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TABLE OF CONTENTS
C.
D.
C.
V.
EUROPE ..............................................................................................................................32
SAHELIAN MILITARIES ........................................................................................................33
SAHELIAN GOVERNMENTS ..................................................................................................34
SAHELIAN POPULATIONS ....................................................................................................34
31 March 2005
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the U.S. Government:
1.
(a)
(b)
(c)
2.
3.
4.
To Donors:
5.
To NATO:
6.
To the EU:
7.
9.
Page ii
31 March 2005
INTRODUCTION
12
Page 2
13
15
Page 3
II.
19
A.
22
Page 4
26
30
The Tijaniyya brotherhood was founded by Ahmad alTijani (1737-1815) in Algeria and started to influence subSaharan African Muslims shortly after 1800.
31
"Jihad" (literally "struggle") is a term with multiple
meanings. Its primary one is an internal struggle for self
knowledge and purification. Only in specific circumstances
would it indicate armed struggle. Tal's jihad was the second
kind. For more on changes in use of the term, see F. Noor,
"The Evolution of 'Jihad' in Islamist Political Discourse: How
a Plastic Concept Became Harder", in Understanding
September 11, C. Calhoun et al., eds. (New York, 2002).
32
Muslims are enjoined in the Qur'an not to wage jihad (of the
sword) against other Muslims. Umar's rhetoric thus had to shift
to an accusation that Masina practised an illegitimate form of
Islam in need of purification. This was hard to justify in the
case of Masina, which had been the site of a major regional
jihad 40 years before. Umar's argument was that the Tijaniyya
brotherhood was the only correct form of Islam. Was he
sincere or justifying a land grab with flimsy theology? It is not
possible to tell from the evidence in David Robinson, The holy
war of Umar Tal: the western Sudan in the mid-nineteenth
century (Oxford, 1985), although it is clear there was an old
dislike between Umar and the Masina caliph. Umar's jihad had
many victims, and his large army, which did not cultivate its
own food, had to be fed from local stocks that were already
reduced by the fighting, thus leading to a major famine in the
region.
33
The other famous example is that of Almamy Samory
Tour, whose empire in the 1880s and 1890s covered much
of present-day Guinea, Mali, Cte d'Ivoire and northern
Ghana.
34
See C. B. Yamba, Permanent Pilgrims: The Role of
Pilgrimage in the Lives of West African Muslims in Sudan
Page 5
B.
1.
The Wahhabiyya
37
Page 6
40
Page 7
2.
The GSPC
46
C.
50
Page 8
prayer;
51
Page 9
54
Page 10
D.
69
ISLAMIC NGOS
72
Page 11
73
74
75
Page 12
80
88
Page 13
90
91
Page 14
92
95
Page 15
101
Page 16
B.
1.
107
108
Page 17
C.
116
D.
THE GSPC
Page 18
125
121
Page 19
130
136
138
Page 20
141
E.
Page 21
144
143
Page 22
F.
147
145
Page 23
151
155
158
Page 24
160
Page 25
A.
163
Page 26
169
B.
Page 27
1.
2.
177
174
3.
4.
181
Page 28
5.
6.
187
7.
192
Page 29
194
C.
196
EUCOM, based in Stuttgart, Germany, covers all
Europe and Africa excluding Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea,
Somalia and Djibouti. Central Command (CENTCOM),
whose headquarters are in Florida, covers those Horn of
Africa countries and the Middle East.
197
Training in Mali consisted of three units in Bamako, Gao
and Timbuktu. Three of the 25 U.S. soldiers in the group that
worked with the Chad and Niger companies were Navy
medics. The rest consisted of 21 Marine troopers and a Marine
commander.
198
Crisis Group interview, Niger, 6 September 2004.
199
Crisis Group interview, Niger, 6 September.
Page 30
200
Page 31
204
208
V.
A.
EUROPE
209
Page 32
214
Page 33
B.
SAHELIAN MILITARIES
217
Page 34
D.
C.
