ATTY. VIRGILIO P. ALCONERA, Complainant, vs. ALFREDO T. PALLANAN, Respondent.

Facts:
Complainant was the counsel for Rafols, the defendant in an unlawful detainer case before the MTCC in General
Santos City, South Cotabato. After trial, the MTCC ruled against Rafols and his co-defendants in a
Judgment dated March 12, 2009.
1

Rafols, through complainant Alconera, appealed the case to the RTC. Pending appeal, the court issued an Order
granting Cua Bengs motion for execution she filed in the unlawful detainer case. Alconera sought
reconsideration but the motion was denied.
Evelyn Rafols, Rafols daughter-in-law, called up Alconera to report that the sheriff, respondent Pallanan, was
about to implement the adverted writ of execution. Respondent sheriff then allegedly demanded payment of
PhP720,000 to settle Rafols obligation to which the latter protested on the ground that the amount is too
exorbitant when they have been religiously depositing monthly rentals in court to satisfy the judgment.
Evelyn Rafols passed her phone to respondent sheriff. Over the phone, a verbal disagreement between the two
ensued. Alconera claims that he has a pending motion for reconsideration on the issuance of the writ of
execution, but the respondent said that the motion has already been denied. And since no Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) has been issued enjoining the implementation, respondent claimed that he is legally
mandated to perform his ministerial duty of enforcing the writ. Complainant countered that he has not yet
received a copy of the denial of the motion, rendering the execution premature and, at the same time, preventing
him from securing a TRO from the higher courts. Nevertheless, respondent still pushed through with the
execution of the judgment.
Complainant returned to General Santos City and found a copy of the Order denying his Motion for
Reconsideration. The RTC ruled that there was no pending Motion to Approve Supersedeas Bond filed with it.
Instead, what was filed not with the RTC but with the MTCC was a "NOTICE OF APPEAL and MOTION TO
APPROVE PROPERTY SUPERSEDEAS BOND," which was not granted.
That afternoon, Alconera went to RTC with his daughter to confront respondent sheriff. The face-off escalated
into a heated argument caught on video. It was complainants daughter, who filmed the incident and transcribed
the dialogue during the altercation.
Alconera filed a Complaint-Affidavit against the respondent sheriff for grave misconduct before this Court.
Respondent filed his comment and averred that the duty of a court sheriff in enforcing a writ of execution is
ministerial, and without a TRO enjoining it, a sheriff is duty bound to implement it.
3

Respondent filed his own Affidavit of Complaint against herein complainant for Grave Misconduct and for
violating the Code of Ethics. Respondent alleged that during the enforcement of the writ, a second phone
conversation took place. Complainant allegedly called up Evelyn Rafols who put him on loudspeaker for the
respondent to hear his words. Alconera then allegedly made a threat that there will be bloodshed if respondents
party pushes through with the implementation of the writ. Respondent likewise claimed that complainant berated
him at his office and that the incident was orchestrated by the complainant.
5

In view of respondents counter-charge, Alconera supplemented his affidavit-complaint to include a charge

against the former for False Testimony. Complainant belied the claims of respondent sheriff, and showed that the
respondents allegations can nowhere be seen in the transcript of the altercation.
6

The Court, upon the OCAs recommendation, resolved to re-docket Alconeras complaint as a regular
administrative case with docket No. A.M. No. P-12-3069 and referred the same to the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, South Cotabato, for investigation, report, and recommendation.

After due proceedings, the investigating judge submitted a report, styled as Order dated August 6, 2013, with
the following recommendation:
7

Based on the findings and evaluation, the herein Executive Judge hereby recommends the respondent Sheriff
be ADMONISHED. The respondent must be reminded that as a Court Employee, he must exercise utmost
patience and humility in the performance of his duties amidst all the pressures and personal attacks against his
person because he carried with him the image of the entire judiciary.
The Executive Judge adopted the transcript of the altercation as appearing in the affidavit of Shyla Mae Zapanta
and based his recommendation mainly thereon.
The Issues
The main issue in this case is whether or not respondent can be held administratively liable for grave misconduct
and false testimony. In fine, the controversy stems from the propriety of the implementation of the writ of
execution, and the altercation between complainant and respondent.
The Courts Ruling
Grave Misconduct
Misconduct has been defined as "a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer." The misconduct is grave if it involves any
of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, all of
which must be established by substantial evidence, and must necessarily be manifest in a charge of grave
misconduct. In this case, complainant imputes grave misconduct on the respondent for the following acts:
8

1. For enforcing the writ despite the fact that complainant has yet to receive the copy of the order
denying his motion for reconsideration on the issuance of the writ of execution;
2. For allegedly leaking to the opposing counsel the issuance of the order denying the motion for
reconsideration;
3. For allegedly demanding P720,000 from Rafols for a P165,000.00 obligation; and
4. For allegedly being arrogant and disrespectful.
Complainant admits that there is no TRO enjoining the enforcement of the writ, nor allegation in his pleadings
that a motion to quash the writ of execution was ever filed. However, complainant asserts that respondent
committed grave misconduct when the latter implemented the writ prior to serving the complainant a copy of the
order denying the motion for reconsideration. According to complainant, said motion stayed the execution, and
the writ could not have been validly executed without first informing the parties concerned of the motions denial.
We rule against complainant on this point.
It must be borne in mind that the case at bar traces its roots to an unlawful detainer case wherein the MTCC
ruled against Rafols, complainants client. In ejectment cases, the rulings of the courts are immediately
executory and can only be stayed via compliance with Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. If judgment is rendered against the
defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the
defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and
executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment
appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount
of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial

Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the
use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of
the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be
transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which
the action is appealed.
Clearly then under said Sec. 19, Rule 70, a judgment on a forcible entry and detainer action is made
immediately executory to avoid further injustice to a lawful possessor. The defendant in such a case may have
such judgment stayed only by (a) perfecting an appeal; (b) filing a supersedeas bond; and (c) making a periodic
deposit of the rental or reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the property during the pendency
of the appeal. The failure of the defendant to comply with any of these conditions is a ground for the outright
execution of the judgment, the duty of the court in this respect being ministerial and imperative. Hence, if the
defendant-appellant has perfected the appeal but failed to file a supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of
the judgment would automatically follow. Conversely, the filing of a supersedeas bond will not stay the execution
of the judgment if the appeal is not perfected. Necessarily then, the supersedeas bond should be filed within the
period for the perfection of the appeal.
9

10

In the case at bar, complainant lost his clients case and appealed to the RTC. His client has also been
periodically depositing rental with the court for the use of the property pending appeal. However, as ruled by the
RTC, the bond filed did not meet the legal requirements because first and foremost, the bond posted was a
property bond, not cash nor surety. Furthermore, Rafols did not own the property he posted as bond and
besides, it was also not issued in favour of the plaintiff in the ejectment case. Because of the non-compliance
with the requirements under the above-quoted rule, the execution of the judgment was not effectively stayed.
The only exceptions to non-compliance are the existence of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence
which prevented the defendant from posting the supersedeas bond or making the monthly deposit, or the
occurrence of supervening events which brought about a material change in the situation of the parties and
which would make the execution inequitable. But whether or not these obtain in the case at bar is an issue best
left to the court that issued the writ of execution.
11

