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1NC
The 1ac sustains the referent object of security - this makes warfare, threat
construction and human insecurity inevitable. Be suspect of their specific scenarios national security is a ploy created through a culture of fear.
Lal 7 - Master of Arts in International Relations (Preerna, 2007,
http://gwu.academia.edu/PrernaLal/Papers/646118/Critical_Security_Studies_Deconstructing_the_National_Securit
y_State)
Under the lens of critical theory, there are many problems with the current framework of national security. First, security
is a
paradox for the more we add to the national security agenda, the more we have to fear. As
Barry Buzan (1991, 37) points out in People, States and Fear, the security paradox presents us with a cruel irony in that to be secure
ultimately, would mean being unable to escape. Thus, to
wideners leave the referent object of security as the state, widening the field of security studies becomes even
more troubling because it risks more state control over our lives, the militarization of social issues
such as drugs and crime, which would further legitimize and justify state violence, leaving us all the
more insecure. Accordingly, it becomes clear that a mere re-definition of security away from its current neorealist framework does not solve the security dilemma if the referent object of security is left
unchanged. This goes to prove that it is the state as the referent object that requires questioning in
terms of its supposed provision of security rather than the problems with widening the field of security. Without
a state-centric concept of security, there would be no national security agenda left to widen, as
our security concerns would be human-centered, hence, the paradox of security would dissipate. A second
part of the security paradox is that security and insecurity are not binary opposites. On a micro-level, if security
is the state of being secure, than insecurity should be the state of not being secure. However, what we do feel secure about is neither part
of the national security agenda nor a conscious thought or feeling. The state of being secure is thus, not conceptualized as an absence of
insecurity. On a policymaking level, Robert Lipschutz (1995, 27), Associate Professor of Politics at University of California, Santa Cruz,
notes in On Security that our
W. Bush
included North Korea in his illogical Axis of Evil and named it as a threat to the
United States, the peripheral state had no nuclear capability and would never have thought to use the threat of weapons of mass
destruction to blackmail Western powers into giving aid. However, alarmed at the thought of being the next
Afghanistan or Iraq, North Korea retaliated within a year by revealing its nuclear arsenal.
The United States watched helplessly as one more previously benign nation became a real security problem. As a consequence ,
imagined enemies become real threats due to the ongoing threat construction by the
state, and this poses the security dilemma of creating self-fulfilling prophecies in the
current framework of security. Our notion of security is what the state says it is, rather than what we feel it is. Yet,
this entrenched view of security is epistemologically flawed, which is our second dilemma;
meaning that our
not hold up under scrutiny. Our perception of what and from whom we need to be secured is not based on the actual threats
that exist, but on the threats that we are told to perceive by the state. Thus, terrorists, drugs, illegal immigrants, Third
World dictators, rogue states, blacks, non-Christians, and the Other, are considered as threats to
the national security apparatus, and consequently, as threats to the individual American .
This state construction of threats pervades our minds, causing a trickledown effect that encourages a culture of fear, where the only limit to the
coming danger is our imagination. Lipschutz (2000, 44-45) concludes in After Authority: War, Peace, and
Global Politics in the 21st Century, the national security state is brought down to the level of the household, and each one arms itself
against the security dilemma posed by its neighbor across the hedge of fence. Lipschutz seems to be saying that it
is national
security that eventually encourages the creation of a dichotomy between the self and the
Other in our everyday lives. Indeed, it is the discourse of security by the rulers and elites, which creates and
sustains our bipolar mindset of the world. A final dilemma presented by the current security framework is that
security is ontologically unstable, unable to exist on its own, requiring the creation of certain conditions and categories, specifically, the
creation of the Other. James Der Derian (1995, 25), Associate Professor of Political Science at U Mass (Amherst), notes in On Security
that we are taught to consider security as an a priori argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security
because there currently happens to be a widespread belief in it. Yet,
securitization,
routinized imagination (Masco, 2006). This technological response is also deeply redemptive in its
potential to recover perfection (Noble, 1997). One of the political questions to be raised in relation to this new banality of
catastro- phe, as we will discuss below, is whether it is able to foster enchantment, understood as the ``profound and empowering attachment to
life'' that, according to Bennett (2001, page 160), is required for ethical political engagement. The apocalyptic
stage-managed in practised responses to the threat of terrorism or climate change: terrorism through, for example, London scenarios of a
terrorist strike and climate change through the search for criteria to measure climate change preparedness across the world. This is bolstered by,
for example, the 1-in-1000- year tidal flood event exercise (Exercise Triton) held in the UK in 2004 or the ATLANTIS project led by Thomas
Downing at the Stockholm Environment Institute branch in Oxford. These
imagination for disaster is used to sustain interest in and profit from perceived future
climatic risks, ones that must be not only anticipated but also exploited. Drawing authority from perceived climate science (whether warranted
or not), these crises become opportunities that must be continually relegitimated by further
warnings of crises to keep the market value of climate sufficiently high. In other words, these imaginaries do not just
generate environmental or government responses; they represent commercial opportunities
too. Whilst uncertainty may have been disabling in the sense of generating coordinated international action on reducing emissions, climate
the
uncertainties, as with terrorism, have successfully generated business innovation, governmental regulation, and manifold surveillance practices.
Politics We have argued that preemption in contemporary security practice, and precaution in contemporary environmental practice display
important affinities and historical entan- glements, through the ways in which they imagine apocalypse and deploy arts and technologies that
render this imagination banal.We now turn to examine more explic- itly the political implications of the importance of precautionary principles
and the resulting quests for knowledge. We argue that three broad political outcomes can be considered. First, terrorist and climate change
policies may be performative, bringing into being the very realities they seek to avoid. Second, the
imagination of apocalypse
may depoliticize debates, smuggling other policies in under their rubric; and, third, they may
delegitimate positions in the debates. If apocalypse is also about the imagination of a
paradise (Enzensberger, 1978; Kumar, 1995), an emergent new order, then the irony of contemporary
debates is that they fail to engage in significant political imagination. Thus, we suggest that the
banality of apocalypse in these debates fosters a disenchantment that is itself depoliticizing. Masco
writes: ``What does it mean when the `state of emergency' has so explicitly become the rule
when in order to prevent an apocalypse the governmental apparatus has prepared so
meticulously to achieve it?'' (2006, page 12, emphasis in original). First, then, it is important to emphasize
that governments not only are anticipating the worst, but also, in trying to prevent that
nightmare, act in ways that increase the possibility of its occurrence. This phantasmagoria
is thus imagined and made real. Thus, with regard to the politics of security preemption, Massumi
(2007, 16) recounts its logic as follows: ``It is not safe for the enemy to make the first move. You have to
move first, to make them move ... .You test and prod, you move as randomly and
unpredictably and ubiquitously as they do... .You move like the enemy, in order to make the
enemy move.'' That such reasoning is not purely theory was demonstrated by the events surrounding the arrest of six New Jersey men
accused of plotting to kill soldiers at Fort Dix in 2007. Reports of the arrest uncovered that the `disrupted plot' was actively encouraged by a
police informer, posing as an Egyptian radical. It was the informer who offered to broker a planned weapons purchase, and who, according to
New York Times journalist Kocieniewski (2007), ``seemed to be pushing the idea of buying the deadliest items, startling at least one of the
suspects.'' In another example of the performativity of security preemption, it is
The alternative is to embrace our untimely intervention into the 1AC refuse the
question of what we should do, and instead embrace a counter-discourse.
Calkivik 10.
