Pakistan Army

Part Four: Orbat Order of Battle 2009

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, Globalsecurity and Official site
Pakistan Army Order of Battle Corps Insignia
West Front (?) - I AC Magla – II AC Multan – IV AC Lahore
V AC Karachi – X AC Rawalpindi – XI AC Peshawar – XII AC Quetta
XXX AC Sialkot – XXXI AC Bhawalpur
Pakistan Army Division Insignia
8th Inf Div.- 9th Inf Div. – 10th Inf Div. - 11th Inf Div. -
14th Inf Div - 15th Inf. Div. - 16th Inf Div – 17th Inf Div.
18th Inf Div. – 19th Inf Div. – 23rd Inf. Div. – 33rd Inf. Div.
37th Inf Div. – 40th Inf. Div. – 41st Inf Div.
Insignia Unknown:
1 and 6 Armored Divisions 2
nd st th
and 12 Artillery Divisions
th
th
25 and 26 Mechanized Divisions 7 and 35 Infantry Divisions .
th th
th
Pakistan Army Order of Battle
Punjab - Strike Corps I Corps Mangla 6 Armoured Division Kharian 17 Mechanized I
nfantry Division Kharian 37 Mechanized Infantry Division Gujranwala Punjab - Hol
ding Corps IV Corps Lahore 10 Infantry Division Lahore 11 Infantry Division Laho
re XXX Corps Gujranwala 2 Artillery Division Gujranwala 8 Infantry Division Sial
kot 15 Infantry Division Sialkot Sindh V Corps Karachi 16 Infantry Division Hyde
rabad 18 Infantry Division Hyderabad 25 Mechanized Infantry Division Malir West
Front Balochistan XII Corps Quetta 33 Infantry Division Hyderabad 41 Infantry Di
vision Hyderabad Other Major Commands ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) Army Air
Defence Command Army Strategic Forces Command In April 2007 Pakistan was report
ed to be creating three new Army commands to "improve the operational efficiency
and working" of its land forces. The Northern, Southern and Central Commands wo
uld be responsible for the administrative arrangements of the corps falling unde
r their respective commands. At that time, the establishment of the Northern and
South Commands had been finalised, while the Central Command was to be raised s
hortly. A three-star General (Lt. General) heads these regional commands. The Pa
kistan Air Force (PAF) already had three regional commands. According to The New
s, the Southern Command would have its headquarters in Quetta, provincial capita
l of Balochistan and home to XII Corps, while the Northern Command's headquarter
s was yet to be determined. The two likely choices in Punjab Province were eithe
r Gujranwala, home to XXX Corps and 37 Mechanized Infantry Division, or Mangla,
home to I Corps. The whereabouts of the headquarters for Central Command was not
reported. These commands are very poorly attested. Governor of Balochistan Owai
s Ahmad Ghani visited Balochistan Institute of Technical Education "BITE" on 9th
May 2007 along with Commander Southern Command Lt. Gen Hamid Rab Nawaz to see t
he progress and activities going on at BITE. On 04 December 2007 President Perve
z Musharraf appreciated the performance of the Pakistan Army and said that he wa
s proud of commanding the best army of the world. Addressing a farewell dinner p
arty hosted by Commander Southern Command Lieutenant General Khalid Shamim Wyne
at the Command and Staff College Quetta, he recalled his affiliation with the co
llege and said he had served as staff director while he was a lieutenant colonel
. Commander Southern Command Khalid Shamim Wyne presented a souvenir to Presiden
t Musharraf and lauded his services as army chief. On arrival at Quetta on 08 Ju
ly 2008, Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani was received by Comman
der Southern Command, Lieutenant General Khalid Shamim Wynne. Kayani also visite
d Headquarters Southern Command, where he was given a briefing on operational, t
raining and administrative matters. After the accession of Punjab in the British
Empire in March 1849, Rawalpindi was made the Headquarters of Northern Command
due to its central location and geo-political importance. The Pakistan Army came
into being as a result of the amalgamation of the Muslim troops of the pre-inde
pendence British Indian Army. The new Pakistan Army when it took over the operat
ions and offices of the British North Command in India in Rawalpindi after indep
endence. Out of the British Northern Command HQ nucleus, the Pakistan Army GHQ w
as organized at its present location. Lt Gen Messervy, the then GOC-in-C Norther
n Command, was promoted and appointed Commander-In-Chief (C-in-C) Pakistan Army.
The GHQ started functioning on 15 August 1947. Engineer-in-Chief Pakistan Army
ERRA (Earthquake Reconstruction & Rehabilitation Authority) WFP / FATA XI Corps
Peshawar 7 Infantry Division Mardan 9 Infantry Division Kohat XXXI Corps Bahawal
pur 26 Mechanized Division Bahawalpur 35 Infantry Division Bahawalpur 40th Infan
try Division Okara J&K, FA A X Corps Rawalpindi Northern Area Command Gilgit 12
Infantry Division Murree 19 Infantry Division Jhelum 23 Infantry Division Gujrat
II Corps Multan 1 Armoured Division Multan 40 Infantry Division Okara
Pakistan Army Order of Battle - Discrepancies
The Pakistan Army does not make its Order of Battle public. As of mid-2009 there
were three recently published ORBATs, including two published a few weeks apart
on Wikipedia. All of these contain notable discrepancies with ORBAT assessments
circa 2002, and there are evident discrepancies even between the two Wikipedia
assessments. 16 Infantry Division, part of V Corps at Panno Aquil as of 2009, wa
s originally was part of XII corps, moving to Panno Aquil Cantonment in 1987. Ja
nes in 2008 places the 14 Infantry Division at Okara under II Corps, while Wiki
in 2009 places the 14 Infantry Division at Okara under XXXI Corps. Janes in 2008
did not attest a 25 Mechanized Infantry Division, while Wiki in 2009 places the
25 Mechanized Infantry Division at Malir under V Corps. Janes in 2008 did not a
ttest a 2 Artillery Division, while Wiki in 2009 places the 2 Artillery Division
at Gujranwala under XXX Corps. Janes in 2008 placed the 34 Infantry Division at
Bahawalpur and the 35 Infantry Division at Pano Aqil, both under XXXI Corps, wh
ile while Wiki in 2009 does not mention the 34 Infantry Division and the 35 Infa
ntry Division is placed at Bahawalpur. Earlier reports on I Corps had 6th Armore
d Division at Mangla, and placed 35 Mechanized Infantry Division at Gujranwala r
ather than 37 Mechanized Infantry Division. Earlier reports on II Corps had 2nd
Artillery Division and 14th Infantry Division at unidentified locations under II
Corps. Earlier reports on XXXI Corps had 33rd Infantry Division at Bhawalpur an
d 37th Infantry Division Sukkur, rather than 34 Infantry Division at Bahawalpur
and 35 Infantry Division at Pano Aqil reported in 2008, or the 2009 report of bo
th 34 Infantry Division and 35 Infantry Division at Bahawalpur, with 14 Infantry
Division at Okara also reporting to XXXI Corps. Earlier reports on V Corps had
16th Infantry Division at Rahim Yar Khan rather than Hyderabad, and did not incl
ude 25 Mechanized Infantry Division. Earlier reports on V Corps had 12th Infantr
y Division at Muzzafarabad [rather than Murree], 19th Infantry Division at Rawal
kot [rather than Jhelum], and 23rd Infantry Division at Mangla [rather than Gujr
at]. Earlier reports on V Corps had 9th Infantry Division at Rawalkot or Mardan,
rather than Kohat. Earlier reports on XII Corps had 16th Infantry Division at a
n un-identified location, and did not include 41 Infantry Division.
Pakistan Army Order of Battle - 21 April 2009
Punjab - Strike Corps I Corps Mangla 6 Armoured Division Kharian 17 Mechanized I
nfantry Division Kharian 37 Mechanized Infantry Division Gujranwala Punjab - Hol
ding Corps IV Corps Lahore 10 Infantry Division Lahore 11 Infantry Division Laho
re XXX Corps Gujranwala 2 Artillery Division Gujranwala 8 Infantry Division Sial
kot 15 Infantry Division Sialkot XXXI Corps Bahawalpur 26 Mechanized Division Ba
hawalpur 35 Infantry Division Bahawalpur 40th Infantry Division Okara II Corps M
ultan 1 Armoured Division Multan 40 Infantry Division Okara
Sindh V Corps Karachi 16 Infantry Division Hyderabad 18 Infantry Division Hydera
bad 25 Mechanized Infantry Division Malir WFP / FATA XI Corps Peshawar 7 Infantr
y Division Mardan 9 Infantry Division Kohat SOURCE XII Corps Quetta X Corps Rawa
lpindi
J&K, FA A Northern Area Command 12 Infantry Division Murree 19 Infantry Division
Jhelum 23 Infantry Division Gujrat Balochistan 33 Infantry Division Hyderabad 4
1 Infantry Division Hyderabad Structure of the Pakistan Army wikipedia
Pakistan Army Order of Battle - 2008
Punjab - Strike Corps I Corps Mangla II Corps Multan
6 Armoured Division Kharian 17 Mechanized Infantry Division Kharian 37 Mechanize
d Infantry Division Gujranwala IV Corps Lahore 10 Infantry Division Lahore 11 In
fantry Division Lahore XXX Corps Gujranwala 8 Infantry Division Sialkot 15 Infan
try Division Sialkot Sindh V Corps Karachi 16 Infantry Division Hyderabad 18 Inf
antry Division Hyderabad
1 Armoured Division Multan 14 Infantry Division Okara 40 Infantry Division Okara
Punjab - Holding Corps
XXXI Corps Bahawalpur 34 Infantry Division Bahawalpur 35 Infantry Division Pano
Aqil J&K, FA A X Corps Rawalpindi Northern Area Command 12 Infantry Division Mur
ree 19 Infantry Division Jhelum 23 Infantry Division Gujrat WFP / FATA Balochist
an XII Corps Quetta 33 Infantry Division Quetta 41 Infantry Division Quetta
XI Corps Peshawar 7 Infantry Division Mardan 9 Infantry Division Rawalkot or Mar
dan
SOURCE Info-Thread on the Pakistan Army Jane's World Armies, 24th issue, Dec-0
8.
Pakistan Army Order of Battle - 2002
Punjab - Strike Corps I Corps Mangla 6 Armoured Division Kharian 17 Mechanized I
nfantry Division Kharian 35 Mechanized Infantry Division Gujranwala II Corps Mul
tan 1 Armoured Division Multan 2nd Artillery Division 14 Infantry Division U/I L
ocation 40 Infantry Division Okara Punjab - Holding Corps IV Corps Lahore 10 Inf
antry Division Lahore 11 Infantry Division Lahore XXX Corps Gujranwala 12 Artill
ery Division Gujranwala 8 Infantry Division Sialkot 15 Infantry Division Sialkot
Sindh V Corps Karachi 16 Infantry Division Rahim Yar Khan 18 Infantry Division
Hyderabad X Corps Rawalpindi Northern Area Command 12 Infantry Division Muzzafar
abad 19 Infantry Division Rawalkot 23 Infantry Division Mangla WFP / FATA XI Cor
ps Peshawar 7 Infantry Division Mardan 9 Infantry Division Kohat SOURCE XII Corp
s Quetta 33 Infantry Division Hyderabad 41 Infantry Division Hyderabad various
Balochistan 33 Infantry Division Bhawalpur 37 Infantry Division Sukkur J&K, FA
A XXXI Corps Bahawalpur
Pakistan Army Order of Battle - Divisions
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 V Corps 19 XXXI Corps 20 21 22 23 2
4 33 Infantry Division 35 Infantry Division 36 Infantry Division 37 Mechanized D
ivision 39 Infantry Division 40 Infantry Division 41 Infantry Division 16 Infant
ry Division 33 Infantry Division U/I Location Gujranwala Disbanded after 1971 wa
r Sukkur Disbanded after 1971 war Okara ?? U/I Location Bhawalpur(?) 30°48'N __°
__'N __°__'N __°__'N 73°26'E __°__'E __°__'E __°__'E II Corps ?? Corps XII Corps
XXXI Corps __°__'N __°__'E XXXI Corps __°__'N __°__'N __°__'E __°__'E XII Corps
I Corps 26 Mechanized Division Bahawalpur 1 Armored Division 2 Artillery Divisi
on 6 Armored Division 6 Infantry Division 7 Infantry Division 8 Infantry Divisio
n 9 Infantry Division 10 Infantry Division 11 Infantry Division 12 Infantry Divi
sion 12 Artillery Division 14 Infantry Division 15 Infantry Division 16 Infantry
Division 17 Infantry Division 18 Infantry Division 19 Infantry Division 23 Infa
ntry Division 25 Mechanized Division Disbanded after 1948 war Mardan Sialkot Raw
alkot [Mardan ?] Lahore Lahore Muzzafarabad [Murree ?] Gujranwala U/I Location S
ialkot Rahim Yar Khan Kharian Hyderabad Rawalkot [Jhelum ?] Mangla [Gujrat ?] Ka
rachi 34°12'N 32°30'N 34°47'N 30°24'N 30°24'N __°__'N __°__'N __°__'N 32°30'N __
°__'N 32°49'N 25°22'N 34°47'N 33°07'N 72°02'E 74°33'E 73°30'E 68°47'E 68°47'E __
°__'E __°__'E __°__'E 74°33'E __°__'E 73°52'E 68°22'E 73°30'E 73°39'E XI Corps X
XX Corps XI Corps IV Corps IV Corps X Corps I Corps II Corps XXX Corps V Corps ?
? I Corps V Corps X Corps X Corps Multan U/I Location 30°11'N __°__'N __°__'N 71
°28'E __°__'E __°__'E II Corps II Corps ? I Corps
Pakistan Army Order of Battle - Corps
The Pakistan Army consists a total of 22 divsions of 12,000 troops -- 20 Infantr
y & 2 Armored Divisions -- commanded by Major Generals, grouped under 9 differen
t Corps headquarters, each commanded by 3-star Lieutenant Generals. There is als
o the Northern Area Command, headquartered at Gilgit, directly responsible to ar
my general headquarters. Corps I Corps II Corps IV Corps V Corps X Corps XI Corp
s XII Corps XXX Corps XXXI Corps Northern Area Command Aviation Corps Air Defens
e Command Strategic Forces Command Mangla Multan Lahore Karachi Rawalpindi Pesha
war Quetta Gujranwala Bahawalpur Gilgit Rawalpindi Rawalpindi Rawalpindi Federal
ly Administered Northern Areas NWFP Balochistan Sindh Headquarters Province
Pakistan Army Order of Battle - Corps Sectors
The geographical areas of responsibility of the Corps commands is not well attes
ted in public record. Of course, the Northern Area Command is responsible for th
e Federally Administered Northern Areas. It appears that XI Corps is responsible
for the North West Frontier Province , to include the Federally Administered Tr
ibal Areas, while the XII Corps is responsible for Balochistan. V Corps in Karac
hi is responsible for the southern part of Sindh province, while XXXI Corps incl
udes the northern part of the province. The remainder of the Pakistan Army is in
Punjab, stationed across from Indian forces in Punjab and Kashmir. Punjab is a
vulnerable province, as it shares a 550 km border with Pakistan. Punjab is strat
egically very important for Pakistan, so the formation of its army is extremely
strong in this area. The XXXI Corps is the defensive formation assigned to take
the brunt of an Indian armored assault. The II Corps in Multan is assigned to fo
llow up the XXXI Corps holding action and counterattack against invading Indian
forces. The tank battles fought in the area between Charwa and Chawinda from 8th
to 21 September 1965 were the most decisive battles of the 1965 War. The main I
ndian attack against Pakistan was launched by the Ist Indian Corps opposite Chaw
inda in Sialkot Sector. The Sialkot Sector was defended by the Pakistani 1 Corps
comprising 15 Division and 6 Armoured Division. [SOURCE] In the West during the
1971 War, the Indian Army had very limited offensive aims and was relegated mor
e to a holding role. The Indians penetrated at least 15 miles into West Pakistan
in the direction of Karachi. The initiative lay with Pakistan. In this theater,
Pakistan had near parity with India in armor and artillery while India had more
infantry divisions. There was fighting on the Punjab plain, but the results wer
e inconclusive. Pakistan's most successful thrust was in Chhamb sector north of
Jammu, where there was good tank country. Here, the 23rd Pakistani Division comp
letely overwhelmed the forward defensive positions of the Indian 10 Division. Ac
ting in accordance with its strategy to grab as much territory in the West as po
ssible, Pakistan also launched a major attack on Punch in the state of Jammu & K
ashmir. This attack, unlike the one on Chhamb, was completely repulsed. Smaller
attacks were launched by Pakistan in Punjab at Fazilka and Hussainiwala. The for
ward Indian defences were breached but the Pakistan Army could not sustain its a
ttacks. During the 1971 War the Rajasthan sector was thinly held by both India a
nd Pakistan for the simple reason that the Thar desert is not conducive to vehic
ular movement. Unlike in North Africa, where the desert surface is relatively ha
rd and the coastal areas allow for easy movement of traffic, the loose shifting
sands of the Thar cannot be crossed by wheeled vehicles and even tracked vehicle
s are liable to get bogged down. The region also has very few dirt tracks and ev
en fewer paved roads. The Indian brigade operating in UmerkotNagarparkar area ca
ptured many thousand square miles but all these consisted of empty desert. An am
bitious Pakistani armored thrust in the Thar Desert of Rajasthan was stopped in
the famous Battle of Longewala. The battle is part of the curriculum taught to s
enior Indian officers in the higher command course at the Army War College and h
as been immortalised by the Bollywood super-hit “Border”. Longewala is part of a
rmy folklore. This is a fairy tale of 100 odd soldiers and their steely resolve,
which forced an entire Pakistani brigade, backed by an armored regiment of 45 t
anks, to retreat in the 1971 war. Pakistan's Chinese Type 59 and US-made Sherman
tanks were slow on the sandy Thar Desert, and some analysts suggest that the at
tack may have been an overly ambitious move on the terrain. Some Pakistan tanks
had suffered engine failures due to the harsh conditions and were abandoned. Pak
istan's vehicles, tanks and guns got bogged in sand, and armor was deployed with
out air defense protection. Longewala provided a classic example of the importan
ce of air defense, with Indian forces destroying 51 tanks, at least 18 and possi
bly as many as 37 of them with the use of aircraft. Since no ground offensive is
possible in the Thar Desert without heavy air cover, India's air deployment in
2002 suggested that the focus of their strike corps could well be in the south (
Western and Southern Commands).
Good Tank Country
Geographically, the whole of Pakistan can be described as a narrow strip of land
 astride the Indus River. This has its own peculiar implications of lack of dept
h and difficulty in defense. Major core areas, major industries and main arterie
s of communication lie perilously close to the border. With a vulnerable coastli
ne open to the Indian Navy, Pakistan is prone to be blockaded due to single port
of Karachi. There is a lot of good tank country in Pakistan's heartland - the P
unjab plain. Korea isn't good tank country. There were almost no good roads in K
orea, and it was not good tank country in the Patton and Walker sense. Iran, one
of the world's most mountainous countries, isn't good tank country. The border
between China and India is high in the Himalayan mountains, which is not good ta
nk country. Burma was definitely not good tank country. Two substantial rivers r
un north and south, the first being the great Irrawaddy and, 50 miles to the eas
t, the Sittang. The few roads and tracks went through rice paddy fields, and wer
e mostly underwater in the rainy season and baked hard in summer, having many ba
nks and obstructions. Beyond the paddy fields was the jungle, almost impenetrabl
e for tanks. What does "good tank country" look like? German tanks easily rolled
into Poland on September 1, 1939. Poland was good tank country, relatively flat
with few physical barriers. The open steppe and farm land of the Ukraine is goo
d tank country. presenting only a few large river barriers to an attacking force
. Germany is good tank country. The North German Plain is relatively flat and op
en terrain. Rivers and valleys do not canalize cross-country movement as is the
situation further south. Such conditions made the area ideally suited to armor o
perations and provided Warsaw Pact forces with the best terrain to conduct a hig
h-speed offensive across Western Europe to the major port facilities along the c
oast. Much of Vietnam was good tank country, particularly northern I Corps along
the DMZ. The Central Highlands were actually very good Tank Country. Iraq has l
ots of
good tank country, offering easy passage with wide and deep fields of view and f
ire. As a theater of military operations, the majority of Kuwait is flat and uno
bstructed desert. Military terrain analyses identified 60% of Kuwait as open des
ert terrain - good tank country and maneuvering - while another 15% was impeding
terrain - soft sand dunes and rough man-made badlands. Pakistan is divided into
three major geographic areas: the northern highlands; the Balochistan Plateau,
and the Indus River plain, with two major subdivisions corresponding roughly to
the provinces of Punjab and Sindh. Because of their rugged topography and the ri
gors of the climate, the northern highlands and the Himalayas to the east have b
een formidable barriers to movement into Pakistan throughout history. North-sout
h valleys in Balochistan and Sindh have restricted the migration of peoples alon
g the Makran Coast on the Arabian Sea east toward the plains. Several large pass
es cut the ranges along the border with Afghanistan. Among them are the the Khyb
er Pass, forty kilometers west of Peshawar and leading to Kabul. On the eastern
border with India, south of the Sutlej River, the Thar Desert may be considered
separately from the Indus Plain. Sindh is the South Eastern Province of Pakistan
. The province can be divided longitudinally in three distinct sections of equal
sizes. The western part, known as Kohistan is hilly; the central portion is a f
ertile valley irrigated by the River Indus (Nara) and in the Eastern part is the
Thar Desert. The Sindh Plain comprises mainly the province of Sindh and stretch
es between the Punjab Plain and the Arabian Sea. River Indus flows here as a sin
gle river. The plain comprises of a vast fertile tract stretching westward from
the narrow strip of flood plain on the right bank of River Indus, and a vast exp
anse of desert stretching eastward from the left bank. The Thar Desert, also kno
wn as the Great Indian Desert, straddles the border between northwestern India a
nd eastern Pakistan. The Thar Desert of Pakistan, also known as the Rajasthan De
sert in India, is bound on the east by the Aravalli Range and on the west by the
present Indus River floodplain. As the monsoon crosses India, it loses moisture
on the eastern slopes of the Aravalli Range. The Thar Desert of western India i
s the most densely populated hot desert in the world. Tharparkar supports a popu
lation of one million spread over 2350 villages pressed on 20,000 square Kilomet
ers. The live stock population is considerably high, i.e about four million head
s (in 1993) as compared to the availability of feed resources which are hardly s
ufficient for half of the live stock population. The area is mainly covered by s
and dunes with substantial natural vegetation. Rains are the only source in the
sand desert tract and it is rare, at intervals of 3-4 years and maximum rain fal
l is recorded up to 3 inches only, with the result that the local Tharies are al
ways in the state of nomad tribes. Besides, uncertain fate, famine is inherited
by Tharies. Under the aforesaid desperate local conditions and environments that
Tharies have a courage and solitude to survive and meet such desperate conditio
ns boldly as their fate. Located in northwestern India and eastern Pakistan, the
Thar desert is bounded on the south by a salt marsh known as the Rann of Kutch,
and on the west by the Indus River plain. About 800 kilometers long and about 5
00 kilometers wide, the desert's terrain is mainly rolling sandhills with scatte
red growths of shrub and rock outcroppings. The Thar desert, located in the Raja
sthan state of India and parts of Pakistan is the home to a number of saline pla
yas (lakes). These commercially important playas in this part of the world vary
in size from very small depressions of few tens of square meters to massive basi
ns which may exceed hundreds of km2. The Thar Desert includes a 214,000-km2 sand
sea on the ancient alluvial plain of the Indus River in Pakistan and western In
dia. The sand dunes of the Thar Desert constantly shift and take on new shapes.
Thar is a desert region in the southern part of Sindh province in Pakistan. “Tha
r” consists of a tract of small hills resembling the waves troubled sea, general
ly, running east and west and generally, higher in the western than eastern part
of the district. 'The ’Parker’ is situated in south-east of Thar. Its length an
d breath are from north to south, twenty miles, and from east to west thirty mil
es. In Parkar, ranges of hills composed of hard rocks take the place of the smal
l hills of the Thar. From the south, the Runn separates the Thar and Parker from
Kutch. The district is mostly desert and consist of barren tracts of sand dunes
covered with thorny bushes. The ridges are irregular and roughly parallel, that
 they often enclosed sheltered valleys, above which they rise to a height of som
e fifty meters. These valleys are moist enough to admit cultivation and when not
cultivated they yield luxuriant crops of rank grass. But the extraordinary sali
nity of the subsoil and consequent shortage of potable water, renders many tract
s quite uninhabitable. In many of the valleys the subsoil water collects and for
ms large and picturesque salt lakes, which rarely dry up. Cultivation is sparse
in the northern mountains, the southern deserts, and the western plateaus, but t
he Indus River basin in Punjab and northern Sindh has fertile soil that enables
Pakistan to feed its population under usual climatic conditions. The Punjab Plai
n comprises mainly the province of Punjab. It is the gifted fertile land of Rive
r Indus and its five eastern tributaries - Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Sutlej and Beas
. The plain is a great alluvial crescent stretching from the Indus River system
in Pakistan to the Punjab Plain (in both Pakistan and India). Most of the Punjab
plain is at an altitude of about 100 m, whereas the cloud-covered peaks to the
north are above 6000 m (6 km or more of relief over a 60-km horizontal distance)
. The Punjab Plain in India has an area of about 40,000 square miles (100,000 sq
uare km) and in India covers the states of Punjab and Haryana and the union terr
itory of Delhi. In Pakistan the Punjab plain spreads from the south of Potohar p
lateau up to Mithankot, where the Sulaiman Range approaches river Indus. The Pun
jab plain is almost a featureless plain with a gentle slope southward averaging
one foot to the mile. The only break in the alluvial monotony is the little grou
p of broken hills (100 ft-1,600ft.) near Sangla and Irana on either side of the
Chenab. The entire plain is extensively irrigated by a network of canals.
Frontier Works Organisation
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Frontier Works Organisation (also known as FWO) is a construction branch of the
Pakistani Army that was created in 1966. It has built numerous bridges, roads, t
unnels, airfields and dams in Pakistan. It is currently led by Major General Tau
fiq Rafiq of the Engineers branch since October 2008. One of the leading Organiz
ation which has performed well in the past doing good in the present and aiming
excellence in Future. As FWO is world famous for its construction of Bridges, Ro
ads, Highways and Other all kinds of Huge construction, one of the example must
always be wisper which is the construction of Karakorum Highway also known as Sh
ahra-e-Karakorum between Pakistan and China which was the first assignment of th
is organization. FWO is also divided in many groups . Every group have a brigadi
er who is the commander of that FWO group . External links Official website of F
WO
Pakistan Army Order of Battle - Divisions
There are a total of 25 divisions in the Pakistan Army. This includes 19 Infantr
y divisions, 2 Mechanized Divisions, 2 Armored Divisions and 2 Artillery Divisio
n. Each division is commanded by a Major General, and usually holds three Brigad
es. These include infantry, artillery, engineer and communications units in addi
tion to logistics (supply and service) support to sustain independent action. Th
e most signficant of the ground force combat formations is the infantry division
. Such a division would primarily hold three infantry brigades. Except for the D
ivisions operating in the mountains, all the Divisions have at least one armored
unit, while some have more. A Brigade is under the command of a Brigadier or so
metimes a Colonel and comprises three or more Battalions of different units. An
independent brigade would primarily consist of an artillery unit, an infantry un
it, an armour unit and logistics to support its actions. Such a brigade is not p
art of any division and is under direct command of a Corps. Each battalion is co
mmanded by a Lieutenant Colonel and has roughly 600 to 900 soldiers under his co
mmand. This number varies depending on the functionality of the battalion. A bat
talion comprises either three batteries (in case of artillery and air defence re
giments - generally named Papa, Quebec, Romeo, and Sierra) or four companies (in
case of infantry regiments - generally named Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, and Delta a
nd other arms excluding armored units that are organized into squadrons) each un
der the command of a major and comprising of individual subunits called sections
(which are further divisible into platoons and squads).
