The Concept of Vinna in Theravda Buddhism

Author(s): O. H. de A. Wijesekera
Source: Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 84, No. 3 (Jul. - Sep., 1964), pp. 254-259
Published by: American Oriental Society
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254

ASTOUR: Second Millennium B. C. Cypriot and Cretan Onomastica Reconsidered

and 14th centuries, which formed a single whole

despite its composition of West Semites and Hurrians (the latter with an Indo-Aryan admixture),
and the cultural impact of the Sumero-Akkadian
world upon it. The people of North Syria had a
common civilization and a common political orB. C.
In 1927, Peet concluded his study of the writing- ganization within a few important states (above all
board from British Museum with the pertinent Ugarit and the confederation of Mukis-Nuhasseremark: " What is clear is that a few random Nii, or Alalaih). Its tri-lingualism (WS and Hurattempts with names taken from various sources in rian, plus Akkadian as the main legal and scholarly
the Eastern Mediterranean are of little use. If it language) was not different in its nature from the
could be shown that several of these names, say six situation in the medieval England with its Angloor seven, were to be found at about this period Saxon, Norman French and Latin. If the Keftiu
among a single people somewhere in or near this displayed the same assortment of personal names,
area, we could then say that these people were taking in account that its location in the Aegean
speaking the language of Keftiu, though we should is beyond doubt, this can only be a firm proof that
the North Syrian population had, by 1500 B. C.,
not necessarily know the location of Keftiu." 199
taken a strong foothold not only in the nearby
names
of
these
all
it
that
seems,
We have shown,
belong to the onomastica of a single people of that Cyprus, but even further West, in Crete. This
very period: the people of North Syria of the 15th corroborates similar conclusions reached by other
means-analysis of Cretan myths, toponyms, and
199 " Keftiu Names," p. 98.
above all of the island's inscriptions.
Sen-nupar, Sen-qad, Luwanta), 1 mixed HurroWS (Sumarassu), 1 North Syrian of undetermined
Unless we suspect the
extraction (R/Lusa).
Egyptian scribe of wanton bad faith, these names
are specimens of Cretan onomastica around 150

THE CONCEPT OF VINNA-NA IN THERAVADA BUDDHISM

0. H.

DE

A.

WIJESEIKERA

UNIVERSITY OF CEYLON

THE BASIC POSITION of the concept of Vifafidna

in the entire scheme of early Buddhist thought as
recorded in the Pali Canon has not received adequate recognition either by traditional exegetists
or by modern interpreters. The common attitude
has been to regard it merely as a psychological
phenomenon interpreted as 'cognition' or 'perception' or 'cognitive consciousness,' or simply as
' consciousness.' The purpose of the present paper
is to indicate, however briefly, that it is a much
more pregnant concept, with a philosophically
'deeper' significance than may be implied by these
terms. Reference must be made, however, to a few
previous scholars, notably Oldenberg,l Mrs. Rhys
Davids 2 and Berriedale Keith,3 who have not
1 Buddha: His Life, His Doctrine, His Order (Tr.
Hoey), London, 1882, pp. 229 sq., 253.
2
The Birth of Indian Psychology and its Development
in Buddhism, London, 1936, pp. 191-193, 245 sq.; Indian
Religion and Survival, London, 1934, pp. 66-67.
India and Ceylon, Oxford,
"Buddhist Philosophy-in
1923, pp. 78-80, 100 sq.

failed to notice some of the broader issues involved

in this concept.
It is true that in the well-known analysis of perception recurring in identical form in several early
canonical passages, the term stands for 'perceptive-' or 'cognitive-consciousness.' In that often
repeated formula (eg., M. i. 259, etc.) it is asserted
that: 'depending on the organ of sight (cakkhu)
and on visible form (ripa) arises the sight-consciousness (cakchu-viiiiniam uppajjati).' Similarly
with respect to the organ of hearing, etc., and also
of mind which too is here regarded as an organ of
sense with the mental phenomena (dhammdi) as its
objects. If in this formula the verb uppajjati is to
be taken literally, then 'cognitive consciousness'
must be regarded as arising de novo from the concourse (samgati) of the organ of sense and its
object, and, the Pali exegetical tradition appears to
support such an idea. But a careful study of the
early texts will show (eg., D. ii. 62) that what the
formula probably meant was that the cognitive or
perceptive process of vifitina begins to function

