No.

_________
================================================================

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

-----------------------------------------------------------------STEPHEN D. CHAMBERLAIN,
Petitioner,
v.
PAUL F. HARRIS, JR.,
Respondent.
-----------------------------------------------------------------On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Fourth Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
-----------------------------------------------------------------STEPHEN D. CHAMBERLAIN
Pro Se Litigant

================================================================

i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
The United States District Court for the District
of Maryland, dismissed a fee-paid 42 U.S.C. 1983
complaint, sua sponte, having determined no relief
could be granted based on the concept of absolute
judicial immunity. The District Court further determined it did not have jurisdiction to consider the
complaint because the alleged constitutional violations occurred in a post-divorce declaratory judgment
action. A panel on the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed these determinations and a Rehearing En Banc was subsequently denied.
The questions presented are:
Does absolute judicial immunity apply when
a judge acts in the clear absence of jurisdiction?
Do certain classes of litigation provide sanctuary for the violation of Constitutional
rights?
Did the Federal District Court in this case
abuse its discretion by dismissing, sua
sponte, the well-pleaded, fee-paid complaint?

ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ................................

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................

iv

OPINIONS BELOW.............................................

JURISDICTION ...................................................

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS ........................................

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..............................

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ....

I.

II.

III.

JUDGES WHO ACT IN THE CLEAR

ABSENCE OF JURISDICTION ARE
NOT AFFORDED ABSOLUTE JUDICIAL IMMUNITY ......................................

NO SANCTUARY EXISTS FOR THE

VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS .....................................................

THE SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL OF THIS

WELL-PLEADED, FEE-PAID COMPLAINT
WAS CLEAR ERROR ................................ 16

CONCLUSION..................................................... 23
APPENDIX
Unpublished United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit per curiam Decision
affirming District Court Order of Dismissal,
filed October 19, 2015 ...................................... App. 1
Judgment, United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit, filed October 19, 2015 ...... App. 3

iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS Continued
Page
United States District Court for the District of
Maryland Order of Dismissal, filed June 8,
2015 .................................................................. App. 4
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit Order denying Petition for Rehearing
En Banc dated December 1, 2015.................... App. 7
Petitioners 42 U.S.C. 1983 Complaint ............ App. 8

iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 556 U.S. 662,
173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) .........................................18
Attorney Gen. v. A.A. County School Bus, 286
Md. 324, 407 A.2d 749 (1979) ...................................8
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 66 S. Ct. 773, 90
L. Ed. 939 (1946) .....................................................17
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 127
S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) ... 17, 18, 19, 20
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents,
403 U.S. 388 (1971) .................................................24
Boyds Civic Assn v. Montgomery County, 526
A.2d 598 (Md. 1987) ..................................................8
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 20
L. Ed. 646 (1872) ...............................................6, 7, 8
Brandon v. District of Columbia Board of
Parole, 236 U.S. App. D. C. 155, 734 F.2d 56
(1984) .......................................................................19
Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989) ..........17
Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir. 1980) ..............6
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) .......................6
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S. Ct.
472, 84 L. Ed. 716 (1940) ........................................25
Chu By Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79 (4th Cir.
1985) ..........................................................................6
Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985) ..................6

v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Continued
Page
Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244 (1996) ........................8
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2
L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957) ............................................18, 20
Davani v. Virginia Dept of Transp., 434 F.3d
712 (4th Cir. 2006) ............................................14, 15
Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980) ...........................6
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) .................................12, 14
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) ........................24
Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Industries Corp.,
544 U.S. 280 (2005) ...........................................13, 14
Floyd v. Barker, 12 Coke 23, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305
(1608) .........................................................................6
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988) ...................6, 7
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct.
792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963) .....................................25
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S. Ct. 585,
100 L. Ed. 891 (1956) ..............................................25
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 104
S. Ct. 2229, 81 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1984) .........................20
H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.,
492 U.S. 229, 109 S. Ct. 2893, 106 L. Ed. 2d
195 (1989) ................................................................20
Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of Elections, 422
F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2005) ..............................................14
Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994) ..............13

vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Continued
Page
Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) ........24
King v. Myers, 973 F.2d 354 (4th Cir. 1992) ................6
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation
Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976)..........................................24
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 112 S. Ct. 286, 116
L. Ed. 2d 9 (1991) ..................................................6, 7
National Organization for Women, Inc. v.
Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 114 S. Ct. 798, 127
L. Ed. 2d 99 (1994) ..................................................20
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S. Ct.
1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989) ............. 17, 19, 21, 24
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 106 S. Ct.
2932, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1986) .................................20
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987) ..........12
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) .............................6
Pressly v. Gregory, 831 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1987)..........6
Raftery v. Scott, 756 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1985) ............10
Reyes v. Prince Georges County, 281 Md. 279,
380 A.2d 12 (1977).....................................................8
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413
(1923) .................................................................13, 14
Sanjuan v. American Bd. of Psychiatry and
Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247 (7th Cir. 1994) ...........20
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S. Ct.
1683, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1974) .............................18, 21
Stevenson v. Lanham, 127 Md. App. 597 (1999)..........8

vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Continued
Page
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) ...............6, 7
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506,
122 S. Ct. 992, 152 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2002) ..............20, 21
The Fair v. Kohler Die Co., 228 U.S. 22 (1913) .........15
Tingler v. Marshall, 716 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir.
1983) ........................................................................22
Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv. Commn of Md.,
535 U.S. 635 (2002) .................................................13
Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832 (4th
Cir. 1982) ........................................................... 10, 11
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S. Ct. 1064,
30 L. Ed. 220 (1886) ................................................24
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
28 U.S.C. 1254(1) .......................................................1
28 U.S.C. 1331 ................................................. passim
28 U.S.C. 1332(a)(1) ....................................... 3, 11, 18
28 U.S.C. 1343(a)(3) ........................... 3, 11, 12, 15, 18
42 U.S.C. 1983 ................................................. passim
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ..................................................18
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) ..........................................16, 23
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ........................................ passim
U.S. Const. amend. XIV .....................................2, 4, 10

viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Continued
Page
OTHER CITATIONS
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Rooker-Feldman: Worth
Only the Powder to Blow It Up?, 74 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1081 (1999) ....................................13
Allison B. Jones, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine:
What Does It Really Mean To Be Inextricably
Intertwined, DUKE LAW JOURNAL, Vol.
56:643 (2006) ...........................................................14
5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004) .........21
F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, The Business of
the Supreme Court: A Study in the Federal
Judicial System 65 (1927) .......................................10