Given the above circumstances, there was no legal impediment preventing respondent sheriff from performing
his responsibility of enforcing the writ of execution. Since Rafols failed to comply with the requirements under the
Rules, Cua Beng who prevailed in the unlawful detainer case is entitled as a matter of right to the immediate
execution of the courts judgment both as to the restoration of possession and the payment of the accrued
rentals or compensation for the use and occupation of the premises.
12

Well-settled is that the sheriffs duty in the execution of a writ is purely ministerial; he is to execute the order of
the court strictly to the letter. He has no discretion whether to execute the judgment or not. When the writ is
placed in his hands, it is his duty, in the absence of any instructions to the contrary, to proceed with reasonable
celerity and promptness to implement it in accordance with its mandate. It is only by doing so could he ensure
that the order is executed without undue delay. This holds especially true herein where the nature of the case
requires immediate execution. Absent a TRO, an order of quashal, or compliance with Sec. 19, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court, respondent sheriff has no alternative but to enforce the writ.
13

Immediacy of the execution, however, does not mean instant execution. The sheriff must comply with the Rules
of Court in executing a writ. Any act deviating from the procedure laid down in the Rules of Court is a misconduct
and warrants disciplinary action. In this case, Sec. 10(c), Rule 39 of the Rules prescribes the procedure in the
implementation of the writ. It provides:
Section 10. Execution of judgments for specific act.
xxxx
(c) Delivery or restitution of real property. The officer shall demand of the person against whom the judgment
for the delivery or restitution of real property is rendered and all persons claiming rights under him to peaceably
vacate the property within three (3) working days, and restore possession thereof to the judgment obligee,

otherwise, the officer shall oust all such persons therefrom with the assistance, if necessary, of appropriate
peace officers, and employing such means as may be reasonably necessary to retake possession, and place
the judgment obligee in possession of such property. Any costs, damages, rents or profits awarded by the
judgment shall be satisfied in the same manner as a judgment for money.
Based on this provision, enforcement in ejectment cases requires the sheriff to give notice of such writ and to
demand from defendant to vacate the property within three days. Only after such period can the sheriff enforce
the writ by the bodily removal of the defendant in the ejectment case and his personal belongings. Even in
cases wherein decisions are immediately executory, the required three-day notice cannot be dispensed with. A
sheriff who enforces the writ without the required notice or before the expiry of the three-day period is running
afoul with the Rules.
14

15

In the present controversy, the Order denying the motion for reconsideration was allegedly served, according to
the respondent, on the same day the writ was executed on March 17, 2011. Complainant, however, avers that
his office was only able to receive the denial the day after the execution or on March 18, 2011. At first blush, one
might hastily conclude that the three-day notice rule was apparently not observed. This Court, however, is not
prepared to make such a finding. We are mindful of the possibility that a demand to vacate has already been
given when complainant and Rafols were first served the Order granting the issuance of a writ of execution,
before the motion for reconsideration was filed. More importantly, complainant failed to allege con-compliance
with Sec. 10(c) of Rule 39.
Thus far, no deviation from the Rules has been properly ascribed to respondent. As an officer of the court, he is
accorded the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties. The burden was on complainant to
adduce evidence that would prove the respondents culpability, if any. Without evidence of any departure from
well established rules, any unlawful behaviour, or any gross negligence on his part, the presumption remains
applicable and respondent cannot be held administratively liable for the offense of grave misconduct.
1wphi1

Based on the transcript of the altercation, it is readily apparent that respondent has indeed been remiss in this
duty of observing courtesy in serving the public. He should have exercised restraint in dealing with the
complainant instead of allowing the quarrel to escalate into a hostile encounter. The balm of a clean conscience
should have been sufficient to relieve any hurt or harm respondent felt from complainant's criticisms in the
performance of his duties. On the contrary, respondent's demeanour tarnished the image not only of his office
but that of the judiciary as a whole, exposing him to disciplinary measure.
Making Untruthful Statements
Lastly, the charge of making untruthful statements must also fail. While the statements mentioned in
respondent's complaint-affidavit were not reflected in the transcript submitted by the complainant, this actuality is
not conclusive evidence that such event did not take place. As claimed by respondent, complainant's clerk was
only able to record a part of the argument. We cannot then discount the probability that there is more to the
argument than what was caught on video and there remains the possibility that what respondent narrated and
what complainant recorded both actually transpired.
WHEREFORE, respondent Alfredo T. Pallanan is ADMONISHED and WARNED to be always courteous in
dealing with the public in the performance of official duties. A repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.

TEODORO S. TEODORO (Deceased), Substituted by his heirs/sons NELSON TEODORO and ROLANDO
TEODORO, Petitioners, vs DANILO ESPINO, ROSARIO SANTIAGO, JULIANA CASTILLO, PAULINA LITAO,
RAQUEL RODRIGUEZ, RUFINA DELA CRUZ, and LEONILA CRUZ, Respondents.
Facts:
The subject property is registered in the name of Genaro, long deceased ascendant of all the parties. This
property is vacant lot where the old ancestral house of Genaro stood until its demolition of Teodoro Teodoro.
Genaro had five children: Santiago; Maria, from whom respondents descended and trace their claim of
ownership and right of possession; Petra, Mariano, Teodoro Teodoros father; and Ana. Genaro and his children
are all deceased.
Respondents respective parents are first cousins of Teodoro Teodoro. All parties are collateral relatives of Petra
Teodoro: Teodoro Teodoro is her nephew while respondents are her grandnephews and grandnieces,
descendants of Petras sister, Maria Teodoro.
Of all Genaros children, only Petra occupied the subject property, living at the ancestral house. Genaros other
children were bequeathed, and stayed at, a different property, still from the estate of their father.
After Petras death, her purported holographic will, was probated before RTC which Decision on the wills
extrinsic validity has become final and executory. In the will, Petra, asserting ownership, devised the subject
property to Teodoro Teodoro.
4

Teodoro Teodoro effected the demolition of the ancestral house, intending to use the subject property for other
purposes.Respondents, whose lots surround the subject property on which the ancestral house previously
stood, erected a fence on the surrounding portion, barricaded its frontage, and put up a sign thereat, effectively
dispossessing Teodoro Teodoro of the property bequeathed to him by Petra.
After Teodoro Teodoros demand for respondents to vacate the subject property went unheeded, he filed the
complaint for forcible entry against respondents
In their Answer, respondents asserted their own ownership and possession of the subject property.
13. While it is true that the dilapidated ancestral house in the subject property was demolished; however, the
said act, as suggested by [Teodoro Teodoro] was allowed by [respondents] (who had their respective houses
built in the same lot where the same is constructed) in order to have the same be partitioned among themselves.
As [Teodoro Teodoro] was constantly complaining that the property left to him and his siblings is less than the
subject property given to the [respondents] in area, they agreed verbally that if the ancestral house will be
demolished, a surveyor would be at ease in surveying the same and determine if indeed the area is more than
that allotted to [Teodoro Teodoro], which in that case, as per agreement, the excess, if any will suffice the lack in
area of [Teodoro Teodoro]. It was however found out that the area of the subject property was less than the area
that should be allocated and apportioned as shares of [respondents], hence they [intimated] the same to
[Teodoro Teodoro], who got mad and threaten[ed] to get the subject property from them.
15. There is no truth, as what [Teodoro Teodoro] claimed in his complaint that he was ousted and prevented from
entering the subject property by [respondents], because in the first place he could not be ousted thereat, as he is
not in possession of the said property. (Emphasis theirs).
6