PhD in Poli Sci @ Univ Minnesota (Emine Asli, 10/2010, "DISMANTLING SECURITY," PhD dissertation submitted to Univ Minnesota for
Raymond Duvall, http://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/99479/1/Calkivik_umn_0130E_11576.pdf)
It is this self-evidence of security even for critical approaches and the antinomy stemming from dissident voices reproducing the language of
those they dissent from that constitutes the starting point for this chapter, where I elaborate on the meaning of dismantling security as untimely
critique. As mentioned in the vignette in the opening section, the
This notion of the untimely demands that critique be strategic and respond to political
exigency, that it provide answers in this light instead of raising more questions about which questions could be raised or what
presuppositions underlie the questions that are deemed to be waiting for answers. After elaborating in the first section such strategic conceptions
of the untimeliness of critical theorizing, in the second section I will turn to a different sense of the untimely by drawing upon Wendy Browns
discussion of the relation between critique, crisis, and political time through her reading of Benjamins Theses on the Philosophy of History.292
In contrast to a notion of untimeliness that demands strategic thinking and punctuality, Browns exegesis provides a conception of historical
materialism where critique
meaning of critique beyond these issues presents itself as an important task. This task takes on additional importance within the context of
security studies where any realm of investigation quickly begets its critical counterpart. The rapid emergence and institutionalization of critical
terrorism studies when studies on terrorism were proliferating under the auspices of the so-called Global War on Terror provides a striking
example to this trend. 296 Such instances are important reminders that, to the extent that epistemology and methodology are reified as the sole
concerns in defining and assessing critical thinking297 or wrong headed refusals298 to get on with positive projects and empirical research gets
branded as debilitating for critical projects, what is erased from sight is the political nature of the questions asked and what is lost is the chance to
reflect upon what it means for critical thinking to respond to its times. In his meditation on the meaning of responding and the sense of
responsibility entailed by writing, Jean-Luc Nancy suggests that all writing is committed. 299 This notion of commitment diverges from the
programmatic sense of committed writing. What underlies this conception is an understanding of writing as responding: writing is a response to
the voice of an other.In Nancys words, [w]hoever writes responds 300 and makes himself responsible to in the absolute sense.301
Suggesting that there
commitment, such a notion of writing contests the notion of creative autonomy premised on the idea of a free, self-legislating subject who
responds. In other words, it discredits the idea of an original voice by suggesting that there is no voice that is not a response to a prior response.
Hence, to respond is configured as responding to an expectation rather than as an answer to a question and responsibility is cast as an anticipated
response to questions, to demands, to still-unformulated, not exactly predictable expectations.302 Echoing Nancy, David Campbell makes an
important reminder as he suggests that as international relations scholars we are always already engaged, although the sites, mechanisms and
quality of engagements might vary.303 The
efforts to go against
the dominant currents and challenge the hegemony of existing power relations by showing how contemporary
practices and discourses contribute to the perpetuation of structures of power and
domination, critical theorists in general and critical security studies specialists in particular take on an untimely
endeavor. It is this understanding of the untimely aspect of critical thinking that is emphasized by Mark Neufeld, who regards the
development of critical approaches to security as one of the more hopeful intellectual
developments in recent years.308 Despite nurturing from different theoretical traditions and therefore harboring fundamental
differences between modernist and postmodernist commitments, writes Neufeld, scholars who are involved in the critical project nevertheless
share a common concern with calling into question prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are
organized. 309 The
desire for changethrough being untimely and making the way to alternative futures that would no longer
resemble the presenthave led some scholars to emphasize the utopian element that must
accompany all critical thinking. Quoting Oscar Wildes aphorisma map of the world that does not
include Utopia is not even worth glancing at, Ken Booth argues for the need to restore the role and reputation of
utopianism in the theory and practice of international politics. 310 According to Booth, what goes under the banner of realismethnocentric
self-interest writ large311 falls far beyond the realities of a drastically changed world political landscape at the end of the Cold War. He
describes the new reality as an egg-box containing the shells of sovereignty; but alongside it a global community omelette [sic] is cooking.312
Rather than insisting on the inescapability of war in the international system as political realists argue, Booth argues for the need and possibility
to work toward the utopia of overcoming the condition of war by banking on the opportunities provided by a globalizing world. The point that
critical thought needs to be untimely by going against its time is also emphasized by Dunne and Wheeler, who assert that, regardless of the form
it takes, critical
theory purport[s] to think against the prevailing current and that [c]ritical
security studies is no exception to this enterprise.313 According to the authors, the function of critical approaches
to security is to problematize what is taken for granted in the disciplinary production of
knowledge about security by resist[ing], transcend[ing] and defeat[ing] theories of security,
which take for granted who is to be secured (the state), how security is to be achieved (by
defending core national values, forcibly if necessary) and from whom security is needed (the
enemy).314 While critical theory in this way is figured as untimely, I want to suggest that this notion of untimeliness gets construed
paradoxically in a quite timely fashion. With a perceived disjuncture between writing the world from within a discipline and acting in it placed at
the center of the debates, the performance of critical thought gets evaluated to the extent that it is punctual and in synch with the times. Does
critical thought provide concrete guidance and prescribe what is to be done? Can it move beyond mere talk and make timely political
interventions by providing solutions? Does it have answers to the strategic questions of progressive movements? Demanding that critical
theorizing come clean in the court of these questions, such conceptions of the untimely demand that critique respond to its times in a responsible
way, where being responsible is understood in stark contrast to a notion of responding and responsibility that I briefly discussed in the
introductory pages of this chapter (through the works of Jean-Luc Nancy and David Campbell). Let me visit two recent conversations ensuing
from the declarations of the contemporary crisis of critical theorizing in order to clarify what I mean by a timely understanding of untimely
critique. The first conversation was published as a special issue in the Review of International Studies (RIS), one of the major journals of the
field. Prominent figures took the 25th anniversary of the journals publication of two key textsregarded as canonical for the launching and
development of critical theorizing in International Relationsas an opportunity to reflect upon and assess the impact of critical theory in the
discipline and interrogate what its future might be. 315 The texts in question, which are depicted as having shaken the premises of the static world
of the discipline, are Robert Coxs 1981 essay entitled on Social Forces, States, and World Orders316 and Richard Ashleys article, Political
Realism and Human Interests.317 In their introductory essay to the issue, Rengger and Thirkell-White suggest that the essays by Cox and
Ashleyfollowed by Andrew Linklaters Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations318 represent the breach in the dyke of
the three dominant discourses in International Relations (i.e., positivists, English School, and Marxism), unleashing a torrent [that would] soon
become a flood as variety of theoretical approaches in contemporary social theory (i.e., feminism, Neo-Gramscianism, poststructuralism, and
post-colonialism) would get introduced through the works of critical scholars.319 After elaborating the various responses given to and resistance
raised against the critical project in the discipline, the authors provide an overview and an assessment of the current state of critical theorizing in
International Relations. They argue that the central question for much of the ongoing debate within the critical camp in its present statea
question that it cannot help but come to terms with and provide a response toconcerns the relation between critical thought and political
practice. As they state, the fundamental philosophical question [that] can no longer be sidestepped by critical International Relations theory is
the question of the relation between knowledge of the world and action in it.320 One of the points alluded to in the essay is that forms of
critical theorizing, which leave the future to contingency, uncertainty and the multiplicity of political projects and therefore provide less
guidance for concrete political action321 or, again, those that problematize underlying assumptions of thought and say little about the potential
political agency that might be involved in any subsequent struggles322 may render the critical enterprise impotent and perhaps even suspect.