1
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
On June 8, 2015, the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland dismissed, sua
sponte, a fee-paid lawsuit filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
1983. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the dismissal on appeal and denied a petition for
rehearing en banc. Petitioner Stephen D. Chamberlain respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to
review this decision.
------------------------------------------------------------------

OPINIONS BELOW
The June 8, 2015 Order of the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland is printed
in full text at Pet. App. 4. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuits affirmation of the
District Courts Order on October 19, 2015 can be
found at Pet. App. 1. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuits denial of the Petitioners request for Rehearing En Banc on December
1, 2015 can be found at Pet. App. 7.
------------------------------------------------------------------

JURISDICTION
The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit denied the Petitioners request for
Rehearing En Banc on December 1, 2015. This Petition has been timely filed and this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
------------------------------------------------------------------

2
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
1.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution provides in
relevant part: No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

2.

42 U.S.C. 1983 Every person who,

under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress, except that in any action
brought against a judicial officer for an
act or omission taken in such officers
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall
not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief
was unavailable. For the purposes of
this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a
statute of the District of Columbia.
------------------------------------------------------------------

3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 fee-paid complaint in a United States Federal District Court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331, 28 U.S.C. 1332(a)(1),
and 28 U.S.C. 1343(a)(3). The pro se complaint was
for money damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983,
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, and under federal law and state law,
against Paul F. Harris, Jr., a Circuit Court Judge in
Anne Arundel County, Maryland, in his individual
capacity.
The complaint acknowledged the general rule of
absolute judicial immunity, clearly articulated the
case involved one of the long held exceptions to that
general rule, and provided a clear basis for the District Courts jurisdiction:
Maryland Circuit Courts have no statutory
authority or jurisdiction to hear moot cases.
Jurisdiction to hear moot cases has been conferred exclusively on appellate courts in
Maryland. Both parties to the case in the
Anne Arundel County Circuit Court had declared the only issue before the Court to be
moot in formal motions filed before the hearing. The Plaintiff proved the only issue
before the Court was moot at the commencement of the hearing. Yet the Defendant
willfully and deliberately acted under the
color of law, and in the clear absence of jurisdiction, to force the Plaintiff to stand trial for
an action without a live controversy. This

4
action directly violated rights protected under the United States Constitution and
caused special and general injury to the
Plaintiff for which damages are sought.
Judicial immunity, under the circumstances
of this case as will be proven at trial, is not
applicable. Judicial acts taken in the clear
absence of jurisdiction are not protected
acts.
Defendant acted in his individual capacity
under the color of law to deprive the Plaintiff
of certain constitutionally protected rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States including,
but not limited to: (a) the right to due process, and (b) the right to equal protection
under the law.
. . . the Defendant acted under the color of
law and deprived the Plaintiff of his liberty
interests by holding the Plaintiff for trial in
the clear face of an absolute lack of jurisdiction.
The District Court stated it dismissed the case
sua sponte for two reasons. First, the District Court
determined the defendant, a Maryland State Circuit
Court Judge, was afforded absolute judicial immunity.
Second, because the alleged constitutional violations
occurred in a post-divorce declaratory judgment
action, the District Court determined it did not have
jurisdiction over the matter.

5
Petitioner filed a timely appeal with the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit alleging the District Court clearly had jurisdiction over the
case, and the Court had the authority to provide
relief. A three judge panel issued an unpublished per
curiam decision affirming the legal reasoning for the
sua sponte dismissal of the complaint by the District
Court. Petitioner requested a Rehearing En Banc
which was subsequently denied. It is important to
note, the petition for Rehearing En Banc was circulated to the full court yet no single judge requested a
poll under Fed. R. App. P. 35.
------------------------------------------------------------------

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

Federal District Courts and Federal Courts of
Appeals are bound by federal law, the United States
Constitution, and the decisions of this Court. When
errors of law are made at the District level, appellate
review affords a remedy to those errors. When an
appellate panel affirms the decision of a lower federal
court which clearly contravenes the decisions of its
own circuit, every other federal circuit, and the
decisions of this Court, a Rehearing En Banc is
justified. When a federal appellate court unanimously
denies a petition to review such egregious and facially
erroneous determinations of law, its conduct has so
far departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure

6
by a lower court,1 it militates the exercise of this
Courts supervisory power.
I.

JUDGES WHO ACT IN THE CLEAR ABSENCE OF JURISDICTION ARE NOT AFFORDED ABSOLUTE JUDICIAL IMMUNITY

An exhaustive and unbroken string of decisions

in this Court, and within the Fourth Circuit, stipulate
specific exceptions to the general rule that judges
enjoy absolute immunity. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9,
112 S. Ct. 286, 116 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1991); Forrester v.
White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474
U.S. 193 (1985); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980);
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547 (1967); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
335, 20 L. Ed. 646 (1872); King v. Myers, 973 F.2d 354
(4th Cir. 1992); Pressly v. Gregory, 831 F.2d 514 (4th
Cir. 1987); Chu By Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79 (4th
Cir. 1985); Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir.
1980). Every other federal circuit has an equally long
list of unwavering decisions which itemize the exceptions to the general rule regarding absolute judicial
immunity.
The immunity of a judge for acts within his
jurisdiction has roots extending to the earliest days of
common law. See Floyd v. Barker, 12 Coke 23, 77 Eng.
1

2013.

