laws. Such expropriation proceedings may be undertaken by the Republic
not only by voluntary negotiation with the land owners but also by taking appropriate court
action or by legislation. When on 17 February 1983 the Batasang Pambansa passed BP 340
expropriating the very properties subject of the present proceedings, and for the same purpose,
it appears that it was based on supervening events that occurred after the decision of the
Supreme Court was rendered in De Knecht in 1980 justifying the expropriation through the
Fernando ReinDel Pan Streets. The social impact factor which persuaded the Court to consider
this extension to be arbitrary had disappeared. All residents in the area have been relocated and
duly compensated. 80% of the EDSA outfall and 30% of the EDSA extension had been completed.
Only De Knecht remains as the solitary obstacle to this project that will solve not only the
drainage and flood control problem but also minimize the traffic bottleneck in the area.
Moreover, the decision, is no obstacle to the legislative arm of the Government in thereafter

making its own independent assessment of the circumstances then prevailing as to the propriety
of undertaking the expropriation of the properties in question and thereafter by enacting the
corresponding legislation as it did in this case. The Court agrees in the wisdom and necessity of
enacting BP 340. Thus the anterior decision of this Court must yield to this subsequent legislative
fiat.