This point comes out clearly in Craig Murphys contribution to the collection of essays in the RISs special issue. 323 Echoing William Wallaces
argument that critical theorists tend to be monks,324 who have little to offer for political actors engaged in real world politics, Murphy argues
that the promise of critical theory is partially kept because of the limited influence it has had outside the academy towards changing the
world.Building a different world, he suggests, requires more than isolated academic talk; that it demands not merely words, but deeds.325
This, according to Murphy, requires providing knowledge that contributes to change.326 Such knowledge would emanate from connections
with the marginalized and would incorporate observations of actors in their everyday practices. More importantly, it would create an inspiring
vision for social movements, such as the one provided by the concept of human development, which, according to Murphy, was especially
powerful because it embodied a value-oriented way of seeing, a vision, rather than only isolated observations.327 In sum, if critical theory is to
retain its critical edge, Murphys discussion suggests, it has to be in synch with political time and respond to its immediate demands. The second
debate that is revelatory of this conception of the timing of critical theoryi.e., that critical thinking be strategic and efficient in relation to
political timetakes place in relation to the contemporary in/security environment shaped by the so-called Global War on Terror. The theme that
bears its mark on these debates is the extent to which critical inquiries about the contemporary security landscape become complicit in the
workings of power and what critique can offer to render the world more legible for progressive struggles.328 For instance, warning critical
theorists against being co-opted by or aligned with belligerence and war-mongering, Richard Devetak asserts that critical international theory has
an urgent need to distinguish its position all the more clearly from liberal imperialism.329 While scholars such as Devetak, Booth,330 and
Fierke331 take the critical task to be an attempt to rescue liberal internationalism from turning into liberal imperialism, others announce the
crisis of critical theorizing and suggest that critical writings on the nature of the contemporary security order lack the resources to grasp their
actual limitations, where the latter is said to reside not in the realm of academic debate, but in the realm of political practice.332 It is amidst these
debates on critique, crisis, and political time that Richard Beardsworth raises the question of the future of critical philosophy in the face of the
challenges posed by contemporary world politics.333 Recounting these challenges, he provides the matrix for a proper form of critical inquiry
that could come to terms with [o]ur historical actuality.334 He describes this actuality as the thick context of modernity (an epoch, delimited
by the capitalization of social relations, which imposes its own philosophical problematicthat is, the attempt, following the social
consequences of capitalism, to articulate the relation between individuality and collective spirit335 ), American unilateralism in the aftermath of
the attacks on September 11, 2001, and the growing political disempowerment of people worldwide. Arguing that contemporary return of
religion and new forms of irrationalism emerge, in large part, out of the failure of the second response of modernity to provide a secular solution
to the inequalities of the nation-state and colonization,336 he formulates the awaiting political task for critical endeavors as constructing a world
polity to resist the disintegration of the world under the force of capital.It is with this goal in mind that he suggests that responsible scholarship
needs to rescue reason in the face irrational war337 and that intellectuals need to provide the framework for a world ethical community of law,
endowed with political mechanisms of implementation in the context of a regulated planetary economy.338 He suggests that an aporetic form of
thinking such as Jacques Derridasa thinking that ignores the affirmative relation between the determining powers of reason and history339
would be an unhelpful resource because such thinking does not open up to where work needs to be done for these new forms of polity to
emerge.340 In other words, critical thinking, according to Beardsworth, needs to articulate and point out possible political avenues and to orient
thought and action in concrete ways so as to contribute to progressive political change rather than dwelling on the encounter of the incalculable
and calculation and im-possibility of world democracy in a Derridean fashion. In similar ways to the first debate on critique that I discussed,
critical thinking is once again called upon to respond to political time in a strategic and efficient manner. As critical inquiry gets summoned up to
the court of reason in Beardsworths account, its realm of engagement is limited to that which the light of reason can be shed upon, and its politics
is confined to mapping out the achievable and the doable in a given historical context without questioning or disrupting the limits of what is
presented as realistic choices. Hence, if untimely critical thought is to be meaningful it has to be on time by responding to political exigency in
a practical, efficient, and strategic manner. In contrast to this prevalent form of understanding the untimeliness of critical theory, I will now turn to
a different account of the untimely provided by Wendy Brown whose work informs the project of dismantling security as untimely critique.
Drawing from her discussion of the relationship between critique, crisis, and political time, I will suggest that untimely
critique of
security entails, simultaneously, an attunement to the times and an aggressive violation of their
self-conception . It is in this different sense of the untimely that the suggestion of dismantling security needs to be situated. Critique and
Political Time As I suggested in the Prelude to this chapter, elevating security itself to the position of major protagonist and extending a
call to dismantle security was itself declared to be an untimely pursuit in a time depicted
as the time of crisis in security. Such a declaration stood as an exemplary moment (not in the sense of illustration or allegory,
but as a moment of crystallization) for disciplinary prohibitions to think and act otherwiseperhaps the moment when a doxa exhibits its most
powerful hold. Hence, what
for a response to it. This call for a response highlights the idea that, far from being a luxury, critique is non-optional in its nature. Such an
understanding of critical thought is premised on a historical consciousness that grasps the present historically so as to break with the
selfconception of the age. Untimely
conceives
the present as historically contoured but not itself experienced as history because not necessarily
continuous with what has been.352 It is an attitude that renders the present as the site of nonutopian possibility since it is historically situated and constrained yet also a possibility since it is not historically
foreordained or determined.353 It entails contesting the delimitations of choice and challenging the
confinement of politics to existing possibilities . Rather than positing history as existing objectively outside of
weight of time (which would amount to ahistoricity) nor being weighed down by the times (as in the case of teleology).351 It
narration, what Browns discussion highlights is the intimate relation between the constitution of political subjectivity vis--vis the meaning of
history for the present. It alludes to the power of historical discourse, which Mowitt explains as a power to estrange us from that which is most
familiar, namely, the fixity of the present because what
saturated by the infinite passion to secure and works toward taking apart the architecture
of security
activists' terrain of concern . In Summers' win win scenario for the global North, the African recipients ot his plan were triply
discounted: discounted as political agents, discounted as long-term casualties of what 1 call in this book "slow violence," and discounted as
cultures possessing environmental practices and concerns of their own. I begin with Summers' extraordinary proposal because it captures the
strategic and representational challenges posed by slow violence as it impacts the environments and the environ-mentalism of the poor. Three
primary concerns animate this book, chief among them my conviction that we urgently need
to rethink politically,
imaginatively , and theoretically what 1 call "slow violence." By slow violence 1 mean a violence that occurs
gradually and out of sight , a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time
and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all. Violence is
customarily conceived as an event or action that is immediate in time, explosive and
spectacular in space, and as erupting into instant sensational visibility . We need, I believe, to
engage a different kind of violence, a violence that is neither spectacular nor instantaneous, but
rather incremental and accretive , its calamitous repercussions playing out across a range of
temporal scales. In so doing, we also need to engage the representational, narrative, and strategic challenges posed by the
relative invisibility of slow violence . Climate change, the thawing cryosphere, toxic drift,
biomagnification, deforestation, the radioactive aftermath s of wars, acidifying oceans, and
significantly in recent years. Where green or environmental discourses were once frequently regarded with skepticism as neocolo-nial. Western
impositions inimical to the resource priorities of the poor in the global South, such attitudes have been tempered by the gathering visibility and
credibility of environmental justice movements that have pushed back against an antihuman environmenialism that too often sought (under the
banner of universalism) to impose green agendas dominated by rich nations and Western NGOs. Among those who inhabit the front lines of the
global resource wars, suspicions that environmentaUsm is another guise of what Andrew Ross calls "planetary management" have not. of course,
been wholly allayed.1 But those suspicions have eased somewhat as the spectrum of what counts as environmenialism has broadened. Western
activists are now more prone to recognize, engage, and learn from resource insurrections among the global poor that might previously have been
discounted as not properly environmental.' Indeed, 1 believe that the fate of environ mentalismand more decisively, the character of the
biosphere itselfwill be shaped significantly in decades to come by the tension between what Ramachandra Guha and Joan Martinez-Alier have