Rules of the Supreme Court, Rule 10(a), adopted April 19,

7
Rep. 1305 (1608). The Supreme Court accepted the
rule of judicial immunity in Bradley v. Fisher, 13
Wall. 335 (1872), however this case and others make
clear that immunity can be overcome by two sets of
circumstances. First, a judge is not immune from
liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken
in the judges judicial capacity. Mireles v. Waco, 502
U.S. 9, 112 S. Ct. 286, 116 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1991); Forrester
v. White, 484 U.S. 227-229 (1988); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 360 (1978); Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall.,
at 351 (1872). Second, a judge is not immune for
actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502
U.S. 9, 112 S. Ct. 286, 116 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1991); Bradley
v. Fisher, 13 Wall. at 351 (1872).
The Bradley Court provided a clear distinction
between acting in excess of jurisdiction and acting
in the clear absence of jurisdiction:
A distinction must be here observed between excess of jurisdiction and the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subjectmatter. Where there is clearly no jurisdiction
over the subject-matter any authority exercised is a usurped authority, and for the exercise of such authority, when the want of
jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse
is permissible.
The instant complaint clearly outlined facts
which showed the only issue before the circuit court
was moot, the judge was aware of these facts, and yet
proceeded to act in the clear absence of jurisdiction.

8
It has been settled law for nearly 4 decades that
Circuit Courts in Maryland have absolutely no jurisdiction to hear moot cases. See Stevenson v. Lanham,
736 A.2d 363 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999); Coburn v.
Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 250 (1996); Boyds Civic Assn v.
Montgomery County, 526 A.2d 598, 609 (Md. 1987);
Attorney General v. Anne Arundel County Sch. Bus
Contractors Assn, 286 Md. 324 (1979); Reyes v. Prince
Georges County, 281 Md. 279, 380 A.2d 12, 297
(1977). The District Court, and the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals, apparently overlooked the explicit
factual allegations in the complaint concerning actions taken by the Defendant in the clear absence of
jurisdiction which left no room for the District Court
to suggest, much less determine, the general rule
concerning judicial immunity was applicable to this
case. The complaint alleged, with clarity and specificity, that absolute immunity did not apply if the judge
acted in the clear absence of jurisdiction. It cited longstanding Maryland law that described moot cases as
a class of case its Circuit Courts did not have subject
matter jurisdiction to consider, and that exclusive
jurisdiction to hear moot cases is conferred exclusively to appellate courts in the state. The District Courts
sua sponte determination that absolute judicial
immunity exists under the circumstances presented,
and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmation
of that determination, is in direct conflict with this
Courts ruling in Bradley v. Fisher, as well as the
unwavering string of cases in the subsequent 140
years which make it settled law that judicial actions
taken in the clear absence of jurisdiction are not

9
protected acts. The sua sponte dismissal by the District Court on the basis of absolute judicial immunity
is erroneous.
II.

NO SANCTUARY EXISTS FOR THE VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

The second justification the District Court provided for its summary dismissal of the 42 U.S.C.
1983 complaint was that the merits of the decisions
made regarding the . . . divorce proceedings are
inextricably intertwined with every claim asserted
in the complaint, such review by this court is not
permitted, that [d]omestic relations cases may not
be heard by this Court, and that this court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction to resolve the case. Unfortunately, the District Court and the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals completely mischaracterized the
nature of the complaint and the relationship between
the Plaintiff and the Defendant. The District Court
further misapprehended the Rooker-Feldman derived
inextricably intertwined argument which has no
applicability whatsoever to this complaint. Jurisdiction over the subject matter in this case is facially
apparent.
The complaint filed was a complaint between
Stephen D. Chamberlain, a citizen of Colorado, and
Paul F. Harris, Jr., a Circuit Court Judge (acting in
his individual capacity) who is a resident of Maryland. The complaint specifically alleged Judge Harris
acted under the color of law, in the clear absence of

10
jurisdiction, and deprived Mr. Chamberlain of rights
guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Mr.
Chamberlain sought monetary damages for these
actions. This case cannot be classified as a domestic
relations case.
The District Court cited Raftery v. Scott, 756 F.2d
335, 343 (4th Cir. 1985), summarizing that domestic
relations exceptions to federal courts jurisdiction [is]
based on [the] idea that [a] state has a stronger more
direct interest. While the state may indeed have a
stronger interest in a domestic relations case, the
state clearly does not have a stronger interest in the
violation of federal statutes and the United States
Constitution than does a federal court. This is a case
which singularly seeks the enforcement of rights
secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. It is inarguable that federal
questions and the vindication of federal rights can be
brought before a federal tribunal. As the Honorable
Felix Frankfurter and his former student James
Landis wrote in 1927, while the duty of the federal
courts to adjudicate and protect federal constitutional
rights is shared with state courts, there can be no
doubt that the federal courts are the primary and
powerful reliances for vindicating every right given
by the Constitution, the laws and treaties of the
United States. F. Frankfurter & J. Landis. The
Business of the Supreme Court: A Study in the Federal Judicial System 65 (1927).
The district court also pointed to Wasserman v.
Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1982) to justify its

11
assertion it had no jurisdiction. Wasserman has no
applicability to the instant case as this case does not
involve using diversity jurisdiction to . . . grant
divorces, determine alimony or support obligations or
decide child custody rights.
Subject matter jurisdiction for this complaint is
provided by 28 U.S.C. 1331:
Federal question The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
Subject matter jurisdiction for this complaint is
further provided by 28 U.S.C. 1332(a)(1):
Diversity of citizenship; amount in controversy; costs (a) The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the
sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest
and costs, and is between: (1) citizens of different States.
Additionally, subject matter jurisdiction is provided
by 28 U.S.C. 1343(a)(3):
Civil rights and elective franchise (a) The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action authorized by law to be
commenced by any person: (3) To redress the
deprivation, under color of any State law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity
secured by the Constitution of the United