After trial, the MTC dismissed the complaint, ruling on the issue of ownership and ultimately resolving the issue
of who between Teodoro Teodoro and respondents had a better right to possess the subject property:
x x x [Teodoro Teodoros] claim of ownership over the subject lot stemmed from the approved and duly probated
Holographic Will of Petra Teodoro. Although it its undisputed that Petra Teodoro was in actual possession of the
subject lot prior to her demise and that she left a Holographic Will wherein the subject lot was bequeathed to

[Teodoro Teodoro], the probate of her last will has not finally settled the question of ownership over the subject
lot. Clearly, the subject lot still forms part of the estate of the late Genaro Teodoro. In the absence of an actual
and approved partition plan among his heirs, the subject lot remains part of the Genaro Teodoros estate. Since
his children Santiago, Maria, Petra, Maraino and Ana are all deceased, their children or grandchildren by right of
representation have the right to inherit from their ancestor.
A person who claims that he has a better right to real property must prove his ownership of the same x x x.
Clearly, [Teodoro Teodoro] has failed to prove his ownership over the property or that of his devisee Petra
Teodoro. Thus, the court is convinced that the possession of [respondents] over the subject lot should not be
disturbed, until and unless the question of ownership over the same shall have been finally resolved before the
appropriate court.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint and the counterclaim interposed in
relation thereto, without pronouncement as to costs.
7

The RTC, in its appellate jurisdiction over forcible entry cases, acting on Teodoro Teodoros appeal, adopted the
factual findings of the MTC, but reversed the ruling, ruled in favor of Teodoro Teodoro and ordered the ejectment
of respondents from the subject property. It pithily ruled, thus:
But the bottom line for resolution in this case is who has the prior physical possession of the subject parcel.The
late Petra Teodoros share to the inheritance of his father Genaro is admittedly the old ancestral house and the
lot over which it stands.
[Teodoro Teodoro] claims right to possession only over said portion (now the vacant space x x x not the entire lot
2476 until he was displaced therefrom by the [respondents] through force). He has acknowledged in clear terms
that the rest of the area is occupied by [respondents]. The assailed decision recognized that Petra Teodoro was
in actual possession of the lot prior to her death. It is [Teodoro Teodoros] argument that Petra Teodoro, tacked
[from by Teodoro Teodoro], has had prior physical possession of the controverted portion of lot 2476. He went on
arguing that regardless of whether or not the duly probated will completely settled the issue of partition of the
remaining estate of Genaro Teodoro, he has the prior actual and physical possession of the vacant space
where the old ancestral house formerly stands, passed on to him by the late Petra Teodoro, a fact
[respondents] deny. [Respondents] even belied that they have ousted and restrained [Teodoro Teodoro]
from entering the subject property.
Said pretension is however negated by evidence showing the barricaded vacant space or disputed area
consisting of 120 square meters, more or less, where the cemented portion of the flooring of the bakery near the
national road lease by [respondents] is still existing x x x and over which he exercised control and constructive
possession. x x x.
xxxx
[Teodoro Teodoro] anchors on the other hand his claim on the Holographic Will of Petra Teodoro duly probated
and approved bequeathing the disputed portion of Lot 2476 and the old ancestral house thereon to him, the
letters of administration issued to him plus his possession of the vacant area or disputed portion of [L]ot 2476.
[Respondents] has stressed that he is not contesting the rest of [L]ot 2476 occupied by the houses of
[respondents].
Analyzing the facts of the case, the lower [court] concluded that the subject parcel is a part of the estate of the
late Genaro Teodoro and in the absence of an approved partition among the heirs, remains a community
property over which the legal heirs of Genaro Teodoro have the right to inherit. All therefore are entitled to
exercise the right of dominion including the right of possession.

This Court disagrees with the said ruling applying the plethora of cases decisive of the issue and consistent with
the established jurisprudence that the lower court cannot dispose with finality the issue of ownership-such issue
being inutile in an ejectment suit except to throw light on the question of possession.
Given the foregoing, [Teodoro Teodoro] has established a valid claim to institute the eviction suit against
[respondents] over the disputed area or vacant portion of Lot 2476 and for him to be restored therein.
Respondents then appealed the RTCs decision to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the RTC,
likewise dismissed the complaint as the MTC had done, but did not reach the same result as that of the inferior
court. It specifically ruled that Teodoro Teodoro:
(1) never had physical possession of the subject property, not having lived there at anytime, whether
while Petra was alive nor after her death;
(4) cannot tack his alleged possession of the subject property to that of Petra Teodoro simply by virtue of
the latters holographic will, leading to the issue of ownership which is insignificant in forcible entry
cases.
Appellate court found that Teodoro Teodoro (substituted by his heirs Nelson and Rolando Teodoro at that
juncture) "failed to discharge the burden of proof that he had prior actual physical possession of the subject
[property] before it was barricaded by [respondents] to warrant the institution of the forcible entry suit." The
appellate court disposed of the case, thus:
Hence, this appeal by certiorari filed by the heirs of Teodoro Teodoro raising the following errors in the appellate
courts dismissal of the complaint:
Issue: Whether or not the act of respondents in barricading the frontage of the portion of Lot No. 2476 on which
stood the ancestral house occupied by Petra amounted to Teodoro Teodoros unlawful dispossession thereof
through the forcible entry of respondents.
The ground rules in forcible entry cases:

11

(1) One employs force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth to deprive another of physical possession
of real property.
(2) Plaintiff (Teodoro Teodoro) must allege and prove prior physical possession of the property in
litigation until deprived thereof by the defendant (herein respondents). This requirement implies that the
possession of the disputed land by the latter was unlawful from the beginning.
(3) The sole question for resolution hinges on the physical or material possession (possession de facto)
of the property. Neither a claim of juridical possession (possession de jure) nor an averment of
ownership by the defendant can, at the outset, preclude the court from taking cognizance of the case.
(4) Ejectment cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership, and the plaintiff needs merely to
prove prior possession de facto and undue deprivation thereof. In this case, both parties assert prior and
exclusive physical possession in the concept of owner acquired through succession from the same
decedent, their aunt and grand aunt, respectively, Petra. In turn, Petra inherited the property from her
father Genaro, in whose name the subject property is still registered.
12

13

Teodoro Teodoros assertion of physical possession comprises mainly of his claimed ownership of the subject
property acquired through testate succession, or via the holographic will of Petra. Teodoro Teodoro then points,
as an exercise of his ownership and incident of his physical possession of the subject property, to his act of
demolition of the ancestral house.
14

Respondents assert possession likewise by virtue of ownership manifested in their residence at Lot No. 2476
spanning more than five (5) decades, reckoned even from the time Maria, respondents grandmother and sister
of Petra, was alive and resided thereat.
15

Respondents trace their possession from the extrajudicial partition of the commingled properties of the siblings
Maria, respondents direct ascendant, Petra and Mariano, father of Teodoro Teodoro, progeny and heirs of
Genaro. According to respondents, from the partition, the heirs of all three Genaro children possessed and
occupied their respective shares: respondents received Lot No. 2476 which encompasses herein subject
property, while Teodoro Teodoro and his siblings received a different property, "a 667 residential lot at Bambang,
Bulacan, Bulacan."
16