called "full-stomach' and "empty-belly" environmenialism.' The challenge of visibility that links slow violence to the environmen-talism of the
poor connects directly to this hook's third circulating concernthe complex, often vexed figure of the
environmental writer-
activist . In the chapters that follow 1 address not just literary but more broadly rhetorical and visual challenges posed by slow violence;
however, 1 place particular emphasis on combative writers who have deployed their imaginative agility and worldly ardor to help amplify the
media marginalized causes of the environmentally dispossessed. I have sought to stress those places where writers and social movements, often in
complicated tandem, have stralcgized against attritional disasters that afflict embattled communities. The writers I engage arc geographically
wide rangingfrom various parts of the African continent, from the Middle East. India, the Caribbean, the United States, and Britainand work
across a variety of forms. Figures like Wangari Maathai. Arundhati Roy. lndra Sinha. Ken Saro-Wiwa, Abdulrah-man Munif. Njabulo Ndebcle,
Nadine Gordimer, Jamaica Kincaid, Rachel Carson, and June Jordan are alive to the inhabited impact of corrosive transnational forces, including
petro-imperialism. the megadam industry, outsourced toxicity, neocolonial tourism, antihuman conservation practices, corporate and
environmental deregulation, and the militarization of commerce, forces that disproportionately jeopardize the livelihoods, prospects, and memory
banks of the global poor. Among the writers 1 consider, some have testified in relative isolation, some have helped instigate movements for
environmental justice, and yet others, in aligning themselves with preexisting movements, have given imaginative definition to the issues at stake
while enhancing the public visibility of the cause. Relations between movements and writers are often fraught and fric-tional. not least because
are
enraged by injustices they wish to see redressed, injustices they believe they can help
expose, silences they can help dismantle through testimonial protest, rhetorical
inventiveness, and counterhistories in the face of formidable odds . Most are restless, versatile writers
such movements themselves are susceptible to fracture from both external and internal pressures.* That said, the writers I consider
ready to pit their energies against what Edward Said called "the normalized quiet of unseen power."" This normalized quiet is of particular
pertinence to the hushed havoc and injurious invisibility that trail slow violence. In this book, I
nuclear "tests," the largest of them equal in force to 1.000 I liroshima-sizcd bombs. In 1950 the Atomic Energy Commission declared the
Marshall Islands "by far the most contaminated place in the world," a condition that would compromise independence in the long term, despite
the islands' formal ascent in 1979 into the ranks of self-governing nations." The island republic was still in pan governed by an irradiated past:
well into the 1980s its history of nuclear colonialism, long forgotten by the colonizers, was still delivering into the world "jellyfish babies"
headless, eyeless, limbless human infants who would live for just a few hours.11 If, as Said notes, struggles over geography are never reducible
to armed struggle but have a profound symbolic and narrative component as well, and if, as Michael Watts insists, we must attend to the "violent
geographies of fast capitalism." we
from slow
violence are moreover, out of sync not only with our narrative and media expectations but also with the swift seasons of
electoral change. Politicians routinely adopt a "last in, first out" stance toward environmental issues, admitting them when limes are
flush, dumping them as soon as times get tight. Because preventative or remedial environmental legislation typically targets slow violence, it
cannot deliver dependable electoral cycle results, even though those results may ultimately be life saving. Relative to bankable pocket-book
actionsthere'll be a tax rebate check in the mail next Augustenvironmental payouts seem to lurk on a distant horizon. Many politicians
and indeed many votersroutinely treat
How can environmental activists and storytellers work to counter the potent political, corporate, and even scientific forces invested in immediate
self-interest, procrastination, and dissembling? We see such dissembling at work, for instance, in the afterword to Michael Crichton's 2004
environmental conspiracy novel, Slate of Fear, wherein he argued that we needed twenty more years of daia gaihcringon climate change before
any policy decisions could be ventured.1* Although the National Academy of Sciences had assured former president George W. Bush that
humans were indeed causing the earth to warm. Bush shopped around for views that accorded with his own skepticism and found them in a
private meeting with Crichton, whom he described as "an expert scientist.*' To address the challenges of slow violence is to confront the
dilemma Rachel Carson faced almost half a century ago as she sought to dramatize what she eloquently called "death by indirection."'" Carson's
subjects were biomagnification and toxic drift, forms of oblique, slow-acting violence that, like climate change, pose formidable imaginative
difficulties for writers and activists alike. In struggling to give shape to amorphous menace, both Carson and reviewers of 5ilcn( Spring resorted
to a narrative vocabulary: one reviewer portrayed the book as exposing "the new, unplottcd and mysterious dangers wc insist upon creating all
around us,"" while Carson herself wrote of "a shadow that is no less ominous because it is formless and obscure."10 To confront slow violence
The
representational challenges are acute, requiring creative ways of drawing public attention
to catastrophic acts that are low in instant spectacle but high in long-term effects. To
intervene representation-ally entails devising iconic symbols that embody amorphous
calamities as well as narrative forms that infuse those symbols with dramatic urgency. Seven
requires, then, that we plot and give figurative shape to formless threats whose fatal repercussions are dispersed across space and time.
years after Rachel Carson turned our attention to ihe lethal mechanisms of "death by indirection," Johan Gaining, the influential Norwegian
mathematician and sociologist, coined the term "indirect or structural violence."'' Gakung's theory of structural violence is pertinent here because
some of his concerns overlap with the concerns that animate this book, while others help throw inio relief the rather different features I have
soughi to highlight by introducing the term "slow violence." Structural violence, forGaltung, stands in opposition to the more familiar personal
violence thai dominates our conceptions of what counts as violence per sc." Galtung was concerned, as I am, with widening the field of what
constitutes violence. He soughi to foreground ihe vast structures thai can give rise to acts of personal violence and constitute forms of violence in
and of themselves. Such structural violence may range from the unequal morbidity that results from a commodificd health care system, to racism
itself. What I share with Gal-tung's line of thought is a concern with social justice, hidden agency, and certain forms of violence that are
imperceptible. In these terms, for example, we
to make forms of
slow violence more urgently visible suffered a setback in the United States in the aftermath
of 9/11, which reinforced a spectacular, immediately sensational, and instantly hyper-visible
image of what constitutes a violent threat . The fiery spectacle of the collapsing towers was
burned into the national psyche as the definitive image of violence , setting back by years attempts to rally
public sentiment against climate change, a threat that is incremental, exponential, and far less sensationally visible. Condoleezza
Rice's strategic fantasy of a mushroom cloud looming over America if the United States failed
to invade Iraq gave further visual definition to cataclysmic violence as something explosive
and instantaneous , a recognizably cinematic, immediately sensational, pyrotechnic event . The
representational bias against slow violence has, furthermore, a critically dangerous impact on
what counts as a casualty in the first place. Casualties of slow violence-human and
environmental-are the casualties most likely not to be seen, not to be counted. Casualties of
slow violence become light-weight, disposable casualties, with dire consequences for the ways wars are remembered,
which in turn has dire consequences for the projected casualties from future wars. We can observe this bias at work in the way wars, whose lethal
repercussions spread across space and time, are tidily bookended in the historical record. Thus, for instance, a 2003 New York Times editorial on
Vietnam declared that" during our dozen years there, the U.S. killed and helped kill at least 1.5 million people.'?' But that simple phrase "during
our dozen years there" shrinks the toll, foreshortening the ongoing slow-motion slaughter: hundreds of thousands survived the official war years,
only to slowly lose their lives later to Agent Orange. In a 2002 study, the environmental scientist Arnold Schecter recorded dioxin levels in the
bloodstreams of Bien Hoa residents at '35 times the levels of Hanoi's inhabitants, who lived far north of the spraying." The afflicted include
thousands of children born decades after the war's end. More than thirty years after the last spray run, Agent Orange continues to wreak havoc as,
through biomagnification, dioxins build up in the fatty tissues of pivotal foods such as duck and fish and pass from the natural world into the
cooking pot and from there to ensuing human generations. An Institute of Medicine committee has by now linked seventeen medical conditions to
Agent Orange; indeed, as recently as 2009 it uncovered fresh evidence that exposure to the chemical increases the likelihood of developing
Parkinson's disease and ischemic heart disease." Under such circumstances, wherein long-term risks continue to emerge, to bookend a war's
casualties with the phrase "during our dozen years there" is misleading: that small, seemingly innocent phrase is a powerful reminder of how our
rhetorical conventions for bracketing violence routinely ignore ongoing, belated casualties.
was important to preserve old battle sites as "not merely symbols for the
recollection of war" but as "symbols of peace."2 As a representative of the Okinawa Peace Network put it, preserved
battle sites will be the "'living witnesses' that pass on local war experience in place of the Battle of Okinawa
survivors who are quickly passing away."3 Indeed, preservation activity has surged over the last decade upon the realization that indiscriminate
development since reversion (1972) has reduced the number of battle site ruins to about 100 according to an Okinawa Peace Network survey.