12
States or by any Act of Congress providing
for equal rights of citizens or of all persons
within the jurisdiction of the United States.
The district courts re-classification of this action
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 as a domestic
relations matter must be rejected. Nothing in the
complaint is intertwined, either inextricably or
even tangentially to the merits of the underlying
action. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The complaint does
not involve a domestic issue, nor does it seek review
of the merits of any decision in the state court. This is
a federal question, brought forward as a result of
alleged constitutional violations by a state actor
acting under the color of law. Neither 28 U.S.C.
1331 nor 28 U.S.C. 1343(a)(3) can be read to
have carved out a sanctuary in specific types of
underlying litigation to eliminate the application of 42 U.S.C. 1983 as a mechanism for
seeking redress for alleged violations of a litigants constitutional and federal statutory
rights.
Furthermore, the district courts inextricably
intertwined reasoning does not comport with the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and cannot be used as a
basis for denial of jurisdiction over the complaint. The
inextricably interwined inquiry was borne from a
footnote in the Feldman case. In Pennzoil Co. v.
Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 107 (1987), Justice Marshall
expanded on the point by stating:

13
a federal claim is inextricably intertwined
. . . if the federal claim succeeds only to the
extent that the state court wrongly decided
the issues before it.
The inextricably intertwined inquiry, employed to
determine Rooker-Feldman doctrine applicability, has
regularly, and wrongly, been used by the lower courts
to deny federal jurisdiction. (See Thomas D. Rowe,
Jr., Rooker-Feldman: Worth Only the Powder to Blow
It Up?, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1081, 1083 (1999)).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine merely recognizes
that 28 U.S.C. 1331 is a grant of original jurisdiction, and does not authorize district courts to exercise
appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments . . .
Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv. Commn of Md., 535
U.S. 635, 644, n. 3 (2002). Rooker-Feldman bars a
losing party in state court from seeking what in
substance would be appellate review of the state
judgment in a United States district court, based on
the losing partys claim that the state judgment itself
violates the losers federal rights. Exxon Mobile
Corp. v. Saudi Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005)
quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 10051006 (1994) (underline and italics added).
In other words, the doctrine is based on the
principle of federalism, particularly the statutory rule
that lower federal courts do not have subject matter
jurisdiction to review state court judgments.
Notably, this Court has only applied the RookerFeldman doctrine twice: first in Rooker v. Fidelity

14
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and sixty years later
in Feldman. Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic
Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283 (2005). Recently, in
Exxon Mobile, this Court provided clarifying guidance
to the doctrine, restricting Rooker-Feldman to the
narrow ground of the Rooker and Feldman cases, both
of which involved federal plaintiffs calling upon
district courts to overturn an injurious state-court
judgment. The unanimous Court specified four
requirements for invocation of the doctrine: 1) the
case must be brought by a state court loser; 2) the
injury alleged must be caused by the state court
judgment; 3) the judgment must have been rendered
before the district court proceedings commenced; and
4) the case must invite the district court review and
rejection of that judgment. (Allison B. Jones, The
Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: What Does It Really Mean
To Be Inextricably Intertwined, DUKE LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 56:643, (2006), referencing Exxon Mobile
and Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of Elections, 422
F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2005)).
In Davani v. Virginia Dept of Transp., 434 F.3d
712, 713 (4th Cir. 2006), the Fourth Circuit itself held
that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only when
the loser in state court files suit in federal district
court seeking redress for an injury allegedly caused
by the state courts decision itself. That is, Exxon
requires us to examine whether the state-court loser
who files suit in federal district court seeks redress
for an injury caused by the state-court decision itself.

15
If he is not challenging the state court decision, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply. Id. at 718.
The complaint dismissed by the District Court in
this case did not assert injuries caused by the state
court judgment. The alleged injuries were sustained
when a judge acted in the clear absence of jurisdiction
by hearing a case which was facially devoid of a live
controversy and for which he had no authority to
preside over. Secondly, the complaint cannot be read,
nor can it be inferred, to invite the district court
review and rejection of the state-court judgment. As
two of the four requirements for invoking RookerFeldman are not met in this case, the district courts
application of the doctrine and use of the inextricably intertwined inquiry was an error. Seeking a
remedy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of
constitutional rights, for which the district court has
jurisdiction, is wholly separate from an attempt to
seek review of a state-court judgment, which has not
been requested of the District Court in this complaint. Legal reasoning that the claims in this complaint are inextricably intertwined with the merits
of the state court decisions is flawed.
Jurisdiction is the authority conferred by Congress to adjudicate a given type of case. The Fair v.
Kohler Die Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913). Here, 1331
and 1343(a)(3) unquestionably authorize federal courts
to adjudicate all civil actions arising under the constitution, and to redress the deprivation of constitutional rights under the color of law. It is also plain that
the complaint formally and explicitly alleged such a

16
deprivation. The district courts dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction was an error.
III. THE SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL OF THIS
WELL-PLEADED, FEE-PAID COMPLAINT
WAS CLEAR ERROR
This case concerns a well-pleaded, fee-paid
complaint. Though the statutory authority for its sua
sponte dismissal was not clearly stipulated in the
Order, the District Court reasoned dismissal was
appropriate because it determined the complaint
failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted, i.e., the judge enjoys absolute immunity. (Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6)), and, because it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)).
The District Court, however, did indeed have a
cause of action before it for which relief could be
granted. The complaint alleged a judge acted in the
clear absence of jurisdiction to deny rights guaranteed under the Constitution, and provided factual
allegations of the circumstances from which the
complaint arose. This action clearly falls within the
exception to absolute judicial immunity established,
and pointed to, since 1872. If the District Court
questioned whether the allegations as presented
constituted action in excess of jurisdiction rather
than the clear absence of jurisdiction, that question
of both law and fact must be resolved after the parties
have presented their case on the merits.