Division Corps Allocation
# 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 Division 1 Armored Di
vision 2 Artillery Division 6 Armored Division 6 Infantry Division 7 Infantry Di
vision 8 Infantry Division 9 Infantry Division 10 Infantry Division 11 Infantry
Division 12 Infantry Division 12 Artillery Division 14 Infantry Division 15 Infa
ntry Division 16 Infantry Division 16 Infantry Division 17 Infantry Division 18
Infantry Division 19 Infantry Division 23 Infantry Division 25 Mechanized Divisi
on 26 Mechanized Division 33 Infantry Division 33 Infantry Division 34 Infantry
Division 35 Infantry Division 36 Infantry Division 23 24 25 37 Mechanized Divisi
on 39 Infantry Division 40 Infantry Division 41 Infantry Division 2002 II Corps
II Corps ? I Corps Disbanded after 1948 war XI Corps XXX Corps XI Corps IV Corps
IV Corps X Corps XXX Corps II Corps XXX Corps V Corps ?? XII Corps I Corps V Co
rps X Corps X Corps ... ... XII Corps XXXI Corps ... I Corps Disbanded after 197
1 war XXXI Corps Disbanded after 1971 war II Corps ... II Corps XII Corps XXXI C
orps XII Corps II Corps XII Corps I Corps I Corps I Corps I Corps V Corps X Corp
s X Corps ... ... XII Corps ... XXXI Corps XXXI Corps I Corps V Corps X Corps X
Corps V Corps XXXI Corps XII Corps ... ... XXXI Corps I Corps V Corps X Corps X
Corps V Corps XXXI Corps XII Corps ... ... XXXI Corps XI Corps XXX Corps XI Corp
s IV Corps IV Corps X Corps ... II Corps XXX Corps V Corps XI Corps XXX Corps XI
Corps IV Corps IV Corps X Corps ... II Corps XXX Corps V Corps XI Corps XXX Cor
ps XI Corps IV Corps IV Corps X Corps ... XXXI Corps XXX Corps V Corps Janes 200
8 II Corps ... I Corps Wiki April 2009 II Corps XXX Corps I Corps Wiki May 2009
II Corps XXX Corps I Corps
Division Cantonment
# 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Division 1 Armored
Division 2 Artillery Division 6 Armored Division 6 Infantry Division 7 Infantry
Division 8 Infantry Division 9 Infantry Division 10 Infantry Division 11 Infant
ry Division 12 Infantry Division 12 Artillery Division 14 Infantry Division 15 I
nfantry Division 16 Infantry Division 16 Infantry Division 17 Infantry Division
18 Infantry Division 19 Infantry Division 23 Infantry Division 25 Mechanized Div
ision 26 Mechanized Division 33 Infantry Division 33 Infantry Division 34 Infant
ry Division 35 Infantry Division 36 Infantry Division 37 Mechanized Division 39
Infantry Division 24 25 40 Infantry Division 41 Infantry Division 2002 Multan U/
I Location Kharian Disbanded after 1948 war Mardan Sialkot Kohat Lahore Lahore M
uzaffarabad Gujranwala U/I Location Sialkot Rahim Yar Khan U/I Location Kharian
Hyderabad Rawalkot Mangla ... ... U/I Location Bhawalpur ... Gujranwala Disbande
d after 1971 war Sukkur Disbanded after 1971 war Okara ... Okara Quetta Okara Qu
etta Okara Quetta Gujranwala Gujranwala Gujranwala Kharian Hyderabad Jhelum Gujr
at ... ... Quetta ... Bahawalpur Pano Aqil Kharian Hyderabad Mangala Jhelum Mali
r Bahawalpur Quetta ... ... Bahawalpur Kharian Hyderabad Mangala Jhelum Malir Ba
hawalpur Quetta ... ... Bahawalpur Mardan Sialkot Rawalkot or Mardan Lahore Laho
re Murree ... Okara Sialkot Hyderabad Peshawar Sialkot Kohat Lahore Lahore Murre
e ... Okara Sialkot Pano Akil Peshawar Sialkot Kohat Lahore Lahore Murree ... Ok
ara Sialkot Pano Akil Janes 2008 Multan ... Kharian Wiki April 2009 Multan Gujra
nwala Kharian Wiki May 2009 Multan Gujranwala Kharian
Army Cantonment Board
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Army Cantonment Board are the administrati
ve bodies of Pakistan Army that oversee the army cantonments in major cities of
Pakistan. There are 43 Army Cantonment Board in Pakistan List of Cantonment Boar
ds in Pakistan Baluchistan • Ormara Cantonment • Quetta Cantonment • Zhob Canton
ment .W.F.P. • Abbottabad Cantonment • Bannu Cantonment • Dera Ismail Khan Canto
nment • Kohat Cantonment • Loralai Cantonment • Mardan Cantonment • Nowshera Can
tonment • Peshawar Cantonment • Risalpur Cantonment • Havelian Cantonment Punjab
• Attock Cantonment • Sanjwal Cantonment (adjacent to Attock Cantt about 5 KM d
istance) • Bhawalpur Cantonment • Chaklala Cantonment • Gujranwala Cantonment •
Jhelum Cantonment • Kamra Cantonment • Kharian Cantonment • Mangla Cantonment •
Multan Cantonment • Murree Gali Cantonment • Murree Hills Cantonment • Okara Can
tonment • Rawalpindi Cantonment • Sargodha Cantonment • Shorkot Cantonment (PAF
Rafiqui) • Sialkot Cantonment • Taxila Cantonment • Lahore Cantonment • Wah Cant
onment • Walton Cantonment (Created out of the southern parts of the original La
hore Cantt.) Sindh • Clifton Cantonment, Karachi • Faisal Cantonment, Karachi •
Hyderabad Cantonment • Karachi Cantonment • Korangi Creek Cantonment, Karachi •
Malir Cantonment, Karachi • Manora Cantonment, Karachi • Pano Aqil Cantonment Se
e also Cantonment External links Cantonment Boards in India
Jhelum Cantonment
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Coordinates: Province District Time zone Calling code

32°34′N 73°26′E32.56°N 73.44°E Punjab Jhelum PST (UTC+5) +92-544 Postal Code 496
00
Administrative Control Cantonment Boad Jhelum ) or Jhelum Cantonment is cantonm
ent area in Jhelum adjacent to city area. It is one of the Jhelum Cantt. (Urdu/P
unjabi: important cantonment(Army Base) of Pakistan, which was built during the
British rule in 1849 which has grown up into a strong Garrison, with an Infantry
Division commanded by a Major General. Jhelum Cantonment is located on the GT R
oad(N-5) adjusent to the city of Jhelum at a distance of 121 km from Capital cit
y of Islamabad and 167 km from provincial capital Lahore. Prominent nearby citie
s and towns include MirPur Azad Kashmir, Kharian Cantonment, Sarai Alamgir, and
Gujrat. The cantonment area is well planned and aesthetically maintained with an
array of ever green tress trees and seasonal flowers. History During British ru
le Jhelum was chosen as the site of a cantonment and as the head-quarters of the
civil administration. For some years it was the seat of the Commissioner of the
Division, but in 1859 his head-quarters were transferred to Rawalpindi. Under B
ritish rule Jhelum has steadily advanced in prosperity; and it is the entrepôt f
or most of the trade of the District, though, since the completion of the Sind-S
āgar branch of the North-Western Railway; the salt trade no longer passes throug
h it. It is an important timber dépôt, the timber from the Kashmir forests which
is floated down the river being collected here. A good deal of boat-building is
carried on. The cantonment, which is 3 miles from the civil station, contains t
he church and post office. The normal strength of the garrison is one Native cav
alry and four Native infantry regiments. The municipality was founded 1867. Duri
ng the ten years ending 1902-3 the receipts averaged Rs. 32,100, and the expendi
ture Rs, 31,900. Receipts and expenditure from cantonment funds in the same peri
od averaged Rs. 31,900 and Rs. 6,100 respectively. The chief income of the munic
ipality in 1903-4 was Rs.34,200 chiefly from octroi; and the expenditure was Rs.
41,000. The town has two Anglo vernacular schools, a municipal high school, and
a middle school maintained by the American Presbyterian Mission. Besides the ci
vil hospital, the mission also maintains a hospital."[1]. During the Indian Rebe
llion of 1857 35 British soldiers of HM XXIV regiment were killed by the local r
esistance. A lectern inside St. John s Church Jhelum the church shows the names
of those 35 soldiers. St. John s Church is located in Jhelum cantonment Pakistan
beside the river Jhelum. It was built in 1860 and is a landmark of the city. It
is a Protestant church and was in use during the British period. For forty year
s it remained closed. Now it has been renovated and opened and almost in good co
ndition. Education Jhelum Cantt offers a number of quality education institutes
for basic, intermediate as well as the higher education. These institutes benefi
t both the residents of cantonment and the people living in the neighboring town
s and villages. the prominent schools and colleges include: • Army Public School
and College Jhelum Cantt. • FG Intermediat College Jhelum Cantt. • Fauji Founda
tion Model School & College, Jhelum Cantt. • FG Boys Public Secondary School Jhe
lum Cantt • FG Girls Public Secondary School Jhelum Cantt • FG Boys High School
Jhelum Cantt • Convent school Jhelum Cantt • Cantonment Board Public School In a
ddition there are number of good schools in the city of Jhelum and neighborhood
of cantonment which include the Beaconhouse School Systems and The City School (
Pakistan) etc. A famous Cadet College with a name of Military College Jhelum is
located at a distance of 5 km at Sarai Alamgir. Sports The Jhelum Cantt boasts a
nine hole Golf Course called the River-View Golf Club[2], where national golf t
ournaments are held regularly.[3] There are variety of sports facilities availab
le within the cantonment which include Cricket fields Hockey Fileds, Football fi
elds, Tennis Courts, Squash courts and Swimming Pools are among many other sport
s facilities that are available. Zamir Jaffri Cricket Stadium is also adjusent t
o the Gul Afshan Colony Jhelum Cantt. Parks There are number of beautiful parks
with exciting rides and activities for the children of all ages. There is a cent
ral park with number of attraction for the residants and people of neighbouring
areas. The jogging and walking traks are a busy site at morning and in the eveni
ng by both men and women alike. Health Facilities The cantonment has an "B" clas
s standard, 500-bed teaching hospital known as Combined Military Hospital (CMH J
helum). All the departments of the hospital are equipped with the latest and sta
te of the art equipment and Facilities. The burn center is the largest and most
advanced in the country. There is a plan to establish a medical college in the v
icinity of the hospital. Shopping The cantonment has number of markets with smal
l to medium shopping stores offering variety of products. These shopping areas a
re source of attrection for both locals and visitors alike. See also • List of c
ities in Pakistan
List of cities in Punjab (Pakistan) Army Cantonment Board Cantonment Jhelum Mang
la Cantt References 1. ^ Gazetteer of India, v. 14, p. 159-160 2. ^ Jhelum River
View Golf Club 3. ^ River-View Golf Club
• • • • •
External links Pakistan portal
Jhelum portal
Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Jhelum
• • •
Jhelum travel guide from Wikitravel Official Urdu Website of Jhelum with News up
dates JhelumNews online Newspaper
Front view of Melange super Market Cricket Stadium Jhelum FG College
Marble Lectern in memory of 35 British soldiers
Kharian Cantonment
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Punjab Province Gujrat District Population (2008) 90,462 PST (UTC+5) Time zone +
92-537 Postal Code 50070 Calling code Administrative Control Cantonment Boad Kha
rian Kharian Cantt. (Urdu/Punjabi: ) or Kharian Cantonment is one of the
largest cantonment (Army Base) of Pakistan. which was built in late 50 s with th
e support of USA as part of the military assistance to Pakistan. Its constructio
n was supervised by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and was built according to
American standards[1] The population of cantonment is 90,462 where as the popula
tion of the parent city Kharian is around 30,000[2]. It is also one of the most
planned and scenic place in Pakistan. Kharian Cantonment is located on the GT Ro
ad(N-5) at a distance of 125 km from Capital city of Islamabad and 145 km from p
rovincial capital Lahore. Prominent nearby cities and towns include Jhelum, Lala
musa, Dinga, Sarai Alamgir, and district city of Gujrat. The cantonment area is
well planned and aesthetically maintained with an array of ever green trees and
seasonal flowers. The
construction of Kharian Cantonment was completed in 1958 with the assistance of
USA as part of the military assistance to Pakistan. Its construction was supervi
sed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and it was built according to American s
tandards which differed considerably from the standards laid down by the British
for Indian and British troops. The master plan of the cantonment is nicely plan
ned grid like network of roads[1]. It is one of the few cantonments which were e
stablished post partition era. One of the reason for construction a cantonment i
n this area was the interest of people towards joining the military services. 11
4 soldiers from a neighboring village of Thutha Roy Bahadur took part in World W
ar-I out of those 34 soldiers gave their lives fighting for coalition. Residenti
al Areas The residential areas of the cantonment include the I.J. Colony, Defenc
e Colony, Shami Colony, North Colony, Afzaal Colony, Gammon Colony and Johar Col
ony. In addition there are number of small camps and residential areas for the r
esidance of troops. All the residential areas are neat, clean, well planned, wel
l maintained and offer good living standards with all the basic amenities availa
ble. This makes it an attrective, favourite and one of the most expensive locali
ties in the whole country. Transportation As the cantonment is located on the ma
in National Highway N-5 (known as the GT road) and the main Rail line, kharian c
antt can be reached in a number of ways either by road or train. As there is not
much rail traffic for the city, all express trains do not stop at the kharian c
antt Railway station; public and private buses are the main means of transportat
ion. The international Airports of Islamabad (Benazir Bhutto International Airpo
rt), Lahore (Allama Iqbal International Airport) and Sialkot International Airpo
rt can be accessed in two to three hours by means of public transport. Education
Kharian Cantt offers a number of quality education institutes for basic, interm
ediate as well as the higher education. These institutes benefit both the reside
nts of cantonment and the people living in the neighboring towns and villages. t
he prominent schools and colleges include: • F.G Degree College For Men • F.G De
gree College For Women • F.G Boys Public School • F.G Girls Public School • F.G.
Boys High School • F.G Girls High School • Garrison Academy and College • Bloom
Field Hall School • Army Public School & College • Cantonment Board Public Scho
ol In addition there are number of good schools in the neighborhood of cantonmen
t which include The Beaconhouse School Systems and The City School (Pakistan) et
c. A famous Cadet College with a name of Military College Jhelum is located at a
distance of 15 km at Sarai Alamgir. Garrison academy and college provides excel
lent education for students including matric,FSC and O levels. Sports There are
variety of sports facilities available within the cantonment which include Crick
et fields Hockey Fileds, Football fields, Tennis Courts, Squash courts, Swimming
Pools, Polo ground, and a nine hole Golf Course are among many other sports fac
ilities that are available. Parks & Tracks There are number of beautiful parks w
ith exciting rides and activities for children of all ages. The Burraq Park is t
he central park with number of attraction for the residants and people of neighb
ouring areas. The jogging and walking traks are a busy site at morning and in th
e evening by both men and women alike. Health Facilities The cantonment has an "
A" class standard, 600-bed teaching hospital known as CMH (Combined Military Hos
pital) Kharian. It is the second largest CMH after Rawalpindi. All the departmen
ts of the hospital are equipped with the latest and state of the art equipment a
nd Facilities. The burn center is the largest and most advanced in the country.
There is a plan to establish a medical college in the vicinity of the hospital.
Shopping The cantonment has number of markets with small to medium shopping stor
es offering variety of products. these shopping areas are source of attrection f
or both locals and visitors alike. Every colony has its own shopping complex wit
h fast food restaurants The area has a lot of shopping malls and the famous ones
include the burraq market and also the new opened kins krunchy branch near the
triangle park.Also there are small markets near each colony to provide the neces
sities of people. a b http://www.defencejournal.com/march98/theway1.htm ^ Refere
nces ^ http://www.mongabay.com/igapo/2005_world_city_populations/Pakistan.html
A beautiful view of the Quaid-e-Azam Road The cantonment is scenic and green in
all seasons
Army Strategic Forces Command (ASFC)
Strategic Forces
Strategic Force North Strategic Force South Pakistan formally instituted an elab
orate nuclear command and control mechanism in February 2000 that comprised Nati
onal Command Authority (NCA), Strategic Plan Division (SPD) and Strategic Forces
Command. Army Strategic Forces Command is regarded as a corps and commanded by
a lieutenant general with his HQ in Rawalpindi. Army Strategic Forces Command is
responsible for training, deployment and activation of nuclear missile assets.
In 2006 the government set up separate commands in its three services equipped w
ith nuclear weapons and missiles capable of retaliating for any first nuclear st
rike. The Armed Strategic Force consists of special commands in the army, air fo
rce and navy that store nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable missiles in semiknoc
ked-down condition in peace time for assembly and deployment during periods of h
igh tension. As of late 2006 the Pakistani nuclear command and control organizat
ion consisted of three branches: (1) the National Command Authority (NCA), consi
sting of the country’s ten highest decision makers; (2) the Strategic Plans Divi
sion (SPD), which is the secretariat to the NCA and is in charge of developing a
nd managing Pakistan’s nuclear capability in all dimensions; and (3) the Strateg
ic Forces Command (SFC) for each branch of the military, which is responsible fo
r planning and control as well as operational directives for nuclear weapons dep
loyment and use. The Ghauri missile system was inducted into the army strategic
forces command early in 2002 along with Shaheen-I and Ghaznavi ballistic missile
systems. President General Pervez Musharraf had handed over the highly accurate
Ghauri Missiles to the ASFC at an impressive ceremony. The Ghaznavi, or Hatf 3,
was formally adopted by the Strategic Forces Command on 22 February 2004. With
the 11 October 2004 test firing of its Ghauri (Hatf 5), the Pakistan Army Strate
gic Forces Command within about a year had test-launched all of its major ballis
tic missiles. In November 2006 Pakistan s Army Strategic Forces Command (ASFC) c
arried out a significant exercise to test the reflexes and operational readiness
of its strategic nuclear and missile establishments. This is the first time tha
t such an exercise exclusively devoted to testing the reflexes and co-ordinating
capabilities of its strategic nuclear and missile establishments has been held.
The exercise culminated in the firing of an intermediate-range HATF 5 (also cal
led Ghauri) missile.On 16 November 2006 Pakistan successfully test-fired the Int
ermediate Range Ballistic Missile Hatf 5 (Ghauri). The launch was carried out by
the troops of the Army Strategic Forces Command (ASFC) at the culmination phase
of a training exercise held to test the operational readiness of a Strategic Mi
ssile Group (SMG) equipped with Ghauri Missiles.Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz and
the Vice Chief of Army Staff General Ahsan Saleem Hyat besides a large number of
senior military officers and scientists and engineers of the strategic organisa
tions witnessed the launch exercise. Among those who attended the exercise and t
he launch were Mr.Shaukat Aziz, the Prime Minister, Gen.Ahsan Saleem Hyat, the V
ice Chief of Army Staff, Lt.Gen.Khalid Kidwai, Director-General of the Strategic
Forces Command, Lt.Gen.Khalid Munir, Commander of the Army Strategic Forces Com
mand, Dr.Samar Mubarakmand, who co-ordinated the 1998 nuclear tests at Chagai, M
r.Anwar Ali, Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), and Mr.Ka
rim Ahmed, the Chairman of the Kahuta Research Laboratory. The prime minister co
ngratulated the officers and other ranks of the ASFC on the high standards achie
ved during the training, which was reflected in the successful launch and the ac
curacy of the missile in reaching the target. On 09 December 2006 Pakistan succe
ssfully conducted the test-fire of the short-range ballistic missile, HATF-III (
Ghaznavi), which has a range of almost 300 km. The launch was carried out by t
he strategic missile group of the Army Strategic Forces Command, a statement i
ssued by the Inter-Services
Public Relations said. On 07 March 2007 President Gen Pervez Musharraf appointed
Maj-Gen Syed Absar Hussain as the Commander of the Strategic Forces Command fol
lowing his promotion to the rank of Lt-General. Lt-Gen Absar was serving as the
Director-General of Defence Export Promotion Organisation (DEPO). Lt-Gen Absar w
as commissioned in the Artillery in April 1972. He is a graduate of the Command
and Staff College, Quetta; Egyptian Army Staff College, and National Defence Uni
versity, Islamabad. A Strategic Missile Group (SMG) of the Pakistan Army’s Strat
egic Force Command (ASFC) conducted a successful training launch of the Shaheen-
1 (Hatf-IV) Medium Range Ballistic Missile on Friday, January 25, 2008. The laun
ch was conducted at the conclusion of the annual field training exercises of a S
haheen-1 Missile Group. On February 13, 2008 a Strategic Missile Group (SMG) of
the Pakistan Army’s Strategic Force Command (ASFC) today conducted successful tr
aining launch of Ghaznavi (Hatf III) Short Range Ballistic Missile. The launch w
as conducted at the conclusion of annual field training exercise of a Ghaznavi M
issile Group. With this launch, ASFC also concluded its highly successful winter
collective training, wherein, various Missile Groups conducted firing of live b
allistic missiles under realistic operational environment. This was the third co
nsecutive test by ASFC Troops in recent weeks. Earlier two other SMGs had conduc
ted successful launches of Shaheen-1 and Ghauri ballistic missiles. The Ghaznavi
Missile has a range of 290 km. The field launch exercise was witnessed by Prime
Minister Mohammedmian Soomro, Chief of the Army Staff General Ashfaq Parvez Kay
ani, senior military officers and scientists. On April 23, 2008 Pakistan success
fully conducted the first training launch of Long Range Ballistic Missile Hatf V
I (Shaheen-II) Weapon System. The launch was conducted by the Army Strategic For
ce Command and marked the culmination of a field training exercise. It validated
the operational readiness of a strategic missile group equipped with Shaheen-II
missile. Shaheen-II is Pakistan’s longest range ballistic missile system with a
range of 2000 Km. It is a two stage solid fuel missile which can carry both con
ventional and nuclear warheads. The launch exercise was witnessed by the Chief o
f Naval Staff Admiral Muhammad Afzal Tahir and a large number of senior military
officers, scientists and engineers of strategic organizations.
Army Air Defence Command
Pakistan Army Air Defence conducted their annual practice fire exercise at Sonmi
ani Air Defence Ranges in November 2008. The aim of the exercise was to provide
live fire experience to Air Defence gunners and missile crews under near real ta
ctical environment and handling of weapons and equipment during firing. The elem
ents of Army Air Defence demonstrated their shooting skills by engaging differen
t targets. The precision and accuracy in marksmanship with surface to air Anza M
ark II missile, 37 mm upgraded guns, 35 mm Oerlikon guns, 57 mm guns and RBs -70
missiles was greatly appreciated. Chief of the Army Staff, General Ashfaq Parve
z Kayani visited the ranges and witnessed anti-aircraft guns and short-range sur
face to air missile fire. Commander Army Air Defence Command, Lt Gen Ashraf Sale
em was also present on the occasion. Talking to the troops, the COAS, Parvez Kay
ani, emphasized that excellence in training was the key to enhancement of operat
ional preparedness. While appreciating the firing standards displayed by the Air
Defenders, he assured that all available means would be utilized to improve the
operational capability of the Army in accordance with the prevailing and the fu
ture operational environment. The COAS emphasized that the troops should devote
themselves fully towards enhancing their professional skills and maintaining hig
h state of preparedness.
Air Defence Forces - Air Defence Force 3 -
Air Defence Force 4 - Air Defence Force 37
Pakistan - West Front
Pakistan always counted on the western border being quiet so that they could fac
e their main enemy in India. The Soviet Union, if it decided to move through Pak
istan, would have had three main ground approaches. The first could be through t
he Khyber Pass to Peshawar, along Kaitu River to Tal and then down to the Indus.
The second approach could be through the Khojak and Bolan Passes down to Sukkur
and Karachi, or Quetta to Karachi along the RCD highway. This would be the shor
test approach from Kandahar with good trafficability of rail, road and air conne
ctions. The advance could be checked at Quetta which itself is a good natural fo
rtress with corps strength troops. However, Quetta can be by-passed by rounding
it from the west near Sheikh-Wasal and Naushki and then onto the RCD highway to
Khuzdar, Las Bela and Karachi. The defending Army Corps can be better deployed b
y pulling its headquarters from Quetta and redeployed near Nushki. Quetta and Kh
ojak Pass can probably be defended by a division strength. The other division co
uld be placed in the West while the third, a little ahead of the Corps headquart
ers and the reserve troops in the rear down in the South of Nushki in Kart. This
approach offers opportunities and dangers to both the invaders and defendants.
From own side it is well defended. The terrain friction offered by the craggy an
d desolate land would retard the advance of the invading army, among other facto
rs. Enemy advance can thus be delayed for international assistance to arrive and
reinforce in good time. However, for the Soviets coming down to the Makran Coas
t the most obvious approach would be from Merv to Chabahar along the western bor
der of Afghanistan and Pakistani Baluchistant. This is in spite of comparatively
poor surface communications. Only one paved road runs along this approach. It w
ould also be vulnerable to attacks as it lies on the flanks of Baluchistan [Paki
stan and Seistan (Iran)]. The presence of the Soviet air base at Shindand, south
of Herat, would be a formidable asset to the land forces in this area. Looking
at it from another angle: as this approach runs on common border of Iran-Pakista
n it would demand coordination of defense efforts between the two states at the
highest levels to evolve a comprehensive plan by the joint Chief of Staffs of th
e two armies. Third, it has no obstacles or any naturally defended features as i
n the case of other approaches. They can have a straight run from the Soviet bor
der to the Indian Ocean. Further, for the defending armies there would be two la
teral lines of communication available, that is, Quetta to Zahedan in northern B
aluchistan and, second, from Karachi to Gwadar along the Makran Coast in souther
n Baluchistan. The latter approach is not well developed. The Iranians can inter
fere with Russian advance or coordinate with Pakistan near Zahedan, using Kirman
as their base. They can also operate along the coast from Bandar Abbas. There a
re no other lateral communication lines.The lack of laterals would also pose dif
ficulties to the invading army as it would bind there to a single road, dangerou
sly restricting manuverability and reinforcement. The Russians, if they choose t
o advance through Pakistan would most probably use all the three approaches with
main and auxilary efforts on Mary (old Merv)-Chabahar, Kandahar-Karachi, Khyber
Pass- Dera Ghazi Khan-Karachi. In the Chabahar approach the resistance would pe
rhaps be minimal, while on the Kandahar-Karachi approach it would be more and on
Khyber Pass-Dera Ghazi Khan-Karachi maximum. Unlike Chabahar, Karachi itself wo
uld present the thoughest resistance by combine army, navy and air arms. If the
enemy succeeded it would be an extremely rewarding operation for it to pick. So,
it seemed, immediately Iran is the more vulnerable of states to Soviet invasion
. For all ends and purposes, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan added another ab
out six hundred miles to the existing Soviet border with Iran in the shape of co
mmon border between Iran and Soviet controlled Afghanistan. This would give extr
a flexibility and initiative to Soviet forces invading Iran at points and time o
f their own choice and subsequently to advance to the Indian Ocean. If they do s
o, the Soviets would have multiple options to advance from the Caucasus to the G
ulf by way of Iran. They have the old line of advance from the border town Jolla
in the north west of Iran (near Caucasus) to Tabriz, Hamadan, Ahvaz to Bandar S
hahpur in the Gulf. Its inverse approach was intensively used during the World W
ar II by the Americans and the British for supplies to the Soviet Union. The oth
er is from Astara on the Caspian Coast, to Tehran and then to Ahvaz and Bandar S
hahpur. There could be another approach from Tehran to Shiraz and then to Bandar
Abbas. All the three approaches are short, if seen from the Caucasus, but long
if taken from Uzbikstan. These three approaches end up in the (closed) Gulf, wit
h the narrow outlet through the Strait of Hormuz. Yet other approaches could be
through Tehran, Kirman, and Bandar Abbas, and Mary, Herat, Zahedan and Chobahar.
These are the lengthy approaches going through the southern Iranian desert befo
re they end up in the Arabian Sea.
I Corps – Mangla
I Corps, headquartered in Mangla, is also called Army Reserve North. It consists
of one armored and one regular infantry division, with another infantry divisio
n that may be mechanized. The Corps is certainly supported by one independent ta
nk brigade and one independent anti-tank brigade [which is often refered to as a
mechanized infantry brigade]. Some sources report that two additional independe
nt brigades, including one of artillery, are part of this Corps. HQ I Corps was
raised on 1st July 1957 at Abbottabad. At the time of the 1965 war with India, P
akistan had only one corps HQ [I Corps at Mangla] with plans for a new IV Corps
(at Lahore). XXX Corps was formed in 1986-87 from elements previously assigned t
o I Corps, which became a Reserve/Strike Corps, with the I Corps area of the fro
nt with India being transferred to the new XXX Corps. City I Corps 11th Ind Armo
red BDE U/I BDE U/I Artillery BDE U/I Anti-tank BDE 6th Armored Division 17th In
fantry Division 35th Infantry Division Mangla U/I Location U/I Location U/I Loca
tion U/I Location Mangla Kharian Gujranwala Latitude 33°07 N __°__ N __°__ N __°
__ N __°__ N 33°07 N 32°49 N __°__ N Longitude 73°39 E __°__ E __°__ E __°__ E _
_°__ E 73°39 E 73°52 E __°__ E
I Corps (Pakistan)
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
1958 to date Active approx. 60,000 Size Northern Command Part of Mangla Garrison
/HQ Red, white and yellow Colors Current Lt Gen Nadeem Ahmad commander otable Lt
Gen Bakhtiar Rana Lt Gen Irshad Ahmed Khan Lt Gen Pervez Musharraf commanders I
Corps (1 Corps) is one of Pakistan s four heavy armour corps within its ten arm
y corps. It is presently stationed in Mangla. History The corps headquarters was
raised in Abbottabad in 1957[1]. Lt Gen Azam Khan was its first commander. It w
as the first Pakistani corps ever to take to the field. 1965 War During the 1965
war, the corps was one of two corps in action. It commanded troops all Pakistan
i troops north of Lahore and in Kashmir. During this time however, because of th
e sheer number of formations under its command, (8 divisions), it was found easi
er to split the formations into corps level task-forces, as a result in the 65
war it acted essentially as a Field Army. 1971 war The war of 1971 saw the corps
heavily engaged in Shakargarh, where Indian attempts to eliminate the Shakargar
h salient were checked. The fighting in Shakargarh, while ultimately successful
as Indian aims were thwarted, resulted in a heavy loss of armor and some territo
ry was also lost.[2] As a result its commander, Lt Gen Irshad Khan, was recommen
ded for court martial and dismissal; this was ultimately not carried out. List o
f commanders 1. Lt Gen Azam Khan, July 1957 – ??