Also, respondents aver that they paid for Lot No. 2476s realty taxes. Respondents counter that the subject
property was not solely bequeathed to Teodoro Teodoro as it is part of Petras estate for disposition to her
legitimate heirs, including herein respondents.
Given both parties respective claims of ownership over the subject property via succession from their
ascendants Maria, Petra and Mariano Teodoro, who are all compulsory heirs of Genaro in whose name the
subject property is still registered, the MTC ruled that respondents cannot be disturbed in their possession of the
subject property "until and unless the question of ownership over the same [is] finally resolved before the
appropriate court."
In contrast, the RTC, without categorically resolving the issue of ownership of Lot No. 2476, ruled that on the
portion of Lot No. 2476 where the ancestral house used to stand, Teodoro did establish his prior physical
possession over the subject property resulting in his right to institute the ejectment suit against respondents.
Significantly, the RTC confirmed respondents physical possession of, and residency at, Lot No. 2476.
There would yet be another turn of events. The appellate court, albeit refusing to touch and rule on the issue of
ownership, declared that there lacked conclusive evidence of Teodoro Teodoros prior actual physical possession
over the subject property. Thus, the appellate court dismissed Teodoro Teodoros complaint for lack of merit.
We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and restore the decision of the RTC.
We affirm the finding of fact by the RTC which is decisive of the issue that has remained unresolved inspite of a
summary procedure and two appellate reviews of the forcible entry case filed by Teodoro Teodoro. The RTC
said:
Analyzing the facts of the case, the lower [court] concluded that the subject parcel is a part of the estate of the
late Genaro Teodoro and in the absence of an approved partition among the heirs, remains a community
property over which the legal heirs of Genaro Teodoro have the right to inherit. All therefore are entitled to
exercise the right of dominion including the right of possession. (Emphasis supplied).
17

The RTCs comment that it "disagrees with the said ruling" only meant that "the lower court cannot dispose with
finality the issue of ownership" since such ownership issue is "inutile in an ejectment suit except to throw light on
the question of possession." And so the RTC ruled that Teodoro Teodoro should be restored in the lawful
possession of the disputed area of Lot No. 2476 in light of the finding of the MTC that the subject lot still forms
part of the estate of the late Genaro Teodoro. It is from this same fact that the MTC reached the contrary
conclusion that Teodoro Teodoros complaint should be dismissed because he has "failed to prove his
ownership."
18

19

In the sense that Teodoro Teodoro has not proven exclusive ownership, the MTC was right. But exclusive
ownership of Lot No. 2476 or a portion thereof is not in this case required of Teodoro Teodoro for him to be
entitled to possession. Co-ownership, the finding of both the MTC at first instance and by the RTC on appeal, is
sufficient. The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state:
1wphi1

Art. 484. There is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different
persons.
Art. 1078. When there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in
common by such heirs, subject to the payment of debts of the deceased.
Certainly, and as found by the trial courts, the whole of Lot No. 2476 including the portion now litigated is, owing
to the fact that it has remained registered in the name of Genaro who is the common ancestor of both parties
herein, co-owned property. All, or both Teodoro Teodoro and respondents are entitled to exercise the right of
possession as co-owners.
Neither party can exclude the other from possession. Although the property remains unpartitioned, the
respondents in fact possess specific areas. Teodoro Teodoro can likewise point to a specific area, which is that
which was possessed by Petra. Teodoro Teodoro cannot be dispossessed of such area, not only by virtue of
Petra's bequeathal in his favor but also because of his own right of possession that comes from his coownership of the property. As the RTC concluded, petitioners, as heirs substituting Teodoro
Teodoro in this suit, should be restored in the lawful possession of the disputed area.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 99805 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 634-M-06 is
REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

LOURDES B. FERRER and PROSPERIDAD M. ARANDEZ, Complainants, vs. JUDGE ROMEO A. RABACA,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 25, Manila, Respondent.
This administrative case charges Hon. Romeo A. Rabaca, then the Presiding Judge of Branch 25 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC), with ignorance of the law, disregard of the law, dereliction of duty,
knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order, and violation of the Code of Conduct for Government Officials.
The complainants were the President and the Executive Director of the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 176394-CV of
the MeTC, an ejectment suit entitled Young Womens Christian Association, Inc. v. Conrado Cano. After trial,
respondent Judge, disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, ju
against the defendant ordering the latter as follows:

dgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and

(a) to vacate the premises located at Ground Floor, YMCA, 1144 Gen. Luna St., Ermita, Manila; and
surrender possession thereof to plaintiff;
(b) to pay plaintiff the sum of Php45,211.80 representing his arrears in rentals from February 2003 to
July 2003 at Php7,535.30 a month plus the further sum of Php7,535.30 a month as reasonable value for
the continued use and occupation of the premises starting August 2003 until the same is finally vacated
and possession thereof is turn-over to plaintiff;
(c) to pay the plaintiff the sum of Php20,000 as attorneys fees; and
(d) to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
The plaintiffs counsel filed a motion for immediate execution, praying that a writ of execution be issued "for the
immediate execution of the aforesaid Judgment." The plaintiff cited Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court as
basis for its motion.2
Respondent Judge denied the motion for immediate execution, 3 stating:
A Notice of Appeal having been seasonably filed by counsel for the defendant, let the records of the abovecaptioned case be, as it is hereby ordered, elevated to the Regional Trial Court of Manila for appropriate
proceedings and disposition.
According to the complainants, their counsel talked with respondent Judge about the matter. Allegedly,
respondent Judge told their counsel that "if you think the court is wrong, file a motion for reconsideration." With
that, the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, which respondent Judge nonetheless denied:
Considering that the Court has already given due course to the appeal of the defendant which was perfected
within the reglementary period, no more action will be taken on the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 19,
2004 filed by the plaintiff thru counsel.
The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to immediately forward the records of this case to the Regional
Trial Court, Manila.
The complainants averred that respondent Judges denial of their motions had rendered their victory inutile, and
had unfairly deprived the plaintiff of the possession of the premises. They further averred that respondent
Judges refusal to perform an act mandated by the Rules of Court had given undue advantage to the defendant
to the plaintiffs damage and prejudice.
The Court required respondent Judge to comment on the administrative complaint against him.

