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MULTIPLE CHOICE
1.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
ANS: C
DIF: Moderate
REF: 460
TOP: Making Strategy and Game Theory
2.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
MSC: Conceptual
ANS: E
DIF: Moderate
REF: 460
TOP: Making Strategy and Game Theory
MSC: Conceptual
3.
Radio City promises if you can find a lower advertised price for anything you
bought at Radio City, anywhere in town within 30 days, it will return the difference plus 20%.
A sophisticated game theoretic analysis suggests Radio City may be:
a.
losing money in the long run.
b.
colluding with other stores.
c.
using a commitment to threaten
competitors.
d.
preempting competitors.
e.
using price leadership.
ANS: B
DIF: Difficult
REF: 460
TOP: Making Strategy and Game Theory
MSC: Conceptual
4.
Potential entrant E threatens to enter incumbent Is market and I threatens to
lower price to P should E enter. It is crucial for E to believe Is threat that:
a.
P > Is average total cost.
b.
P > Is average variable cost.
c.
P is low enough to discourage E.
d.
I could conceivably charge P without Es
threat.
e.
Is profit with P and no entry are better than
expected profits with entry.
ANS: B
DIF: Difficult
REF: 460
TOP: Making Strategy and Game Theory
MSC: Conceptual
5.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
ANS: A
MSC: Factual
6.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
ANS: B
MSC: Factual
7.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
ANS: C
Representation
MSC: Factual
DIF: Easy
REF: 461
REF: 461
REF: 463
TOP: Visual
8.
Consider the following decision tree. This tree illustrates hypothetical payoffs
to General Mills (GM) and Quaker Oats (Q) if they engage in a price war.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
ANS: A
Representation
MSC: Applied
DIF: Easy
REF: 463
TOP: Visual
9.
Consider the following decision tree. This tree illustrates hypothetical payoffs
to General Mills (GM) and Quaker Oats (Q) if they engage in a price war. If GM cuts prices
and Quaker Oats follows this behavior:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
ANS: C
Representation
MSC: Applied
10.
DIF: Easy
REF: 463
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
1.
2.
3.
4.
Unknown until Bs action is observed.
ANS: B
Representation
MSC: Applied
11.
DIF: Moderate
c.
d.
e.
ANS: A
Strategies
MSC: Factual
12.
e.
TOP: Visual
b.
c.
d.
REF: 463
a.
a.
b.
TOP: Visual
DIF: Easy
REF: 468
TOP: Dominant
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
ANS: C
Strategies
MSC: Factual
13.
DIF: Easy
REF: 468
TOP: Dominant
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
ANS: C
Strategies
MSC: Factual
14.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
ANS: E
Strategies
MSC: Factual
DIF: Easy
REF: 468
TOP: Dominant
REF: 468
TOP: Dominant
15.
In a two-player game in which each player has four options, how many
outcomes can there be?
a.
1.
b.
4.
c.
8.
d.
16.
e.
64.
ANS: D
Strategies
MSC: Applied
16.
player:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
DIF: Easy
REF: 468
TOP: Dominant
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
ANS: B
Equilibrium
MSC: Factual
17.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
ANS: C
Equilibrium
MSC: Factual
18.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
ANS: D
Equilibrium
MSC: Factual
DIF: Easy
REF: 472
REF: 472
REF: 472
19.
Which pair of strategies would cooperative cartel members A and B choose
given this payoff matrix?
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
W, Y.
W, Z.
X, Y.
X, Z.
Either X, Y or W, Z.
ANS: B
Equilibrium
MSC: Applied
20.
DIF: Easy
REF: 472
Which pair of strategies would competing firms A and B choose given this
payoff matrix?
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
W, Y.
W, Z.
X, Y.
X, Z.
Either X, Y or W, Z.
ANS: C
Equilibrium
MSC: Applied
21.
DIF: Easy
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
ANS: C
Equilibrium
MSC: Applied
22.
DIF: Easy
ANS: C
Equilibrium
MSC: Applied
23.
equilibrium?
c.
d.
e.
REF: 472
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
b.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
a.
REF: 472
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
DIF: Easy
REF: 472
ANS: D
Equilibrium
MSC: Applied
24.
equilibrium?
DIF: Easy
b.
c.
d.
e.
25.
equilibrium?
DIF: Moderate
c.
d.
e.
c.
d.
e.
b.
26.
based on:
a.
b.
REF: 472
a.
ANS: B
Equilibrium
MSC: Applied
a.
ANS: A
Equilibrium
MSC: Applied
REF: 472
DIF: Moderate
REF: 472
Strategic foresight is the ability to make decisions today that are rational
complete uncertainty about the future.
our best information about what will happen
in the future.
what we know only about behavior in the
past.
information that we have only about our
own behavior in the past.
incorrect information about the past.
ANS: B
DIF: Easy
REF: 479
TOP: Strategic Foresight: The Use of Backward Induction
MSC: Factual
27.
Suppose that firm A finds itself facing the following payoff matrix in its
rivalry with firm B:
b.
c.
d.
e.
ANS: C
DIF: Easy
REF: 482
TOP: Strategic Foresight: The Use of Backward Induction
28.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
MSC: Conceptual
A most-favored-customer clause:
is a commitment but not a threat.
is a threat but not a commitment.
is both a threat and a commitment.
is neither a threat nor a commitment.
could be either a threat or a commitment
depending on the terms.
ANS: C
DIF: Moderate
REF: 482
TOP: Making Strategy and Game Theory
MSC: Conceptual