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WIJESEKERA:

The Concept of Viffi-ina in Theravdda Buddhism

when there is contact between the organ and the

object of sense. It is obvious that the viniAina or
consciousness that is said to 'arise' in each case
of sense contact could not be something created
afresh by the latter, for in that event, the Buddhist
theory of perception would be identical with that
of the materialistic schools which believed that
consciousness is a mere by-product of matter. But
with such a theory the Buddha is reported as
having radically differed. Therefore in the phrase
'uppajjati cakkhu-viiiiianam' it would be far more
reasonable from the point of view of early Buddhism to see the idea of ' viiiiana coming to function in relation to the organ of sight' etc. Or, if
all animistic implications are eschewed from the
idea of 'manifesting,' in the words of Dr. E. J.
Thomas, vifiiiana may be said to "manifest itself
through the six sense organs." Moreover, there
are several contexts in the Pali Canon which go to
prove conclusively that Vififidna is much more
'profound' a concept than to be regarded as a mere
by-product of the interaction of the sense-organs
and their objects. In other words, there is much
more in the concept of Vififi~na than one may
gather from its translation as 'consciousness' in
the above formula of perception.
Elsewhere 5 I have discussed the concept of
Vififidna in relation to the problem of Rebirth.
There are several contexts in the early parts of the
Canon which represent the Vififidna as the sine
qua non for embryonic development. One passage
in the Digha Nikaya clearly asserts that "if
vififiina were not to descend (okkamissatha) into
the mother's womb (mitu kucchim) " or if "having descended into the mother's womb were to
leave (okkacmitva vokkalmissatha), then the development of the embryo will not be successful"
(D. ii. 63). In this context what is most significant is the use of the verb 'ava(o) + kram' to
denote the entering, and ' vi + ut + kram' to mean
the leaving, of Vifiiatna. There is no doubt that it
is used in the actual sense of descending or entering
into-the original (literal) sense of this verb as
found in other places in the Nikayas in analogous
contexts with the accusative of that which is entered (D. ii. 12, 108; M. iii. 119, etc.), as well as in
the early Upanisads as will be shown below. Similarly, in the phrase 'ggabbhassa avakkanti' the
original sense seems to have been 'descent of the
4 History of Buddhist Thought, p. 104.
5 cc Vedic Gandharva and Pali Gandhabba," University

of Ceylon Review, Vol. III. 1, pp. 73 sq.