2. Lt Gen Bakhtiar Rana, during the 1965 war 3. Lt Gen Abdul Hamid Khan, 1966 –
March 1969 4. Lt Gen Attiqur Rahman, August 1969 – February 1970 5. Lt Gen Irsha
d Ahmed Khan, February 1970 – 1972 6. Lt Gen Abdul Ali Malik, 1972 – 1974 7. Lt
Gen Azmat Bakhsh Awan, 1974 – March 1976 8. Lt Gen Ghulam Hassan Khan, March 197
6 – April 1980 9. Lt Gen Ejaz Azim, April 1980 – April 1981 10. Lt Gen Khalid La
tif Mughal, ?? – October 1995 11. Lt Gen Pervez Musharraf, October 1995 – Octobe
r 1998 12. Lt Gen Saleem Haider, October 1998 – September 1999 13. Lt Gen Tauqir
Zia, September 1999 – April 2001 14. Lt Gen Ghulam Mustafa, April 2001 – April
2002 15. Lt Gen Javed Alam Khan, April 2002 – April 2006 16. Lt Gen Sajjad Akram
, April 2006 – March 2008 Present day and ORBAT The corps has not been in action
since 1971, though its subordinate units have served on the LOC and the war on
terror, on secondment to other formations. Its ORBAT is: • HQ I Corps, Mangla o
6th Armoured Division, Kharian o 17th Infantry Division, Kharian o 37th Infantry
Division, Gujranwala References 1. ^ Pakistan Orbat [Archive] - PakDef Forums 2
. ^ Brian Cloughly, A History of Pakistan Army External links • GlobalSecurity.o
rg, Global Security Website about the I Corps • This shows the Formations Insign
ia
II Corps Multan
II Corps, headquartered in Multan since it was set up in mid 1971, is also desig
nated Army Reserve South. XXXI Corps was formed in 1986-87 from elements previou
sly assigned to II Corps, which became a Reserve/Strike Corps, with the II Corps
area of the front with India being transferred to the new XXXI Corps. Most sour
ces agree that II Corps consists of three divisions, and most agree that this in
cludes one armored and two infantry divisions. One of the [infantry] divisions w
as formed recently. At least one source, while affirming the 1 Armored and 14 Me
ch Divisions, also reports "2 Artillery Divisions". Most sources report that Pak
istan s Army does not include Divisions of Artillery, though this reference is c
learly attesting the presence of the "2nd Artillery" rather than two divisions.
According to one source, as of early 2001 it was believed that one artillery div
ision had been raised recently, though this had yet to be confirmed. Another sou
rce reports only the 1 Armored and 14 Infantry Divisions, while reporting that 4
0 Infantry Division was assigned to V Corps as of early 2001. A newly formed 2nd
Artillery may account for the recently formed division reported by some sources
. Some sources suggest that the Corps is supported by one tank brigade or by one
Mechanised Infantry light Anti Tank Brigade, while other sources suggest as man
y as four supporting independent Brigades. On 31 August 2000 Gen. Pervez Musharr
af transfered Lt. Gen.Mohammad Yusaf (a Punjabi), GOC, 2 Corps, Multan, to the G
HQ as the new CGS. City II Corps U/I BDE U/I Armored BDE U/I Artillery BDE U/I A
nti-tank BDE 1st Armored Division ? 2nd Artillery Division 14th Infantry Divisio
n 40th Infantry Division Multan U/I Location U/I Location U/I Location U/I Locat
ion Multan U/I Location U/I Location Okara Latitude 30°11 N __°__ N __°__ N __°_
_ N __°__ N 30°11 N __°__ N __°__ N 30°48 N Longitude 71°28 E __°__ E __°__ E __
°__ E __°__ E 71°28 E __°__ E __°__ E 73°26 E
II Corps (Pakistan)
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Active Size Part of Garrison/HQ Colors Current commander otable commanders
1971 to present 40,000 men (though this may vary as units are rotated) Central C
ommand Multan Red, White and Black Lt Gen Sikander Afzal[1] Lt Gen Tikka Khan Lt
Gen Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq Lt Gen Rahimuddin Khan Lt Gen Hamid Gul Lt Gen Jehangir
Karamat
The II Corps (2 Corps) is one of the Pakistan Army s 10 active corps. It is stat
ioned in Multan and is one of Pakistan s four heavy armour corps. It is also kno
wn as Army Reserve South.
History II Corps was formed in 1971[2] as the winds of war began to blow in the
sub-continent. It was responsible for the defense of all of Pakistan south of Mu
ltan; a huge undertaking, as well as the launching of counterattacks against Ind
ia itself[3]. As war came its units would be heavily involved in the first task.
1971 War The Corps was commanded by Tikka Khan during the war. Controversially
one of its divisions; the 18th Infantry Division[4], was taken out of II Corp s
command and sent on an ill-fated offensive towards Ramgarh; which led to the deb
acle at the Battle of Longewala, the fact it was under GHQ rather than II Corps,
spared the corps of any blame, but was latter deemed one of the causes of failu
re. A major Indian attack towards Umerkot would be defeated[5] by two of the cor
ps divisions; the 18th after its return from Ramgarh and to II Corps command, an
d the 33rd Infantry Division, a task for which they were commended[6], after the
war. In the final analysis its performance in the war; while commended by many
partys, would be controversial, since at no time was its most powerful formation
; 1st Armoured Division committed to action[7]. Other conflicts As a heavy armou
r and mechanised formation, it was unsuited for the mountain warfare that charac
terised the army s commitments over the next three decades in Kashmir, Siachen a
nd Kargil, although a few units did see action attached to other corps. As Pakis
tan s main strategic reserve, it was also not sent on overseas operations under
the UN and with allies (such as Gulf War I and Somalia)which the army was ordere
d to undertake. List of commanders 1. Lt Gen Tikka Khan, September 1971 – March
1972 2. Lt Gen Muhammad Shariff, March 1972 – 1975 3. Lt Gen Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq
, 1975 – March 1976 4. Lt Gen Rahimuddin Khan, March 1976 – ?? 5. Lt Gen Raja Sa
roop Khan, March 1984 – March 1988 6. Lt Gen Shamim Alam Khan, March 1988 – May
1989 7. Lt Gen Hamid Gul, May 1989 – August 1991 8. Lt Gen Jehangir Karamat, 199
2 – 1994 9. Lt Gen Salahuddin Tirmizi, February 1996 – October 1998 10. Lt Gen Y
usaf Khan, October 1998 – August 2000 11. Lt Gen Syed Mohammad Amjad, August 200
0 – April 2002 12. Lt Gen Shahid Siddiq Tirmizey, April 2002 – September 2003 13
. Lt Gen Mohammad Akram, September 2003 – October 2004 14. Lt Gen Afzal Muzaffar
, October 2004 – May 2005 15. Lt Gen Syed Sabahat Hussain, May 2005 – April 2006
16. Lt Gen Sikander Afzal, April 2006 – present Order of Battle The Corps order
of battle is[8]: • HQ II Corps; Multan o 1st Armoured Division; Multan o 40th I
nfantry Division; Okara References 1. ^ Three Corps Commanders replaced DAWN Apr
il 11 2006 2. ^ Global Security 3. ^ Brian Cloughley- A History of the Pakistan
Army, ISBN 0-19-579507-5, Page 200. 4. ^ Brian Cloughley- A History of the Pakis
tan Army, ISBN 0-19-579507-5 Page 205-207. 5. ^ The History of Pakistan Army (19
66-71), by Maj Gen (Retd) Shaukat Raza, Page 209 6. ^ Brian Cloughley- A History
of the Pakistan Army, ISBN 0-19-579507-5 Page 206. 7. ^ Brian Cloughley- A Hist
ory of the Pakistan Army, ISBN 0-19-579507-5 Page 200. 8. ^ Global Security Exte
rnal links Corps formation sign can be seen on Pak Army Flags page
IV Corps Lahore
IV Corps, headquartered at Lahore, is responsible for the sector from Narowal to
Sulemankie. The IV Corps consists of at least two holding Infantry Divisions, a
s well as one independent tank brigade, and one or two other brigades, which may
include one independent infantry brigade and/or an independent artillery brigad
e. According to some reports, as of early 2001 the 40 Infantry Division was stat
ioned at Okara under IV Corps. At the time of the 1965 war with India, Pakistan
had only one corps HQ [I Corps at Mangla] with plans for a new IV Corps (at Laho
re). IV Corps was raised after the 1965 War. On 31 August 2000 Gen. Pervez Musha
rraf transfered Lt. Gen. Mohammad Aziz, a Kashmiri, from the post of the Chief o
f the General Staff (CGS) in the GHQ at Rawalpindi to that of GOC, 4 Corps, Laho
re. In mid-October 2001 Pakistani President General Pervaiz Musharraf reshuffled
several key security positions. Lieutenant General Mohammad Aziz Khan, an "Isla
mic soldier," was "promoted" as a fourstar officer to the largely ceremonial pos
t of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. Gen Aziz was the IV Corps
commander in the strategically vital border city of Lahore. City IV Corps U/I Ar
tillery BDE 3rd Ind Armored BDE 212th Infantry BDE 10th Infantry Division 11th I
nfantry Division Lahore U/I Location U/I Location U/I Location Lahore Lahore Lat
itude 30°24 N __°__ N __°__ N __°__ N 30°24 N 30°24 N Longitude 68°47 E __°__ E
__°__ E __°__ E 68°47 E 68°47 E
IV Corps (Pakistan)
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Active Size Part of Garrison/HQ Colors Cur
rent commander otable commanders 1965 to present 60,000 men (though this may var
y as units are rotated) Central Command Lahore Red, White and silver Lt Gen Ijaz
Ahmed Bakhshi Lt Gen Bahadur Sher Lt Gen Alam Jan Mehsud
IV Corps is one of the Pakistan Army s 10 active corps. It is based in Lahore. H
istory The corps was formed in 1965 and was the second corps level formation cre
ated by Pakistan Army. After independence, Pakistan had an organisation whereby
all divisions were controlled directly by General Headquarters. Although a Corps
would be raised in the late 1950 s, it was found that the organisation was unwi
eldly, and thus orders for a second corps and a Field Army to control the two co
rps were given, the army was later disbanded[1]. 1965 War The Corps and its assi
gned assets were still under the process of raising when war came. As a result i
t was in a unique position when it faced the Indian thrust at Lahore; it would b
e commanded directly from GHQ rather than from its own headquarters. Although it
along with other forces assembled managed to repel the Indian attack, the lack
of a fully functional corps HQ was felt.[2]. Later the formation was one of two
Pakistani corps at Chawinda, where it came under the effective control of the Pa
kistani commander in the sector; Tikka Khan. IV Corps artillery which was the on
ly organic IV Corps formation to have fully stood up
before the war would play a major part in the battle [3], and its performance wa
s deemed to have been the desicive factor in the battle[4][5]. 1971 War Immediat
ely after the war, the corps was fully stood up. In 1971 it would go to war agai
n, under command of Lt.Gen Bahadur Sher. With two divisions under command it wou
ld see skirmishes on the Wagha border area, and later it would capture the Husse
inwala district in India, including Qaisar-e-Hind Fort. List of commanders 1. Lt
Gen Attiqur Rahman, 1966 – August 1969 2. Lt Gen Tikka Khan, August 1969 – Marc
h 1971 3. Lt Gen Bahadur Sher, March 1971 – January 1972 4. Lt Gen Abdul Hameed
Khan, January 1972 – 1974 5. Lt Gen Iqbal Khan, March 1976 – January 1978 6. Lt
Gen Sawar Khan, January 1978 – March 1980 7. Lt Gen Sardar F.S. Khan Lodi, March
1980 – March 1984 8. Lt Gen Mohammad Aslam Shah, March 1984 – 1988 9. Lt Gen Al
am Jan Mehsud, 1988 – July 1990 10. Lt Gen Mohammad Ashraf, July 1990 – January
1993 11. Lt Gen Humayun Khan Bangash, January 1993 – January 1996 12. Lt Gen Moi
nuddin Haider, January 1996 – March 1997 13. Lt Gen Mohammad Akram, March 1997 –
October 1998 14. Lt Gen Khalid Maqbool, October 1998 – August 2000 15. Lt Gen A
ziz Khan, August 2000 – October 2001 16. Lt Gen Zarrar Azim, October 2001 – Dece
mber 2003 17. Lt Gen Shahid Aziz, December 2003 – October 2005 18. Lt Gen Shafaa
t Ullah Shah, October 2005 – March 2008 19. Lt Gen Ijaz Ahmed Bakhshi, March 200
8 – present Order of Battle The corps order of battle is[6]. • Headquarters IV C
orps: Lahore o 10th Infantry Division: Lahore o 11th Infantry Division: Lahore o
3rd Independent Armoured Brigade: Unidentified Location o 212 Infantry Brigade:
Unidentified Location References 1. ^ The Pakistan Army-War 1965-Shaukat Riza-A
rmy Education Press-1984 2. ^ Brian Cloughley- A History of the Pakistan Army, I
SBN 0-19-579507-5 3. ^ 50 years of the Regiment of Artllery 4. ^ Battle of Chawi
nda 5. ^ History of Indo-Pak War of 1965. Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmed (ret) ISBN 969-869
3-01-7, Chapter oo Chawinda Battle 6. ^ Global Security Page on IV Corps
V Corps Karachi
V Corps has been headquartered in Karachi since it was raised in 1975. All sourc
es agree that it consists of at least one Division and at least one and probably
at least two independent Brigades. Several sources suggest that it also include
s a second ("holding") Division, possibly the 16 Infantry or 41 Infantry Divisio
n. All sources agree that the Corps includes at least one Independent Armored Br
igade. While some sources suggest that the independent brigades include one tank
and one infantry independent brigades, other reports say there are two independ
ent armored brigades, while others report an artillery brigade, for a total of a
s many as four independent brigades. By early July 1999, during the Kargil confl
ict, Pakistan had moved most of its strike corps to the eastern border, forcing
India to heighten the vigil across the LoC and the international border. Pakista
n s XI corps and XII corps, which had been stationed in Peshawar and Quetta, wer
e believed to have moved east, reinforcing the V corps in Karachi, whose role ha
d been to intercept any Indian attempt to cut the Karachi-Lahore road. The X cor
ps at Rawalpindi was in position across the Line of Control in Kashmir, and the
four mountain divisions near the LoC had been reinforced with the three brigades
that have moved into Skardu. As of late 2000 the 5 Corps was commandded by Lt.
Gen. Muzaffar Hussain Usmani (a Mohajir), one of the so-called "Mullas Generals
" or Islamised Generals, who reportedly worked during off-duty hours for the Tab
lighi Jamaat, an Islamic organisation which provided most of the jehadist volunt
eers for the Pakistan-based extremist organisations active in J & K in India. Wi
th the move of XXXI Corps to Pannu Aquil the responsibility for Rahim Yar Khan-S
ukkur had fallen to V Corps by early 2001. As such 16 Infantry Division could be
allocated the task for either a local offensive in V Corps Sector or given the
responsibility of the area South of Rahim Yar Khan. Most probably the former. Ci
ty V Corps 31st Inf BDE (MECH) 2nd Armored BDE ?? U/I Armored BDE ?? U/I Artille
ry BDE ?? 16th Infantry Division 18th Infantry Division Karachi Hyderabad Hydera
bad U/I Location U/I Location Rahim Yar Khan Hyderabad Latitude 24°52 N 25°22 N
25°22 N __°__ N __°__ N __°__ N 25°22 N Longitude 67°03 E 68°22 E 68°22 E __°__
E __°__ E __°__ E 68°22 E
V Corps (Pakistan)
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Active Size Part of Garrison/HQ Current commander otable commanders
1975 – present 60,000 men (though this may vary as units are rotated) Southern C
ommand Karachi Lt Gen Shahid Iqbal Lt Gen Asif Nawaz Lt Gen Naseer Akhtar Lt Gen
Muzaffar Usmani
The V Corps is one of the Pakistan Army s ten active corps, and the only one in
the Sindh. It is based in Karachi. The Corps was raised in 1975 to command Pakis
tani units in the entire of Sindh and some parts of southern Punjab and eastern
Balochistan.
History The corps was heavily used in the Sindh anti-dacoity operations in the r
ural Sindh and the anti-terrorism operations in the urban Sindh during the late
1980s and the early 1990s. List of commanders 1. Lt Gen Mohammad Akbar Khan, 197
5 – March 1976 2. Lt Gen Jehanzeb Arbab, March 1976 – January 1978 3. Lt Gen Iqb
al Khan, January 1978 – March 1980 4. Lt Gen S.M. Abbasi, March 1980 – March 198
4 5. Lt Gen Ahmad Shamim Khan, April 1984 – April 1988 6. Lt Gen Asif Nawaz, Apr
il 1988 – March 1991 7. Lt Gen Arif Bangash, March 1991 – 1992 8. Lt Gen Naseer
Akhtar, 1992 – 1994 9. Lt Gen Lehrasab Khan, 1994 – May 1997 10. Lt Gen Afzal Ja
njua, May 1997 – October 1998 11. Lt Gen Muzaffar Usmani, October 1998 – May 200
1 12. Lt Gen Tariq Waseem Ghazi, May 2001 – January 2004 13. Lt Gen Ahsan Saleem
Hyat, January 2004 – October 2004 14. Lt Gen Syed Athar Ali, October 2004 – Apr
il 2006 15. Lt Gen Ahsan Azhar Hayat, April 2006 – October 2008 16. Lt Gen Shahi
d Iqbal, October 2008 – present Order of Battle The order of battles of the corp
s is as follows: • HQ V Corps: Karachi o 16th Infantry Division: Pano Aqil o 18t
h Infantry Division: Hyderabad o 25th Mechanized Division: Malir External links
• Global Security Website about the V Corps • This shows the Formations Insignia
X Corps Rawalpindi
Although Pakistan does not have a Corps headquarters in Kashmir [unlike India],
X Corps has responsibility for Jammu and Kashmir. Some sources report that the F
orce Commander Northern Areas is the equivalent of a Division, and is subordinat
e to X Corps, while most sources agree that it is an independent Corps-equivalen
t command reporting directly to the Army headquarters. The X Corps, which has be
en headquarterd in Rawalpindi since it was raised in 1974, consists of three hol
ding infantry divisions allocated for Jammu and Kashmir. The 19th Infantry Divis
ion is reportedly responsible for the area between Kel and Jhelum. These three d
ivisions have a total of four extra brigades, above and beyond the nine [three t
imes three] normally assigned to Pakistani Army divisions. In addition, there ar
e at least one independent brigade, with some sources reporting two [one tank an
d one infantry], with possibly a third [artillery] brigade]. One of the first ac
ts of Gen. Musharraf, after his appointment as the COAS by Mr. Nawaz Sharif in O
ctober, 1998, was to post Lt. Gen. Mahmud Ahmed, ethnicity not clear, but possib
ly a Pathan, who was then Commandant, National Defence College, as the GOC, 10 C
orps. Following the 1999 military coup, Musharraf initially posted Lt.Gen. Moham
mad Aziz [a Kashmiri], as the GOC, 10 Corps, but Qazi Hussain Ahmed of the Jamaa
t-e-Islami, and Maulana Fazlur Rahman of the Jamaat-ul-Ulema Pakistan criticised
the proposed transfer of Lt.Gen. Aziz on the ground that this would weaken the
so-called jehad in Kashmir. Gen. Musharraf, thereupon, cancelled his order and i
nstead promoted Maj.Gen. Jamshaid Gulzar, the then head of the India Division in
the ISI, as a Lt. Gen. and posted him as the GOC, 10 Corps. During the five-yea
r-long Taliban regime in Afghanistan, Pakistan had gained several advantages wit
h a friendly neighbour at Kabul. It shifted large elements of its XI and XII Cor
ps close to the Indian border in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), Punjab and Rajasthan.
The 9 Infantry Division of XI Corps had been deployed opposite Dras with Headqua
rters at Gulteri, under X Corps. In November 2001 it was reported that Pakistan
had begun shifting elements of its forces from the Indian borders to its borders
with Afghanistan. This was the first time in six years that troops had reverted
to their original location under the XI Corps (Peshawar) and XII Corps (Quetta)
. In December 2001 the Indian government ordered perhaps the largest post-Second
World War military build-up, sending some three-quarters of India s 1.2 million
soldiers on to offensive positions on the border with Pakstian. Pakistan respon
ded by moving 10, 11 and 12 Corps from their Afghan frontier locations near Rawa
lpindi, Peshawar and Quetta to its eastern frontier with India. City X Corps 111
Inf BDE (MECH) 8th Armored BDE U/I Artillery BDE 12th Infantry Division U/I BDE
U/I BDE U/I BDE U/I BDE U/I BDE U/I BDE 19th Infantry Division U/I BDE U/I BDE
U/I BDE 23rd Infantry Division U/I BDE U/I BDE Rawalpindi Rawalpindi Kharian U/I
Location Muzzafarabad [Murree ?] U/I Location U/I Location U/I Location U/I Loc
ation U/I Location U/I Location Rawalkot [Jhelum ?] U/I Location U/I Location U/
I Location Mangla [Gujrat ?] U/I Location U/I Location Latitude 33°36 N 33°36 N
__°__ N __°__ N __°__ N __°__ N __°__ N __°__ N __°__ N __°__ N __°__ N 34°47 N
__°__ N __°__ N __°__ N 33°07 N __°__ N __°__ N Longitude 73°04 E 73°04 E __°__
E __°__ E __°__ E __°__ E __°__ E __°__ E __°__ E __°__ E __°__ E 73°30 E __°__
E __°__ E __°__ E 73°39 E __°__ E __°__ E
U/I BDE U/I BDE
U/I Location U/I Location
__°__ N __°__ N
__°__ E __°__ E
X Corps (Pakistan)
Active Size Part of Garrison/HQ Colors Current commander otable commanders 1974
to present 60,000 men (though this may vary as units are rotated) Northern Comma
nd Rawalpindi Red, White and yellow Lt Gen Tahir Mahmood Lt Gen Faiz Ali Chishti
Lt Gen Ghulam Muhammad Malik Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmed Lt Gen Tariq Majid
The X Corps (10 Corps) is one of Pakistan s 10 active Corps and one of two curre
ntly active in Kashmir. The X Corps was raised in 1974. Headquartered in Rawalpi
ndi, it is responsible for operations in some areas of Kashmir[1]. Before that a
ll formations in Kashmir were controlled directly from GHQ. Serving on the LOC I
n 1974, as today, the Indian and Pakistani forces face each other across the LOC
, and there are often exchanges of fire, and sometime full scale battles. Since
1974, the formation s primary occupation has been to protect Pakistani interests
on the LOC. Siachen conflict In 1984, the Indian Army undertook an incursion in
to Siachen. The X Corps was put into action in the highest battlefield in the wo
rld. Despite early setbacks, notably at Quaid Observation Post[2], the corps uni
ts were able to prevent a complete loss of the glacier, and were able to capture
territory in at Chumik[3], and in Operation Qidaat[4]. eelum Valley In 1991, th
e Indian Army commenced an incursion into the Neelum Valley. The Corps troops in
several months of fighting managed to retake the captured areas. Kargil War In
1999, the conflict over Kargil saw the corps enter action, in Kargil itself, and
all along the LOC. Over several weeks in June 1999, the entire corps was engage
d for the first time in its history. During the fighting, Havildar Lalak Jan a t
rooper of the corps would earn the Nishan-e-Haider. List of commanders 1. Lt Gen
Aftab Ahmad Khan, 1974 – March 1976 2. Lt Gen Faiz Ali Chishti, March 1976 – Ma
rch 1980 3. Lt Gen Jahan Dad Khan, March 1980 – March 1984 4. Lt Gen Zahid Ali A
kbar Khan, March 1984 – May 1987 5. Lt Gen Imran Ullah Khan, May 1987 – May 1991
6. Lt Gen Ghulam Muhammad Malik, 1992 – October 1995 7. Lt Gen Ali Kuli Khan, O
ctober 1995 – May 1997 8. Lt Gen Saleem Haider May 1997 – October 1998 9. Lt Gen
Mahmud Ahmed, October 1998 – November 1999 10. Lt Gen Jamshed Gulzar, November
1999 – October 2001 11. Lt Gen Syed Arif Hassan, October 2001 – September 2003 1
2. Lt Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, September 2003 – October 2004 13. Lt Gen Salahud
din Satti, October 2004 – October 2006 14. Lt Gen Tariq Majid, October 2006 – Oc
tober 2007 15. Lt Gen Mohsin Kamal, October 2007 – October 2008 16. Lt Gen Tahir
Mahmood, October 2008 – present Orbat The Corps HQ is stationed in Rawalpindi,
however its subordinate formations and units are mostly deployed in Kashmir. • H
Q X Corps (Rawalpindi) o 12th Infantry Division Murree o 23rd Infantry Division
Jhelum o 19th Infantry Division Mangla o Force Command Northern Areas Gilgit o 1
11 Independent Infantry Brigade Rawalpindi References 1. ^ X Corps 2. ^ Pakistan
Military Consortium :: www.PakDef.info 3. ^ Pakistan Military Consortium :: www
.PakDef.info 4. ^ http://pakdef.info/pakmilitary/army/siachen/siachen6.html • Br
ain Cloughley, A History of Pakistan Army External links GlobalSecurity.org, Glo
bal Security Page on X Corps This shows the Formations Insignia • A BBC document
ary on Siachen and the LOC conflict in general. The troops are all from this cor
ps • A collection of pictures of X Corps soldiers in Kashmir
XI Corps Peshawar
The XI Corps, headquartered at Peshawar in the North West Frontier Province bord
ering Afghanistan since it was raised in 1975, is sometimes referred to Army Res
erve Center. It consists of two divisions, including one that replaced the divis
ion sent to FCNA. It reportedly also includes one independent brigade, though so
urces disagree as to whether this is an armor or artillery unit [most sources ag
ree that it is an Independent Armored Brigade]. The XI Corps command was the pri
mary support and logistic base for the Taliban. During the five-year-long Taliba
n regime in Afghanistan, Pakistan had gained several advantages with a friendly
neighbour at Kabul. It shifted large elements of its XI and XII Corps close to t
he Indian border in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), Punjab and Rajasthan. The 9 Infantr
y Division of XI Corps had been deployed opposite Dras with Headquarters at Gult
eri, under X Corps. By early July 1999, during the Kargil conflict, Pakistan had
moved most of its strike corps to the eastern border, forcing India to heighten
the vigil across the LoC and the international border. Pakistan s XI corps and
XII corps, which had been stationed in Peshawar and Quetta, were believed to hav
e moved east, reinforcing the V corps in Karachi, whose role had been to interce
pt any Indian attempt to cut the Karachi-Lahore road. The Pakistani concept of R
iposte was neutralized, as the reserve formations were denuded of their forces,
in that both XI Corps in Peshawar and XII Corps in Quetta were denuded of their
divisions, with one in Afghanistan and the other in Jammu and Kashmir. The X cor
ps at Rawalpindi was in position across the Line of Control in Kashmir, and the
four mountain divisions near the LoC had been reinforced with the three brigades
that have moved into Skardu. As of early 2001 it was reported that the 7 Infant
ry division from Mardan was moving under the command of Northern Areas Command [
Force Command Northern Areas - FCNA], possibly to a location opposite Kargil in
Kashmir. To make XI Corps viable after the move of 7 Infantry Division Pakistan
would have to raise one more division. In November 2001 it was reported that Pak
istan had begun shifting elements of its forces from the Indian borders to its b
orders with Afghanistan. This was the first time in six years that troops had re
verted to their original location under the XI Corps (Peshawar) and XII Corps (Q
uetta). As of late 2001 the 11 Corps was entrusted with the task of detecting th
e Al-Qaida activists who had fled Afghanistan in the wake of American airstrikes
on Afghanistan. In December 2001 the Indian government ordered perhaps the larg
est post-Second World War military build-up, sending some threequarters of India
s 1.2 million soldiers on to offensive positions on the border with Pakstian. P
akistan responded by moving 10, 11 and 12 Corps from their Afghan frontier locat
ions near Rawalpindi, Peshawar and Quetta to its eastern frontier with India. In
midOctober 2001 Pakistani President General Pervaiz Musharraf re-shuffled sever
al key security positions. The new Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) chief was L
ieutenant General Ehsanul Haq, former commander of the Peshawar-based 11 Corps.