17
In 1989, this Court reviewed the dismissal of a
42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint which had been dismissed
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and found by a 9-0 vote that
it had, in fact, stated a cognizable claim. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d
338 (1989), referring to Brower v. County of Inyo, 489
U.S. 593 (1989). The circumstances of this case also
demand such review and reversal.
In the instant case, the District Court could not
determine that the complaint failed to state claim for
which relief could be granted without first assuming
jurisdiction to make that determination. It is a question of law whether a complaint adequately states a
cause of action for which relief could be granted. The
determination of such a question must be based on
the merits, and not determined sua sponte before
affording the Plaintiff an opportunity to be heard on
the matter. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66
S. Ct. 773, 776, 90 L. Ed. 939 (1946).2
When ruling on a motion to dismiss, all the
factual allegations in the complaint must be accepted
as being true. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (citing
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, n. 1,
122 S. Ct. 992, 152 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2002); Neitzke v.
2

Jurisdiction . . . is not defeated . . . by the possibility that

the averments might fail to state a cause of action on which
petitioners could actually recover. For it is well settled that the
failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on
the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.

18
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104
L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,
236, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1974)). Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief. Specific facts are not
necessary; the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 550 U.S. 544, 167 L. Ed. 2d
929 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47,
78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957)). Also see Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 556 U.S. 662, 173 L. Ed. 2d
868 (2009). Here, the complaint was well-pleaded,
and the cause of action and how the pleader [was]
entitled to relief was articulated with specificity.
Furthermore, District court jurisdiction, as
clearly laid out in the complaint, is provided by three
statutes: 28 U.S.C. 1331, 1332(a)(1), and 1343(a)(3).
The complaint is a civil action arising under the
Constitution and laws of the United States, the
parties are citizens of different states, and the matter
in controversy exceeds the sum of $75,000.00. The
complaint was filed to redress the deprivation, under
color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity
secured by the Constitution of the United States or by
any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of
citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States. It is inarguable the District Court
had jurisdiction to adjudicate the complaint.

19
It does not appear this Court has previously had
the opportunity to pass judgment on a sua sponte
dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). In Neitzke,
however, the Court clearly stated how lower courts
should proceed when presented with a motion to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6):
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff with an arguable claim is ordinarily accorded notice of
a pending motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim and an opportunity to amend
the complaint before the motion is ruled upon. These procedures alert him to the legal
theory underlying the defendants challenge,
and enable him meaningfully to respond by
opposing the motion to dismiss on legal
grounds or by clarifying his factual allegations so as to conform with the requirements
of a valid legal cause of action. This adversarial process also crystallizes the pertinent
issues and facilitates appellate review of a
trial court dismissal by creating a more complete record of the case. Brandon v. District
of Columbia Board of Parole, 236 U. S. App.
D. C. 155, 158, 734 F. 2d 56, 59 (1984), cert.
denied, 469 U. S. 1127 (1985)
In Bell Atlantic Corp., this Court provided instructive guidance regarding the minimum standard
of adequate pleading to overcome a complaints dismissal:
Once a claim has been stated adequately, it
may be supported by showing any set of
facts consistent with the allegations in the

20
complaint. See Sanjuan v. American Bd. of
Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247,
251 (C.A.7 1994) (once a claim for relief has
been stated, a plaintiff receives the benefit
of imagination, so long as the hypotheses
are consistent with the complaint); accord,
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. at
514, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002); National Organization for Women, Inc. v.
Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 256, 114 S.Ct. 798,
127 L.Ed.2d 99 (1994); H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229,
249-250, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 106 L.Ed.2d 195
(1989); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S.
69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984).
The Bell Atlantic Court provided additional
amplification on the sufficiency of a complaint:
While a complaint attacked by a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, ibid. [Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2
L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)]; Sanjuan v. American Bd.
of Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d
247, 251 (C.A.7 1994), a plaintiffs obligation
to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment]
to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do, see
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106
S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (on a motion to dismiss, courts are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation). Factual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the

21
speculative level, see 5 C. Wright & A. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure 1216, pp.
235-236 (3d ed.2004) (hereinafter Wright &
Miller) ([T]he pleading must contain something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts
that merely creates a suspicion [of ] a legally
cognizable right of action), on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint
are true (even if doubtful in fact), see, e.g.,
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506,
508, n. 1, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed 2d 1
(2002); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989)
(Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance . . .
dismissals based on a judges disbelief of a
complaints factual allegations); Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40
L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (a well-pleaded complaint
may proceed even if it appears that a recovery is very remote and unlikely).
The factual statements in the complaint before
the District Court in this case provided far more than
a suspicion [of ] a legally cognizable right of action.
Substantial initial evidence was clearly provided in
support of the allegations made, the allegations were
more than plausible, and they were directly in line
with precedent found within the Fourth Circuit, those
of every other circuit, and this Court. The averments
in this case fall squarely within one of the settled
exceptions to judicial immunity. The facts as laid out
in the complaint cannot be characterized as being
labels, conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action. The factual allegations

22
in the instant case are more than sufficient to warrant the opportunity to present the merits of the case
before a fair tribunal for adjudication. Both parties to
the underlying proceeding had filed formal motions
explicitly declaring the only issue before the court
to be moot, both sought dismissal, and at the commencement of the trial, the only issue before the
court was proven to be moot. The complaint further
provided citations to Maryland law that showed
Circuit Courts have no jurisdiction to hear moot cases
and jurisdiction to do so has been conferred exclusively on appellate courts in that state.
The most clear and comprehensive rules for
dismissing a complaint sua sponte were articulated
by the 6th Circuit in Tingler v. Marshall, 716 F.2d
1109 (6th Cir. 1983):
Under our supervisory power, we hold that a
district court faced with a complaint which it
believes may be subject to dismissal must:
(1) allow service of the complaint upon the
defendant; (2) notify all parties of its intent
to dismiss the complaint; (3) give the plaintiff a chance to either amend his complaint
or respond to the reasons stated by the district court in its notice of intended sua
sponte dismissal; (4) give the defendant a
chance to respond or file an answer or motions; and (5) if the claim is dismissed, state
its reasons for the dismissal.
The District Courts sua sponte dismissal, and the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmation of that

