Process Hazard

Analysis (PHA)
Training by: Syed
Hassan Sultan
Date: 17 March 2016

PROCESS HAZARD
ANALYSIS (PHA)
TRAINING CONTENT:
Module 1: PHA in the context of PSM
Module 2: PHA Process Overview
Module 3: PHA Planning & Preparation
Module 4: PHA Execution-Hazard
Identification
Module 4a: Hazard & Operability Study
(HAZOP) Technique Overview

Module 1: PHA in the

context of PSM
Running business implies taking
risks.

Module 1: PHA in the

context of PSM
Operational risks cover a large portion of the entire risk portfolio
that major corporations are facing on a day-to-day business

-----------Adopting an integrated approach to the Company

Risk Portfolio------------

Module 1: PHA in the

context of PSM
Understanding of risks plays a central role as it
drives effective risk management activities
Process
Hazard
Analysis
(PHA)
is
applied
to
understand
risks involved
in the design,
operation,
and
modification
of processes
that
handle
hazardous

Module 1: PHA in the

context of PSM
The impact to companys objectives varies
depending on the risks

Module 1: PHA in the

context of PSM
PHA mainly focus on risks associated with
handling of hazardous material with
potential for catastrophic consequence

Module 1: PHA in the

context of PSM
Its necessary to recognize the final
implications to the company

Module 2: PHA Process Overview

A Hazard is commonly considered as the
potential for

Module 2: PHA Process Overview

A Hazard is commonly considered as the
potential for

Module 2: PHA Process Overview

Every PHA implementation follows 3
phases

Module 2: PHA Process Overview

PHA Execution: Logical Steps
Key steps of the PHA execution depend on the defined
scope and methodology to be applied. In general terms,
three main logic steps can be identified for any PHA

Module 2: PHA Process Overview

There is not a uniform consensus across industries and
standards
on
the
terminology
describing
risk
management process steps
--------------------Example of terminology from different
standards-----------------

Module 2: PHA Process Overview

A Comprehensive PHA program encompasses a number of
components which are interconnected to provide a
complete understanding of risks.
-----------Key relationship among different PHA components
(Not Exhaustive)-------

The Hazard Identification stage is one of the most

important steps

Module 3: PHA Planning

and Preparation
Careful preparation lays the groundwork for a
successful study

Module 4: PHA ExecutionHazard Identification

Hazard identification is the first step in a
systematic process which aims to improve
the management of risk

Module 4: PHA ExecutionHazard Identification

A number of techniques can be used in the
hazard identification
----------Common Hazard Identification
Methodologies--------------

Module 4: PHA ExecutionHazard Identification

Different techniques apply different logic to
help identifying hazards

Module 4: PHA ExecutionHazard Identification

Different techniques apply different logic to
help identifying hazards

What if / Checklist review can enter the logic at any point in the cause
& effect relationship
FMEA begins with looking at the cause (failed regulator) & works toward
defining the consequence (vessel rupture)
HAZOP begins with deviation (high pressure), determines the
consequence (vessel rupture), and then identifies potential causes (failed
regulator) of the deviation

Module 4: PHA ExecutionHazard Identification

Potential Hazards:
--------------------------Five Hazard
Categories---------------------------

Module 4a: Hazard and

Operability Study (HAZOP)
A HAZOP is a group technique used to identify
hazards and operability issues arising from
process deviations from plant design intent
The technique is used to identify
Hazards (ways the system can fail leading to
human
loss/injury,
asset
damage
or
environmental impact
Operability (ways in which the system can fail
to perform as required)
The approach is formal and systematic using a
structured question and answer procedure to
identify deviations from the intent of the design.
The study is performed by a team of people
familiar with the system design and operation,
working under the guidance of a leader who is
experienced in the HAZOP method.
The leader systematically applies a set of
specific
guideword-parameters
combinations to evaluation deviations in terms
of causes, consequence, safeguards.
The team evaluates whether existing safeguards
are adequate to protect from the identified
scenario; if not a recommendation for
improvement is raised.
A recorder makes a detailed tabulation of the
team discussion.

Module 4a: Hazard and

Operability Study (HAZOP)
The team for a HAZOP is selected from the
available staff who will need to be free of
others duties for the period of the study

Module 4a: Hazard and

Operability Study (HAZOP)
Process deviations result from the
combination of guidewords to
parameters

Module 4a: Hazard and

Operability Study (HAZOP)

HAZOP can also be applied to batch

processes, using Ad Hoc guidewords applied
to ACTION
Guidewords
No
More Of
Less Of
As well as
Part Of
Other than
Before
After
Disordered
Repetitive

Deviation
Action not executed
Too much of action
Too less of action
Additional action executed although not
required
Action partially executed
Incorrect action
Action executed too early
Action executed too late
Action executed in the wrong order /
sequence
Action executed repetitively

Module 4a: Hazard and

Operability Study (HAZOP)
HAZOP Work Flow
Select line or vessel

Start here for each

process line and vessel

Define node & design intention of node

Select parameter & guide word
Develop meaningful deviation
Identify all possible causes for the
deviation
Describe consequences if all safeguards
fail
List safeguards & protection available
Evaluate need for risk control
recommendation

Repeat for all guide words

& parameters

Module 4a: Hazard and

Operability Study (HAZOP)
A number of criteria and approaches can be
used by the HAZOP Leader to identify /select
the nodes. Here are the most frequent adopted:
Process Flow Analysis: the leader follows the main flows
from/to the different process equipment and lines
Presence of Loops: the leader can follow process loops
when selecting the sequence of the Nodes
Complexity of Equipment: Node coincide with 1 single
process equipment, including relevant inlet/outlet lines and
relevant instrumentation.
Line by Line Approach: assigning a Node to each of the
main process line and equipment.

Module 4a: Hazard and

Operability Study (HAZOP)
Part of the team discussion should include the
layers of protection which already exist and the
extent to which they are adequate COMMUN ITY
The team members need a good
knowledge of the plant to explain
accurately the protections already in
place
The extent to which these are
considered adequate depends on the
size of the risk posed by the hazard
The discussion should refer to the basic
process control system as well as any
engineering controls or administrative
procedures which are in place

EMERGENCY RESPONSE
PLANT EMERGENCY
RESPONSE
MITIGATION
PREVENTION
CONTROL &
MONITORING
PROCESS

Layers of
Protection

Module 4a: Hazard and

Operability Study (HAZOP)
Examples of HAZOP Notes-How do you
judge the quality?

Module 4a: Hazard and

Operability Study (HAZOP)
Its important to clearly write recommendation so that
they can be actionable
---------------- Examples of Good Quality of
recommendations ------------------

Module 4a: Hazard and

Operability Study (HAZOP)
-----------Inadequate Quality of HAZOP-Key
Factors-----------

Inadequate Study Time

Inadequate Documentation
Inadequate Team Members
Incomplete Study
Inadequate Team Guidance
Inadequate Facilities
Inadequate Follow-up

Q/A Session

PLEASE FEEL FREE

TO ASK!
THANK YOU