This statistic can be appreciated by recognizing that virtually the entire main island of Okinawa was turned into one big battle site during the
three-month campaign (late March to July 1945) that resulted in over two hundred thousand deaths, including about ninety-four thousand
Okinawan noncombatants.4 This preservation effort, supported by the teaching and practice of "battle ruin archeology" (senseki kSkogaku), has
paralleled systematic training and mobilization of a younger generation of "peace guides" (heiwa gaido) in Okinawa to replace the "war
experience storytellers" (senso taiken kataribe), who will represent only about 5 percent of the population in Okinawa Prefecture by 2005.5 This
chapter reflects on the ways in which war-related tours conducted by volunteer peace guides and catering primarily to mainland high school study
tours have been framed in relation to history education and peace discourses, on the one hand, and popular commercial battle site tours and
veterans' group pilgrimages, on the other. My interest is not only in how "war
slavery is universally condemned. The point is that the most central values of cultures
thought to be essential to the very survival of the society and allegedly grounded in the
natural conditions of creationcan change in fundamental ways in relatively short
periods of time with profound implications for individuals and societies. John Dewey beautifully links this point
to the consideration of warism: War is as much a social pattern [for us] as was the domestic slavery which the
ancients thought to be immutable fact.9 The civil rights movement has helped us see that human worth is not
determined by a racial hierarchy. Feminism has helped us realize again that dominant attitudes about people are more likely values we choose
rather than innate and determined features of human nature. It is historically true that men have been more actively violent and have received
more training and encouragement in violence than have women.10 Dominant attitudes of culture have explained this by reference to what is
natural for males and natural for females. By questioning the traditional role models for men and women, all of us be- come more free to
sexism have been examined and exposed. Just as opponents of racism and sex-
2NC Framework
The role of the judge should be an educator pushing students to propose Utopia.
Most predictable the majority of coaches and judges work in education,.
Their F/W argument link to the k it assume the same model of technical-oriented
rationality which discounts epistemological inquiry as not timely the impact is
global warfare and structural violence thats above.
The permutation of letting them weigh the aff against the Kritik is bad, a.) it
presumes we should be using this space for short-term action which we already
impact turned, and b:) presumes an emergency frame which discounts alternative
viewpoints.
Dillon & Reid 9
[Michael, Professor of Politics at Lancaster University, England and Julian, Lecturer in International Relations in the Department of War Studies at Kings College London, The
Liberal Way of War, page number below, CMR/WD]
Many have observed that the societies of the Atlantic basin are now increasingly ruled by fear; that there is a
politics of fear. But they interpret this politics of fear in politically naive ways, as the outcome of deliberate machination by political and economic elites. They may well be correct to
what is perfectly evident, also, is that the elites themselves are also governed by the very
grids of intelligibility furnished by the account of life as an emergency of emergence. It is not
simply a matter, therefore, of leaders playing on fears. The leadership itself is in the grip of a conjugation of
government and rule whose very generative principle of formation is permanent
emergency. In other words, fear is no longer simply an affect open to regular manipulation by leadership
cadres. It is, but it is not only that, and not even most importantly that. More importantly (because this is not a condition that can be resolved simply by 'throwing
the rascals out'), in the permanent emergency of emergence, fear becomes a generative principle of formation for rule.
The emergency of emergence therefore poses a profound crisis in western understandings of the
political, and in the hopes and expectations invested in political as opposed to other forms of life. Given the wealth, and given the vast
military preponderance in weapons of mass destruction and other forms of globally deployed military
capability of the societies of the Atlantic basin, notably, of course, the United States, this poses a world crisis as well. In short, then,
this complex adaptive emergent life exists in the permanent emergency of its own emergence. Its politics of security and war, which is to say its very foundational
politics of rule as well, now revolve around this state of emergency . Here, that in virtue of which a 'we' comes to belong together, its very
generative principle of formation (our shorthand definition of politics), has become this emergency. What happens, we also therefore ask of the
biopoliticization of rule, when emergency becomes the generative principle of formation of community and rule? Our answer has already been given. Politics becomes
subject to the urgent and compelling political economy, the logistical and technical
dynamics, of war. No longer a 'we' in virtue of abiding by commonly agreed rules of government, it becomes a 'we' formed by the
rule of the emergency itself; and that is where the political crisis, the crisis of the political itself in the west, lies,
since the promise always invested in western understandings of the political is that a 'we'
can belong together not only in terms of agreeing to abide by the rule of its generative
principles of formation but also by the willingness to keep the nature and operation of
those generative principles of formation under common deliberative scrutiny. You cannot,
however, debate emergency. You can only interrogate the utile demands it makes on you, and all the epistemic challenges it poses, acceding to those demands
according both to how well you have come to know them, and how well you have also adapted your affects to suffering them, or perish. The very exigencies of
emergency thus militate profoundly against the promise of 'politics' as it has been commonly
understood in the western tradition; not simply as a matter of rule, but as a matter of self-rule in which it was possible to debate the nature of the self in terms of the good
some degree. But
the very idea of the self has disappeared from view in this conflation of
life with species life. The only intelligence, the only self-knowledge, the only culture which qualifies in
the permanence of this emergency is the utilitarian and instrumental technologies said to
be necessary to endure it. We have been here before in the western tradition, and we have experienced the challenges of this condition as tyranny (Arendt
1968). The emergency of emergence, the generative principle of formation, the referential
matrix of contemporary biopolitics globally, is a newly formed, pervasive and insidiously
complex, soft totalitarian regime of power relations; made all the more difficult to contest
precisely because, governing through the contingent emergency of emergence, it is a governing through the transactional
freedoms of contingency itself. [Page 84-87]
for and of the self. Note, also, how much
Fairness is only a means to an end. Advocacy offense trumps their impacts. Its
better to have a slightly worse debate about an important subject than a fair and
deep debate about one that doesnt matter.
Policy relevance destroys scholarship- and turns any of their standards.