220
SAHELIAN POPULATIONS
SAHELIAN GOVERNMENTS
222
223
Page 35
VI. CONCLUSION
The countries of the Sahel face enormous development
challenges and are among the poorest in the world, with
weak institutional structures and Islamic populations
which have natural ties to co-religionists in the Middle
East and beyond. In an era in which weak states
constitute attractive targets for terrorist and criminal
organisations, even the limited evidence of possible entry
points for some of those groups merits concern. The
initial response from the U.S. in the PSI was aimed
almost exclusively at bolstering military capacity. If that
approach is the only international response, and
particularly if it remains solely American in origin, there
are real dangers. Fortunately the Bush administration has
approved a much broader, integrated concept, the
TSCTI, which is half economic, social and political, and
there is some indication it is talking more with Europeans
about partnerships. The concept has also been expanded
to incorporate five neighbouring countries.
The immediate question is whether an integrated
financing package is introduced in time for the
Congress to act during the current budget cycle. The
U.S. Congress then should consider the Sahel not
merely as four countries in need but as a region where
failure to act could have serious consequences for U.S.
interests and perhaps U.S. security as well.
The U.S. and EU partners should cooperate and
coordinate more than they do on their counter-terrorism
and military capacity-building work in the Sahel. Their
goal should be to help all four countries professionalise
their armed forces and extend state control over their full
territories. All training should consequently include a
strong rule of law component. Control, however, is at
most half the equation. The Sahelian states need help in
bringing services to the inhabitants of their distant desert
regions. This requires more development aid.
Islam in the Sahel has been, as many scholars and local
dignitaries argue, tolerant and peaceful, often mixing preIslamic African religious practices with Muslim doctrine.
However, this should not lull observers to sleep. Islam in
the Sahel is a living religion, constantly changing and
evolving. Widespread antipathy to U.S. Middle East
policies has opened the door for extremist doctrines to
win an audience for the first time. Moreover, the very
perception that West Africa is a zone of "good Islam"
may exert a certain pull on terrorists. As an intelligence
expert put it: "A terrorist attack in the Sahelian region
would be a way for violent Islamists to say, 'Even where
Islam is supposed to be moderate, we are here'".
Page 36
APPENDIX A
MAP OF SAHEL REGION
Page 37
APPENDIX B
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ACOTA
ACRF
ACRI
AOPIG
CAERT
CENTCOM
CSP
DSCA
ECOWAS
EUCOM
GIA
GPOI
GPS
GSPC
Groupe Salafiste pour la Prdication et le Combat (Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat).
IARA
MCA
MCC
MDJT
Mouvement pour la Dmocratie et la Justice Tchadien (Movement for Democracy and Justice in
Chad).
MPRI
MPS
NATO
OFR
PDG
PSI
Pan-Sahel Initiative.
RECAMP
SPLM
TSCTI
UNAMSIL
USAID
WAMY
Page 38
APPENDIX C
ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP
The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an
independent, non-profit, multinational organisation, with
over 100 staff members on five continents, working
through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to
prevent and resolve deadly conflict.
Crisis Group's approach is grounded in field research.
Teams of political analysts are located within or close by
countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of
violent conflict. Based on information and assessments
from the field, it produces analytical reports containing
practical recommendations targeted at key international
decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes CrisisWatch,
a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct
regular update on the state of play in all the most
significant situations of conflict or potential conflict
around the world.
Crisis Group's reports and briefing papers are distributed
widely by email and printed copy to officials in
foreign ministries and international organisations and
made available simultaneously on the website,
www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with
governments and those who influence them, including
the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate
support for its policy prescriptions.
The Crisis Group Board -- which includes prominent
figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business
and the media -- is directly involved in helping to bring
the reports and recommendations to the attention of
senior policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is
co-chaired by Leslie H. Gelb, former President of the
Council on Foreign Relations, and Lord Patten of Barnes,
former European Commissioner for External Relations.
President and Chief Executive since January 2000 is
former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans.