Respondent Judge denied the charges. He explained that he had honestly thought that his court had lost
jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the provision of Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court (which provides
that "in appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals
filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties") once he had given due course to
the defendants notice of appeal. He claimed that he had issued the orders in good faith and with no malice after
a fair and impartial evaluation of the facts, applicable rules, and jurisprudence; and that if he had thereby
committed lapses in the issuance of the orders, his doing so should be considered as error of judgment on his
part.
In their reply, complainants contended that respondent Judge exhibited his ignorance of the law and procedure
in relying on Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court which referred to appeals from the Regional Trial Court;
that Rule 40, which contained provisions on appeal from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts,
and which provided in its Section 4 that the perfection of the appeal and the effect of such perfection should be
governed by the provisions of Section 9 of Rule 41, concerned appeals by notice of appeal in general; and that
instead, the applicable rule should be Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
The complainants pointed out that respondent Judge apparently did not know that appeal in forcible entry and
detainer cases was not perfected by the mere filing of a notice of appeal (as in ordinary actions) but by filing of a
notice of appeal and a sufficient supersedeas bond approved by the trial judge executed to the plaintiff to pay
the rents, damages and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from. They asserted that
respondent Judges invocation of good faith and error of judgment did not absolve him of liability, because he
had grossly neglected his duties mandated by law by failing and refusing to act on their motion for immediate
execution and motion for reconsideration and by giving due course to the appeal despite no supersedeas bond
having been filed and approved by the trial court.
In his memorandum,7 then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., now Associate Justice of the Court,
recommended that the administrative complaint against respondent Judge be re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter; and that respondent Judge be fined in the amount of P5,000.00 with warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely, based on an evaluation of the charges,
as follows:
EVALUATION: We agree with the complainants that respondent erred when he did not act on complainants
motion for immediate execution.
Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure provides:
"SEC. 19. If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless
an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a supersedeas bond, approved by the
Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to
the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the
appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the
judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. XXXX XXXX XXXX."
It is clear from the foregoing that the perfection of an appeal by itself is not sufficient to stay the execution of the
judgment in an ejectment case. The losing party should likewise file a supersedeas bond executed in favor of the
plaintiff to answer for rents, damages and costs, and, if the judgment of the court requires it, he should likewise
deposit the amount of the rent before the appellate court from the time during the pendency of the appeal.
Otherwise, execution becomes ministerial and imperative. (Philippine Holding Corporation vs. Valenzuela, 104
SCRA 401 as cited in Hualam Construction and Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 612,
626).
In the case at bar, defendant seasonably filed his Notice of Appeal; he however failed to file any supersedeas
bond. Prior to the filing of such notice of appeal, complainants have already filed their Motion for Execution.
Instead of acting on the Motion for Execution, respondent Judge Rabaca gave due course to the appeal in an
Order dated 14 July 2004 and directed his Branch Clerk of Court to elevate the records of the case to the

Regional Trial Court (RTC). The Branch Clerk of Court however failed to forward the records to the RTC. This
fact is clear from Judge Rabacas Order dated 28 July 2004 wherein he directed the Branch Clerk of Court to
forward the records of the case to the Manila Regional Trial Court immediately.
From the foregoing, it is clear that when the complainant moved for the immediate execution of Judge Rabacas
decision, the latter still had jurisdiction over the case. He therefore clearly erred when he refused to act on the
Motion for Execution. The relevant question that we should resolve however is whether such error is an error of
judgment or an error amounting to incompetence that calls for administrative discipline.
Judge Rabaca claims that he refused to act on the complainants Motion for execution because he honestly
thought that when he gave due course to the defendants appeal which was seasonably filed, and ordered the
elevation of the records to the appellate court, his court already lost jurisdiction over the case.. In making his
ruling, respondent asserts he relied on the provisions of Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. This provision
reads as follows:
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed
in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
He likewise allegedly relied on the ruling of the Court in Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 03-1513-MTJ:
Susana Joaquin Vda. De Agregado vs. Judge Thelma Bunyi-Medina, MeTJ wherein the Court said thatRespondent Judge is correct in saying that she had lost jurisdiction to entertain the motion for execution after the
perfection of the appeal and after she issued an order to transmit the records of the case to the appellate court
for review.
The facts of the case against Judge Bunyi-Medina are however different from those prevailing in the instant
case. In the Medina case, the fifteen (15) day period within which to perfect the appeal had already lapsed
before the complainant therein moved for the execution of the execution judgment. Clearly therefore, appeal had
already been perfected. In the instant case, although the defendant had filed his appeal, the period to appeal
had not yet lapsed since the plaintiff still had his own period to appeal from the judgment and such period had
not yet lapsed. The provision relied upon by judge Rabaca, more specifically, Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court, clearly states that, "In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon
perfection of the appeals filed on due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties."
Moreover and more importantly, the herein complainants filed their Motion for Execution even before the
defendant had filed his Notice of Appeal. Such motion was therefore still well within the jurisdiction of the lower
court.
It is basic rule in ejectment cases that the execution of judgment in favor of the plaintiff is a matter of right and
mandatory. This has been the consistent ruling of the Court in a number of cases involving the same issue
posed before the respondent judge. Respondent Judge is expected to know this and his justification of
erroneous application of the law, although mitigating, could not exculpate him from liability.
We agree with and adopt the evaluation of the Court Administrator.
Indeed, respondent Judge should have granted the plaintiffs motion for immediate execution considering that
the defendant did not file the sufficient supersedeas bond despite having appealed. Granting the plaintiffs
motion for immediate execution became his ministerial duty upon the defendants failure to file the sufficient
supersedeas bond. Section 19, Rule 70, of the Rules of Court clearly imposes such duty, viz:
Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. If judgment is rendered against the
defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the
defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and
executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment
appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount
of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial

Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the
use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of
the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be
transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which
the action is appealed.
xxx
Respondent Judges excuse, that he had lost jurisdiction over the case by virtue of the defendants appeal, was
unacceptable in light of the clear and explicit text of the aforequoted rule. To begin with, the perfection of the
appeal by the defendant did not forbid the favorable action on the plaintiffs motion for immediate execution. The
execution of the decision could not be stayed by the mere taking of the appeal. Only the filing of the sufficient
supersedeas bond and the deposit with the appellate court of the amount of rent due from time to time, coupled
with the perfection of the appeal, could stay the execution. Secondly, he could not also credibly justify his
omission to act according to the provision by claiming good faith or honest belief, or by asserting lack of malice
or bad faith. A rule as clear and explicit as Section 19 could not be misread or misapplied, but should be
implemented without evasion or hesitation. To us, good faith, or honest belief, or lack of malice, or lack of bad
faith justifies a non-compliance only when there is an as-yet unsettled doubt on the meaning or applicability of a
rule or legal provision. It was not so herein. And, thirdly, given that his court, being vested with original exclusive
jurisdiction over cases similar to Civil Case No. 176394-CV, had been assigned many such cases, he was not a
trial judge bereft of the pertinent prior experience to act on the issue of immediate execution, a fact that further
exposed the abject inanity of his excuses.
1avvphil

We agree with the complainants insistence, therefore, that respondent Judges omission to apply Section 19
was inexcusable. He had ignored the urging to follow the clear and explicit provision of the rule made in the
plaintiffs motion for immediate execution. Had he any genuine doubt about his authority to grant the motion for
immediate execution, as he would have us believe, he could have easily and correctly resolved the doubt by a
resort to the Rules of Court, which he well knew was the repository of the guidelines he was seeking for his
judicial action. Neither was it relevant that he did not know any of the parties, or that he did not corruptly favor
the defendant by his omission. His mere failure to perform a duty enjoined by the Rules of Court sufficed to
render him administratively accountable.
This case is an opportune occasion to remind judges of the first level courts to adhere always to the mandate
under Section 19, Rule 70, of the Rules of Court to issue writs of execution upon motion of the plaintiffs in
actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer when the defendant has appealed but has not filed a sufficient
supersedeas bond. The summary nature of the special civil action under Rule 70 and the purpose underlying the
mandate for an immediate execution, which is to prevent the plaintiffs from being further deprived of their rightful
possession, should always be borne in mind.
The recommended penalty of P5,000.00 with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt
with more severely is also correct. The Court Administrator rationalized the recommendation of the penalty
thuswise:
Under A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, Gross Ignorance of the Law or Procedure is classified as serious offense for which
the imposable penalty ranges from a fine to dismissal. However, we find respondents acts not ingrained with
malice or bad faith. It is a matter of public policy that in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corrupt motive, the
acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous.
In Domingo vs. Judge Pagayatan, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1751, 10 June 2003, the penalty of fine in the amount of five
thousand pesos was deemed sufficient where it was held that respondents lack of malice or bad faith frees him
from administrative liability but not for gross ignorance of the law.
We concur with the rationalization of the Court Administrator. Verily, even if respondent Judges omission would
have easily amounted to gross

ignorance of the law and procedure, a serious offense under Section 8, 8 Rule 140, of the Rules of Court, as
amended, the fact that the complainants did not establish that malice or bad faith impelled his omission to act, or
that fraud, dishonesty, or a corrupt motive attended his omission to act demands a downgrading of the liability. In
the absence of any showing that he had been held guilty of any other administrative offense, 9 and without our
attention being called to other circumstances that might demonstrate respondent Judges dark motives for his
inaction, we should find and consider the recommended penalty of P5,000.00 with warning that a repetition of
the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely to be commensurate to the offense. 10
WHEREFORE, we find respondent JUDGE ROMEO A. RABACA, Presiding Judge of Branch 25, Metropolitan
Trial Court, in Manila guilty of ignorance of the law and procedure, and, accordingly, impose upon him a fine of
P5,000.00 with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 170916