255

embryonic being' for even in the earlier language

'garbha' meant both the embryo as receptacle as
well as the being inside it. Hence it is that gabbha
is said to derive from the six elements of which
Vififiana is the last and to be the cause of ndmaruipa at least in one version of the paticcasamuppada formula (A. i. 176). What is significant here
is that for the usual phrase 'viijana-paccayd
ndma-rupam' we have ' (gabbhassa) okkantiyd sati
ndma-rupam,' a fact which assumes greater importance when we find Vififidna regarded as the
sixth of the six dhatus or elements (M. iii. 239;
A. i. 176). These references should help to convince one that in embryonic conception Vififidna is
not just some incidental phenomenon of the process but a more 'original' factor, apart from the
mere physical elements. In fact, as the Digha
Nikaya passage makes it quite clear, it is the most
essential factor without which there cannot be the
development of an embryo.
That the above Vififidna is no other than the
Vififina which is regarded as the cause for the
individual's survival after death is made clear by
a number of references in the early Pali Canon.
In the Majjhima Nikdya (ii. 262 ff.) it is technically called 'saimvattanika-viiinaia' or 'the
Vifninanathat evolves (into the next life).' It is
for this that in the later scholastic period the term
'patisandhi-viiiiiana' was substituted (see P. T. S.
Dict., s.v.). This 'samvattanika-viiinana' is said
to continue up to the spiritual stage of Nevasafifidnasafinnayatana
usually rendered 'Sphere of neither
perception nor non-perception' (ib. 264). It is
thus the samsdric Vififinna to which Sati is reported as having referredwith the words " Vifaulana
that fares on and continues (sandhivati samsarati) " but erred in saying that it did so "without
change of identity (tadeva. . . anaiNam) " and
also in regarding it as the "speaker and experiencer (vado vedeyyo) ," in other words, as the
agent behind all mental activities (M. i. 256).
Now, this samsdric Viinnana cannot be different
from the stream of Vinhhna (viniidna-sota) referred to as extending into both the worlds in the
Digha Nikaya (iii. 105; cp. Sn. 1055, etc.), called
also the 'stream of becoming' (bhava-sota) in the
Samyutta Nikdya (iv. 291). It may be remarked
in passing that in the present writer's opinion the
term bhavanga occurring at Tika-Patthana i. 159
and the probable use of the same compound at
AniguttaraNikaya ii. 79 indicate no other than this
selfsame 'stream of becoming.' It is extremely

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256

WIJESEKERA:

The Concept of ViiiAuna in Theravdda Buddhism

significant that in the Pdyasi Suttanta of the

Digha Nikdya (ii. 325) which clearly refers to the
samsdric Vinnana, this Viafidna is made analogous
to 'purisa,' a term whose Upanisadic antecedence
cannot be missed. It may be added that it is this
same samsdric Vififidna that is called an dhdra
(S. ii. 13; M. i. 48, 261), and sometimes regarded
as the cause (b ja) of rebirth (A. i. 223; S. iii. 54,
etc.). It should now be clear why the other categories constituting the individual are said to be the
home (olca) of Viiifidna (S.iii. 9ff.). In view of
such evidence the conclusion is difficult to avoid
that the term viniiina in Early Buddhism indicated the surviving factor of an individual which
by re-entering womb after womb (gabbha gabbham:
Sn. 278, cp. D. iii. 147) produced repeated births
resulting in what is generally known as Samsdra.
The idea that, as explained above, Vififidna is
the factor in the individual that survives death is
also supported by other evidence in the Pali Canon.
In the contribution above referred to, I showed
how the term gandhabba denotes another aspect of
the very same concept. In such an anchistological
sense the term gandhabba occurs twice in the
Majjhima Nikdya signifying the last of three conditions necessary for successful development of the
embryo. In the Mahatanhdsankhaya Sutta it is
said that, for 'conception' (gabbhassa avakkanti)
to take place, there should be the conjunction of
three things: " There should be coitus of parents,
the mother should have her period, and the gandhabba must be present" (M.i.265).
Buddhaghosa's comment is unusually clear on the point:
" Gandhabba (here denotes) the being about to
enter the womb; paccupatthito hoti: it is not that
(he) remains in the proximity observing the union
of the parents, (on the other hand) what is implied is that a certain being (satto) is about to be
born in that situation, being driven on by the
mechanism of Kamma." It is idle to seek to
explain away the phrase "a certain being about
to enter the womb" (tatru'palca-satto) as an unconscious lapse into popular terminology on the
part of Buddhagosa, for, the significance of the
text itself is weighty enough to have compelled
Buddhaghosa to resort to the particular terminology he uses. Chalmers translated the last
phrase as " if there is the presiding deity of generation (gandhabba) present," and is followed by the
P. T. S. Dictionary which says, citing only this
single instance, that the gandhabba "is said to preside over child-conception." Doubtless, these ex-