Although Gen Haq took charge of the Peshawar Corps only in May, he was familiar
with Taliban bases, assets and secrets. City XI Corps U/I Armored BDE 7th Infant
ry Division 9th Infantry Division Peshawar U/I Location Mardan Rawalkot [Mardan
? ] Latitude 34°00 N __°__ N 34°12 N 34°47 N Longitude 71°33 E __°__ E 72°02 E 7
3°30 E
XI Corps (Pakistan)
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Active Size Part of Garrison/HQ Colors Current commander otable commanders
1975 to present 60,000 men (though this may vary as units are rotated) Northern
Command Peshawar Red, White and Black Lt Gen Masood Aslam Lt Gen Fazle Haq Lt Ge
n Ali Muhammad Jan Orakzai Lt Gen Safdar Hussain Lt Gen Mohammad Hamid Khan
The XI Corps (11 Corps) is one of the Pakistan Army s nine active corps, and the
only one in the NWFP. It is based in Peshawar. The Corps was raised in 1975 to
command Pakistani units in the NWFP and Northern Areas. Afghan War It was the st
art of the Afghan War, which brought the Corps to prominence in 1979. It was giv
en three infantry divisions, and was given the responsibility of covering the Kh
yber Pass, one of the two approches by which the Soviets could attack into Pakis
tan (the other was the Bolan Pass, guarded by the XII Corps). For more than a de
cade it held the line against Soviet expansionism. Kargil War The end of the Col
d War brought effected the Corp immesly. No longer facing a threat on its Wester
n flank, the army moved division, brigades and units away from the division, and
its orienatation was changed from a defence of the Afghan border, to being a re
serve in Kashmir. The 1999 Kargil War saw the corps enter action for the first t
ime and it fought mainly in the Gultari sector of the war, where one of its memb
ers, Captain Kernel Sher Khan would win the Nishan-e-Haider, the Highest Pakista
ni Gallantry Award. War on Terror After September 11 attacks and the subsequent
invasion of Afghanistan, the XI Corps became the main Pakistani formation involv
ed in fighting in Waziristan and the North West Frontier in general. It has been
reinforced and also commands substantial forces of paramilitary Frontier Corps.
List of commanders 1. Lt Gen Majeed Malik, April 1975 – March 1976 2. Lt Gen Sa
war Khan, March 1976 – January 1978 3. Lt Gen Fazle Haq, January 1978 – March 19
80 4. Lt Gen Chaudhri Abdul Majid, March 1980 – April 1984 5. Lt Gen Muhammad Iq
bal, April 1984 – 1985 6. Lt Gen Mirza Aslam Beg, 1985 – January 1987 7. Lt Gen
Ahmad Kamal, January 1987 – February 1989 8. Lt Gen Rehm Dil Bhatti, February 19
89 – September 1990 9. Lt Gen Farrakh Khan, September 1990 – August 1991 10. Lt
Gen Ayaz Ahmad, August 1991 – May 1994 11. Lt Gen Mumtaz Gul, May 1994 – October
1996 12. Lt Gen Saeed uz Zafar, October 1996 – March 2000 13. Lt Gen Imtiaz Sha
heen, March 2000 – April 2001 14. Lt Gen Ehsan ul Haq, April 2001 – October 2001
15. Lt Gen Ali Muhammad Jan Orakzai, October 2001 – March 2004 16. Lt Gen Safda
r Hussain, March 2004 – September 2005 17. Lt Gen Mohammad Hamid Khan, September
2005 – April 2007 18. Lt Gen Masood Aslam, April 2007 – present Composition The
order of battles of the corps keeps changing, especially in view of its current
commitment in the War on terror. During peacetime the XI corps is based in the
following areas: • HQ XI Corps: Peshawar o 7th Infantry Division: Peshawar o 9th
Infantry Division: Kohat o Armoured Brigade: Nowshera. References Brain Cloughl
ey, A History of Pakistan Army External links • GlobalSecurity.org, Global Secur
ity Website about the XI Corps • This shows the Formations Insignia
XII Corps Quetta
XII Corps has been headquartered in Quetta since it was raised in 1984-85, and a
pparently consists of two infantry divisions. Unlike many other Corps, no indepe
ndent brigades have been identified in association with 12 Corps, although one s
ource suggests the possible presence of one Independent Armored or Independent I
nfantry Brigade. Differences between Nawaz Sharif and Ghulam Ishaq Khan started
in the early 1990s due to Sharif s objection to Gen Abdul Wahid, Commander XII c
orps in Quetta who was appointed as the Army Chief, after Asif Nawaz passed away
. During the five-year-long Taliban regime in Afghanistan, Pakistan had gained s
everal advantages with a friendly neighbour at Kabul. It shifted large elements
of its XI and XII Corps close to the Indian border in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), P
unjab and Rajasthan. By early July 1999, during the Kargil conflict, Pakistan ha
d moved most of its strike corps to the eastern border, forcing India to heighte
n the vigil across the LoC and the international border. Pakistan s XI corps and
XII corps, which had been stationed in Peshawar and Quetta, were believed to ha
ve moved east, reinforcing the V corps in Karachi, whose role had been to interc
ept any Indian attempt to cut the Karachi-Lahore road. The X corps at Rawalpindi
was in position across the Line of Control in Kashmir, and the four mountain di
visions near the LoC had been reinforced with the three brigades that have moved
into Skardu. The Pakistani concept of Riposte was neutralized, as the reserve f
ormations were denuded of their forces, in that both XI Corps in Peshawar and XI
I Corps in Quetta were denuded of their divisions, with one in Afghanistan and t
he other in Jammu and Kashmir. In the month preceding his coup, In the months be
fore the coup, it had become clear to Gen. Musharraf that there was information
being leaked to "the politicians" (particularly to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif)
from the monthly meetings of Corps Commanders. Gen. Musharraf told Prime Ministe
r Nawaz Sharif that he wanted the suspect corps commander, Lt.-Gen. Tariq Pervai
z, of XII Corps, Quetta, removed. The Prime Minister said that this would be a l
engthy process. Gen. Musharraf, as COAS, then moved within his jurisdiction to r
emove Lt.-Gen. Tariq Pervaiz from his post, and then retired him, without the Pr
ime Minister s approval. Lt Gen. Tariq Parvez was sacked by Lt. Gen. Pervez Mush
arraf, Chief of Army Staff and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee o
n 09 October 2001 for ill-discipline and disloyalty. The composition of XII Corp
s appears to have undergone considerable evolution over time, reflecting the var
ious deployments. As of early 2001 the Corps apparently consisted only of the 41
Infantry Division, and it was suggested that, to make this Corps a viable Corps
, one more division will have to be raised, having lost 40 Infantry Division to
IV Corps. In November 2001 it was reported that Pakistan had begun shifting elem
ents of its forces from the Indian borders to its borders with Afghanistan. This
was the first time in six years that troops had reverted to their original loca
tion under the XI Corps (Peshawar) and XII Corps (Quetta). In December 2001 the
Indian government ordered perhaps the largest post-Second World War military bui
ld-up, sending some three-quarters of India s 1.2 million soldiers on to offensi
ve positions on the border with Pakstian. Pakistan responded by moving 10, 11 an
d 12 Corps from their Afghan frontier locations near Rawalpindi, Peshawar and Qu
etta to its eastern frontier with India. City XII Corps U/I BDE 16th Infantry Di
vision 33rd Infantry Division Quetta U/I Location U/I Location U/I Location Lati
tude __°__ N __°__ N __°__ N __°__ N Longitude __°__ E __°__ E __°__ E __°__ E
XII Corps (Pakistan)
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Active Size Part of Garrison/HQ Colors Cur
rent commander otable commanders 1985 to present 40,000 men (though this may var
y as units are rotated) Southern Command Quetta Red, White and Black Lt Gen Khal
id Shameem Wynne Lt Gen Khushdil Khan Afridi Lt Gen Abdul Waheed Kakar Lt Gen Ab
dul Qadir Baloch Lt Gen Hamid Rab Nawaz
The XII Corps (12 Corps) is a Pakistani army corps stationed in Quetta. Its corp
s commander also commands the Southern Command simultaneously. History The Sovie
t invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 created for Pakistan a real security threat on
the western borders for the first time it its history. As a result two new corp
s were raised to guard the western borders. These were the XI Corps in Peshawar,
and the XII Corps, with the responsibility of guarding the Bolan Pass. The form
ation spent, the first few years of its history guarding again Soviet expansioni
sm. The end of the cold war and the ending of the Soviet threat, led the formati
on into a new era. It would lose divisions, and brigades to the western border.
Notably 40 infantry division would be moved to Okara[1], and for a time it would
have only one division. War on Terrorism The war on terror began and once again
the corps began to undertake duty on the western borders, catching and neutrali
sing Al-Qaeda and Taliban operatives, although it has not been involved to such
an extent as the XI Corps. The operations continue to this day. 2001-2002 Stando
ff The formation would in early 2002 be moved to the eastern border for the firs
t time in its history as the threat of war with India loomed. The corps purpose
was to provide reinforcement to V Corps in the Thar desert. It would return to Q
uetta in 2004 just in time to face a new challenge. Baloch Rebellion In 2004, th
e Balochistan conflict restarted. The formation was involved in putting down the
insurrection in collaboration with local security forces, and by 2006, with the
killing of Akbar Bugti, the rebellion was more or less suppressed. List of comm
anders 1. Lt Gen Khushdil Khan Afridi, 1985 – May 1987 2. Lt Gen Syed Zakir Ali
Zaidi, May 1987 – August 1989 3. Lt Gen Abdul Waheed Kakar, August 1989 – Januar
y 1993 4. Lt Gen Zia Ullah Khan, January 1993 – 1995 5. Lt Gen Saranjam Khan, 19
95 – May 1997 6. Lt Gen Tariq Pervaiz, May 1997 – October 1999 7. Lt Gen Mushtaq
Hussain, October 1999 – October 2001 8. Lt Gen Abdul Qadir Baloch, October 2001
– September 2003 9. Lt Gen Shahid Hamid, September 2003 – October 2004 10. Lt G
en Hamid Rab Nawaz, October 2004 – April 2007 11. Lt Gen Khalid Shameem Wynne, A
pril 2007 – present ORBAT The formations composition has changed on several occa
sions in the past, and like all formations on the western border it has received
reinforcements for the war on terror, however its present composition iss thoug
ht to be. • HQ XII Corps (Quetta) o 33rd Infantry Division (Quetta) o 41st Infan
try Division (Quetta) o Infantry Brigade (Turbat) o Armoured Brigade (Khuzdar) E
xternal References • Global Security Website • Orbat.com References ^ XII Corps
XXX Corps Sialkot
XXX Corps, headquartered at Sialkot, is reportedly responsible for the area betw
een Jhelum and Narowal. It consists of two holding Infantry divisions with a tot
al of at least seven brigades [versus the normal three for each division]. 15th
Infantry Division is generally reported as having four brigades, while the 8th I
nfantry Division is various reported as having three or four. XXX Corps also inc
ludes at least one, and perhaps as many as three, independent brigades, certainl
y including one tank brigade, and with anti-tank and/or artillery independent br
igades also reported. XXX Corps was formed in 1986-87 from elements previously a
ssigned to I Corps, which became a Reserve/Strike Corps, with the I Corps area o
f the front with India being transferred to the new XXX Corps. City XXX Corps U/
I Anti-tank BDE 2nd Ind Armored BDE U/I Artillery BDE 8th Infantry Division U/I
BDE U/I BDE U/I BDE 15th Infantry Division U/I BDE U/I BDE U/I BDE U/I BDE Sialk
ot U/I Location Rawalpindi U/I Location Sialkot U/I Location U/I Location U/I Lo
cation Sialkot U/I Location U/I Location U/I Location U/I Location Latitude 32°3
0 30"N __°__ N 33°36 N __°__ N 32°30 30"N __°__ N __°__ N __°__ N 32°30 30"N __°
__ N __°__ N __°__ N __°__ N Longitude 74°33 29"E __°__ E 73°04 E __°__ E 74°33
29"E __°__ E __°__ E __°__ E 74°33 29"E __°__ E __°__ E __°__ E __°__ E
XXX Corps (Pakistan)
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Active Size Part of Garrison/HQ ickname Colors Engagements Current commander
1987-present 60,000 men, though this may change as units are rotated. Northern C
ommand Gujranwala Triple X Red and White LOC Conflict Lt Gen Nadeem Taj
The XXX Corps (30 Corps) is one of the Pakistan Army s 10 active corps and is cu
rrently based in Gujranwala. History The vital area, which connects Pakistani Pu
njab and parts of Kashmir governed by India (extending from Jehlum to Narowal),
has always been of strategic importance; the place was the site of major battles
in both 1965 and 1971. Traditionally, this area had been held by I Corps. That
corps already had offensive duties and the task of defending this area was being
neglected by the corps HQ. To improve the situation it was decided to raise ano
ther corps headquarters to look after this area. Thus the XXX Corps was raised a
nd given the command of both new raisings and units and formations detached from
I Corps, which was then dedicated to offensive tasks.[1] LOC Operations Since t
he beginnings of an anti-India insurgency in Kashmir, the line of control has be
en an active operational zone. The corps has been deployed along its sector of t
he LOC and engaged in operations since 1989. List of commanders 1. Lt Gen Imtiaz
Warraich, 1987 2. Lt Gen Mohammad Tariq, 1993 – August 1995 3. Lt Gen Javed Ash
raf Qazi, August 1995 – February 1996 4. Lt Gen Ziauddin Butt, February 1996 – M
arch 1997 5. Lt Gen Naeem Akbar Khan, March 1997 – April 1998 6. Lt Gen Agha Jeh
angir Khan, April 1998 – January 2001 7. Lt Gen Abdul Qadir Baloch, January 2001
– October 2001 8. Lt Gen Faiz Jilani Malik, October 2001 – March 2003 9. Lt Gen
Khalid Munir Khan, March 2003 – January 2004 10. Lt Gen Javed Hassan, January 2
004 – October 2004 11. Lt Gen Mohammad Sabir, October 2004 – September 2005 12.
Lt Gen Anis Ahmed Abbasi, September 2005 – April 2007 13. Lt Gen Waseem Ahmad As
hraf, April 2007 – October 2008 14. Lt Gen Nadeem Taj, October 2008 – present Or
der of battle Its present order of battle is as follows:[2] • HQ XXX Corps, Gujr
anwala o 8th Infantry Division, Sialkot o 15th Infantry Division, Sialkot o 2nd
Independent Armoured Brigade, Rawalpindi References 1. ^ Ravi Rikhye, Pakistan A
rmy Divisions 2. ^ Global Security website page on XXX Corps
XXXI Corps Bhawalpur
XXXI Corps, headquartered at Bhawalpur [also reported as headquartered at Pannu
Aquil], consists of two holding Infantry Divisions. One of these divisions is ap
parenty 37 Infantry Division, while the other is either 33 or [less probably] 40
Infantry Division. Sources generally agree that the Corps is supported by two i
ndependent brigades, but there is considerable divergence as to the composition
of these two brigades. Several sources suggest at least one Mechanised Infantry
Heavy Anti Tank Brigade, as well as possibly one other Independent Brigade Group
. At least one source claims an Independent Armored Brigade and an Artillery Bri
gade. XXXI Corps was formed in 1986-87 from elements previously assigned to II C
orps, which became a Reserve/Strike Corps, with the II Corps area of the front w
ith India being transferred to the new XXXI Corps. As of early 2001 it was repor
ted that 37 Infantry Division had shifted from Bhawalpur to Sukkur. It had the r
esponsibility for Sukkur-Rahim Yar Khan. This move threw open the area between R
ahim Yar Khan and Fort Abbas, which would have to be covered by raising one more
division. At that time, 33 Infantry Division was reported as likely to be moved
from Bhawalpur, and could be employed for local offensive or provide depth to 3
7 Infantry division in the region of Sukkur-Rahim Yar Khan or along the Islamgar
h-Kishengarh axis. City XXXI Corps 13th Ind Armored BDE 101st Ind BDE Group 33rd
Infantry Division 37th Infantry Division Bhawalpur [Pannu Aquil ?] U/I Location
U/I Location Bhawalpur(?) Latitude __°__ N __°__ N __°__ N __°__ N Longitude __
°__ E __°__ E __°__ E __°__ E
XXXI Corps (Pakistan)
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Active Size Garrison/HQ Current commander otable commanders
1988-present 60,000 men, though this may change as units are rotated. Bahawalpur
Lt Gen Naeem Khalid Lodhi Lt Gen Mohammad Shafiq
The XXXI Corps (31 Corps) is one of the Pakistan Army s 10 active corps and is c
urrently based in Bahawalpur. The corps was raised in the end of 1980 s and took
over the assets of formerly II Corps, which is currently based in Multan. Now,
it has under it more than 3 full-sized division and is responsible for the south
ern Punjab desert zone. In 1988, when the C-130 Hercules plane of President Gene
ral Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq crashed near Bahawalpur, he was visiting Bahawalpur corp
s along with the top of the military brass. War in orth-West Pakistan 2008 was t
he year that the elements of the corps saw action. As the war in FATA heated up
and militant activity increased to a hitherto unseen level, the government respo
nded by launching a massive operation (code-named Operation Zalzala meaning eart
hquake) against the militant strongholds South Waziristan.[1]. The operation wou
ld be spearheaded by 14th Infantry Division of XXXI Corps, and would succeed in
evicting the militants from their stronghold[2]. On December 26, 2008, elements
of the 14th Infantry Division, are currently being redeployed to the Indian bord
er.[3] List of commanders 1. Lt Gen Mohammad Shafiq, 1988 – April 1991 2. Lt Gen
Shamim Alam Khan, April 1991 – August 1991 3. Lt Gen Nazar Hussain, 4. Lt Gen M
uzaffar Usmani, May 1997 – October 1998
5. Lt Gen Tahir Ali Qureshi, October 1998 – August 2000 6. Lt Gen Munir Hafiez,
August 2000 – October 2001 7. Lt Gen Shahid Hamid, October 2001 – September 2003
8. Lt Gen Syed Parwez Shahid, September 2003 – May 2005 9. Lt Gen Imtiaz Hussai
n, May 2005 – April 2007 10. Lt Gen Raza Mohammad Khan, April 2007 – October 200
8 11. Lt Gen Muhammad Yousaf, October 2008 – October 2009 12. Lt Gen Naeem Khali
d Lodhi, October 2009 – present Order of battle Its present order of battle is a
s follows:[4] • HQ XXXI Corps, Bahawalpur o 14th Infantry Division, Okara (curre
ntly based in Waziristan region for operations) o 26th Mechanized Division, Baha
walpur o 35th Infantry Division, Bahawalpur References 1. ^ "Deserted town shows
human cost of Operation Zalzala" Daily Times, 20 May, 2008 2. ^ http://www.satp
.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/Waziristan/timeline/index.html 3. ^ http://new
s.yahoo.com/s/ap/20081227/ap_on_re_as/as_pakistan 4. ^ Global Security website p
age on XXXI Corps
orthern Area Command
The Northern Area Command, also known as Force Command Northern Areas [FCNA], is
headquatered at Gilgit. Flying above the main gate of the headquarters, the FCN
A flag is orange with the command formation sign on the center (a black disk wit
h a silver snow leopard salient issuing from the fly edge of the disk). After 19
99 it has apparently functioned as the equivalent of a Corps command. Some sourc
es report that the Force Commander Northern Areas is the equivalent of a Divisio
n, and is subordinate to X Corps, while most sources agree that as of early 2002
it was an independent Corp-equivalent command reporting directly to the Army he
adquarters. Sources differ as to the composition of the command, with some repor
ting one division and four independent brigades, while others sugges a total of
five independent brigades. Apparently, as of early 2001 it was reported that the
7 Infantry division from Mardan was moving from the command of XI Corps in Pesh
awar to the command of Northern Areas Command, possibly to a location opposite K
argil in Kashmir. City Northern Area Command 80th Inf BDE 150th Inf BDE 323rd Si
achen Inf BDE 62nd Inf BDE 61st Inf BDE 7th Infantry Division U/I Location Gilgi
t, Kashmir Astor Gilgit Dansam / Kel?? Skardu U/I Location 34°12 N Latitude 35°5
5 N 35°22 N 35°55 N __°__ N 35°18 N __°__ N 72°02 E Longitude 74°18 E 74°51 E 74
°18 E __°__ E 75°37 E __°__ E
6th Armoured Division “Flying Horse”
1965 to present 20,000 men (though this may vary as units are rotated) I Corps K
harian Flying Horse black and gold Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, Indo-Pakistani Wa
r of 1971, Somalia Maj-Gen Changez Dil Khan Maj Gen Abrar Hussain Maj-Gen Iftikh
ar Janjua Maj-Gen Fazle Haq Maj-Gen S Wajahat otable commanders Hussain The 6th
Armoured Division is a Pakistan Army armoured division currently based in Kharia
n, in Punjab Province. Formation The division was originally an armoured brigade
known as the 100 Independent Armoured Brigade Group. In 1964, it was decided to
use the headquarters and other assets of this formation to create a new armoure
d division.[1] It was still in the process of raising when the 1965 war against
India broke out. 1965 War The formation would see its first taste of action in O
peration Grand Slam in Chamb sector where it was the armoured contingent. Howeve
r the general weakness of Pakistan Army defence around Sialkot and the fact that
war was expected to break out over the internationl border, meant that the divi
sion would see only a few days of fighting before it was sent to Sialkot, where
it would earn its spurs at a village called Chawinda[2]. On 8th of September the
Indian attack came and thus began the Battle of Chawinda. Initially the divisio
n was surprised and outflanked by the Indians as the enemy chose an unexpected a
xis to attack[1], desperate holding actions by some individual units, famously 2
5th Cavalry, would hault the advance outside Chawinda. A counter attack against
the Indians at Phillarah would be badly mauled[3] resulting in the loss of 22 ta
nks. The division then settled in defensive positions around Chawinda, and it an
d other divisions than withstood multiple corps sized attacks by the Indian I Co
rps [4], until the biggest on the 18th of September when the Indian 1st Armoured
and 6th Mountain divisions attacked, and would be destroyed. The Indians than w
ent on the defensive as the 6th and its sister formations steadily and remorsele
ssly forced them back across the international border; a task which was mostly (
though not completely[4] completed by the ceasefire on 23rd of September. The di
visions action at Chawinda remains its most famous action. This battle was the
largest tank battle since Kursk in 1943 and has been forver associated with the
6th. Amongst the many commendations received was one by the President which read
: The President of Pakistan has commanded that his personal congratulations be c
onveyed to All Ranks under your command for the exemplary, succeessful and coura
geous battle that they have fought. The President and the whole Nation are proud
of these untarnishable deeds of valour.[3] The division would lose over 200 kil
led and over a thousand wounded during the battle of Chawinda.[3] 1971 War Durin
g the 1971 war against India the division once again would see action in Chamb w
ith its helping to capture Chamb and clear all the area uptil the river Tawi. At
this point the division would be sent to the battle of Shakargarh, where anothe
r Indian attempt at Sialkot would be checked, though this time the Pakistan army
would not be able to expel the Indians fully till the ceasefire.[5] Somalia The
6th would re-enter combat in 1993 when it was dispatched to Somalia after the i
ncrease in the international presence in that country, becoming one of the two d
ivision level headquarters in theatre (the other was the US 10 Mountain Division
). Thus the division became only the second Pakistani division to serve overseas
after the 7th Infantry Division.[6] The division uniquely came under the direct
command of the United States Central Command, the first time in Pakistani histo
ry that a formation served outside Pakistan command.[7] It also had the command
of foreign units, including for the first time since 1971, a Bangaldeshi battali
on.[8] In Somalia the division mostly undertook a counter insurgency role to hel
p bring peace to that embattled country, its heavy armour contingent providing m
ost of the heavy firepower for the International forces. It was in this role tha
t units of this division took part in the Battle of Mogadishu (1993), notably, 1
9 Lancers, 15 FF and 7 FF.[citation needed] Present ORBAT The division is at pre
sent stationed in Kharian and has four armoured brigades attached.[citation need
ed] HQ 6AD Kharian 7th Armoured Bde, Kharian 9th Armoured Bde, Kharian 8th Armou
red Bde Group, Mangla (wartime only, normally under corps control) In addition t
he following units are attached and stationed in Kharain. 6 Armoured Division Su
pport troops (a brigades worth of troops, mostly engineers, signal and other log
istic troops) 314 Assault Engineers 6 AD Artillery Bde 6 AD Air Defence 6 AD Avi
ation Bde (wartime only, ordinarily units are dispersed) References 1. ^ a b The
Pakistan Army-War 1965-Shaukat Riza-Army Education Press-1984 2. ^ Brian Clough
ley- A History of the Pakistan Army, ISBN 0-19-579507-5 3. ^ a b c Maj Gen (r) A
brar Hussein-"Men of Steel-6 Armoured Division in the 1965 War" ISBN 969-8125-19
-1 4. ^ a b History of Indo-Pak War of 1965. Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmed (ret) ISBN 969-
8693-01-7 5. ^ The History of Pakistan Army (1966-71), by Maj Gen (Retd) Shaukat
Raza 6. ^ This does not include divisions and corps which have served inside In
dian territory, of which they are several. 7. ^ Tom Clancy-Battle Ready ISBN 039
9151761 8. ^ Tom Clancy-Battle Ready ISBN 0399151761. • Brian Cloughley: A Histo
ry of Pakistan Army • Orbat.com External links Information from Global Security
Formation Sign of the division Active Size Part of Garrison/HQ ickname Colors En
gagements Current commander
6 Armored Division ORBAT 1965
Usama Ahmed Malik v.1.0. October 8, 2007 The information is from Pakistani sourc
es. It does not reflect the reinforcements attached for the 1965 War. For that i
nformation, please see Mandeep Singh Bajwa’s orbat obtained from Indian intellig
ence sources. HQ 6 Armored Division Major General Abrar Hussain • 10 Guides Cava
lry (44xM48) • 11 PAVO Cavalry (30 x M48 in HQ and 2 x squadrons; 1 x squadron 1
3 x M36B2 destroyers deployed to Chhamb) • [13th Lancers (44xM48) ] • 22 Cavalry
(44xM48) detached from 7. Div. • 9 Frontier Force (mot) • 14 Frontier Force (mo
t) • 1 SP Artillery Field Regiment (18 x 105 mm SP) • 8 Engineer Battalion • 22
S & T Battalion • 87 EME Battalion • 44 Field Ambulance • 82 Ordnance Company •
MP Unit • Field Intelligence Unit (FIU) Deployed in area Badiana-Chawinda-Pasrur
Notes 10 (Guide’s) Cavalry was detached to 12 Infantry Division for Operation G
RAND SLAM wef 26 August 1965; reverted 8 September 1965. 24 Infantry Brigade ex
15 Division placed under command 6 Armored Division wef 9 September 1965. The FF
battalions were motorized. (Some sources refer to them as armored infantry – Ed
itor.) (18 x 105mm SP) (newly raised) (18 x 105mm) (Detached from 7 Div) (18 x 1
05mm) (12.7mm Quads/40mm)
• • •
1 x Field Regiment (SP) 39 Field Regiment 11 Field Regiment 1 x Light AA Regimen
t
The Division was raised in early 1965 as a light armored division with 100th (In
dependent) Armored Brigade as its nucleus. The division’s formation was in contr
avention of the Pakistan-US agreement of 1954, which saw the US providing equipm
ent for an almost complete re-equipment and expansion of the Pakistan armed forc
es. In return for US assistance, Pakistan acceded to the Central and South East
Asia Treaty Organizations. Regarding armored formations, the agreement called fo
r one armored division and an independent brigade to permit parity with India. A
fter the Sino-India 1962 War, however, India embarked on a huge expansion of its
armed forces, including provision for a new armored division and another indepe
ndent armored brigade. Ironically, while India did raise the new independent arm
ored brigade, it deferred the second armored division till 1972. Both Bajwa and
myself are of the opinion that this delay cost India grievously in 1965 and 1971
. Pakistan’s counter was to raise the 6th Armored and 11th Infantry Divisions us
ing reserve stocks. The US refused equipment for these new raisings because it w
as now working to help India against China. That Pakistan was not much of an all
y under CENTO and SEATO undoubtedly played a role in the US’s shift to backing I
ndia rather than Pakistan. Instead of working with the US to block communist exp
ansionism, Pakistan maintained cordial relations with China, and friendly relati
ons with the Soviet Union. 6th Armored Division was a curious creature and its o
rganization baffled the Indians. It had no brigades. The division HQ directly co
ntrolled all battalions; the sole concession to an intermediate HQ was a planned
all-purpose Task Force HQ with a flexible TOE for operations under the Division
HQ. In the event, the TO was deemed a failure, and according to Bajwa, the divi
sion was reorganized after the war with a TO similar to that for the 1st Armored
Division. At the time Pakistan 1st Armored Division had three armored and one a
rtillery brigades, in contrast to India’s World War II organization of its armor
ed division into one armored, one lorry, and one artillery brigades. The mystery
of the division’s TO was recently resolved when Mandeep Singh Bajwa noticed cor
respondences with Liddell-Hart’s light armored division, and the influences of t
he US Pentomic structure. While the US did not reorganize its World War II TO to
include armored divisions, the notion of a divisional HQ directly controlling a
number of combat groups was central to the Pentomic structure.
