DECISIONS OF PRINCIPLE

4.4.3 It would be folly, however, to say that there is only one way of learning a
skill or any other body of principles, or of justifying a particular decision made
in the practice of it. There are many ways, and I have tried to make the above
account sufficiently general to cover all of them. It is sometimes said by writers
on morals that we have to justify an act by reference to its effects, and that we tell
which effects are to be sought, which avoided, by reference to some principle.
Such a theory is that of the utilitarians, who bid us look at the effects, and
examine these in the light of the principle of utility, to see which effects would
maximize pleasure. Sometimes, on the other hand, it is said (as by Mr. Toulmin)4
that an act is justified directly by reference to the principles which it observes,
and these principles in their turn by reference to the effects of always observing
them. Sometimes it is said that we should observe principles and ignore the
effects -- though for the reasons given above 'effects' cannot be here intended in
the sense in which I have been using it. What is wrong with these theories is not
what they say, but their assumption that they are telling us the only way to
justify actions, or decide what actions to do. We do, indeed, justify and decide on
actions in all these ways; for example, sometimes, if asked why we did A, we
say, 'Because it was a case falling under principle P', and if asked to justify P in
turn, we go into the effects of observing it and of not observing it. But
sometimes, when asked the same question 'Why did you do A?' we say 'Because
if I hadn't, E would have happened', and if asked what was wrong about E
happening, we appeal to some principle.