Crisis Group's international headquarters are in Brussels,
with advocacy offices in Washington DC, New York,
London and Moscow. The organisation currently
operates nineteen field offices (in Amman, Belgrade,
Cairo, Dakar, Dushanbe, Islamabad, Jakarta, Kabul,
Nairobi, Osh, Port-au-Prince, Pretoria, Pristina, Quito,
Sarajevo, Seoul, Skopje and Tbilisi), with analysts
working in over 50 crisis-affected countries and
territories across four continents. In Africa, this includes
Angola, Burundi, Cte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of
the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Liberia, Rwanda,
March 2005
Further information about Crisis Group can be obtained from our website: www.crisisgroup.org
Page 39
APPENDIX D
CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON AFRICA SINCE 2002
CENTRAL AFRICA
Storm Clouds over Sun City: The Urgent Need to Recast the
Congolese Peace Process, Africa Report N44, 14 May 2002
(also available in French)
Burundi: After Six Months of Transition: Continuing the War
or Winning the Peace, Africa Report N46, 24 May 2002
(also available in French)
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The
Countdown, Africa Report N50, 1 August 2002 (only available
in French)
The Burundi Rebellion and the Ceasefire Negotiations, Africa
Briefing N9, 6 August 2002
Rwanda at the End of the Transition: A Necessary Political
Liberalisation, Africa Report N53, 13 November 2002 (also
available in French)
The Kivus: The Forgotten Crucible of the Congo Conflict,
Africa Report N56, 24 January 2003
A Framework for Responsible Aid to Burundi, Africa Report
N57, 21 February 2003
Rwandan Hutu Rebels in the Congo: a New Approach to
Disarmament and Reintegration, Africa Report N63, 23
May 2003 (also available in French)
Congo Crisis: Military Intervention in Ituri, Africa Report N64,
13 June 2003
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Time for
Pragmatism, Africa Report N69, 26 September 2003 (only
available in French)
Refugees and Displaced Persons in Burundi Defusing the
Land Time-Bomb, Africa Report N70, 7 October 2003 (only
available in French)
HORN OF AFRICA
God, Oil & Country: Changing the Logic of War in Sudan,
Africa Report N39, 28 January 2002
Capturing the Moment: Sudans Peace Process in the
Balance, Africa Report N42, 3 April 2002
Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State, Africa
Report N45, 23 May 2002
Dialogue or Destruction? Organising for Peace as the War in
Sudan Escalates, Africa Report N48, 27 June 2002
Sudans Best Chance for Peace: How Not to Lose It, Africa
Report N51, 17 September 2002
Ending Starvation as a Weapon of War in Sudan, Africa
Report N54, 14 November 2002
Salvaging Somalias Chance for Peace, Africa Briefing N11,
9 December 2002
Power and Wealth Sharing: Make or Break Time in Sudans
Peace Process, Africa Report N55, 18 December 2002
Sudans Oilfields Burn Again: Brinkmanship Endangers The
Peace Process, Africa Briefing N13, 10 February 2003
Negotiating a Blueprint for Peace in Somalia, Africa Report
N59, 6 March 2003
Sudans Other Wars, Africa Briefing N14, 25 June 2003
Sudan Endgame Africa Report N65, 7 July 2003
Somaliland: Democratisation and Its Discontents, Africa
Report N66, 28 July 2003
Ethiopia and Eritrea: War or Peace?, Africa Report N68, 24
September 2003
Sudan: Towards an Incomplete Peace, Africa Report N73,
11 December 2003
Darfur Rising: Sudan's New Crisis, Africa Report N76, 25
March 2004 (also available in Arabic)
Biting the Somali Bullet, Africa Report N79, 4 May 2004
Sudan: Now or Never in Darfur, Africa Report N80, 23 May
2004 (also available in Arabic)
Darfur Deadline: A New International Action Plan, Africa
Report N83, 23 August 2004 (also available in Arabic and in
French)
Sudan's Dual Crises: Refocusing on IGAD, Africa Briefing