April 27, 2007

CGR CORPORATION herein represented by its President ALBERTO RAMOS, III, HERMAN M.
BENEDICTO and ALBERTO R. BENEDICTO, Petitioners, vs. ERNESTO L. TREYES, JR., Respondent
Facts:
CGR Corporation, Herman M. Benedicto and Alberto R. Benedicto (petitioners) claimed to have occupied
37.3033 hectares of public land in Sagay City, Negros Occidental even before the notarized separate Fishpond
Lease Agreement Nos. 5674,3 56944 and 56955 in their respective favor were approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture for a period of twenty-five (25) years or until December 31, 2024.
Ernesto L. Treyes, Jr. (respondent) allegedly forcibly and unlawfully entered the leased properties and once
inside barricaded the entrance to the fishponds, set up a barbed wire fence along the road going to petitioners
fishponds, and harvested several tons of milkfish, fry and fingerlings owned by petitioners.
Petitioners promptly filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Sagay City separate complaints for Forcible
Entry With Temporary Restraining Order And/Or Preliminary Injunction And Damages against Ernesto M. Treyes,
Sr. and respondent.
In a separate move, petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for damages against respondent.
xxxx
V
That prior to the issuance of the fishpond lease agreement in favor of the plaintiffs, they had already
been in open and continuous possession of the same parcel of land;
VI
As lessee and in possession of the above[-]described fishpond, plaintiffs have continuously occupied,
cultivated and developed the said fishpond and since then, had been regularly harvesting milkfish,
shrimps, mud crabs and other produce of the fishponds;
1a\^/phi1.net

VII
That the yearly income of the fishpond of the plaintiff corporation is at least P300,000.00 more or less,
while the yearly income of the fishpond of plaintiff Herman Benedicto, Sr. is at least P100,000.00 more or
less, and the yearly income of the fishpond of plaintiff Alberto Benedicto is at least P100,000.00 more or
less;
VIII
That sometime last November 18, 2000 or thereabout, defendant Ernesto L. Treyes, Jr. and his armed
men and with the help of the blue guards from the Negros Veterans Security Agency forcibly and
unlawfully entered the fishponds of the plaintiffs and once inside barricaded the entrance of the fishpond
and set up barb wire fence along the road going to plaintiffs fishpond and harvested the milkfish and
carted away several tons of milkfish owned by the plaintiffs;
IX
That on succeeding days, defendants men continued their forage on the fishponds of the plaintiffs by
carting and taking away the remaining full grown milkfish, fry and fingerlings and other marine products
in the fishponds. NOT ONLY THAT, even the chapel built by plaintiff CGR Corporation was ransacked

and destroyed and the materials taken away by defendants men. Religious icons were also stolen and
as an extreme act of sacrilege, even decapitated the heads of some of these icons;
xxxx
XIII
That the unlawful, forcible and illegal intrusion/destruction of defendant Ernesto Treyes, Jr. and his men
on the fishpond leased and possessed by the plaintiffs is without any authority of law and in violation of
Article 539 of the New Civil Code which states:
"Art. 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should he be disturbed therein he
shall be protected in or restored to said possession by the means established by the laws and rules of the
Court."9 (Underscoring supplied) and praying for the following reliefs:
1) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff CGR Corporation the sum of at least P900,000.00 and to
plaintiffs Herman and Alberto Benedicto, the sum of at least P300,000.00 each by way of actual
damages and such other amounts as proved during the trial;
2) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P100,000.00 each as moral damages;
3) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P100,000.00 each as exemplary damages;
4) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P200,000.00 as attorneys fees, and to
reimburse plaintiffs with all such sums paid to their counsel by way of appearance fees. 10 (Underscoring
supplied)
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss11 petitioners complaint for damages on three grounds litis pendentia, res
judicata and forum shopping.
RTC dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground of prematurity, it holding that a complaint for damages may
only be maintained "after a final determination on the forcible entry cases has been made."
Hence, the present petition for review.
Issue: Whether, during the pendency of their separate complaints for forcible entry, petitioners can
independently institute and maintain an action for damages which they claim arose from incidents
occurring after the dispossession by respondent of the premises.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Section 17, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 17. Judgment. If after trial the court finds that the allegations of the complaint are true, it shall render
judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, attorneys fees and costs. If it finds that
said allegations are not true, it shall render judgment for the defendant to recover his costs. If a counterclaim is
established, the court shall render judgment for the sum found in arrears from either party and award costs as
justice requires. (Emphasis supplied)
The recoverable damages in forcible entry and detainer cases thus refer to "rents" or "the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises" or "fair rental value of the property" and attorneys
fees and costs.13

Dumo v. Espinas14 reiterates the long-established rule that the only form of damages that may be recovered in
an action for forcible entry is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of
the property:
Lastly, we agree with the CA and the RTC that there is no basis for the MTC to award actual, moral, and
exemplary damages in view of the settled rule that in ejectment cases, the only damage that can be recovered is
the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property. Considering that
the only issue raised in ejectment is that of rightful possession, damages which could be recovered are those
which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and
occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may have suffered but which have no direct relation
to his loss of material possession. x x x15 (Emphasis, underscoring and italics supplied; citations omitted)
Other damages must thus be claimed in an ordinary action.16
In asserting the negative of the issue, respondent cites the 1999 case of Progressive Development Corporation,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals.17 In this case, Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. (Progressive), as lessor,
repossessed the leased premises from the lessee allegedly pursuant to their contract of lease whereby it was
authorized to do so if the lessee failed to pay monthly rentals. The lessee filed a case for forcible entry with
damages against Progressive before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City. During the pendency
of the case, the lessee filed an action for damages before the RTC, drawing Progressive to file a motion to
dismiss based on litis pendentia. The RTC denied the motion.
On appeal by Progressive, the Court of Appeals sustained the RTC order denying the motion to dismiss.
Progressive brought the case to this Court. Citing Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, this Court reversed
the lower courts ruling, it holding that "all cases for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be filed before the
Municipal Trial Court which shall include not only the plea for restoration of possession but also all claims for
damages and costs therefrom." In other words, this Court held that "no claim for damages arising out of forcible
entry or unlawful detainer may be filed separately and independently of the claim for restoration of possession."18
(Underscoring supplied)
In thus ruling, this Court in Progressive made a comparative study of the therein two complaints, thus:
A comparative study of the two (2) complaints filed by private respondent against petitioner before the two (2)
trial courts shows that not only are the elements of res adjudicata present, at least insofar as the claim for actual
and compensatory damages is concerned, but also that the claim for damagesmoral and exemplary in addition
to actual and compensatoryconstitutes splitting a single cause of action. Since this runs counter to the rule
against multiplicity of suits, the dismissal of the second action becomes imperative.
The complaint for forcible entry contains the following pertinent allegations
2.01 On 02 January 1989, plaintiff entered into a contract of lease with defendant PDC over a property
designated as Ground Floor, Seafood Market (hereinafter "Subject Premises") situated at the corner of EDSA
corner MacArthur Street, Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon City, for a period of ten (10) years from 02 January
1989 to 30 April 1998.
2.02 Immediately after having acquired actual physical possession of the Subject Premises, plaintiff established
and now operates thereon the now famous Seafood Market Restaurant. Since then, plaintiff had been in actual,
continuous, and peaceful physical possession of the Subject Premises until 31 October 1992.
xxxx
3.02 Plaintiff, being the lessee of the Subject Premises, is entitled to the peaceful occupation and enjoyment of
the Subject Premises to the exclusion of all others, including defendants herein.