23
decision, appears to disregard the 6th Circuits prudent guidance. The District Court did not allow
service of the complaint upon the Defendant, provided no notification of its intent to dismiss, did not offer
the Plaintiff an opportunity to amend the complaint
or respond to the concerns of the Court, nor did it give
the Defendant an opportunity to respond by filing an
answer or motion. Instead, the District Court discarded a well-pleaded, fee-paid complaint on its own
accord, in contravention to settled law, supporting
such a decision with facially erroneous legal reasoning.
The District Court reliance on either Rule
12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6) as justification for its sua
sponte dismissal of this complaint cannot be reconciled with settled law. The Plaintiff has a right to
prove his case at trial.
------------------------------------------------------------------

CONCLUSION
The framers of the Constitution understood that
a properly functioning judicial system required a
Supreme Court with authority to intervene, when
necessary, in a supervisory role. When a District
Court, and an entire Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, demonstrates a willingness to deny jurisdiction
it clearly possesses and ignores over a century of
precedent in order to prevent the prosecution of a
lawsuit against a fellow jurist, this Courts intervention is required. The settled exceptions to absolute

24
judicial immunity exist because the dangers in not
affording citizens these very limited exceptions are
palpable and clear.
This case is of extraordinary importance. The
law is the definition and limitation of power. Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 220
(1886). The rationalization cited, and affirmed, for the
sua sponte dismissal of this case demonstrates a
purely personal and arbitrary application of settled
law which would fall under the weight of any cursory
judicial scrutiny by this Court or any impartial jurist.
That such settled law has been ignored by an entire
Federal Circuit is unfathomable, and invoking this
Courts supervisory authority is the Petitioners last
avenue to correct such a fundamental miscarriage of
justice.
Close questions of federal law, including claims
filed pursuant to 42 U. S. C. 1983, have on a number of occasions arisen on motions to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, and have been substantial
enough to warrant this Courts granting review,
under its certiorari jurisdiction, to resolve them.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S. Ct. 1827,
104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989). Also see, e.g., Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); McDonald v. Santa Fe
Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976); Bivens
v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971); Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968). As this case does not involve a close question

25
of federal law, but rather, the overt disregard for it,
this Courts review is warranted.
From the very beginning . . . state and national
constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on
procedural and substantive safeguards designed to
assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which
every defendant stands equal before the law. Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d
799 (1963) (underline added). Both equal protection
and due process emphasize the central aim of our
entire judicial system for all people charged with
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, stand on
an equality before the bar of justice in every American court. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S. Ct.
585, 100 L. Ed. 891 (1956); quoting Chambers v.
Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S. Ct. 472, 84 L. Ed. 716
(1940).
Supervisory authority over a Federal Circuits
decision is rightly invoked when no fair minded jurist
could disagree that those decisions contravene the
precedents of this Court and settled law. The clarity
of the issues can be found in the Complaint itself, the
Order of the District Court, and the affirmation of
that Order by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
No formal briefs or oral arguments are necessary to
demonstrate the need for review. A judge who knowingly acts in the clear absence of jurisdiction is not
protected by the concept of absolute judicial immunity.

26
The Petitioner respectfully prays the Writ of Certiorari is granted.
Respectfully submitted,
STEPHEN D. CHAMBERLAIN
Pro Se Litigant

App. 1
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

No. 15-1710
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

STEPHEN D. CHAMBERLAIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PAUL F. HARRIS, JR.,
Defendant-Appellee.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

District of Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz,
Senior District Judge. (1:15-cv-01476-JFM)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Submitted: October 15, 2015 Decided: October 19, 2015

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and HARRIS, Circuit

Judges.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Stephen D. Chamberlain, Appellant Pro Se.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

App. 2
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in
this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Stephen D. Chamberlain appeals the district
courts order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. 1983
(2012) complaint. We have reviewed the record and
find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the
reasons stated by the district court. Chamberlain v.
Harris, No. 1:15-cv-01476-JFM (D. Md. filed June 8,
2015; entered June 9, 2015). We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED

App. 3
FILED: October 19, 2015
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

No. 15-1710
(1: 15-cv-01476-JFM)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

STEPHEN D. CHAMBERLAIN
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
PAUL F. HARRIS, JR.
Defendant-Appellee
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

JUDGMENT
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

In accordance with the decision of this court, the

judgment of the district court is affirmed.
This judgment shall take effect upon issuance of
this courts mandate in accordance with Fed. R. App.
P. 41.
/s/ PATRICIA S. CONNOR, CLERK

App. 4
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
STEPHEN D. CHAMBERLAIN *
Plaintiff
* Civil Action No.
v.
JFM-15-1476
*
PAUL F. HARRIS, JR.
Defendant
*
***
ORDER
Self-represented plaintiff Stephen D. Chamberlain, a resident of Castle Pines, Colorado, filed this
fee-paid case, seeking money damages from the
Honorable Paul F. Harris, Jr., a judge in the Circuit
Court for Anne Arundel County, Maryland. Plaintiff
alleges that Judge Harris, who is sued in his individual capacity, violated plaintiff s civil rights in connection with divorce proceedings commenced against
1
plaintiff. ECF No. 1.
The defendant is sued for decisions made in the
context of his role as a judge, and the claims against
him must be dismissed as he enjoys absolute immunity. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 226-27 (1988)

See Judith C. Chamberlain vs. Stephen D. Chamberlain,

Case No. 02C09139690, filed March 26, 2009, http://casesearch.
courts.state.md.us/casesearch/inquirySearch.jis. Access to the
Maryland electronic docket is limited; however, it appears the
case is ongoing.