N19, 5 October 2004
Somalia: Continuation of War by Other Means?, Africa Report
N88, 21 December 2004
Darfur: The Failure to Protect , Africa Report N89, 8 March
2005
SOUTHERN AFRICA
Zimbabwes Election: The Stakes for Southern Africa, Africa
Briefing N8, 11 January 2002
All Bark and No Bite: The International Response to
Zimbabwes Crisis, Africa Report N40, 25 January 2002
WEST AFRICA
Liberia: The Key to Ending Regional Instability, Africa Report
N43, 24 April 2002
Sierra Leone after Elections: Politics as Usual? Africa Report
N49, 12 July 2002
Liberia: Unravelling, Africa Briefing N10, 19 August 2002
Sierra Leones Truth and Reconciliation Commission: A
Fresh Start?, Africa Briefing N12, 20 December 2002
Tackling Liberia: The Eye of the Regional Storm, Africa
Report N62, 30 April 2003
The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Promises and Pitfalls of
a New Model, Africa Briefing N16, 4 August 2003
Sierra Leone: The State of Security and Governance, Africa
Report N67, 2 September 2003
Liberia: Security Challenges, Africa Report N71, 3 November
2003
Cte dIvoire: The War Is Not Yet Over, Africa Report
N72, 28 November 2003
Guine: Incertitudes autour dune fin de rgne, Africa Report
N74, 19 December 2003 (only available in French)
Rebuilding Liberia: Prospects and Perils, Africa Report N75,
30 January 2004
Cte d'Ivoire: No Peace in Sight, Africa Report N82, 12 July
2004 (also available in French)
Liberia and Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed States, Africa
Report N87, 8 December 2004
Cte d'Ivoire: Le pire est peut-tre venir, Africa Report
N90, 24 March 2005 (currently only available in French)
Asia
Europe
Page 40
Thematic Issues
CrisisWatch
please visit our website www.crisisgroup.org
Page 41
APPENDIX E
CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES
Co-Chairs
Leslie H. Gelb
Wesley Clark
Pat Cox
Ruth Dreifuss
Uffe Ellemann-Jensen
Mark Eyskens
Executive Committee
Morton Abramowitz
Stanley Fischer
Emma Bonino
Bronislaw Geremek
Cheryl Carolus
I.K.Gujral
Yoichi Funabashi
Chief Diplomatic Correspondent & Columnist, The Asahi Shimbun,
Japan
William Shawcross
Journalist and author, UK
Stephen Solarz*
Former U.S. Congressman
George Soros
Carla Hills
Lena Hjelm-Walln
Former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister, Sweden
Swanee Hunt
Chair of Inclusive Security: Women Waging Peace; former U.S.
Ambassador to Austria
Asma Jahangir
William O. Taylor
Adnan Abu-Odeh
Kenneth Adelman
Bethuel Kiplagat
Ersin Arioglu
Member of Parliament, Turkey; Chairman Emeritus, Yapi Merkezi
Group
Diego Arria
James V. Kimsey
Wim Kok
Former Prime Minister, Netherlands
Trifun Kostovski
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Elliott F. Kulick
Victor Chu
Joanne Leedom-Ackerman
Page 42
Mohamed Sahnoun
Barbara McDougall
Ghassan Salam
Ayo Obe
Salim A. Salim
Christine Ockrent
Douglas Schoen
Friedbert Pflger
Pr Stenbck
Victor M Pinchuk
Surin Pitsuwan
Thorvald Stoltenberg
Grigory Yavlinsky
Chairman of Yabloko Party and its Duma faction, Russia
Uta Zapf
Itamar Rabinovich
Ernesto Zedillo
Fidel V. Ramos
George Kellner
George Loening
Douglas Makepeace
Baron Ullens
Peter Corcoran
Stanley Weiss
Quantm
Westfield Group
John Ehara
Michael L. Riordan
Yasuyo Yamazaki
Sunny Yoon
SENIOR ADVISERS
Crisis Group's Senior Advisers are former Board Members (not presently holding executive office) who maintain an association
with Crisis Group, and whose advice and support are called on from time to time.
Oscar Arias
Zainab Bangura
Christoph Bertram
Jorge Castaeda
Eugene Chien
Gianfranco Dell'Alba
Alain Destexhe
Marika Fahlen
Malcolm Fraser
Max Jakobson
Mong Joon Chung
Allan J. MacEachen
Matt McHugh
George J. Mitchell
Mo Mowlam
Cyril Ramaphosa
Michel Rocard
Volker Ruehe
Simone Veil
Michael Sohlman
Leo Tindemans
Ed van Thijn
Shirley Williams
As at March 2005