planations are influenced by the notion that the

Vedic term gandharva meant an auspicious deity
presiding over conception, an idea not very sound
in itself as I have shown in my earlier discussion
cited above. To infer any idea of 'presiding' from
the Pali verb "paccupatthito hoti" is also unwarranted, for it can only mean 'to be present at.'
The other occurrence is found in the Assaldyana
Sutta where Buddha relates to Assalayana a discussion said to have taken place between Asita
Devala and seven sages who were too proud of their
brahmin birth. Devala lays down three conditions
necessary for conception (M. ii. 156), in exactly
the same terms as above, and, in order to ridicule
the overbearing Brahmins, argues that in such a
case it would be impossible to know whether the particular gandhabba involved was by caste ksatriya,
brahmana, vaisya or suidra. Here the text is unequivocal and leaves no doubt that what is meant
is the surviving element of a previously dead
person. As I have shown in the cited publication,
from the time of the Atharvaveda the word gandharva is found meaning ' discarnate spirit.' Since,
however, in this particular context, the identity of
the 'spirit' with a previous person in point of
caste goes against the Buddhist principle that the
reborn individual is neither identical nor nonidentical with the previous person (na ca so na ca
anhno), Buddhaghosa maintains a discreet silence.
This latter reference to gandhabba is missed by
most writers who have dealt with the term including the P. T. S. Dictionary although it is obviously
as important as the former. But, from the early
Buddhist point of view, the special meaning of the
term gandhabba as used in the above contexts is
not difficult to determine. It must refer to the
samsdric Vififidna in the intermediate state between death and the succeeding birth. This conclusion is supported by the Amarakosa where the
term gandharva is explained as 'antardbhavasattva.' Amara, who was himself a Buddhist,
seems here to have followed a genuine Buddhist
tradition on the meaning of the term. One can
easily see that this sense is quite compatible with
Buddhaghosa's explanation of the term as referred
to above.
Even more important than the above discussed
functions of the term vihftnna in Pdli Buddhism,
is the part it plays in the scheme of spiritual training or meditation generally known as JhAna or
Samapatti. An analysis of its occurrence in the
various descriptions of these spiritual or psychical

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WIJESEKERA:

The Concept of Viinn-a-ain Theravida Buddhism

257

states shows unmistakably that Vififina is the in the state of Nirodha it obtains no such foot-hold.
That the above described states of Vififidna,
'medium' in which the course of meditational
progress takes place. Now, it is important that represent so many states of a progressive purificathese stages or states of spiritual attainment tion of the individual in empirical (samsaric)
(samdpatti) are definitely called 'the abiding existence is made clear from several passages in the
places (or footholds) of Viififidna' (vififun'a-thiti; Pali Canon. Of these, two passages dealing with
D. ii. 68 ff., A. iv. 39 f.). A careful study of each the numinous concept of the yakkha (Vedic yakcsa)
of the canonical statements regarding the succes- deserve special mention. The term occurs with a
sive Jhdnic stages will show how this idea of thitis philosophical meaning in the Suttanipfta (478;
is applicable. There is no other explanation of 875-6), once in the Atthakavagga and once in the
this usage of the expression 'vihiinna-thiti' except Mahavagga. It occurs in the quasi-technical
the straight-forward one that throughout these phrase 'yalcichassasuddhi' which I have discussed
states the 'stream' of Vififidna (vini-dna-sota) to fully in an earlier paper." In the Kalahavivada
which I have already referred, appears to abide in Sutta of the Atthakavagga the Buddha after exa certain plane of existence for some duration. It plaining the process of eliminating the conditionmay be stated that in the first Jhdnic state the ing factors of the manifold experience of empirical
Vilfidna manifests itself as reasoning and investi- existence (papaica) is made to reply to the intergation (vitakka-vicdra), but in the second this locutor that 'form, happiness and sorrow' cease
intelligential function of the mind is said to be for him 'who is of neither normal nor abnormal
pacified (viipasama), but yet the second Jhdna, consciousness, neither unconscious nor with conaccording to what was said above, is also con- sciousness ceased to become' (na saniasaAiA!,na
sidered as a "state of consciousness" (vihiiina- visann-sanii, no pi asafiii, na vibfitasaiifiH). Then
thiti). Similarly, the second of the four Higher the inquiry is made whether that state is what some
Jhdnas, i. e., the sixth of the Attainments, is said metaphysicians would call 'the purity of the yakkha' or whether there is a purity different from
to be the 'infinity of Vififidna (vin-conainacayatana). Beyond the stage of the infinity of Vififiaina that. To this the Buddha replies that there are
is the 'state of Nothingness' (CkiNcafifia'yatana). some who hold that the permanent state of the
It needs to be emphasized again that both these conscious entity is the highest purity (sassata)
states are also called 'vififinnatthitis.' Further, while others hold that the annihilation of that
the next or the final 'abiding place of Vififiinaa' is conscious entity is the goal (uccheda), but that the
asserted to be 'the sphere of Neither-saian-d-nor- true sage (muni) knowing that both these are inasaRR2,'which, I believe, implies that while the clined to extremes does not enter into disputes and
previous states are 'conceptual,' that is to say, in does not go into renewed existence (in Samsdra).
the final analysis reducible to a particular 'noetic' Now, an analysis of this context leads one to the
experience of the subject, the last indicates a state conclusion that the term yakkha is used here with
which, while being non-noetic, is still some form reference to that state of Vififidna which is neither
of 'experience.' Since, however, there can be no normal (saiftasaiiii) nor yet attained to that
experience of any kind without some sort of higher state which is the ceasing to become of such
Vififidna acting as the medium for it, and, there- norv:al consciousness, that is to say, not yet reached
fore, must be characterizable as impermanent the Nirodha state which we discussed earlier.
(anicca), Buddha declared that even this 'state of Hence the term yaklcha here must refer to the
Neither-conception-nor-non-conception' does not formless (arilpa), infinite (ananta) state of
imply final emancipation or Nibbana. The Vifaifina as characteristic of the last three states of
Vififidna ceases to manifest itself altogether the Jhdnic series as well as in the subtler state of
(nirujjhati) only in the final state of 'the cessa- 'Neither safia nor non-safiR5a' (nevasanh nation of all conceptual and empirical experience sainiayatana), but not yet reached the highest state
(saiiAi-vedayita-nirodha).' ' Nirujjhati' literally of emancipation (parimutti) which is also called
means ' checked' and this can best be taken as the highest state of Purity (parisuddhi).
referring to the checking of the flow (sota) of
That the above is the correct interpretation is
Vififina, that is to say, the stopping of the continuity of Viin-Ania. In the previous states the
6 " The Philosophical Import of Vedic Yaksa and Pali
Vififina could find some abiding place (thiti) but Yakkha," Ibid., Vol. I. 2, pp. 24 sq.

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258

WIJESEKERA:

The Concept of VIiinfa-nain Theravada Buddhism

seen when we cast a retrospective glance at the

meaning of yakcsareached in the philosophy of the
Upanisads. Take for instance the reference to this
sense of yak~saas found at Brhaddranyaka, v. 4,
where it is said: "This verily is That. This indeed was That, even the Actual. ile who knows
that great yaksa, the first born, as the actual Brahman, conquers the worlds." There can be no doubt
that the term here refers to the actualized (satya)
Brahman, the great (i. e., infinite) and first-born.
Such a macrocosmic sense of the term yakcsaoccurs
in the Kena Upanisad too (iii. 2. 12), where in
the allegory of the Vedic gods' ignorance of Brahman it is narrated that when " It appearedto them
they did not understand It. 'What wonderful
Being (yaksa) is this!' they said." Safikara identifies yakcsahere with 'mahad bhitam' which appears in a similar sense in the Taittiriya Brahmana
(iii. 11. 1. 1). Now, it is well known that in the
Upanisads the individual soul in its highest purity
is identified with infinite being, infinite consciousness and infinite bliss. Brhaddranyaka Upanisad
(v. 6. 1) refers to the human consciousness in its
pure state as identifiable with the Brahman or
Atman which is infinite (i. e., macrocosmic) and
is the 'mind-made person' (manomaya-purusa)
said to be of the nature of light, i. e., radiant
(bheth, bhisatyah), and the Taittirlya Upanisad
(i. 6. 1) regards it as immortal and resplendent
(hiranmaya). It is significant that the idea is
found in early Buddhism that citta, identical with
mano or (mano-)viiiiietna (D. i. 21) is radiant
(pabhassara) when it is undefiled (A. i. 10) and
loses its radiance when defiled (S. v. 92). It is
this mano-vinniina that, after passing the fourth
Jhdna when it divests itself of the sense-functions,
is regarded as pure (parisuddha) in the Majjhima
Nikaya (i. 293), and such infinite Vifnfianais definitely asserted to be 'devoid of characteristics and
radiant all-round' (anidassanam anantam sabbatopabham) in the Digha Nikaya (i. 223). It is
therefore the purity of Vififina with the consequent radiance that is especially signified by the
term yalkkeha. This, however, does not mean for
Buddhism the ultimate stage of spiritual evolution,
for, as I pointed out earlier, in order to reach that
final state Vififnn.a must cease to function in any
form. That is why in the above passage the phrase
'yakckchassa
suddhi ' is deliberately employed implying, as it does, that this yakichahas to be purified
further if final emancipation or vimutti is to be
attained.

These considerations also should prove sufficient

to help one to distinguish between the Upanisadic
use of the word vijfidna and the Buddhist term
vini-iana. Even with regard to the above discussed
idea of Vififiadnaas the surviving factor in rebirth,
it has to be emphasized that it is not exactly identical with the parallel idea of vijininaitmanas found
in the Upanisads. The Upanisadic theories of
survival fall into different categories. According
to some texts when a man dies and is cremated,
from the oblation, " purusa arises having the colour
of light" (e. g., Taittirlya Upd. i. 6. 1) and that
is the ' survivor.' Here a compromise between the
eschatological and the biological theories of survival is seen, as I have shown in the publication
already referred to. Another more developed
theory, inclining rather to the anchistological doctrine of transmigration refers to " the purusa
among the senses, made of knowledge, who being
born (again) obtains a (fresh) body" (e. g., Brhad.
Upd. iv. 3. 8). But it is at Brhadaranyaka iv. 4. 2
that the survivor is clearly asserted to be no other
than the &tman in the individual: " (As he is
dying) . . . verily, the extremity of the heart of
this afore-said (person) becomes luminous; by that
become luminous, this soul (Ctman) goes out
(nis1crdmati), through the eye or the head or any
other point of the body; in the wake of him as he
leaves (ut-lcrdmantam) life leaves, (and) in the
wake of life, all the vital functions leave; (he)
becomes (one-) with-consciousness (savijiinah);
as that very (eva) consciousness with which (he is
identified), (he) descends (ava-krdmati) (into a
womb) over again (anu) . . . ." The terminological parallelism with the Pali is quite obvious.
Here Safkara interprets the term itman as
4vijnandtman' as clearly implied by the text.
This vijina atman has its parallel in the Upanisadic
concept of the ' vijndnamaya-purusa' as referred to
at Brhaddranyaka (ii. 1. 15). There is no doubt
that the Upanisadic tradition took the vijfiana as
the surviving factor at death in the metaphysical
sense of an Otman that leaves the body at death
(nis-1crdmati) and in transmigration enters into
some relationship or other with vifrAdna. Thus it
is easy to see how the Buddhist theory of Vififidna
as the surviving factor shows a distinct difference
from the parallel Upanisadic concept of an &tman
that transmigrates carrying the vijiAcnaalong with
it, or, becoming one with it, as it proceeds on to the
next life. In short, neither in the microcosmic nor
in the macrocosmic sense can the Upanisadic con-

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WIJEsEKERA:

The Concept of Viiiinua in Theravada Buddhism

cept of the Atman be regarded as being identical

with the Buddhist idea of Vifnnaa. In the canonical texts (e.g., M. i. 300) it is emphatically asserted that Vinnana or any other of the Khandhas
cannot be viewed as soul (att&) in any sense; nor
can the soul be considered as having the Vifiafiaa;
nor can it be said that Vinadna is part of the soul,
The same
or that the soul is part of the Vifiina.
text makes it clear that Vinfidna, is impermanent
(anicca) like any other empirical phenomenon
(i. 138).
From what has been said above regarding the
nature of the Buddhist concept of Vilifina it will
not be difficult to understand why most writers
have come to the conclusion that the term Vififidna
in Buddhist literature has several senses. Such a
conclusion obviously carries with it the suspicion
that the authors of the Pali Canon had no clear
conception as to the exact connotation of this important term. It is true that the word is used
for several philosophical and psychological phenomena. As I have attempted to show in this
paper, it has the sense of cognitive or perceptive
consciousness in most of the passages. In addition,
however, Vifnnaa also means the surviving factor
in the individual, denoted by the special term
samvattanika viiiinana in Pali. Then, again, the

259

term is applied to the 'medium' in which Jhanic

or spiritual progress takes place, as implied by the
Perhaps the foregoing
expression vifidnatthiti.
discussion has made it clear that the so-called
'separate meanings' of Vifaina do not refer to so
many different entities but to aspects of the same
phenomenon. A study of all the relevant passages
shows that behind all these aspects is a much
deeper Vinfiaina. It may be difficult to define its
exact nature in modern philosophical terms, but
the early Buddhists appear to have entertained no
doubts as to its fundamental significance for their
view of individualized existence and spiritual deliverance. From this 'basic' point of view the
apparent 'contradictions' of the texts could be
satisfactorily resolved. Thus, the conclusion forces
itself upon one that in the early Buddhist view as
reflected in the Pali Canon Vihfidna was the basis
for all conscious and unconscious psychological
manifestations pertaining to individuality as it
continued in Samsara or empirical existence. In
itself, however, it was nothing permanent (nicca)
or constant (dhuva), being no aspect or part of any
metaphysical Being or Atman but only an aspect
of Bhava or Becoming which was emphatically declared as being subject to constant change
(viparin-imadhamma) and finally to cessation at
the attainment of Nibbdna.

THE PROTO-MALAYOPOLYNESIAN WORD FOR 'LADDER, STAIRCASE'

RUFUS

S.

HENDON

YALE UNIVERSITY

are, however, two difficulties with this

reconstruction.
In the first place, it fails to account for the g of
the Tagalog word. Dempwolff wrote it halgiddan,
thereby indicating that he interpreted the g as not
belonging to the stem,n3but he gave no evidence to
prove the existence of such an infix in Tagalog or
pre-Tagalog.
The other difficulty is with the Ngaju Dayak
word. The words in Ngaju Dayak which can be
derived from PMP etyma fall into two groups char-

DEMPWOLFF1 RECONSTRUCTEDProto-Malayopoly- There

nesian (PMP) *hejan from the comparison of

Tagalog (Tg.) hagddn and Ngaju Dayak (NgD.)
hejan, both of which mean 'staircase, ladder.'2
I Otto Dempwolff, Vergleichende Lautlehre des austronesischen Wortschatzes 2.66-7, 3.63 (Berlin, 1934-8). I
follow the revisions in Dempwolff's symbols and reconstructions made by Isidore Dyen, The Proto-MalayoPolynesian laryngeals (Baltimore, 1953), but write? and
ij instead of his q and N. In addition, since the differences among Dyen's final *-V, *-Vh, and *-V(h) have no
bearing on the present topic, I represent them all as
*-v.

My spelling of Tagalog (and Bisayan) words conforms

to that used in Dyen, Laryngeals. Ngaju Dayak words
are quoted as they appear in Aug. Hardeland, Dajacksch2

deutsches Wdrterbuch (Amsterdam, 1859), with au dj ng

replaced by aw j a.
s Dempwolff 3.10: " Vertical strokes in a word serve to
separate affixes (Formantien) from the word stem."

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