App. 5
(If judges were personally liable for erroneous decisions, the resulting avalanche of suits, most of them
frivolous but vexatious, would provide powerful
incentives for judges to avoid rendering decisions
likely to provoke such suits.). Further, this court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction to resolve the case.
Domestic relations cases may not be heard in this
2
court. See Raftery v. Scott, 756 F. 2d 335, 343 (4th
Cir. 1985) (domestic relations exception to federal
courts jurisdiction based on idea that state has a
stronger more direct interest); Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F. 2d 832 (4th Cir. 1982) (diversity jurisdiction does not include power to grant divorces,
determine alimony or support obligations, or decide
child custody rights). The merits of the decisions
made regarding the Chamberlains divorce proceedings are inextricably intertwined in every claim
asserted in the complaint; such review by this court is
not permitted.
Accordingly, it is this 8th day of June, 2015, by
the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, hereby ORDERED that:

1.

The complaint IS DISMISSED for lack

of jurisdiction;

2.

The Clerk SHALL PROVIDE a copy of

this order to plaintiff; and

The court notes that if plaintiff is aggrieved by the Circuit

Courts decision appellate review may be available.

App. 6
3.

The Clerk SHALL CLOSE this case.

/s/ J Frederick Motz
J. Frederick Motz
United States District Judge

App. 7
FILED: December 1, 2015
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

No. 15-1710
(1: 15-cv-01476-JFM)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

STEPHEN D. CHAMBERLAIN
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
PAUL F. HARRIS, JR.
Defendant-Appellee
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

ORDER
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

The petition for rehearing en banc was circulated

to the full court. No judge requested a poll under Fed.
R. App. P. 35. The court denies the petition for rehearing en banc.
For the Court
/s/ Patricia S. Connor, Clerk

App. 8
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Stephen D. Chamberlain

*
*
*

Plaintiff
vs.
Paul F. Harris, Jr.
Anne Arundel County
Circuit Court
8 Church Circle
Annapolis, MD 21404
410-222-1397
*

Civil No.: ________

Jury Trial
Demanded

*
*
*

Defendant
*

COMPLAINT
Comes the Plaintiff and for cause of action would
state as follows:
I.

INTRODUCTION

This is an action for money damages pursuant to

42 U.S.C. 1983, the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, and under federal law
and state law, against Paul F. Harris, Jr., a Circuit
Court Judge in Anne Arundel County, Maryland, in
his individual capacity.

App. 9
Maryland Circuit Courts have no statutory
authority or jurisdiction to hear moot cases. Jurisdiction to hear moot cases has been conferred exclusively
on appellate courts in Maryland. Both parties to the
case in the Anne Arundel County Circuit Court had
declared the only issue before the Court to be moot in
formal motions filed before the hearing. The Plaintiff
proved the only issue before the Court was moot at
the commencement of the hearing. Yet the Defendant
willfully and deliberately acted under the color of law,
and in the clear absence of jurisdiction, to force the
Plaintiff to stand trial for an action without a live
controversy. This action directly violated rights
protected under the United States Constitution and
caused special and general injury to the Plaintiff for
which damages are sought.
II.

Jurisdiction and Venue

1. This court has jurisdiction over the subject

matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331, 28 U.S.C. 1332,
and 28 U.S.C. 1343(a)(3). The complaint alleges a
deprivation, under the color of law, of constitutional
rights. The parties are citizens of different states and
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum of
$75,000.00. The Plaintiff is a citizen of Colorado and
upon information and belief, the Defendant is a citizen
of Maryland.
2. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1391(b)(1) and
1391(b)(2), the venue is appropriate in the United
States District Court for the District of Maryland,

App. 10
where the acts complained of took place and Plaintiff s cause of action arose.
III.

THE PARTIES

3. The Defendant, The Honorable Paul F. Harris, Jr., upon information and belief, is a citizen of
Maryland, employed as a Circuit Court Judge in
Anne Arundel County, Maryland, and in his individual capacity, is a person within the meaning of 42
U.S.C. 1983. Judge Harris may be served with
process at his place of work, the Anne Arundel County Court, 8 Church Circle, Annapolis, Maryland 21404.
4. The Plaintiff, Stephen D. Chamberlain, is a
citizen of Colorado.
IV.

FACTS

5. On September 19, 2013, Judith C. Chamberlain, the Plaintiff s ex-wife, sought a declaratory
judgment concerning a single, clear and unambiguous
sentence in a college education provision in the
parties Marital Settlement Agreement.
6. Ms. Chamberlain maintained this litigation
for 207 days before filing a Request for Voluntary
Dismissal on April 14, 2014, four days prior to trial.
In this motion she explicitly declared the only issue
before the Court had become moot and sought voluntary dismissal.

App. 11
7. The Honorable Paul F. Harris, Jr., was assigned to preside over the case on April 17, 2014.
8. Mr. Chamberlains then attorney filed a
response with the Court on April 17, 2014 and additionally hand delivered a copy to the judge. This
motion explicitly agreed the only issue was moot,
requested the case be dismissed, and sought fees as
the action had been maintained for over 4 months
after it had become moot.
9. The following day at the commencement of
the hearing, Judge Harris granted a verbal motion by
Ms. Chamberlains counsel to withdraw her Request
for Voluntary Dismissal. The basis for Ms. Chamberlains request for voluntary dismissal was that the
only issue before the court had become moot. Those
facts did not change. No explanation was provided to
Judge Harris by Ms. Chamberlains counsel as to how
the issue declared moot on Monday could now be
un-moot on Thursday. Mr. Chamberlains counsel
not only provided evidence proving the only issue
before the Court was moot, but specifically noted that
the withdraw of a motion requesting voluntary dismissal, while allowed by leave of the Court, cannot
change the declared facts made in support of the
motion.
10. The record will show that Judge Harris was
fully aware of the jurisdictional challenge on the
morning of April 18, 2014, that he understood a legal
determination had to be made concerning the issue of
mootness, and that he intentionally refrained from

