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  • Foster, J. 1993, Dennett's Rejection of Dualism

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    khriniz
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    In Consciousness Explained, Dennett elaborates and defends a materialist-functionalist account of the human mind, and of consciousness in particular. This defence depends crucially on his prior rejection of dualism. Dennett rejects this dualist alternative on three grounds: first, that its version of mind-to-body causation is in conflict with what we know, or have good reason to believe, from the findings of physical science; second, that the very notion of dualistic psychophysical causation is incoherent; and third, that dualism puts the mind beyond the reach of scientific investigation. In each case, his reasoning is unconvincing, and indeed leaves the dualist entirely unscathed. In contrast, without an adequate basis for his rejection of dualism, Dennett himself is left with a theory which is vulnerable to a number of familiar objections.

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    In Consciousness Explained, Dennett elaborates and defends a materialist-functionalist account of the human mind, and of consciousness in particular. This defence depends crucially on his prior rejection of dualism. Dennett rejects this dualist alternative on three grounds: first, that its version of mind-to-body causation is in conflict with what we know, or have good reason to believe, from the findings of physical science; second, that the very notion of dualistic psychophysical causation is incoherent; and third, that dualism puts the mind beyond the reach of scientific investigation. In each case, his reasoning is unconvincing, and indeed leaves the dualist entirely unscathed. In contrast, without an adequate basis for his rejection of dualism, Dennett himself is left with a theory which is vulnerable to a number of familiar objections.

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    46 просмотров15 страниц

    Foster, J. 1993, Dennett's Rejection of Dualism

    Загружено:

    khriniz
    In Consciousness Explained, Dennett elaborates and defends a materialist-functionalist account of the human mind, and of consciousness in particular. This defence depends crucially on his prior rejection of dualism. Dennett rejects this dualist alternative on three grounds: first, that its version of mind-to-body causation is in conflict with what we know, or have good reason to believe, from the findings of physical science; second, that the very notion of dualistic psychophysical causation is incoherent; and third, that dualism puts the mind beyond the reach of scientific investigation. In each case, his reasoning is unconvincing, and indeed leaves the dualist entirely unscathed. In contrast, without an adequate basis for his rejection of dualism, Dennett himself is left with a theory which is vulnerable to a number of familiar objections.

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    Inquiry, 36, 17-31 ‘Symposium: Daniel C, Dennett's Consciousness Explained” Dennett’s Rejection of Dualism John Foster Brasenose College, Oxford In Consciousness Explained, Dennett elaborates and defends a materilist- functionalist account of the human mind, and of consciousness in partiul ‘defence depends crucially on his prior rejection of dualism. Dennett rejects this

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