7th Infantry Division “Golden Arrow”
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Active Country Type Role Size Part of Garrison/HQ Colors Current commander otabl
e commanders
1940 to 1947 (Part of British Indian Army) 1947 to present (Pakistan Army) Briti
sh India Infantry Division Infantry, though supporting, artillery and armour ele
ments are attached 20,000 men (though this may vary as units are rotated) XI Cor
ps (Pakistan) Peshawar black and gold Maj-Gen Naweed Zaman Maj-Gen Attiqur Rahma
n Maj-Gen Abdul Qadir Maj-Gen Yahya Khan Maj-Gen Asif Nawaz MajGen Akram Sahi Ma
j-Gen Azhar Ali Shah Pakistan
The 7th Infantry Division, also known as the Golden Arrow (after its formation s
ign) and Peshawar Division, (after its garrison city) is the Pakistan Armys olde
st and most battle-hardened division. The officers and men of the Golden Arrow D
ivision have fought in all of Pakistan s Wars and have an unmatched combat recor
d. History The division was raised on 1 October 1940 at Attock, in present-day P
akistan. Its formation sign was an arrow, pointing bottom left to top right, in
yellow on a black background. The division was known as the "Golden Arrow" divis
ion from this sign. After initially training for operations in the deserts in th
e Middle East, in early 1943 it was reassigned to the Burma Campaign. After exte
nsive training and preparation, it fought in the Arakan from December 1943. Afte
r the divisional HQ was overrun by a Japanese attack, units of the division took
part in the Battle of the Admin Box. The division later moved to Assam and foug
ht in the Battle of Kohima. In 1945 it played a prominent part in the Battle of
Central Burma and the subsequent advance down the Irrawaddy River. After the war
ended, the division moved to Thailand, where it disarmed the Japanese occupying
army, and liberated and repatriated Allied prisoners of war. Component Units (1
June 1944) (Note: on this date, the unit was fighting at Kohima. Indian 89th In
fantry Brigade was detached to the Indian 5th Infantry Division at the Imphal.)
• Indian 33rd Infantry Brigade o 1st Bn. Burma Regiment o 1st Bn. Queen s Royal
Regiment o 4th Bn. 15th Punjab Regiment o 4th Bn. 1st Gurkha Rifles • Indian 114
th Infantry Brigade o 1st Bn. Somerset Light Infantry o 4th Bn. 14th Punjab Regi
ment o 4th Bn. 5th Gurkha Rifles • Indian 161st Infantry Brigade (attached from
Indian 5th Infantry Division) o 4th Bn, The Queen s Own Royal West Kent Regiment
o 1st Bn. 2nd Punjab Regiment o 4th Bn. 7th Rajput Regiment Support Units • 7th
Bn, 2nd Punjab Regiment • 136th (1st West Lancashire) Field Regt. RA • 139th (4
th London) Field Regt. RA • 25th Mountain Regt. IA Commanders • Maj. Gen. A.V.T.
Wakely • Maj. Gen. R. Richardson • Maj. Gen. T.W. Corbett • Maj. Gen. Sir Frank
Messervy • Maj. Gen. G.C. Evans Upon the Partition of India in 1947, the divisi
on was one of two allocated to Pakistan. The 7th Infantry Division is currently
being commanded by Major General Naweed Zaman. Indo-Pakistan War of 1948 The Div
ision first saw action during the Indo-Pakistan War of 1948, where it fought and
captured some territory in the Poonch sector. Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 In the
intervening years, the formation became part of the Pakistan Army s strategic re
serve. At the outbreak of war, the Peshawar Division was commanded by a native P
eshawarite; Major General Yayha Khan. In it, the Golden
Arrow s were the lead division of the Operation Grandslam, where they and two di
visions which had been placed under the division s command managed to achieve th
e most dramatic breakthrough of the war when they defeated the Indian formations
in front of them, capturing the district of Chamb, and pushed up to a position
6 km beyond Jammu City, by the end of hostilities. Its commander, General Yayha
Khan would be awarded the Hilal-e-Jurat for this achievement. Jordan During Blac
k September in 1970 the Jordanian Government asked the Pakistan Government to as
sist in putting down the Palestinian uprising. The Peshawar Division was dispatc
hed to Jordan where it would be placed under the command of the Pakistani attach
é; Muhammad Zia ul Haq (later President of Pakistan, and would restore order and
government control in Jordan. Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 6 years later, the Pesh
awar Division would once again be called into action. Once again Pakistan s stra
tegic reserve, along with 1st Armoured Division, would not see action as a unit
but many of its sub-units would enter combat in various sectors. Gulf War The fo
rmation would go overseas for the third time in its history (and for the second
time as a Pakistani division) when it deployed with two brigades to Saudi Arabia
for the 1991 Gulf War. Siachin and Kargil It would be the better part of a deca
de, before the formation would get the call to arms again, but when it came it w
as at the highest battlefield of the world, and several units would serve in tha
t area. In 1999 during the Kargil War, the division was sent as a reinforcement
to the Gultari area. War on terror After 9/11, and the United States led invasio
n of Afghanistan, the Golden Arrows would be called into a period of almost cont
inuous action in difficult and mountainous terrain, carrying out operations in W
aziristan and the North West Frontier Province, against Al-Qaeda and Taliban esc
aping from Afghanistan. Most of the Al-Qaeda operatives have been captured by el
ements of this formation. Under its corps headquarters, XI Corps, the Division i
s now taking part in the 2009 South Waziristan offensive. Order of Battle It is
unsure what the exact composition of the formation is, since the Peshawar Divisi
on has received several additional troops during the ongoing war on terror, but
the peacetime order of battle is: • HQ 7th Infantry Division; Peshawar o Infantr
y Brigade; Peshawar o Infantry Brigade; Peshawar o Infantry Brigade; Parachinar
o Division Troops; under HQ command, but usually parcelled out to the Brigades.
References • Global Security Website. • Orbat.com • Pakistan Army; A History, by
Brian Cloughly. External links Contains information on Pakistan Army Divisions
including the Golden Arrows External Images • 7th Infantry Division Soldiers adv
ance in Kashmir, 1965 war • GOC of the Division, briefs President of Pakistan on
situation. 1965 War
11th Infantry Division “Battleaxe”
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Active Size Part of Garrison/HQ ickname Colors Engagements Current commander ota
ble commanders
July 1965 to present 20,000 men (though this may vary as units are rotated) IV C
orps Lahore Battleaxe Navy Blue and Blood Red Battle of Lahore, Battle of Khem K
aran, Battle of Husseinwala Maj-Gen Raza Mohammad Maj-Gen Abdul Hamid Khan Maj-G
en Nadeem Taj
The 11th Infantry Division is an active formation of the Pakistan Army. It is cu
rrently deployed in Lahore as part of IV Corps, and is responsible for the defen
ce of that city and the surrounding areas. History The division was formed just
before the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. Prior to this, the army chief at the time
, Musa Khan, had been calling for raising two new divisions;[1] this was denied
by the government citing a benign security environment, the lack of funds and th
e general reluctance of the US to fund new risings under the foreign military as
sistance scheme.[2] After the 1962 SinoIndian War, the Indian army underwent a s
ubstantial increase in numbers and capability and the government reversed its po
sition and the division was raised by utilising reserve stocks.[2] Initially cal
led the 20th Infantry Division, the name was changed upon the request of the for
mation s first GOC, Major General Abdul Hamid Khan.[3] The Division was then ass
igned to the defence of Lahore. Major General Raza Muhammad is the present Gener
al Officer Commanding 11th Infantry Division. 1965 War The Division as a whole f
irst went into action at the Battle of Lahore, though individual units had seen
action already in the Rann of Kutch and in Operation Grand Slam. It, along with
the 10th Division successfully withstood the Indian assault towards Lahore, the
11th fighting in the Kasur region. After this battle, the division was committed
to the Khem Karan offensive, for which the Divisional HQ was given command of t
he 1st Armoured Division. The two formations successfully managed to capture Khe
m Karan, though further attacks by the 1st Armoured were checked by the Indians.
At the same time as the fighting in Khem Karan, the Indian offensive towards Si
alkot was making progress at the Battle of Chawinda and the 1st Armoured was wit
hdrawn to reinforce the Pakistani forces in that sector. The 11th was forced to
fall back to Khem Karan, where it withstood multiple attempts by the Indians to
retake the town, however the ceasefire found the division in command of the town
and several hundred square kilometres of Indian territory.[4] 1971 War Six year
s later, the division once again went into action in the 1971 war, and in a repe
at of the experience in 1965, the Division crossed the International Border, thi
s time capturing the areas surrounding Husseinwala. One of the famous features t
hat the formation captured was the Qaisar-e-Hind Fort. Present The division is a
t present deployed around Lahore and has the following composition • 21st Inf Br
igade, Lahore • 52nd Inf Brigade, Lahore • 106th Inf Brigade, Lahore References
1. ^ Pakistan Army War 1965, Shakuat Riza, ISBN 8185019606 2. ^ a b Orders of Ba
ttle - Orders of Battle 3. ^ History of Indo-Pak War of 1965. Lt Gen Mahmud Ahme
d (ret) ISBN 969-8693-01-7 4. ^ Brian Cloughy, A History of Pakistan Army, Wars
and Insurrections, Third Edition, ISBN 978-0-19-547334-6 External links • A Coll
ection of newspaper reports about the capture of Khem Karan • A 11th Infantry Di
vision Soldier in Khem Karan • A tank belonging to the division advances. 65 Wa
r
12th Infantry Division “Maple Leaf”
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Active Country Branch Type Part of Garrison/HQ ickname Colors Engagements Curren
t commander otable commanders
1948 to present Pakistan, Azad Kashmir Pakistan Army Mountain Infantry X Corps (
Pakistan) Murree, Punjab Maple Leaf Division Gold and Green Indo-Pakistani War o
f 1947 Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 Kargil War Siachen
conflict Maj-Gen Maqsood Ahmad Maj-Gen Attiqur Rahman Maj-Gen Akhtar Hussain Mal
ik Maj-Gen Yahya Khan Maj-Gen Akhtar Abdur Rahman Maj-Gen Mohammad Akbar Khan Ma
j-Gen Majeed Malik Maj-Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani Maj-Gen Shahid Aziz
The 12th Infantry Division is a Pakistani Army infantry division currently based
in Murree, Punjab close to Azad Kashmir. It is the country s largest division.
History The division was formed in 1948, from troops allocated to Pakistan from
the old British Indian Army. It was the first division sized formation to be cre
ated by the Pakistan Army (the three prior ones, 7th (Golden Arrow), 8th and 10t
h infantry divisions predated Pakistan). 1948 Kashmir War The division went into
combat against the Indian army in Kashmir. A notable action was the recapturing
of Skardu from the Indian forces, accomplished with help from tribesmen from th
e tribal areas. 1965 Indo-Pakistani War In between the wars the division was act
ive on the ceasefire line, where fighting broke out on several occasions. In 196
5 the division undertook Operation Grand Slam, whereby under the command of 7th
Infantry Division, it attacked and captured Chamb, and then moved on and capture
d territory beyond the river Tawi, ending up in a position 6 km ahead of Jammu.
Although its performance was greatly lauded at the time, its commander Maj-Gen A
khtar Hussain Malik was privately criticized by General Ayub Khan, for abandonin
g several posts in Kashmir which were then taken by the Indian forces, and for l
osing the strategically vital Hajir Pir Pass (this would not be retaken until af
ter the ceasefire). 1971 Bangladeshi War Six years later, the division went into
action again, this time in Poonch-Ranjouri sector. Despite being outnumbered by
Indian forces, the formation managed to advance nearly 50 km, all the way to Ra
njouri. Unfortunately dogged Indian resistance meant that it was unable to captu
re Poonch itself. During the war, it was commanded by Maj-Gen Mohammad Akbar Kha
n. Recent history Since 1971, the formation had been deployed on the Line of Con
trol, dividing the Indian and Pakistani-administered Kashmir, where sporadic fig
hts break out with Indian forces, and occasionally full fledged actions develop.
In 1991, the division defeated an Indian incursion into the Neelum Valley. Refe
rences • Global Security Website. • Orbat.com • Pakistan Army; A History, by Bri
an Cloughly. External links Contains information on Pakistan Army Divisions incl
uding the 12th
Pakistan Army Corps
I AC Mangla – II AC Multan
IV AC Lahore – V AC Karachi
X AC Rawalpindi – XI AC Peshawar
XXX AC
Pakistan Army Infantry Divisions
Division 8 - Division 8 commander
Division 9 - Division 10
Division 11 Division 14a
Division 15 - Division 18
Division 17 - Division 17 commander
Division 19 - Division 33
Division 40 - Division 40 commander
Division 41
Volume 8, Number 1 February 13, 2009
Swat, Pakistan orth West Frontier Province A letter from Hamid, forwarded by Maj
or A.H. Amin (Retired)
Following is a piece sent to me by a former mid level intelligence official of P
akistan army with first hand information & experience about handling the issues
discussed in the piece. My comments are in italics. The problem is complex and t
here are no easy answers or quick solutions. I do not claim to be privy to any s
pecial information or have any solution. My perspective is based on my interacti
on with ordinary Pakistanis & Afghans especially Pushtuns and many Pakistan army
officers and limited only to military aspect. Military aspect is only 20 percen
t but an important one and the rest 80 percent is social. This is just part of a
n ongoing dialogue because these events pose a serious threat to Pakistan s inte
rests and specifically the future of Pushtuns. Consider not only present but fu
ture discords … If one waits until they are at hand, the medicine is no longer i
n time as the malady has become incurable. Machiavelli In the spring of 1994 Mu
llah Omer started his Taliban movement with less than 50 Madarassa students and
after the capture of Kandahar, the second largest city of Afghanistan, students,
in thousands from Pakistani Madrassas rushed to join the new force and by Decem
ber 1994 he had a force of 12000 talibs– a new phenomena had emerged in the Pash
tun society, madrassa students and Mullahs were ruling the pashtuns with the bar
rel of gun. In Pashtun society no clear role is defined for religious functionar
ies in the social system. The Government officials posted in these areas and the
Maliks/Khans are considered leaders, who get legitimacy from the state authorit
y while religious functionaries are given a limited role dealing with some relig
ious rituals. (This is correct summary of traditional role of clerics and their
rising power.) Religious leaders are not satisfied and content with this role, a
s they have always wanted a more prominent role in the decision making. Througho
ut the history of Pashtuns major uprising were led by religious leaders like Pir
Rosh an, Powinda Mullah, Faqir of Ipi, Sartor Mullah and many others. (This is
only partly correct. These examples are correct but they represent only a fracti
on of expeditions/uprisings in Pushtun territories in the last two hundred years
. In majority of cases especially in cases of Pushtun on Pushtun violence, leade
rship has been squarely in the hands of traditional leaders. In addition, each i
ncidence was more local in nature and we can not put them in the same basket. Fa
qir of Ipi fought against Pakistan as fiercely as he did against British.) They
had leadership as long as the war/jihad was on, but the moment the conflict was
over, the leadership again reverted to the Maliks and Khans. The present talabin
ization is not just a movement for enforcement of Sharia,the mullahs want power,
authority and a defined role in the decision making in the social system of Pas
htun society (They have crashed into the party demanding their share and who wou
ld not if he had the gun and a firm belief that his hand was God s own hand doin
g God s work.) Events and political happenings in Afghanistan have always had so
me impact on NWFP in general and FATA in particular. Durand line divided many tr
ibes, and out of the seven tribal agencies, 6 have divided tribes – with people
of same tribe living on both sides of the Durand line. They cross the border fre
ely and in British time they had easement rights which enabled them to travel ac
ross the border without any documents. (This is correct but since increased cent
ralization of Afghanistan & Pakistan in late 19th and early 20th century, the ro
le of central governments gradually increased. Tribal areas were never able to t
hreaten the established order in both countries. Disintegration of Afghanistan i
n 1980s & 90s set in motion a dangerous phenomenon and we are now seeing the res
ults of spreading of that process to contiguous areas. The most unfortunate part
is that most Pakistanis are not aware of the involvement of their governments i
n Afghan affairs. Everything was swept under the Jihad carpet and the phenomenon
was never seriously studied even by those who were actively involved in it. Mos
t Pakistani never heard the narratives of others including Afghans. Examples fro
m my own personal experience may help to give some context; I interviewed an ISI
colonel who had worked for years dealing with southern Afghanistan. His knowled
ge about his area of operation and the population simply shocked me. He was simp
ly handing money to Afghan proxies and thinking he was the master. Those of us w
ho grew up in Peshawar in 1980s knew very well that Afghan rebels were routinely
executing school teachers. When asked they replied that their mullahs have told
them that they were teaching communism in schools. So teachers became apostates
and eligible for summary execution. It started with female teachers and then ex
panded to males. ISI directly supported bombings in Kabul University stating tha
t as communism was taught there therefore educational institutions were a fair
game . Exiled Afghan intellectuals and who held different views were assassinate
d in Pakistan by its proxies. I m not saying that Pakistan ordered their killing
s but its proxies which it could control were doing it on its soil so they share
some responsibility. When Khost was captured by rebels, it was designated conqu
ered territory by clerics and therefore eligible for treatment as booty . In ca
se of a school, there was dispute about what to do with benches and chairs. A pr
ompt fatwa solved the matter quickly when all furniture was chopped and distribu
ted as booty among the so called mujahids to be used as firewood. Pakistanis a
re shocked now when it is happening in their own country but don t know that the
ir government s direct support to elements doing these things more than two deca
des ago to someone else has something to do with it. The purpose is not to denou
nce the whole policy or start blame game but facts need to be acknowledged to fi
nd a better course now. It is too fashionable in Pakistan to criticize America f
or all their ills and every civilian and uniformed scoundrel has walked free and
has never been asked to answer for their acts of omission and commission which
resulted in deaths of hundred of thousands of Afghans.) Swat is neither a tribal
area nor is it bordering Afghanistan, so the question arises, how come it has b
ecome a strong hold of extremist elements who have virtually taken over the area
. Being a fertile area it always attracted invaders. Till the 10th century most
of the population were followers of Buddhism and were very peaceful and docile p
eople. In the 16th century the Yousafzai tribe captured the valley. The area was
divided between various sub-tribes. There was no central system of administrati
on. The tribes resolved their own disputes. In each tribe a system of "Wesh" exi
sted wherein residents of every village were shifted every 5-7 years to another
village except for Syeds and Kasabgars. The Gujjars and Kohistanis of Swat had n
o land ownership. Except for few years of central rule, this tribal system conti
nued till 1917, after which different tribes elected a central leader and Swat e
merged as an independent state. In 1926, the British accepted the state of Swat
and the ruler was coffered with the title of Waali-e-Swat. He formed his own cen
tral administrative system with two types of courts functioning in the State. Co
urts headed by the religious scholars, known as Qazi Courts, and Judicial Courts
, headed by the area Tehsildars. The Qazi Courts dealt with cases of divorce,
inheritance and some other minor cases involving sharia, while all other dispute
s were referred to the Tehsildar. The appellate forum was that of a Hakim, and a
final appeal could be made to the Waali. All this process took only one month.
In those times the social problems were also not very complex so generally, the
population was getting free and speedy justice. The Wali had a very effective ad
ministrative mechanism for the implementation of his laws known as "Riwajnamas"
(Good summary of evolution of Swat but the question is whether it has any releva
nce to present scenario? We can learn some positive lessons but obviously can no
t turn the clock back.) Dir and Bajaur were annexed to Pakistan in 1960, while S
wat was merged in Pakistan in 1969. In 1975, these former independent states wer
e declared as Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA). District Administra
tion and Police were placed in these areas which were given status of districts.
However, the judicial system was based on Jirgas and executive authority of the
District Magistrates. In 1992, on a petition of lawyers, the PATA regulations w
ere abolished by the courts. No alternative system was evolved and put in place
to replace the previous system, so there was a judicial void which created unres
t in the general public. (I m glad that you pointed to an important event and yo
u are the first person who understood the importance of this fact. This is the d
irty little known secret in Pakistan which even well informed people don t know.
Systems in place no matter how imperfect evolved over one hundred years and any
ill thought action to overhaul them without serious home work is going to bring
the whole edifice down. If any one needs any proof, he should look at Swat whic
h literally melted away in front of our eyes in less than two years. Those who a
re advocating abolishing FCR need some soul searching. o one is suggesting that
existing systems are perfect but they worked pretty good in the past and are far
better than anarchy. It is fashionable in newly independent countries to critic
ize colonial enterprises but I was surprised in my numerous interactions with Pu
shtuns that they have a great respect for British rulers. Several of my friends
from tribal areas consider British political officers far superior to any which
independent Pakistan has produced. Contributions of officers like George Rooskep
ple & Robert Warburton to Pushtun society are far superior to any Pakistani offi
cial.) In November 1994, a general uprising took place in former Malakand Divisi
on on the call of Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e- Mohammdi (TNSM). Violence erupted
during the movement and the mob took control of 6 Districts. New rules for traff
ic were introduced and all kinds of transport were forced to move on the right s
ide of the road, left being un-Islamic. This resulted in numerous road accidents
. Men were made to wear watches on right hand. A sitting MPA of the PPP, the the
n ruling party, was killed. It took the law enforcement agencies more than a mon
th to dislodge the militants and to regain control of these areas. TNSM was form
ed by Sufi Mohammad in 1988. He himself is a simple peaceful person who does not
preach violence except for Jihad against the Non Muslims. However, he does not
have the leadership qualities and capabilities to control large movements. In th
e 1994 movement, besides the TNSM, car-lifters, timber mafia, kissans having dis
putes with Khans, loan defaulters, smugglers and many other antisocial elements
penetrated, and took over control of the movement and resorted to violence. As a
result of this movement the provincial government was pressurized and a Nizam-e
-Adal was introduced in the Malakand Division in December 1994. The religious el
ements of TNSM established peaceful camps which continued till August 1995 for i
mplementation of Nizam-e-Adal act. Qazi Courts were established in 1995. About 1
1 Qazis were directly enrolled and for remaining civil courts the Judges were na
med as Qazis. In 2001 Sufi Mohammad crossed over to Afghanistan to fight against
the American forces, along with thousands of volunteers who could not fire even
a single bullet and were routed and they fled, in all directions, from Afghanis
tan. Sufi Mohammad was arrested in Kurram and was awarded 7 years imprisonment.
(Lesson for GHQ from this incident is that let the nature takes its course. Loca
l population was furious against Sufi for taking young boys to slaughter and run
back safe to Pakistan. It would have been much better to force Sufi back to his
territory and let some disgruntled local bump him and some other TS M leaders o
ff when emotions were high. Instead, he was put in the safe house in DI Khan.) T
he TNSM remained dormant for several years till Fazal Ullah became active in 200
6-2007. Besides the TNSM factor, there are other actors in the prevailing Swat s
ituation. After the Tora Bora operations and operation Anaconda, conducted in Ma
rch 2002 by the NATO forces in Shahi Kot,Paktiya,most of the foreigners crossed
over to Pakistan and took shelter in almost all parts of Pakistan with Jihadi, S
ectarian organization and other tribal, facilitating their movement and providin
g other administrative support to them. A number of them went to Swat. (This is
another example of strategic myopia of GHQ. They seriously under-estimated the e
xtremist threat to Pakistan. They only looked the whole changed strategic landsc
ape through the prism of Afghanistan and no one can blame them. After all it was
only a handful of American Special Forces and CIA operatives who were operating
at that time in Afghanistan. Senior brass concluded that Americans were for a s
hort stint and once gone, Afghanistan will again become their playground. Even i
f that was the case, they should have looked at the extremist threat independent
of American factor. The decision at highest level was only to catch foreign fig
hters while Taliban were given a free pass. This later proved to be a strategic
blunder the price of which is being paid with the blood of Pakistanis; both sold
iers & civilians. This is the reason that I m of the view that Pakistani officer
s should stop reading novels of asim Hijazi and start reading some serious milit
ary strategy to broaden their horizon. May be a little bit of Shakespeare will n
ot do harm). On the onset of army operations in 2002, these foreigners kept on s
hifting their position. Another factor may also have contributed to the situatio
n which is the conflict between the Kissans and the Khans. During Bhutto era, a
kissan movement was started where the landless farmers took possession of lands
which belonged to various big landlords. Matta Tehsil of Swat was the most affec
ted area of this movement in Malakand Division. In 2003 Gulbadin, Taliban and Al
-Qaeda reached an agreement to fight the NATO jointly. The apparent strategy ado
pted was:• To start guerrilla warfare against the NATO Forces and engage them in
a long war causing attrition and prolonging the conflict to tire them out so th
at they are forced to leave Afghanistan-- a repeat of jihad against Russia. • To
create a Taliban state and system of Khilafat again in Afghanistan, as it exist
ed before 9/11\ • To discredit the NATO Forces through effective propaganda camp
aign by proving the war on terror a crusade launched by infidels against Muslims
and that American forces are killing innocent unarmed Pashtun civilians. • To g
et the support of religious elements and middle class population of both Pakista
n and Afghanistan through anti-US propaganda. • To exploit the sentiments of eth
nic Pashtuns through code of conduct of Pashtunwali to get shelter and support i
n those areas. • To eliminate prominent elders/ Maliks, create terror by use of
brutal force and to Talibanize the whole tribal area so that security forces can
not operate freely in the area.
To paint both Karzai and Pakistani rulers as puppets of US. (This was the strate
gy of the adversary. It will be more helpful if we review what was GHQ s strateg
y to face these challenges?) In case a focused strategy is evolved and pursued t
o a logical conclusion, the situation in both, FATA and Swat can be brought to n
ormalcy. Some steps, if taken, may improve the situation in Swat:• To develop a
consensus of civil society, all political parties, media and all segments of soc
iety and educate the general public that Pakistan is facing a serious threat of
Talibanization and if suitable steps are not taken, the country may land into an
archy. (The most serious impediment is the perception on part of Pushtuns that a
rmy is in cahoots with the militants. GHQ has not been able to convince Pushtuns
that it is not dividing militants into good ones and bad ones. In my countless
conversations with Pushtuns of different backgrounds, majority were of the view
that if army wanted to eliminate militants, it could do it swiftly but it wanted
to keep the option open for the use of good militants in Afghanistan & Kashmi
r on some later date. There has been numerous stories told and retold about how
police arrested some militants or captured arms & ammunition but were told to le
t them go by military authorities. Some also argue that large scale camps can no
t operate without official knowledge. They are not clear whether army is unable
or unwilling to tackle the problem.) • The proposal of Sufi Mohammad for establi
shment of Appellate Court may be accepted. Since the Adal act is already in plac
e, the appellate court establishment is not a very serious issue. Some TNSM elem
ents are likely to join sufi mohammad and fazalullah may be isolated to some ext
ent. • Targeted operations should be conducted by the law enforcement agencies a
gainst the real terrorists through accurate intelligence and avoiding collateral
damages. Troops should remain stationed in these areas after flushing out the t
errorists. All troubled areas should be secured in operations conducted in phase
s. (Mid and senior officers should start reading some serious counterinsurgency
works.) • The office of the DC/District Magistrate should be restored with inher
ent powers. • Compensation should be paid for all the damages caused to public p
roperty. • Special funds should be provided by the Federal Government for recons
truction of all damaged schools. • An Army Garrison should be established in Swa
t of a Brigade size force. (May be a division size will be needed but more impor
tant than numbers is first molding the battle space in army s favor by firmly co
ntrolling areas and providing security to population. Without that no one is Swa
t is going to support army for simple reason of lack of protection. Once it is k
nown that army will protect the population then the next step is setting up a ro
bust local intelligence set up. In the absence of these two essential steps no a
mount of money will bear any fruit. It is naïve to expect a huge reconstruction
bonanza courtesy of foreign benefactors when people are being beheaded on daily
basis. Although no two situations are same, but it will help Pakistan army a lot
if they seriously study what happened in Sunni areas of Iraq. A number of open
source materials are available for those willing to learn.) • Swat Scouts Headqu
arters be shifted from Warsak to Kanju. It should be reorganized into 5 wings co
rps and FC Post be established in all suitable areas. • Police strength should b
e augmented and Frontier Constabulary already stationed in the area should be su
itably deployed. • The local people who are against the present violence should
be provided security. Make the locals rise against these terrorists. They will o
nly rise if they feel and see on ground that the government is serious and commi
tted in eliminating the Taliban. (In short run, army will be needed to clear the
areas. The division of labor should be organized at tehsil level. As soon as ar
ea is cleared, every attempt should be made to reconstruct the model of police a
nd Frontier Constabulary as first layer closely supported by FC. Army should be
kept in reserve to come to rescue when needed. A more close coordination between
police, constabulary, FC & army will be needed from lowest to highest level. A
battalion reserve for each tehsil backed by mobile combined rapid reaction teams
will increase coordination & morale. Severely curtail use of air assets and art
illery. The dilemma for officers in charge of operations is that if they don t s
often up opposition with artillery they increase risk to their own soldiers and
if they use it then chances of collateral damage increase thus alienating local
population. If a decision is made to liquidate hard line leadership then the pol
icy has to be broad based and should be carried out in all areas. Otherwise ther
e is risk that to relieve pressure on one area, militants will open other fronts
to try to bog down army. Setbacks in Swat and Bajawar may be forcing some milit
ant leaders to move to other areas i.e. Waziristan, Mohmand & Khyber. Forces dep
loyed in those areas should be working to arrange for the reception parties.