Xenakis 2 - Christopher I. Xenakis Assistant Professor of Political Science, Tidewater
Community College What Happened to the Soviet Union? 2002
Why did so many American Soviet experts fail to anticipate the possibility of reform taking place
in the USSR? A number of prominent scholars, whose work we have examined at length in these pages, have argued pointedly that Cold War Sovietology
was perversely influenced, or co-opted, by totalitarianism model thinking and the Cold War
consensus. And it stands to reason that if Sovietologists themselves thought they were co-opted, some of them probably were. This explanation accords with Thomas S. Kuhn's account
of why scholarly communities are often reticent to accept new and anomalous data . As Alexander Dallin and
Gail W. Lapidus recalled, the Gorbachev reforms of the mid-1980s "challenged the prevailing academic paradigms and conventional wisdom regarding the Soviet system. The initial Western
reaction to the Gorbachev program was one of profound skepticism," the two scholars noted.86 "The widely held belief among U.S. Soviet experts was that "basic [Soviet) change was impossible
and could not be carried out by people who had themselves grown up in and benefited from the system." Eventually, with the delegitimation of Communism in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet
Union in 1991, a "scientific revolution" occurred in western Sovietology, as Soviet experts saw many of the familiar realities they had taken for grantednotably, the Cold War and the USSR
discipline of Sovietology came into being "during the worst years" of the East-West conflict. Cohen added, at a time when U.S.-Soviet relations "intruded into academia both] politically and
The Cold War put a premium on "usable scholarship" that served Washington's
policy interests and diminished "more detached academic pursuits." If most early Sovietologists were honorable and
intellectually "
well-intentioned scholars, "many came to [their discipline through] wartime experience and [their] interest in 'national security,'" and not out "of an intellectual passion" for Soviet studies. These
Motyl revealed that during much of the Cold War, the influx of government money into academic political science departments and Russian studies institutes went hand in hand with the
government's attempt "to set Sovietology's research agenda" along policy-analysis lines.*8 But
universities, because "notwithstanding its importance for democratic government, policy analysis inclines
Sovietologists to eschew the very stuff of theorybig questions with no simple answers. "
Analogously, Frederic J. Fleron and Eric P. Hoffmann argued that far too many U.S. scholars were focusing on short-term policyoriented research during the Cold War years. Such analyses were "neither historically grounded nor farsighted"; they "place[d] heavy emphasis on current political personalities, top-level power
relationships, and international and domestic crises" and skimped "on the thinking and
behavior of counter-elites and citizens; on underlying socioeconomic and scientifictechnological trends; and on policy options, policy implementation, and policy outcomes at
the national, regional, and local levels."*9 In addition, such research was "more focused on means
than ends, more speculative than analytical, more partial to simplistic than complex
explanations," more eager for quick fixes than durable solutions, more accepting of official
than independent views, and more cognizant of immediate than eventual political costs and
consequences." According to scholar Raymond C. Taras, Cold War scholarship simply followed geopolitics and
followed the money. Since the government was paying universities and think tanks for
research pertaining to the Soviet threat, little attention was focused on the Baltic states or
on the individual Soviet republics.90 Even as late as 1992, "western universities ha[d] trained few students in the languages spoken in the breakaway
republics, making prospects for incisive empirical research not promising." The existence of a pervasive co-optative relationship between academic Sovietology and the government is also
suggested by the career mobility many scholars enjoyed between these two environments. According to Jerry F. Hough, there existed, throughout the Cold War period, a virtual revolving door
between American universities, think tanks, and government foreign policy and national security-related agencies and departmentsand a number of Soviet experts moved repeatedly and often
from one of these professional environments to another.91 Not only did Sovietologists move freely from academia to government and back again; this study argues, more
perversely,
that
. While there were
significant distinctions between realist, political cultural-historicist, and pluralist points of view, the scholarly differences between professors, researchers, and policy makers of the same
Sovietologiest school were relatively slight. Thus, political cultural-historicists tended to think alike, whether they taught at a university or sat at a policy desk at the State Departmentand the
same was true of realists and pluralists. What this suggests is that
both in
the early Cold War years and in the 1970s and 1980sif for no other reason than that all Sovietologists, regardless of the professional setting in which they worked, needed good data, and the
government both supplied much of this data (for example, in unclassified CIA and Department of Defense studies) and controlled scholars' ability to acquire it on their own (through the tacit
threat of denying research grants and passport renewals to researchers who stirred up trouble). If it is true that many scholars became policy makers, and in turn, that a significant number of
government officials were also scholars, then we should expect that these professional communities courted and cooperated with one another as much they competed against each other. And it
A2: Permutation
Permutation is either severance or intrinsic both are voting issues. Makes it
impossible for us to be negative.
Perm is impossible The aff is a pragmatic deliberation, the alt is a Utopian rupture
to the architecture of securitization the two are necessary distinct.
All our links are DAs to the permutation:
National Security DA Any net benefit to the permutation presumes a top-down model
of deliberation and policy construction, the impact is the nation security apparatus, thats
above.
Apocalypse DA The emergency frame of the aff necessitates crowding out deliberation with a
politics of pre-emption, thats De-Good, Randall, Dillon and Reid. The impact is serial policy
failure.
Shift DISAD the emergency frame of the aff means withdrawal will lead to a
renewed call for military presence.
Kozue Akibayashi, 9 researcher at the Institute for Gender Studies, Ochanomizu University,
and Suzuyo Takazato, co-chair of Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence and one of the
foremost Japanese peace activists and feminists who critically examines U.S. bases on Okinawa,
Bases of Empire, p. 265-267
In the OWAAMV movement, it
is believed that closing the U.S. bases and troop withdrawal need to be
implemented in the larger context of demilitarization of the entire security system. As the discussions of
the movements international networking reveal, closing or decreasing the capacity of one Asian base has often led
to the reinforcement of other military bases in the region as a means of minimizing the negative
effects of the closure on the U.S. militarys global strategies. For instance, when the bases in the
Philippines were closed in 1992, those troops previously assigned there were transferred to bases in
Okinawa and Korea. More recently, lessening the burden of people in Okinawa, a phrase in the Security
Consultative Committee (2006) document, will be achieved by build-up on Guam
. From the perspectives of the international community and of the U.S. military, which
limits access to such highly classified information on security policies to a handful of people, thereby creating a new hierarchy, this may be an obvious tactic. It has been very difficult for grassroots peace activists to make such analyses and predictions due largely to the lack of resources
and information. In recent years, however, this type of observation of global strategies has been made possible through international solidarity and the exchange of information among areas. Through these networks, members of grassroots movements in Asia and in other parts of the world are
now connected and are better equipped to cope with the dwarfing information giant of the U.S. military. People have to unite with each other. There is an increasing understanding among people in the struggle against the U.S. military empire that security of people can never be achieved
without demilitarizing the security system. Feminist international scholars have already argued that a gender perspective effectively reveals an unequal dichotomy between the protector and the protected on which the present security system has been built (Peterson 1992). The OWAAMV
movement illustrates from a gender perspective that the protected, who are structurally deprived of political power, are in fact not protected by the militarized security policies; rather their livelihoods are made insecure by these very policies. The movement has also illuminated the fact that
gated bases do not confine military violence to within the bases. Those hundreds-of-miles-long fences around the bases are there only to assure the readiness of the military and military operations by excluding and even oppressing the people living outside the gated bases. The practical
aspect of analysis, connection, and solidarity among feminist activists worldwide has not been the only empowering experience for women in the struggle. As has happened so many times in the past, people in communities hosting U.S. bases have been divided over such issues as public
economic support for the financially distressed localities, and thus have felt isolated and disempowered, unable to mount or maintain protest actions. OWAAMV women have also, at times, been lone voices against a patriarchy that is, they argue, the source of the militarized security system.
Not only people in the local communities but also members of communities across borders share knowledge, analysis, and deep rage against injustice, as well as a vision of a demilitarized world with gender justice. Here, we see possibility and hope for transformation. Those who struggle for
the achievement of a demilitarized security system may have a long way to go, but they never lose hope.
Links
[John, Woody Hayes National Security Studies and Professor of Political Science @ Ohio State University, Mark, Professor of Civil Engineering and Director of the
Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle in Australia, Terror, Security, and Money, page numbers below, CMR]
Sunstein, who seems to have invented the phrase "probability neglect," assesses the version
peoples attention is focused on
the bad outcome itself and they are inattentive to the fact that it is unlikely to occur." Moreover, they
are inclined to "demand a substantial governmental response-even if the magnitude of the
risk does not warrant the response." It may be this phenomenon that Treverton experienced. Playing to this demand,
government officials are inclined to focus on worst-case scenarios , presumably in the
knowledge, following Sunstein's insight, that this can emotionally justify just about any expenditure , no [end page
14] matter how unlikely the prospect the dire event will actually take place. Accordingly; there is a
preoccupation with "low probability/ high consequence" events, such as the detonation of a sizable nuclear device in
Focusing on Worst-Case Scenarios Cass
of the phenomenon that comes into being when "emotions are intensely engaged." Under that circumstance, he argues, "
midtown Manhattan. The process could be seen in action in an article published in 2008 by Secretary of Homeland Security (DHS) Michael Chertoff. He felt called upon to respond to
the number of people who die each year from international terrorism, While tragic, is
exceedingly small
actually
. "This fails to consider," he pointed out, "the much greater loss of life that Weapons of mass destruction could wreak on the American
people." That is, he was justifying his entire budget-only a limited portion of which is concerned with Weapons of mass destruction by the WMD threat, even While avoiding assessing
"disaster" or "catastrophe" resulting in "great human costs in life, property environmental damage, and future economic activity" However, depending on how one Weighs the
melt down. If we don't build it, We will run short of power and society will collapse into anarchy" And worst, it "validates ignorance" because, "instead of focusing on what We
the precautionary principle, a decent working definition of which is "action should be taken to correct a problem as soon as there is evidence that harm may occur, not after the harm
action less than a week after 9/11, when President George W Bush outlined his new
national security strategy: "We cannot let our enemies strike first . . . [but must take]
anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place
of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United
States, will, if necessary act preemptively _ . . America will act against such emerging threats
before they are fully formed ." The 2003 invasion of Iraq, then, was justified by invoking the
has already occurred." It could be seen in
precautionary principle based on the worst-case scenario in which Saddam Hussein might
strike. If, on the other hand, any worst-case thinking focused on the potential for the destabilizing
effects a war would have on Iraq and the region, the precautionary principle would guide
one to be very cautious about embarking on war. As Sunstein notes, the precautionary principle "offers
no guidance-not that it is Wrong, but that it forbids all courses of action, including regulation." Thus, "taken seriously it is paralyzing ,
banning the very steps that it simultaneously requires."9 It can be invoked in equal measure to act or not to act. There are
considerable dangers in applying the precautionary principle to terrorism: on the one hand, any action taken to reduce a presumed risk
always poses the introduction of countervailing risks, while on the other, larger, expensive counterterrorism
efforts will come accompanied by high opportunity costs." Moreover "For public officials no less than the rest of us, the
probability of harm matters a great deal, and it is foolish to attend exclusively to the worst case scenario ." A more
rational approach to worst-case thinking is to establish the likelihood of gains and losses
from various courses of action, including staying the current course." This, of course, is the essence of risk assessment. What is
necessary is due consideration to the spectrum of threats, not simply the worst one
imaginable, in order to properly understand, and coherently deal with, the risks to people, institutions, and the economy The relevant decision makers are professionals,
and it is not unreasonable to suggest that they should do so seriously. Notwithstanding political pressures (to be discussed more in chapter 9), the fact that the public has difficulties
with probabilities when emotions are involved does not relieve those in charge of the requirement, even the duty to make decisions about the expenditures of vast quantities of public
monies in a responsible manner. [page 14-17]
Link Legitimacy
Their tactic of legitimacy is a guise to provide the United States with a velvet
coercive glove. Not only do nations see through the charade, but the politics
produce violent pre-emption.
Gulli 13. Bruno Gulli, professor of history, philosophy, and political science at Kingsborough
College in New York, For the critique of sovereignty and violence,
http://academia.edu/2527260/For_the_Critique_of_Sovereignty_and_Violence, pg. 5
I think that we have now an understanding of what the situation is: The sovereign
everywhere , be it the political or financial elite, fakes the legitimacy on which its power
and authority supposedly rest. In truth, they rest on violence and terror , or the threat
thereof. This is an obvious and essential aspect of the singularity of the present crisis. In
this sense, the singularity of the crisis lies in the fact that the struggle for dominance is at
one and the same time impaired and made more brutal by the lack of hegemony. This is
true in general, but it is perhaps particularly true with respect to the greatest power on
earth, the United States , whose hegemony has diminished or vanished . It is a fortiori true
of whatever is called the West, of which the US has for about a century represented the
vanguard. Lacking hegemony, the sheer drive for domination has to show its true face , its
raw violence. The usual, traditional ideological justifications for dominance (such as
bringing democracy and freedom here and there) have now become very weak because of
the contempt that the dominant nations (the US and its most powerful allies) regularly
show toward legality, morality, and humanity. Of course, the so-called rogue states,
thriving on corruption, do not fare any better in this sense, but for them, when they act
autonomously and against the dictates of the West, the specter of punishment, in the form
of retaliatory war or even indictment from the International Criminal Court, remains a
clear limit, a possibility. Not so for the dominant nations: who will stop the United States
from striking anywhere at will, or Israel from regularly massacring people in the Gaza
Strip, or envious France from once again trying its luck in Africa? Yet, though still
dominant, these nations are painfully aware of their structural, ontological and historical,
weakness. All attempts at concealing that weakness (and the uncomfortable awareness of
it) only heighten the brutality in the exertion of what remains of their dominance.
Although they rely on a highly sophisticated military machine (the technology of drones is
a clear instance of this) and on an equally sophisticated diplomacy, which has traditionally
been and increasingly is an outpost for military operations and global policing (now
excellently incarnated by Africom ), they know that they have lost their hegemony .
Domination without hegemony is a phrase that Giovanni Arrighi uses in his study of the
long twentieth century and his lineages of the twenty-first century (1994/2010 and 2007).
Originating with Ranajit Guha (1992), the phrase captures the singularity of the global crisis,
the terminal stage of sovereignty, in Arrighis historical investigation of the present and of
the future (1994/2010: 221). It acquires particular meaning in the light of Arrighis notion
of the bifurcation of financial and military power. Without getting into the question, treated
by Arrighi, of the rise of China and East Asia, what I want to note is that for Arrighi, early in the
twenty-first century, and certainly with the ill-advised and catastrophic war against Iraq,
the US belle poque came to an end and US world hegemony entered what in all
likelihood is its terminal crisis. He continues: Although the United States remains by far
the worlds most powerful state, its relationship to the rest of the world is now best
described as one of domination without hegemony (1994/2010: 384). What can the US do
next? Not much, short of brutal dominance. In the last few years, we have seen president
Obama praising himself for the killing of Osama bin Laden. While that action was most
likely unlawful, too (Noam Chomsky has often noted that bin Laden was a suspect, not
someone charged with or found guilty of a crime), it is certain that you can kill all the bin
Ladens of the world without gaining back a bit of hegemony . In fact, this killing, just like
G. W. Bushs war against Iraq, makes one think of a Mafia-style regolamento di conti more
than any other thing. Barack Obama is less forthcoming about the killing of 16-year-old
Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, whose fate many have correctly compared to that of 17-year-old
Trayvon Martin (killed in Florida by a self-appointed security watchman), but it is precisely in
cases like this one that the weakness at the heart of empire , the ill-concealed and
uncontrolled fury for the loss of hegemony , becomes visible. The frenzy denies the
possibility of power as care , which is what should replace hegemony , let alone domination.
Nor am I sure I share Arrighis optimistic view about the possible rise of a new hegemonic
center of power in East Asia and China: probably that would only be a shift in the axis of
uncaring power, unable to affect, let alone exit, the paradigm of sovereignty and violence.
What is needed is rather a radical alternative in which power as domination, with or
without hegemony, is replaced by power as care in other words, a poetic rather than
military and financial shift.