App. 12
making that determination in order to proceed with
the hearing in the clear absence of jurisdiction. The
transcript of the hearing will also show Judge Harris
had most likely engaged in ex parte communication
with opposing counsel prior to the commencement of
the hearing and had predetermined he would proceed
to hear the moot case prior to the commencement of
the trial.
11. Subsequent to this action, Judge Harris
then failed to comply with clear law, the most basic
canons of contract interpretation, and demonstrated
his partiality and lack of objectivity during an in
chambers conference with the parties attorneys
which he directed take place. These actions created
the duress required to coerce Mr. Chamberlain into
orally placing general settlement terms on the record
to end the litigation. Weeks later, and without the
consent of Mr. Chamberlain, Judge Harris added
terms not found in the oral agreement and unilaterally signed an order committing the Plaintiff to a
monetary contract on June 5, 2104.
12. Judge Harris was afforded numerous opportunities to acknowledge he acted without subject
matter jurisdiction on April 18, 2014, and to take
corrective action.
13. On May 16, 2014, now having to act pro se
due to an inability to pay for legal counsel, Mr.
Chamberlain filed a Motion Requesting Declaration
of Mistrial and Request for Scheduling of Expedited

App. 13
Merits Hearing. Judge Harris denied this Motion on
June 5, 2014.
14. On June 4, 2015, after more fully understanding Judge Harriss clear absence of jurisdiction
and lack of authority on the day of the hearing, Mr.
Chamberlain filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Judge Harris failed to
rule on this motion.
15. On October 6, 2014, Mr. Chamberlain filed a
Motion to Vacate Judge Harriss order of June 5,
2014. This motion explicitly outlined the courts lack
of subject matter jurisdiction on April 18, 2014 and
the unlawfulness of the June 5, 2014 order. Judge
Harris denied this motion on October 21, 2014.
16. On November 13, 2014, Mr. Chamberlain
filed a Motion to Revise Denial of the motion to
vacate the June 5, 2014 order. Judge Harris failed to
rule on this motion.
17. Judge Harris subsequently denied a motion
he [sic] recuse himself and found Mr. Chamberlain in
contempt of court for breaching a contract he himself
had unilaterally mandated. The transcript of this
hearing will show that Judge Harris, again, disregarded the clear and incontrovertible evidence presented by Mr. Chamberlain that the sole issue which
had been before the Court on April 18, 2014 was moot
and the court was facially without subject matter
jurisdiction to proceed. Judge Harris additionally
took the extraordinary action of awarding legal fees
to the opposing counsel after Mr. Chamberlain had

App. 14
presented numerous sound and legally supported
defenses to the contempt charges. Mr. Chamberlain
has been forced to file two appeals as a result of the
errors of law which occurred solely because Judge
Harris decided to hear a case for which he knew there
was no live controversy and for which he clearly
lacked all jurisdiction to preside over.
18. Judge Harriss decision to act, under the
color of law, in the clear absence of jurisdiction on
April 18, 2014, deprived Mr. Chamberlain of rights
clearly secured by the United States Constitution,
namely, the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
V.

CAUSE OF ACTION
COUNT 1

Violation of Civil Rights Pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

1983 (Deprivation of Constitutional Rights)
19. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates herein
by reference the allegations set forth in Paragraphs
1-18 of this Complaint.
20. In committing the act complained of herein,
Defendant acted in his individual capacity under the
color of law to deprive the Plaintiff of certain constitutionally protected rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
including, but not limited to: (a) the right to due

App. 15
process, and (b), the right to equal protection under
the law.
21. In violating Plaintiff s rights as set forth
above and other rights that will be proven at trial,
Defendant acted under the color of law and deprived
the Plaintiff of his liberty interests by holding the
Plaintiff for trial in the clear face of an absolute lack
of jurisdiction. As a direct and proximate result of
this clear violation of the Plaintiff s constitutional
civil rights, the Plaintiff suffered special and general
damages as alleged in this Complaint and is entitled
to relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983.
22. The conduct of the Defendant was premeditated, deliberate, oppressive, and discriminatory. The
nature of such conduct militates that compensatory
and punitive damages be imposed in an amount
commensurate with the wrongful acts alleged herein.
23. Judicial immunity, under the circumstances
of this case as will be proven at trial, is not applicable. Judicial acts taken in the clear absence of jurisdiction are not protected acts.
VI.

DAMAGES

24. Special and general damages have been

sustained as a result of the Defendants conduct as
outlined in Paragraphs 1-23 above.
25. Special damages sustained include, but are
not limited to, loss of wages, medical expenses, and
loss of earnings potential.

App. 16
26. General damages include, but are not
limited to, intentional and/or negligent infliction of
emotional distress, loss of consortium, damage to the
parent/child relationship, mental anguish including
but not limited to emotional pain, torment and suffering, and physical pain and suffering.
27. The Defendants willful and reckless disregard for federally protected rights of a citizen, federal
law, state law, and his own judicial code of conduct,
demands that punitive damages be awarded to deter
similar conduct in the future and protect other citizens from injury.
VII.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests

this Court:
A.

Enter judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and

against the Defendant;

B. Enter an order declaring Defendants conduct to have violated constitutionally protected rights;
C. Find the Defendant liable for compensatory
and punitive damages for the injuries sustained and award Plaintiff monetary relief in
the amount of $300,000.00;
D. Grant Plaintiff such other and further relief
as may be just and proper under the circumstances.

App. 17
JURY DEMAND
Plaintiff respectfully demands a jury trial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(b).
Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ SD Chamberlain
Stephen D. Chamberlain
Pro Se Litigant