•
Two crucial factors which have not been seriously evaluated as far as armed forc
es are concerned are ethnic & sectarian dimensions. We need to seriously ponder
what is the effect of ongoing extremist violence on Pushtun and Shia soldiers &
officers and what are the remedies to prevent widening of existing fault lines?)
The Judicial system should be made more effective by taking suitable steps for
provision of speedy and affordable justice. Negotiations with terrorist should b
e held on two points-: All terrorist should surrender and lay down their arms.
Militant s leaders should give an undertaking that they will not run a parall
el administration and will not interfere in State functions. In case these two
conditions are accepted by the militants a general amnesty may be declared by t
he government in the national interest. (The key strategic question for senior m
ilitary brass is how they are defining the adversary? They should be thinking ab
out it the following narrative; The dogs biting us today are our own pets. We f
ed and trained them. The question is whether the disease they are suffering from
is a curable one and after appropriate treatment we may be able to keep them as
pets or the dogs have truly become rabid for which there is no effective cure.
This means that no matter how much we liked them in the past and our children ma
y have affection for them but they have become a serious threat to our own famil
y and we need to put them to sleep for good. GHQ can not move forward without an
swering this crucial question. The whole operational and tactical work will be b
ased on these
assumptions and more importantly public perceptions will change only when they s
ee move in one or the other direction. I think that the term rabies fits into
current dilemma. Those who think that the disease will be limited to Pushtun are
as are either ignorant or naïve. Look for the next trouble spot which will be so
uthern Punjab. There the violence will be intra-Sunni. Hardline salafi militants
rapidly gaining ground will come in direct clash with Barelvis. Many people are
perplexed by rising activities of militants in Southern Punjab and wondering if
they are operating with wink from the government. I have yet to see an informed
and professional discussion about the very premise of using non-state actors fo
r country s national security policy; the centre piece of military s policy in t
he last three decades. Lets open some windows for fresh air and review what was
achieved and what was lost following this policy. My personal view is that most
of Pakistan s ills (Afghan mess, sectarian conflict, radicalization of FATA, int
ernational terrorism etc.) can be directly contributed to this strategic myopia
on part of some of the senior brass. o adversary of Pakistan could have dreamed
of taking the country to such an abyss which this policy has achieved. Every one
in Pakistan is looking for mother of all conspiracies but refuse to look at t
heir own actions. Pakistan has to off course safeguard its interests in the regi
on but the question is how to do it without seriously harming the country. Pakis
tan has many problems and it is up to Pakistanis to decide what is best for them
. A peaceful and prosperous Pakistan is in everybody s interest and many well wi
shers of Pakistan are willing to help. We are already seeing the disturbing sign
s of rise of armed militias which Machiavelli described about a divided country
quoted below; In a divided country, when any man thinks himself injured, he app
lies to the head of his faction, who is obliged to assist him in seeking vengean
ce if he is to keep up his own reputation and interests, instead of discouraging
violence. Machiavelli
Volume 7, umber 3 July 29, 2008 A 1985 Study By The BDM Corporation
Forwarded by Mandeep Singh Bajwa
ote: for every mention of "soviet Union" in the paper, replace with "United Stat
es": you will then be reading a paper updated for 2008. Plan To Change the Map o
f India-Pakistan & Afghanistan Region (or Dismemberment of Pakistan (1985) – pro
posed by BDM Corporation (Subsidiary of FORD), Intelligence Analysts), under the
ew World Order.
SCE ARIO OF THE FUTURE
A Soviet military presence in Afghanistan – thus positioned on the Pakistan bord
er – would not be so disturbing if South Asia did not have a history of violent
settlement of conflicts. The inherent belligerency between India and Pakistan ha
s produced three wars in less than 40 years. The details of the disputes evolved
from religious and territorial issues which have neither disappeared nor been d
iminished by an arms competition that has acquired a raison d’etre all its own.
India’s rise to the status of a regional superpower, a posture which now rivals
that of its occupier, Britain, has consistently been at the expense of Pakistan.
The In the initial confrontation between 1947-48, Pakistan did well to hold the
high ground while the prize – the value of Kashmir –went to India. The 1965 war
was as indecisive as it was costly to both. Despite lackluster showing by the I
ndian Army, what kudos the Pakistan earned in terms of that performance were los
t in the rematch six years later when the Bangladesh revolt and Indian invasion
resulted in a humiliating defeat in the West and the loss of East Pakistan. Indi
a’s test of a “peaceful” nuclear device in 1974 did not soothe the regional riva
lry. Its symbolic value for Indian prestige stimulated a crash program by Pakist
an which in turn has caused New Delhi to take on a crusade against nuclear proli
feration. Rather than become involved as a signatory to the 1968 Non-Proliferati
on Treaty, India has taken on the self-anointed role of regional enforcer. In th
e fall of 1984, there was growing evidence that the Indian military had develope
d preemptive options and was urging an attack on Pakistan’s developing nuclear f
acilities. In an address to an army commanders’ conference only weeks before her
assassination, the late Prime Minister Indira Gandhi complained that “Pakistan’
s nuclear program has brought about a qualitative change in our security environ
ment.” Subsequent reports, both on the accelerated pace of Pakistan’s nuclear de
velopment and on heightened efforts to increase its survivability by constructin
g underground facilities probably means that an Indian preemptive option may not
be infinitely applicable. In any case, the number, location, and protection of
those facilities probably means that an Indian attack could neither be as small
nor surgical as the precedent of the Israeli strike against the lone Iraqi nucle
ar reactor in 1981. But there is no shortage of excuses for war (like U.S. has d
emonstrated).. Earlier in 1984 the Indians were blaming Pakistan for fomenting r
evolt among the Sikhs--charges noticeably absent since Indira Gandhi’s death. Be
tween July and October there occurred an escalating series of border clashes wit
h Indian patrols penetrating 60-km across the uninhibited but disputed territory
of the Siachin Glacier, high up the Himalayan Rim. Interestingly, it was during
this same period that the cross-border raids by Kabul ground units reached thei
r peak in frequency and magnitude. There has never been a paucity of conflict sc
enarios between India and Pakistan, but with Soviet offensive power ensconced in
the Afghan regional pivot, new and more dangerous possibilities arise. Such sce
narios are new in that they could involve a joint or at least a coordinated Indo
-Soviet effort. They are more dangerous in the sense that combined Indo-Soviet c
apabilities permit them to contemplate aggressive military actions with not only
a higher pay-off than either could achieve alone, but also with substantiallyre
duced risk. The Soviets and Indians manifest a growing interest in the violation
of Pakistani air-space, which is shared consequence of engaging quite different
targets. For the Soviets, the concentrated insurgent base camps just across the
border (where air-strikes could have a more significant effect than on disperse
d and hard-t-acquire targets in Afghanistan) must look increasingly attractive a
s they become frustrated with their inability to close down the infiltration rou
tes from the resistance sanctuaries into Afghanistan. Whatever the immediate mil
itary valu, the collateral effect of terror upon the civilian refugees would lik
ely push these settlements further and further from the border—thus decreasing t
he proximity of te mujahideen to a key source of their support. Given the high p
ercentage of rebel arms which are of Chinese origin, the Soviets may also feel c
ompelled to interdict the most conspicuous route of supply – the Karakoram Highw
ay linking China and Pakistan. Attack from the air is a necessity for any attemp
t to take out Pakistan’s budding nuclear program. The problem for either India o
r Soviets in this regard is the active resistance of Pakistan’s air force. But i
n this scenario, the two countries have an incentive to act in concert. A carefu
lly coordinated air offensive attacking simultaneously from two different direct
ions would overwhelm Pakistan’s interceptors. With fighter strikes limiting the
defenders sortie rate, the bombers of Soviet strategic aviation could inflict pu
nishing blows against Pakistani AIRBASES. After this initial surge provided mean
ingful air-superiority, Indian and Soviet forces would have an uninterrupted rid
e for subsequent attacks and could concentrate against their respective targets.
In such a campaign, India, and the USSR could achieve via joint action that whi
ch neither could accomplish individually (at least with high confidence of succe
ss and acceptable loss).
THE I DO-SOVIET VICE
A far more ambitious and permanent solution to the joint irritant of Pakistan wo
uld be a combined Indo-Soviet invasion.. In its relatively brief history, West P
akistan has never been realistically threatened by abject dismemberment—until th
e Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It is not evident that either the Soviet Union
or India desires the disappearance of Pakistan. However, their past behavior (S
oviet support for the Baluch uprising of the early 1970’s and the Indian invasio
n of Bangladesh) certainly does not rule this out as a possible, if unlikely, co
ntingency. In the wake of a devastating air offensive, a simultaneous Indo-Sovie
t ground assault from opposite directions with converging axes would be unstoppa
ble. An Indian attack out of the Punjab toward Islamabad (a’ la 1965) coupled wi
th a Soviet drive out of the Khyber (utilizing absolute firepower superiority to
suppress the opposing infantry; air assault to enfilade defense strong points a
nd seize key terrain; and attack helicopters to retard reinforcement and maneuve
r) would force the main body of the Pakistan army to fight back-to-back. Options
facing the Pakistanis would be unacceptable—defend in place under the prospect
of ever-tightening encirclement , or withdraw south and abandon the capital and
Kashmir. A second Indian offensive—a deep armored sweep across the Sind desert (
a’ la 1971) that linked up on the Hinus River north of Karachi with a mirrored S
oviet move through the lightly-defended Baluchi crest—would seal Pakistan’s fate
. Against India alone. Given current force deployment, the Pakistanis have a rea
sonable prospect of making a good account of themselves (accepting some territor
ial loss for a lot of Indian blood in a protracted series of attrition battles).
. The same is also true concerning the Soviets, given the terrain on the Afghan
frontier and assuming substantial Pakistani redeployment prior to take on both s
imultaneously, with quantitative and qualitative inferiority on the ground and w
ithout adequate air protection, invites defeat within weeks if not days.
REAPI G THE BE EFITS!
For the aggressors, the outcome would offer enormous strategic benefit. Using th
e Indus River as the primary partition of responsibility. Kabul could re-establi
sh its historic claim to the northwest frontier and be confident that, however l
ong its internal insurgency lasted, the “miscreants” possessed neither sanctuary
nor source of supply. The Soviets could bring the “fruits of class struggle:” t
o a newly established People’s Republic of Baluchistan which would, of course, a
sk for protection in exchange for Soviet port access on the Indian Ocean (Gawada
r). India could complete its quest for the Kashmir and administer as an autonomo
us region whatever was left. Other than short-lived economic sanctions and even
briefer condemnation by irrelevant international bodies, the risk of outside int
erference to such a short, decisive campaign would come from only two significan
t antagonists – China and the U.S. For China, her proximity to this potential ba
ttle zone does not translate into deployable power. Between Pakistan and the adj
acent province of Sinkiang lies an enormous mountain range. With only a few infa
ntry division in this province and an antique air force what China cannot provid
e prior to hostilities will not come. With the mountain passes closed by weather
, the only militarily significant land route linking China and Pakistan is the K
arakoram Highway. An 800-km road which took 20 years to build , its 99 bridges a
nd 1,708 culverts make it one of the world’s most attractive targets for air int
erdiction. For the US, strategic timing, not tactical geography, is the most cri
tical limitation. With advanced warning, the US Air Force could redeploy enough
US assets to correct the aerial imbalance, redress some point defense deficienci
es, and establish a symbolic ground presence. But realistically, the warning tim
e prior to hostilities is likely to be too short and the assets the US can deplo
y after the shooting starts is not whether the Soviets and Indians would actuall
y initiate such a campaign, nor how they would operationally implement it—but th
at it is a consequence of the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan that
this scenario is even available for conjecture. It is a contingency which did n
ot exist five years ago. The most likely scenario, however, is that the Soviets—
by carefully orchestrating their military posture next door, tightening the poli
tical –strategic vice of the Indo-Soviet bloc, and periodically allowing the cou
nterinsurgency war to spill over the border—will convey to the Pakistanis a heig
htened sense of the danger they are in. Given an overdose of threat perception,
Pakistan might find it convenient to do the Soviets’ dirty work for them by clos
ing down the frontier passes, keeping the refugees from creating a unified and e
ffective infrastructure, and inhibiting the external flow of arms to the rebels.
Afghan armed resistance may go on for decades. That notwithstanding, if the Sov
iets can militarily or politically seal off sanctuaries in Pakistan, the intensi
ty and effectiveness of the guerilla activity will fall to a level, the Soviet “
pacification by terror” campaign can achieve its intended results over time.
THE AMERICA OPTIO
The motile challenges to US regional policy aggravated by Soviet action in Afgha
nistan offer contradictory dilemmas. Should the US provide the arms modernizatio
n necessary to backstop Pakistan’s self confidence in the face of growing blackm
ail while discouraging its proliferative ego trip for an Islamic bomb”? Should t
he US prepare contingency forces for a credible regional commitment without forw
ard deployment; attempt to wean the Indians from the lure of Soviet largesse whi
le resisting their hegemonic ambitions to “paper train” the Russians while their
troops make a mess in Afghanistan? But the most pressing policy issue is what t
he United States will do to help the Afghan people. David Isby, one of the most
informed commentators on the Soviet War in Afghanistan describes the expectation
of a mujahid after listening to President Reagan state his support for the jiha
d over Voice of America. Being an educated man, and knowing what the Americans h
ad done to aid people fighting communism in the past, he went outside to look up
ward for the black C-130s he thought would be arriving with what the Afghans nee
ded to keep fighting. The black C-130s never arrived. The US faces not only a po
licy decision but moral choice. To proclaim a “crusade for freedom” and then off
er nothing but rhetoric is not just hypocritical—it is contemptuous of every Ame
rican value. It is time to put up or shut up. And there is no clearer
litmus test than supporting the Afghan resistance with the one armament that eve
ry observer of the war has noted they need most—a man-portable surface-to-air mi
ssile. When the Soviet Union feels free to arm Marxists and terrorists all over
the globe with its latest weaponry, and when the US has a massive stock of surpl
us Redeye missiles (which are being replaced with the new Stinger), why does the
US continue the charade of dribbling third-party SA-7s to the Afghan Resistance
? America can make the Soviet invasion extremely costly by aiming directly at th
e military assets, which most typifies the war—Soviet air power. An unwillingnes
s to provide that minimal assistance will foreordain the success of the Soviet “
time and terror” strategy. America’s future deterrent to Soviet aggression in th
e third world will be no more credible than in December 1979, and Afghanistan wi
ll not be a prologue but a precedent. This article on page 103 shows two maps of
Pakistan under the caption of “A Scenario of the Future?” Top Map - Pakistan gr
aphically depicting “Joint Indo-Soviet Air Offensive”
Preemptive attacks on Pa
kistan’s major airbases
Soviet bombing of refugee camps and air assault seizur
e of key passes.
Indian Strikes on Pakistani nuclear facilities
Soviet inter
diction of Karakoram Highway Bottom Map - Pakistan graphically depicting “Ground
Campaign for the Dismemberment of Pakistan”
Creation of independent “Peoples
Republic of Baluchistan” with USSR Naval Base and Force Deployment Treaty
Abso
rption of northwest tribal territories into Afghanistan
Absorption of West Kas
hmir into India
Administration of Sind /Punjab autonomous zone by India. Refer
ences: 1. The above contains only relevant partial article (only the last 4 out
of 16 pages ) “Afghanistan’s Ordeal Puts a Region at Risk,” by James B. Curren a
nd Phillip A, Karber, published in Armed Forces JOUR AL International, pp. 78-10
5, March 1985. NOTE: 1. All these events happened during Reagan Administration,
including the existence of folks called NEOCONS. I was witness to the work that
GE received under a Military Contract called “Operation Desert Shield,” a huge c
ontract awarded to several others as well (Raytheon, Westinghouse, Lockheed-Mart
in, and more). Simply replace the word “Soviets” with “American” and it brings y
ou from 1980 era to events beginning of 21st Century. 2. Just imagine who is occ
upying Afghanistan right now, and these thought came from two American Defense/I
ntelligence Analysts, working for BDM Corporation (a subsidiary of FORD) of MacL
ean, VA. Only juxtapose Soviets with the word American to relate what is going o
n in Afghanistan at presents and the direction of the blowing winds engulfing Pa
kistan, India, Afghanistan, and Iran. All these countries are surrounded by Mili
tary bases now possessed in a region called “Petrolistan.” Complete details are
posted in a 30-page PDF File posted at www.environmentaldirectory.info (after lo
gging select Houston to acquire this 30-page document with graphic maps showing
most of the important U.S. Military bases in this region as part of the New Worl
d Order. According to University of California Professor, and president of Japan
Policy Research Institute, (author of BLOWBACK and The Sorrows of Empire), U.S.
now possesses more than 750 Bases around the globe to enforce the New World Ord
er, as we have seen after September 11, 2001. 3. This quest would be incomplete
without connecting the above information with a Known World Oil Reserves Map pub
lished by British Petroleum (BP) that is posted on the web at to learn where McC
ain acquired the “110 –year” military occupation of Iraq: http://earthtrends.wri
.org/maps_spatial/maps_fullscale.php?mapID=505&theme=6 4. “The United States and
the Global Struggle for Minerals,” by Alfred E/ Eckes, Jr., University of Texas
Press, Austin & Toronto, 1979. ISBN Box 0-292-78511-9. (pbk) 5. “RESOURCE WARS-
The New Landscape of Global Conflict,” by Michael T. Klare, Owl Books Henry Hol
t and Company, 2001. ISBN 08050-5576-2. (pbk) 6. “OIL, POWER & EMPIRE: Iraq and
the U.S. Global Agenda,” by Larry Everest, Common Courage Pres, Monroe, Maine 20
04. ISBN 1-56751-246-1.(pbk) 7. “CONFESSIONS OF AN ECONOMIC HIT MAN,” by John Pe
rkins, A Plume Book, published by Penguin Group, New York 2004. ISBN 0-452-28708
-1. (pbk) 8. “Forbidden TRUTH: U.S. - Taliban Secret Oil Diplomacy and the Faile
d Hunt for Bin Laden, “ by Jean-Charles Brisard & Guillaume Dasquie, and publish
ed by Thunder’s Mouth Press/Nation Books, New York 2002. ISBN 1-56025-414-9. (pb
k). 9. “The PENTAGON’S NEW MAP – War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century,” by
Thomas P.M. Bennett, Berkeley Books, New York 2004. ISBN 0-425-20239-9. (pbk). 1
0. “The ISLAMIC BOMB: The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East, “ by Ste
ve Weissman & Herbert Krosney, NYT/Times Books, New York 1981. ISBN 0-8129-0978-
X 11. “ROGUE STATE: A Guide to the World’s Only Superpower, by William Blum, pub
lished by Common Courage Press, Monroe, Maine 2005. ISBN 1-565751-374-3. 12. "Af
ter Iraq: A report from the new Middle East - and a glimpse of its possible futu
re," by Jeffrey Goldberg, pp cover and 68-79. published in "The ATLANTIC Magazin
e, January/February 2008. Cover had the map of New Middle East as envisaged by t
he Neocons and Zionocons. .
Volume 7 umber 2 March 19, 2008 Hamid Hussain Comments on Major A.H. Amin s anal
ysis of US policy Pakistan/Afghanistan
March 19, 2008
Editor s Introduction To Major Amin s Analysis An analytic piece by a former Pak
istani armored corps officer who is well versed with military history. He has in
sight into Pakistan army mindset and has been in Afghanistan for the last few ye
ars. He is one of few officers well versed with military history especially of t
he region. In addition, he has first hand knowledge of ground realities in Afgha
nistan being there for more than four years. Hamid Hussain s comments I have had
interaction with large number of Pakistani officers of all ranks from Lieutenan
t to Lieutenant General and frankly this officer is one of few with such insight
into the region’s military history. He does not mince his words and has a uniqu
e perspective with which many may disagree. My comments are in italics and blue.
These are exchanges between two eccentrics who have interest in military histor
y and based on hypothetical scenarios. He can be counted as an expert but I’m su
rely a spectator. Most official and non-official reports and briefings tend to b
e polite and do not touch ‘inflammable’ topics pertaining to the conflict but fo
r a meaningful and informed discussion, no aspect should be a taboo. My comments
are based on my recent three week trip to the region and interaction with peopl
e of different backgrounds with main focus on Pushtuns. Readers should be mindfu
l that this is a very limited perspective and based on armchair spectators like
me who have the luxury to pass judgments sitting in the comfort of their homes.
ot even hot air of the conflicts touched them or their loved ones. Those who liv
e through the horrors of violence will surely have a very different take on thes
e issues. ) Hamid eed for a ew Long Term US Strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan
(It should be clear at outset that several competing interests are involved in t
erms of U.S. policy in Afghanistan. A number of government agencies with differe
nt approach and perspective are engaged in various activities in Afghanistan and
this makes the coordination task a nightmare. Expanding role of ATO has further
complicated the task. ow there are severe limitations on U.S. maneuvers due to
heavy commitment in Iraq. Former Secretary of State had duly warned before the I
raq war that’ this thing will suck oxygen from everything else’ and he was right
. On part of Afghans, it will be naïve to expect that U.S. & ATO will continue t
he heavy lifting indefinitely while they will have the luxury where some Afghans
making money from the foreign funding and reconstruction while another group of
Afghans making money by blowing up this infrastructure. The solution will be di
ctated by Afghans and at the end of the day they have to decide among themselves
whether they will slaughter each other or decide to live with each other. As fa
r as the foreign factor is concerned, Afghans will need to make their mind about
choosing sides. They have to pick one side whether to ally with U.S. or with Ta
liban. They can not be just spectators and expect that their country will simply
drift forward and foreigners will have unlimited money and patience. Having sai
d that, it is an undeniable fact that Afghanistan is much better in the last sev
en years. Good news is usually not news but common Afghan has benefited from the
changed situation. Off course, more is needed but looking at all standards real
istically Afghanistan is better. Even if one looks at violence and compares it w
ith Pakistan things are not that bad. Again, more effort is needed to avoid loss
of innocent lives. Those who oppose U.S. presence in Afghanistan have this simp
listic notion that if tomorrow U.S. leaves Afghanistan, everything will be fine.
Strategically, for U.S. the main question is whether heavy military presence wi
ll serve their security interests or more covert and less visible presence will
be more cost effective. U.S. policy in Afghanistan for the next decade will revo
lve around this question and benefits and risks equation will depend on which pa
th is taken.) The USA occupied Afghanistan in November 2001 and its almost more
than 6 years since then and yet the United States has failed to win the hearts a
nd minds of a substantial part of Afghan populace. The reason lies in abject fai
lure of USA s economic policy .This in turn has led to a counterproductive situa
tion. There is nothing inevitable in history but those who cannot identify the c
ritical time span in any crisis and who fail to seize it by the horns are bound
to fail. Such unfortunately has been the case with US strategy in Afghanistan. T
he US president failed to find the right strategic talent for Afghanistan and th
us thrust mediocre US policy makers on Afghanistan who know, nor recognize anyth
ing higher than their shallow mediocrity! The main thrust of USA s policy was to
construct roads and schools and clinics. These were important but no substantia
l class of stakeholders which had a vested interest in success of US policy insi
de Afghanistan was created. No major employment opportunities were created. No m
ajor effort was made to encourage private enterprise. No major attempt was made
to privatize Afghanistan s main economic potential i.e. its massive custom reven
ues most of which do not land in government coffers and are skimmed away by corr
upt custom officials as bribes and by smugglers as profits once Afghan imports a
re re-exported i.e. smuggled to Pakistan. US approach in short was bureaucratic,
conservative and in final summing up timid!
(When confronted by a problem, we usually throw in more bodies and money and hop
e that the problem will go away. In fact this creates another bureaucratic layer
further slowing down the process. British approach was for long haul. General A
braham Roberts spent 50 years in India while his son Fredrick Roberts 44 years w
hich means that between father and son, ninety four years. We are sending young
kids on three to six months stints. Almost none of them speak either Dari or Pus
htu. Result is that we are being fleeced by every one. On top of it corrupt U.S.
officials are treating these funds in a manner which reminds me of old west way
s. It looks like a wagon loaded with cash has broken down on the main road and e
very body is taking money as he pleases with no sheriff in sight. First we went
to bed with warlords to find out later that it was not good. Then we shook hand
with drug lords to find four years later that we were successful in making Afgha
nistan a leading exporter of opium and bringing it on top of chart. ow we are tr
ying to arm tribesmen. And then surprise, we found that it was the same guy who
was wearing different hats depending on the situation. I don’t see any coherent
game plan. We are just adjusting to changing tactical ground realities. Unfortun
ately, we do not have desserts on the menu. Our choices are limited to which bra
nd of castor oil we want to take. To be fair, the work itself is a messy one wit
h no perfect solution.) Bearing Point a large US firm got the major contract for
economic reform. It hired Americans and expatriates who would not have got any
decent job in USA or even a medium level country. In addition they hired some Af
ghan Americans who came to Afghanistan for a short term period, to make a quick
buck and go back to their relatively far more comfortable permanent places on th
e California coast. (There is no perfect solution to any given problem. A certai
n amount of wastage/corruption is expected, however most important thing to focu
s on is to make sure that this wastage does not derail the whole project where e
veryone walks away with whatever he can get hold of leaving only ruin behind. A
number of Afghan-Americans who were owners of pizza places and some used car sal
esmen ended up running mega projects in Afghanistan. o wonder we are now scratch
ing our heads what went wrong. Almost all Americans who deal with them are polit
e as they have to work with them and don’t want to offend them. In reality, they
are disgusted by the petty fights about personal gains among a whole lot of Afg
hans. one other than President Bush remarked that ‘you can not buy an Afghan but
you can surely rent a one’ and make no mistake we are renting a whole lot by do
zens. It took central state hundred years to create a sense of nationhood among
Afghans. Thirty years of civil war shattered the very foundation and it will be
hard work to rebuild it again. Realism and not romanticism will save Afghanistan
. Afghans will need a lot of soul searching.) The magnum bonus achievement of US
advisors was creation of AISA a government agency funded and administered by US
A and some European donors to regulate licensing and setting up of industrial pa
rks. Again since little private enterprise was involved with Bearing Point is in
the background and making a good buck hiring Afghans with US or Canadian passpo
rts at relatively low salaries and some local Afghans. The main industrial proje
ct of AISA industrial parks in Jalalabad, Kabul, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar took
six years to be awarded and will take another one year to complete. Having said
that it is good if AISA has licensing/registration alone and Industrial Parks ar
e handled by a highly professional international company with full support of th
e US Government and with zero percent interference from the Afghan Government. A
better approach could have been to award the contract to a private firm on turn
key basis with a profit incentive instead of hiring Afghans on fixed salary in A
ISA.This combined with a 30 or 50 year incentive to industries to export quota f
ree to USA , combined with a buy back guarantee with USA with the condition that
all quality standards were met would have let to creation of industrial parks i
n Afghanistan by mid 2004 and by mid 2005 or late 2005 many hundreds of industri
al units would have been functioning in Afghanistan. Thus at least permanent lon
g term employment could have been created for 200,000 to 500,000 Afghans. Instea
d the main thrust of US economic policy was on roads ,schools and clinics which
benefited a coupe of construction companies of foreign companies and created a l
ow income short term employment for an Afghan labour which could not have exceed
ed 300,000 at any time. Schools and clinics awarded to LBGI were in turn sub con
tracted by LBGI to Afghan contractors , many being US and European passport hold
ers at about 25 % to 30 % of the total cost. These contractors in turn sub contr
acted these to local Afghan petty contractors at low rates.Thus hardly 10 % of t
he total amount earmarked for these schools and clinics were actually spent resu
lting in leaking and collapsing roofs and highly sub standard construction. This
faux pas was well covered by the Washington Post in late 2005. It has been esti
mated that the contraband non drug mafia in Afghanistan is larger than the drug
mafia of Afghanistan. In turn both the mafias have overlapping key figures invol
ved in both the trades. It has been estimated that some 80 % of Afghanistan s im
ports are smuggled back to neighboring Pakistan where custom duties are very hig
h. The United States made a somewhat lukewarm effort to re-structure the low pai
d and highly corrupt and inefficient Afghan customs .Another approach could have
been to award the custom collection and enforcement task to an international pr
ivate firm like Cotecna or SGS. This way Afghan custom revenues could have been
multiplied by 400 % to 600 % and Afghan Government could have been made financia
lly far stronger, while also reducing its overwhelming dependence on foreign aid
. It is significant to note that many key Afghan governors on the bordering prov
inces as well as some ministers are known to have a close link with the non drug
contraband mafia. (Those who have even only rudimentary knowledge of the countr
y well know that they and their forefathers have been involved in this business.