Alt
Responding directly to Thayer, Duncan Bell and Paul MacDonald have expressed concern at the intellectual
functionalism inherent in sociobiological explanations, suggesting that too often analysts choose a
specific behaviour and read backwards into evolutionary epochs in an attempt to
rationalize explanations for that behaviour. These arguments, Bell and MacDonald write, often fall into what
Richard Lewontin and Stephen Jay Gould have called adaptionism, or the attempt to understand all physiological
and behavioural traits of an organism as evolutionary adaptations.42 Arguments such as
these are hand-crafted by their makers, and tend to carry forward their assumptions and
biases. In an insightful article, Jason Edwards suggests that sociobiology and its successor, evolutionary psychology,
are fundamentally political because they frame their major questions in terms of an
assumed individualism. Edwards suggests that the main question in both sub- fields is: given human nature, how is politics possible?43 The
problem is that the givens of human nature are drawn backward from common
knowledges and truths about humans in society, and the game-theory experiments which
seek to prove them are often created with such assumptions in mind. These arguments are seen by their critics
as politicized from the very start. Sociobiology in particular has been widely interpreted as a conservative
politico-scientific tool because of these basic assumptions, and because of the political
writings of many sociobiologists .44 Because sociobiology naturalizes certain behaviours like
conflict, inequality and prejudice, Lewontin et al. suggest that it sets the stage for legitimation of things
as they are. 45 The danger inherent in arguments that incorporate sociobiological arguments into
examinations of modern political life, the authors say, is that such arguments naturalize variable
behaviours and support discriminatory political structures. Even if certain behaviours are found
to have a biological drives behind them, dismissing those behaviours as natural precludes the
possibility that human actors can make choices and can avoid anti-social, violent, or undesirable
action.46 While the attempt to discover a genetically- determined human nature has usually been
justified under the argument that knowing humankinds basic genetic programming will help to
solve the resulting social problems, discourse about human nature seems to generate selffulfilling prophesies by putting limits on what is considered politically possible. While
sociobiologists tend to distance themselves from the naturalistic fallacy that what is is what
should be, there is still a problem with employing adaptionism to explain how existing political
structures because conclusions tend to be drawn in terms of conclusions that assert what must
be because of biologically- ingrained constraints.47 Too firm a focus on sociobiological
arguments about natural laws draws attention away from humanitys potential for social and
political solutions that can counteract and mediate any inherent biological impulses, whatever
they may be. A revived classical realism based on biological arguments casts biology as destiny
in a manner that parallels the neo-realist sentiment that the international sphere is doomed to
everlasting anarchy. Jim George quotes the English School scholar Martin Wight as writing that
hope is not a political virtue: it is a theological virtue.48 George questions the practical result
of traditional realsist claims, arguing that the suggestion that fallen mans sinful state can only be
redeemed by a higher power puts limitations on what is considered politically possible. Thayers
argument rejects the religious version of the fallen man for a scientific version, but similar
problems remain with his scientific conclusions. The political and philosophical debates that
surround sociobiology in general are the least of the problems with Bradley Thayers article. In
fact, Thayers argument is exactly the sort of reading of sociobiology about which its critics like
Lewontin and Gould have been uncomfortably anticipating. Worse, Thayers exercise
demonstrates a misreading of many evolutionary arguments drawing conclusions with
which the theorists he cites would likely distance themselves. His argument about an
egoistic human nature relies on a tiresomely common oversimplification of a classic
Darwinist argument, crudely linking natural selection to the assumption that selfishness
encourages evolutionary fitness ; Even Thayer feels the need to qualify this argument in a footnote.49 Thayers citation of
Richard Dawkins selfish gene theory to provide the second sufficient explanation for
egoism is also incredibly problematic.50 In The Selfish Gene, Dawkins suggests that at the
beginning of micro-organic life genes that promoted survival were key to making basic lifeforms into simple survival machines. Rather than viewing genes as an organisms tool for generating, Dawkins suggests
that it is wiser to look at the development of complex organisms as genes method of
replicating themselves. The word selfish is used as a shorthand to describe a more complex
phenomenon: genes that give their organic vessel advantages in survival and reproduction
are successfully transmitted into future generations.5 1 However, an important part of
Dawkins work is that the selfishness of genes translates into decidedly unselfish
behaviours. Dawkins himself has had to distance himself from groups who interpreted his
focus on kin selection as a reification of ethnocentrism : The National Front was saying something like this, kin selection
provides the basis for favoring your own race as distinct from other races, as a kind of generalization of favoring your own close family as opposed to other
individuals. Kin selection doesnt do that! Kin selection favors nepotism towards your own immediate close family. It does not favor a generalization of nepotism
together do not suggest, contrary to Thayers argument, that humans readily give allegiance to
the state, or embrace religion or ideologies such as liberalism or communism, because evolution
has produced a need to belong to a dominance hierarchy.55 If humans do depend on social
connectedness, must this necessarily come in the form of hierarchical, patriarchal structures? The
case is not made convincingly. As I shall discuss below, alternate understandings of the
connection between basic human needs, human culture, and environmental stresses can provide
an understanding of dominance hierarchies that does not naturalize their ubiquity. Beyond the
problems with the scientific evidence behind Thayers ontological claims, there are also
problems with his proposed epistemological project of consilience. Using sociobiology to unite
the social and natural sciences (and to give bases to a revitalized classical realism) would depend
on achieving a near omnipotence, where known genetic programs could be weighed against
known environmental influence, using science to predict the results. At the outset of his essay,
Thayer implies that science is progressing at a rapid pace towards making this a reality. Yet
evolutionary explanations for specific behaviours become incredibly problematic given all of the
possible factors and externalities which might have affected evolutionary outcomes, all of which
are impossible to map into even the most complex mathematical theoretical games. Bell and
MacDonald point out that many biologists dispute whether sociobiology can offer useful
commentary on humans because of the central role of culture, language, and self-reflexivity in
determining human behaviour.56 Similarly, in response to Shaw and Wong, Joshua Goldstein
cites evidence that human beings do not demonstrate an inherent tendency towards aggression,
instead displaying cooperation more often. Goldstein offers the possibility that human
behavioural traits like aggression, altruism, and sacrifice are shaped more by cultural
transmission than by genes. This possibility enormously complicates the attempt at consilience
intended by Thayer and his contemporaries, by adding in incalculable variables that come with
social and cultural interactions.57 Because of these complications, Lewontin, Rose, and Kamin
have asserted that sociobiologys grand argument is discredited since no aspect of human social
behaviour has ever been linked to a specific gene or set of genes.58 As Mary Clark observes, one
of the major results of the human genome project was the falsification of the supposition that
each protein produced in a human cell was coded by a separate gene. In fact, genes often work
interdependently, with the same gene recurring along the chromosome and causing different
outcomes depending on its position and neighbouring genes. Clark describes the complex signals
and activations which occur at the genetic level, concluding that rather than a linear
unidirectional blueprint, the human genome is more like an ecosystem, and can be responsive to
its microscopic and perhaps even the macroscopic environment.59 Just how important are the
influences culture, social behaviour, and environment to the human condition, as distinct from
biological programming? In many caveats and footnotes within Thayers own argument, he
includes statements that acknowledge the importance of cultural factors in the shaping of modern
human societies. If all behaviour cannot be explained by sociobiology and other evolutionary
arguments because behaviours are contingent on cultural and environmental factors, how strong
is the scientific support for Thayers revived realist project? As Bell and MacDonald have
suggested, many of the scientific foundations Thayer employs to support his epistemological
program are indeterminate because they cannot explain when cultural or environmental factors
will play a role.60 On the ontological side, Thayer certainly comes a long way from proving that
human nature is defined by and limited to egoism and dominance, as he had intended to do. If
knowledge borrowed from evolutionary biology and other natural sciences suggests that culture
and environment play a significant role in shaping human behaviours, then it may not be the
realist project that is best supported by a deep and sustained interdisciplinary exploration. Citing
evolutionary Science does not truly support realist narratives and explanations of egoistic
competition in human society, despite the fact that over the years it has often been cited by those
wishing to make such cases. There is plenty of evidence in evolutionary science for
explaining why biology is not destiny, and in fact, for unsettling any claim about an
evolutionarily-derived human nature that underlies political life . In her book In Search of Human Nature,
Mary E. Clark has suggested that instead of a human nature defined by genetically programmed instincts, predispositions and drives, it is more useful to discuss a
human nature in terms of universal needs. These needs, she argues, are as close to a human nature as we humans have, since their fulfilment is necessary as a result
of complex development. Clark suggests that human beings have basic biological and psychological needs for bonding, for autonomy, and for meaning.