3.03 Defendants resort to strong arms tactics to forcibly wrest possession of the Subject Premises from plaintiff
and maintain possession thereof through the use of force, threat, strategy and intimidation by the use of superior
number of men and arms amounts to the taking of the law into their own hands.
3.04 Thus, defendants act of unlawfully evicting out plaintiff from the Subject Premises it is leasing from
defendant PDC and depriving it of possession thereof through the use of force, threat, strategy and intimidation
should be condemned and declared illegal for being contrary to public order and policy.
3.05 Consequently, defendants should be enjoined from continuing with their illegal acts and be ordered to
vacate the Subject Premises and restore possession thereof, together with its contents to plaintiff.
xxxx
4.07 Considering that defendants act of forcibly grabbing possession of the Subject Premises from plaintiff is
illegal and null and void, defendant should be adjudged liable to plaintiff for all the aforedescribed damages
which plaintiff incurred as a result thereof.
The amended complaint for damages filed by private respondent alleges basically the same factual
circumstances and issues as bases for the relief prayed for, to wit:
4. On May 28, 1991, plaintiff and defendant PDC entered into a Contract of Lease for a period of ten years or
from January 2, 1989 up to April 30, 1998 over a property designated as Ground Floor, Seafood Market
(hereinafter referred to as Subject Premises) situated at the corner of EDSA corner McArthur Street, Araneta
Center, Cubao, Quezon City. A copy of the lease contract is attached hereto as Annex "A."
5. Immediately thereafter, plaintiff took over actual physical possession of Subject Premises, and established
thereon the now famous "Seafood Market Restaurant."
xxxx
7. On October 31, 1992 at around 8:30 p.m., defendant PDC, without the benefit of any writ of possession or any
lawful court order and with the aid of approximately forty (40) armed security guards and policemen under the
supervision of defendant Tejam, forcibly entered the subject premises through force, intimidation, threats and
stealth and relying on brute force and in a thunderboltish manner and against plaintiffs will, unceremoniously
drew away all of plaintiffs men out of the subject premises, thereby depriving herein plaintiff of its actual, physical
and natural possession of the subject premises. The illegal high-handed manner of gestapo like take-over by
defendants of subject premises is more particularly described as follows: x x x x
8. To date, defendants continue to illegally possess and hold the Subject Premises, including all the multi-million
improvements, fixtures and equipment therein owned by plaintiff, all to the damage and prejudice of plaintiff. The
actuations of defendants constitute an unlawful appropriation, seizure and taking of property against the will and
consent of plaintiff. Worse, defendants are threatening to sell at public auction and without the consent, of
plaintiff and without lawful authority, the multi-million fixtures and equipment of plaintiff and at prices way below
the market value thereof. Plaintiff hereby attaches as Annex "B" the letter from defendants dated August 6, 1993
addressed to plaintiff, informing the latter that the former intends to sell at an auction on August 19, 1993 at 2:00
p.m. properties of the plaintiff presently in defendants possession.
xxxx
12. Defendants unlawful takeover of the premises constitutes a violation of its obligation under Art. 1654 of the
New Civil Code requiring the lessor to maintain the lessee in peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for
the entire duration of the contract. Hence, plaintiff has filed the present suit for the recovery of damages under
Art. 1659 of the New Civil Code x x x x19 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
Analyzing the two complaints, this Court, still in Progressive, observed:

Restated in its bare essentials, the forcible entry case has one cause of action, namely, the alleged unlawful
entry by petitioner into the leased premises out of which three (3) reliefs (denominated by private respondent as
its causes of action) arose: (a) the restoration by the lessor (petitioner herein) of the possession of the leased
premises to the lessee, (b) the claim for actual damages due to the losses suffered by private respondent such
as the deterioration of perishable foodstuffs stored inside the premises and the deprivation of the use of the
premises causing loss of expected profits; and, (c) the claim for attorneys fees and costs of suit.
On the other hand, the complaint for damages prays for a monetary award consisting of (a) moral damages of
P500,000.00 and exemplary damages of another P500,000.00; (b) actual damages of P20,000.00 and
compensatory damages of P1,000,000.00 representing unrealized profits; and, (c) P200,000.00 for attorneys
fees and costs, all based on the alleged forcible takeover of the leased premises by petitioner. Since actual and
compensatory damages were already prayed for in the forcible entry case before the MeTC, it is obvious that
this cannot be relitigated in the damage suit before the RTC by reason of res adjudicata.
The other claims for moral and exemplary damages cannot also succeed considering that these sprung from the
main incident being heard before the MeTC. x x x20 (Italics in the original; Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It bears noting, however, that as reflected in the earlier-quoted allegations in the complaint for damages of herein
petitioners, their claim for damages have no direct relation to their loss of possession of the premises. It had to
do with respondents alleged harvesting and carting away several tons of milkfish and other marine products in
their fishponds, ransacking and destroying of a chapel built by petitioner CGR Corporation, and stealing religious
icons and even decapitating the heads of some of them, after the act of dispossession had occurred.
Surely, one of the elements of litis pendentia - that the identity between the pending actions, with respect to the
parties, rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, is such that any judgment rendered on one action will, regardless
of which is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration - is not present, hence, it may not
be invoked to dismiss petitioners complaint for damages. 21
Res judicata may not apply because the court in a forcible entry case has no jurisdiction over claims for
damages other than the use and occupation of the premises and attorneys fees.22
Neither may forum-shopping justify a dismissal of the complaint for damages, the elements of litis pendentia not
being present, or where a final judgment in the forcible entry case will not amount to res judicata in the former.23
Petitioners filing of an independent action for damages other than those sustained as a result of their
dispossession or those caused by the loss of their use and occupation of their properties could not thus be
considered as splitting of a cause of action.
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated August 26, 2005 and January 2, 2006 issued by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 43, Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 04-12284 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Bacolod City, is directed to REINSTATE Civil Case No. 04-12284 to its
docket and to conduct proceedings thereon with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 189239