It is important to note that it is not considered illegal, unethical or immoral
. They consider it as a legitimate business and fight every effort by nation sta
tes to regulate this activity.)) During the past six years many Afghans and many
Pashtuns saw daisy cutters, Chinooks and armored cars but no one saw the benefi
ts of USA s advent in Afghanistan. Both the countries got a lot of hot lead and
shrapnel but no Marshall Plan other than a Marshal being created in Afghanistan!
(Each theatre is different and no two Marshal plans can be same. Most important
factor is the social and psychological make up of the population. In the afterm
ath of Second World War, two nations; Japan and Germany took a different path. A
t individual level,
even loss of a single innocent human life is a tragedy and every effort should b
e made to preserve human life. However, in the life of nations internal and exte
rnal factors can catapult them into the midst of a horrible storm. Japanese and
Germans are first rate fighters and they plunged the world into a horrible carna
ge. Both nations came out of the conflict devastated and defeated. However, both
nations made a difficult choice at a critical juncture of their history. They u
sed the resources of their conquerors judiciously and in fifty years came out as
front runners among the league of nations. Even Vietnamese after a brutal war c
ame out with their nation intact. In contrast, look at Palestinians and Afghans.
Palestinians unable to solve their own problem tried to hop on a different trai
n. They dragged every neighboring Arab country into direct conflict and thus wer
e able to directly contribute to crushing defeats to Egypt, Syria and Jordan. Th
ey produced gentlemen such as late Abdullah Azam who had nothing for his own peo
ple but was very successful in brutalizing societies such as Egypt, Afghanistan
and Pakistan with his extremist ideologies. Afghans ended up burning up their ow
n house for good in the struggle to get rid of the Russians. Pakistan is now an
assembly plant of suicide bombers.) In Afghanistan this was a case of lack of vi
sion on part of US Government. In Pakistan which got more than 10 Billion USD in
aid, the corrupt non Pashtun dominated government spent a very nominal part of
this aid on the Pashtun areas despite the fact that this aid was meant to basica
lly pacify the Pashtun areas of Pakistan which are definitely the centre of grav
ity of Al Qaeda/Taliban.No special export zone with the right to quota free guar
anteed export reinforced by buy back guarantees was created in the NWFP and Balo
chistan provinces of Pakistan. These zones could have gone a long way in creatin
g employment and prosperity in the Pashtun areas and vastly reduce the sense of
alienation in the Pashtuns.The reasons for this were more ethnic than anything a
nd the USA made no effort to arm twist the tin pot Musharraf regime into spendin
g this money on the Pashtun areas of Pakistan. The only investment that Pakistan
s non Pashtun dominated government made on the Pashtun areas was in form of Cob
ra helicopter munitions, 7.62 mm bullets, 155 mm artillery etc in pounding the P
ashtun areas indiscriminately, targeting mostly non combatant’s women and childr
en. (There is a common perception which has never been seriously debated which t
akes the view that if Washington simply pumps more money into the region then th
e problem will go away. As a spectator of Afghan civil war, I came to the conclu
sion and I may be totally wrong that when there are more spoils the game becomes
more brutal and uglier. Every Afghan faction and sub-faction took money from ev
eryone and his cousin and turned their homeland into rubble. Without understandi
ng the sociology of the population in the conflict zone, one may deduce wrong co
nclusions. One example may give some insight. In early 1990s, towns started to f
all to Afghan rebels fighting against Soviet backed government. Afghan rebels co
nquered a town in Khost and all spoils were declared booty and distributed among
various factions. They had gathered in a school and there was quandary about ho
w to distribute the furniture of the school among the men. They decided to chop
all the furniture and distribute the wood to be used for fire. It looks like tim
e has frozen in some areas. They routinely executed school teachers labeling the
m as communists. A new generation of leaders with a different mindset emerged wh
en every sensible Afghan was either killed or forced to leave the country. The j
ungle was left for the wolves only. You are more familiar with luxurious dwellin
gs of these new leaders in one of the most expensive real estate enclaves in Kab
ul. In my humble view the situation is tribal territories along Pakistan-Afghan
border is more complex with a number of players with different agendas. I fear t
hat rather than learning the lesson from Afghanistan, the region is following th
e Afghan example.) In addition no major effort was made to create a stock exchan
ge or float investment bonds giving good interest which could have created a sub
stantial class in Afghanistan whose success and prosperity was linked to US poli
cies in Afghanistan. It was just a matter of a little imagination and printing b
onds with the backing and sovereign guarantee of US government for payment of in
terest in USD for a period of 10 to 20 years. Unfortunately there was no brillia
nt man like Nixon in the US leadership who could think of a coup like delinking
of gold standard in the early 70s.A condition could have been imposed that in or
der to buy these Afghanistan Fund Bons all companies had to register in Afghanis
tan thus bringing money to Afghanistan as well as a long term class of stake hol
ders in Afghanistan. (This is a good idea which could have benefited the country
in the long run.) I developed friendship with a US official in Kabul in 2005.We
discussed many aspects of US policy in Afghanistan.In the end the US officer pe
ssimistically concluded that his superiors were a bunch of w_t p______s .Similar
ideas were expressed by many US military officers I met in Afghanistan in the c
ourse of military contracting in course of 4 years. (You just got the small samp
le of the feeling of frustration. Patience has never been an American virtue. I
don’t think that we will pack from Afghanistan tomorrow or after small setbacks.
We will be engaged but the methodology may change depending on the public suppo
rt and economic situation of U.S. I see future with more covert operations rathe
r than heavy military presence. We may decide about this inevitable outcome in a
wise way before more damage is done or we will learn the usual way after burnin
g a number of fingers and toes: both ours and of others. The battle will be foug
ht by Afghans themselves with or without our help. I don’t know whether it will
be good or bad but I think that if violence crosses a certain threshold in Afgha
nistan and Pakistan, then there is a possibility of division of Afghanistan alon
g Hindu Kush line. I don’t think non-Pushtuns are in a mood for Pushtun hegemony
anymore. This probably will not be in the form of separation or emergence of ne
w countries but it will be de facto just we are seeing in Iraq. Each community e
ntrenched in its own ethnic enclave with protracted fight along contested areas.
If that event comes first then in addition to increasing intra-Pushtun violence
there will be increase pressure on the state of Pakistan. If the current cycle
of violence emanating from tribal areas continue to kill and maim people in big
non-Pushtun cities such as Rawalpindi, Lahore, Karachi then it will be naïve not
to expect a backlash against Pushtuns in general. This will estrange different
ethnic communities. Only a concerted effort by concerned citizens can prevent th
e schism. The problem is that even informed people do not analyze these trends r
ationally. They are easily carried away by emotions and dwell on conspiracy theo
ries preventing a concerted effort to prevent fragmentation. They keep looking f
or the hidden hands and not paying attention to their actions and evident social
, economic and political factors which push events in a particular direction.)
It may be added that the same policy should have been followed in Pakistan , par
ticularly its tribal areas creating industrial zones guaranteeing 10 to 20 years
quota free exports to USA with buy back guarantee instead of doling out many bi
llion US Dollars to Pakistanis highly corrupt military junta. This way employmen
t would have been created and potential recruits of Al Qaeda and Taliban given d
ecent risk free long term jobs in the industrial units established as part of th
is policy. (It may work but then who could guarantee that the same Wazir or Mahs
ud who would make $500 per month from working in an industry in tribal areas wil
l also not sell his tomatoes at $50 per kilogram to al-Qaeda up in the mountains
to make some extra change. Money is only one factor and other aspects need to b
e tackled along with economic activity. I think it is naïve to expect that the y
oung chap who has life and death authority when he is member of one of the extre
mist outfits will go back and run a tea stall on the roadside suffering daily hu
miliation. These are social factors which need to be studied. I fear more kids w
ill follow this model and it will be of different shapes in different parts of t
he country. In Karachi Muhajir youth have joined the fascist strain of MQM and l
iving comfortably on the extortion from the urban areas. Rural Sindhis are follo
wing the same path. Their preference is kidnapping for ransom. They are now quie
tly moving to urban areas after learning lessons from MQM. In Darra Adam Khel, f
lashy SUVs come and distribute monthly stipend to the Taliban foot soldiers open
ly. This kid getting a regular salary, brandishing a brand new AK-47, instilling
some fear through his coercive capability and also gaining some respect being t
he enforcer of some good is now on a different plane. He has crashed into the pa
rty and it will not be an easy task to reverse this trend. The phenomenon needs
serious research.) No major effort was made to regulate the visa regime. A Work
Permit was issued by the Ministry of Labour for visa extension but this permit w
as not honored by the Ministry of Interior when AISA issued them visa extension
letters for multiple visas in many cases thus restricting in country and out cou
ntry movement of expatriates. The Afghan Embassies particularly those in Pakista
n followed yet another highly absurd practice of granting a 15 day single entry
visa to all applicants with the condition that after they had visited Afghanista
n once and exited they could not apply for another Afghan visa till the three mo
nth period of the visa expired. Thus an expatriate with a valid Afghan Work Perm
it was told that work permit had no legal value in eyes of Afghan Embassy Staff
and that they could not apply for another visa till the three months visa validi
ty period expired. Afghanistan and even Pakistan may be compared to a sort of We
st Germany and South Korea for USA.Any withdrawal from Afghanistan would straigh
t away lead to re-occupation of the country by Taliban with an active re-entry o
f Russia, Iran and India on side of non Taliban forces. The Afghan Army needs at
least 10 to 15 years to recover its military effectiveness. Thus all this would
be a 100 percent disaster for USA. (Same argument was forwarded in case of Viet
nam. The two situations are not the same but I think strategically it will be mo
re cost effective and may be more productive if U.S. concentrate on covert measu
res to tackle the extremist issue rather than embarking on the projects of huge
military footprints and nation building. Plenty of local players are more than w
illing to rent their guns at a much lower price tag. This is strictly looking at
the menace of extremists. On bigger canvas, helping these countries build their
own societies will make the world a better place for our children. I would pref
er my children going as exchange students or scholars to Afghanistan or Pakistan
and vice versa. This is much better than sending our kids with M-16s and in ret
urn expecting their kids blowing themselves up. ) The only viable strategy for U
SA in Afghanistan is to settle in for next two decades. Introduce a Marshall Pla
n which creates employment and prosperity .Introduce public bonds with good inte
rest that make US presence in Afghanistan a cause of progress and prosperity for
many. Keep a watchful eye on the region. Build up the capacity of the Afghan Na
tional Army and Police. Any withdrawal by USA would be a cardinal strategic blun
der. Something which the USA cannot afford and an event which would constitute a
Clausewitzian culminating point of USA. (Afghanistan and Pakistan will be saved
only by Afghans and Pakistanis. Even if U.S. comes in with good intentions it c
an surely help in some aspects but it is unlikely to change the dynamic of econo
mics, governance and conflict. Both countries are nations in terms of definition
s but a long process over the last sixty years has widened the fault lines. Pres
ent geographic boundaries of Afghanistan have not changed much in the last three
hundred years. Efforts in 20th century mainly coercive helped to strengthen the
central state but ethnic, tribal and political Islamic forces have significantl
y weakened the foundation. A Herculean effort by wise Afghan leadership with a g
rand bargain among various groups will be needed to even to go back to the statu
s quo of the last century. Pakistan is a new state which has struggled to cobble
a nation. It embarked on using the religion as an anchor but it didn’t work. On
one end, it opened Pandora boxes by declaring some citizens as non-Muslim i.e.
Ahmadis and on the other end sectarian fault line widened. Bengalis were as good
or as bad Muslims as any other Pakistani but they finally rejected the Pakistan
i identity and were able to achieve independence. The ethnic fault lines have wi
dened in the last twenty years and I don’t see any mechanism in place either at
government or at civil society level to address this crucial issue. Baluchs are
completely alienated to a point where Baluchistan university is now a no go area
for armed forces personnel of the country’s army. This was frankly admitted non
e other than the Commandant of the Staff College at Quetta. Ethnic and sectarian
forces will realign and if violence stays above a certain threshold then intern
ational players will have no choice but to work with local players rather than r
outing everything through Islamabad. That will be a bad day for Pakistan. ) Furt
her the USA has to reinforce the democratic forces in Pakistan and Afghanistan w
hile making use of Pakistan s mercenary army which is still far cheaper than any
Western force even if their pay is tripled by US aid. At the same time the Paki
stani forces being more than 60 % non Pashtuns have to be restrained from causin
g collateral damage. (I sincerely hope and pray that I’m wrong but the seeds of
chaos sowed two decades ago are bearing fruit now. Off course, a different metho
dology is needed but majority of Pakistanis think that if they simply unilateral
ly withdraw from the fight against extremists everything will be fine. It will n
ot be an easy task to put the extremism genie back in the bottle. This has now b
ecome truly
native and even if U.S. walks away from the scene, this devil will devour many m
ore souls before it is exorcised. Case of Iraq is a good example to study.) The
USA has invested many billions in Afghanistan but its priorities are not clear.V
accillation , procrastination and supreme indecision remain the hallmarks of US
policy in Afghanistan. (For a dispassionate analysis to understand better, we ne
ed to look at facts and not carried away by emotions. Myths and romantic notions
have been passed on as history. Pushtuns have some sterling qualities but also
have their share of vices. Recently, when sectarian clashes broke out in Parachi
nar, the sectarian extremists entrenched in Waziristan became jubilant and start
ed to arrive in Kurram to kill the Shia ‘infidel’ which is closer than American.
Turis had to set up ambushes at the strategic entrance points of the agency to
put some fear of God in them. The result was over 200 casualties. Majority of Pa
kistanis do not have any clue what is eating away their foundations. You need to
sit with a Wazir woman to at least get the other narrative but no one is intere
sted in that. I met an Afghan woman who had married a non-Muslim. She was a youn
g woman who had lived the horrors of civil war for the spoils of 1990s. We just
chatted casually but then she came out with a statement which showed her pain. S
he said that I married this man because he was the first man in my life who show
ed ‘respect’ to me. Unlike most Pakistanis you are well aware of the history of
the region. Remember First afghan War of 1840s; the Gilzai tribes along the bord
er rose against British troops not for ideology or religion. They were happily r
eceiving 8000 sterling pounds per year and British troops were partying in Kabul
. Many had romantic relations with Afghan women. Then a bureaucrat wanted to sav
e money and decided to cut the subsidy from 8000 pounds to 4000 pounds. All trib
es rose and the rest is history. In 1980s, Afridis took toll from rebels passing
through their lands in the form of cash and weapons. When Afghan forces garriso
ns were besieged, the same Afridis will supply them with food and weapons off co
urse 100 times higher than market value. In 2008, Taliban commander of Helmand s
witched sides and now serves as an advisor to U.S. ambassador to Kabul. othing i
s changed over the centuries. This commander has not turned overnight a champion
of human or women rights or a democrat. It boils down to interest at any given
time. If tomorrow he can make a quick buck he will not hesitate to stab in the b
ack any Afghan or American. He may shoot at American soldier for his night visio
n goggles. All this is too embarrassing for Afghans and Pakistanis to let their
children know. So the myths pass on as history. ) ‘Courage among civilized peopl
es consists in a readiness to sacrifice oneself for the political community. G.W
. Hegel’ Definition of bravery is different as far nation is concerned. A wise A
fghan once mentioned to me that unless ‘we learn to differentiate what belongs t
o us and what to the nation, we will not move forward’. I think new model of con
flict resolution and prevention is needed. Security is just one dimension of a c
omplex conflict paradigm. More people to people interaction between various grou
ps inside Pakistan, between Pakistan and Afghanistan and between the region and
U.S. will be more fruitful and less violent and painful. This is a long drawn pr
ocess with no short cuts.
Volume 7 umber 1 January 28, 2008 Major A.H. Amin (Pakistan Army, Retired) Wazir
istan
Waziristan is the testing ground, the acid test of Pakistan Army s worth in the
so- called war against terrorism. What is the Pakistani intelligence ? An intell
igence operative stated that they don t have the guts to go out of a fort of FC
in Waziristan. They meekly step out of a Qila (fort) and stop some truck drivers
and ask what s going on. From what they scramble all the guys from Military Int
elligence, the ISI , the Corps Intelligence and the FC Intelligence sit down and
make a generally similar report. The guy who compares all reports in GHQ jumps
with joy when he sees all these reports and states that all reports can be cross
checked and are correct. There is the Sab Accha mentality since Mughal times. S
ab Accha means All Correct. So in the final summing it is gleefully concluded th
at the writ of the Pakistani Government is established in all parts of tribal ar
eas! Glory be to Allah. I recently met some mid-ranking and major-general level
army officers and discussed Waziristan with them. We concluded: o Waziristan is
a case of clash of interests among ambitious officers trying to get a good chit
(report) and serious regimental officers who see soldiering as a way of life. Th
e fast-track guys want to bash up some villages with artillery fire and do some
dog catching for Americans and improve their career index called OEI. o The firs
t major disaster was Lt.-Gen. Safdar, a Punjabi and a careerist. He wanted a fas
t-track approach for the problem, .His policy was bomb everyone, kill everyone a
nd get the feathers in the cap for being a conqueror. This was counter-productiv
e. The armed forces lost all credibility in this area. Safdar was finally packed
off to the post of director logistics in the army Headquarters a post seen as w
aiting area for dumped generals. o Lieutenant General Hamid Khan, a Pashtun armo
red corps officer from 11 Cavalry was not effective. During his tenure the army
was neither here nor there. He was serving for most of the time when the Waziris
tan accord had been signed. o The present corps commander Masud Aslam was a Karg
il Warrior! (Major Amin is not being complimentary.) He again tried to introduce
the Safdar policy with disastrous results. o One Major General level divisional
commander stood out. Strangely it was a Shia officer, Major General Mir Haider.
Although a Punjabi he understood the Pasthun psyche and did well. His modus ope
randi was psy war. Healing the tribal eg . Gifting copies of Holy Quran. o Anoth
er Major General Sahi was a failure. Again he was using the Safdar approach. Kil
l , batter , destroy and bomb. Sahi had close links with the Quisling PML (Presi
dent Musharraf s political party: the writer believes Pakistan has sold out to t
he Americans) as his brother was a politician from that party. In words of a dir
ect participant officer, he was also a total failure. He was finally packed off
as commandant of infantry school. Another resting place of dumped generals. In h
is dining out he said that he had established writ of Pakistani Government in Wa
ziristan and was corrected there and then by a serving army officer that this wa
s a white lie. He was challenged that he could not drive with his GOC s flag fro
m Miran Shah to Bannu even with an escort! He was infamous in the Frontier Corps
Officers for trying to prod them to attack this village or that because he want
ed to get a good chit from his bosses. o A serving army officer in that area com
pared Pakistan Army and the FC in Waziristan to a mouse running from point A to
point B while he said that the tribals were the lazy cat watching this despicabl
e mouse. We further concluded: o The great danger is not Pakistan but the fall-o
ut after its demise. o The great danger to the West is not the hopeless Pakistan
i state but non-state actors o The more Pakistani Don Quixotes are proved to be
spineless clowns in Waziristan, the more dangerous the situation becomes. o Warf
are has become cheap. It is easy to rock the boat and non-state actors are good
at this. o The front is unclear. The distinction between friend and foe unclear.
My assessment is that if the Americans decide to knock out Pakistan , in strate
gic terms , there will be no resistance in Punjab and Sindh ,only the Pashtuns w
ill be their adversaries and the settled area Pashtuns will be as hopeless as th
e Punjabis and Sindhis. Pakistan s military and political establishment is simpl
y hopeless. This theme is discussed in my article "5 minutes over Islamabad" (th
e article details how the US forced Pakistan to join it s side in the GWOT.) The
Pakistani military junta has already lost all credibility with the Pakistani po
pulation and cannot control the situation. Even the Americans will not achieve m
uch if they enter Waziristan. The terrain is bad and Americans will be a good ca
use for Jihad. The solution is withdrawal from Waziristan and regime change in P
akistan. The Americans should let the hopeless Paki politicians do the dirty job
of all this. As an officer who served in Pakistan Army I would sum up the situa
tion as following: o The Pakistani High Command a Punjabi-Mohajir (Mohajirs are
Pakistans who migrated from India to the new country of Pakistan in/after 1947)
team lacks the grey matter or resolve to deal with the tribals. o The troops the
y are commanding have lost faith in the cause they are fighting for. This is the
worst thing for an army. o All said and done the tribals can be dealt political
ly. Any Pakistani officer who is posted as commander 11 Corps is a job seeker. H
e is trying to be a Napoleon and a Punjabi cannot be a Napoleon with a tribal! o
The present Governor of NWFP Owais Ghani has already miserably failed in Baluch
istan. He is regarded as a non-Pashtun as he is the hated Hindko Punjabi (we don
t know what Hindko means; Hind generally refers to India) speaking from Peshawar
city just like General Kakar, whose first cousin he is.
o
The whole situation requires a change in command in Pakistan from top to bottom.
Vol 6 umber 4 August 6, 2007 Hamid Hussain Wages of Extremism --- Past, Present
and Future of Lal Masjid Phenomenon
[This article also appears in the Pakistan Defense Journal August 2007. Reprinte
d with author s permission.] Recently, in the Pakistani capital of Islamabad, se
curity forces launched an operation codenamed ‘Silence’ to get rid of armed extr
emists holed up in Lal Masjid and its affiliated Madrassah (religious school). T
his operation resulted in death of more than one hundred entrenched in the mosqu
e as well as about ten security personnel. The operation was watched closely by
Pakistani and international audience. Focus was mainly on the events surrounding
the stand off between extremists led by two brothers; Abdul Aziz and Abdul Rash
id. There was no attempt to look at the crisis in the broader context. It will b
e a folly to look at the issue only in terms of law and order. The incident itse
lf may be very local in nature but it has broader implications for the country a
nd the region. Rise of extremism in the region has many dimensions and its effec
ts will also be multifaceted. The stand off at Lal Masjid came as a surprise to
many Pakistanis. With few exceptions, country has no culture of serious academic
analysis of deep rooted social and security problems. In the last few years, th
ere has been rapid expansion of print and visual media outlets; however there ha
s been very little effort to inculcate a culture of serious and responsible disc
ussion about vital national security issues. Just like most of their western cou
nterparts, majority of private television stations are interested in sensational
news with gory details. Even debates about important issues boil down to shouti
ng matches between participants thus depriving the audience of any meaningful an
d constructive dialogue. In the corridors of power, key decision makers simply s
tumble from one crisis to another and major focus is only on crisis management a
s it arises. There is no institutional mechanism for serious study of newly emer
ging threats. Military and intelligence hierarchy has not been able to reform it
self to changing threats. Culture of highly personalized decision making process
, lack of input from different sources, strong inhibitory environment for dissen
ting voices and unaccountability generates an environment which is not conducive
for a well informed decision making process. Those who have even rudimentary kn
owledge of the events of the last two decades in the region are not surprised ab
out the events like stand off at Lal Masjid. This downward trend has a long hist
ory. Pakistanis are not the only players in this drama and therefore all the bla
me cannot be placed at Pakistan’s doorsteps. It is disingenuous on part of Washi
ngton to blame everyone while completely ignoring its own follies. Americans nee
d to remember that two decades ago, it was national security policy of U.S. gove
rnment which was executed by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on the killing fi
elds of Afghanistan. CIA provided training in sabotage, handling of explosive de
vices and urban warfare for yesterday’s holy warriors and today’s terrorists. Sp
ecial courses were run for target assassinations and how to make lethal bicycle,
camel and car bombs. CIA also provided sophisticated communication equipment, d
elayed timing devices for plastic explosives, long range sniper rifles and high
precision targeting devices for mortars. The next generation of holy warriors is
now not only using these skills against Pakistani security forces but has acqui
red new ones adding Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and suicide bombers to t
heir arsenal. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the civil war in the wake of wi
thdrawal of Soviet troops changed the dynamics of power in the region. Non state
actors gradually gained strength as the nation state of Afghanistan fragmented.
The ripples were felt from Pakistan stretching to Middle East and all the way a
cross Atlantic to U.S. A new breed of warriors emerged from the ashes of Afghani
stan which is now shaking the very foundations of many nation states. The seeds
were sowed in 1980s when rules of warfare were completely overhauled to suit the
need of that time. All major players including Afghans, Pakistani military and
intelligence personnel, U.S. Saudi Arabia and China conveniently ignored the bru
tality of their clients and proxies on the Afghan battlefield. Everyone agreed w
ith the principle of armed resistance against occupying forces but in executing
the policy on ground the most brutal and inhumane tactics were employed. Afghans
indiscriminately killed civilians and indulged in activities such as skinning t
heir adversaries alive and sodomizing prisoners. Pakistani intelligence personne
l approved and provided logistical support for sabotage operations even in educa
tional institutions. Arab countries let loose their own lunatics to descend on A
fghanistan and contribute to the mayhem. The label of communist was used liberal
ly to eliminate school teachers, intellectuals and educated females. The barbari
ty practiced on the land of Afghanistan also infected non-Afghans playing on tha
t field. The most bigoted and extremist fringe of Pakistani sectarian warriors w
hich embarked on wholesale killing of Shia in Pakistan a decade later was school
ed on the battlefields of Afghanistan. Arab extremists
flew back to their native lands to engage in barbaric acts in the name of Islam
which have not even been catalogued properly let alone analyzed. Indiscriminate
killing of men, women and children in the most horrific way in Algeria was one g
ory example of this saga. Careful look at the emergence of extremism and Pakista
n’s role in it should be done not as an exercise of blame game but to understand
the dangerous trend and finding ways to curb this trend. Combination of general
discontent, Islamist discourse, deteriorating economic and security situation a
nd anger about some foreign policy issues are contributing to the brew of a dang
erous cocktail. Pockets of extremist militant groups are scattered throughout th
e country and they can create crisis situation at any time. These groups are rap
idly expanding their area of influence. Their influence extends from the border
hinterlands of North and South Waziristan to other border areas of Bajawar, Dir
and Swat to small and large cities and now even the state’s capital is not immun
e from the rapidly escalating violence. Several small groups are taking advantag
e of the situation and following the example set up by Lal Masjid. In Swat Maulv
i Fazlullah is threatening to send suicide bombers against Pakistani security fo
rces. In Mohmand tribal agency, a group of about 100 armed militants took contro
l of a shrine and mosque. Their leader offered talks with government and then th
reatened to unleash suicide bombers. It looks like that everybody is obsessed wi
th the death cult. Extremists of all colors and shades are now popping everywher
e. The big landscape is a general trend of piety and observance of religious rit
uals by the majority of population. Pakistani society has been a conservative so
ciety but in the last two decades religious symbols and rituals are visible in p
ublic arena. The background theme is ‘revival’ and ‘return to puritan ways’ link
ed with the ‘end of the world’ and ‘arrival of Messiah’. A number of orthodox cl
erics and their organizations as well as self taught neo-clerics and evangelists
are propagating their views in their respective mosques, print and electronic m
edia. The very nature of this phenomenon is exclusive. Each cleric is entrenched
in his own mosque or institution with no interaction with others thus splinteri
ng general population into small groups. The negative side of this phenomenon is
entrenchment of sectarian identity. Now a more younger and radical generation i
nfluenced by the ‘salafi’ (an ultra orthodox school of thought based on Hanbali
school of juristic traditions which stresses on literal interpretation of script
ure and discourages innovation) trend has taken a step forward towards ‘takfir’
(apostasy) and painting their version on the big landscape. Their modus operandi
is a mix of cult and gang culture making it very difficult to engage them in an
y meaningful way. In areas ridden with violence, this younger leadership is push
ing traditional peaceful clerics out of public arena and using coercive measures
to purify the community. Religion rather than advancing the concepts of equalit
y, economic and social justice and egalitarianism has become a tool for the frag
mentation of society. The most pressing question now for Pakistani state and soc
iety is how to tackle this phenomenon of extremism. As far as Pakistan is concer
ned, this internal threat has now surpassed all external threats. One is the imm
ediate security aspect of the problem and the other is more long term holistic a
pproach to forestall Iraqification of Pakistan. It is now clear that threat from
extremists can not be completely eliminated but measures can be taken to limit
its damaging effects. Pakistan is facing a grave crisis and there will be securi
ty, economic, political and social fallout from the extremism menace. Outsiders
can sympathize, warn or threaten Pakistan but at the end of the day it will be t
he decision of the Pakistani state and society to determine their own future. On
ly Pakistanis will decide what kind of society they are willing to live in. All
critical decisions should be made in this context carefully balancing the benefi
ts and risks. A closer look at the emerging threat gives a glimpse of the future
discourse in the context of Pakistan. Extremist groups are very small in number
s and majority of Pakistanis of all ethnicities and religious denominations are
moderate and are appalled at the violent cycle. However, it is the action genera
ted by extremist groups which send shock waves both internally and externally. I
n Pushtun areas, the extremist ideology with its doctrine of apostasy was brough
t by Arab fighters. This doctrine is the foundation stone of the legitimacy of k
illing fellow Muslims after they are declared apostates. Two decades ago, during
 ‘external Jihad’ against the Soviets, no suicide bombings were carried out. The
tables are now turned and in ‘internal Jihad’, extremists have no qualms about
using suicide bombings against all targets; civilian and military in Pakistan an
d Afghanistan. The Pushtun element among the extremist groups based in tribal ar
eas will continue to have some loose affiliation with their kin across the borde
r in Afghanistan. This will keep violence graph high enough on both sides of the
border and will contribute to economic stagnation and dislocation. In both coun
tries, Pushtuns will come under increasing scrutiny. Whether in Kabul or Islamab
ad, a poor Pushtun from the hinterlands will be viewed with suspicion further al
ienating a large number and aggravating ethnic frictions. Nationalist Pushtuns m
ay close ranks to provide the alternative stressing on ethnic identity and will
try to negotiate with Pakistani state and international players. Influence of ex
tremists is making its way into the Hindko speaking belt of Hazara and Kohistan
resulting in instability in that traditionally peaceful area. In northern areas,
where a large number of Shia and Ismaili community live, the nature of conflict
invariably will be sectarian in nature. In Punjab, a decade ago, extremist elem
ents channeled their energy towards Indian held Kashmir. Suicide bombings agains
t Indian targets both civilian and military did not bother anyone in Pakistan fo
r over a decade. Now in ‘internal Jihad’, the same methodology is being used aga
inst Pakistani targets. In Punjab, popular piety revolving around shrines and to
mbs will not be tolerated by puritans who consider such traditions as apostasy.
The rise of extremists will fan the sectarian fires and the wages of Jihad will
be more bloodshed among Muslims. A number of groups in Pakistan are not yet in t
he loop of religiously motivated violence and this include Baluch, Sindhi and Ur
du speaking known as Muhajirs. Rise of religious militancy and weakening of nati
onal bonds will only strengthen ethnic identity of these groups and they will us
e this identity while negotiating with the state or international players. These
groups will need armed wings to keep spoilers at bay and negotiate a better bar
gain from the state which is a recipe for a multidimensional internal conflict.
Pakistani state is facing a daunting challenge. On the security front, the appro
ach needs to be diverse and innovative depending upon the situation. The strateg
y needs to take
into consideration local conditions. Security operations in tribal areas have qu
ite different dynamics compared to urban areas. Support of local tribes both for
negotiations and punitive measures is essential. Hardcore extremist leadership
both local and foreigner cannot be eliminated without tribal cooperation and tim
ely intelligence. In case of attacks of large groups of militants on settled tow
ns such as recent attacks in Tank (a city bordering restive tribal agencies), sh
ow of force of combination of police and paramilitary soldiers backed by regular
troops can neutralize the threat quickly and allay the fears of general populat
ion. In case of suicide attacks by individuals, pouring large number of troops t
o the scene does not serve any meaningful purpose and wastes resources. Quick re
sponse of police to maintain law and order and handle transfer of casualties at
the scene will serve the purpose and may be a better and cost effective approach
. In fighting extremism, lot of things can be achieved quietly and more efficien
tly without too much of collateral damage. More attention should be paid to the
subtle approach and covert measures to neutralize the leadership of extremist gr
oups. In foreseeable future, it is clear that army will be used frequently for s
upport of civilian law enforcement agencies. Army should be used as a last resor
t and not as first option in case of a crisis. Army’s General Head Quarter (GHQ)
has to do some homework to analyze internal threat and how to handle it. So far
, everybody has been simply waiting for the crisis and when it occurs, bodies ar
e simply thrown at it with the hope that something good will come out of it. Reg
ular troops are not trained to handle small groups of people entrenched in urban
areas nor to manage a scene of a suicide bombing. In addition, regular army tro
ops have a long logistical tail and movement is usually slow and costly. In view
of these limitations, government has been using Special Services Group (SSG); t
he elite commando units of Pakistan army. These are highly trained soldiers and
can be effective in such situation. However, they are a highly prized commodity
and can not be replaced easily. It takes a long time to select the best soldiers
and officers and then train them in special tasks. SSG has been stretched to it
s limits as they are involved in operations in Waziristan and Baluchistan. A sep
arate anti-terrorist battalion of SSG named Zarrar has been trained for special
tasks and was used in ‘Operation Silence’. The commanding officer Lieutenant Col
onel Haroon –ulIslam, Captain Salman Butt and many soldiers gave the ultimate sa
crifice in the operation. Several others were injured. These officers kept the t
radition of Pakistan army by leading their men from the front. The sad fact is t
hat homegrown Jihadis were never able to lay their hands on Indian Special Force
s but were able to kill a number of Pakistani elite soldiers without any moral q
ualms. A new special unit called Anti Terrorism Force (ATF) is being used in som
e internal security cases. Expansion and strengthening of this force with a mix
of new police recruits and retired army soldiers and officers may decrease relia
nce on SSG. There is a need of more coordination between civilian and military i
ntelligence and security entities. Use of army in internal security duties is al
ways a tricky situation. In case of use of religion by extremist groups makes th
e task more complicated. Most of the rank and file of army is recruited from con
servative districts of North West Frontier Province (N.W.F.P.) and Punjab. The b
ulk of recruits are from rural areas, however soldiers are more educated nowaday
s. They are not living in isolation and they are exposed to outside world and di
fferent opinions. They are watching the same media and reading the same newspape
rs. Confusion among general population affects soldiers and sympathy shown by a
segment of population for extremists can have an impact on the morale of soldier
s. GHQ needs to look at the educational and psychological aspect of preparing so
ldiers for the unpleasant task of internal security duty. In modern world, inter
nal security operations can not be viewed in isolation. Some covert operations a
re best done in total secrecy and information is shared only among a limited gro
up. However, in case of deployment of troops in troubled areas or Lal Masjid typ
e operations, government has to take local community leaders, political parties
and media into confidence. Those involved in the decision making process of the
operation have to do the homework to prepare their case and present it as a nece
ssary measure to get consent of the majority of the society. In the absence of t
hat such operation though necessary to maintain law and order will not get the d
esired results. Recently, federal government deployed paramilitary soldiers and
regular troops in Swat but provincial government demanded removal of these troop
s. Such chaotic decision making process will only bring grief and merely add mor
e confusion to a very complicated and dangerous situation. Prolonged deployment
of soldiers under these trying circumstances for internal security duty can put
enormous pressure on officers and soldiers and there is a clear danger that a nu
mber of them may refuse to perform such tasks. Pakistan army is a disciplined fo
rce but fissiparous tendencies in the society will invariably seep into the army
. No government can tackle the very difficult and complex problem of religious e
xtremism with its attendant violence alone. Civil society dialogue about the thr
eat of extremism and effective measures to counter it is desperately needed to b
uild a consensus. Apathy among general population is not helping in this regard.
They have a simplistic and naive view of the whole saga. They want government t
o be responsible for law and order and do not want gun totting militants in thei
r neighborhoods. However, when government decides to take action, they blame it
for the crisis and want negotiation with extremists. In case of Lal Masjid, gene
ral public opinion was in favor of action against militants entrenched in the mo
sque. However, when action became messy, then public quickly back paddled and ma
ny even started to espouse the cause of those who had challenged the writ of the
government. Legitimacy crisis of government is coupled with the lack of trust.
A mix of denial, anger and frustration is severely hampering the efforts to unde
rstand a dangerous trend. These basic issues need to be addressed above party po
litics and narrow interests. It is up to Pakistanis to decide what kind of gover
nment they want but regardless of the shape and form of the government, the fund
amental issues facing the nation need to be addressed. Majority of Pakistanis wa
nt to live a stable and peaceful life. Economic and social problems take precede
nce over all other problems. Most Pakistanis are connected to the outside world
and get a variety of opinion from local and international sources. However, as f
ar as the issue of religious extremism is concerned, the attitude of a large num
ber of Pakistanis is a mix of fear, anger, frustration and denial. Even well inf
ormed Pakistanis are either
unaware of the dynamics of violence generated by religious extremists which was
linked to Pakistan’s national security agenda defined by Pakistani security esta
blishment for over two decades or prefer to completely ignore the relevance of t
hat phenomenon. There are no quick and easy solutions to the complex security di
mension in the context of religious extremism. There is no easy pick on the tabl
e and Pakistani society has to make some tough decisions about benefits and risk
s of various approaches. Current judicial system is unable to handle the rapidly
rising menace of extremism and there is an urgent need for frank and informed d
ebate about special antiterrorism court set up with adequate individual protecti
ons to try these cases. Pakistan’s recent experience should be an eye opener. Ju
dges have been reluctant to sit on benches which try extremists. No witness is w
illing to come forward to record the statement against the culprits for fear of
his own life. Even lawyers and judges have been assassinated, making normal judi
cial process unworkable. Under such trying circumstances what kind of justice ca
n be delivered is anybody’s guess. Some mechanism needs to be worked out where t
errorism cases are processed through judicial system giving reasonably fair tria
l to the accused. In the absence of a holistic approach, it is likely that crime
s committed by extremists under religious banner will get a similar response. On
part of government, it will be very tempting to embark on extra-judicial killin
gs. The argument in favor of this approach will be that normal criminal and judi
cial principles do not apply to extremists and after appropriate intelligence th
ese criminals should be put to sleep quietly without any fanfare. On the other e
nd of the spectrum, if state is unable to control law and order, then it is like
ly that some will take law in their own hands. We may see emergence of small gro
ups who may take the page from the book of religious extremists and start to ass
assinate leaders and rank and file of extremist groups. It will be very tempting
for the government to support such groups to avoid using large number of securi
ty forces. Few months ago, in South Waziristan, a local group under the leadersh
ip of Mullah Nazir Ahmad killed large number of Uzbek militants. Recently, some
Afghan Taliban commanders and foreign militants crossing over from Afghanistan i
nto Pakistan have been killed by unidentified gunmen in Baluchistan province. Th
ere will be increase in such killings of rank and file and leaders of militant g
roups. Those who decide to take arms against militants in tribal areas will link
with Pakistani authorities and build relationship across the border with Afghan
government and U.S. military and intelligence assets. It is also inevitable tha
t militant groups will fracture on issues of ideology, resources and operations.
These internecine battles will dramatically increase the scope of violence and
further add to the complexity. Recent example of arrest of suicide operators sen
t from Bajawar to Waziristan to assassinate Mullah Nazir Ahmad point towards thi
s phenomenon. The culprits are held by Nazir’s followers and being interrogated.
In earlier battles between local militants loyal to Mullah Nazir and Uzbeks, so
me local small armed bands sided with Nazir while others with Uzbeks. However wh
en the tide turned in favor of Nazir, many of them abandoned Uzbeks. These small
commanders are now in reconciliation process with Nazir. In coming years, espec
ially in tribal areas, the one who will carry the longest knife and fattest purs
e will turn the tide in his favor. A number of religio-political parties such as
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI) and Jamiat-e-Ulema Pakistan (J
UP) participate in political process of the country, contesting elections and se
rving in provincial and federal assemblies and cabinets. They use these position
s for political and economic gains. It is likely that the clash between these re
ligio-political parties and militant groups will follow the Afghanistan and Iraq
patterns. The gulf between orthodox clerics of various denominations and extrem
ist militant fringe will widen. The fight over control of disciples, mosques, ma
drassahs and economic resources will not be non-violent. Recently, the house of
leader of his own faction of JUI Maulana Fazlur Rahman in Dera Ismail Khan was a
ttacked and enraged students of Lal Masjid threw out the JI delegation not allow
ing them even to pray in the mosque. These are early signs of the coming conflic
t between orthodox clerics and neo-Taliban. Religio-political parties will also
see fragmentation of their own ranks where more radical elements will break rank
s and link up with militant groups. Second and third tier leadership of these pa
rties will try to increase their influence by playing on both sides of the fence
. Recently, wanted militant Abdullah Mahsud was killed in the house of local JUI
leader Shaikh Ayub Mandokhel in the city of Zhob in Baluchistan. This event has
led to internal blame game among the provincial leadership of JUI. We may see m
ore of this cycle of suspicion, accusation and blame in coming days. Militant ou
tfits are seething with anger against clerics who are benefiting from present ar
rangement. If extremists decide to strike against religio-political parties then
their first target will be Fazlur Rahman group of JUI followed by Barelvi outfi
t JUP. The most damaging long term effect from the incident was a sense of fear
and helplessness among general population. Pakistanis are now openly questioning
the very viability of the state and the danger of anarchy, fragmentation and ci
vil war is clear and present. Rise of religious extremism has unnerved every Pak
istani but the most damaging effect has been on minorities and Muslim sects who
are not part of the majority. This has severely weakened the national bond and s
maller units of identity based on sect are on the rise. Militants involved in se
ctarian conflict rotate through various Jihadi organizations to avoid capture. I
f law and order situation is not controlled in a reasonable time period, it is i
nevitable that nonMuslims, Shia and other Sunni groups such as Barelvi school of
thought will decide to arm themselves for self protection. There is a real thre
at of emergence of these sect based militias and geographic shifts in communitie
s all around the country. In such an atmosphere, even a small incident can ignit
e large scale violence. Kurram and Orakzai tribal agencies have seen such kind o
f sectarian violence. If religiously motivated violence escalates, then other gr
oups such as tribes and ethnic groups will also arm themselves and violence will
become multi-faceted. This is what exactly happened in Afghanistan about two de
cades ago and now happening in front of our eyes in Iraq. In the regional and in
ternational context, large scale violence in the heart of the country’s capital
alarmed everyone interested in Pakistan. So far, Washington’s interest in Pakist
an’s border region has been limited to its relevance in the context of Afghanist
an. However, recent intelligence reports from U.S. raised the fear of possibilit
y of attacks on U.S. soil from
extremists entrenched along Pakistan-Afghanistan border and this has added anoth
er element to the dynamics of relations between Pakistan and U.S. In efforts aga
inst non-state actors, despite differences it is the cooperation between countri
es which will counter the threat effectively. Blaming each other causes more fri
ction and less cooperation between security agencies thus allowing more room of
maneuverability for the non-state actors. Surely, many policies of U.S. have sim
ply added fuel to the fire of extremism but Pakistan has no control over how oth
ers will act. It needs to act to secure its national interests and every sane Pa
kistani agrees that ‘loose canons’ of any kind pursuing their own agendas at the
expense of the country are a recipe for disaster. It is clear that any direct a
ction by U.S. on Pakistani soil will exacerbate the situation but if Washington
concludes that extremists are gaining strength and their links with alQaeda are
growing then Pakistan should prepare itself for direct overt or covert action by
U.S. from its Afghanistan bases. In action against non-state actors, best resul
ts are achieved by cooperation of states. These battles will be won only by invi
sible forces and by actions which will never be publicized. Traditional military
tactics and beating of war drums will not curtail this trend. If such crucial d
ecisions become hostage to political rhetoric then nation states: big and small
will pay a heavy price. The mosque incident may be just an aberration and may no
t have any long term negative effects but the message it sent to the outside wor
ld was shocking. It affected Pakistan on both the security and economic front. O
n security front, world is now paying close attention to the nuclear and missile
arsenal of Pakistan in the context of internal conflict. On economic front, man
y foreign entities cancelled projects and a number of foreign experts including
citizens of Pakistan’s close ally China left the country. This will have a negat
ive impact on future direct and indirect investments in Pakistan. Pakistanis wer
e busy in the blame game and trying to get political mileage from a sad situatio
n and nobody cared to send a reassuring signal to the outside world. The result
of this utter lack of responsible and mature attitude is that even Pakistan’s ge
nuine friends are now worried about ‘loose nukes and long range missiles’ slippi
ng out of Pakistan. In the context of previous allegations of nuclear proliferat
ion and rise of religious extremism with its attendant death cults, now even Pak
istan’s friends are thinking about contingency plans of securing Pakistan’s ‘cro
wn jewels’. Whether right or wrong, the credibility of Pakistan as a nation stat
e is very low on all international forums and sending a Lieutenant Colonel from
Strategic Planning Division (the department of Pakistan army controlling nuclear
and missile forces) to assure the world that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are in
safe hands is simply not cutting the ice. Pakistan may not care what others thin
k or may consider their views biased but they have to do some soul searching. Th
ey need to make decisions which they think are best for their country. However,
they should be prepared to face the consequences of their decisions. No country
can live in isolation and regional and international competition and conflicts i
mpact on what choices one makes. The violent incident in Islamabad mosque result
ed in deaths of many including soldiers of Pakistani security forces. Whatever i
s the ideology and motives of the people who have embarked on a violent ‘interna
l Jihad’, the irony is that no adversary could have done what they have achieved
by shaking the very foundations of the state of Pakistan and setting the stage
for a possible civil war. It is prudent for Pakistanis to remember that the civi
l war of Afghanistan after the departure of Soviet troops was fought under the n
ame of religion and Jihad. All groups had the word ‘Islami’ in their titles and
they killed and maimed their own so called brothers and sisters of religious fra
ternity in a methodical way without any moral ambiguity. The blowback of Jihad f
or Pakistan has been a nightmare and now reached a stage where it is truly threa
tening the viability of the state itself. Those who think that the threat is exa
ggerated; they only need to look at Afghanistan and Iraq and draw their own conc
lusions. Internal conflicts don’t pop up overnight. They evolve through various
stages and internal and external factors impact on what direction a particular c
onflict takes. Up to a certain stage, fault lines can be bridged but after cross
ing a certain threshold, reconciliation and peaceful coexistence can be very dif
ficult if not impossible. Pakistan’s own experience of separation of eastern win
g in 1971 provides some insight into such painful scenarios. The crisis and its
immediate aftermath of a string of suicide bombings against security forces and
ordinary citizens have raised some serious questions about the nature of interna
l conflict in the country. There are some difficult times ahead for Pakistan and
some tough choices need to be made. Government, political parties, clerics, rel
igious institutions, intelligentsia and civil society in general need to serious
ly look at core issues threatening the viability of the state. Minimum consensus
about how to tackle religious extremism in a holistic way is the need of the ho
ur. Pakistanis will need patience, tolerance and wisdom to come out of the curre
nt crisis with minimum damage to the society.
Vol. 5, Number 9 April 23, 2006 Bill Roggio Taleban Consolidate Power in Pakista
n Tribal Zone
[Note: some Pakistani tribals have taken the name "Taliban", the same as the Pak
istan-created and trained Afghan militia. They deny Afghan insurgents are amongs
t them, but say if the Afghans were to ask for shelter they would provide it. As
such their denials are pointless. It is difficult for outsiders to tell who are
the Pakistani Taliban and who are the Afghan; its not clear the distinction has
any significance, as they espouse identical values. Editor] Yesterday s rocket
attack on the U.S. Embassy and NATO s International Security Assistance Force co
mpound in Kabul, Afghanistan highlights the increased level of violence througho
ut the country. Coalition and Afghan troop have seen a marked increase in suicid
e bombings, IED (roadside bombing) attacks and platoon and company-sized attacks
from Taliban fighters over the past year. The Taliban s latest springtime offen
sive is now in full swing. In the latest attempt to stem the violence, Coalition
and Afghan troops launched Operation Mountain Lion in the Pech River Valley in
Kunar Province, which borders Pakistan s Bajaur agency. Over forty Taliban were
killed during the operation. The Pakistani Army reportedly has deployed paramili
tary troops "along the border stretching from Dir Lower to Dir Upper and Chitral
districts" to halt the flow of Taliban across the border during the operation.
The Bajaur tribal agency hosts al-Qaeda and Taliban infiltration routes into Afg
hanistan. The agency is also the scene of air strikes in the village of Damadola
, where U.S. Predator drones struck at a meeting of al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders
. Ayman al-Zawahiri was thought to be in attendance but missed the dinner. Five
senior commanders, including Abu Khabab al-Masri, the head of al-Qaeda WMD commi
ttee are believed to have been killed in the strike. A segment of the violence c
an be attributed to Coalition and Afghan Army s push into previously uncharted t
erritories within Kandahar, Urguzan, Kunar and Helmand Provinces. The Coalition
and Afghan forces are now making contact with the enemy. The Taliban are attempt
ing to fracture the Coalition, and believe they can run up the body count and fo
rce the Canadians to withdraw. "We think that when we kill enough Canadians, the
y will quit war and return home," said Taliban spokesman Qari Yuosaf Ahmedi. The
narcotics trade is also a major source of conflict, as Robert Charles noted las
t January. The drug lords are finding common cause with the Taliban as the Coali
tion and Afghan government seek to eradicate the poppy crops. But the increased
violence and regeneration of the Taliban in Afghanistan cannot be viewed as a st
rictly Afghan problem. The Taliban is reconstituting in Pakistan s lawless North
West Frontier Province. The Taliban have been massing in large formations and h
ave essentially taken control of the North and South Waziristan agencies, while
consolidating power in the Tank, Khyber and Peshawar agencies. The Pakistani Arm
y is essentially confined to the two garrisons in Miranshah (North Waziristan) a
nd Wana (South Waziristan). The Taliban has openly declared Shariah law in North
and South Waziristan and usurped power from the local tribes. Two tribesmen hav
e been beheaded, Zarqawi-style, for "working as US spies." Eight Pakistani param
ilitary troops were killed and twenty-two wounded in an ambush near Miranshah, a
nd eight miscreants [Taliban/al-Qaeda] were killed in the ensuing firefight. T
he Pakistani Army has been conducting air strikes against al-Qaeda and Taliban c
amps, and has claimed the Taliban and al-Qaeda have taken heavy casualties. Whil
e these accounts are likely true, Pakistan has gone to great lengths to hide the
ir own casualties. Pakistan s Daily Times indicates "Taliban forces have so far
killed 150 pro-government tribal Maliks in the North and South Waziristan Agenci
es and are openly challenging the writ of the government by engaging a number of
security forces personnel in the area." A source supposedly privy to a high lev
el Cabinet meeting also indicates "the Talibnisation of Waziristan was damaging
other parts of the NWFP and that the local Maliks and political administration h
ad been limited to their houses and offices..." The Taliban s sphere of influenc
e has expanded to [the tribal agencies of] DI Khan [Dera Ismail Khan], Tank and
the Khyber Agency, where clerks of the area have started to join them. There has
been a sharp increase in attacks on heavily-defended military targets in these
areas as well, according to Pakistani Interior Minister Aftab Khan Sherpao. Stev
en Emerson aptly explained the status of Pakistan in the Global War on Terror, "
[Pakistan] is both an ally and it s an "anti-ally," so to speak. It has been hel
pful. It s also been detrimental." The Taliban s consolidation of power in the t
ribal belt is a major detriment, and a problem the Musharraf government can no l
onger ignore.
April 19, 2006 A.H. Amin Pakistan Army Promotions
Last week three corps commander of the Pakistan Army retired and two directors-g
eneral of the Inter Services Intelligence were replaced, presumably because they
had reached retirement age. Six major generals were promoted to 3-star rank. Th
ese were: MajorGeneral Ahsan Azhar Hayat, Maj-Gen Nadeem Ahmed, Maj-Gen Sajjad A
kram, Maj-Gen Mohammad Zaki, Maj-Gen Sikander Afzal and Maj-Gen Ijaz Ahmed Bakhs
hi. Maj-Gen Ahsan Azhar Hayat has been promoted and appointed as the Corps Comma
nder, Karachi. He belongs to Hayat Family of Wah famous or infamous for services
to British from 1849 till 1947 . This makes him a good US son . Westernized , a
nti Mullah , commissioned in 19 Lancers and commanded 5 Corps Reserve Karachi. A
mbitious man who will send Musharraf packing if he is made Vice Chief after pres
ent VCOAS Ahsan Saleem Hayat retires in 2007 . Could be on JK list as brother ar
mored corps officer for replacement of Musharraf constituted in Washington D.C .
Will be good US tactical garbage collector in Pakistan and a useful auxiliary a
s dog catcher of USA. Maj-Gen Sajjad Akram, who was serving as the director-gene
ral of the National Accountability Bureau in Lahore, has been appointed Corps Co
mmander, Mangla. He is a Jat from Gujrat . Nephew of Maj Gen Imtiaz last militar
y secretary of Prime Minister Z.A Bhutto overthrown by military junta in July 19
77 on US instigation. Professionally probably the best officer in Pakistan Army.
A man of strong dislikes and likes , extremely ambitious, with a very oversized
ego . Extremely driving and tough in his command. As a platoon commander he was
known to be obsessed with a cadet and his platoon . A chronic bachelor till he
married the daughter of Col Khattak a Saghri Pashtun from Chhab village in Attoc
k. Commissioned in the crack regiment 11 Baloch which was complemented for outst
anding valor by Gen Von Lettow Vorbeck in First World War in East Africa, the ol
d 129 Balochis, and the Victor of Pandu in 1947-48 Kashmir War , Sajjad Akram is
no ordinary general. How he survived the pedantic system is hard to decipher, b
ut he did . Extremely ambitious and " President Material" Sajjad may be an ideal
choice to replace Musharraf . If I have to choose a capable army chief for the
Punjabi Pakistan Army , I would cast my vote for Sajjad , although as a cadet at
the military academy I was at loggerheads with him while he was a platoon comma
nder .Bad for Balochistan and fine political crisis Sajjad is rash and a bit arb
itrary at times. Must be the top notch candidate for VCOAS unless JK favors his
brother cavalry officer Ahsan Azhar Hayat, the more flashy, show piece type sold
ier. Maj-Gen Nadeem Ahmed will continue as Deputy Chairman ERRA. Not much to wri
te about. Maj-Gen Mohammad Zaki, a director-general of the ISI, has been appoint
ed Director-General, Infantry, at the General Headquarters. No match to the top
two VCOAS candidates . Musharraf may favor him for his docility but the decision
may not be in Musharraf s hands. Maj-Gen Sikander Afzal, who is at present serv
ing as director-general of the ISI, has been appointed Corps Commander, Multan.
Armored corps officer of median type. Does not have the fire drive and energy of
Sajjad Akram. Maj-Gen Ijaz Ahmed Bakhshi will continue serving as the Director-
General Weapons and Equipment at the General Headquarters. Not much to write abo
ut. Maj-Gen Bakhshi has also been the director-general of NAB in Karachi. Lieut-
Gen Syed Athar Ali, at present Corps Commander, Karachi, has been posted as the
director-general of Joint Staff at the Joint Staff Headquarters. Good officer wi
th a mild demeanor. May be Musharraf s choice as is mild and docile and a fellow
Urdu Speaking officer. His Shia sect origin may prove to be a disqualification
for the VCOAS slot in 2007 Lieut-Gen Syed Sabahat Ali, at present Corps Commande
r, Multan, has been appointed as chairman of the Pakistan Ordinance Factory, Wah
Board. A Westernised fine officer from 2 FF Guides. He took care not to use the
name Naqvi with his name. A Naqvi Syed of Persian speaking origin from Peshawar
. His Shia sect disqualified him from VCOAS slot and Pakistan Ordnance Factories
Group is a nice place to enjoy corporate life for a sidelined lt.- general. It
may be noted that Lt Gen Syed Amjad was not promoted to VCOAS in 2004 because de
spite being the finest professional in Pakistan Army he was a Shia by sect.