November 24, 2010

SPOUSES LETICIA & JOSE ERVIN ABAD, SPS. ROSARIO AND ERWIN COLLANTES, SPS. RICARDO AND
FELITA ANN, SPS. ELSIE AND ROGER LAS PIAS, LINDA LAYDA, RESTITUTO MARIANO, SPS. ARNOLD
AND MIRIAM MERCINES, SPS. LUCITA AND WENCESLAO A. RAPACON, SPS. ROMEO AND EMILYN
HULLEZA, LUZ MIPANTAO, SPS. HELEN AND ANTHONY TEVES, MARLENE TUAZON, SPS. ZALDO AND
MIA SALES, SPS. JOSEFINA AND JOEL YBERA, SPS. LINDA AND JESSIE CABATUAN, SPS. WILMA AND
MARIO ANDRADA, SPS. RAYMUNDO AND ARSENIA LELIS, FREDY AND SUSANA PILONEO, Petitioners,
vs FIL-HOMES REALTY and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and MAGDIWANG REALTY CORPORATION,
Respondents.
Fil-Homes Realty and Development Corporation and Magdiwang Realty Corporation (respondents), co-owners
of two lots situated in Sucat, Paraaque City and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 21712 and
21713, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer on May 7, 2003 against above-named petitioners before the
Paraaque Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC).
Respondents alleged that petitioners, through tolerance, had occupied the subject lots since 1980 but ignored
their repeated demands to vacate them.
Petitioners countered that there is no possession by tolerance for they have been in adverse, continuous and
uninterrupted possession of the lots for more than 30 years; and that respondents predecessor-in-interest,
Pilipinas Development Corporation, had no title to the lots. In any event, they contend that the question of
ownership must first be settled before the issue of possession may be resolved.
During the pendency of the case or on June 30, 2004, the City of Paraaque filed expropriation proceedings
covering the lots before the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque with the intention of establishing a socialized
housing project therein for distribution to the occupants including petitioners. A writ of possession was
consequently issued and a Certificate of Turn-over given to the City.
Branch 77 of the MeTC, by Decision of March 3, 2008, rendered judgment in the unlawful detainer case against
petitioners, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants Leticia and
Ervin Abad et. als. ordering the latter and all persons claiming rights under them to VACATE and SURRENDER
possession of the premises.
The MeTC held that as no payment had been made to respondents for the lots, they still maintain ownership
thereon. It added that petitioners cannot claim a better right by virtue of the issuance of a Writ of Possession for
the project beneficiaries have yet to be named.
Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed the MeTC decision and dismissed respondents complaint in this wise:
x x x The court a quo ruled that the case filed by plaintiffs (respondents herein) is unlawful detainer as shown by
the allegations of the Complaint. The ruling of the court a quo is not accurate. It is not the allegations of the
Complaint that finally determine whether a case is unlawful detainer, rather it is the evidence in the case.
Unlawful detainer requires the significant element of "tolerance". Tolerance of the occupation of the property
must be present right from the start of the defendants possession. The phrase "from the start of defendants
possession" is significant. When there is no "tolerance" right from the start of the possession sought to be
recovered, the case of unlawful detainer will not prosper.3 (emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
The RTC went on to rule that the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the City bars the continuation of the
unlawful detainer proceedings, and since the judgment had already been rendered in the expropriation
proceedings which effectively turned over the lots to the City, the MeTC has no jurisdiction to "disregard the . . .
final judgment and writ of possession" due to non-payment of just compensation:

The Writ of Possession shows that possession over the properties subject of this case had already been given to
the City of Paraaque since January 19, 2006 after they were expropriated. It is serious error for the court a
quo to rule in the unlawful detainer case that Magdiwang Realty Corporation and Fil-Homes Realty and
Development Corporation could still be given possession of the properties which were already
expropriated in favor of the City of Paraaque.
There is also another serious lapse in the ruling of the court a quo that the case for expropriation in the Regional
Trial Court would not bar, suspend or abate the ejectment proceedings. The court a quo had failed to consider
the fact that the case for expropriation was already decided by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 196 way back in
the year 2006 or 2 years before the court a quo rendered its judgment in the unlawful detainer case in the year
2008. In fact, there was already a Writ of Possession way back in the year 1996 (sic) issued in the expropriation
case by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 196. The court a quo has no valid reason to disregard the said
final judgment and the writ of possession already issued by the Regional Trial Court in favor of the City
of Paraaque and against Magdiwang Realty Corporation and Fil-Homes Realty Development
Corporation and make another judgment concerning possession of the subject properties contrary to
the final judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 196.4 (emphasis in the original)
Before the Court of Appeals where respondents filed a petition for review, they maintained that respondents "act
of allowing several years to pass without requiring [them] to vacate nor filing an ejectment case against them
amounts to acquiescence or tolerance of their possession."5
By Decision of May 27, 2009,6 the appellate court, noting that petitioners did not present evidence to rebut
respondents allegation of possession by tolerance, and considering petitioners admission that they commenced
occupation of the property without the permission of the previous owner Pilipinas Development Corporation
as indicium of tolerance by respondents predecessor-in-interest, ruled in favor of respondents. Held the
appellate court:
Where the defendants entry upon the land was with plaintiffs tolerance from the date and fact of entry, unlawful
detainer proceedings may be instituted within one year from the demand on him to vacate upon demand. The
status of such defendant is analogous to that of a tenant or lessee, the term of whose lease, has expired but
whose occupancy is continued by the tolerance of the lessor. The same rule applies where the defendant
purchased the house of the former lessee, who was already in arrears in the payment of rentals, and thereafter
occupied the premises without a new lease contract with the landowner.7
Respecting the issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation proceedings, the appellate court, citing
Republic v. Gingoyon,8 held the same does not signify the completion of the expropriation proceedings. Thus it
disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court a
quo is REVOKED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court dated March 3, 2008 is hereby
REINSTATED with MODIFICATION [by] deleting the award for attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED. (underscoring supplied)
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution dated August 26, 2009, hence, the filing of the
present petition for review.
The petition fails.
As a general rule, ejectment proceedings, due to its summary nature, are not suspended or their resolution held
in abeyance despite the pendency of a civil action regarding ownership.
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 53810 enlightens, however:

Section 1. When the Government seeks to acquire, through purchase or expropriation proceedings, lands
belonging to any estate or chaplaincy (cappellania), any action for ejectment against the tenants occupying said
lands shall be automatically suspended, for such time as may be required by the expropriation proceedings or
the necessary negotiations for the purchase of the lands, in which latter case, the period of suspension shall not
exceed one year.
To avail himself of the benefits of the suspension, the tenants shall pay to the landowner the current rents as
they become due or deposit the same with the court where the action for ejectment has been instituted.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners did not comply with any of the acts mentioned in the law to avail of the benefits of the suspension.
In another vein, petitioners posit that respondents failed to prove that their possession is by mere tolerance. This
too fails. Apropos is the ruling in Calubayan v. Pascual:14
In allowing several years to pass without requiring the occupant to vacate the premises nor filing an action to
eject him, plaintiffs have acquiesced to defendants possession and use of the premises. It has been held that a
person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission, without any contract between
them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary
action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them. The status of the defendant is analogous to that of a
lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. In
such a case, the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand
to vacate. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondents bought the lots from Pilipinas Development Corporation in 1983. They stepped into the shoes of
the seller with respect to its relationship with petitioners. Even if early on respondents made no demand or filed
no action against petitioners to eject them from the lots, they thereby merely maintained the status quo allowed
petitioners possession by tolerance.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED.