08 RemRev Digests 2014 CRIMPRO Venue To Rule 113 v3

08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador.
CrimPro:
Venue to Rule 113
The students of 4C 2015 Ateneo Law worked hard to make the remedial
law digests found in this compilation. It is requested that the readers
neither remove the names of the makers nor alter the format. Brought to
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GERALDEZ KING LAGOS LIBONGCO LOPA LUCENARIO MAGTAGNOB MUTI
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TEVES TIU VELASQUEZ. Thank you!
CONTENTS
F. Creation of the Sandiganbayan..............................................................17
APPLICABLE LAWS............................................................................. 17
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Section 4, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.............................17

Presidential Decree 1486 dated June 11, 1978...........................17
Presidential Decree 1606 dated December 10, 1978.................17
Presidential Decree 1861...........................................................17
Republic Act 7995 approved March 10, 1995.............................17
Republic Act 8249 approved February 5, 1997...........................17
G.Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan......................................................17

1. People v. Sandiganbayan, August 25, 2009, G.R. No. 167304
MAGTAGNOB...................................................................................... 17
2. Serrana v. Sandiganbayan, January 22, 2008, G.R. 162059 MUTI 21
3. Esquivel v. Ombudsman, September 17, 2002, G.R. 137237
NARVASA........................................................................................... 23
H.Dismissal of the Complaint because of inordinate delay.....................25
1.Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 ORTIZ...............................25
2.Cervantes v. Sandiganbayan, 307 SCRA 149 - PEREZ DE TAGLE.....26
I.Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman............................................................28
J.Review of Decisions of the Ombudsman..............................................37

1. Antonino v. Desierto, December 18, 2008, G.R. No. 144492
SANCHEZ........................................................................................... 37
2. Enemecio v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 146731, January
13, 2004 SANTOS............................................................................ 38
3. Baviera v. Zoleta, G.R. NO. 169098, October 12, 2006 SUPERABLE
.......................................................................................................... 41
K.Procedure before the Ombudsman.....................................................43
1. Sesbreno v. Aglugub, February 28, 2005, A.M. No. MTJ 05-1581
TANDOC............................................................................................. 43
2. Enriquez v. Caminade, A.M. NO. RTJ-05-1966, March 21, 2006
TEVES................................................................................................ 44
L.Power of the Secretary of Justice over Prosecutors.............................45
1. Punzalan v. de la Pena, July 21, 2004, G.R. No. 158543 TIU.........45
2. Dino et al. v. Olivarez, G.R. No. 170447, December 04, 2009
VELASQUEZ....................................................................................... 47
PART II....................................................................................................... 49
A.Complaint or Information (Rule 110)...................................................49
a.Sufficiency of Complaint or Information..........................................49
1.
People v. Dimaano, 469 SCRA 647 AQUINO........................49
2.
Sasot v. People, 462 SCRA 138 ARCEO...............................50
3.
Lasoy v. Zenarosa, 455 SCRA 360 BASCARA.......................52
4.
People v. Batin, G.R. No. 177223, November 28, 2007 CHAN
...................................................................................................... 53
5.
People v. Cachapero, G.R. No. 153008, May 20, 2004
CORTEZ.......................................................................................... 55
6.
Bacasmas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 189343, July 10, 2013 DE LA PAZ...................................................................................... 57
b.Substitution of Information.............................................................59
i.1. Republic Act No. 6770 otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act
of 1989.......................................................................................... 28
1.
Saludaga v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 184537, April 23, 2010
GERALDEZ..................................................................................... 59
2.
Pacoy v. Cajigal, G.R. NO. 157472, September 28, 2007 KING
...................................................................................................... 61
CASES................................................................................................ 28
c.Amended Information/Amendment.................................................63
1. Department of Justice v. Liwag, February 11, 2005, G.R. No.

149311 PUNO.............................................................................. 28
2. Lazatin v. Desierto, June 5, 2009, G.R. No. 147097 - QUIJANOBENEDICTO.................................................................................... 31
3. Angeles v. Merceditas Gutierrez, G.R. Nos. 189161 & 189173,
March 21, 2012 RAZON...............................................................32
4. Busuego v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No.196842, October
9, 2013 RESPICIO........................................................................ 33
1.
Cabo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. NO. 169509, June 16, 2006
LAGOS........................................................................................... 63
2.
Kummer v. People, G.R. No. 174461, September 11, 2013
LIBONGCO...................................................................................... 67
APPLICABLE LAW............................................................................... 28
d.Filing of Information if there is pending Motion for Reconsideration 68

1. Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 172476-99, September 15,
2010 - LOPA................................................................................... 68
08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro:

Venue to Rule 113
e.Prescription..................................................................................... 70
1.
Panaguiton v. DOJ, G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008
LUCENARIO.................................................................................... 70
2.
People v. Romuladez, G.R. No. 166510, April 29, 2009
MAGTAGNOB.................................................................................. 72
3.
Disini v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.169823, September 11, 2013
MUTI............................................................................................ 74
f.Control and Direction of Criminal Action..........................................77
1.
Pinote v. Ayco, 477 SCRA 409 NARVASA.............................77
2.
Bureau of Customs v. Whelan, G.R. No. 190487, April 13, 2011
ORTIZ.......................................................................................... 77
3.
Flores v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 188197, August 03, 2010 - PEREZ
DE TAGLE....................................................................................... 78
2.
Serag v. Court of Appeals, 473 SCRA 590 AQUINO.................99
3.
Soriano v. People, G.R. No.162336, February 1, 2010 ARCEO
........................................................................................................ 100
4.
Samuel Lee v. KBC Bank, G.R. No. 164673, January 15, 2011
BASCARA......................................................................................... 102
5.
Okabe v. Gutierrez, May 27, 2004, G.R.No. 150185 CHAN....104
Rule 113- Arrest................................................................................... 106
1.
People v. De Leon , G.R. No. 169858, January 26, 2010 PINERA
........................................................................................................ 106
2.
People v. Laguio, March 16, 2007, G.R. No. 128587 PINERA. 109
3.
Valdez v. People, G.R.170180, November 23, 2007 DEVESA.113
4.
Rolito Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R.No.101837, February 11, 1992
- DEVESA......................................................................................... 114
B.Civil Aspect of a Criminal Case (Rule 111)..........................................80

a.Rule in Civil Liability Arising from Delict..........................................80
1.
Bun Tiong v. Balboa, G.R. No. 158177, January 28, 2008
PUNO............................................................................................. 80
b.Independent Civil Action.................................................................82
1.
Simon v. Chan, G.R. No. 157547, February 23, 2011 - QUIJANOBENEDICTO.................................................................................... 82
c.Death of the Accused...................................................................... 84
1. Asilo v. People, G.R. Nos. 159017-18, March 09, 2011 RAZON. 84
2. People v. Bayot, G.R. No. 200030, April 18, 2012 RESPICIO....86
d.Acquittal......................................................................................... 88
1.
People v. Tirso Velasco, G.R. No. 127444, September 13, 2000
SANCHEZ.................................................................................... 88
2.
Ching v. Nicdao, G.R. No. 141181, April 27, 2007 SANTOS. 89
3.
Coscoluella v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.No. 191411, July 15, 2013
SUPERABLE................................................................................. 92
e.Prejudicial Question........................................................................ 94
1.
Dreamwork Construction v. Janiola, G.R. No. 184861, June 30,
2009 TANDOC.............................................................................. 94
2.
Pimentel v. Pimentel, G.R. No. 172060, September 13, 2010
TEVES............................................................................................ 95
3.
San Miguel Properties v. Perez, G.R. No.192253, September
18, 2013 TIU................................................................................ 96
Part III........................................................................................................ 98
Rule 112- Preliminary Investigation.......................................................98
1.
Community Rural Bank v. Talavera, 455 SCRA 34 VELASQUEZ
.......................................................................................................... 98
PA RT I .
A.VENUE IN CRIMINAL CASES IS JURISDICTIONAL
APPLICABLE LAWS
A.1 SECTION 15, RULE 110, RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A.2 SECTION 21, CHAPTER V, REPUBLIC ACT 10175 OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE CYBERCRIME , PREVENTION ACT OF 2012
A.3 SECTION 58, REPUBLIC ACT 9372 OTHERWISE KNOWNAS THE
HUMAN SECURITY ACT OF 2007
A.4 ARTICLE 2, REVISED PENAL CODE
CASES
1. ISIP V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO.. 170298, JUNE 26, 2007 CORTEZ
Note: Mej magulo siya. sorry! pero keri na ER. pay more attention to
MANUEL ISIP's ESTAFA CASE (yung P200k ring) kasi yun yung
pinaguusapan ng kaso na 'to. The wife's case (as well as the BP 22
cases)...not so much.
Keyword: 7-carat diamond swindled
DOCTRINE:
The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases,

is jurisdictional. The place where the crime was committed determines
not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of
jurisdiction.

Venue to Rule 113
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired
by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been
committed or any one of its essential ingredients should
have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court.
The jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown,
the court may validly take cognizance of the case.
o
EMERGENCY DIGEST:
FACTS: JOSE SUED MANUEL
Petitioner Manuel Isip (MANUEL) was charged with estafa (ESTAFA

CASE) before RTC CAVITE.
The information alleged that MANUEL swindled from JOSE one 7-carat
diamond worth P200,000.
o MANUEL was supposed to sell the ring and deliver to JOSE the
proceeds of the sale or to return the ring if not sold.
HOWEVER, according to MANUEL, the transactions took place

in JOSEs residence in MANILA, and NOT in JOSEs ancestral
house in Cavite.
RTC Cavite convicted MANUEL for the crime charged. It found that
the transactions involved in these cases were sufficiently
shown to have taken place at complainant JOSEs ancestral
house in Cavite City when the latter was on leave of absence from the
Bureau of Customs where he was connected.
MANUEL appealed his conviction, arguing that RTC Cavite has no

jurisdiction over the Estafa case against him; but the CA affirmed the
RTCs ruling.
ISSUE: WON RTC Cavite has jurisdiction (YES)
HELD & RATIO: CA ruling is AFFIRMED.
The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil

cases, is jurisdictional. The place where the crime was committed
determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element
of jurisdiction.
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by

courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been
committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have
taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is

determined by the allegations in the complaint or information.
Here, MANUEL failed to establish by sufficient and competent

evidence that the transaction happened in Manila.
o He argues that since he and his late wife actually resided
in Manila, convenience alone unerringly suggests that the
transaction was entered into in Manila. We are not persuaded.
The fact that Cavite City is a bit far from Manila does not
necessarily mean that the transaction cannot or did not
happen there. Distance will not prevent any person from going
to a distant place where he can procure goods that he can sell
so that he can earn a living.
It is not improbable or impossible for MANUEL and his wife to
have gone, not once, but twice in one day, to Cavite City if that
is the number of times they received pieces of jewelry from
complainant.
COMPLETE DIGEST:
FACTS:
ESTAFA CASE
Petitioner Manuel Isip (MANUEL) was charged with Estafa 1 before RTC
branch 17 Cavite City- docketed as Criminal Case No. 136-84 (ESTAFA
CASE).
The information alleged that he received from a certain Leonardo

Jose (JOSE) one 7-carat diamond amounting to P200,000 for
the purpose of selling the same on commission basis and to
deliver the proceeds of the sale thereof or return the
jewelry if not sold.
MANUEL however, once in possession of the above-described

articles, with intent to defraud and with grave abuse of confidence,
did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to his own
personal use and benefit and notwithstanding repeated demands
made by JOSE for the return of the jewelry or the delivery of the
proceeds of the sale thereof, failed to do so, to the damage and
prejudice of the latter amounting to P200,000.
BP22 CASE
MANUELs wife, Marietta Isip (MARIETTA) was indicted before the same
court for 7 counts2 of violation of B.P. 22.
1
That on or about March 7, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received from Leonardo A. Jose
one (1) seven carat diamond (mens ring), valued at P200,000.00, for the purpose of selling the
same on commission basis and to deliver the proceeds of the sale thereof or return the jewelry if
not sold, on or before March 15, 1984, but the herein accused once in possession of the abovedescribed articles, with intent to defraud and with grave abuse of confidence, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to his
own personal use and benefit and notwithstanding repeated demands made by Leonardo A. Jose
for the return of the jewelry or the delivery of the proceeds of the sale thereof, failed to do so, to
the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid Leonardo A. Jose in the abovestated amount
of P200,000.00, Philippine Currency
2
Crim. Case No.
146-84
147-84

Venue to Rule 113
The checks issued in payment for assorted pieces of jewelry

received from JOSE. Upon presentation for payment with the
drawee bank, said checks were dishonored for insufficiency of
funds. And despite JOSEs repeated demands, MARIETTA refused to
pay.
SPOUSES ISIP were likewise charged before the same court with 5 counts of
Estafa.
Here, the information alleged that the spouses, in conspiracy,

received from JOSE 1 set dome shape ring and earrings worth
P120,000 , with the obligation of selling the same on commission
basis and deliver the proceeds of the sale thereof or return them if
not sold, on or before March 21, 1984, but the herein accused,
once in possession of the said jewelry by means of false pretenses,
with intent to defraud and with grave abuse of confidence, did,
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate,
misapply and convert them to their own personal use and benefit
The checks used by the SPOUSES to pay the jewelry were

dishonored for insufficiency of funds and has failed to pay despite
repeated demands.
The SPOUSES pleaded NOT guilty.
The Prosecution3 as well as the defense 4 presented their

version of the facts.
RTC of Cavite rendered judgment that MARIETTA is guilty if B.P. 22

violations. MANUEL was acquitted for the B.P. 22 violations BUT was found
GUILTY in the ESTAFA CASE.
The RTC found that the transactions involved in these cases

were sufficiently shown to have taken place at complainant
JOSEs ancestral house in Cavite City when the latter was on
leave of absence from the Bureau of Customs where he was
connected.
The defense failed to substantially prove its allegations that

the transactions occurred in Manila, particularly in the Towers
Condominium, and that complainant is a resident of
Bigasan,Makati.
o It added that the testimony of MARIETTA that the money
with which the complainant initially agreed to finance their
transactions was withdrawn from the Sandigan Finance
in Cavite City further refuted the defenses claim that the
transactions happened in Manila.
o The trial court likewise found the defenses contention, that
the obligations were already paid and set-off with the
turnover to JOSE of personal and real properties, to be
untenable for it is contrary to human nature to demand
payment when the same had already been made and the
alleged set-offs were for other cases which were settled
amicably and subsequently dismissed upon motion of the
City Prosecutors Office at the instance of the complainant.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the lower courts findings.
MARIETTA already passed away so the CA dismissed the case

against her.
MANUELs conviction was affirmed.

MANUELS CONTENTION: Before the Supreme Court, MANUEL maintains
that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the estafa charge in THE
ESTAFA CASE and it is pure speculation and conjectural, if not
altogether improbable or manifestly absurd, to suppose that any
of the essential elements of the Estafa charged in THE ESTAFA
CASE took place in Cavite City.
First, he states that the residence of the parties is immaterial and

that it is the situs of the transaction that counts. He argues that it
is non sequitur that simply because complainant had an alleged
ancestral house in Caridad, Cavite, complainant actually lived there
and had the transactions there with him when he and his late wife
were actual residents of Manila. Mere convenience suggests that
their transaction was entered into in Manila.

5
Venue to Rule 113
He adds that the source of the fund used to finance the
o He asserts that there is no competent proof showing that
transactions is likewise inconsequential because it is where

the subject item was delivered and received by petitioner
and/or where it was to be accounted for that determines
venue where Estafa, if any, may be charged and tried.
Second, he further argues that it does not follow that because
complainant may have been on leave from the Bureau of Customs,
the transactions were necessarily entered into during that leave
and in Cavite City.
148-84
149-84
155-84
156-84
157-84Date of Commission
27 March 1984
17 March 1984
30 March 1984
12 March 1984
25 March 1984
29 March 1984
1 April 1984No. of Check
518672
518644
518645
030086[5]
518674
518646
518669Amount of Check
P 562,000.000
P50,000.00
P50,000.00
P150,000.00
P95,000.00
P90,000.00
P25,000.00
3
[NOTE: I only got the pertinent part, in relation to the ESTAFA CASE] In the afternoon
of the same day (March 7, 1984), Mr. Manuel Isip went to complainants residence
in Cavite City and got from the latter a mens ring (7 carats) worth P200,000.00. Mr.
Isip signed a receipt with the condition that he return the ring or deliver the proceeds,
if sold, on or before March 15, 1984. March 15, 1984 came, but Mr. Isip sought an
extension which fell due on April 7, 1984. April 7, 1984 came and went by, but Mr. Isip
defaulted (pp. 41-46, tsn, ibid). The above is the subject matter of Criminal Case No.
136-84 for Estafa against Manuel Isip.
4
[NOTE: I only got the pertinent part]Beginning early 1983, at complainants residence at
Plaza Tower Condominium in Manila, appellant Marietta, accompanied by her husband who
participated only as a witness, started having transactions with complainant who, on different
dates in February, March and April, 1984, extended various amounts to her for which appellant
Marietta pledged jewelry which, in turn, were agreed between her and complainant to be sold on
commission and to turn over the proceeds thereof or return the jewelry to complainant (Tr., Idem,
16-18). In the course of the transactions, appellant Marietta had issued several checks to
complainant as guarantee for the payment of the subject jewelry which have either been paid or
redeemed, had returned the unsold jewelry to complainant and had conveyed, by way of
payment for other jewelry, some personal properties, like brass and antics, and real properties in
Balanga, Bataan and Mabalacat, Pampanga, to complainant who caused the same to be
registered in the names of his son, Christian Jose, and his wife, Zenaida Jose (Exhibits 1, 2, 2-A,
during his leave of absence, he stayed in Cavite City; and

that the transactions involved, including the subject of THE
ESTAFA CASE covering roughly the period from February to
April 1984, coincided with his alleged leave.
ISSUE: WON RTC Cavite has jurisdiction over MANUELs ESTAFA CASE (YES,
it has jurisdiction)
HELD: Court of Appeals decision is AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil
cases, is jurisdictional. The place where the crime was committed
determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential
element of jurisdiction.
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in

criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any
one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within
the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where

the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the
offense allegedly committed therein by the accused.
o Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an
offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case

is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take
cognizance of the case.
o However, if the evidence adduced during the trial
shows that the offense was committed somewhere
else, the court should dismiss the action for want of
jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, we, like the RTC and the Court of Appeals, are convinced
that the venue was properly laid in the RTC of Cavite City.
The complainant had sufficiently shown that the transaction

covered by THE ESTAFA CASE took place in his ancestral home
in Cavite City when he was on approved leave of absence from the
Bureau of Customs.
Since it has been shown that venue was properly laid, it is now
MANUELs task to prove otherwise, for it is his claim that the
transaction involved was entered into in Manila. The age-old but
familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his allegations applies.
Here, MANUEL failed to establish by sufficient and competent evidence that
the transaction happened in Manila.
3, 4, 5, 6, 6-A, 7, 7-A), with the result that all the obligations of appellants to complainant have
already been paid for or offset

Venue to Rule 113
He argues that since he and his late wife actually resided in Manila,
convenience alone unerringly suggests that the transaction was
entered into in Manila. We are not persuaded.
The fact that Cavite City is a bit far from Manila does not
necessarily mean that the transaction cannot or did not happen
there. Distance will not prevent any person from going to a distant
place where he can procure goods that he can sell so that he can
earn a living. This is true in the case at bar.
It is not improbable or impossible for MANUEL and his wife to have
gone, not once, but twice in one day, to Cavite City if that is the
number of times they received pieces of jewelry from complainant.
Moreover, the fact that the checks issued by MANUELs late wife in
all the transactions with complainant were drawn against accounts
with banks in Manila or Makati likewise cannot lead to the
conclusion that the transactions were not entered into
in Cavite City.
2. LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. BELISATA, G.R. NO. 170298,

JUNE 26, 2007 - DE LA PAZ
Landbank of the Philippines v. Belisata, G.R. No. 170298, June 26, 2007
DOCTRINE:
DARAB has the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate

agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
The DAR is an administrative agency which cannot be granted

jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain (for such are takings
under R.A. No. 6657 - CARP) and over criminal cases.
(from the CRIMPRO Tranquil Transcript)

o Special Agrarian Courts, which are RTCs, are given
original and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories
of cases, to wit:
(1) "all petitions for the determination of just

compensation to landowners" and
(2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses

under [R.A. No. 6657 CARP]."
EMERGENCY DIGEST
Spouses Ralla donated land to their daughter, BELISATA.
The parcels of land were subject of Agrarian Reform and, in exchange,

the DAR, thru Landbank, assessed the just compensation due at 200K.
Belisata felt that the amount was insufficient and filed a PETITION FOR
VALUATION AND PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION against LANDBANK
before the DARAB. They assessed the value at 2M.
Aggrieved LANDBANK filed ORIGINAL Petition for Determination of

Just Compensation at the same sala of the RTC sitting as SAC.
This was DISMISSED by RTC AND CA, saying that (the Petition for
determination of just compensation before the RTC sitting as SAC is
violative of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies +)
LANDBANK should have appealed with the DARAB.
ISSUES: WON the dismissal was proper? What is the jurisdiction of the RTC
sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC)? IMPROPER DISMISSAL. SAC
has jurisdiction.
No need for appeal with the DARAB.
Under Section 50, DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and

adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction
over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform,
except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DA and the
DENR.
Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are
given original and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of
cases, to wit:
o (1) "all petitions for the determination of just
o (2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses under [R.A.
No. 6657] CARP."
The provisions of 50 must be construed in harmony with this provision
by considering cases involving the determination of just compensation
and criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted from the
plenitude of power conferred on the DAR.
The DAR is an administrative agency which cannot be granted
jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain (for such are takings
under R.A. No. 6657) and over criminal cases. The Court recognizes
that the determination of just compensation is a judicial function which
is exercised by courts rather than an administrative agency.
COMPLETE
FACTS:
Spouses Pablo Ralla and Carmen Munoz Ralla had donated their eight
(8) parcels of lot located in Ligao, Albay to their daughter, Rene Ralla
Belista. The eight (8) parcels of lot were placed by the DAR under
Agrarian Reform, and BELISATA claimed payment of just compensation
for the conversion. It further appears that the DAR's evaluation of the
subject farms was only P227,582.58, while petitioner Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP, for brevity) assessed the same at P317,259.31.
Believing that her lots were grossly underestimated, BELISATA filed a

Petition for Valuation and Payment of Just Compensation against
LANDBANK before the DARAB-Regional Adjudicator for Region V
(RARAD-V). IT RULED IN FAVOR OF BELISATA. It fixed just compensation
at P2,896,408.91 PESOS and ordered Land Bank was ordered to pay

Venue to Rule 113
the sum minus the sum already remitted. In response to the respective
MRs filed by the Parties. The decision was MODIFIED : fixing the sum
for just compensation at P2,540,211.58 Pesos.
Aggrieved LANDBANK , filed an original Petition for Determination
of Just Compensation at the same sala of the RTC, docketed as
Agrarian Case No. 03-06 on NOV 11 2002. The court DISMISSED THE
CASE "for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and/or comply
with Sections 5, 6, and 7, Rule XIX, 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure.
LANDBANK ARGUES in an MR "that the DARAB 2003 Rules of
Procedure does not apply to SAC nor its precursor DARAB Case
and that the ground for dismissal of the case is not among the
instances when a court may dismiss a case on its motion."
CA DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR REVIEW, saying that filing the case
before the RTC without first seeking the intervention of the DARAB is
violative of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. An
appeal from the adjudicators resolution should first be filed with the
DARAB.
Office was already provided in the 2003 DARAB Rules before resorting
to judicial action, the RTC correctly dismissed the petition,
Sections 50 and 57 of RA No. 6657 provide:
o Section 50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is
hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive
original
jurisdiction
over
all
matters
involving
the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA)
and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) x x x
Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. The Special Agrarian Court
shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions
for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and
the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. x x x
o The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases
under their special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from
submission of the case for decision.
o Clearly, under Section 50, DAR has primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and
exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the DA and the DENR. Further
exception to the DAR's original and exclusive
jurisdiction are all petitions for the determination of
just compensation to landowners and the prosecution of
all criminal offenses under RA No. 6657, which are
within the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a Special
Agrarian Court. Thus, jurisdiction on just compensation
cases for the taking of lands under RA No. 6657 is
vested in the courts.
In Republic v. CA,5 the Court explained:
o
ISSUE: WON it is necessary that in cases involving claims for just

compensation under Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 that the decision of the
Adjudicator must first be appealed to the DARAB before a party can resort
to the RTC sitting as SAC? NO
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The
Decision dated May 26, 2004 and the Resolution dated July 28, 2004, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81096, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Legaspi City, sitting as Special
Agrarian Court, is directed to hear without delay petitioner's
petition for the determination of just compensation.
SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
BELISATA contends that the petition for valuation and payment of just
compensation was filed with the DARAB- Regional Adjudicator for
Region V (RARAD) on November 11, 2002, long before the effectivity of
the 2003 Rules of Procedure; it is the date of filing of the petition with
the DARAB or any of its adjudicators which is the reckoning date of the
applicability of the 2003 DARAB Rules and not the date of filing with
the SAC; that under the 1994 DARAB Rules prevailing at the time of the
filing of the respondent's claim for just compensation, the Rules
provided that the decision of the adjudicator on land valuation and
preliminary determination of just compensation shall not be appealable
to the Board, but shall be brought directly to the RTC; that it was in the
observance of the 1994 DARAB Rules that petitioner brought the
adjudicator's decision to the RTC sitting as SAC.
LANDBANK claims that petition with the RTC is an original action and,
since the case was filed at a time when appeal to the DARAB Central
Thus, Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial

Courts, are given original and exclusive jurisdiction over
two categories of cases, to wit:
(1) "all petitions for the determination of just

(2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses

under [R.A. No. 6657]."
The provisions of 50 must be construed in harmony with this
provision by considering cases involving the determination of
just compensation and criminal cases for violations of R.A. No.
6657 as excepted from the plenitude of power conferred on the
DAR. Indeed, there is a reason for this distinction. The DAR is
an administrative agency which cannot be granted

Venue to Rule 113
jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain (for such are

takings under R.A. No. 6657) and over criminal cases.
The Court has upheld the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC,
sitting as SAC, over all petitions for determination of just compensation
to landowners in accordance with Section 57 of RA No. 6657. The
Court recognizes that the determination of just compensation
is a judicial function which is exercised by courts rather than
an administrative agency. It would be well to emphasize that the
taking of property under RA No. 6657 is an exercise of the power of
eminent domain by the State. The valuation of property or
determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is
essentially a judicial function which is vested with the courts and not
with administrative agencies.
The RTC allowed the formal amendment of the Information, but in

the subsequent one, Gimenez merely alleged that the article was
published and first accessed in Makati.
These deficiencies were the subject of the PEPCI peoples MOTION TO

QUASH.
ISSUES: WON the allegation that that the article was published and first
accessed in Makati was sufficient to confer jurisdiction in RTC Makati? NO
3. BONIFACIO V. RTC OF MAKATI, G.R. NO. 184800, MAY 05, 2010

GERALDEZ
WONINA M. BONIFACIO, JOCELYN UPANO, VICENTE ORTUOSTE AND
JOVENCIO PERECHE, SR., Petitioners, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MAKATI, BRANCH 149, and JESSIE JOHN P. GIMENEZ, Respondents.
(G.R. No. 184800 May 5, 2010) - Geraldez
The Yunchengcos own Pacific Plans, a preneed company that was not
able to fulfill its obligations and sought a suspension of payments.
Because of this, petitioners herein, who are officers and trustees of
PEPCI (Parents Enabling Parents Coalition), and who availed of the
preneed plans, put up the website pepcoalition.com, wherein various
posts were written against the Yuchengcos and their
companies.
Gimenez, the representative of the Yuchengcos, filed a complaint for 13

counts of libel against the PEPCI people in the Makati RTC.
However, in the original Information that was filed, there was NO:
o
allegation of the place of residence of the complainants
or the place where the article was printed and first

published.
THE LAW NOW: Venue of libel cases where the complainant is a

private individual is limited to only either of two places, namely:
o 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense; or
o
2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first

published.
CONDITION SINE QUA NON: If the second mode is chosen, the place
where the written defamation was printed and first published
should likewise be alleged.
In the present case, the Amended Information opted to lay the venue
by availing of the second mode.
THE OLD LAW ON LIBEL: Before the amendment of Art. 360 (libel), the
rule was that a criminal action for libel may be instituted in any
jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated,
irrespective of where it was written or printed. Experience had
shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass
the accused in a libel case by laying the venue of the criminal
action in a remote or distant place. HENCE, the law on libel was
amended.
To credit Gimenezs premise of equating his first access to the

defamatory article on petitioners website in Makati with "printing and
first publication" would spawn the very ills that the amendment to
Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent.
Hence, RTC is directed to QUASH the Information.
[NG: The case didnt say where you should file a case for internetbased libel].
Emergency Recit:

Venue to Rule 113
a.
COMPLETE
Facts:
1.
2.
Respondent Gimenez, on behalf of Amabassador Yuchengco, Helen Dee

and Malayan Insurance, filed a 13 cases of libel under Art. 355 and 353
against the officers, trustees, and a member of Parents Enabling
Parents Coalition Inc. (PEPCI), as well as the administrator of its
website, pepcoalition.com. PEPCI also owns a blogspot account and a
yahoo group.
PEPCI was formed by a large group of disgruntled planholders of Pacific
Plans Inc (PPI), a wholly owned subsidiary of Grepalife Corp, which is
owned by the Yuchengco Group of Companies (YGC).
a.
a.
b.
4.
5.
6.
7.
NOTE: The original Information did not contain details as to

where the complainants resided and where the article was
printed and first published.
The Makati Prosecutor found probably cause to indict the accused.
Several of the accused appealed to the Secretary of Justice, who, in
2007, reversed the finding of probable cause and directed the
withdrawal of the Informations. It reasoned that internet libel was
non-existent crime.
Meanwhile, in 2006, Petitioners in this case, which are the other
accused, filed with the RTC a Motion to Quash.
i.
a particular place within the RTCs jurisdiction where

the subject article was printed and first published,
ii.
or that the parties resided in Makati at the time the

article was printed and first published.
The prosecutor filed an MR, alleging that Helen and Malayan were
residents of Makati, and that even if they werent, the defects could be
cured by a formal amendment.
a. RTC granted the MR and ordered the amendment of the
Information.
8.
NOTE: The new information alleged, inter alia, that the accused
published an article imputing a vice or defect to the complainant and
caused to be composed, posted and published in the said website
www.pepcoalition.com, a website accessible in Makati City, an injurious
and defamatory article, which was first published and accessed by the
private complainant in Makati City.
9.
The RTC accepted this to be sufficient in form. RTC denied the MR.
Some of the stuff mentioned were:

Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos.
Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng
negotiation. x x x x x x x x x
For sure may tactics pa silang nakabasta sa atin. Let us be
ready for it because they had successfully lull us and the next
time they will try to kill us na. x x x
They allege that the Information failed to allege
b. The quashing was granted by the RTC.
This was a pre-need educational plans company that wasnt

able to pay its liabilities when it became due, and eventually
sought rehabilitation and suspension of payments.
3. Gimenez alleges that when he accessed these website in

Makati, he was appalled by the highly derogatory statements
and accusations found therein, attacking the Yuchengco family,
YGC, and Malayan.
10. Petitioners filed this petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.

ISSUES:
1.
2.
WON petitioners violated the rule on hierarchy of courts to thus render

the petition dismissible YES, but an exception is made.
WON grave abuse of discretion attended the public respondents
admission of the Amended Information. YES.
RATIO:
In the present case, the substantive issue calls for the Courts exercise
of its discretionary authority, by way of exception, in order to
abbreviate the review process as petitioners raise a pure question of
law involving jurisdiction in criminal complaints for libel under Article
360 of the RPCwhether the Amended Information is sufficient to
sustain a charge for written defamation in light of the

Venue to Rule 113
requirements under Article 360 of the RPC, as amended by
Republic Act (RA) No. 4363, reading:
o xxx The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of
written defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be
filed simultaneously or separately with the CFI of the
province or city where the libelous article is

printed and first published
OR where any of the offended parties actually

resides at the time of the commission of the offense:
xxx
Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the
crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but
constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction. This principle acquires
even greater import in libel cases, given that Article 360, as
amended, specifically provides for the possible venues for the
institution of the criminal and civil aspects of such cases.
In Macasaet, it was held:

o
1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the

commission of the offense; or
2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first

published.
The Amended Information in the present case opted to lay the

venue by availing of the second. Thus, it stated that the offending
article "was first published and accessed by the private complainant
in Makati City." In other words, it considered the phrase to be
equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing and first
publication.
The rationale for the amendment to Art. 360 by RA 4363 is:

o
Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal
action for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the
libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of
where it was written or printed. Experience had shown that
under that old rule the offended party could harass the
accused in a libel case by laying the venue of the
criminal action in a remote or distant place.
To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was

enacted.
It lays down specific rules as to the venue of the criminal action

so as to prevent the offended party in written defamation cases
from inconveniencing the accused by means of out-of-town
libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal
courts.
If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first

published are used by the offended party as basis for the
venue in the criminal action, the Information must allege with
particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first
published, as evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of
their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers, magazines
or serial publications. This pre-condition becomes necessary in order to
forestall any inclination to harass.
To credit Gimenezs premise of equating his first access to the

defamatory article on petitioners website in Makati with
"printing and first publication" would spawn the very ills that
the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage
and prevent. It hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos
that would ensue in situations where the websites author or writer, a
blogger or anyone who posts messages therein could be sued for libel
anywhere in the Philippines that the private complainant may have
allegedly accessed the offending website.
For the Court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested
jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply because the defamatory
article was accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel suit
being filed in all other locations where the pepcoalition website is
likewise accessed or capable of being accessed.
Whenever possible, the place where the written

defamation was printed and first published should
likewise be alleged. That allegation would be a sine qua
non if the circumstance as to where the libel was printed and
first published is used as the basis of the venue of the action.
It becomes clear that the venue of libel cases where the complainant
is a private individual is limited to only either of two places, namely:
10

Venue to Rule 113
Respecting the contention that the venue requirements imposed by

Article 360, as amended, are unduly oppressive, the Courts
pronouncements in Chavez are instructive: xxx These limitations
imposed on libel actions filed by private persons are hardly onerous,
especially as they still allow such persons to file the civil or criminal
complaint in their respective places of residence, in which situation
there is no need to embark on a quest to determine with precision
where the libelous matter was printed and first published.
The RTC is directed to QUASH the Information.
B.JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED

1. REPUBLIC ACT 7691
C.JURISDICTION TO ISSUE HOLD DEPARTURE ORDERS (REGULAR
COURTS DISTINGUISHED WITH THE SANDIGANBAYAN)
1.MONDEJAR V. BUBAN, A.M. NO. MTJ-01-1349, JULY 12, 2001 KING
Bernadette Mondejar, complainant vs. Judge Marino Buban, MTCC Tacloban
AM No. MTJ-01-1349, July 12, 2001
Doctrine: Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure
orders to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of second level
courts. Paragraph No. 1 of the said circular specifically provides that
hold-departure orders shall be issued only in criminal
cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTCs.
ER:
ADMIN CASE Judge Buban of the MTCC Tacloban issued a Hold

Departure Order against Mondejar in connection with a case of
violation of BP22 committed by Mondejar.
Mondejar filed a complaint with the Court administrator

alleging GRAVE MISCONDUCT on the part of Judge Buban, the judge
of MTCC Tacloban.
SC: Judge Buban is hereby reprimanded. Being an MTCC judge, he had

not authority to issue a HDO. Only the RTC has jurisdiction issue HDOs.
COMPLETE
Facts:
ADMIN CASE A complaint by Bernadette Mondejar charged Judge

Buban with gross ignorance of the law, partiality, serious
irregularity and grave misconduct relative to Criminal Case No. 9807-CR-133 entitled People of the Philippines v. Bernadette Mondejar
and Arlette Mondejar for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
The case was exclusively under the jurisdiction of the MTCC.
11
Mondejar alleged that Judge Buban, as a judge of MTCC, issued

a hold department order against her in violation of Supreme
Court Circular No. 39-97
The circular states hold departure orders(HDO) shall be issued only
in criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts.
Judge Buban commented that he was not aware of the
Supreme Court Circular.
o But eventually, when he came to know it he issued an order
lifting and setting aside the HDO.
ISSUE: Who has jurisdiction issue Hold departure orders? RTC

RATIO:
Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure orders to

criminal
cases
within
the
jurisdiction
of
second
level
courts. Paragraph No. 1 of the said circular specifically provides
that hold-departure orders shall be issued only in criminal
cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regional trial
courts.
Clearly then, criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of

first level courts do not fall within the ambit of the circular, and
it was an error on the part of respondent judge to have issued
one in the instant case.
The Court, in exercising administrative supervision of all lower courts,

has not been remiss in reminding the members of the bench to exert
due diligence in keeping abreast with the development in law and
jurisprudence.
Herein judge, therefore, cannot be excused for his infraction. Judges

should always be vigilant in their quest for new developments in the
law so they could discharge their duties and functions with zeal and
fervor.
2.MUPAS V. ESPANOL, A.M. NO. RTJ-04-1850, JULY 14, 2004 LAGOS
Judge Mupas vs. Judge Espaol
Topic: Hold Departure Order
Doctrine

criminal cases within the jurisdiction of second level courts. Criminal
cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of first level courts do not fall
within the ambit of the circular.
o It is logical to state that the criminal cases must be
pending in the sala of the RTC concerned.
Section 1 of Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97 states that HoldDeparture Orders shall be issued only in criminal cases within the

Venue to Rule 113
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC the same should be read that the
subject criminal case has been filed and pending with the RTC.
ER: MTC JUDGE MUPAS SUED EXEC RTC JUDGE ESPANOL
ADMIN CASE Judge Mupas charged Judge Espaol in her capacity as

Executive Judge, with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Usurpation of
Authority.
MTC Judge Mupas conducted the PI in an estafa case between

Bituon et al and Malihan et al.
o On the same day, she issued a warrant of arrest against the
accused and recommended no bail for their provisional
liberty.
THEREAFTER, Bituon et al filed a motion to transfer Malihan

from the municipal jail to the provincial jail addressed to RTC
EXEC JUDGE ESPANOL.
o A copy of the motion was sent to Judge Espaol, the Executive
Judge of RTC Dasmarias, Cavite, invoking her supervisory
authority over all municipal jail detainees pursuant to Sec 25
Rule 114.
Judge Espaol, in turn, transferred Malihan

o and directed the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation to HOLD AND PREVENT the departure from
the Philippines of Malihan while the cases are pending.
Judge Mupas thus alleges that Judge Espaols act of issuing

said assailed orders, despite the fact that the cases are
pending with the MTC, constitutes gross ignorance of the law and
usurpation of authority.
Judge Espaol argues that the SC Circular 39-97 does not

require that the subject criminal cases be in her court for the
issuance of a hold-departure order.
ISSUE: WON Judge Espaols order to issue a hold departure order was
valid? NOPE

criminal cases within the jurisdiction of second level courts. Criminal
cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of first level courts do not fall
within the ambit of the circular.
It is logical to state that the criminal cases must be pending in

the sala of the RTC concerned.
In this case, at time of the issuance of the hold-departure

order, the criminal cases were only in the preliminary
investigation stage in the MTC to determine whether there is
reasonable ground to believe that accused Eva Malihan is guilty of the
offense charged and should be held for trial. Judge Mupas findings
had not yet been elevated to and reviewed by the provincial
prosecutor.
12
Judge Espaols issuance of the hold-departure order was

therefore premature and clearly contravenes the mandate of
Circular No. 39-97 proscribing the precipitate and indiscriminate
issuance of hold-departure orders. All told, Judge Espaols claim of
good intention finds no convincing justification.
COMPLETE
(Note: The case is long because it discussed other topics. The ER is enough
for the assigned topic.)
Facts:
Judge Mupas charged Judge Espaol in her capacity as Executive Judge,

with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Usurpation of Authority.
Private complainants Bituon, Cantada, Mendoza, Callo and Glorioso

filed three separate criminal complaints for syndicated estafa against
Malihan, Sinagbulo, Vargas, Baldovino, Liwanag, Sanchez and Tizon
before the MTC.
Judge Mupas conducted the preliminary investigation and on the same

day, she issued a warrant of arrest against the accused and
recommended no bail for their provisional liberty.
Private complainants filed a motion to transfer Malihan from

the municipal jail to the provincial jail. Malihan filed an Urgent
Motion for Bail.
Private complainants filed a supplemental pleading adding support as

to why Malihan should be transferred. They then sent copies of the
motion to transfer and supplemental pleading to Judge Espaol,
invoking that the Executive Judge has authority to supervise all
detainees in the municipal jail of Dasmarias, Cavite under Section 25
of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Judge Mupas asked for comment on the petition for bail but
Judge Espaol issued two orders: 1) transferring Malihan to the
Provincial Jail; and 2) directed the Commissioner on
Immigration and Deportation to hold and prevent the
departure from the Philippines of Malihan while the cases are
pending.
Judge Mupas thus alleges that Judge Espaols act of issuing

said assailed orders, despite the fact that the cases are
pending with the MTC, constitutes gross ignorance of the law
and usurpation of authority.
Judge Espaol claims that the complaint is baseless and retaliatory as

it is founded on intrigue and spite for blowing the whistle concerning
Judge Mupas activities that are pernicious to the judiciary.
Judge Espaol states that Mupas involvement in a scam in

the form of commissions from bail bond applicants is the main
reason why complainant clings dearly to the delegated
authority in the conduct of preliminary investigation of cases filed
with her court.

Venue to Rule 113
Judge Espaol explains that she was surprised when she was
furnished a copy of the two pleadings relating to cases pending
with the MTC, but admits that she acted on the motions as
Executive Judge in order not to frustrate the administration of
justice.
o With respect to the transfer order, she claims that under
Section 25 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, she has the authority to supervise all persons in
custody.
o As regards the hold-departure order, she argues that she is
authorized under Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97, which
does not require that the subject criminal cases be in
her court for the issuance of a hold-departure
order. She argues further that she issued the questioned holddeparture order based on the allegation of the complaining
witnesses that accused is trying to abscond from
prosecution in the criminal case. Furthermore, she decided to
act on the motions because of the fact that complainant chose
to ignore said motions to the prejudice of the complaining
witnesses.
Subsequently, in a letter dated February 8, 2002, Judge Mupas
reiterates her earlier inquiry in 1999 involving the practice of Judge
Espaol in granting bail on cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
MTC.
On May 15, 2002, the OCA treated complainants letter as a
supplemental complaint and referred it to Judge Espaol for her
comment.
o Judge Espaol maintains that the issue of granting bail is
subject of investigation in A.M. No. MTJ-01-1348.
o She contends that the complaint is frivolous considering that
the hold-departure order she issued against Eva Malihan was
sustained by the prosecutor. She claims that it is complainant
Judge who should be investigated on irregularities in approving
bail bonds of detention prisoners. She avers further that
complainant Judge falsified her report on detention prisoners
and purposely delayed the resolution of preliminary
investigation cases until after a considerable period of time
which is a clear instance of complainant Judges gross abuse of
authority and gross ignorance of the law.
In her Reply, Judge Mupas brandishes as lies the allegations of Judge
Espaol in her Comment.
o As regards the hold-departure order, complainant Judge claims
that the case was eventually dismissed by the RTC of
Imus, Cavite. Lastly, she claims that Judge Espaol continues
to defy the rules on bail since she still issues release orders on
detention prisoners whose cases are filed either for preliminary
investigation or trial in the MTC.
o
13
On February 28, 2004, Judge Mupas filed a supplement to her

allegations in the letter dated February 8, 2002 regarding the practice
of Judge Espaol to grant bail in cases within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the MTC. She cites nine cases pending with the MTC wherein Judge
Espaol granted bail and subsequently released the accused even
though the judge where the case is pending is neither absent,
unavailable nor even alleged to be absent or unavailable.
Judge Mupas emphatically submits that without the necessity of a
formal investigation on the matter, the records of the case involved will
bear out the culpability of Judge Espaol and will more than justify the
imposition of the most severe penalty upon her.
OCA opines that Judge Espaols order to transfer the accused from the
municipal jail to the provincial jail cannot be justified under Section 25
of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides,
in part:
o SEC. 25. Court supervision of detainees. The court shall
exercise supervision over all persons in custody for the purpose
of eliminating unnecessary detention. The executive judges of
the Regional Trial Courts shall conduct monthly personal
inspections of provincial, city and municipal jails and the
prisoners within their respective jurisdictions. They shall
ascertain the number of detainees, inquire on their proper
accommodation and health and examine the condition of the
jail facilities. They shall order the segregation of sexes and of
minors from adults, ensure the observance of the right of
detainees to confer privately with counsel, and strive to
eliminate conditions inimical to detainees.
The OCA expounds that as Executive Judge, Judge Espaol exercises
supervision over all persons in custody for the purpose of eliminating
unnecessary detention but the rule does not give her the authority to
arrogate upon herself a power vested upon a presiding judge of the
court where the case is pending. Instead of issuing an order
transferring the accused, the OCA observes that Judge Espaol should
have called the attention of the complainant regarding the motions
which allegedly required immediate action; that there was no showing
that she called the attention of complainant Judge on the alleged
motion to transfer accused Eva Malihan, neither was there any
indication that the accused in the subject cases was in a situation
which requires the interference of the Executive Judge. The OCA
concludes that Judge Espaol encroached upon the power of
complaining judge when Judge Espaol took cognizance of the motions
not pending in her court.
With regard to the hold-departure order, the OCA opines that
the same cannot be sustained since it is contrary to the
mandates of Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97 inasmuch as at
the time of its issuance, no case has yet been filed in the RTC. It adds
that while Section 1 of said circular states that Hold-Departure Orders
shall be issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of

Venue to Rule 113
the Regional Trial Court the same should be read that the subject
criminal case has been filed and pending with the RTC. In the criminal
cases subject of the present administrative case, there is even no final
determination yet of a prima facie case that would warrant the filing of
an information in court. The determination made by an MTC would still
be reviewed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. The OCA
concludes that Judge Espaol went against the injunction in Circular
No. 39-97 that judges of the RTCs should be cautious and avoid the
indiscriminate issuance of hold-departure orders as this results in
inconvenience to the parties affected and is tantamount to an
infringement on the right and liberty of an individual to travel.
OCA recommends to the Court that: (a) Judge Espaol be admonished
for issuing an order transferring the accused from the municipal jail to
the provincial jail; (b) Judge Espaol be reprimanded for issuing a hold
departure order considering that it is not within her authority to issue
hold departure orders in cases pending preliminary investigation in the
MTC; Judge Espaol compulsorily retired from service on January 9,
2004.
ISSUES:
(1) WON Judge Espaols order for the issuance of a hold departure order
constitutes gross ignorance of the law? YES.
(2) Whether Judge Espaol can issue hold departure orders? NO.
HELD: Judge Dolores L. Espaol is found guilty of Gross Ignorance of the
Law and is FINED Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) to be deducted from
whatever retirement benefits due her.
Ratio:
Issuance of Hold Departure Orders (RELEVANT)
With regard to the hold-departure order, Circular No. 39-97 limits the
authority to issue hold-departure orders to criminal cases within the
jurisdiction of second level courts. Criminal cases within the exclusive
jurisdiction of first level courts do not fall within the ambit of the
circular. It is logical to state that the criminal cases must be pending in
the sala of the RTC concerned.
In this case, at time of the issuance of the hold-departure order, the

criminal cases were only in the preliminary investigation stage in the
MTC to determine whether there is reasonable ground to believe that
accused Eva Malihan is guilty of the offense charged and should be
held for trial. Judge Mupas findings had not yet been elevated to and
reviewed by the provincial prosecutor. Judge Espaols issuance of the
hold-departure order was therefore premature and clearly contravenes
the mandate of Circular No. 39-97 proscribing the precipitate and
indiscriminate issuance of hold-departure orders. All told, Judge
Espaols claim of good intention finds no convincing justification.
Powers and Duties of an Executive Judge (IRRELEVANT)
14
The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA, except as to the
recommended penalty. Judge Espaol urges that her conduct was
nothing more than the zealous fulfillment of her duties as Executive
Judge of the RTC, Dasmarias, Cavite.
However, it is elementary that an Executive Judge only has
administrative supervision over lower courts. Her function relates only
to the management of first and second level courts, within her
administrative area with a view to attaining prompt and convenient
dispatch of its business. Acting as such, she cannot unilaterally
override the MTCs actions in cases pending with it under the guise of
administrative supervision, without running afoul of the orderly
administration of justice. Only when her courts jurisdiction is
appropriately invoked in an appeal or certiorari and other special civil
actions can Judge Espaol judge, in her judicial capacity, override the
lower courts judgment.
Although the Guidelines on the Selection and Designation of Executive
Judges and Defining their Powers, Prerogatives and Duties 5, the same
is a mere reiteration of what has been in effect before said Circular.
Administrative Order No. 66, which took effect on July 1, 1975, narrates
the specific power, prerogative and duties of an executive judge. The
SECTION 1. Executive Judges; general powers, prerogatives and duties. Executive Judges
shall, within their respective area of administrative supervision:
(a)
Provide leadership in, and coordinate with the management of the first and second level
courts;
(b)
Exercise supervision over the judges and personnel;
(c)
Balance the workload among the courts and maintain equitable distribution of cases in
accordance with relevant existing issuances;
(d)
Recommend and implement policies concerning court operations;
(e)
Identify, address and resolve problems in court administration which do not require any
intervention by the Supreme Court or the Court Administrator.
(f)
Direct, through the Clerk of Court, the undertaking of staff support activities to improve
judiciary services in accordance with relevant existing issuances;
(g)
Initiate, propose, and supervise the implementation of professional development programs
for judicial personnel that the Philippine Judicial Academy, in coordination with the Office of the
Court Administrator, may undertake;
(h)
Exercise such other powers and prerogatives as may be necessary or incidental to the
performance of their functions in relation to court administration; and
(i)
Perform such other functions and duties as may be assigned by the Supreme Court or the
Court Administrator.
6
IV.
Specific Powers, Prerogatives and Duties
The specific powers, prerogatives and duties of the Executive Judge are as follows:
1.
To investigate administrative complaints against Municipal and City Judges, and other
court personnel within his administrative area; and to submit his findings and recommendations
to the Supreme Court.
10.
To visit and inspect municipal and provincial jails and their prisoners as required by
Section 1730 of the Revised Administrative Code and by applicable rules and regulations.
12.
To designate, with immediate notice to the Supreme Court, the municipal judge to try
cases in other municipalities within his area of administrative supervision, in case of absence or
incapacity of the municipal judge concerned, which designation shall be effective immediately,
unless revoked by the Supreme Court.
13.
To assign, with the prior approval of the Chief Justice, Municipal and City Judges to hear
and determine cadastral cases as provided by law.
...

Venue to Rule 113
executive judge has not been given any authority to interfere with the
transfer of detainees in cases handled by other judges, be it of the first
or second level; nor to grant hold-departure orders in cases not
assigned to her sala. The powers of an executive judge relate only to
those necessary or incidental to the performance of his/her functions in
relation to court administration.
Time and again the Court has adverted to the solemn obligation of
judges to be very zealous in the discharge of their bounden
duties. Nonetheless, the earnest efforts of judges to promote a speedy
administration of justice must at all times be exercised with due
recognition of the boundaries and limits of their jurisdiction or
authority. Judge Espaol's ardent determination to expedite the case
and render prompt justice may be a noble objective but she did so in a
manner which took away from the complainant MTC judge the initiative
which by constitutional and legal mandates properly belongs to her.
The Court agrees with the observations of the OCA that Judge Espaol
should have conferred with complainant regarding the criminal cases
and relayed her concerns to the latter, rather than precipitately issuing
the assailed orders.
The Court further notes that, contrary to Judge Espaols allegation,
complainant did not choose to simply ignore the pending motion to
transfer but, in fact, promptly directed the Chief of Police to comment
thereon.
Appropriate Penalty (NOT SO RELEVANT)
The Court recognizes that not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance
of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant
administrative sanction, but only in cases within the parameters of
tolerable misjudgment. Where, however, the procedure is so simple
and the facts so evident as to be beyond permissible margins of error,
to still err thereon amounts to ignorance of the law.[24]
Considering the Judge Espaols ten years of service as a judge, her

judicial mind should have been tempered with the delicate intricacies
of the law and procedure. Judge Espaols confusion between her
administrative and judicial functions betrays the degree of her
competency and displays her unfamiliarity with basic procedural
rules. Judge Espaol ought to have known the correct procedure to be
followed in order to ensure proper administration of justice with due
regard to her jurisdictional boundaries. She was bound to discharge her
duties with competence, prudence, caution and attention inasmuch as
she is a reflection of the entire judiciary.
Thus, the Court finds the penalty of admonition and reprimand

recommended by the OCA to be too lenient.
Besides, the recent cases wherein the penalty of reprimand was

imposed on erring judges for the issuance of hold-departure orders
beyond the ambit of Circular 39-97 is not applicable because of the
different circumstance in this case where Judge Espaol precipitately
15
issued orders in criminal cases still undergoing preliminary

investigation in the MTC.
Under Section 8 of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC amending Rule 140 of the Rules
of Court on the Discipline of Justices and Judges, which took effect on
October 1, 2001, gross ignorance of the law is classified as a serious
charge which carries with it a penalty of either dismissal from service,
suspension or a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not
exceeding P40,000.00. However, considering that the incident took
place on September 4, 2001 which is before A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC took
effect, the Court finds that a fine of P5,000.00 is sufficient for unduly
transferring the detainee and arrogating upon herself the authority to
issue a hold-departure order.
3. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO V. VASQUEZ, 217 SCRA 633 LIBONGCO

DOCTRINES
A hold departure order is but an exercise of respondent court's

inherent power to preserve and to maintain the effectiveness
of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.
Parties with pending cases therein should apply for permission to leave
the country from the very same courts which, in the first instance, are
in the best position to pass upon such applications and to impose the
appropriate conditions therefor since they are conversant with the
facts of the cases and the ramifications or implications thereof. Where,
as in the present case, a hold departure order has been issued
ex parte or motu proprio by said court, the party concerned
must first exhaust the appropriate remedies therein, through a
motion for reconsideration or other proper submissions, or by
the filing of the requisite application for travel abroad.
o Only where all the conditions and requirements for the
issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus indubitably obtain against a disposition of the lower
courts may our power of supervision over said tribunals be
invoked through the appropriate petition assailng on
jurisdictional or clearly valid grounds their actuations therein.
ER:
An information against Miriam was filed with the SB for violation of the
Anti-Graft Law.
o She filed a motion wherein she posted a 15K bond and she
stated that she was putting herself under the custody
of the SB.
She made a public statement that she was going to the US to

accept a fellowship supposedly offered by the JFK school of
Government at Harvard.
o HENCE, SB MOTU PROPRIO issued a HDO against
Miriam.

Venue to Rule 113
Miriam filed DIRECTLY WITH SC a so-called Motion to Restrain the

Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with Prayer for
the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction, with Motion to Set Pending Incident for Hearing.
Miriam argues that SB did not acquire jurisdiction, and therefore
committed GADALEJ in issuing the HDO.
ISSUE: WON HDO was properly issued? YES, SB properly issued it

RATIO:
Miriam voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the

SB when she expressly sought leave that she be considered as having
placed herself under the jurisdiction of the SB for purposes of the
required trial and other proceedings and that by said motion she be
considered as having placed herself under the custody of the SB.
o She is effectively estopped from asserting the contrary
Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to

be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction in addition to
those expressly conferred to them. These inherent powers are
such powers as are necessary for the due administration of
justice.
Miriam does not deny the public statement she made that she had
every intention of leaving the country. We uphold the course of action
adopted by the Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice of such fact of
petitioner's plan to go abroad and in thereafter issuing sua sponte the
hold departure order, in justified consonance with our preceding
disquisition.
To reiterate, the hold departure order is but an EXERCISE of

respondent court's INHERENT POWER to preserve and to
maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and
the person of the accused.
COMPLETE
FACTS
An information was filed against Miriam Defensor-Santiago (Miriam)

with the Sandiganbayan (SB) for alleged violation of Sec. 3 (e) of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
An order of arrest was issued against her by Presiding Justice Francis

Garchitorena , with bail.
Miriam filed a Urgent ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail

Bond
o It stated therein that she suffered extensive physical injuries
due to a vehicular collision and as such would not be
able to personally appear in court for an indefinite
period.
o SB issued a resolution (RES A) allowing the posting of cash
bond was authorized and physical appearance was temporarily
dispensed with.
16
Prayer: WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this

Honorable Court that the bail bond she is posting in the
amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted, and that by
this motion, she be considered as having placed herself
under the custody of this Honorable Court and
dispensing of her personal appearance for now until such
time she will (sic) have recovered sufficiently from her recent
near fatal accident.
Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez (Conrado) filed with the SB a
manifestation that Miriam appeared in his office, and that she came
and left his offices unaided.
SB issued a resolution setting arraignment, and set aside the
RES A, ordering Miriams appearance before the deputy clerk
of the First Division.
Miriam filed a motion that her cash bond be cancelled and that she
be allowed provisional liberty upon a recognizance.
o She contended that the continuance of the bail bond may
imply to other people that she has intentions of fleeing.
Miriam filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction, seeking to enjoin the SB and the RTC from proceeding with
the criminal cases for anti-graft and libel, respectively. TRO was issued.
SB issued an order deferring arraignment until further advised by the
SC and the consideration of her motion to cancel cash bond until
further initiative from her counsel.
SC dismissed the petition for certiorari and lifted the TRO.
SB issued a hold departure order against Miriam due to an
announcement made by the latter that she would be leaving
for the US to accept a fellowship supposedly offered by the JFK
school of Government at Harvard which was widely publicized
by the media.
Miriam argues that SB did not acquire jurisdiction, and therefore
committed GADALEJ in issuing the HDO. MR was also dismissed with
finality
o
ISSUE: WON the SB properly issued the HDO.

HELD: WHEREFORE, with respect to and acting on the motion now before
us for resolution, the same is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
Miriam voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the

SB when she expressly sought leave that she be considered as
having placed herself under the jurisdiction of the SB for
purposes of the required trial and other proceedings and that
by said motion she be considered as having placed herself
under the custody of the SB

Venue to Rule 113
She cannot now be heard to claim otherwise, she is
effectively estopped from asserting the contrary after
she had earlier recognized the jurisdiction of the court and
caused it to exercise that jurisdiction over the aforestated
pleadings she filed therein.
Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be
implied from a general grant of jurisdiction in addition to those
expressly conferred to them.
o These inherent powers are such powers as are
necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of
jurisdiction; or essential to the existence, dignity and functions
of the courts, as well as to the due administration of
justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to
the execution of their granted powers; and include the power
to maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in
behalf of the litigants.
A court of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies
the necessary and usual incidental powers it and subject to existing
laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted
court has the power to do things that are reasonably necessary
for the administration of justice within the scope of its
jurisdiction.
Furthermore, a court has the inherent power to make interlocutory
orders necessary to protect its jurisdiction. Such being the case, with
more reason may a party litigant be subjected to proper coercive
measures where he disobeys a proper order, or commits a fraud on the
court or the opposing party, the result of which is that the jurisdiction
of the court would be ineffectual. What ought to be done depends upon
the particular circumstances.
Miriam does not deny the public statement she made that she
had every intention of leaving the country. We uphold the
course of action adopted by the Sandiganbayan in taking
judicial notice of such fact of petitioner's plan to go abroad and
in thereafter issuing sua sponte the hold departure order, in
justified consonance with our preceding disquisition. To
reiterate, the hold departure order is but an exercise of
respondent court's inherent power to preserve and to maintain
the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the
person of the accused.
o
D.JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE ACCUSED

1.VALDEPENAS V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. L-20687, APRIL 30, 1966 LOPA
MAXIMINO VALDEPEAS, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
No. L-20687. April 30, 1966.
17
DOCTRINE:
Jurisdiction over the person of an accused is acquired upon

either his apprehension, with or without warrant, or his
submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
In the case at bar, the case went from CFICACFI CA and the
petitioner never raised the question of jurisdiction over his
person. He is deemed, therefore, to have waived that objection
and, hence, to have submitted himself to the Courts jurisdiction. What
is more, his behaviour and every single one of the steps taken by him
before said courts particularly merely a submission to the
jurisdiction thereof, but, also, that he urged the courts to exercise the
authority thereof over his person.
EMERGENCY DIGEST:
Ester ULSANO filed with the justice of peace (JOP) a criminal complaint
charging VALDEPENAS with forcible abduction with rape of Ester
Ulsano.
o JOP found probable cause and forwarded the complaint to the
CFI.
CFI: VALDEPENAS Guilty as charged.
CA: modified the decision, convicting him of abduction with consent.
Valdepenas filed MR/MNT contesting the findings of CA, to the

effect that complainant was below 18 y/o at the time of the occurrence.
o Motion was granted.
o The decision was set aside and the case was remanded to the
CFI.
CFI rendered decision reiterating findings of CA (convicting him of

abduction with consent.)
o Petitioner again appealed to CA which affirmed the CFI
decision.
o MR filed again on the ground that lower court had no
jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter of
the action for the offense of abduction with consent.
Valdepenas claims there was no complaint for abduction with
consent filed and that the lower court acquired no jurisdiction over his
person or over the crime of abduction with consent.
ISSUE: WON CFI lacked jurisdiction over the person of the accused and the
subject matter of the action for the offense of abduction with consent? CFI
HAD JURISDICTION!
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON

Venue to Rule 113
Jurisdiction over the person of an accused is acquired upon

either his apprehension, with or without warrant, or his
submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
In the case at bar, the case went from CFI->CA->CFI-> CA and the
petitioner never raised the question of jurisdiction over his person. He
is deemed, therefore, to have waived that objection and,
hence, to have submitted himself to the Courts jurisdiction.
What is more, his behaviour and every single one of the steps taken by
him before said courts particularly merely a submission to the
jurisdiction thereof, but, also, that he urged the courts to exercise the
authority thereof over his person.
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action in this case the crime
of abduction with consent is and may be conferred only by law. Under
an information for forcible abduction, the accused may be
convicted of abduction with consent.
A complaint is not a condition precedent for the exercise of jurisdiction.

The third paragraph of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code does not
determine the jurisdiction of the courts over the offenses of seduction,
abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness. It could not affect said
jurisdiction, because the same is governed by the Judiciary Act of 1948,
not by the Revised Penal Code, which deals primarily with the definition
of crimes and the factors pertinent to the punishment of the culprits.
The complaint required in said Article 344 is merely a condition
precedent to the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to
prosecute the guilty parties.
COMPLETE
FACTS:
Ester Ulsano, assisted by her mother Consuelo filed with the Justice of
the Peace Court in Piat, Cagayan, a criminal complaint, duly subscribed
and sworn to by both, charging Maximino Valdepeas with forcible
abduction with rape of Ester Ulsano.
Justice of the peace of Piat found that there was probable cause and
forwarded the complaint to the CFI Cagayan where information for
forcible abduction with rape was filed. CFI found Valdepenas guilty as
charged and sentenced him accordingly.
On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals modified the
decision of the court of first instance, convicted him of abduction with
consent and meted out to him the penalty set forth in the opening
paragraph of this decision.
MR and MNT filed by Valdepenas contesting the finding, made by the
Court of Appeals, to the effect that complainant was below 18 years of
age at the time of the occurrence, said Court granted the motion, set
18
aside its aforementioned decision and remanded the case to the court
a quo for the reception of additional evidence on said issue.
Case went back to the CFI, which rendered another decision,
reiterating said finding of the Court of Appeals, as well as its judgment
of conviction for abduction with consent and the penalty imposed
therein. Petitioner appealed again to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed that of the court of first instance with costs against the
petitioner.
Again petitioner filed an MR based, for the first time, upon the
ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the person
of appellant and over the subject matter of the action, with
respect to the offense of abduction with consent. Upon denial of
the motion, petitioner interposed the present appeal by certiorari.
ISSUE: WON CA erred in not reversing the decision of the trial court for
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused and the subject matter
of the action for the offense of abduction with consent
HELD: Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with
costs against the petitioner Maximino Valdepenas. It is so ordered.
RATIO:
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
Jurisdiction over the person of an accused is acquired upon either his
apprehension, with or without warrant, or his submission to the
jurisdiction of the court. In the case at bar, the petitioner was brought
before the bar of justice, first, before the justice of the peace court,
then before the Court of First Instance, later before the Court of
Appeals; thereafter back before said Court of First Instance, and then,
again, before the Court of Appeals, and never, within the period of six
years that had transpired until the Court of Appeals rendered its
decision, had he questioned the judicial authority of any of these three
courts over his person. He is deemed, therefore, to have waived
whatever objection he might have had to the jurisdiction over his
person, and, hence, to have submitted himself to the Courts
jurisdiction. What is more, his behaviour and every single one of the
steps taken by him before said courts particularly merely a
submission to the jurisdiction thereof, but, also, that he urged the
courts to exercise the authority thereof over his person.
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
It is well-settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action
in this case the crime of abduction with consent is and may be
conferred only by law; that the jurisdiction over a given crime, not
vested by law upon a particular court, may not be conferred thereto by
the parties involved in the offense; and that, under an information for

Venue to Rule 113
-
forcible abduction, the accused may be convicted of abduction with

consent.
A complaint is not a condition precedent for the exercise of jurisdiction.
The third paragraph of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code does not
determine the jurisdiction of the courts over the offenses of seduction,
abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness. It could not affect said
jurisdiction, because the same is governed by the Judiciary Act of
1948, not by the Revised Penal Code, which deals primarily with the
definition of crimes and the factors pertinent to the punishment of the
culprits. The complaint required in said Article 344 is merely a
condition precedent to the exercise by the proper authorities of the
power to prosecute the guilty parties. And such condition has been
imposed out of consideration for the offended woman and her family
who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go
through with the scandal of a public trial.
The complaint for forcible abduction includes abduction with consent.
Virginity is an essential ingredient of abduction with consent.The
virginity mentioned in Article 343 of the Revised Penal Code as an
essential ingredient of the crime of abduction with consent does not
exclude the idea of abduction of a virtuous woman of good reputation
(U.S. vs. Casten, 34 Phil. 808, 811-812), because the essence of the
offense is not the wrong done to the woman, but the outrage to the
family and the alarm produced in it by the disappearance of one of its
members.
The presumption of innocence includes also that of morality and
decency, and, as a consequence, of chastity.
E.JURISDICTION DETERMINED
COMPLAINT
BY
THE
ALLEGATIONS
OF
THE
1.FOZ V. PEOPLE, OCTOBER 9, 2009, G.R. NO. 167764 LUCENARIO

Foz vs. People
Doctrine: Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the complaint
Emergency Digest: PORTIGO SUED FOZ
Libel case was filed by Doctor PORTIGO against FOZ (columnist)

and FAJARDO (editor-publisher) of Panay Newspaper in RTC Iloilo.
PORTIGO was the company physician of San Miguel Corporation (SMC)

in Iloilo and an article was published in Panay News calling him
arrogant, negligent, and incompetent after an incidence wherein
he wrongly diagnosed the wife of an SMC employee which
eventually led to her death.
In the information, it merely alleged
o
o
19
that PORTIGO was a physician and medical practitioner

in Iloilo City
AND that the article was published in Panay News, a daily
publication with a considerable circulation in the City of
Iloilo.
ISSUE: WON such allegations in the complaint are sufficient to vest the
RTC Iloilo with jurisdiction?
HELD/RATIO: NO. RTC Iloilo has no jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the

allegations of the complaint or information, and the offense
must have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court.
Libel shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the CFI of the

province or city
o where the libelous article is printed and first published
o or where any of the offended parties actually resides at
the time of the commission of the offense.
The information in this case failed to allege such requisite facts.
The allegations in the Information that "Panay News, a daily publication

with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the
region" only showed that Iloilo was the place where Panay
News was in considerable circulation but did not establish that
the said publication was printed and first published in Iloilo
City.
o Just because it is of general circulation there does not mean it
was first printed and published there.
The fact that PORTIGO was a physician in Iloilo does not also
necessarily mean that he is living in Iloilo. It is possible that he
works there and has his residence elsewhere.
COMPLETE
FACTS:
Doctor PORTIGO was the company physician of the San Miguel

Corporation office in Iloilo City. FOZ and FAJARDO are the columnist and
editor-publisher respectively of the Panay News.
An article entitled MEET DR. PORTIGO, COMPANY PHYSICIAN was

published in the opinion section of Panay News on July 5, 1994 which
portrayed PORTIGO as wanting in high sense of professional integrity,
trust and responsibility expected of him as a physician.
The article primarily contained an account of the experience of patient

Lita PAYUNAN, a wife of a SMC employee, when she had a check up
with PORTIGO. Some contents of the article:
o After consultation, PORTIGO put her under observation and
took 7 months to conclude that she had rectum myoma and
must undergo an operation

Venue to Rule 113
The family engaged the services of Dr. Celis and a Dr. de los
Reyes at Doctor's Hospital. PORTIGO allegedly got mad that
PAYUNAN
chose
a
surgeon
without
seeking
his
recommendation.
o PAYUNAN was operated on but afterwards readmitted for
having difficulty urinating and defacating. second operation
was conducted this time by the surgeon recommended by
PORTIGO.
o The results were devastating! PAYUNAN woke to find
out her anus and vagina closed and a hole with a
catheter punched on her right side. This was also followed
by the news that she had cancer.
o Dr. Portigo recommended another operation, this time to bore
another hole on the left side of Lita. But a Dr. Rivera to whom
he made the referral frankly turned it down because it would
only be a waste of money since the disease was already on the
terminal state.
o SMC and PAYUNAN spent some P150,000.00 to pay for
the wrong diagnosis of the company physician.
o PAYUNAN later on died.
o Lita is not alone. Society is replete with similar experience
where physicians treat their patients for profits. Where
physicians prefer to act like agents of multinational
corporations prescribing expensive drugs seen if there are
equivalent drugs sold at the counter for much lower price. Yes,
Lita, we also have hospitals, owned by a so-called charitable
religious institutions and so-called civic groups, too greedy for
profits. Instead of promoting baby-and mother-friendly
practices which are cheaper and more effective, they still
prefer the expensive yet unhealthy practices.
An information for libel was filed in RTC Iloilo against FOZ and FAJARDO.
RTC Iloilo convicted FOZ and FAJARDO.
o MR with RTC denied.
CA affirmed. CA MR also affirmed.
Hence, the present Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari
with the SC.
PORTIGO asserts that the element of defamatory imputation was
satisfied when he was portrayed as an incompetent doctor and an
opportunist who enriched himself at the expense of the poor.
FOZ contends good faith to serve the public good and that it was in the
opinion page. Hence, there was no malice.
Solicitor General claims that FOZ and FAJARDO are raising questions of
fact (to determine whether or not there was malice) which is misplaced
in a Rule 45 petition for review.
FOZ and FAJARDO filed a reply stating that their petition does not
require the evaluation of evidence submitted in court; that malice, as
an element of libel, has always been discussed whenever raised as an
o
20
issue via a petition for review on certiorari. They also raise for the
first time the issue that the information charging them with
libel did not contain allegations sufficient to vest jurisdiction in
the RTC of Iloilo City.
The SC decided the case based on the jurisdictional issue raised in the
reply.
ISSUE: WON the complaint sufficiently alleged facts to give RTC Iloilo
jurisdiction NO.
HELD: CA decision set aside on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of RTC
Iloilo. Case dismissed without prejudice.
RATIO:
SC has consistently held that lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged
may be raised or considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the
proceedings or on appeal. Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in
a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by
express waiver or otherwise, since such jurisdiction is conferred by the
sovereign authority which organized the court, and is given only by law in
the manner and form prescribed by law.
In Macasaet vs. People, the Court held that:
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in

criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any one of
its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of
the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where
the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense
allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take
jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed
outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case
is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly
take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced
during the trial show that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want
of jurisdiction.
In this regard, Art. 360 of the RPC provides the following rules on
jurisdiction over defamation cases, as summarized in Agbayani vs. Sayo:
1.
2.
Whether the offended party is a public official or a private

person, the criminal action may be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is
printed and first published.
If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action
may also be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province

Venue to Rule 113
3.
4.
where he actually resided at the time of the commission of

the offense.
If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in
Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action
may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside
of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of
the province or city where he held office at the time of the
commission of the offense.
In this case, the information should therefore show that Iloilo City was
where the libelous article was first printed and published, or was where
PORTIGO resided at the time.
However, it failed to do so.
The information provided:
That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in the City of Iloilo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this court, both the accused as
columnist and Editor-Publisher, respectively, of Panay News, a daily
publication with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo
and throughout the region, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously with malicious intent of impeaching the virtue, honesty,
integrity and reputation of Dr. Edgar Portigo, a physician and
medical practitioner in Iloilo City, and with the malicious intent of
injuring and exposing said Dr. Edgar Portigo to public hatred, contempt
and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said daily
publication on July 5, 1994, a certain article entitled "MEET DR.
PORTIGO, COMPANY PHYSICIAN,"
The allegations in the Information that "Panay News, a daily
publication with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo
and throughout the region" only showed that Iloilo was the
place where Panay News was in considerable circulation but
did not establish that the said publication was printed and first
published in Iloilo City.
Just because the publication is of general circulation
somewhere does not mean that it was first printed or
published there.
The Information filed against petitioners failed to allege the
residence of Dr. Portigo. While the Information alleges that "Dr.
Edgar Portigo is a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City,"
such allegation did not clearly and positively indicate that he was
actually residing in Iloilo City at the time of the commission of the
offense. It is possible that Dr. Portigo was actually residing in another
place.
One who transacts business in a place and spends considerable time
thereat does not render such person a resident therein. Where one
21
may have or own a business does not of itself constitute residence

within the meaning of the statute. Pursuit of business in a place is not
conclusive of residence there for purposes of venue.
F. CREATION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN
APPLICABLE LAWS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
SECTION 4, ARTICLE XI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1486 DATED JUNE 11, 1978
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1606 DATED DECEMBER 10, 1978
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1861
REPUBLIC ACT 7995 APPROVED MARCH 10, 1995
REPUBLIC ACT 8249 APPROVED FEBRUARY 5, 1997
G.JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN

1. PEOPLE V. SANDIGANBAYAN, AUGUST 25, 2009, G.R. NO. 167304
MAGTAGNOB
Topic: Sandiganbayan Jurisdiction
DOCTRINE
Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that
they hold the positions thus enumerated by the same law.
Members of the sangguniang panlungsod are particularly

enumerated therein (Section 4a).
EMERGENCY DIGEST
Quick Facts:
AMANTE was a MEMBER OF THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD

of Toledo City in Cebu.
o She got cash advance to defray SEMINAR EXPENSES of the
Committee on Health and Environment Protection.
o 2 years have lapsed, and Amante still has not made
any liquidation.
The City Auditor sent a demand letter asking Amante to settle her
unliquidated cash advance.
o (The COA submitted an investigation report to the OMBVisayas recommending that Amante be further investigated.)
o The OMB-Visayas recommended that an Information for
Malversation of Public Funds be filed against her.
LATER, the Prosecutor, finding probable cause, filed an

Information with the SB accusing Amante for VIOLATION of THE
AUDITING CODE of the Philippines.

Venue to Rule 113
Amante filed a MOTION TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT and MOTION FOR

REINVESTIGATION on the ground that SB does NOT HAVE
JURISDICTION because Amante falls under Salary Grade 26.
SB agreed and DISMISSED the case for lack of jursidiction.
ISSUE: WON Sandiganbayan has Jursidiction? YES, SB HAS JURISDICTION.

RATIO:
In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said

offenses, the latter must be committed by, among others, officials of
the executive branch occupying positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. However, the
law is not devoid of exceptions.
Members of the sangguniang panlungsod are particularly

enumerated therein (Section 4a). 7 By simple analogy, applying the
provisions of the pertinent law, Amante, being a member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time of the alleged
commission of an offense in relation to her office, falls within
the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless of
salary grade.
Moreover, under Section 4(a), the following offenses are specifically

enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379,
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code.
In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the

offense in this case (Auditing Code Violation) Section 4(b) provides
that:
7
RA 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following people:
o
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang

panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city

treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads.
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher
rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or

controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations;
o
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
o
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
o
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and
o
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
22
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and

employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in
relation to their office.
A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision
shows that those public officials enumerated in Section 4(a) of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the
Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379
or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but
also with other offenses or felonies in relation to their office.
o
The said other offenses and felonies are broad in scope
but are limited only to those that are committed in
relation to the public official or employee's office.
This Court had ruled that as long as the offense charged in the
information is intimately connected with the office and is alleged to
have been perpetrated while the accused was in the performance,
though improper or irregular, of his official functions, there being no
personal motive to commit the crime and had the accused not have
committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held
to have been indicted for an offense committed in relation to his
office.
o
Doctrine:
Under Section 4(b) of RA 8249, as long as the offense charged in the

information is intimately connected with the office and is alleged to
have been perpetrated while the accused was in the performance,
though improper or irregular, of his official functions, there being no
personal motive to commit the crime and had the accused not have
committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held
to have been indicted for an offense committed in relation to his
office.
COMPLETE DIGEST:
FACTS:
Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of

Toledo City, Province of Cebu. Amante was able to get hold of a cash
advance in the amount of P71,095.00 under a disbursement voucher
to defray seminar expenses of the Committee on Health and
Environmental Protection, which she headed. After almost two years
since she obtained the said cash advance, no liquidation was made.
As such, Toledo City Auditor Manolo V. Tulibao issued a demand letter
to Amante asking the latter to settle her unliquidated cash advance
within 72 hours from receipt of the same demand letter.
The Commission on Audit submitted an investigation report to the

Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB-Visayas), with the
recommendation that Amante be further investigated to ascertain
whether appropriate charges could be filed against her under P.D. No.
1445, otherwise known as The Auditing Code of the Philippines.
The OMB-Visayas issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an

Venue to Rule 113
Information for Malversation of Public Funds against Amante. The

Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), upon review of the OMBVisayas' Resolution, prepared a memorandum finding probable cause
to indict Amante.
The OSP filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan accusing
Victoria Amante of violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445 (Auditing
Code).
The case was raffled to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan.
Thereafter, Amante filed with the said court a MOTION TO DEFER
ARRAIGNMENT AND MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION stating that the
Decision of the OMB-Visayas arose from an incomplete proceeding in
so far as Amante had already liquidated and/or refunded the
unexpected balance of her cash advance, which at the time of the
investigation was not included as the same liquidation papers were
still in the process of evaluation by the Accounting Department of
Toledo City and that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction
over the said criminal case because Amante was then a local
official who was occupying a position of salary grade 26,
whereas Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8249 provides
that the Sandiganbayan shall have original jurisdiction only in
cases where the accused holds a position otherwise classified
as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989, R.A. No. 6758.
The OSP filed its Opposition arguing that Amante's claim of settlement
of the cash advance dwelt on matters of defense and the same should
be established during the trial of the case and not in a motion for
reinvestigation.
As to the assailed jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, the OSP contended that the said court has
jurisdiction over respondent Amante since at the time
relevant to the case, she was a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Toledo City, therefore, falling under those
enumerated under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249. According to
the OSP, the language of the law is too plain and unambiguous that it
did not make any distinction as to the salary grade of city local
officials/heads.
Sandiganbayan- dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: WON SB has jurisdiction over a case involving a sangguniang

panlungsod member where the crime charged is one committed in relation
to office, in violation of the Auditing Code of the philippines, but not for
violation of RA 3019, RA 1379 or any of the felonies mentioned in chapter
II, section 2, title VII of the RPC YES, Sandiganbayan has Jurisdiction.
HELD: WHEREFORE, the Petition dated April 20, 2005 is hereby
GRANTED and the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated
February 28, 2005 is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, let the
case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.
23
RATIO:
The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended
by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995, which
was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. The alleged
commission of the offense, as shown in the Information was on or about
December 19, 1995 and the filing of the Information was on May 21,
2004. The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be
determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the
time of the commission of the offense. The exception contained in R.A.
7975, as well as R.A. 8249, where it expressly provides that to determine
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R.A.
No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of
the Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense
involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines. The
last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of the said two
provisions states:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379,
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where
one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions
in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of the offense:
The present case falls under Section 4(b) where other offenses
and felonies committed by public officials or employees in relation to their
office are involved. Under the said provision, no exception is contained.
Thus, the general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to
be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of
the commission of the offense applies in this present case. Since the
present case was instituted on May 21, 2004, the provisions of R.A. No.
8249 shall govern. Verily, the pertinent provisions of P.D. No. 1606 as
amended by R.A. No. 8249 are the following:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379,
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or
more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions
in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher,
of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act

Venue to Rule 113
No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers,
and other city department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads.
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of
consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and
officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as
Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions
of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions,
without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27
and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with
other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection

with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction

of the Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4(a), the following offenses are
specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A.
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code.
In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over
the said offenses, the latter must be committed by, among
others, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27
and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions.
24

Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors,
vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial
department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the
sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers ,
and other city department heads; officials of the diplomatic service
occupying the position as consul and higher; Philippine army and air
force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP
chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City and
provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
and presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of governmentowned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4(b) of
the same law provides that other offenses or felonies committed by
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation
to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent
law, Amante, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
at the time of the alleged commission of an offense in relation
to her office, falls within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner is correct in disputing the above ruling of the
Sandiganbayan. Central to the discussion of the Sandiganbayan is
the case of Inding v. Sandiganbayan where this Court ruled that the
officials enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4(a)(1) of P. D. No.
1606, as amended are included within the original jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan regardless of salary grade.
In the Inding case, the public official involved was a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod with Salary Grade 25 and was charged with
violation of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling that the Sandiganbayan had
jurisdiction over the said public official, this Court concentrated its
disquisition on the provisions contained in Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended, where the offenses involved are specifically
enumerated and not on Section 4(b) where offenses or felonies
involved are those that are in relation to the public officials' office.
Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, provides that:
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and

employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their
office.
A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision

shows that those public officials enumerated in Section 4(a) of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the
Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379
or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code,

Venue to Rule 113
but also with other offenses or felonies in relation to their

office. The said other offenses and felonies are broad in scope
but are limited only to those that are committed in relation to
the public official or employee's office. This Court had ruled that
as long as the offense charged in the information is intimately
connected with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated
while the accused was in the performance, though improper or
irregular, of his official functions, there being no personal motive to
commit the crime and had the accused not have committed it had he
not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to have been
indicted for an offense committed in relation to his office.
Thus, in the case of Lacson v. Executive Secretary, where the crime
involved was murder, this Court held that:
o The phrase other offenses or felonies is too broad as to
include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in
relation to the accuseds official functions. Thus, under said
paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the
offender that is, whether he is one of those public
officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of
Section 4. x x x.
Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan, where the public official
was charged with grave threats, this Court ruled:
o x x x In the case at bar, the amended information contained
allegations that the accused, petitioner herein, took
advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor of
Meycauayan, Bulacan when he committed the crime of grave
threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code
against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a municipal councilor.
Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading of the
Information filed against respondent Amante for violation of The
Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals that the said offense was
committed in relation to her office, making her fall under Section 4(b)
of P.D. No. 1606, as amended.
In the offenses involved in Section 4(a), it is not disputed that public
office is essential as an element of the said offenses themselves,
while in those offenses and felonies involved in Section 4(b), it is
enough that the said offenses and felonies were committed in relation
to the public officials or employees' office. In expounding the
meaning of offenses deemed to have been committed in relation to
office, this Court held:
o In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court
elaborated on the scope and reach of the term offense
committed in relation to [an accuseds] office by referring to
the principle laid down in Montilla v. Hilario [90 Phil 49
(1951)], and to an exception to that principle which was
recognized in People v. Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The
principle set out in Montilla v. Hilario is that an offense may
25
be considered as committed in relation to the

accuseds office if the offense cannot exist without
the office such that the office [is] a constituent
element of the crime x x x.
o In People v. Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice
Concepcion, said that although public office is not an
element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract, the facts in
a particular case may show that x x x the offense therein
charged is intimately connected with [the accuseds]
respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the
performance, though improper or irregular, of their official
functions. Indeed, [the accused] had no personal motive to
commit the crime and they would not have committed it had
they not held their aforesaid offices.
Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provision of Section 4(b)
does not mention any qualification as to the public officials involved.
It simply stated, public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection (a) of the same section. Therefore, it refers to those
public officials with Salary Grade 27 and above, except those
specifically enumerated.
2. SERRANA V. SANDIGANBAYAN, JANUARY 22, 2008, G.R. 162059 MUTI

DOCTRINE: See sentences in bold below.
ER:
SERANA, a student regent of UP, discussed with former Pres.

Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall in UPD.
o She then formed OSRFI with her relatives and received P15M
under OSRFIs name.
o The funds was allegedly sourced from the Office of the
President for the proposed renovation.
The next student regent along with other students filed a

COMPLAINT FOR MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS AND
PROPERTY with the Office of the Ombudsman.
SERANA was indicted.
SERANA MOVED TO QUASH the information on the ff. grounds:

o (1) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa;
o (2) she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27 and she
paid her tuition fees;
o (3) the offense charged was not committed in relation to
her office;
o (4) the funds in question personally came from President
Estrada, not from the government.
ISSUE: WON the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction in this case? YES, SB has
jurisdiction

Venue to Rule 113
(1) The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies
committed by public officials in relation to their office. Estafa is
one of those other felonies included in Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606.
The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that

o (a) the offense is committed by public officials and employees
mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and
that
o (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.
(2) It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan.
While the first part of Sec. 4(A) covers only officials with S.G. 27 and
higher, its second part specifically includes other executive
officials whose positions may not be of S.G. 27 and higher but
who are by express provision of law placed under the
jurisdiction of the said court.
This includes Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of

educational institutions or foundations. SERANA falls under this
category.
o The Board of Regents performs functions similar to
those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation.
(3) Jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the information.
The information alleged in no uncertain terms that the offense was
committed in relation to her office.
(4) Source of funds is a defense that should be raised during trial on the
merits.
COMPLETE
FACTS:
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana (SERANA) was a senior student of

the University of the Philippines-Cebu. She was appointed by then
President Joseph Estrada (ESTRADA) as a student regent of UP.
SERANA discussed with ESTRADA the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex

in UP Diliman. SERANA, with her siblings and relatives, registered with
the SEC the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).
ESTRADA gave P15M to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the

proposed renovation. The source of the funds, according to the
information, was the Office of the President.
The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize.
The succeeding student regent and the Secretary General of the

KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within the
state university, consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of
Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.
26
The Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to

indict SERANA and her brother for estafa.8
SERANA moved to quash the information. She claimed that the
Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense
charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent.
o SERANAs arguments: (a) the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over estafa; (b) she is not a public officer with
Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense
charged was not committed in relation to her office; (d) the
funds in question personally came from President Estrada, not
from the government.
The Ombudsman opposed the motion.
o Ombudsmans arguments: Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains the catch -all phrase "in
relation to office". As a member of the BOR, SERANA had the
general powers of administration and exerciseds the corporate
powers of UP. Compensation is not an essential part of
public office. Parenthetically, compensation has been
interpreted to include allowances.
The Sandiganbayan denied SERANAs motion for lack of merit.
Accused-movants claim is of no moment, in view of the express
provision of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249.9
The Information reads: That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, abovenamed accused, HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, a high-ranking public officer, being then the
Student Regent of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, while in the
performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking
advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA,
a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the
government by falsely and fraudulently representing to former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada
that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of the University of the Philippines will be renovated and
renamed as "President Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall," and for which purpose accused
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA requested the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00),
Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter relying and believing on said
false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No.
91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00),
which check was subsequently encashed by accused Jade Ian D. Serana on October 25, 2000
and misappropriated for their personal use and benefit, and despite repeated demands made
upon the accused for them to return aforesaid amount, the said accused failed and refused to do
so to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount. CONTRARY TO LAW.
(Underscoring supplied)
9
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
(A) x x x
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
xxxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. (Italics
supplied)

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It is very clear from the said provision that the Sandiganbayan
has original exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses involving the
officials enumerated in subsection (g), irrespective of their
salary grades, because the primordial consideration in the
inclusion of these officials is the nature of their responsibilities
and functions.
o A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the UP reveals
that the Board of Regents, to which accused-movant
belongs, exclusively exercises the general powers of
administration and corporate powers in the university. It
is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can
act only through its board of directors, or board of trustees in
the case of non-stock corporations. It is unmistakably evident
that the Board of Regents of the UP is performing functions
similar to those of the Board of Trustees of a non-stock
corporation. This draws to fore the conclusion that being a
member of such board, SERANA undoubtedly falls within the
category of public officials upon whom this Court is vested with
original exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that she
does not occupy a position classified as Salary Grade 27 or
higher.
o Finally, this court (Sandiganbayan) finds that SERANAs
contention that the same of P15M was received from former
President Estrada and not from the coffers of the government,
is a matter a defense that should be properly ventilated during
the trial on the merits of this case.
SERANA filed a MR which was denied with finality.
o
ISSUE: WON Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the person of SERANA

and the offense charged in the information. - YES
RATIO:
Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to quash is not correctible by
certiorari. (not the issue in this case, so brief lang)
Well-established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal
case is denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for
petitioners to go to trial, without prejudice to reiterating the special
defenses invoked in their motion to quash. Remedial measures as
regards interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned
upon and often dismissed. If the court, in denying the motion to
dismiss or motion to quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. We do
not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave abuse of
discretion.
The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is set by P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, not by R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
27
SERANAs contention: the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is determined

by Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as
amended).
Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather
than R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on
August 17, 1960. The said law represses certain acts of public officers
and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or
which may lead thereto. It does not contain an enumeration of the
cases over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa.
SERANAs contention: Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, estafa is not
among those crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
We note that in hoisting this argument, SERANA isolated the first

paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without regard to the
succeeding paragraphs of the said provision.
o The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes
should receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust
or an absurd conclusion. Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper
fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there
is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience
and absurdity is to be adopted.
Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads: B. Other offenses or felonies

whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by
the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of
this section in relation to their office.
Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies

committed by public officials in relation to their office. We see no
plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the offenses
included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of
those other felonies.
The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that

o (a) the offense is committed by public officials and employees
mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and
that
o (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.
Petitioner UP student regent is a public officer.
SERANAs contention: She is not a public officer. She does not receive any
salary or remuneration as a UP student regent
The 1987 Constitution does not define who are public officers. Rather,
the varied definitions and concepts are found in different statutes and
jurisprudence.
In Aparri v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that: A public office is the
right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a

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given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the
benefit of the public ([Mechem Public Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1).
In Laurel v. Desierto, the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of a
public office above.
SERANAs contention: She is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she
is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-paying student.
This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers
enumerated in P.D. No. 1606.
In Geduspan v. People, We held that while the first part of Section

4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its
second part specifically includes other executive officials
whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but
who are by express provision of law placed under the
jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of
law.
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan

with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this
category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs
functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock
corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed,
a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an

essential element of public office. At most, it is merely
incidental to the public office.
Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An

investment in an individual of some portion of the sovereign functions
of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public
makes one a public officer.
o The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with
Article XIV of the Constitution. UP performs a legitimate
governmental function by providing advanced instruction in
literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving
professional and technical training.49 Moreover, UP is
maintained by the Government and it declares no dividends
and is not a corporation created for profit.
The offense charged was committed in relation to public office,
according to the Information.
SERANAs contention: Even assuming that she is a public officer, the
Sandiganbayan would still not have jurisdiction over the offense because it
was not committed in relation to her office. According to her, she had no
28
power or authority to act without the approval of the BOR. She adds there
was no Board Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to contract with
then President Estrada; and that her acts were not ratified by the
governing body of the state university. Resultantly, her act was done in a
private capacity and not in relation to public office.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the

information.
In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms

that SERRANO, being then a student regent of U.P., "while in the
performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation
to her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain,
conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the
government x x x."
Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the

Sandiganbayan when it did not quash the information based on this
ground.
Source of funds is a defense that should be raised during trial on
the merits.
SERANAs contention: The amount came from President Estradas private
funds and not from the government coffers.
The information alleges that the funds came from the Office of the
President and not its then occupant, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada.
Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the
source of the P15M is a matter of defense that should be ventilated
during the trial on the merits of the instant case.
3. ESQUIVEL V. OMBUDSMAN, SEPTEMBER 17, 2002, G.R. 137237

NARVASA
Esquivel v. Ombudsman, Sandiganbayan, People of the Philippines
Topic: Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
DOCTRINE:
R.A. 7975, as amended by R.A. No. 8249,provides that it is only in
cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary grade 27 or higherthat exclusive original
jurisdiction shall be vested in the proper regional trial court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit
court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
ER: EDUARDO SUED ESQUIVELS
PO2 EDUARDO alleges that the ESQUIVELS brought him to the

municipal hall where he was mauled and threatened because he was

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one of the officers who raided a jueteng den connected to mayor
ESQUIVEL.
o Prior to his release, he was forced to sign a statement that he
was in good physical condition.
EDUARDO & CATACUTAN filed
their
respective
complaintaffidavits before the PNP-CIDG,
o which was later forwarded to Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon for appropriate action.
After investigation, Deputy Ombudsman issued the herein assailed
resolution recommending that the ESQUIVELS be indicted for
less serious physical injuries and grave threats.
Thereafter, informations for less serious physical injuries and grave
threats were filed before the Sandiganbayan, which assumed
jurisdiction over the case.
BRGY CAPTAIN was now questioning the SBs jurisdiction, saying that
he is a mere Brgy captain he is outside the SBs jurisdiction
ISSUE: WON the SB was correct in assuming jurisdiction over the case
against the municipal mayor and the barangay captain? YES!
Under the 1991 Local Government Code, Mayor Esquivel has a salary
grade of 27, and it had been previously held by this Court that
municipal mayors fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.
Neither can Barangay Captain Mark Anthony Esquivel claim

that since he is not a municipal mayor, he is outside the SBs
jurisdiction.
o Since Barangay Captain Esquivel is the co-accused of Mayor
Esquivel, whose position falls under salary grade 27, the
Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion in
assuming jurisdiction over said criminal case.

corresponding to salary grade 27 or higherthat exclusive
original jurisdiction shall be vested in the proper regional trial
court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal
circuit court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
In this case, one of the accused falls under SBs jurisdiction. Hence, SB
has jurisdiction over Brgy Captain too.
COMPLETE
Facts:
PO2 Herminigildo C. Eduardo (EDUARDO) and SPO1 Modesto P.
Catacutan (CATACUTAN) filed their respective complaint-affidavits
before the PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNPCIDG).
29
They charged herein petitioners Antonio Prospero Esquivel

(ESQUIVEL) municipal mayor of Jaen and his brother,
Mark
Anthony
Eboy
Esquivel
(EBOY), barangay
captain of barangay Apo, Jaen, with alleged illegal arrest,
arbitrary detention, maltreatment, attempted murder, and
grave threats.
o Also included in the charges were other police and LTO officers
of the Jaen Municipal Police Force for dereliction of duty.
At about 12:30 p.m., EDUARDO was about to eat lunch at his
parents house at Jaen when ESQUIVEL and EBOY arrived with
police officers and disarmed EDUARDO.
o They then forced him to board their vehicle and brought him to
the Jaen Municipal Hall.
While they were on their way to the town hall, ESQUIVEL mauled him
with the use of a firearm and threatened to kill him. ESQUIVEL pointed
a gun at him and said, Putang-ina mo, papatayin kita, aaksidentihin
kita dito, bakit mo ako kinakalaban!
Upon reaching the municipal hall, EBOY shoved EDUARDO inside an
adjacent hut. ESQUIVEL then ordered one of the officers to kill him,
saying Patayin mo na iyan at gawan ng senaryo at report.
At this point, according to CATACUTAN, he arrived to verify what
happened to his teammate EDUARDO, but ESQUIVEL likewise
threatened him and ordered one of the officers of the Jaen Police
Station to file charges against EDUARDO. He once again struck
EDUARDO in the nape with a handgun, while EBOY was holding the
latter.
EDUARDO then fell and lost consciousness. When he regained his
consciousness, he was told that he would be released. Prior to his
release, however, he was forced to sign a statement in the
police blotter that he was in good physical condition.
EDUARDO told the PNP-CIDG investigators that he was most likely
maltreated and threatened because ESQUIVEL believed he was
among the law enforcers who raided a jueteng den in Jaen that
same day. He surmised that the mayor disliked the fact that he
arrested members of crime syndicates with connections to the mayor.
He also presented a medical certificate showing the injuries he suffered
and other documentary evidence.
After the initial investigation, the PNP-CIDG forwarded the
pertinent records to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon for appropriate action.
Deputy Ombudsman issued the impugned resolution recommending
that the ESQUIVEL BROTHERS be indicted for the crime of less serious
physical injuries, and ESQUIVEL alone for grave threats. Ombudsman
Desierto approved.

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Thereafter, separate informations for less serious physical injuries

against the ESQUIVEL BROTHERS and for grave threats against
ESQUIVEL alone were filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Is the Ombudsman guilty of GADLEJ?

Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion in
assuming jurisdiction over Criminal Cases? [Our topic]
I. Powers of the Ombudsman
The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists

reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the
corresponding information with the appropriate courts.
Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere
with the Ombudsmans exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory
powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise.
Consistent policy of non-interference in the determination of the

Ombudsman regarding the existence of probable cause, provided there
is no grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion.
In this case, petitioners utterly failed to establish that the

Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in rendering
the disputed resolution and order.
There was no abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, much

less grave abuse in disregarding PO2 Eduardos admission that he was
in good physical condition when he was released from the police
headquarters.
o Admission was never brought up during the preliminary
investigation.
o The records show that no such averment was made in
petitioners counter-affidavit[ nor was there any document
purporting to be the exculpatory statement attached therein as
an annex or exhibit.
o Petitioners only raised this issue in their motion for
reconsideration.
II.
Sandiganbayans Jurisdiction
Petitioners allege that the positions of municipal mayors
and barangay captains are not mentioned therein, they claim they are
not covered by said law under the principle of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.
We already held that municipal mayors fall under the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Nor can Barangay Captain Mark Anthony Esquivel claim that since he is
not a municipal mayor, he is outside the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.
30
corresponding to salary grade 27 or higherthat exclusive original

jurisdiction shall be vested in the proper regional trial court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit
court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
Note that under the 1991 Local Government Code, Mayor Esquivel has
a salary grade of 27.
Since Barangay Captain Esquivel is the co-accused of Mayor Esquivel,
whose position falls under salary grade 27, the Sandiganbayan
committed no grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over
said criminal case.
H.DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT BECAUSE OF INORDINATE DEL AY

1.TATAD V. SANDIGANBAYAN, 159 SCRA 70 ORTIZ
Doctrine: The inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation
and filing the information is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed
right of the petitioner to due process and to a speedy disposition of the
cases against him
PD 911 prescribes a 10-day period for the prosecutor to

resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its
termination. While this period fixed by law is merely
"directory," yet, on the other hand, it cannot be disregarded or
ignored completely, with absolute impunity.
ER: 1) PSD; 2) TANODBAYAN; 3) CIS
1974, Antonio de los Reyes, Executive Assistant of the Department of

Public Information, filed a report with the Legal PanelPresidential Security Demand, charging Tatad, the Secretary of
the Department, with violations of the ANTI GRAFT LAW.
o No action was taken on the report.
5 years later (1979), de los Reyes filed a complaint with

Tanodbayan, alleging the same things. Within the same year, Tatad
resigned.
It was only after Tatads resignation was accepted by Marcos when the
Tanodbayan
referred
the
complaint
to
the
Criminal
Investigation Service (CIS) for fact finding investigation.
In June 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan,

recommending the filing of charges for graft and corruption against
Tatad.
By 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were already with

the Tanodbayn and the case was already for disposition.
o However, it was only in 1985 (3 years delay in the
preliminary investigation) that a resolution was
approved by the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing

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of the corresponding criminal informations against the

accused Francisco Tatad.
Thereafter, 5 criminal informations were later filed with the
Sandiganbayan.
o (3 informations for failure to file SALN, the other two relate to
bribery and giving undue advantage to a private corporation)
Tatad filed a MOTION TO QUASH the information based on the
alleged violation of due process and his right to a speedy
disposition of casesDENIED BY SB.
Hence, Certiorari (65) with the SC.
ISSUE: WON Tatad was deprived of his constitutional right to due process
and the right to "speedy disposition" of the cases against him as
guaranteed by the Constitution? YES, his right was violated
The long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by

the Tanodbayan in the instant case is violative of the constitutional
right of the accused to due process.
PD 911 prescribes a 10-day period for the prosecutor to

resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its
ignored completely, with absolute impunity.
Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the

conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance
with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the
case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process
constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law.
COMPLETE
Facts:
In 1974, Antonio de los Reyes (Head Executive Assistant of Department of
Public Information) filed a formal report with the Legal Panel, Presidential
Security Command against Tatad (who was then Secretary of the Dept. of
Public Information). Allegations therein relate to alleged violations of RA
3019 (anti-graft). No action was taken on said report. 5 years later (1979),
Tatad resigned from his post as department head. 2 months later, de los
Reyes filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan against Tatad alleging the
same things. In 1980, the resignation of Tatad was accepted by Pres.
Marcos. In the same year, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the
Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) for fact finding investigation.
Thereafter, an investigation report was made stating that based on
evidence gathered, Tatad violated RA 3019.
Tatad filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that he has
immunity from prosecution (PD 1791). This was denied. So pleadings were
instead submitted. By 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were
already with the Tanodbayan for final disposition. Note that it was only in
1985 when the
Tanodbayan made a resolution recommending that
31
informations be filed with the Sandiganbayan against Tatad. 2 months

after, Five informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan (3 informations
for failure to file SALN, the other two relate to bribery and giving undue
advantage to a private corporation).
Tatad filed a motion to quash with the Sandiganbayan alleging, among
other things, that the prosecution deprived him of due process of law and
of the right to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him,
amounting to loss of jurisdiction to file the information and that the
offenses charged had already prescribed. On the other hand, Tanodbayan
submitted that based on jurisprudence, the filing of the complaint with
them interrupted that prescription period so the offenses are not really
prescribed yet. Moreover, Tanodbayan pointed out that a law such as BP
195, extending the period of limitation with respect to criminal prosecution,
unless the right to acquittal has been acquired, is constitutional.
Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash. It held that based on the Rule
117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the defect in the information
can be cured by amendment. So several months after this resolution, an
amended information was filed by the Tanodbayan changing the dates of
the commission of the offenses.
MR filed by Tatad also denied. Hence, this certiorari and prohibition (Rule
65) was filed with the SC. Tatad claims that the Tanodbayan culpably
violated the constitutional mandate of due process and speedy disposition
of cases in unduly prolonging the termination of the preliminary
investigation and in filing the corresponding information only after
more than a decade from the alleged commission of the purported
offenses, which amounted to loss of jurisdiction and authority to file the
informations.
The Sandiganbayan dismissed this by saying that the applicability of the
authorities cited by Tatad to the case at bar was "nebulous;" that it would
be premature for the court to grant the "radical relief" prayed for at this
stage of the proceeding; that the mere allegations of "undue delay" do not
suffice to justify acceptance thereof without any showing "as to the
supposed lack or omission of any alleged procedural right granted or
allowed to the respondent accused by law or administrative fiat" or in the
absence of "indubitable proof of any irregularity or abuse" committed by
the Tanodbayan in the conduct of the preliminary investigation; that such
facts and circumstances as would establish petitioner's claim of denial of
due process and other constitutionally guaranteed rights could be
presented and more fully threshed out at the trial.
ISSUE: Was Tatad deprived of his constitutional right to due process and
the right to "speedy disposition" of the cases against him as guaranteed by
the Constitution? (YES)

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Held: In a number of cases, the SC has not hesitated to grant the so-called
"radical relief" and to spare the accused from undergoing the rigors and
expense of a full-blown trial where it is clear that the accused has been
deprived of due process of law or other constitutionally guaranteed rights.
Of course, it goes without saying that in the application of the doctrine
enunciated in those cases, particular regard must be taken of the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case.
A review of the facts at hand cannot but leave the impression that
political motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling the
prosecutorial process in this case. First, the complaint came to life
only after Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos.
Second, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for
preliminary investigation, which require the submission of affidavits
and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their
witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential
Security Command for finding investigation and report.
SC held that there was a blatant departure from the established

procedure as a dubious, but revealing attempt to involve an office
directly under the President in the prosecution was politically
motivated.
Prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid, giving the impression
that their noble office is being used or prostituted, wittingly or
unwittingly, for political ends or other purposes alien to, or subversive
of, the basic and fundamental objective of serving the interest of
justice evenhandedly, without fear or favor to any and all litigants
alike, whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Only
by strict adherence to the established procedure may the public's
perception of the impartiality of the prosecutor be enhanced.
LONG DELAY
Moreover, the long delay in resolving the case under preliminary

investigation cannot be justified on the basis of the facts on record.
PD 911 prescribes a10 day period for the prosecutor to resolve

a case under preliminary investigation by him from its
ignored completely, with absolute impunity. It certainly cannot be
assumed that the law has included a provision that is deliberately
intended to become meaningless and to be treated as a dead letter.
The long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by

the Tanodbayan in the instant case is violative of the constitutional
right of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the
requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary
investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation
prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor,
is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by
the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due
process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of "speedy
disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights
32
(both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is
violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to
three (3) years cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light
of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. It has been suggested
that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation should
not be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary
investigation does not warrant dismissal of the information. True but
the absence of a preliminary investigation can be corrected by giving
the accused such investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of a
preliminary investigation cannot be corrected, for until now, man has
not yet invented a device for setting back time.
2.CERVANTES V. SANDIGANBAYAN, 307 SCRA 149 - PEREZ DE TAGLE

May 18, 1999
DOCTRINE: It is the duty of the prosecutor to speedily resolve the
complaint, as mandated by the Constitution, regardless of whether the
petitioner did not object to the delay or that the delay was with
his acquiescence provided that it was not due to causes directly
attributable to him.
ER: ALMENDRAS COMPLAINED AGAINST TAPANG, THEN SP FILED
INFO AGAINST CERVANTES 6 years later
ALMENDRAS filed a complaint with the TANODBAYAN against Tapang for

falsification of Almendras salaysay.
o He mentioned that help was sought from Cervantes in such
falsification.
AFTER 6 YEARS, the Special Prosecution officer filed an

information in the Sandiganbayan (SB) against Cervantes for
violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
o Cervantes filed an MR with the Office of the Special Prosecutor
(denied).
Then he filed a MOTION TO QUASH with the SB for, inter alia, the
case having prescribed due to unreasonable delay in the resolution of
the preliminary investigation SB DENIED.
Hence, Cervantes filed a special civil action for CERTIORARI &

PROHIBITION with preliminary injunction with the SC to annul the
SBs order denying the motion to quash.
ISSUE: WON SB acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion
to quash for violation of the right to speedy disposition of the case. YES,
GADLEJ, Cervantes right to speedy disposition of the case was
violated!
The SB and Special Prosecutor try to justify the inordinate delay in

the resolution of the complaint by stating that no political

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motivation appears to have tainted the prosecution of the

case. (referring to jurisprudence that seemed to name that as
an additional standard, aside from a delay, to quash the case
on the ground of inordinate delay). The SC said NO WAY is that
meritorious.
It is the duty of the prosecutor to speedily resolve the
complaint, as mandated by the Constitution, regardless of whether
the petitioner did not object to the delay or that the delay was
with his acquiescence provided that it was not due to causes
directly attributable to him.
Thus, the SC annulled the order of the SB and Cervantes ended up
winning. Case against him in the SB was dismissed
COMPLETE
Facts:
On March 6, 1986, one Pedro Almendras filed with the Office of the
Tanodbayan (predecessor of the Ombudsman) a sworn complaint
against Alejandro Tapang for falsification of complainant's "salaysay"
alleging that Alejandro Tapang made complainant sign a piece of paper
in blank on which paper a "salaysay" was later inscribed stating that
complainant had been paid his claim in the amount of P17,594.00,
which was not true.
o In the said complaint, Pedro Almendras mentioned that he
sought the help of petitioner Elpidio C. Cervantes who
worked as analyst in the office of labor arbiter Teodorico
L. Ruiz
Cervantes filed with the office of the Tanodbayan an affidavit stating

that he had nothing to do with the blank paper that Almendras signed.
More than six (6) years after the filing of the initiatory complaint with
the Tanodbayan, Special Prosecution Officer filed with the
Sandiganbayan, assigned to the First Division, an Information charging
petitioner Elpidio C. Cervantes, together with Teodorico L. Ruiz and
Alejandro Tapang with violation of Section 3 (e), Republic Act 3019.
o Cervantes filed a motion for reconsideration with the Office of
the Special Prosecutor reiterating that he never met
complainant Almendras [OMB denied]
o Cervantes filed with the Sandiganbayan, Manila, a "motion to
defer arraignment due to pendency of reinvestigation or
motion to quash and motion to recall warrant of arrest" on
the ground that
(a) petitioner filed with the office of the Special

Prosecutor a motion for reinvestigation;
(b) that the case against Cervantes
"has
prescribed" due to unreasonable delay in the
resolution of the preliminary investigation, and
(c) that the acts charged in the information do not

constitute an offense
33
ISSUE:
1.
Whether the acts charged in the information filed against petitioner for
violation of Section 3 (e), R. A. 3019 do not constitute an offense [NOT
RULED UPON]
2. Whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of
discretion in denying his motion to quash for violation of the
right to speedy disposition of the case. [YES INORDINATE
DELAY IS MENTIONED IN THE RATIO]
HELD: WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition and ANNULS
the minute resolution of the Sandiganbayan, dated December 24, 1992, in
Criminal Case No. 17673. The Court directs the Sandiganbayan to dismiss
the case, with costs de oficio.
The temporary restraining order heretofore issued is made permanent.
Ratio:
Issue 1
We deem it unnecessary to resolve the first issue in view of the foregoing
ruling.
Issue 2
We find petitioner's contention meritorious.

He was deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case, a right
guaranteed by the Constitution.
o It took the Special Prosecutor (succeeding the Tanodbayan) six
(6) years from the filing of the initiatory complaint before he
decided to file an information
for the offense with the
Sandiganbayan.
o The letter complaint was filed with the Tanodbayan on March 6,
1986. The affidavit of the petitioner was filed therein on
October 16, 1986.
o The Special Prosecutor resolved the case on May 18, 1992.
In their comment to the petition at bar, the Sandiganbayan and the
Special Prosecutor try to justify the inordinate delay in the
resolution of the complaint by stating that no political
motivation appears to have tainted the prosecution of the
case in apparent reference to the case of Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan,
where the Court ruled that the long delay (three years) in the
termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan" was
violative of the Constitutional right of speedy disposition of cases
because political motivations played a vital role in activating and
propelling the prosecutorial process in this case.
The Special Prosecutor also cited Alvizo vs. Sandiganbayan (footnote
220 SCRA 55, 64) alleging that, as in Alvizo, the petitioner herein was
insensitive to the implications and contingencies thereof by not taking
any step whatsoever to accelerate the disposition of the matter.

Venue to Rule 113
We cannot accept the Special Prosecutors ratiocination. It is the duty

of the prosecutor to speedily resolve the complaint, as mandated by
the Constitution, regardless of whether the petitioner did not
object to the delay or that the delay was with his acquiescence
provided that it was not due to causes directly attributable to
him.
Consequently, we rule that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in not quashing the information for violation of petitioners
Constitutional right to the speedy disposition of the case in the level of
the Special Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman.
I.JURISDICTION OF THE OMBUDSMAN

APPLICABLE LAW
I.1.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6770 OTHERWISE

OMBUDSMAN ACT OF 1989
KNOWN
AS
THE
CASES
1. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE V. LIWAG, FEBRUARY 11, 2005, G.R. NO.
149311 PUNO
DOJ v LIWAG, LACSON & AQUINO
DOCTRINE: Section 15(1) of Republic Act No. 6770 gives the Ombudsman
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and
authorizes him to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency,
the investigation of such cases.
The power of the Ombudsman to
investigate cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not co-equal with
other investigative bodies, such as the DOJ.
ER: OMB NBI
Mary Ong filed with the OMB a complaint affidavit against Lacson et al
for kidnapping and murder. The OMB ordered Lacson et al to file
their counter-affidavits.
Lacson et al filed the counter-affidavits and prayed that the case be

dimissed.
Months later, Mary Ong executed a sworn statement before the

NBI regarding the same matter.
o NBI Director ordered DOJ Sec. Perez to form a panel of
prosecutors.
o The panel sent a subpoena to Lacson et al with an order
to submit counter-affidavits.
o Lacson et al filed a MTD citing the pending case with
the OMB.
34
DOJ panel denied so Lacson et al filed PETITION FOR PROHIBITION

on the ground that the DOJ has no jurisdiction over the matter.
Judge Liwag granted Lacsons petition so DOJ appealed to SC
ISSUE: WON DOJ has authority to conduct preliminary investigation even if

there is pending case in OMB about same subject matter and same
parties? NONE
HELD: DOJ has no jurisdiction. OMB has jurisdiction. No concurrent
jurisdiction
Section 15(1) of Republic Act No. 6770 gives the Ombudsman

primary
jurisdiction
over
cases
cognizable
by
the
Sandiganbayan and authorizes him to take over, at any stage,
from any investigatory agency, the investigation of such cases.
This power to take over a case at any time is not given to other
investigative bodies.
All this means that the power of the
Ombudsman to
investigate
cases
cognizable
by
the
Sandiganbayan is not co-equal with other investigative bodies,
such as the DOJ.
The Office of the Ombudsman is a constitutional creation. In contrast,

the DOJ is an extension of the executive department, bereft of the
constitutional independence granted to the Ombudsman.
COMPLETE
FACTS
Mary Ong filed a complaint-affidavit before the Ombudsman against PNP
General Panfilo M. Lacson, and other high-ranking officials of the PNP for
kidnapping and murder.
She alleged that she was a former undercover agent of the Presidential
Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) and the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Narcotics Group,
The Ombudsman found the complaint-affidavit sufficient in form and
substance and required Lacson et al to file their counter-affidavits on the
charges. Lacson et al submitted their counter-affidavits and prayed that
the charges against them be dismissed.
Subsequently, Mary Ong and other witnesses executed sworn
statements before the NBI, alleging the same facts and
circumstances she revealed in her complaint-affidavit before the
Ombudsman.
NBI Director Reynaldo Wycoco wrote a letter to Secretary of Justice
Hernando Perez and recommended the investigation of Lacson, Aquino,
other PNP officials.

Venue to Rule 113
Thus, a panel of prosecutors from the DOJ sent a subpoena to Lacson et al.
The subpoena required Lacson et al to submit their counter-affidavits and
controverting evidence at the scheduled preliminary investigation on the
complaint filed by the NBI at the DOJ Multi-Purpose Hall.
Prior to the preliminary investigation, Lacson and Aquino manifested in a
letter that:
1.
the DOJ panel of prosecutors should dismiss the complaint filed
since there was also a pending case before the Ombudsman
alleging a similar set of facts against the same respondents.
2. according to the Courts ruling in Uy v. Sandiganbayan, the
Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over criminal cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this
primary jurisdiction, he may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such
cases involving public officials, including police and military
officials such as private respondents.
The DOJ construed the letter as a motion to dismiss and denied such on the
basis that under the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, an MTD is not allowed.
Lacson and Aquino filed before the RTC Manila a PETITION FOR
PROHIBITION arguing that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct a
preliminary investigation on the complaints submitted by Mary
Ong and the other witnesses.
This was granted by Judge Liwag who issued an Order that prohibited the
DOJ from conducting the preliminary investigation against Lacson and
Aquino. A Writ of Preliminary Injunction was likewise issued by the trial
court.
Judge Liwag reasoned that since the OMB has assumed jurisdiction over
the parties and the subject matter, the DOJ cannot insist on conducting a
preliminary investigation on the same matter under the pretext of a shared
and concurrent authority. In the final analysis, the resolution on the matter
by the Ombudsman is final. Thus, the other investigative agencies of the
Government have no power and right to add an input into the
Ombudsmans investigation.
Furthermore, Judge Liwag argued that rudimentary common sense and
becoming respect for power and authority would require the DOJ panel to
desist from interfering with the case already handled by the Ombudsman.
The DOJ panel consists of deputized prosecutors by the Ombudsman.
Since that is the truth, the exercise by the principal of the powers negates
absolutely the exercise by the agents of a particular power and authority.
The hierarchy of powers must be remembered. The principle of agency
must be recalled.
35
DOJ appealed directly to the SC on the basis of GADLEJ.

ISSUE: Whether the DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary
investigation despite the pendency before the Ombudsman of a complaint
involving the same accused, facts, and circumstances.
HELD: No. OMB has jurisdiction. No concurrent jurisdiction with DOJ.
RATIO
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
DOJ appealed to the SC without filing an MR of the RTC order on the

ground that it was imperative for them to do so for the sake of the
speedy administration of justice and that this is all the more
compelling, in this case, considering that this involves the highranking officers of the PNP and the crimes being charged have
already attracted nationwide attention.
SC RULING: Allowed since time is of the essence in this case. At

stake here may not only be the safety of witnesses who risked life and limb
to give their statements to the authorities, but also the rights of Lacson et
al who may need to clear their names and reputations of the accusations
against them. The rules of procedure are not to be applied when such
application would clearly defeat the very rationale for their conception and
existence.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
The authority of the DOJ to conduct a preliminary investigation is

based on the provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code under
Chapter I, Title III, Book IV, governing the DOJ, which states:
Section 1. Declaration of policy. It is the declared policy
of the State to provide the government with a principal law
agency which shall be both its legal counsel and
prosecution arm; administer the criminal justice system in
accordance with the accepted processes thereof consisting
in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders
and administration of the correctional system; . . .
Section 3. Powers and Functions. To accomplish its
mandate, the Department shall have the following powers
and functions:
...

Venue to Rule 113
(2) Investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute
offenders and administer the probation and
correction system;
...
his deputies, i.e., they should be natural-born citizens, of

recognized probity and independence and must not have been
candidates for any elective office in the immediately preceding
election. The Ombudsman and his deputies were given the rank
and salary equal to that of the Chairman and Members,
respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions, with a prohibition
for any decrease in their salary during their term of office. They
were given a fixed term of seven years, without reappointment.
Upon their cessation from office, they are prohibited from running
for any elective office in the immediately succeeding election.
Finally, unlike other investigative bodies, the Constitution granted
the Office of the Ombudsman fiscal autonomy. Clearly, all these
measures are intended to enhance the independence of the
Office of the Ombudsman.
Furthermore, Section 1 of the Presidential Decree 1275, effective April 11,

1978, provides:
Section 1. Creation of the National Prosecution Service;
Supervision and Control of the Secretary of Justice. There
is hereby created and established a National Prosecution
Service under the supervision and control of the Secretary
of Justice, to be composed of the Prosecution Staff in the
Office of the Secretary of Justice and such number of
Regional State Prosecution Offices, and Provincial and City
Fiscals Offices as are hereinafter provided, which shall be
primarily responsible for the investigation and prosecution
of all cases involving violations of penal laws.
2.
The OMB serves as the principal and primary complaints

and action center for the aggrieved layman baffled by the
bureaucratic maze of procedures . It was vested with the power
to investigate complaints against a public office or officer
on its own initiative, even without a formal complaint
lodged before it. It can inquire into acts of government
agencies and public servants based on reports in the media
and those which come to his attention through sources
other than a complaint. The method of filing a complaint with
the Ombudsman is direct, informal, speedy and inexpensive. All
that may be required from a complainant is sufficient information
detailing the illegal or improper acts complained of. The ordinary
citizen, who has become increasingly dependent on public
agencies, is put to minimal expense and difficulty in getting his
complaint acted on by the Office of the Ombudsman. Vis--vis
other prosecutors, the exercise by the Ombudsman of its power to
investigate public officials is given preference over other bodies.
3.
Section 15(1) of Republic Act No. 6770 gives the

Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan and authorizes him to take over, at any
stage, from any investigatory agency, the investigation of
such cases. This power to take over a case at any time is not
given to other investigative bodies. All this means that the power
of the Ombudsman to investigate cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan is not co-equal with other investigative
bodies, such as the DOJ. The Ombudsman can delegate the
power but the delegate cannot claim equal power.
Section 15, Republic Act No. 6640, known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989,
provides:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and
duties:
(1)
Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint
by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of
such cases; .
Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution specifically vests in the
Office of the Ombudsman the plenary power to investigate any
malfeasance, misfeasance or non-feasance of public officers or
employees.
To discharge its duty effectively, the Constitution endowed the
Office of the Ombudsman with special features which puts it a
notch above other grievance-handling, investigate bodies.
1.
The OMB is independent and insulated from the intrusions of

partisan politics. Thus, the Constitution provided for stringent
qualification requirements for the selection of the Ombudsman and
36
Therefore, while the DOJ has general jurisdiction to conduct

preliminary investigation of cases involving violations of the
Revised Penal Code, this general jurisdiction cannot diminish the
plenary power and primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to

Venue to Rule 113
investigate complaints specifically directed against public officers
and employees.
The Office of the Ombudsman is a constitutional creation. In contrast, the
DOJ is an extension of the executive department, bereft of the
constitutional independence granted to the Ombudsman.
37
In the past, the complaint was never filed ahead with the Office of
the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation. Hence, there was no
simultaneous exercise of power between two coordinate bodies and no risk
of conflicting findings or orders
OTHER MATTERS (I included the listing of other cases mentioned just in

case Atty. Tranquil asks)10
PLUS: Allowing the DOJ to assume jurisdiction over the case would not
promote an orderly administration of justice. It would go against the
multiplicity of proceedings, cause undue difficulties to the respondents who
would have to appear and defend his position before every agency or body
where the same complaint was filed, and leave hapless litigants at a loss
as to where to appear and plead their cause or defense. Should the two
bodies exercising jurisdiction at the same time come up with conflicting
resolutions, this would be greatly problematic. Also, the second
investigation would entail an unnecessary expenditure of public funds, and
the use of valuable and limited resources of Government, in a duplication
of proceedings already started with the Ombudsman.
NOTE: SC said none of the cases previously decided by this Court involved
a factual situation similar to that of the present case.
2. LAZATIN V. DESIERTO, JUNE 5, 2009, G.R. NO. 147097 - QUIJANOBENEDICTO
The Doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction is not applicable. While the doctrine

of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same
subject matter, the settled rule is that the body or agency that first
takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of the others. In the present case, initial complaint was filed
with the OMB. Hence, it has the authority to proceed with the preliminary
investigation to the exclusion of the DOJ.
10
In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), the Court

upheld the special authority of the PCGG to conduct the preliminary investigation of ill-gotten
wealth cases pursuant to Executive Order No. 1, issued by then President Aquino, creating the
PCGG. While the Court emphasized in Cojuangco that the power of the Ombudsman to conduct
a preliminary investigation over said cases is not exclusive but a shared authority, the
complaints for the alleged misuse of coconut levy funds were filed directly with the PCGG. No
complaint was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman. Moreover, a close scrutiny of said case
will disclose that the Court recognized the primary, albeit shared, jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
to investigate all ill-gotten wealth cases. In fact, it ordered the PCGG to desist from proceeding
with the preliminary investigation as it doubted the impartiality of the PCGG to conduct the
investigation after it had previously caused the issuance of sequestration orders against
petitioners assets.
In Sanchez v. Demetriou, the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission filed a complaint with the
DOJ against petitioner Mayor Sanchez for the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez.
After the DOJ panel prosecutors conducted the preliminary investigation, a warrant of arrest was
issued and the corresponding Informations were filed in court by the DOJ prosecutors. Petitioner
claimed that it is only the Ombudsman who has the power to conduct investigation of cases
involving public officers like him. The Court reiterated its previous ruling that the authority to
investigate and prosecute illegal acts of public officers is not an exclusive authority of the
Ombudsman but a shared authority. However, it will be noted that the complaint for preliminary
investigation in that case was filed solely with the DOJ.
In Aguinaldo v. Domagas, a letter-complaint charging petitioners with sedition was filed with
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Cagayan. After investigation by the DOJ panel of
prosecutors, the corresponding Information was filed in court. The pertinent issue raised by
petitioners was whether the prosecutors can file the said Information without previous authority
from the Ombudsman. The Court ruled in the affirmative and reiterated its ruling regarding the
shared authority of the DOJ to investigate the case. Again, it should be noted that the complaint
in that case was addressed solely to the provincial prosecutor.
The same factual scenario obtains in the cases of Natividad v. Felix and Honasan v. Panel of
Investigating Prosecutors of the DOJ where the letter-complaint against petitioners public
officers were brought alone to the DOJ prosecutors for investigation.
LAZATIN VS. DESIERTO as OMBUDSMAN and SANDIGANBAYAN (2009)

Doctrine: OSP is "merely a component of the Office of the
Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control,
and upon authority of the Ombudsman
Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and RA 6770,
the Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute any act or
omission of a public officer or employee when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.
EMERGENCY
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, praying that the
Ombudsman's disapproval of the Office of the Special Prosecutor's
(OSP) Resolution recommending dismissal of the criminal cases filed
against Lazatin.
Congressman Lazatin et al. were accused of ILLEGAL USE OF PUBLIC

FUNDS under Article 220 of the RPC and violation of Section 3, (a)
and (e) of RA3019.
o The complaint alleged that there were irregularities in
the use by of his Countrywide Development Fund
(CDF) for 1996, i.e., he was both proponent and
implementer of the projects funded from his CDF.
A preliminary investigation was conducted and the Evaluation and

Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) issued a Resolution
recommending the filing of cases.
The OMB approved the resolution and 28 Informations were filed

against Lazatin et al. before the SANDIGANBAYAN.

Venue to Rule 113
Lazatin and his co-petitioners filed their respective
Motions for Reconsideration/Reinvestigation, which
were granted by the Sandiganbayan.
***The OSP submitted to the OMB its Resolution and
recommended the DISMISSAL of the cases for lack or
insufficiency of evidence.
***However, instead of dismissing the case, OMB ordered the Office
of the Legal Affairs (OLA) to review the OSP Resolution.
o The OLA recommended that the OSP Resolution be
disapproved and the OSP be directed to proceed
with the trial of the cases.
OMB adopted the OLA Memorandum, and disapproved the OSP
Resolution.
Hence, case in SB continued.
o
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Ombudsman had authority to overturn the Office of the
Special Prosecutor's (OSP) Resolution - YES
2. Whether RA 6770 (Ombudsman's Act) is unconstitutional - NO
3. Whether the Ombudsman acted with GADLEJ NO
RATIO:
The Court held in Office of the Ombudsman v. Valera, basing its ratio
decidendi on its ruling in Acop and Camanag, that the OSP is "merely
a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act
under the supervision and control, and upon authority of the
Ombudsman" and ruled that under R.A. No. 6770, the power to
preventively suspend is lodged only with the Ombudsman and Deputy
Ombudsman.
The Court's ruling in Acop that the authority of the Ombudsman to

prosecute based on R.A. No. 6770 was authorized by the Constitution
was also made the foundation for the decision in Perez v.
Sandiganbayan, where it was held that the power to prosecute
carries with it the power to authorize the filing of informations,
which power had not been delegated to the OSP.
It is, therefore, beyond cavil that under the Constitution, Congress was
not proscribed from legislating the grant of additional powers to the
Ombudsman or placing the OSP under the Office of the Ombudsman.
COMPLETE DIGEST:
Facts:
The Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman
filed a Complaint-Affidavit charging Lazatin et al. with Illegal Use of Public
Funds as defined and penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal
Code and violation of Section 3, paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3019, as amended.
The complaint alleged that there were irregularities in the use by
38
Congressman Carmello F. Lazatin of his CDF for 1996, i.e., he was both
proponent and implementer of the projects funded from his CDF; he signed
vouchers and supporting papers pertinent to the disbursement as
Disbursing Officer; and he received, as claimant, 18 checks amounting to
P4,868,277.08. Lazatin, with the help of petitioners Marino A. Morales,
Angelito A. Pelayo and Teodoro L. David, was allegedly able to convert his
CDF into cash.
A preliminary investigation was conducted and the Evaluation and
Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) issued a Resolution recommending
the filing against herein petitioners of 14 counts each of Malversation of
Public Funds and violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. The
Ombudsman approved the resolution and 28 Informations were filed
against Lazatin et al. before the Sandiganbayan.
Lazatin and his co-petitioners filed their respective Motions for
Reconsideration/Reinvestigation,
which
were
granted
by
the
Sandiganbayan (3rd Division). The Sandiganbayan also ordered the
prosecution to re-evaluate the cases against petitioners.
The OSP submitted to the Ombudsman its Resolution and recommended
the dismissal of the cases for lack or insufficiency of evidence. The
Ombudsman, however, ordered the Office of the Legal Affairs (OLA) to
review the OSP Resolution. The OLA recommended that the OSP Resolution
be disapproved and the OSP be directed to proceed with the trial of the
cases. The Ombudsman adopted the OLA Memorandum, and disapproved
the OSP Resolution and ordered the aggressive prosecution of the subject
cases. The cases were then returned to the Sandiganbayan for the
continuation of criminal proceedings.
Issue:
Whether the Ombudsman had authority to overturn the Office of the
Special Prosecutor's (OSP) Resolution - YES
Whether RA 6770 (Ombudsman's Act) is unconstitutional - NO
Whether the Ombudsman acted with GADLEJ - NO
Held:
In view of the foregoing, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
Ratio:
The Court held in Office of the Ombudsman v. Valera, basing its ratio
decidendi on its ruling in Acop and Camanag, that the OSP is "merely a
component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the
supervision and control, and upon authority of the Ombudsman" and ruled
that under R.A. No. 6770, the power to preventively suspend is lodged only
with the Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman. The Court's ruling in Acop
that the authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute based on R.A. No. 6770
was authorized by the Constitution was also made the foundation for the

Venue to Rule 113
decision in Perez v. Sandiganbayan, where it was held that the power to
prosecute carries with it the power to authorize the filing of informations,
which power had not been delegated to the OSP. It is, therefore, beyond
cavil that under the Constitution, Congress was not proscribed from
legislating the grant of additional powers to the Ombudsman or placing the
OSP under the Office of the Ombudsman.
Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and RA 6770,
the Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute any act or
omission of a public officer or employee when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has been the
consistent ruling of the Court not to interfere with the Ombudsman's
exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers as long as his rulings
are supported by substantial evidence. Envisioned as the champion of the
people and preserver of the integrity of public service, he has wide latitude
in exercising his powers and is free from intervention from the three
branches of government. This is to ensure that his Office is insulated from
any outside pressure and improper influence. The Court can only overturn
the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause, if it is clearly proven that the
Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion.
3. ANGELES V. MERCEDITAS GUTIERREZ, G.R. NOS. 189161 &
189173, MARCH 21, 2012 RAZON
Angeles v. Gutierrez
G.R. No. 189161 & 181973
March 21, 2012
Doctrine: The determination by the Ombudsman of probable cause or

of whether there exists a reasonable ground to believe that a crime has
been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, is usually
done after the conduct of a preliminary investigation. However, a
preliminary investigation is by no means mandatory.
39
The determination by the Ombudsman of probable cause or of whether

there exists a reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been
committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, is usually done
after the conduct of a preliminary investigation. However, a preliminary
investigation is by no means mandatory. The Ombudsman has full
discretion to determine whether a criminal case should be filed, including
whether a preliminary investigation is warranted. The Court therefore
gives due deference to the Ombudsmans decision to no longer conduct a
preliminary investigation in this case on the criminal charges levelled
against respondent Velasco.
COMPLETE
Facts:
Judge Angeles filed a criminal Complaint against respondent

Velasco with the Ombudsman alleging the following acts allegedly
committed in his capacity as a prosecutor:
o 1. Giving an unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference
to the accused in a criminal case for smuggling by failing to
present a material witness;
o 2. Engaging in private practice by insisting on the
reopening of child abuse cases against petitioner;
o 3. Falsifying a public document to make it appear that a
clarificatory hearing on the child abuse Complaint was
conducted.
In the questioned Joint Order, the Ombudsman dismissed the

charges against respondent Velasco. It found that after
evaluation of the facts and evidence presented by complainant,
there was no cause to conduct a preliminary investigation or an
administrative adjudication with regard to the charges.
MR was filed. Denied by Ombudsman. Thus, this petition for

certiorari alleging gadlej on the part of the Ombudsman.
Emergency Digest:
Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman committed gadlej in dismissing the

complaint outright? NO
Facts: Judge Angeles filed a criminal complaint against Velasco before the
Ombudsman. Ombudsman dismissed the complaint without preliminary
investigation. Judge Angeles filed a petition for certiorari before the SC
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman.
Held: WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the Petition for Certiorari filed by Judge

Adoracion G. Angeles. We AFFIRM the two Joint Orders of the Ombudsman
in Case Nos. OMB-C-C-07-0103-C and OMB-C-A-O7-0117-C dated 21 March
2007 and 30 June 2008, respectively.
Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman committed gadlej in dismissing the

complaint outright? NO
Ratio:
As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsmans
exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial powers without good and
compelling reasons. Such reasons are clearly absent in the instant
Petition.
In Esquivel v. Ombudsman, the Court explained thus:
Ratio: As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the
Ombudsmans exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial powers
without good and compelling reasons. Such reasons are clearly absent in
the instant Petition.

Venue to Rule 113
o
The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there

exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and,
thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the
appropriate courts. Settled is the rule that the Supreme
Court
will
not
ordinarily
interfere
with
the Ombudsmans exercise of his investigatory and
prosecutory powers without good and compelling
reasons to indicate otherwise. Said exercise of powers is
based upon the constitutional mandate and the court will not
interfere in its exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect
for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon
practicality as well. Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking
dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by
the Ombudsman will grievously hamper the functions of the
office and the courts, in much the same way that courts will be
swamped if they had to review the exercise of discretion on the
part of public prosecutors each time they decided to file an
information or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.
(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto, the Court

further clarified the plenary powers of the Ombudsman. The Court
emphasized that if the latter, using professional judgment, finds a case
dismissible, the Court shall respect that finding, unless the exercise of
such discretionary power was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
The determination by the Ombudsman of probable cause or of
whether there exists a reasonable ground to believe that a
crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof, is usually done after the conduct of a
preliminary investigation. However, a preliminary investigation
is by no means mandatory.
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman
Rules of Procedure), specifically Section 2 of Rule II, states:
o Evaluation. Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating
officer shall recommend whether it may be:
a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit;
b) referred to respondent for comment;
c) indorsed to the proper government office or agency

which has jurisdiction over the case;
d) forwarded to the appropriate officer or official for

fact-finding investigation;
e) referred for administrative adjudication; or
f) subjected to a preliminary investigation.
40
Thus, the Ombudsman need not conduct a preliminary investigation

upon receipt of a complaint. Should investigating officers find a
complaint utterly devoid of merit, they may recommend its
outright dismissal. Moreover, it is also within their discretion to
determine whether or not preliminary investigation should be
conducted.
The Court has undoubtedly acknowledged the powers of the
Ombudsman to dismiss a complaint outright without a preliminary
investigation in The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans v. Desierto
Ombudsman has full discretion to determine whether a criminal
case should be filed, including whether a preliminary investigation
is warranted. The Court therefore gives due deference to the
Ombudsmans decision to no longer conduct a preliminary
investigation in this case on the criminal charges levelled against
respondent Velasco.
4. BUSUEGO V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. NO.196842,

OCTOBER 9, 2013 RESPICIO
Emergency
Alfredo is a chickboy. He is a public officer working in a hospital (Chief

of Hospital).
Sometime in 1983, Rosa unearthed photographs of, and love letters

addressed to Alfredo from, other women.
Later, Rosa left for the US to work there as a nurse.
Rosa learned that a certain Emy Sia (Sia) was living at their conjugal
home.
The wife filed a case of concubinage and VAWC before the

ombudsman.
Ombudsman went into Preliminary Investigation.
In the course thereof, the procedural issue of Rosas failure to implead

Sia and de Leon as respondents cropped up.
The Ombudsman, ultimately, found probable cause to indict only

Alfredo and Sia of Concubinage and directed the filing of an
Information against them in the appropriate court
Alfredo now comes to us on PETITION FOR CERTIORARI alleging

grave abuse of discretion in the Ombudsmans finding of
probable cause to indict him and Sia for Concubinage.
Alfredos contention: Alfredo claims that the Ombudsman should

have referred Rosas complaint to the Department of Justice (DOJ),
since the crime of Concubinage is not committed in relation to his
being a public officer.
ISSUE:
(1) WON OMB can conduct PI over public officer not in relation to official
functions? YES

Venue to Rule 113
(2) WON the case should undergo PI by DOJ? DOJ CAN PI, but once
OMB enters, DOJ is excluded
RATIO:
OMB has jursidiction to PI cases cognizable by sandiganbayan. This

case is cognizable by sandiganbayan.
The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses

involving public officers or employees is concurrent with other
government investigating agencies such as provincial, city and
state prosecutors. However, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of
its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage, from any
investigating agency of the government, the investigation of
such cases.
COMPLETE
FACTS:
Before us is a petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the
Resolution of the Ombudsman which directed the filing of an
Information for Concubinage under Article 334 of the Revised Penal
Code against petitioner Alfredo Romulo A. Busuego (Alfredo).
We chronicle the facts thus.
Private respondent Rosa S. Busuego (Rosa) filed a complaint for: (1)

Concubinage under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code; (2) violation
of Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children); and (3) Grave Threats under Article 282 of the Revised Penal
Code, before the Office of the Ombudsman against her husband,
Alfredo
In her complaint, Rosa painted a picture of a marriage in disarray.
She and Alfredo were married with two (2) sons, . Sometime in 1983,
their marriage turned sour. At this time, Rosa unearthed photographs
of, and love letters addressed to Alfredo from, other women. Rosa
confronted Alfredo who claimed ignorance of the existence of these
letters and innocence of any wrongdoing.
Purportedly, Alfredo very rarely stayed at home to spend time with his
family. He would come home late at night on weekdays and head early
to work the next day; his weekends were spent with his friends, instead
of with his family. Rosa considered herself lucky if their family was able
to spend a solid hour with Alfredo.
Around this time, an opportunity to work as nurse in New York City,

United States of America (US) opened up for Rosa. Rosa informed
Alfredo, who vehemently opposed Rosas plan to work abroad.
Nonetheless, Rosa completed the necessary requirements to work in
the US and was scheduled to depart the Philippines in March 1985.
Before leaving, Rosa took up the matter again with Alfredo, who
remained opposed to her working abroad. Furious with Rosas pressing,
Alfredo took his loaded gun and pointed it at Rosas right temple,
41
threatening and taunting Rosa to attempt to leave him and their family.
Alfredo was only staved off because Rosas mother arrived at the
couples house. Alfredo left the house in a rage: Rosa and her mother
heard gun shots fired outside.
Because of that incident, Rosa acted up to her plan and left for the US.
While in the US, Rosa became homesick and was subsequently joined
by her children who were brought to the US by Alfredo. Rosa singularly
reared them: Alfred, from grade school to university, while Robert,
upon finishing high school, went back to Davao City to study medicine
and lived with Alfredo.
During that time his entire family was in the US, Alfredo never sent
financial support. In fact, it was Rosa who would remit money to
Alfredo from time to time, believing that Alfredo had stopped
womanizing. Rosa continued to spend her annual vacation in Davao
City.
Sometime in 1997, Rosa learned that a certain Emy Sia (Sia) was living
at their conjugal home. When Rosa asked Alfredo, the latter explained
that Sia was a nurse working at the Regional Hospital in Tagum who
was in a sorry plight as she was allegedly being raped by Rosas
brother-in-law. To get her out of the situation, Alfredo allowed Sia to live
in their house and sleep in the maids quarters. At that time, Rosa gave
Alfredo the benefit of the doubt.
In October 2005, Rosa finally learned of Alfredos extra-marital

relationships. Robert, who was already living in Davao City, called Rosa
to complain of Alfredos illicit affairs and shabby treatment of him. Rosa
then rang up Alfredo which, not surprisingly, resulted in an altercation.
Robert executed an affidavit, corroborating his mothers story and
confirming his fathers illicit affairs:
1. In varying dates from July 1997 to January 1998, Robert found it strange
that Sia slept with his father in the conjugal bedroom.
2. He did not inform his mother of that odd arrangement as he did not want
to bring trouble to their family.
3. Eventually, Sia herself confirmed to Robert that she was Alfredos
mistress.
4. During this period of concubinage, Sia was hospitalized and upon her
discharge, she and Alfredo resumed their cohabitation.
5. The relationship between Alfredo and Sia ended only when the latter
found another boyfriend. 6. His father next took up an affair with Julie de
Leon (de Leon) whom Robert met when de Leon fetched Alfredo on one
occasion when their vehicle broke down in the middle of the road.
7. Robert read various Short Message Service (SMS) exchanges between
Julie and Alfredo on Alfredos mobile phone.
8. On 23, 24, 30 and 31 December 2004, de Leon stayed in Rosas and
Alfredos conjugal dwelling and stayed in the conjugal room the entire
nights thereof.
The househelpers, Melissa S. Diambangan and Liza S. Diambangan,

likewise executed a joint affidavit in support of Rosas allegations:

Venue to Rule 113
1. They had seen Sia sleep and stay overnight with Alfredo in the conjugal
bedroom.
2. Sia herself, who called Alfredo "Papa," confirmed the twos sexual
relationship.
3. On 23, 24, 30 and 31 December 2004, de Leon stayed in the conjugal
dwelling and slept overnight with Alfredo in the conjugal room.
As a result, Rosa and their other son Alfred forthwith flew to Davao City
without informing Alfredo of their impending return. Upon Rosas
return, she gathered and consolidated information on her husbands
sexual affairs.
Pursuant to her charges of violation of Republic Act No. 9262 and

Grave Threats, Rosa averred that during the course of their marriage,
apart from the marital infidelity, Alfredo physically and verbally abused
her and her family. On one occasion after Rosa confirmed the affairs,
Alfredo threatened their family, including other members of their
household that he will gun them down should he chance upon them in
Tagum City. Lastly, on 22 March 2006, Alfredo purportedly dismissed
house helper Liza Diambangan and threatened her.
ISSUE
The Ombudsman did not refer the complaint to the Department of Justice,
considering that the offense of Concubinage is not committed in relation to
his office as Chief of Hospital;
RATIO
We sustain the Ombudsman.
Alfredo claims that the Ombudsman should have referred Rosas

complaint to the Department of Justice (DOJ), since the crime of
Concubinage is not committed in relation to his being a public officer.
This is not a new argument.
The Ombudsmans primary jurisdiction, albeit concurrent with the DOJ,

to conduct preliminary investigation of crimes involving public officers,
without regard to its commission in relation to office, had long been
settled in Sen. Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of
DOJ,17 and affirmed in subsequent cases:
The Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and

Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, do not give to the
Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed
by public officers or employees. The authority of the Ombudsman to
investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is
concurrent with other government investigating agencies such as
provincial, city and state prosecutors. However, the Ombudsman, in
the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage, from any investigating
agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.
In other words, respondent DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting

any investigation of cases against public officers involving violations of
penal laws but if the cases fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
42
Sandiganbayan, the respondent Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its

primary jurisdiction take over at any stage.
Thus, with the jurisprudential declarations that the Ombudsman and
the DOJ have concurrent jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
investigation, the respective heads of said offices came up with OMBDOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 for the proper guidelines of their
respective prosecutors in the conduct of their investigations, to wit:
OMB-DOJ JOINT CIRCULAR NO. 95-001Series of 1995

ALL GRAFT INVESTIGATION/SPECIAL PROSECUTIONOFFICERS OF THE
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
TO: ALL REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTORS AND THEIR ASSISTANTS,
PROVINCIAL/CITY PROSECUTORS AND THEIR ASSISTANTS, STATE
PROSECUTORS ANDPROSECUTING ATTORNEYS OF THE DEPARTMENT
OFJUSTICE.
SUBJECT: HANDLING COMPLAINTS FILED AGAINST PUBLICOFFICERS AND
EMPLOYEES, THE CONDUCT OFPRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, PREPARATION
OFRESOLUTIONS AND INFORMATIONS AND PROSECUTION OF CASES BY
PROVINCIAL AND CITY PROSECUTORS AND THEIR ASSISTANTS.
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
In a recent dialogue between the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and the
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, discussion centered around the latest
pronouncement of the SUPREME COURT on the extent to which the
OMBUDSMAN may call upon the government prosecutors for assistance in
the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases cognizable by his office
and the conditions under which he may do so. Also discussed was Republic
Act No. 7975 otherwise known as "AN ACT TO STRENGTHEN THE
FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS
AMENDED" and its implications on the jurisdiction of the office of the
Ombudsman on criminal offenses committed by public officers and
employees.
Concerns were expressed on unnecessary delays that could be caused by
discussions on jurisdiction between the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and
the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, and by procedural conflicts in the filing of
complaints against public officers and employees, the conduct of
preliminary investigations, the preparation of resolutions and informations,
and the prosecution of cases by provincial and city prosecutors and their
assistants as DEPUTIZED PROSECUTORS OF THE OMBUDSMAN.
Recognizing the concerns, the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and the
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, in a series of consultations, have agreed on the
following guidelines to be observed in the investigation and prosecution of
cases against public officers and employees:
1. Preliminary investigation and prosecution of offenses committed by
public officers and employees IN RELATION TO OFFICE whether cognizable
by the SANDIGANBAYAN or the REGULAR COURTS, and whether filed with
the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN or with the OFFICE OF THE

Venue to Rule 113
PROVINCIAL/CITY PROSECUTOR shall be under the control and supervision
of the office of the OMBUDSMAN.
2. Unless the Ombudsman under its Constitutional mandate finds reason to
believe otherwise, offenses NOT IN RELATION TO OFFICE and cognizable by
the REGULAR COURTS shall be investigated and prosecuted by the OFFICE
OF THE PROVINCIAL/CITY PROSECUTOR, which shall rule thereon with
finality.
3. Preparation of criminal information shall be the responsibility of the
investigating officer who conducted the preliminary investigation.
Resolutions recommending prosecution together with the duly
accomplished criminal informations shall be forwarded to the appropriate
approving authority.
4. Considering that the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN has jurisdiction over
public officers and employees and for effective monitoring of all
investigations and prosecutions of cases involving public officers and
employees, the OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL/CITY PROSECUTOR shall
submit to the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN a monthly list of complaints
filed with their respective offices against public officers and employees.
xxxx
A close examination of the circular supports the view of the respondent

Ombudsman that it is just an internal agreement between the
Ombudsman and the DOJ.
Sections 2 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure

on Preliminary Investigation, effective December 1, 2000, to wit:
SEC. 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations
The following may conduct preliminary investigations:
(a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants;
(b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
(c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and
(d) Other officers as may be authorized by law.
Their authority to conduct preliminary investigation shall include all crimes
cognizable by the proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions.
SEC. 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. - If the
investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he
shall prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify under oath in
the information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer,
has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that
the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of
the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he was
given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall
recommend the dismissal of the complaint.
Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the
case to the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the
Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the
43
Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on

the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall
immediately inform the parties of such action.
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating
prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial
or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his
deputy.
Where the investigating prosecutor recommends the dismissal of the
complaint but his recommendation is disapproved by the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy on
the ground that a probable cause exists, the latter may, by himself file the
information against the respondent, or direct another assistant prosecutor
or state prosecutor to do so without conducting another preliminary
investigation.
If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department of
Justice may prescribe or motu proprio, the Secretary of Justice reverses or
modifies the resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the
corresponding information without conducting another preliminary
investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or
information with notice to the parties. The same Rule shall apply in
preliminary investigations conducted by the officers of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
confirm the authority of the DOJ prosecutors to conduct preliminary
investigation of criminal complaints filed with them for offenses cognizable
by the proper court within their respective territorial jurisdictions, including
those offenses which come within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan; but with the qualification that in offenses falling within the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the prosecutor shall, after their
investigation, transmit the records and their resolutions to the Ombudsman
or his deputy for appropriate action. Also, the prosecutor cannot dismiss
the complaint without the prior written authority of the Ombudsman or his
deputy, nor can the prosecutor file an Information with the Sandiganbayan
without being deputized by, and without prior written authority of the
Ombudsman or his deputy.
xxxx
To reiterate for emphasis, the power to investigate or conduct preliminary
investigation on charges against any public officers or employees may be
exercised by an investigator or by any provincial or city prosecutor or their
assistants, either in their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman
prosecutors. The fact that all prosecutors are in effect deputized
Ombudsman prosecutors under the OMB-DOJ circular is a mere superfluity.
The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor deputized by the Ombudsman to

Venue to Rule 113
conduct the preliminary investigation for complaints filed with it because
the DOJs authority to act as the principal law agency of the government
and investigate the commission of crimes under the Revised Penal Code is
derived from the Revised Administrative Code which had been held in the
Natividad case citation omitted as not being contrary to the Constitution.
Thus, there is not even a need to delegate the conduct of the preliminary
investigation to an agency which has the jurisdiction to do so in the first
place. However, the Ombudsman may assert its primary jurisdiction at any
stage of the investigation. (Emphasis supplied).
In Honasan II, although Senator Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan was a public
officer who was charged with coup detat for the occupation of Oakwood on
27 July 2003, the preliminary investigation therefor was conducted by the
DOJ. Honasan questioned the jurisdiction of the DOJ to do so, proferring
that it was the Ombudsman which had jurisdiction since the imputed acts
were committed in relation to his public office. We clarified that the DOJ
and the Ombudsman have concurrent jurisdiction to investigate offenses
involving public officers or employees. Nonetheless, we pointed out that
the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage, from any
investigating agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.
Plainly, applying that ruling in this case, the Ombudsman has primary
jurisdiction, albeit concurrent with the DOJ, over Rosas complaint, and
after choosing to exercise such jurisdiction, need not defer to the dictates
of a respondent in a complaint, such as Alfredo. In other words, the
Ombudsman may exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the DOJ.
J.REVIEW OF DECISIONS OF THE OMBUDSMAN

1. ANTONINO V. DESIERTO, DECEMBER 18, 2008, G.R. NO. 144492
SANCHEZ
DOCTRINE: While the Ombudsman's discretion in determining the
existence of probable cause is not absolute, nonetheless, petitioner must
prove that such discretion was gravely abused in order to warrant the
reversal of the Ombudsman's findings by this Court
ER:
Presidential Proclamation 168 reserved a parcel of land in General

Santos for recreation and health purposes to be administered by
the city, and also prohibiting its alienation.
o This land was subdivided into 3 (Lots Y-1; Y-2 and X).
However, Pres. Marcos issued Proclamation 2273 which stated that lots
Y-1 and Y-2 are open to disposition under CA 141 (Public Land Act).
o After this, 16 people (private respondents), applied for
Miscellaneous Sales Patents over Lot X.
44
The city mayor and the DENR executive Director for General Santos
approved the applications, and TCTs were issued to the private
respondents.
Antonino, the former Congresswoman of the 1st district of South
Cotabato filed a complaint-affidavit with the Ombudsman for
VIOLATION OF RA 3019 + MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS
thru falsification of public documents.
OMBUDSMAN DECISION: CHARGES DISMISSEDMayor Nunez,
et al. regularly performed their duties [January 20, 1999].
The MR [filed: Feb 4, 2000] of Antonino was also denied, because the
OMB already lost its jurisdiction.
Hence, Antonino files a R65 petition.
ISSUE: WON the OMB committed GADLEJ.

HELD: NO GADLEJ. Antonino loses. WHY?
1. [Procedural] Antonino failed to establish that she timely filed her MR.
Section 27 of RA 6770 (OMB Act) provides MRs must be filed within
five (5) days after receipt of written notice. Antonino failed to
establish in her MR why she didnt file her MR within 5 days from
receipt of the decision.
a. Antonino did not proffer any explanation at all for the
late filing of the motion for reconsideration. Petition
dismissed.
2. [Substantive] Although the OMB is granted the power to investigate
and prosecute the act of any public employee, it can still be reviewed if
its GAD.
a. While the Ombudsman's discretion in determining the
existence
of
probable
cause
is
not
absolute,
nonetheless, petitioner must prove that such discretion
was gravely abused in order to warrant the reversal of
the Ombudsman's findings by this Court.
b. The alleged grave abuse of discretion imputed to the
Ombudsman is found wanting in this case. Thus, this Court
finds no reason to deviate from the general rule.
COMPLETE
FACTS:
Presidential Proclamation No. 168 was issued by then President

Diosdado Macapagal on October 3, 1963 (Record, pp. 23-24). The
pertinent provision of which states that:
o do hereby withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for
recreational and health resort site purposes, under the
administration of the municipality of General Santos, subject to
private rights, if any there be, a certain parcel of land of the
public domain
The property subject of Presidential Proclamation No. 168 was

thereafter subdivided into three lots, namely: Lot Y-1 with an area of

Venue to Rule 113
18,695 square meters, Lot X containing 15,020 square meters and Lot
Y-2 with 18,963 square meters, or a total of 52,678 square meters
which is still equivalent to the original area.
o However, on February 25, 1983, former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2273 amending Proclamation
No. 168, which excluded Lots Y-1 and Y-2 from the recreational
and health purposes.
On July 23, 1997, the 16 private respondents applied for Miscellaneous
Sales Patent over portions of Lot X.
o On August 2, 1997, respondent City Mayor Rosalita T. Nuez,
assisted by respondent City Legal Officer Pedro Nalangan III
issued 1st Indorsements (refer to application documents,
Record, pp. 421-500) addressed to CENRO, DENR for portions
of Lot X applied by private respondents and stated therein that
this office interposes no objection to whatever legal
proceedings your office may pursue on application covering
portions thereof after the Regional Trial Court, General Santos
City, Branch 22 excluded Lot X, MR-1160-D from the coverage
of the Compromise Judgment dated May 6, 1992 per said
courts order dated July 22, 1997.
o The parcels of land were sold.
Antonino (former 1st district congresswoman) filed a complaint-affidavit
with the OMB.
o Against the respondents together with Cesar Jonillo (Jonillo),
Renato Rivera (Rivera), Mad Guaybar, Oliver Guaybar, Jonathan
Guaybar, Alex Guaybar, Jack Guiwan, Carlito Flaviano III,
Nicolas Ynot, Jolito Poralan, Miguela Cabi-ao, Jose Rommel
Saludar, Joel Teves, Rico Altizo, Johnny Medillo, Martin Saycon,
Arsenio de los Reyes, and Jose Bomez (Mad Guaybar and his
companions), Gen. Jose Ramiscal, Jr. (Gen. Ramiscal), Wilfredo
Pabalan (Pabalan), and Atty. Nilo Flaviano (Atty. Flaviano)
(indicted) for violation of Paragraphs (e), (g) and (j), Section 3
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended, and for
malversation of public funds or property through falsification of
public documents.
OMB RESOLUTION on JANUARY 20, 1999: CHARGES DISMISSED
o The Ombudsman also ruled that the Order of Judge Adre was
made in accordance with the facts of the case, while Diaz,
Borinaga, Momongan and Cruzabra were found to have
regularly performed their official functions. Accordingly, the
charges against the respondents were dismissed
On FEBRUARY 4, 2000, Antonino filed an MR. It was DENIED.
o The Ombudsman held that since the criminal Informations were
already filed against the aforementioned indicted and the
cases were already pending before the Sandiganbayan and the
regular courts of General Santos City, the Ombudsman had lost
jurisdiction over the said case.
Antonino files the 65 petition.
45
ISSUE: WON the OMB committed GADLEJ in denying the MR. (NO)
HELD: All told, the Ombudsman did not act with grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing the criminal complaint against respondents. WHEREFORE, the
petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
RATIO:
-
Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989)[22]

provides:
o SEC. 27.
Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. (1) All
provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are
immediately effective and executory.
o A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision
of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five
(5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be
entertained only on any of the following grounds:
o (1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects
the order, directive or decision;
o (2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed
prejudicial to the interest of the movant. The motion for
reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days from
filing: Provided, That only one motion for reconsideration shall
be entertained.
Other than the statement of material dates wherein petitioner claimed
that she received through counsel the assailed Resolution of the
Ombudsman on January 21, 2000, she failed to establish that her
Motion for Reconsideration was indeed filed on time, and thus,
failed to refute the assertion of the respondents based on the
aforementioned Certification that petitioner was personally served a
copy of the assailed Resolution on February 24, 1999.
There are a number of instances when rules of procedure are relaxed in
the interest of justice. However, in this case, petitioner did not
proffer any explanation at all for the late filing of the motion
for reconsideration.
After the respondents made such allegation, petitioner did not bother
to respond and meet the issue head-on. We find no justification why
the Ombudsman entertained the motion for reconsideration, when, at
the time of the filing of the motion for reconsideration the assailed
Resolution was already final.
[Substantive]
o Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,
and pursuant to R.A. No. 6770, the Ombudsman has the power
to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of a public
officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. Well-settled is the rule
that this Court will not ordinarily interfere with the
Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory

Venue to Rule 113
powers without good and compelling reasons that indicate

otherwise.
Of course, this rule is not absolute. The aggrieved

party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court when the finding of the Ombudsman
is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, as what the petitioner did
in this case, consistent with our ruling in Collantes v.
Marcelo, where we laid down the following exceptions
to the rule:
1. When necessary to afford adequate protection
to the constitutional rights of the accused;
2. When necessary for the orderly administration
of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity
of actions;
3. When there is a prejudicial question that is sub
judice;
4. When the acts of the officer are without or in
excess of authority;
5. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law,
ordinance or regulation;
6. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
7. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the
offense;
8. Where it is a case of persecution rather than
prosecution;
9. Where the charges are manifestly false and
motivated by the lust for vengeance;
10. When there is clearly no prima facie case
against the accused and a motion to quash on
that ground has been denied.
While the Ombudsman's discretion in determining the existence of
probable cause is not absolute, nonetheless, petitioner must prove that
such discretion was gravely abused in order to warrant the reversal of
the Ombudsman's findings by this Court.
The alleged grave abuse of discretion imputed to the
Ombudsman is found wanting in this case. Thus, this Court
finds no reason to deviate from the general rule.
2. ENEMECIO V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. NO. 146731, JANUARY

13, 2004 SANTOS
Enemecio vs Office of the Ombudsman and Servando Bernante
AGUSTINA M. ENEMECIO vs. OFFICE OF
(VISAYAS) and SERVANDO BERNANTE.
THE
OMBUDSMAN
46
Doctrine: Jurisprudence now holds that where the findings of the

Ombudsman on the existence of probable cause in criminal cases is tainted
with GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court under Rule 65. Since Enemecio filed a certiorari petition
before the Court of Appeals, instead of the Supreme Court, she availed of a
wrong remedy in the wrong forum. Hence, the instant petition should be
dismissed outright. Also, APPEALS from decisions of the Ombudsman
in administrative disciplinary actions should be brought to the
Court of Appeals under Rule 43.
ER:
ENEMECIO works at the CEBU STATE COLLEGE. She filed an

administrative complaint to the dean of the school against
BERNANTE (an assistant professor) for gross misconduct,
falsification, malversation, dishonesty and defamation.
The dean indorsed the complaint to the Ombudsman.
ENEMECIO also filed with the ombudsman a criminal complaint against

BERNANTE for FALSIFICATION OF A PUBLIC DOCUMENT.
ENEMECIO said that BERNANTE caused a spray painting of

obscene words against her in the walls of the school.
o Also claimed that BERNANTE shouted defamatory words
against her.
o She further alleged that BERNANTE made it appear that he was
on leave but he was in prison. BERNANTE denied all the
allegations.
The OMBUDSMAN dismissed the ADMIN complaint AND the CRIMINAL

complaint against BERNANTE, finding no probable cause to indict
BERNANTE for falsification of public document.
o MR by ENEMECIO denied.
ENEMECIO filed a petition for certiorari with the COURT OF

APPEALS Dismissed.
o MR denied.
Thus, ENEMECIO filed a pet rev with CA. CA dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction (The CA said that the power to review decisions of the
OMBUDSMAN in criminal cases is retained by the SC).
ISSUE: WON a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed before the Court of
Appeals is the proper remedy to question the dismissal of
a criminal complaint filed with the Ombudsman? NO.
Jurisprudence now holds that where the findings of the Ombudsman on

the existence of probable cause in criminal cases is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the
aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court under Rule 65.
Since Enemecio filed a certiorari petition before the Court of

Appeals, instead of the Supreme Court, she availed of a wrong

Venue to Rule 113
remedy in the wrong forum. Hence, the instant petition should be

dismissed outright.
Also, Appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary actions should be brought to the
Court of Appeals under Rule 43.
FACTS:
Petitioner Agustina M. Enemecio (Enemecio) is a utility worker at

the Cebu State College of Science and Technology, College of
Fisheries Technology (CEBU STATE COLLEGE) Cebu.
Private respondent Servando Bernante (Bernante) is an Assistant

Professor IV of CEBU STATE COLLEGE.
Enemecio filed an administrative complaint for gross misconduct,

falsification of public documents, malversation, dishonesty and
defamation against BERNANTE before the Office of the Executive
Dean of CEBU STATE COLLEGE.
The Dean indorsed the complaint to the Office of the Ombudsman

for the Visayas (Ombudsman) Enemecio also filed with the
Ombudsman
a criminal complaint
against
BERNANTE
for
falsification of public document.
Ombudsman ordered Enemecio to submit her affidavit and the

affidavits of her witnesses.
After Enemecio submitted the required affidavits, the Ombudsman

ordered Bernante to submit his counter-affidavit.
The administrative complaint and criminal complaint was jointly

tried by the Ombudsman.
Enemecio alleged that Bernante had caused the spray-painting of

obscene and unprintable words against her on the walls of the
CEBU STATE COLLEGE Carmen Campus.
Enemecio claimed that Bernante also shouted defamatory words

against her while she was inside the school premises.
Enemecio further asserted that Bernante made it appear in his

leave application that he was on forced leave and on vacation
leave for a certain time but in truth he was serving a 20-day prison
term because of his conviction of slight physical injuries.
Bernante was able to receive his salary during that time since then
CEBU STATE COLLEGE Superintendent approved Bernantes
application for leave.
Enemecio contended that Bernante was not entitled to receive

salary for that period because of his falsified leave applications.
BERNANTE DID NOT DENY HE WAS IN PRISON. He maintained that

he received his salary for that period because of his duly approved
leave applications.
He further alleged that ENEMECIO filed the criminal and admin

complaints against him in retaliation for the case he filed against
Enemecios friends.
47
BERNANTE denied he was behind the spray-painting of obscenities

against ENEMECIO on the walls of the school campus.
OMBUDSMAN DISMISSED THE ADMIN COMPLAINT AGAINST

BERNANTE. It said that that there is no regulation restricting the
purpose or use of an employees earned leave credits. Considering
that the application for leave filed by BERNANTE was duly
approved by the appropriate official concerned, it matters not how
he utilizes his leave for it is not a requirement that the specifics or
reasons for going on leave be spelled out in such application. It
further said that the evidence is insufficient to prove that
BERNANTE was the one who sprayed on the wall, there was no
witness.
Regarding the complainants allegation that BERNANTE defamed

the former by uttering slanderous words, it appears that only the
incident occurring on March 10, 1998 was corroborated by the
testimony of witness Delfin Buot. Witness Buot testified that he
was about (3) meters from the BERNANTE when the latter shouted
the words buricat (whore) putang ina and maot (snob) to
ENEMECIO. However, the circumstances of the utterance,
particularly the time and the relation of the protagonists involved,
leads us to conclude that the same is removed from the official
functions of the respondent as a professor of the school. Stated
otherwise, the act of the respondent was not in relation to his
official functions. In the case of Palma vs. Fortich, et al., 147 SCRA
397, the Supreme Court ruled that:
In administrative actions against municipal officers, the Supreme
Court in Festijo v. Crisologo, et al. (17 SCRA 868, 869 [1966]),
classified the grounds for suspension under two categories, namely:
(1) those related to the discharge of the functions of the officer
concerned (neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other forms of
maladministration of office and (2) those not so connected with said
functions. Under the second category, when the crime involving moral
turpitude is not linked with the performance of official duties,
conviction by final judgment is required as a condition precedent to
administrative action.
Therefore, inasmuch as the oral defamation charge is now pending
before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court in Cebu, the matter of
BERNANTEs administrative culpability is still premature to be
determined.
ON THE SAME DATE, the OMBUDSMAN dismissed the criminal
complaint against BERNANTE finding no probable cause to indict
BERNANTE for falsification of public document.
MR by ENEMECIO DENIED.
ENEMECIO filed certiorari with the CA. it was dismissed for being filed
out of time. They also stated that the proper remedy was petition
for review under Rule 43 and not certiorari under 65.

Venue to Rule 113
ENEMECIO filed a MR, he argued that the CA should not have relied on
the case of FABIAN (pet review not rule 65).
The Court of Appeals denied Enemecios MR.
Petition for review in the CA. CA dismissed the petition
The Court of Appeals clarified that Fabian does not apply to
Enemecios petition assailing the dismissal of the criminal complaint
against Bernante.
o The appellate court stated that what Fabian declared void
was Section 27 of RA 6770, which authorized appeals to the
Supreme Court from decisions of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases.
o Under the Fabian ruling, the appellant should take such
appeal in administrative disciplinary cases to the Court of
Appeals under Rule 43.
o The Court of Appeals added that it follows that the power
to review decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal
cases is retained by the Supreme Court under Section 14
of RA 6770. Thus, the appellate court dismissed the petition
for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUES: WON a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed before the CA is
the proper remedy to question the dismissal of a criminal complaint filed
with the Ombudsman?
HELD: NO. Enemecio filed before the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 questioning the Ombudsmans Resolution
dated 13 January 2000 and Order dated 28 February 2000 dismissing
the criminal case against Bernante. Thus, the Prefatory statement of
Enemecios Petition in the Court of Appeals states:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking
to nullify the Resolution dated 13 January 2000 and the Order dated 28
February 2000 both issued by the Public Respondent in the Ombudsman
Case docketed as and entitled, Agustina Enemecio vs. Servando
Bernante, Asst. Professor IV, CSCST- College of Fisheries Technology,
Carmen, Cebu, for being a manifest and grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction. The Resolution dated 13 January 2000
dismissed the criminal complaint for malversation and falsification of
public documents filed against herein Private Respondent while the Order
dated 28 February 2000 denied herein Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. Certified machine copies of the aforesaid Resolution and
Order
are
hereto
appended
as
Annexes
A
and
B
respectively. (Emphasis supplied)
The CA dismissed Enemecios petition and denied her MR. Enemecio
now comes to this Court via this petition for review, claiming that what
was involved in the petition before the CA was the administrative,
not the criminal case. Enemecio thus stresses that there is no reason
for the Court of Appeals to say that the petition concerned the criminal
case.
48
We cannot countenance the sudden and complete turnabout of

Enemecio and her counsel, Atty. Terence L. Fernandez. Atty. Fernandezs
conduct has fallen far too short of the honesty required of every member of
the Bar.
It is clear from the records that Atty. Fernandez filed with the Court of
Appeals a certiorari petition assailing the Ombudsmans Resolution and
Order dismissing the criminal case, not the administrative case against
Bernante. For this reason, the CA in its 7 December 2000 Resolution
rectified itself and stated that Fabian does not apply to Enemecios
petition as the Fabian ruling applies only to administrative disciplinary
actions. Atty. Fernandezs attempt to mislead this Court in a last ditch
effort to secure a decision favorable to his clients cause does not escape
our attention. As an officer of the court, Atty. Fernandez is duty bound to
uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity
according to the oath he has taken as attorney, and not to promote distrust
in the administration of justice. He must always bear in mind that good
faith and honorable dealings with judicial tribunals are primary obligations
of an attorney. He must always remember to deal with courts with
truthfulness and not to trifle with court proceedings. For this, Atty.
Fernandez should be admonished not to commit similar acts again.
Even if we consider Enemecios petition before the Court of Appeals as
questioning the dismissal of the administrative case against Bernante, the
action must also fail. Appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary actions should be brought to the Court
of Appeals under Rule 43. The only provision affected by
the Fabian ruling is the designation of the Court of Appeals as the proper
forum and of Rule 43 as the proper mode of appeal. All other matters in
Section 27 of RA 6770, including the finality or non-finality of decisions of
the Ombudsman, remain valid.
In any event, jurisprudence now holds that where the findings of the
Ombudsman on the existence of probable cause in criminal cases is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
the aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court under Rule 65. Since Enemecio filed a certiorari petition before the
Court of Appeals, instead of the Supreme Court, she availed of a wrong
remedy in the wrong forum. Hence, the instant petition should be
dismissed outright.
NOT REM RELATED:
EVEN CONSIDERING THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CASE, we find no grave
abuse of discretion in the Ombudsmans determination of whether there
exists a prima facie case against Bernante.
Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, the
elements of falsification of public documents through an untruthful
narration of facts are: (a) the offender makes in a document untruthful
statements in a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a legal obligation to
disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the
offender are absolutely false; and (d) the perversion of truth in the

Venue to Rule 113
narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent to injure a third
person.
As the Ombudsman correctly pointed out, Enemecio failed to point to
any law imposing upon Bernante the legal obligation to disclose where he
was going to spend his leave of absence. Legal obligation means that
there is a law requiring the disclosure of the truth of the facts narrated.
Bernante may not be convicted of the crime of falsification of public
document by making false statements in a narration of facts absent any
legal obligation to disclose where he would spend his vacation leave and
forced leave.
In PCGG v. Desierto the Court ruled that the Ombudsman has the
discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given the facts and
circumstances, should be filed or not. The Ombudsman may dismiss the
complaint forthwith if he finds it insufficient in form or substance. On the
other hand, he may continue with the inquiry if he finds otherwise. If, in
the Ombudsmans view, the complaint is sufficient in form and substance,
he may proceed with the investigation. In fact, the Ombudsman has the
power to dismiss a complaint outright without going through a preliminary
investigation.
Our evaluation of the records leads us to the conclusion that the
Ombudsman has carefully studied the merits of the criminal
complaint. Where the Ombudsman has thoroughly examined the merits of
the complaint, it would not be right to subject the private respondent to an
unnecessary and prolonged anguish.
3. BAVIERA V. ZOLETA, G.R. NO. 169098, OCTOBER 12, 2006 SUPERABLE

MANUEL BAVIERA, petitioner, vs. ROLANDO B. ZOLETA, in his
capacity as Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II; MARY
SUSAN S. GUILLERMO, in her capacity as Director, Preliminary
Investigation and Administrative Adjudication Bureau-B; PELAGIO
S. APOSTOL, in his capacity as Assistant Ombudsman, PAMO;
ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, in his capacity as Assistant Ombudsman
for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices; and MA.
MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ (Then) Undersecretary, Department of
Justice, respondents. October 12, 2006. (NONS)
NSS: Haba ng facts! Pero not really relevant sa atin. LOL
DOCTRINE: Appeals of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman finding
probable cause or lack of probable cause involving criminal cases are filed
with the Supreme Court via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
EMERGENCY RECIT
FACTS:
49
Baviera filed a case against several individuals, alleging that Standard

Chartered defrauded him and others by soliciting funds in unregistered
and unauthorized foreign stocks and securities
In connection with this, Baviera applied for and was granted a HoldDeparture Order issued by the DOJ against the individuals, including
Sridhar Raman (CFO of Standard Chartered).
Raman was able to fly out of the country despite the HDO due
to the verbal order given by Acting Secretary Merceditas
Guiterrez.
Because of this, Baviera initiated a criminal complaint against
Gutierrez for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corruption Act.
The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for lack of probable
cause.
Baviera filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the
COURT OF APPEALS.
o The CA dismissed this on the ground that the proper remedy is
certiorari under 65 filed with the SC.
ISSUE: Whether the proper appeal was a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 filed before the SC? YES!
It was already established in previous cases that when what is involved

is a decision of the Ombudmsan involving a criminal complaint, the
proper remedy is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before
the Supreme Court.
It is only when the decision being questioned involves

administrative disciplinary complaints that the CA has
jurisdiction over the complaint.
COMPLETE
FACTS:
Background Facts
Manuel Baviera filed several complaints against the officers or directors

of Standard Chartered Bank, including Sridhar Raman (Indian national,
Chief Financial Officer of Standard Chartered) before the SEC (violation
of Securities and Regulations Code), BSP (violation of banking laws),
AMLC (money laundering), NLRC (illegal dismissal), (syndicated estafa)
and BIR (tax fraud).
Baviera was a former employee and an investor of the bank,

and he alleged that Standard Chartered defrauded him and
others by soliciting funds in unregistered and unauthorized
foreign stocks and securities.
On September 18, 2003, Baviera requested the Secretary of

Justice to issue a Hold-Departure Order (HDO) against
respondents in those cases, including Raman.
On September 26, 2003, Secretary Datumanong of the DOJ issued the

HDO, which was served on the Bureau of Immigration and the HDO was
implemented.

Venue to Rule 113
Secretary Datumanong left for a conference in Vienna, Austria

and Undersecretary Merceditas Gutierrez was designated as
Acting Secretary.
On September 28, 2003, Raman was supposed to go to Singapore

but he was apprehended in NAIA pursuant to the HDO. But the next
day, Raman was able to leave on an 8:15am Singapore flight.
This was because Acting Secretary Gutierrez had verbally allowed the
departure of Raman because of the strong representations of Ramans
counsel.
Criminal Complaint of Baviera filed before the Ombudsman
Because of this, on October 3, 2003, Baviera filed a ComplaintAffidavit with the Ombudsman, charging Undersecretary
Gutierrez for violation of Section 3(a), (e), and (j) of Republic
Act (RA) No. 3019, as amended.
Baviera alleged that the acts of Gutierrez were illegal, highly irregular
and questionable: she interceded on behalf of the Indian national, gave
the verbal instructions on September 29 (6:15am) when the office was
still closed, there was no written application for the temporary stay of
the HDO, among others. All in all, the acts of Gutierrez show arrogance
of power and insolence of office, thereby extending unwarranted
preference, benefits and advantage to Raman.
In her Counter-Affidavit, respondent Gutierrez denied the allegations

against her. She averred that she did not violate any law or rule, in
allowing Raman to leave the country. She merely upheld his rights to
travel as guaranteed under the Constitution. Moreover, the DOJ may
allow persons covered by HDOs to travel abroad, for a specific purpose
and for a specific period of time. In fact, no prejudice resulted because
Raman immediately came back to the Philippines after his business trip
on October 2, 2003.
In his Reply-Affidavit, Baviera alleged that the complaint stemmed from

Gutierrez abuse of her discretionary powers in allowing an individual
to travel despite the HDO.
On October 5, 2003, Raman et. al. filed a MR of the HDO. On October

17, 2003, Secretary Datumanong lifted the HDO.
On June 22, 2004, Graft Investigation and Prosecutor Officer Rolando

Zoleta recommended that the criminal complaint agaisnt Gutierrez be
dismsissed for insufficiency of evidence. According to the Senate
deliberations on Sec. 3(a) of 3019, consideration is required before a
criminal complaint for influence peddling can prosper. No proof was
shown that Gutierrez received consideration for allowing Raman to
leave despite the HDO. No injury likewise resulted to any party because
Raman immediately returned to the Philippines.
Because the recommendation that the case be dismissed was

approved, Baviera filed a MR of the resolution on Aug. 2, 2004. Zoleta
recommended that the MR be denied for lack of merit, and Deputy
Ombudsman Casimiro approved this.
50
Thus, on November 16, 2004, Baviera filed a petition for

certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in the
CA, assailing the resolutions of the Ombudsman.
Improper Appeal
On January 7, 2005, the CA dismissed the petition because the proper

appeal should be a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before
the Supreme Court pursuant to Enemecio v. Office of the
Ombudsman, reiterated in Perez v. Ombudsman and Estrada v.
Desierto.
Baviera filed a MR, contending that petition before the CA is proper

pursuant to Fabian v. Desierto. This is because the Office of the
Ombudsman is a quasi-judicial agency, and under BP 129, the CA has
concurrent jurisdiction with the SC over petitions for certiorari under
Rule 65 (following the heirarchy of courts).
The CA denied the MR. The ruling in Fabian is only applicable in

appeals from resolutions of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases. The remedy of the aggrieved party from
resolutions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases is to file a
petition for certiorari in this Court, and not in the CA. The
applicable rule is that enunciated in Enemecio v. Ombudsman,23
later reiterated in Perez v. Office of the Ombudsman24 and Estrada v.
Desierto.25
Baviera went to the Supreme Court with a petititon for review

on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the CA rulings.
ISSUE: Whether the proper appeal in criminal cases decided by the Office
of the Ombudsman was a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the
Supreme Court YES
HELD: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals
are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
RATIO:
In Estrada v. Desierto, the Court reiterated its ruling in Kuizon v.

Ombudsman. There, the Court cited Fabian v. Desierto where it was
stated that the CAs jurisdiction extends only to decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. Thus:
o In appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court
of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Sec. 27 of R.A. 6770 that stated that an appeal by certiorari
under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an administrative
disciplinary action is unconstitutional.
o It cannot be taken into account where an original action for
certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial
review, such as from an incident in a criminal action. In fine, we

Venue to Rule 113
hold that the present petition should have been filed with this
Court.
Kuizon and Mendoza-Arce v. Ombudmsan reiterated the rule that the
remedy of aggrieved parties from resolutions of the Office of
the Ombudsman finding probable cause in criminal cases or
non-administrative cases, when tainted with grave abuse of
discretion, is to file an original action for certiorari with the SC.
Perez v. Ombudsman stated the rule that in cases when the
aggrieved party is questioning the Office of the Ombudsmans
finding of lack of probable cause, the proper remedy is a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed with the SC.
On whether there was grave abuse of discretion? NO!
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise

of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsmans
exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic
manner, which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Bavieras petition failed to establish probable cause for violations of

R.A. No. 3019. Indeed, in the absence of a clear case of abuse of
discretion, this Court will not interfere with the exercise of the
Ombudsmans discretion, who, based on his own findings and
deliberate consideration of the case, either dismisses a complaint or
proceeds with it.
K.PROCEDURE BEFORE THE OMBUDSMAN

1. SESBRENO V. AGLUGUB, FEBRUARY 28, 2005, A.M. NO. MTJ 05-1581
TANDOC
Doctrine: Administrative Order No. 8 entitled Clarifying and Modifying
Certain Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman provides that all
prosecutors are now deputized Ombudsman prosecutors.
ER:
Sesbreno filed a complaint against Judge Aglubub for gross negligence

of the law.
The admin complaint springs from the different charges 11 in a criminal

case filed by Sesbreno against officers of Traffic Managment Unit of San
Pedro, Laguna.
This case was raffled to Judge Aglububs branch.

11
Falsification, Grave Threats and Usurpation of Authority
51
The Judge dismissed one of the charges, which is the violation of R.A
10, for lack of probable cause.
Sesbrenos Urgent Manifestation of the RA 1012 charge and prayer for
arrest warrants to issue were also dismissed/denied.
Judge Aglubub ordered that the records of the case be sent to the
Provincial Prosecutors Office (PPO) for review (instead of the
Ombudsman).
Sesbreno argues that since the charge of violation of RA 10 is
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, the Office of the Ombudsman has
the primary jurisdiction to review the resolution of dismissal.
ISSUE: WON the judge was correct in sending the records for review to the
PPO instead of the Ombudsman?
Yup. This issue is answered by Administrative Order No. 8 entitled

Clarifying and Modifying Certain Rules of Procedure of the
Ombudsman, which provides that all prosecutors are now
deputized Ombudsman prosecutors.
Moreover, [R]esolutions in Ombudsman cases against public officers

and employees prepared by a deputized assistant prosecutor shall be
submitted to the Provincial or City Prosecutor concerned who shall, in
turn, forward the same to the Deputy Ombudsman of the area with his
recommendation for the approval or disapproval thereof.
o The Deputy Ombudsman shall take appropriate final action
thereon, including the approval of its filing in the proper
regular court or the dismissal of the complaint, if the crime
charged is punishable by prision correccional or lower, or
fine of not more than P6,000.00 or both.
o Resolutions involving offenses falling within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan shall be forwarded by the Deputy
Ombudsman with his recommendation thereon to the
Office of the Ombudsman.
FACTS:
- Peter L. Sesbreo filed a Verified Complaint dated March 2, 2004 against
respondent judge, Hon. Gloria B. Aglugub, charging the latter with Gross
Ignorance of the Law, Neglect of Duty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service relative to Criminal Case No. 39806
-Sesbreno filed three (3) separate complaints against Enrique Marcelino
(Marcelino), Susan Nuez (Nuez), Edna Tabazon (Tabazon) and Fely
Carunungan (Carunungan), all from the Traffic Management Unit of San
Pedro, Laguna, for Falsification, Grave Threats and Usurpation of
Authority
- The three (3) cases were assigned to respondent judges branch and
subsequently consolidated for disposition
12
Usurpation of Public Authority

Venue to Rule 113
-After conducting a preliminary examination, respondent judge issued a
Consolidated Resolutiondated May 6, 2003, dismissing the cases for
Falsification and Grave Threats for lack of probable cause, and setting for
arraignment the case for Usurpation of Authority
-complainant Sesbreno filed a Private Complainants Urgent Manifestation
dated February 6, 2004 alleging that the accused were also charged with
violation of Republic Act No. 10 (R.A. 10) and praying that warrants of
arrest be likewise issued against all of the accused
- Acting upon this manifestation, respondent judge issued an Order dated
February 12, 2004 stating that a charge for violation of R.A. 10 was indeed
alleged in the complaint for Usurpation of Authority but was not resolved
due to oversight. However, since the statute only applies to members of
seditious organizations engaged in subversive activities pursuant to People
v. Lidres, and considering that the complaint failed to allege this element,
respondent judge found no probable cause and dismissed the
charge for violation of R.A. 10. Further, citing Sec. 6(b), Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules), respondent judge denied
complainants prayer for the issuance of warrants of arrest against the
accused and ordered the records forwarded to the Provincial Prosecutors
Office (PPO) for review.
During the hearing of the case on February 14, 2004, Tabazon, Carunungan
and Nuez did not appear. Atty. Sesbreo, however, did not move for the
issuance of warrants of arrest against them. Neither did he object to the
cancellation of the scheduled hearing.
- Complainant Sesbreno contends that respondent judge violated Sec. 6(b),
Rule 112 of the Rules when she refused to issue warrants of arrest against
the accused. Complainant also faults respondent judge for allegedly motu
proprio reconsidering her Consolidated Resolution dated May 6, 2003 and
failing to order its transmittal to the Office of the Ombudsman within ten
(10) days.
-In her Comment With Motion To Dismiss The Administrative Complaint
dated March 26, 2004, respondent judge counters that the issuance of a
warrant of arrest is discretionary upon the judge.
Since she found no indication that the accused would abscond, she found
it unnecessary to issue the warrant. Moreover, under Republic Act No.
6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the PPO has been
designated as the Deputized Ombudsman Prosecutor. The PPO can take
action on similar cases for review and appropriate action. Thus, she acted
in accordance with law when she forwarded the records of the case to the
PPO for review and not to the Office of the Ombudsman as complainant
insists.
ISSUES:
1. WON the judge was correct in elevating the records to the PPO
instead of Ombudsman for review. yes
2. WON the judge erred in refusing to issue the warrant of arrest. nope,
discretionary on the part of the judge
52
RATIO:
1. This brings us to the issue of whether respondent should have
transmitted her Order dated February 12, 2004 dismissing the charge of
violation of R.A. 10 to the Office of the Ombudsman instead of the PPO.
Complainant asserts that since the charge of violation of R.A. 10 is
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, the Office of the Ombudsman has the
primary jurisdiction to review the resolution of dismissal.
This issue is answered by Administrative Order No. 8 entitled Clarifying and
Modifying Certain Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman, which provides
that all prosecutors are now deputized Ombudsman prosecutors.
Moreover, [R]esolutions in Ombudsman cases against public officers

and employees prepared by a deputized assistant prosecutor shall be
submitted to the Provincial or City Prosecutor concerned who shall, in
turn, forward the same to the Deputy Ombudsman of the area with his
recommendation for the approval or disapproval thereof.
o The Deputy Ombudsman shall take appropriate final action
thereon, including the approval of its filing in the proper regular
court or the dismissal of the complaint, if the crime charged is
punishable by prision correccional or lower, or fine of not more
than P6,000.00 or both.
o
Resolutions involving offenses falling within the jurisdiction of

the Sandiganbayan shall be forwarded by the Deputy
Ombudsman with his recommendation thereon to the Office of
the Ombudsman.
Thus, respondent judge did not err and was, in fact, merely acting in
accordance with law when she forwarded the case for violation of R.A. 10
to the PPO. The fact that the PPO remanded the case to the court for
further proceedings instead of forwarding the same to the Deputy
Ombudsman as required by Administrative Order No. 8 is quite another
matter. In any event, respondent judge should have taken the necessary
steps to remedy the lapse in order to preclude delay in the disposition of
the case
2.A careful consideration of the records as well as the pertinent rules
reveals that there is nothing in the Rules of Criminal Procedure which
requires a judge to issue a warrant of arrest for the non-appearance of the
accused during the trial. Hence, its issuance rests on the sound discretion
of the presiding judge. More so in this case, the private prosecutor did not
move for the issuance of such warrant.

Venue to Rule 113
It is thus not obligatory but merely discretionary upon the investigating
judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused even after having
personally examined the complainant and his witnesses in the form of
searching questions for the determination of whether probable cause
exists. Whether it is necessary to place the accused in custody in order not
to frustrate the ends of justice is left to the judges sound judgment.
2. ENRIQUEZ V. CAMINADE, A.M. NO. RTJ-05-1966, MARCH 21, 2006 TEVES
IMELDA ENRIQUEZ v. JUDGE ANACLETO CAMINADE (A.M. No. RTJ05-1966)
TOPIC: Criminal Proceedings under the Ombudsman
DOCTRINE:
Under the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman, the accused has 15

days to move for a reconsideration or a reinvestigation of an adverse
resolution in a preliminary investigation. But the Rules of Court
(which is used by prosecutors) there is no corresponding
provision.
ER:
Imelda Enriquez filed a case against Judge Anacleto Caminade for gross
ignorance of the law
In a murder case against Que and Apura, Judge Anacleto denied the
motion to issue a warrant of arrest against the former (Que and Apura)
because, according to Judge Anacleto, there was no PI because Que
and Apura were denied their opportunity to file either MR or
Petition for Review before the information was filed in the Court.
Because of this, the prosecutor was unable to file a criminal

information against Que and Apura.
Anacleto cited the ruling in Sales v. Sandiganbayan, which held that:

o 1. The filing of the motion of reconsideration is an integral
part of the preliminary investigation.
o 2. Information filed without first affording xxx accused
his right to file a motion for reconsideration is
tantamount to the a [sic] denial of the right to a
preliminary investigation.
OCA reported that the issue was not actually an error of judgment, but
misappropriation of the rules of criminal procedure, thus Anacleto was
guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
ISSUE: WON filing of the MR is an integral part of the preliminary
investigation? NO
In truth, the application was not on point. A careful study of Sales

reveals
that
Sales
applies
specifically
to
preliminary
investigations conducted before the Ombudsman.
53
That case was decided in accordance with the Rules of

Procedure of the Ombudsman, granting the accused 15 days to
move for a reconsideration or a reinvestigation of an adverse
resolution in a preliminary investigation.
Obviously, the criminal case filed before Judge Anacletos court
was NOT covered by the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman
but by the Rules of Court, which had no corresponding
provision.
Anacleto's was found to be guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
o
COMPLETE
FACTS
Imelda S. Enriquez, mother of a murder victim in a criminal case, filed a
verified complaint against Judge Anacleto Caminade (Anacleto) for gross
misconduct, knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, and gross ignorance
of the law and procedure in the case of "People of the Philippines v.
Sherwin Que @Bungol, Anthony John Apura."
Anacleto denied the motion to issue a warrant of arrest against Que and
Apura, his reasoning being that there was no preliminary investigation
against Que and Apura as they were denied the opportunity to file a
motion for reconsideration or petition for review before the information was
filed in court. Anacleto not only denied the warrant of arrest, he also
remanded the case back to the Prosecutor for the completion of
Due to Anacleto's ruling, the prosecutor was unable to file a criminal
information before the expiration of the 15-day period which allowed the
accused, by the Rules of Court, to move for a reconsideration or petition for
review of an adverse "resolution."
In his defense, Anacleto cited Sales v. Sandiganbayan, which ruled that:
1. The filing of the motion of reconsideration is an integral part of the
2. Information filed without first affording xxx accused his right to file a
motion for reconsideration is tantamount to the a [sic] denial of the right to
a preliminary investigation.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) stated in its report the issue
raised by Enriquez is not an error of judgment, nor to one pertaining
to the exercise of sound judicial discretion by Anacleto. Rather, the
issue is whether respondent complied with procedural rules so
elementary that to digress from them amounts to either ignorance
or negligence. Since the procedure for the institution of criminal
actions is basic and clearly expressed in the Rules of Court, Judge
Anacleto's Order is deemed to have been attended by gross ignorance of
the law.
ISSUE: WON Anacleto was guilty of gross ignorance of law. (Y-E-S)

Venue to Rule 113
HELD: WHEREFORE, Judge Anacleto L. Caminade is found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law, for which he is FINED in the amount of twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000). He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely in the future.
RATIO:
A perusal of the Order issued by Anacleto, showed that he remanded the
criminal case to the city prosecutor for the completion of the preliminary
investigation based on this Courts ruling in Sales v. Sandiganbayan. He
failed to read the case in its entirety, or he grossly misapprehended the
doctrine it had laid down.
A careful study of Sales reveals that it applies specifically to
preliminary investigations conducted before the Ombudsman.
That case was decided in accordance with the Rules of Procedure
of the Ombudsman, granting the accused 15 days to move for a
reconsideration or a reinvestigation of an adverse resolution in a
preliminary investigation. Obviously, the criminal case filed before
respondents court was not covered by the Rules of Procedure of
the Ombudsman but by the Rules of Court, which had no
corresponding provision. Thus, Anacleto's application of Sales was not
in point.
54
In a later event, Rosalinda Punzalan, allegedly approached

Cagara in the Prosecutors Office and insulted his credibility
and dignity for everyone to hear.
Several complaints were filed before the Prosecutors office, but 3
became the highlight of this case:
o (1) Attempted homicide filed by Rainier against Michael,
o (2) Attempted murder filed by Dencio against the Punzalans
and 14 others; and
o (3) Grave oral defamation filed by Cagara against Rosalinda
Punzalan, the mother.
The Assistant City Prosecutor dismissed the (1) Attempted murder
and (3) Grave oral defamation complaints.
Upon REVIEW by the Justice Secretary, the Resolution was
reversed, with the charges being downgraded to Attempted
homicide and Slight oral defamation, respectively.
Naturally, the Punzalans filed an MR, which led to the Justice
Secretary reversing his former Resolution and the withdrawal of
the Informations.
Dencio and Cagara filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, which
reversed the Justice Secretary, forcing the Punzalans to file a Rule 45
certiorari with the SC.
As aptly pointed out by the OCA, the termination of a preliminary

investigation upon the filing of an information in court is a well-established
procedural rule under the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Anacleto clearly
strayed from the well-trodden path when he grossly misapplied the ruling
of the Court in Sales. Since a preliminary investigation in the criminal case
was held, that stage of the legal process was already completed.
ISSUE: Whether there was sufficient probable cause to sustain the

foregoing complaints? No.
L.POWER OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE OVER PROSECUTORS
1. PUNZALAN V. DE LA PENA, JULY 21, 2004, G.R. NO. 158543 TIU

ER:
One evening, Dencio was in front of a store when the group of Rainer
and Randall Punzalan and 14 others came by. The group bullied Dencio,
ganged up on him, and eventually beat him up.
o Dencio was able to flee, but the group chased him.
While running away, Dencio encountered Michael Platas driver,

Cagara, who had a gun with him.
o Dencio got the gun in order to scare the group that was
chasing him. But Michael tried to intervene and while trying to
retrieve the gun from Dencio, the firearm went off and hit
Rainier on the thigh.
Thereafter, Dencio, Cagara, and Michael ran away, while the group
chased them and threatened to kill them.
Under the Revised Administrative Code, the Secretary of Justice

exercises the power of direct control and supervision over the
decisions or resolutions of the prosecutors.
In connection with this, the determination of probable cause
during a preliminary investigation or reinvestigation is
recognized as an executive function exclusively of the
prosecutor.
An investigating prosecutor is under no obligation to file a criminal
action where he is not convinced that he has the quantum of evidence
at hand to support the averments. Thus, the question of whether
or not to dismiss a complaint is within the purview of the
functions of the prosecutor and, ultimately, that of the
Secretary of Justice.
In this case, the Justice Secretary ruled that Rosalindas statements did not
make out a case for oral defamation and the case filed by Dencio could be
threshed out in the case filed by Rainier against Michael, as Dencio was a
part thereof.
COMPLETE

Venue to Rule 113
Facts: The Punzalan and the Plata families were neighbors in Hulo Bliss,
Mandaluyong City. At around 11PM of 13 Aug 1997, Dencio dela Pea
(Dencio), a house boarder of the Platas, was in front of a store near their
house when a group composed of Rainier and Randall Punzalan, along with
14 others arrived. Ricky Eugenio shouted at Dencio, Hoy, kalbo, saan mo
binili and sumbrero mo? Dencio, Kalbo nga ako, ay pinagtatawanan pa
ninyo ako.
- Irked by the response, Jose Gregorio slapped Dencio while Rainier
punched him in the mouth. The group then ganged up on Dencio.
Eventually, somebody shouted, Yariin na yan! Thereafter, Alex
Ofrin kicked Dencio and tried to stab him with a balisong but
missed. Dencio fled, but the group chased him.
- While Dencio was fleeing, he met Cagara, the Platas family driver, who
was carrying a gun. Dencio grabbed the gun and pointed it to the group
chasing him to scare them. Michael Plata, who was nearby, intervened and
tried to wrestle the gun away from Dencio.
- [NOTE] The gun accidentally went off and hit Rainier on the thigh.
Shocked, Dencio, Cagara, and Michael ran towards the latters house and
locked themselves in. The group ran after them and when they got to the
Platas house, shouted, Lumabas kayo dyan, putang ina ninyo! Papatayin
namin kayo! Dencio, Cagara, and Michael left the house through the back
door and proceeded to the police station to seek assistance.
- As a result of the incident, the following criminal charges were filed:
By Rainier: Attempted homicide against Michael

By Rainer: Illegal possession of firearm against Cagara
By Michael, Cagara, and Dencio: Grave oral defamation, Grave
threats, Robbery, Malicious mischief, and slight physical injuries
against the Punzalans
By Dencio: Attempted murder against Rainier, Randall, and
14 others
By Dencio: Grave threats against Alex Ofrin
By Cagara: Grave oral defamation against Rosalinda
Punzalan
- In their counter-affidavit, the Punzalans argued that the charges against

them were fabricated in order to dissuade them from testifying in the
Attempted Homicide and Illegal Possession of Firearm cases instituted by
Rainier against Michael and Cagara, respectively.
- Later, Cagara also filed a complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against
Rosalinda Punzalan, mother of Rainier, alleging that Rosalinda approached
him in the Office of the City Prosecutor and within hearing distance of other
people, told him, Hoy Robert, magkanong ibinigay ng mga Plata sa iyo sa
55
pagtestigo? Dodoblehin ko at ipapasok pa kita ng trabaho. The alleged

statements were denied by Rosalinda.
- [NOTE] The Mandaluyong City Assistant City Prosecutor dismissed
the following complaints:
By Dencio: Attempted murder against Rainier, Randall, and 14

others because Dencios claim that he accidentally shot Rainier
forms part of the defense in the Attempted homicide case against
Michael
By Cagara: Grave oral defamation against Rosalinda because
Cagara failed to show that the alleged defamatory statements
would cast dishonor, discredit or contempt upon him.
- Dencio and Cagara separately appealed to the DOJ. Justice Secretary

Artemio Tuquero issued a Resolution modifying Joint Resolution of the
Assistant City Prosecutor by ordering, among others [NOTE] (1) that the
charge of Grave Oral Defamation against Rosalinda be downgraded to
Slight Oral Defamation; (2) that the charge of Attempted Murder against
Rainier, Randall, and 14 others be downgraded to Attempted Homicide;
and (3) that the charge of Grave Threats against Alex Ofrin be downgraded
to Other Light Threats. The Assistant City Prosecutor was directed to file
the corresponding Informations.
- Rosalinda, Rainier, and Randall, together with their co-respondents, filed
separate MRs. The Justice Secretary set aside his earlier Resolution and
directed the withdrawal of the Informations against the movants.
The Oral Defamation case should be dismissed, as the alleged

defamatory statements were uttered without malice since
Rosalinda was then in a state of shock and anger.
The Attempted Homicide case filed by Dencio should also be
dismissed, as the allegations in support thereof should first be
threshed out in the trial of the Attempted Homicide case filed by
Rainier against Michael. Also, Dencio failed to prove that Rainier,
Randall, and his companions intended to kill him.
- Dencio and Cagara filed an MR of the foregoing Resolution, but the same
was denied.
- Thus, Dencio and Cagara filed a petition for certiorari with the CA,
praying for the reinstatement of the first Justice Secretary Resolution. The
CA reinstated the Slight oral defamation case, as well as the Attempted
homicide case, but affirmed the withdrawal of the Other light threats
against Alex Ofrin.
- The Punzalans filed an MR before the CA, but the same was denied. Thus,
they filed a Rule 45 certiorari before the SC.

Venue to Rule 113
Issue: Whether or not there is sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of
probable cause against Rosalinda for Slight Oral Defamation and against
Randall and Rainier for Attempted Homicide? No. WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Resolution of the Justice Secretary, directing the withdrawal of the
informations for slight oral defamation and attempted homicide is
REINSTATED.
Held: We now resolve whether the Justice Secretary committed
GADALEJ in his Resolutions.
- Under the Revised Administrative Code, the Secretary of Justice
exercises the power of direct control and supervision over the decisions
or resolutions of the prosecutors.
- Supervision and control includes the authority to act directly
whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a
subordinate; to direct the performance of duty; and to approve, revise
or modify acts and decision of subordinate officials or units.
- People v. Peralta: The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with
a wide range of discretion the discretion of whether, what and whom
to charge, the exercise of which depends on a variety of factors which
are best appreciated by prosecutors.
- Hegerty v. Court of Appeals: A public prosecutor, by the nature of his
office, is under no compulsion to file a criminal information where no
clear legal justification has been shown, and no sufficient evidence of
guilt nor prima facie case has been presented by the petitioner. The
determination of probable cause during a preliminary
investigation or reinvestigation is recognized as an executive
function exclusively of the prosecutor. An investigating
prosecutor is under no obligation to file a criminal action
where he is not convinced that he has the quantum of
evidence at hand to support the averments. Prosecuting officers
have equally the duty not to prosecute when after investigation or
reinvestigation they are convinced that the evidence adduced was not
sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Thus, the determination of
the persons to be prosecuted rests primarily with the prosecutor who
is vested with discretion in the discharge of this function.
- [IMPORTANT] Thus, the question of whether or not to dismiss
a complaint is within the purview of the functions of the
prosecutor and, ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice.
- Samson, et al. v. Guingona: The Court will not interfere in the
conduct of preliminary investigations or reinvestigations and leave to
the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the
exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as
will establish probable cause for the filing of information against an
offender. Moreover, his findings are not subject to review unless
shown to have been made with grave abuse.
56
- In this case, the reasons of the Justice Secretary in directing the

withdrawal of the informations for slight oral defamation and for attempted
homicide is determinative of whether or not he committed grave abuse of
discretion.
- First, in the charge of slight oral defamation, the records show that
the defamatory remarks were uttered within the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City. While the CA stated that the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses is best left to the trial court
in view of its opportunity to observe the demeanor and conduct of the
witnesses on the stand; it is the City Prosecutor, the proper officer at
the time of the occurrence of the incident, who is the best person to
observe the demeanor and conduct of the parties and their witnesses
and determine probable cause whether the alleged defamatory
utterances were made within the hearing distance of third parties.
The investigating prosecutor found that no sufficient evidence
existed. The Justice Secretary affirmed the decision of the City
Prosecutor.
- Second, in charge of attempted homicide, the Justice Secretary
resolved to dismiss the complaint because it was in the nature of a
countercharge. The DOJ had already directed that Dencio be likewise
investigated for the charge of attempted homicide in connection with
the shooting incident that occurred, making him a party to the case
filed by Rainier against Michael. This resulted in the Resolution of the
Justice Secretary that the complaint of Dencio should be threshed out
in the proceedings relevant to the shooting incident that resulted in
the serious injury of Rainier.
- In the case at bar, therefore, the Secretary of Justice did not commit
grave abuse of discretion contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals.
2. DINO ET AL. V. OLIVAREZ, G.R. NO. 170447, DECEMBER 04, 2009
VELASQUEZ
Dio et al. v. Olivarez, G.R. No. 170447, December 04, 2009
*Yung 2nd issue pertinent. I included the 1 st issue because they also talk
about the actions of the prosecutor and Im not sure Sir will ask about it or
not but I wont include it in the emergency.
Emergency Recit:
Dino filed a complaint for vote buying against Olivarez. Assistant City
Prosecutor Pablo found probable cause as stated in a Joint Resolution.
Olivares filed before the Law Department of COMELEC an appeal of the
Resolution and a MOTION TO REVOKE THE AUTHORITY OF THE
PROSECUTOR.
The Law Dept agreed with him and sent a letter to the city
prosecutor ordering it to send the records to it and suspend
the implementation of the resolution.

Venue to Rule 113
Olivares filed a motion to quash (information contained more than

one offense) which was opposed by the prosecutor and the
prosecutor filed an amended complaint. Motion to quash was denied.
Olivares likewise opposed the admission of the amended
information, saying that it the prosecutor was no longer
empowered to amend the informations, since the COMELEC
had already directed it to transmit the entire records of the
case and suspend the hearing of the cases before the RTC until
the resolution of the appeal before the COMELEC en banc.
Issue: Whether the city prosecutor still had authority to file the
amended information. NO
Being mere deputies or agents of the Commission on Elections

(COMELEC), provincial or city prosecutors deputized by it are expected
to act in accord with and not contrary to or in derogation of its
resolutions, directives or orders in relation to election cases that such
prosecutors are deputized to investigate and prosecutethey must
proceed within the lawful scope of their delegated authority.
When the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Law Department, acting

with authority of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc,
directs the City Prosecutor of Paraaque to transmit the entire records
of the case to the Law Department, Commission on Elections, by the
fastest means available and to suspend further implementation of the
questioned resolution until final resolution of said appeal by the
COMELEC En Banc, it has the effect of suspending the authority of the
City Prosecutor to prosecute the case.
In filing the Amended Informations despite the order to hold the

proceedings in abeyance until final resolution of said appeal, the City
Prosecutor clearly exceeded the legal limit of its delegated authority
any action made by the City Prosecutor in relation to the two criminal
cases subsequent to the issuance of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) order, like the filing of the amended informations and the
amended informations themselves, is void and of no effect.
Informations filed in court sans lawful authority are nothing but mere
scraps of paper which have no value.
The trial courts knowledge that the filing of the amended informations
was done by the public prosecutor in excess of his delegated authority
no longer gives it the discretion as to whether or not to accept the
amended informationsthe only option it had was not to admit the
amended informations as a sign of respect to the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) which already had taken cognizance of the
accuseds appeal.
COMPLETE
Facts:
Dio and Comparativo filed a complaint for vote buying against the
respondent Pablo Oivares. Assistant City Prosecutor Pablo Medina
57
(Pablo) found probable cause. Two informations were filed in the RTC of
Paraaque against Pablo Olivares charging him with violation of Sec
261, paragrapsh a,b and k of Article 22 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Olivares filed before the Law Department of the COMELEC an appeal of
the Joint Resolution of the Porsec with Motion to Revoke Continuing
Authority. They argued that the pendency of the appeal of the Joint
Resolution should prevent the filing of the Informations until the
COMELEC had resolved the appeal.
The Law Department sent a letter to the city prosecutor ordering the
latter to transit the records and suspend the implementation of the
Joint Resolution until the resolution of the appeal before the COMELEC.
(Medyo naignore siya)
Olivares filed a Motion to Quash (more than one offense charged in
information). Pablo filed an Opposition and Motion to Admit amended
Informations. (Articl 261 par a in relation to b na lang).
Olivares filed and opposition raising the fact that the city prosec was
no longer empowered to amend the information since COMELEC
already ordered it to transmit the records and suspend the hearings of
the cases in the RTC.
Judge denied Motion to Quash. Olivares failed to appear before RTC for
arrignemnt. Warrant issued.
Law Department of Comelec filed a Manifestation and Motion revoking
the delegated authority to the city prosec. COMELEC Resolution also
directed the Law Dept to handle the prosection of the case and to hold
abeyance proceedings until the appeal has been acted upon by the
Commission. (Walang sinabo anong ginawa ng court. Certiorari lang
agad si Olivares).
Olivares filed Certiorari before the CA. CA agreed with Olivares (wala
nang powers si prosec to continue with the case. Lack of power= lack
of legal basis for the judge to admit amended infos and order to
arrest).
Issue:
1) Whether the city prosecutor still had authority to file the amended
information.
2) Whether it was proper for the judge to issue the warrant. IMPORTANT
Held: Petition Granted. (Dio won).
Ratio:
FIRST ISSUE:
COMELEC is empowered to investigate and prosecute election offenses

and that Chief State Prosecutor, the provincial prosecutors and city
prosecutors, acting on its behalf, must proceed within the lawful scope
of their delegated authority.
Furthermore, Section 10 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides
that the COMELEC is empowered to revise, modify and reverse the

Venue to Rule 113
resolution of the Chief State Prosecutor and/or provincial/city

prosecutors. (By appeal within 10 days from receipt of their resolution
Be that as it may, this Court finds that the public prosecutors, in filing
the Amended Informations, did not exceed the authority delegated by
the COMELEC.
o The Resolution of the COMELEC revoking the deputation was
issued on April 4, 2005.
o The Amended informartion was filed on October 28, 2004.
o Although a letter was earlier sent by the Law Department, it
did not revoke the continuing authority granted to the city
prosec.
o Letter:In this connection, you are hereby directed to transmit
the entire records of the case to the Law Department,
Commission on Elections, Intramuros, Manila by the fastest
means available. You are further directed to suspend further
implementation of the questioned resolution until final
resolution of said appeal by the Comelec En Banc.
The filing of the Amendment was not made in defiance of the
instructions of COMELEC.
o If it hadnt filed the amended informations, the case would
have been dismissed.
o The instructions of the COMELEC were clearly intended to allow
sufficient time to reconsider the merit of the Joint Resolution
and not to have the prosec abandon the case.
o If the case were dismissed, the appeal before the COMELEC
would also be dismissed and the COMELEC would only be
foreced to re-file the case (waste of tume and money, dely in
administration of justice).
o The actions of the prosec were not intended to disobey the
COMELEC.
SECOND ISSUE:
The judge properly ordered the arrest because there was failure on the
part of the accused to appear for arraignment.
o The filing of an information initiates criminal action. When the
accused is arrested the court acquires jurisdiction over the
person.
o Arraignment would then follow. Rule 116, Sec 11: Arraignment
may be suspended upon motion of the proper party: a petition
for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at
either the DOJ, or the Office of the Pres. Provided the
suspension shall not exceed 60 days.
o So, the suspension is not indefinite in case of an appeal before
the DOJ.
o In this case, the appeal was filed on October 7, 2004. The
arraignment was re-scheduled to February 1, 2005 due to
58
motion to quash. Respondednt failed to appear. Reset

arraignment to March 9, 2005.
It was only on March 9, 5 MONTHS AFTER APPEAL WAS FILED when the
Judge held arraignment and ussed the Bench Warrant of Arrest.
PA RT I I
A.COMPL AINT OR INFORMATION (RULE 110)
A.SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION

1.
PEOPLE V. DIMAANO, 469 SCRA 647 AQUINO
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDGARDO DIMAANO

Emergency Recit: Maricar charged her father with two counts of rape and
one count of attempted rape. In the complaint for attempted rape, it was
stated that the accused tr[ied] and attempt[ed] to rape Maricar. He
pleaded not guilty. However, both the trial court and Court of Appeals
found him guilty of all charges. Edgardo appealed to the SC saying that
Maricar was only pressured by her mother to file the action. Also, he said
that the trial court should have considered the Complaint Agreement
between him and the complainant. For CrimPro purposes, the issue is the
sufficiency of the complaint for attempted rape. The SC found Edgardo
guilty of rape but acquitted him for the crime of attempted rape. The
complaint [reproduced below] failed to allege specific acts constituting the
elements of of rape. Neither does it constitute sufficient allegation of
elements for crimes other than rape, i.e., Acts of Lasciviousness. The acts
or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper
judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not
accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged.
Facts:
Maricar was 10 years old when she was first sexually abused in the
morning of September 1993. A few days later, Edgardo again
ravished her. On December 29, 1995, the same thing happened.
The last sexual assault happened in the afternoon of January 1,
1996.

Venue to Rule 113
Maricar Dimaano charged her father, Edgardo with two (2) counts
of rape and one (1) count of attempted rape. [AA: For CrimPro, we
only need to take a look at the contents of the 3rd complaint (on
attempted rape).]
That on or about the 1 st day of January 1996, in the Municipality of
Paranaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, try and attempt
to rape one Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, thus commencing the
commission of the crime of Rape, directly by overt acts, but
nevertheless did not perform all the acts of execution which would
produce it, as a consequence by reason of cause other than his
spontaneous desistance that is due to the timely arrival of the
complainant's mother.
Edgardo pleaded not guilty to the charges. He contended though
that he could not have raped complainant because he was always
in the office from 7:00 a.m. until 9:00 p.m. waiting to be dispatched
to another assignment overseas.
The trial court found the testimony of Maricar to be spontaneous
and credible. It found the delay in reporting the rape
understandable due to the fear complainant had of her father who
had moral ascendancy over her. Also, the quarrel between
complainant's parents was not sufficient motive for the wife to
lodge a serious charge of rape against appellant. It disregarded the
Compromise Agreement and the Salaysay sa Pag-uurong ng
Sumbong since complainant was not assisted by a lawyer when
she signed the same.
The Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the decision of
the trial court
Edgardo contends that if complainant's accusations were true, then
she could have reported them to the authorities when she
accompanied him to Paranaque Police Station and the Barangay
Hall of San Antonio or to their relatives when she had the
opportunity to do so. He also argues that had the trial court
considered the Compromise Agreement and Sinumpaang Salaysay
ng Pag-uurong ng Sumbong, it would have known that complainant
was only pressured by her mother into filing the complaint.
Issue: (For CrimPro) Whether the complaint for attempted rape was
sufficient.
Other issue: Whether the court should have considered the Compromise
Agreement.
Held: GUILTY of the crime of rape. ACQUITTED for attempted rape.
Ratio:
This credibility given by the trial court to the rape victim is an

important aspect of evidence which appellate courts can rely on
because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses,
59
particularly their demeanor, conduct and attitude during direct and

cross-examination by counsel
It is likewise well established that the testimony of a rape victim is
generally given full weight and credit, more so if she is a minor.
Contrary to Edgardos assertion, Maricar's credibility was not
diminished by her failure to report the sexual abuses to the
authorities and her relatives despite opportunities to do so. Delay
in reporting the rape incidents, especially in the face of threats of
physical violence, cannot be taken against the victim, more so
when the lecherous attacker is her own father.
Edgardo's reliance on complainant's affidavit of desistance
deserves scant consideration. A survey of our jurisprudence reveals
that the court attaches no persuasive value to a desistance,
especially when executed as an afterthought.
Maricar repudiated the affidavit of desistance in open court by
stating that no lawyer assisted her when she affixed her signature
and had shown her resolve to continue with the prosecution of the
cases.
Hence, under the above circumstances, we affirm the trial court's
conviction in Criminal Case Nos. 96-125 and 96-150 for the crimes
of rape committed in September 1993 and on December 29, 1995.
However, we acquit appellant in Criminal Case No. 96-151 for the
crime of attempted rape for failure to allege in the complaint the
specific acts constitutive of attempted rape.
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state
the name of the accused; the designation of the offense
given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of
as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate time of the commission of the
offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.
What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the
designation of the offense charged or the particular law or
part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere
conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the
description of the crime charged and the particular facts
therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must
be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person
of common understanding to know what offense is intended
to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper
judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does
not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime
charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the
information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be
included therein must be determined by reference to the
definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement
of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform
the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to
enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is

Venue to Rule 113
that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense.
error, grave abuse of discretion and prejudice on the part of public

prosecutor, as in the present case, the trial court should respect such
determination.
Notably, the above-cited complaint upon which the appellant was

arraigned does not allege specific acts or omission constituting the
elements of the crime of rape. Neither does it constitute sufficient
allegation of elements for crimes other than rape, i.e., Acts of
Lasciviousness.
COMPLETE DIGEST
2.
SASOT V. PEOPLE, 462 SCRA 138 ARCEO
FACTS:
MELBAROSE and ALLANDALE SASOT v. PEOPLE

EMERGENCY DIGEST
NBA PROPERTIES, a US corp., filed a complaint before the NBI
against the SASOTs for violation of Art. 189 of the RPC on unfair
competition. NBI discovered that the SASOTs are manufacturing and
distributing counterfeit NBA garment products. In a SPA, Rick Welts, Pres.
of NBA, constituted the law firm of Ortega as attorney-in-fact in filing the
case. It was notarized, certified, and authenticated in New York. Welts
executed a Complaint-Affidavit before a Notary Public of New York. Prosec.
Gutierrez recommended the filing of Information. The SASOTs filed a Motion
to Quash in the RTC on the grounds: (1) That the facts charged do not
constitute an offense; and (2) Lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged
or the person of the accused.
ISSUE: WON the complaint is sufficient. (YES) RATIO: Sec. 3, Rule
117 of the 1985 Rules enumerates the grounds for quashing an
information, but there is no mention of the defect in the complaint filed
before the fiscal as ground for a motion to quash. Doctrine: Under Sec. 3,
Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules, a complaint is substantially sufficient if it
states the known address of the respondent, it is accompanied by
complainants affidavit and his witnesses and supporting documents, and
the affidavits are sworn to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or
government official authorized to administer oath, or in their absence or
unavailability, a notary public who must certify that he personally
examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily
executed and understood their affidavits.
All these have been duly
satisfied in this case. The absence of an oath in the complaint does not
necessarily render it invalid, as it is a mere defect of form. Weltss
Complaint-Affidavit contains an acknowledgement by a Notary Public
Brown of New York that the same has been subscribed and sworn to before
her, duly authenticated by the Phil. Consulate. While the copy on record of
the complaint-affidavit appears to be merely a photocopy, Prosec.
Gutierrez stated that complainants representative will present the
authenticated notarized original in court, and Prosec. Guray manifested
that the original copy is already on hand. Records show that there are
other documents from which the prosecutor based his recommendation. If
the information is valid on its face, and there is no showing of manifest
60
The NBI conducted an investigation pursuant to a complaint by NBA

PROPERTIES against the SASOTs for violation of Art. 189 of the RPC on
unfair competition. In its Report, the NBI stated:
o that NBA PROPERTIES is a U.S. corporation and is the registered
owner of NBA trademarks and names of basketball teams such as
BULLS, SUNS, CAVS, etc, which are used on hosiery, footwear,
shirts, sweatshirts, and other garments, which are allegedly
registered with the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology
Transfer.
o that the SASOTs are engaged in the manufacture, printing, sale,
and distribution of counterfeit NBA garment products.
Hence, it recommended SASOTs prosecution for unfair

competition under Art. 189 of the RPC.
In a SPA, Rick Welts, as President of NBA PROPERTIES,
o constituted the law firm of Ortega, Del Castillo, Bacorro, Odulio,
Calma & Carbonell, as the companys attorney-in-fact in the filing
of criminal, civil and administrative complaints, among others.
The SPA was notarized by Nicole Brown of New York and

certified by Goodman, Clerk of the Supreme Court of of New
York.
Consul Rebong of the Consulate General of the Philippines,

New York, authenticated the certification.
o Welts also executed a Complaint-Affidavit before Notary Public
Nicole J. Brown of the State of New York.
Prosec. Gutierrez recommended the filing of an Information against the
SASOTs for violation of Art. 189 of the RPC. It reads:
o That on or about May 9, 97 and on dates prior thereto, in the City
of Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, ALLANDALE
SASOT and MELBAROSE SASOT of Allandale Sportslines, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously manufacture and sell
various garment products bearing the appearance of NBA names,
symbols and trademarks, inducing the public to believe that the
goods offered by them are those of NBA to the damage and
prejudice of the NBA Properties, Inc., the trademark owner of the
NBA.
Before arraignment, the SASOTs filed a Motion to Quash on the
grounds:
o That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

Venue to Rule 113
This honorable court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged
or the person of the accused.
SASOTs argue that: (1) the complaint must be sworn to before the
prosecutor and the copy appears to be only a fax transmittal; (2)
complainant is a foreign corporation not doing business in the
Philippines, and cannot be protected by Philippine patent laws since it
is not a registered patentee; and (3) they have been using the business
name ALLANDALE SPORTSLINE since 1972, and their designs are
original.
Prosec. Guray commented that he has the original of the complaint,
that complainant has an attorney-in-fact to represent it, and that the
State is entitled to prosecute the offense even without the private
offended party.
RTC denied SASOTs motion to quash. CA dismissed SASOTs Rule 65
certiorari and MR. SASOTs went to SC via Rule 65.
o
ISSUES:
1. WON it is proper to quash the information on the grounds of (a) defect in
the complaint filed before the fiscal; or (b) lack of capacity to sue. (NO)
2. WON the complaint in this case is sufficient. (YES)
3. WON the capacity to sue of NBA Properties is relevant. (NO)
HELD: Petition DENIED. Records REMANDED to the RTC of Manila.
RATIO:
1.
Sec. 3, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of CrimPro, which was then in
force at the time the alleged criminal acts were committed, enumerates
the grounds for quashing an information. 13 Nowhere in the foregoing
provision is there any mention of the defect in the complaint filed before
the fiscal and the complainants capacity to sue as grounds for a motion to
quash.
2.
Under Sec. 3, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of CrimPro, a complaint is
substantially sufficient if:
13
it states the known address of the respondent,

it is accompanied by complainants affidavit and his witnesses and
supporting documents, and
the affidavits are sworn to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or
government official authorized to administer oath, or in their
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (b) That the court trying the case has
no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused; (c) That the officer who
filed the information had no authority to do so; (d) That it does not conform substantially to the
prescribed form; (e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which
existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses; (f) That the criminal action or
liability has been extinguished; (g) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a
legal excuse or justification; and (h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in
jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted of the offense charged.
61
absence or unavailability, a notary public who must certify that he

personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they
voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.
All these have been duly satisfied in the complaint filed before Prosec. Atty.
Gutierrez. Even the absence of an oath in the complaint does not
necessarily render it invalid. Want of oath is a mere defect of form, which
does not affect the substantial rights of the defendant on the merits.
In
this
case,
Weltss
Complaint-Affidavit
contains
an
acknowledgement by Notary Public Brown of New York that the same has
been subscribed and sworn to before her on Feb. 12, 98, duly
authenticated by the Phil. Consulate. While the copy on record of the
complaint-affidavit appears to be merely a photocopy thereof, Prosec.
Gutierrez stated that complainants representative will present the
authenticated notarized original in court, and Prosec. Guray manifested
that the original copy is already on hand. The prosecutor enjoys the legal
presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties and functions,
which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy.
Moreover, records show that there are other supporting documents
from which the prosecutor based his recommendation, to wit:
(1) NBI Report containing an account of the investigation and the
subsequent search and seizure of several items from SASOTs.
(2) The letter from the law firm of Ortega to the NBI, seeking assistance
in stopping the illegal manufacture and sale of fake products bearing
the NBA trademark, and in prosecuting the proprietors of said
factory; and
(3) The Joint Affidavit of Malicse and Bal-ot of the Pinkerton Consulting
Services, which was certified to by Prosec. Gutierrez, attesting to their
findings that SASOTs were found to be manufacturing, printing, selling,
and distributing counterfeit NBA garment products.
Consequently, if the information is valid on its face, and there is no
showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion and prejudice on the
part of public prosecutor, as in the present case, the trial court should
respect such determination.
3.
More importantly, the crime of Unfair Competition punishable
under Art. 189 of the RPC is a public crime. It is essentially an act against
the State and it is the latter which principally stands as the injured party.
The complainants capacity to sue in such case becomes immaterial.
In La Chemise Lacoste v. Fernandez, the Court ruled that: What
preceded this petition for certiorari was a letter-complaint filed before the
NBI charging Hemandas with a criminal offense, i.e., violation of Art. 189 of
the RPC. If prosecution follows after the completion of the preliminary
investigation being conducted by the Special Prosecutor the information
shall be in the name of the People and no longer the petitioner which is

Venue to Rule 113
62
only an aggrieved party since a criminal offense is essentially an act

against the State. It is the latter which is principally the injured party
although there is a private right violated. Petitioner's capacity to sue would
become, therefore, of not much significance in the main case. We cannot
allow a possible violator of our criminal statutes to escape prosecution
upon a far-fetched contention that the aggrieved party or victim of a crime
has no standing to sue. ... In upholding the right of the petitioner to
maintain the present suit before our courts for unfair competition or
infringement of trademarks of a foreign corporation, we are moreover
recognizing our duties and the rights of foreign states under the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property to which the Philippines
and France are parties. We are simply interpreting and enforcing a solemn
international commitment of the Philippines embodied in a multilateral
treaty.
Ratio: An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory

designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. In
other words, if the offense is stated in such a way that a person of ordinary
intelligence may immediately know what is meant, and the court can
decide the matter according to law, the inevitable conclusion is that the
information is valid. It is not necessary to follow the language of the
statute in the information. The information will be sufficient if it describes
the crime defined by law. The inescapable conclusion is that the first
information is valid inasmuch as it sufficiently alleges the manner by which
the crime was committed. Verily the purpose of the law, that is, to apprise
the accused of the nature of the charge against them, is reasonably
complied with. The belated move on the part of the prosecution to have
the information amended defies procedural rules, the decision having
attained finality after the accused applied for probation and the fact that
amendment is no longer allowed at that stage.
3.
Facts:
LASOY V. ZENAROSA, 455 SCRA 360 BASCARA
Doctrine: If the offense is stated in such a way that a person of ordinary

intelligence may immediately know what is meant, and the court can
decide the matter according to law, the inevitable conclusion is that the
information is valid. It is not necessary to follow the language of the
statute in the information. The information will be sufficient if it describes
the crime defined by law.
Quick Facts:
Marcelo and Felix were charged in an information for illegal sale of 42.410
grams of dried marijuana. Upon arraignment, they pleaded guilty and
were convicted by the RTC Quezon on July 16, 1996 sentenced to a jail
term of 6 months to 1 day. It turned out that the Information
reflected a much lesser quantity42.410 GRAMS instead of 42.410
Kilos. The People of the Philippines filed two separate motions.
1. Motion to admit amended information
2. Motion to set aside arraigment and decision of the Trial Court
The Trial Court first denied the Motion to Amend the information but later
on granted the Motion to Set Aside the Arraigment and the Trial Courts
decision. The Information was amended to reflect the correct amount of
marijuana and was assigned to another branch of RTC Quezon City. Both
accused filed a Motion to Quash which was denied by the Trial Court. MR
denied as well.
Issue: After an information has been filed and the accused had been
arraigned, pleaded guilty and were convicted and after they had applied
for probation, may the information be amended and the accused arraigned
anew on the ground that the information was allegedly altered/tampered
with?NO
Marcelo Lasoy and Felix Banisa were charged in an information for

illegal sale of 42.410 grams of dried marijuana.
Upon arraignment, they pleaded guilty and were convicted by the
RTC Quezon on July 16, 1996 sentenced to a jail term of 6 months
to 1 day
Marcelo and Felix applied for probation.
Thereafter, the People of the Philippines filed two separate
motions. First, to admit an amended information and second, to set
aside the arraigment of the accused as well as the decision of the
trial court dated July 16, 1996. In plaintiffs motion to admit
amended information, it alleged that the information was wrong
stating that instead of 42.410 grams, it should have been 42.410
kilos.
The Trial Court first denied the Motion to Amend the information.
However, another Order of the same date was issued by the trial
court granting the Motion to Set Aside the Arraigment and the
decision dated July 16, 1996.
The Information was amended to reflect the correct amount of
marijuana and was assigned to another branch of RTC Quezon City.
Both accused filed a Motion to Quash which was denied by the Trial
Court. MR denied as well.
The accused insisted on the validity of the first information,
whereas respondents Republic of the Philippines asserted that the
accused were arraigned under an invalid information. Alleging that
there being an alteration on the first information, hence it failed to
reflect the true quantity of drugs caught in possession of the
accused, the prosecution insisted that the first information under
which accused were arraigned is invalid.

Venue to Rule 113
Issue: After an information has been filed and the accused had been
arraigned, pleaded guilty and were convicted and after they had applied
for probation, may the information be amended and the accused arraigned
anew on the ground that the information was allegedly altered/tampered
with?NO
Held: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition
is GRANTED. The Orders dated 14 February 1997 and 16 April 1997 issued
by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76, are set aside.
Criminal Case No. Q-96-67572 is ordered Dismissed. Accused Marcelo
Lasoy and Felix Banisa are forthwith ordered released from
detention unless there may be valid reasons for their further detention.
Ratio:
FIRST, it cannot be denied that the request for appropriate inquest

proceedings stated that the accused were apprehended for illegal
sale of forty-five kilos of marijuana. Also, in the joint affidavit of
the poseur-buyer, and arresting officer stated that the accused
were caught with approximately 45 kilos of dried marijuana. For
some unknown reasons, however, the Information filed against the
accused reflected a much lesser quantity, i.e., 42.410 grams.
The question is whether this is sufficient to consider the first
Information under which the accused were arraigned invalid.
o Section 4. Information defined. An information is an
accusation in writing charging a person with an offense
subscribed by the fiscal and filed with the court.
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory
designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive
thereof.
In other words, if the offense is stated in such a way that a person
of ordinary intelligence may immediately know what is meant, and
the court can decide the matter according to law, the inevitable
conclusion is that the information is valid. It is not necessary to
follow the language of the statute in the information. The
information will be sufficient if it describes the crime defined by
law.
The inescapable conclusion is that the first information is valid
inasmuch as it sufficiently alleges the manner by which the crime
was committed. Verily the purpose of the law, that is, to apprise
the accused of the nature of the charge against them, is
reasonably complied with.
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or
information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the
offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.
63
Bonus : Double Jeopardy
SECOND, and with respect specifically to the trial courts point of

view that the accused cannot claim their right against double
jeopardy because they participated/acquiesced to the tampering,
we hold that while this may not be far-fetched, there is actually no
hard evidence thereof. Worse, we cannot overlook the fact that
accused were arraigned, entered a plea of guilty and convicted
under the first information. Granting that alteration/tampering
took place and the accused had a hand in it, this does not justify
the setting aside of the decision dated 16 July 1996. The alleged
tampering/alteration allegedly participated in by the accused may
well be the subject of another inquiry.
The belated move on the part of the prosecution to have the

information amended defies procedural rules, the decision having
attained finality after the accused applied for probation and the
fact that amendment is no longer allowed at that stage.
In Sanvicente v. People, this Court held that given the far-reaching

scope of an accuseds right against double jeopardy, even an
appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of evidence will not
lie.
o The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is
when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where
the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its
case or where the trial was a sham.
There is, therefore, no question that the amendment of an

information by motion of the prosecution and at the time when the
accused had already been convicted is contrary to procedural rules
and violative of the rights of the accused.
4.
PEOPLE V. BATIN, G.R. NO. 177223, NOVEMBER 28, 2007
CHAN
People v. Batin
DOCTRINE: Evidentiary facts need not be alleged in the information
because these are matters of defense. Informations need only state the
ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could be proved during the trial.
ER
An Information was filed against Castor and Neil Batin. The Information
stated that they with treachery, taking advantage of superior strength,
and with evident premeditation, attack, assault and employ personal
violence upon the person of one EUGENIO REFUGIO xxx. The RTC
convicted them of murder, qualified by treachery. CA affirmed, with
modifications.
ISSUE - Whether the honorable court of appeals and the trial court gravely
erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of treachery. NO!!!

Venue to Rule 113
RATIO
-
64
Josephine went to the street because of a feeling of

uneasiness. She found her husband leaning against the
mango tree so she told Eugenio to go home.
o As she was talking with Eugenio, she saw Neil Batin
standing at the gate of the Batin compound. Neil Batin was
looking towards her and her husband. Afterwards, Neil took
a gun from one of the parked cars.
o She saw Castor going towards Neil and heard Castor shout
Huwag! Castor grabbed the gun from Neil but Castor
followed Neil behind the parked car and handed the gun
back to him.
o Josephine then heard Castor ordering Neil: Sige, banatan
mo na. Neil then fired twice so Josephine and Eugenio fell
to the ground.
o Eugenio was rushed to the Quezon City General Hospital
where he died.
The defenses version of the facts: (NOT IMPORTANT)
o Neil Batin claimed that he was cleaning the family taxicab
when he found a short gun (de bola). He picked the gun
and concealed it. He then drove to Tondo to fetch his
younger brother. Afterwards, they went to Valenzuela to
get his clothes from his cousin. They then went home.
o Neil said that Castor was outside talking with a man. He
then decided to take the gun from the taxicab and he
tucked it in his waistline. While he was standing there, he
suddenly felt the impulse of drawing the gun from his
waistline. He thus drew the gun and turned around but he
accidentally pulled the trigger causing the gun to fire twice.
The testimonies of the defenses two other witnesses were
inconsistent. For example, Maricon Pantoja contradicted herself
when she said during the trial that she, Neil and Castor were
outside the house when Neil drew the gun. However, in her
affidavit, she alleged that they went outside when they heard
gunshot.
RTC ruled against the Batins and found them guilty of murder,
qualified by treachery.
CA affirmed, with modifications.
Castor brought the case to the SC.
o
According to Castor, the allegation therein that the accused with

treachery x x x, attack, assault and employ personal violence is a
mere conclusion of law. Hence, it did not satisfy the test of
sufficiency of Information as provided in Sections 8 and 9 of Rule
110 of the Rules of Court.
SC does not agree. It cited cases wherein the Information
contained mere allegations of treachery. In these cases, the SC
stated that these Informations were sufficient so the accused were
convicted with the crimes and the qualifying circumstance of
treachery was also included.
Evidentiary facts need not be alleged in the information because
these are matters of defense. Informations need only state the
ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could be proved during the
trial.
FACTS (the only real important part here is the allegation of treachery in
the information AND the conviction by the RTC and the CA of the Batins
with Murder qualified by treachery. The facts have been included just in
case you want to know what happened)
An Information against Castor and Neil Batin was filed by the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. It alleged:
o That on or about the 21st day of October, 1994, in Quezon
City, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring
together, confederating with and mutually helping each
other, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill, with treachery, taking
advantage of superior strength, and with evident
premeditation, attack, assault and employ personal
violence upon the person of one EUGENIO REFUGIO y
ZOSA, by then and there shooting him with a handgun,
hitting him on the right side of his stomach, thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were
the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Eugenio
Refugio y Zosa, in such amount as may be awarded under
the provisions of the Civil Code. (Important!)
Castor and Neil Batin entered pleas of not guilty
The prosecutions version of the facts: (NOT IMPORTANT)
o Before the shooting, Josephine, Eugenios wife, was at
home and when she looked out of the window, she saw
Castor Batin washing his feet at a nearby faucet while
angrily
muttering
the
words
mga
matatandang
kunsintidor, dapat manahimik na. Castor then walked
towards the street
ISSUE Whether the honorable court of appeals and the trial court gravely
erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of treachery. NO!!!
HELD - WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming with
modification the conviction of accused-appellant Castor Batin for murder is
AFFIRMED with FURTHER MODIFICATION as to the amount of the moral
damages, which is hereby reduced to P50,000.00.
RATIO (only the part relevant to the topic is included)

Venue to Rule 113
65
The test of sufficiency of Information is whether it

enables a person of common understanding to
know the charge against him, and the court to
render judgment properly.
The rule is that
qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded
in the Information
o In People v. Opuran, the Information is sufficient even
though treachery was alleged in the following manner:
with deliberate intent to kill and treachery
with attendant qualifying circumstance of

treachery
Evidentiary facts need not be alleged in the information because
these are matters of defense. Informations need only state the
ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could be proved during the
trial.
According to the trial court, treachery was attendant in the killing

of Eugenio because Castor ordered Neil to fire at Eugenio after they
clearly saw that he was still leaning against the mango tree and
being restrained by Josephine who had her arms on his shoulders.
o Accused insured their safety from any defensive or
retaliatory act of Eugenio
Castor does not refute the above findings of the trial court that
treachery was sufficiently proven during trial. However, he claims
that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not specifically
alleged in the Information.
o According to Castor, the allegation therein that the
accused with treachery x x x, attack, assault and
employ personal violence is a mere conclusion of
law. Hence, it did not satisfy the test of sufficiency of
Information as provided in Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court.14
SC DOES NOT AGREE WITH CASTOR
o Balitaan v. CFI of Batangas
The main purpose of requiring the various

elements of a crime to be set forth in an
Information is to enable the accused to suitably
prepare his defense.
As a general rule, matters of evidence, as
distinguished from facts essential to the description
of the offense, need not be averred. For instance,
it is not necessary to show on the face of an
information for forgery in what manner a person is
to be defrauded, as that is a matter of evidence at
the trial.
o People v. Lab-eo
Wilson was indicted for murder even though the

treachery was alleged in the Information in the
following manner:
That the aggravating circumstances of

evident premeditation, treachery, abuse of
superior strength and craft attended the
commission of the offense.
14
SEC. 8. Designation of the offense.The complaint or information shall state the designation
of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and
specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense,
reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
SEC. 9. Cause of the accusation.The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient
to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as
its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
5.
PEOPLE V. CACHAPERO, G.R. NO. 153008, MAY 20, 2004

CORTEZ
People v. Cachapero (G.R. No. 153008, May 20, 2004)

DOCTRINE:
Time is not an essential element of rape. Information that states

the approximate rather than the precise time it was committed is
sufficient in form.
Any perceived formal defect in the information must be raised

before arraignment, either through a bill of particulars or a motion
to quash; otherwise, objection to such defect shall be considered
waived.
EMERGENCY DIGEST:
FACTS: RTC Tarlac convicted accused Larry Cachapero (LARRY) for rape.
The information filed against the accused alleged, "That sometime in
March 1998, in the Municipality of Camiling, Province of Tarlac, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of
force and intimidation succeed in having sexual intercourse with Anna
Laurence Toledo, a 7-year old minor. On appeal, he argues that the
Information was fatally defective for failing to state the precise hour when
the crime was committed.
ISSUE: W/N the court properly convicted the accused despite the
prosecutions failure to state the precise date of commission of the alleged
rape (NO)

Venue to Rule 113
HELD & RATIO: Appeal has NO merit; Conviction for statutory rape is
AFFIRMED. The Information in this case alleged that the crime was
committed "sometime in March 1998" which, according to private
complainant, was more or less at the closing of the school year. Being
reasonably definite and certain, this approximation sufficiently meets the
requirement of the law. After all, Section 6 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
merely requires that the information must state, among others,
the approximate time of the commission of the offense.
COMPLETE DIGEST:
FACTS:
An information for rape was filed against accused Larry Cachapero
(LARRY), which charged:
That sometime in March 1998, in the Municipality of Camiling,

Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of force and
intimidation succeed in having sexual intercourse with Anna
Laurence Toledo, a 7-year old minor."
LARRY pleaded not guilty. RTC Tarlac convicted him for rape.
On appeal, LARRY contended that time is a material ingredient of

rape, and argued that the Information was fatally defective for
failing to state the precise hour when the crime was committed.
Such infirmity, he added, jeopardized his right to be properly
informed of the charge against him.
66
Both the prosecution 15 and defense16 presented their verison of the

story.
ISSUE:
W/N the trial court erred in finding the information sufficient to support a
judgment of conviction despite the prosecutions failure to state the
precise date of commission of the alleged rape- it being an essential
element of the crime charged (NO, trial court DID NOT err, conviction IS
proper.)
HELD: Appeal is DENIED, RTC decision is AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
The time of occurrence is not an essential element of rape. This
being so, its precise date and hour need not be alleged in the
complaint or information. Section 11 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
provides:
"SEC. 11. Date of commission of the offense. It is not
necessary to state in the complaint or information
the precise date the offense was committed except
15
"Sometime in March 1998, complainant Anna Toledo, who was seven (7) years old, went to
play with Lorena Cachapero and Dino Cachapero at a nearby house in Barrio Bancay 1st,
Camiling, Tarlac.
"During that occasion, appellant Larry Cachapero, brother of Lorena, made her lie down and
removed her shorts and panty. He inserted his penis into her sexual organ and she felt pain.
Larry told her not to tell her parents because he might be scolded.
"On September 2, 1998, witness Conchita Donato was conducting a remedial class in Reading to
her Grade I and II students. While they were reading the word tagtuyot or saluyot, one of her
students Jocelyn Meneses told her that Anna was sexually abused by Manong Larry.
"She then ordered the students to leave the room and asked Jocelyn and Anna to stay behind.
She confronted Anna and asked her the truth. Anna covered her face with her two hands, cried,
and said yes. The teachers had a conference, after which they decided to report the matter to
the parents of Anna.
"On September 3, 1998, Annas mother brought her to the Camiling District Hospital where she
was examined. Dr. Mercedes B. Gapultos, a Medico Legal Officer, examined Anna and came out
with the following report testified that she found old hymenal lacerations and that it may be
caused by many factors like penetration of the hymen by a hard object, or by an object forcibly
entered."
16
"Accused Larry Cachapero testified that at the time of the alleged incident, he was in their
house together with his father and mother. He denied seeing the private complainant on that
day. He alleged the case was filed against [him] because of the long standing feud between his
mother and the mother of the private complainant."

Venue to Rule 113
when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The
offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date
as near as possible to the actual date of its
commission."(Italics supplied)
The Information in this case alleged that the crime was committed
"sometime in March 1998" which, according to private complainant, was
more or less at the closing of the school year.
Being reasonably definite and certain, this approximation

sufficiently meets the requirement of the law.
After all, Section 6 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court merely

requires that the information must state, among others,
the approximate time of the commission of the offense.
Moreover, objections as to the form of the complaint or information
cannot be made for the first time on appeal.
If the present appellant found the Information insufficient, he

should have moved before arraignment either for a bill of
particulars, for him to be properly informed of the exact date of
the alleged rape; or for the quashal of the Information, on the
ground that it did not conform with the prescribed form.
Having failed to pursue either remedy, he is deemed to have

waived objection to any formal defect in the Information.
By cross-examining the prosecution witnesses and presenting evidence for
the defense, LARRYs counsel actively took part in the trial. Furthermore,
the defense never objected to the presentation of the prosecution
evidence proving that the offense had been committed in March 1998.
LARRY has not shown that he was deprived of a proper defense, for
he was in fact able to foist an alibi. It cannot be said, therefore,
that his constitutionally protected right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him has been violated.
*SIDE ISSUE: W/N the private complainants testimony, which was tainted
with material inconsistencies, should not have been received by the trial
court with precipitate credulity (NO, it was PROPER for the court to receive
the testimony)
LARRYs contentions are unconvincing. It is well-established that the
testimony of a rape victim is generally given full weight and
credit, more so if she is a minor.
The revelation of an innocent child whose chastity has been
abused deserves full credit, as her willingness to undergo
the trouble and the humiliation of a public trial is an
eloquent testament to the truth of her complaint.
67
In so testifying, she could only have been impelled to tell the truth,
especially in the absence of proof of ill motive.
To be sure, the victims testimony was not flawless or perfect in all aspects.
We must remember, however, that it was the narration of a minor who
barely understood sex and sexuality. Hence, in assessing her testimony, it
would not be fair to apply the standards used for adults.
Indeed, she fully understood the defilement of her person, even if

she was at a loss for the right words with which to describe the
horrid details. It was for this reason that the prosecutor had to
ask leading questions, which are allowed under Section 10
of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Furthermore, the account given by the victim, stating the essential fact
that LARRY had carnal knowledge of her, refers to details that are not in
any way affected or obscured by the supposed contradictions- whether or
not she bled after the rape or how soon she informed her mother of the
incident.
What further buttressed the story of private complainant were Dr.
Gapultos medical findings that there were old lacerations in her hymen.
Although not indispensable to a rape conviction, such findings were
credible physical evidence of forcible defloration, among others.
6.
BACASMAS V. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 189343, JULY 10,

2013 - DE LA PAZ
Bacasmas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 189343, July 10, 2013

DOCTRINE: An information is sufficient even if you do not state the exact
date of the commission of the crime, when the date and time of the
commission of the crime is not a material ingredient. A violation of RA 3019
3e does not need a statement of the EXACT DATE because the date is not a
material ingredient of the crime.
A violation of RA 3019 3e may be committed in three ways. The use of the
three phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith" and "inexcusable
negligence" in the same Information does not mean that three distinct
offenses were thereby charged but only implied that the offense charged
may have been committed through any of the modes provided by the
law. In addition, there was no inconsistency in alleging both the presence
of conspiracy and gross inexcusable negligence, because the latter was not
simple negligence. Rather, the negligence involved a willful, intentional,
and conscious indifference to the consequences of ones actions or
omissions.
EMERGENCY DIGEST: Bacamas, Gaviol, and Cesa all worked for the City
Government of Cebu. A surprise audit was conducted and found that there
was a shortage of 9M pesos because of the failure to follow the procedure
and the excessive granting of cash advances. The information was filed
with the Sandiganbayan for the violation of RA 3019 corrupt practices. SB

Venue to Rule 113
found them guilty. They filed MRs alleging the insufficiency of the
information. SB ruled that the information was sufficient.
WON the information is sufficient? YES
It is not necessary to state the precise date when the offense was
committed, except when it is a material ingredient thereof. Here, the
date is not a material ingredient of the crime, not having been
committed on one day alone, but rather within a period of time
ranging from 20 September 1995 to 5 March 1998. Hence, stating
the exact dates of the commission of the crime is not only unnecessary,
but impossible as well.
The Information is sufficient, because it adequately describes the nature
and cause of the accusation against petitioners, namely the violation of the
aforementioned law. The use of the three phrases "manifest partiality,"
"evident bad faith" and "inexcusable negligence" in the same Information
does not mean that three distinct offenses were thereby charged but only
implied that the offense charged may have been committed through any of
the modes provided by the law. In addition, there was no inconsistency in
alleging both the presence of conspiracy and gross inexcusable negligence,
because the latter was not simple negligence. Rather, the negligence
involved a willful, intentional, and conscious indifference to the
consequences of ones actions or omissions.
COMPLETE DIGEST
FACTS
Bacamas (Cash Division Chief) Gaviola (City Administrator) and Cesa (City
Treasurer) all worked for the City government of Cebu. By virtue of their
positions, they are involved in the process of approving and releasing cash
advances for the City. PLEASE CHECK FOOTNOTE FOR THE PROCEDURE. 17
17
A written request for a cash advance is made by paymaster Luz Gonzales (Gonzales), who
then submits it to Cash Division Chief Bacasmas for approval. Once the latter approves the
request, she affixes her initials to the voucher, which she forwards to City Treasurer Cesa for his
signature in the same box. By signing, Bacasmas and Cesa certify that the expense or cash
advance is necessary, lawful, and incurred under their direct supervision.
Thereafter, the voucher is forwarded to City Accountant Edna C. Jaca (Jaca) for processing and
pre-audit. She also signs the voucher to certify that there is adequate available
funding/budgetary allotment; that the expenditures are properly certified and supported by
documents; and that previous cash advances have been liquidated and accounted for. She then
prepares an Accountants Advice (Advice).
This Advice is returned with the voucher to the Chief Cashier for the preparation of the check.
After it has been prepared, she affixes her initials to the check, which Cesa then signs.
Afterwards, City Administrator Gaviola approves the voucher and countersigns the check.
The voucher, the Advice, and the check are then returned to the Cash Division, where Gonzales
signs the receipt portion of the voucher, as well as the Check Register to acknowledge receipt of
the check for encashment.
Upon receipt of the check, Gonzales encashes it at the bank, signs the voucher, and records the
cash advance in her Individual Paymaster Cashbook. She then liquidates it within five days after
payment.
A report of those cash advances liquidated by Gonzales is called a Report of Disbursement (RD).
An RD must contain the audit voucher number, the names of the local government employees
who were paid using the money from the cash advance, the amount for each employee, as well
as the receipts. The RDs are examined and verified by the City Auditor and are thereafter
submitted to the Cash Division for recording in the official cash book.
68
There was a surprise audit conducted by the COA. The examination

revealed an accumulated shortage of P9,810,752.60 from 20 September
1995 to 5 March 1998 from the cash and accounts of Gonzales. The team
found that Bacasmas, Gaviola, Cesa, and Jaca failed to follow the abovementioned procedure. The irregularities with the finances were manifested
in the following: additional cash advances were granted even if previous
cash advances had not yet been liquidated, cash advance vouchers for
salaries were not supported by payrolls or lists of payees, and cash
advances for salaries and wages were not liquidated within five days after
each 15th day or end-of-the-month pay period.
The report stated that Bacasmas, Gaviola, Cesa, and Jaca not only signed,
certified, and approved the cash advance vouchers, but also signed and
countersigned the checks despite the deficiencies, which amounted to a
violation of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7160; Presidential Decree No. (P.D.)
1445; and the circulars issued by the Commission on Audit (COA),
specifically COA Circular Nos. 90-331, 92-382 and 97-002. 23 According to
the COA, the violation of the foregoing laws, rules, and regulations
facilitated the loss of a huge amount of public funds at the hands of
Gonzales.
AN INFORMATION WAS FILED WITH THE SB against Bacasmas, Gaviola,
Cesa, and Jaca, to wit:
That on or about the 5th and subsequent thereto, at Cebu City,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above-named accused, ALAN C. GAVIOLA,
EUSTAQUIO B. CESA, BENILDA N. BACASMAS and EDNA J. JACA,
public officers, being then the City Administrator, City Treasurer,
Cash Division Chief and City Accountant, respectively, of the Cebu
City Government, in such capacity and committing the offense in
relation to Office, conniving and confederating together and
mutually helping with each other [sic], with deliberate intent, with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith and with gross inexcusable
negligence, did then and there allow LUZ M. GONZALES,
Accountant I, Disbursing Officer-Designate of the Cebu City
Government, to obtain cash advances despite the fact that she has
previous unliquidated cash advances, thus allowing LUZ M.
GONZALES to accumulate Cash Advances amounting to NINE
MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED TEN day of March 1998, and for
sometime prior THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO PESOS
AND 60/100 (P9,810,752.60), PHILIPPINE CURRENCY, which
remains unliquidated, thus accused in the performance of their
official functions, had given unwarranted benefits to LUZ M.
GONZALES and themselves, to the damage and prejudice of the
government, particularly the Cebu City Government.
SB found that the accused, as public officers, had acted with gross
inexcusable negligence by religiously disregarding the instructions for

Venue to Rule 113
preparing a disbursement voucher and by being totally remiss in their
respective duties and functions under the Local Government Code of
1991. Their gross inexcusable negligence amounted to bad faith, because
they still continued with the illegal practice even if they admittedly had
knowledge of the relevant law and COA rules and regulations. The
Sandiganbayan held that the acts of the accused had caused not only
undue injury to the government because of the P9,810,752.60 shortage,
but also gave unwarranted benefit to Gonzales by allowing her to obtain
cash advances to which she was not entitled. Lastly, it found conspiracy to
be present in the acts and omissions of the accused showing that they had
confederated, connived with, and mutually helped one another in causing
undue injury to the government through the loss of public money.
The accused individually filed their Motions for Reconsideration impugning
the sufficiency of the Information and the finding of gross inexcusable
negligence, undue injury, and unwarranted benefit.
SB resolved that the information was sufficient because the three modes of
violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 commonly involved willful, intentional,
and conscious acts or omissions when there is a duty to act on the part of
the public official or employee. Furthermore, the three modes may all be
alleged in one Information. The Sandiganbayan held that the accused were
all guilty of gross inexcusable negligence. Claiming that it was the practice
in their office, they admittedly disregarded the observance of the law and
COA rules and regulations on the approval and grant of cash advances. The
anti-graft court also stated that the undue injury to the government was
unquestionable because of the shortage amounting to P9,810,752.60.
Finally, the Sandiganbayan decided that although the criminal liability of
Jaca was extinguished upon her death, her civil liability remained. Hence,
the Motions for Reconsideration were denied.
Thus the present PET. For REVIEW on CERTIORARI before this court.
ISSUE: WON THE INFORMATION WAS SUFFICIENT? The Information
specified when the crime was committed, and it named all of the
accused and their alleged acts or omissions constituting the
offense charged.
HELD: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the 07 May 2009 Decision
and 27 August 2009 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No.
26914 are AFFIRMED.
2.
3.
not all of the accused were named, as Gonzales was not charged in
the Information; and
the Information did not specify an offense, because negligence and
conspiracy cannot co-exist in a crime.
THE INFORMATION IS SUFFICIENT.

1. it is not necessary to state the precise date when the offense was
committed, except when it is a material ingredient thereof. The offense
may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to
the actual date of its commission. Here, the date is not a material
ingredient of the crime, not having been committed on one day
alone, but rather within a period of time ranging from 20
September 1995 to 5 March 1998. Hence, stating the exact dates of
the commission of the crime is not only unnecessary, but impossible as
well. That the Information alleged a date and a period during which the
crime was committed was sufficient, because it duly informed petitioners
that before and until 5 March 1998, over nine million pesos had been taken
by Gonzales as a result of petitioners acts. These acts caused undue injury
to the government and unwarranted benefits to the said paymaster.
2. The Information charges petitioners with violating Section 3(e) of R.A.
301918, to wit:
Cesa contends that Gonzales should have been included in the Information,
because the latter incurred cash shortages and allegedly had unliquidated
cash advances. Cesa is wrong. The Information seeks to hold petitioners
accountable for their actions, which allowed Gonzales to obtain cash
advances, and paved the way for her to incur cash shortages, leading to a
loss of over nine million pesos. Thus, the Information correctly excluded her
because her alleged acts did not fall under the crime charged in the
Information.
3. The Information sufficiently specified the offense that violated Section
3(e) of R.A. 3019, the essential elements of which are as follows:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative,
judicial or official functions;
2. The accused must have acted with manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and
3. The action of the accused caused undue injury to any party,
including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted
18
RATIO:
Cesa and Gaviola question the sufficiency of the Information on three
grounds:
1. it did not specify a reasonable time frame within which the offense
was committed, in violation of their right to be informed of the
charge against them;
69
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful.
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative
or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence.

Venue to Rule 113
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of the functions
of the accused.
The Information is sufficient, because it adequately describes the nature
and cause of the accusation against petitioners, namely the violation of the
aforementioned law. The use of the three phrases "manifest partiality,"
"evident bad faith" and "inexcusable negligence" in the same Information
does not mean that three distinct offenses were thereby charged but only
implied that the offense charged may have been committed through any of
the modes provided by the law. In addition, there was no inconsistency in
alleging both the presence of conspiracy and gross inexcusable negligence,
because the latter was not simple negligence. Rather, the negligence
involved a willful, intentional, and conscious indifference to the
consequences of ones actions or omissions.
NOTE:
1.Petitioners committed gross negligence amounting to bad faith when
they approved and disbursed the cash advances in violation of law and
rules and regulations. The concerned City Officials signed, certified and
approved the disbursements/cash advance vouchers, and signed and
countersigned the corresponding checks despite the deficiencies which are
violations of laws, rules and regulations mentioned in the preceding
paragraphs. The accountable officer was able to accumulate excess or idle
funds within her total control and disposal, resulting in the loss of public
funds, due to the flagrant violations by the concerned city officials of the
abovementioned laws, rules and regulations.
2. Petitioners acts show that they were unified in illegally approving
irregular
cash
advance
vouchers
in
order to defraud the government. Clearly, they were in cahoots in granting
the cash advances to Gonzales. By these acts, petitioners defrauded the
government of such a large sum of money that should not have been
disbursed in the first place, had they been circumspect in performing their
functions.
3. The third element of the offense is that the action of the offender caused
undue injury to any party, including the government; or gave any party any
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge of his or her
functions. Here, the Sandiganbayan found that petitioners both brought
about undue injury to the government and gave unwarranted benefit to
Gonzales.
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. (G.R. NO. 184537 April 23, 2010) Geraldez
Emergency Recitation: Petitioners herein are the subjects of
Informations filed with the Sandiganbayan. Quintin Saludaga was Mayor of
Municipality of Lavezares, Northern Samar, and SPO2 Fiel Genio is a
policeman. In both allegations, they were being accused of violating
Section 3(e) of RA 3019 (Anti-graft and Corrupt Act) for awarding a Pakyaw
Contract for the Construction of Barangay Day Care Centers in 2 Barangays
(P48,500 each). The contracts were awarded without competitive public
bidding and given to Olimpio Legua, a non-license contractor and nonaccredited NGO.
The first information alleged a violation of Sec. 3(e) by causing undue
injury to the government. This was quashed on the ground that the
damages caused were unsubstantiated. The Special Prosecutor refiled the
case, again alleging a violation of Sec. 3(e), but this time by giving
unwarranted benefit or advanted to a private person. Saludaga and Genio
claim that they should be subject to another preliminary investigation,
since this new information consituted a substitution, or at the very least, a
substantial amendment.
Held: R.A. 3019, Section 3, paragraph (e), as amended, provides as one of
its elements that the public officer should have acted by causing any
undue injury to any party, including the Government, or by giving any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his functions. An accused may be charged under either mode
or under both should both modes concur. As such, Petitioners contention
that "in substitution of information another preliminary investigation is
entailed and that the accused has to plead anew to the new information" is
not applicable to the present case because, as already stated, there is no
substitution of information there being no change in the nature of the
offense charged. There is also no substantial amendment, as all the
underlying facts, as well as the evidentiary requirements for the
prosecution and defense, remain the same.
The Real McCoy:
Facts:
1.
B.SUBSTITUTION OF INFORMATION
1.
SALUDAGA V. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 184537, APRIL 23,

2010 GERALDEZ
QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA and SPO2 FIEL E. GENIO, Petitioners, vs. The

HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, 4th DIVISION and the PEOPLE OF
70
2.
Petitioners herein are the subjects of Informations filed with the

Sandiganbayan. Quintin Saludaga was Mayor of Municipality of
Lavezares, Northern Samar, and SPO2 Fiel Genio is a policeman. In
both allegations, they were being accused of violating Section 3(e)
of RA 3019 (Anti-graft and Corrupt Act) for awarding a Pakyaw
Contract for the Construction of Barangay Day Care Centers in 2
Barangays (P48,500 each). The contracts were awarded without
competitive public bidding and given to Olimpio Legua, a nonlicense contractor and non-accredited NGO.
An Information was filed in the Sandiganbayan charging Saludaga
and Genio for having violated Section 3(e) of RA 3019, by causing
undue injury to the government.

Venue to Rule 113
a.
The Third Division granted a Motion to Quash and dismiss

the information for failure to allege and prove the amount
of actual damages caused to the government.
3.
The Special Prosecutor amended the information and re-filed it with

the Sandiganbayan.
4.
The second Information now charges the Petitioners with violating

(still) Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019, but now by giving unwarranted benefit
or advanted to a private person (Legua), to the prejudice of the
government.
5.
Saludaga and Genio filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation.

They claim that a failure by the prosecution to conduct a new
preliminary investigation before the filing of the second Inofrmation
violates the law, as the latter charges a different offense.
a.
They argue that a substitution took place of the first

information.
b.
Assuming there was no substitution, there was at least a

substantial amendment.
c.
They further claim that newly discovered evidence

mandates re-examination of the finding of probable cause
to file the case.
6.
The SB Fourth Division denied the petitioners motion. It reasoned

that the second information did not change the nature of the
offense. The MR was also denied.
7.
As such, they filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,

preliminary injunction, and TRO.
Issues:
The core issue is whether or not the two (2) ways of violating section 3(e)
of Republic Act 3019, namely: (a) by causing undue injury to any party,
including the Government; or (b) by giving any private party any
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference constitute two distinct and
separate offenses that would warrant a new or another preliminary
investigation. NOPE.
Ratio:
We find no merit in this petition.
71
Petitioners were charged with a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The essential elements of the
offense are as follows:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative,
judicial or official functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
inexcusable negligence; and
3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including
the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
R.A. 3019, Section 3, paragraph (e), as amended, provides as one of its
elements that the public officer should have acted by causing any undue
injury to any party, including the Government, or by giving any private
party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his functions. The use of the disjunctive term "or" connotes that either act
qualifies as a violation of Section 3 paragraph (e), or as aptly held in
Santiago, as two (2) different modes of committing the offense. This does
not however indicate that each mode constitutes a distinct offense, but
rather, that an accused may be charged under either mode or under both.
Contrary to the argument of petitioners, there is no substituted
information. The Information dated August 17, 2007 filed in Criminal Case
No. SB-08 CRM 0263 charged the same offense, that is, violation of Section
3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Only the mode of commission was modified.
While jurisprudence, the most recent being Talaga, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,
provides that there are two (2) acts or modes of committing the offense,
thus: a) by causing any undue injury to any party, including the
government; or b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference, it does not mean that each act or mode
constitutes a distinct offense. An accused may be charged under either
mode or under both should both modes concur.
Petitioners reliance on the Teehankee v. Madayag, ruling that, "in
substitution of information another preliminary investigation is entailed and
that the accused has to plead anew to the new information" is not
applicable to the present case because, as already stated, there is no
substitution of information there being no change in the nature of the
offense charged.
Consequently, petitioners cannot invoke the principle that failure to
conduct a new preliminary investigation is tantamount to a violation of
their rights. While it is true that preliminary investigation is a statutory and
substantive right accorded to the accused before trial, the denial of
petitioners claim for a new investigation, however, did not deprive them of
their right to due process. An examination of the records of the case
discloses that there was a full-blown preliminary investigation wherein both
petitioners actively participated.
Anent the contention of petitioners that the information contained
substantial amendments warranting a new preliminary investigation, the
same must likewise fail.

Venue to Rule 113
Petitioners erroneously concluded that giving undue injury, as alleged in
the first Information, and conferring unwarranted benefits, alleged in the
second Information, are two distinct violations of, or two distinct ways of
violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, and that such shift from
giving undue injury to conferring unwarranted benefit constituted, at the
very least, a substantial amendment. It should be noted that the
Information is founded on the same transaction as the first Information,
that of entering into a Pakyaw Contract for the construction of barangay
day care centers for barangays Mac-Arthur and Urdaneta, Lavezares,
Northern Samar. Thus, the evidentiary requirements for the prosecution
and defense remain the same.
There was no modification in the nature of the charged offense.
Consequently, a new preliminary investigation is unnecessary and cannot
be demanded by the petitioners.
Finally, the third assigned error, that newly discovered evidence mandates
due re-examination of the finding of prima facie cause to file the case,
deserves scant consideration.
The Pornelos (COA auditor) affidavit, which petitioners claim as newlydiscovered, was executed by affiant way back in November 29, 2000, as
correctly found by the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, it cannot be considered as
newly found evidence because it was already in existence prior to the refiling of the case.
Case law has it that the determination of probable cause against those in
public office during a preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to
the Office of the Ombudsman. Without good and compelling reasons, the
Court cannot interfere in the exercise by the Office of the Ombudsman of
its investigatory and prosecutory powers. There is no grave abuse of
discretion here that would warrant the exercise of Rule 65 certiorari in this
case.
2.
PACOY V. CAJIGAL, G.R. NO. 157472, SEPTEMBER 28, 2007

KING
dismissed without his consent. He also alleged that the amendment was
substantial. Hence it cannot be made after a plea has been given. And that
the aggravating circumstance of in disregard of rank does not qualify
Homicide to Murder.
SC: No double jeopardy. There was merely a formal amendment. The
homicide case was not dismissed upon the changing of the title to Murder.
Hence, no GADALEJ on the part of the judge.
Pacoy v Judge Cajigal, People of the Philippines, Escueta

GR No. 157472
September 28, 2007
Doctrine: A change in the caption of the Information from homicide to
murder is only a formal amendment considering that the allegations in the
information remained the same.
ER:
An information for Homicide was filed against SSGT Pacoy alleging that he
shot 2LT. Frederick Esqueta using an armalite. It was also alleged that there
was the qualifying circumstance of in disregard of his rank. SGGT Pacoy
pleaded not guilty. After arraignment though, the title of the offense
Homicide in the information was ordered changed to Murder. Pacoy now
contends that this puts him in double jeopardy as the homicide case was
72
Facts:
An information for Homicide was filed against SSGT. Pacoy.
. . . shot his commanding officer 2Lt. Frederick Esquita with

his armalite rifle
hitting
and
sustaining
upon
2Lt.
Frederick Esquita multiple gunshot wounds on his body which
caused his instantaneous death. With the aggravating
circumstance of killing, 2Lt. Frederick Esquita in disregard of his
rank.
He pleaded not guilty upon arraignment.
Pretrial conference and trial was set on October 8, 2002.
However, on the same day after the arraignment, the judge issued another
Order, likewise dated September 12, 2002, directing the trial prosecutor to
correct and amend the Information to Murder in view of the aggravating
circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the Information. (mali naman
talaga. Hindi naman qualifying circumstance ang in disregard of rank)
Acting upon such Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by
crossing out the word Homicide and instead wrote the word Murder in
the caption and in the opening paragraph of the Information.
The accusatory portion remained exactly the same as that of the original
Information for Homicide, with the correction of the spelling of the victims
name from Escuita to Escueta.
On the date of pretrial conference, SSGT. Pacoy was to be re-arraigned for
the crime of murder.
Counsel for petitioner objected on the ground that the latter would be
placed in double jeopardy, considering that his Homicide case had been
terminated without his express consent, resulting in the dismissal of the
case. As petitioner refused to enter his plea on the amended Information
for Murder, the public respondent entered for him a plea of not guilty.
On October 28, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash with Motion to
Suspend Proceedings Pending the Resolution of the Instant Motion on the
ground of double jeopardy. Pacoy alleged that in the Information for
Homicide, he was validly indicted and arraigned before a competent court,
and the case was terminated without his express consent; that when the
case for Homicide was terminated without his express consent, the
subsequent filing of the Information for Murder in lieu of Homicide placed
him in double jeopardy.
The motion to quash was denied. There was no double jeopardy yet as
stated by the RTC.
Motion to Inhibit with MR was filed. Motion to Inhibit was denied.

Venue to Rule 113
But the MR was granted. The judge found that a close scrutiny of Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code shows that disregard of rank is merely a
generic mitigating circumstance which should not elevate the classification
of the crime of homicide to murder. Hence, he ordered that it be changed
to Homicide.
A petition for certiorari was alleging GADALEJ on the judge.
Pacoy alleges that:
despite having entered his plea of not guilty to the charge of

Homicide, the judge ordered the amendment of the Information
from Homicide to Murder because of the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank, which is in
violation of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure;
disregard of rank is only a generic aggravating circumstance which

serves to affect the penalty to be imposed upon the accused and
does not qualify the offense into a more serious crime;
that even assuming that disregard of rank is a qualifying

aggravating circumstance, such is a substantial amendment which
is not allowed after petitioner has entered his plea.
considering that the original Information for Homicide filed against

him was terminated without his express consent; thus, prosecuting
him for the same offense would place him in double jeopardy.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General argues that:
The judge's Order reinstating the Information to Homicide after

initially motu proprio ordering its amendment to Murder renders
herein petition moot and academic;
that petitioner failed to establish the fourth element of double

jeopardy, i.e., the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the
case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his consent;
SSGT Pacoy confuses amendment with substitution of Information;
The respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002

mandated an amendment of the Information as provided under
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure;
amendments do not entail dismissal or termination of the previous

case.
Issue: Whether the amendment of the title HOMICIDE to MURDER violated
the rights of the accused against double jeopardy? No.
Ratio:
the change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder is merely a
formal amendment and not a substantial amendment or a substitution.
Pacoy is confused with the provisions below. He based his action on Section
14, Rule 110 which was erroneous.
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court:
73
If it appears at anytime before judgment that a mistake has been made in

charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint
or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in
accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be
placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail
for their appearance at the trial.
The applicable provision is Section 19, Rule 119, which provides:
SEC. 19.- When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense When it becomes manifest at any time before judgment that a mistake has
been made in charging the proper offense and the accused cannot be
convicted of the offense charged or any other offense necessarily included
therein, the accused shall not be discharged if there appears good cause to
detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for
the proper offense and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the
proper information.
Evidently, the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, applies only when
the offense charged is wholly different from the offense proved, i.e., the
accused cannot be convicted of a crime with which he was not charged in
the information even if it be proven, in which case, there must be a
dismissal of the charge and a substitution of a new information charging
the proper offense.
Section 14 does not apply to a second information, which involves the
same offense or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the first information. In this connection, the offense charged
necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.
There was no change in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged
or in the determination of the jurisdiction of the court. The averments in
the amended Information for Murder are exactly the same as those already
alleged in the original Information for Homicide, as there was not at all
any change in the act imputed to petitioner, i.e., the killing of
2Lt. Escueta without any qualifying circumstance. Thus, we find that the
amendment made in the caption and preamble from Homicide to
Murder as purely formal.
Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal amendments in
cases in which the accused has already pleaded, it is necessary that the
amendments do not prejudice the rights of the accused. The test of
whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a
complaint or information is whether a defense under the complaint or
information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the

Venue to Rule 113
amendment is made; and when any evidence the accused might have
would be inapplicable to the complaint or information. [22] Since the facts
alleged in the accusatory portion of the amended Information are identical
with those of the original Information for Homicide, there could not be any
effect on the prosecution's theory of the case; neither would there be any
possible prejudice to the rights or defense of petitioner.
While the respondent judge erroneously thought that disrespect on
account of rank qualified the crime to murder, as the same was only a
generic aggravating circumstance, we do not find that he committed any
grave abuse of discretion in ordering the amendment of the Information
after petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide,
since the amendment made was only formal and did not adversely affect
any substantial right of petitioner.
NOT YET TOPIC:
It is the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal or
termination of the case that bars further prosecution for the same offense
or
any
attempt
to
commit
the
same
or
the
frustration
thereof; or prosecution for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.
The respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002 was for the trial
prosecutor to correct and amend the Information but not to dismiss the
same upon the filing of a new Information charging the proper offense.
Section 14 does not apply to a second information, which involves the
same offense or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the first information. In this connection, the offense charged
necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.
Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder; thus, the
respondent judge merely ordered the amendment of the Information and
not the dismissal of the original Information. To repeat, it was the same
original information that was amended by merely crossing out the word
Homicide and writing the word Murder, instead, which showed that
there was no dismissal of the homicide case.
A reading of the Order dated December 18, 2002showed that the
respondent judge granted petitioner's motion for reconsideration, not on
the ground that double jeopardy exists, but on his realization that
disregard of rank is a generic aggravating circumstance which does not
qualify the killing of the victim to murder. Thus, he rightly corrected himself
74
by reinstating the original Information for Homicide. The requisite of

double jeopardy that the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the
second is not present, considering that petitioner was neither convicted
nor acquitted; nor was the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
C.AMENDED INFORMATION/AMENDMENT
1.
CABO V. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 169509, JUNE 16, 2006

LAGOS
Cabo vs Sandiganbayan
Topic: Amended Information/ Complaint
(sorry, long case)
Doctrine:
Rule 110 Sed. 14.
Amendment or substitution. A complaint or
information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave court,
at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during
the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and
when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
Amendment of an information after the accused has pleaded thereto is
allowed, if the amended information merely states with additional precision
something which is already contained in the original information and
which, therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime
charged.
ER
Cabo, the Business Manager of Orient Integrated Development

Consultancy, Inc was charged of violating Sec 3(b) of RA 3019,
along with Balahay, then Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur. An
information was filed in the Sandiganbayan (SB). Needing to travel
abroad, Cabo asked permission from the Sandiganbayan, which the
latter granted deemed Cabo conditionally arraigned. Additionally,
SB gave the condition that if the need to amend the information
arises, Cabo shall waive her right to object under Sec 14 Rule 110
of ROC and under double jeopardy.
Upon her return, she and Balahay were rearraigned, Cabo,
reiterating her not guilty plea in her previous conditional
arraignment. Balahay, then filed a motion to quash the information
on the ground that it does not charge any offense; arguing that the
information failed to allege that Balahay had to intervene in the
said contract under the law, in his official capacity as municipal
mayor. SB sustained the contention but did not order the quashal
of the information. Instead, it directed the prosecution to amend
the information.

Venue to Rule 113
Upon filing of the amended information, Cabo motioned to cancel

her second arraignment on the ground that the amended
information pertained to Balahay alone and that there could be no
substantial amendments after a plea has been made. She also
claimed double jeopardy. The SB denied her motion and her
subsequent MR. Thus this petition for certiorari in the SC.
Issue: Whether the amendment was proper? YES
The original information can be cured by amendment even after
she had pleaded thereto, since the amendments ordered by the
court below were only as to matters of form and not of substance.
What the Sandiganbayan ordered was for the amendment of the
information pursuant to the express provision of Section 4, Rule
117, which states:
o SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information.- If the
motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the
complaint or information which can be cured by
amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be
made.
If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute
an offense, the prosecution shall be given by the court an
opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall
be granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the
complaint or information still suffers from the same defect despite
the amendment.
o SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint
or information may be amended, in form or in
substance, without leave court, at any time before
the accused enters his plea. After the plea and
during the trial, a formal amendment may only be
made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the
accused.
An amendment is only in form when it merely adds
specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information
and does not introduce new and material facts.
Amendment of an information after the accused has
pleaded thereto is allowed, if the amended information
merely states with additional precision something which is
already contained in the original information and which,
therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the
crime charged.
In the case at bar, an examination of the two informations in this
case would justify the preceding observation. While the first
information alleged that Balahay committed the offense with the
use of his influence as such public official together with Cabo,
the amended information stated that he did so in the performance
of his official functions, taking advantage of his official position,
with grave abuse of

confederating with Cabo.
Facts
authority
75
while
conspiring
and
On June 26, 2004, an information for violation of Section 3(b) of

R.A. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was filed
against Cabo and her co-accused Bonifacio C. Balahay.
o Alleged that Balahay, then Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del
Sur, received and accepted P104,162.31 from Cabo,
Business Manager of Orient Integrated Development
Consultancy, Inc. Balahay in consideration of the said
accused having officially intervened in the undertaking by
the OIDCI of such contract for consultancy services with
the Municipality of Barobo.
Claiming that she was deprived of her right to a preliminary
investigation as she never received any notice to submit a counteraffidavit or countervailing evidence to prove her innocence, Cabo
filed a motion for reinvestigation before the 4 th division of the
Sandiganbayan.
o Sandiganbayan granted the motion for reinvestigation
Cabo then filed a motion seeking the courts permission to travel
abroad.
o Sandiganbayan, likewise, granted the motion and stated in
its order that since the reinvestigation is still pending and
the accused have not yet been arraigned, should the
accused fail to return to the Philippines, Cabo shall be
deemed conditionally arraigned.
If upon such
reinvestigation/review, it shall be found that there is no
probable cause to proceed against said accused, the
conditional arraignment this morning shall be with no force
and effect. However, if it should be found that there is a
need to amend the present indictment or to pave the way
for the filing of some other indictment/s, then the accused
shall waive her right to object under Section 14, Rule 110
of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure and her
constitutional right to be protected against double
jeopardy.
Cabo returned from abroad. The Special Prosecutor concluded its
reinvestigation and found probable cause to charge her with
violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019
o Cabo filed an MR but it was denied
Thus, the Sandiganbayan set anew the arraignment of Cabo and
her co-accused.
On the day of the arraignment, Cabo asked if she can reiterate her
plea of not guilty previously entered during her conditional
arraignment so that she may be excused from attending the

Venue to Rule 113
scheduled arraignment but the Sandiganbayan seemed to not act

on it.
Cabos
co-accused,
Balahay
failed
to
appear
for
arraignment. Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Balahay as well
the confiscation of his bail bond. Upon motion for reconsideration
of Balahay, however, the Sandiganbayan recalled the warrant for
his arrest and reinstated the bail bond. His arraignment was
subsequently reset for November 30, 2004
On November 24, 2004, Balahay, filed a motion to quash the
information on the ground that the same does not charge any
offense.
o While Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 penalizes the act of
(d)irectly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift,
present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for
another, from any person, in connection with any
transaction between the Government and any other party,
wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to
intervene under the law, the information alleged only in
general terms that Balahay intervened in the undertaking
by the OIDCI of such contract for consultancy services with
the Municipality of Barobo. In other words, the
information failed to allege that Balahay had to intervene
in the said contract under the law, in his official capacity
as municipal mayor.
Sandiganbayan sustained Balahays contention that the facts
charged in the information do not constitute the offense of
violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019. Apart from the failure to
allege that Balahay had to officially intervene in the transaction
pursuant to law, it also failed to allege that Balahay accepted and
received the money for himself or for another. The information
was thus defective in that it failed to allege every single fact
necessary to constitute all the elements of the offense charged.
o However, did not order the immediate quashal of the
information. It held that under Section 4, Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court, if the motion to quash is based on the
ground that the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense x x x the (c)ourt should not quash the
information outright, but should instead direct the
prosecution to correct the defect therein by proper
amendment. It is only when the prosecution fails or
refuses to undertake such amendment, or when despite
such amendment the information still suffers from the
same vice or defect, that the court would be finally
justified in granting the motion to quash.
The
Sandiganbayan thus gave the prosecution a period of 15
days from notice within which to file an amended
information that is sufficient as to both form and
substance.
76
the prosecution filed an amended information which incorporated

all the essential elements of the crime charged, to wit:
o That BALAHAY, a high ranking public official, in the
performance of his official functions, taking advantage of
his official position, with grave abuse of authority, and
committing the offense in relation to his office, conspiring
and confederating with JOCELYN CABO, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously receive and accept the
amount of (P104,162.31) for his own benefit or use from
said JOCELYN CABO, Business Manager of Orient Integrated
Development Consultancy, Inc. (OIDC), a consultancy
group charged with conducting a feasibility study for the
Community-Based Resource Management Project of the
Municipality of Barobo, with accused Cabo giving and
granting said amount to accused Balahay in consideration
of the contract for said feasibility study, which contract
accused Balahay in his official capacity has to intervene
under the law.
Consequently, Balahay was sent a notice for his arraignment on
the amended information. Cabo was likewise notified of her rearraignment.
o However, Cabo filed a Motion to Cancel Second
Arraignment on the ground that the amended information
pertained to Balahay alone. Cabo claimed that she could
no longer be re-arraigned on the amended information
since substantial amendment of an information is not
allowed after a plea had already been made thereon.
the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution denying
Cabos motion for lack of merit, to wit:
o [T]he arraignment of accused Cabo on the original
information was only conditional in nature and that the
same was resorted to as a mere accommodation in her
favor to enable her to travel abroad without this Court
losing its ability to conduct trial in absentia in the event
she decides to abscond. However, as clearly stated in the
Courts Order, accused Cabo agreed with the condition that
should there be a need to amend the information, she
would thereby waive, not only her right to object to the
amended information, but also her constitutional protection
against double jeopardy. Now that the original information
has been superseded by an amended information, which
was specifically filed by the prosecution, and thereafter
admitted by this Court, on the basis of Section 4, Rule 117
of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, accused Cabo is
already estopped from raising any objection thereto.
Cabo filed a motion for reconsideration, on the additional ground
that double jeopardy had already set in. She asserted that her
conditional arraignment under the original information had been

Venue to Rule 113
validated or confirmed by her formal manifestation, wherein she

reiterated her plea of not guilty. Thus, her arraignment on the
original information was no longer conditional in nature such that
double jeopardy would attach.
The Sandiganbayan denied Cabos motion for reconsideration.
Consequently, Cabo filed the instant special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleging that the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in holding that her
arraignment on the original information was conditional in nature
and that a re-arraignment on the amended information would not
put her in double jeopardy.
Issues:
Whether double jeopardy would attach on the basis of the not guilty plea
entered by Cabo on the original information, considering that her
arraignment, which was initially conditional in nature, was ratified when
she confirmed her not guilty plea by means of a written manifestation?
NO.
Whether the amendment was proper? YES.
Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
Ratio:
No double jeopardy without a valid information and a criminal
case that was not dismissed nor terminated
At any rate, with or without a valid plea, still Cabo cannot rely upon
the principle of double jeopardy to avoid arraignment on the
amended information. It is elementary that for double jeopardy to
attach, the case against the accused must have been dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon a valid information sufficient in form
and substance and the accused pleaded to the charge.[25] In the
instant case, the original information to which Cabo entered a plea
of not guilty was neither valid nor sufficient to sustain a
conviction, and the criminal case was also neither dismissed nor
terminated. Double jeopardy could not, therefore, attach even if
Cabo is assumed to have been unconditionally arraigned on the
original charge.
It should be noted that the previous information in Criminal Case

No. 27959 failed to allege all the essential elements of violation of
Section 3(b), R.A. No. 3019. It, in fact, did not charge any offense
and was, to all intents and purposes, void and defective. A valid
conviction cannot be sustained on the basis of such information.
77
Cabo was resultantly not placed in danger of being convicted when

she entered her plea of not guilty to the insufficient indictment.
Formal amendments may be done after plea [RELEVANT]
Moreover, there was no dismissal or termination of the case

against Cabo. What the Sandiganbayan ordered was for
the amendment of the information pursuant to the express
provision of Section 4, Rule 117, which states:
o SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information.- If
the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of
the complaint or information which can be cured by
amendment, the court shall order that an
amendment be made.
If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute

an offense, the prosecution shall be given by the court an
opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall
be granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the
complaint or information still suffers from the same defect despite
the amendment.
The Sandiganbayan correctly applied the foregoing provision when

Cabos co-accused filed a motion to quash the original information
on the ground that the same does not charge an offense. Contrary
to Cabos submission, the original information can be cured by
amendment even after she had pleaded thereto, since the
amendments ordered by the court below were only as to matters of
form and not of substance. The amendment ordered by the
Sandiganbayan did not violate the first paragraph of Section 14,
Rule 110, which provides:
o SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint
or information may be amended, in form or in
substance, without leave court, at any time before
the accused enters his plea. After the plea and
during the trial, a formal amendment may only be
made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the
accused.
In Poblete v. Sandoval, the Court explained that an amendment is

only in form when it merely adds specifications to eliminate
vagueness in the information and does not introduce new
and material facts.
Amendment of an information after the accused has

pleaded thereto is allowed, if the amended information
merely states with additional precision something which is
already contained in the original information and which,
therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the
crime charged.
In the case at bar, while certain elements of the crime charged

were missing in the indictment, the amended information did not

Venue to Rule 113
change the nature of the offense which is for violation of Section

3(b), R.A. No. 3019. The amended information merely clarified the
factual averments in the accusatory portion of the previous
information, in order to reflect with definiteness the essential
elements of the crime charged.
An examination of the two informations in this case would justify
the preceding observation. While the first information alleged that
Balahay committed the offense with the use of his influence as
such public official together with Cabo, the amended
information stated that he did so in the performance of his official
functions, taking advantage of his official position, with grave
abuse of authority while conspiring and confederating with
Cabo. Then too, while it was averred previously that Balahay
received and accepted the money from Cabo, with the latter
giving and granting the said amount to accused Balahay in
consideration of the said accused having officially intervened in the
undertaking by the OIDCI of such contract for consultancy
services, the amended information simply specified that Balahay
received the money for his own benefit or use and that the
contract mentioned in the first information was one that Balahay,
in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.
Consequently, even if we treat Cabos arraignment on the original
information as unconditional, the same would not bar the
amendment of the original information under Section 14, Rule 110.
Re-arraignment on the amended information will not prejudice
Cabos rights since the alterations introduced therein did not
change the nature of the crime.
As held in People v. Casey:
o The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the
amendment of an information has been said to be whether
a defense under the information as it originally stood would
be available after the amendment is made, and whether
any evidence defendant might have would be equally
applicable to the information in the one form as in the
other. A look into Our jurisprudence on the matter shows
that an amendment to an information introduced after the
accused has pleaded not guilty thereto, which does not
change the nature of the crime alleged therein, does not
expose the accused to a charge which could call for a
higher penalty, does not affect the essence of the offense
or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity
to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of
form and not of substance not prejudicial to the accused
and, therefore, not prohibited by Section 13 (now Section
14), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Likewise, it is not necessary, as Cabo suggests, to dismiss the
original complaint under the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule
110, which states:
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake

has been made in charging the proper offense, the court
shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the
filing of a new one charging the proper offense in
accordance with section 11, Rule 119, provided the
accused would not be placed in double jeopardy. The court
may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance
at the trial.
The afore-cited rule is inapplicable to the case at bar for the simple
reason that there was no mistake in charging the proper offense in
the original information.
As correctly observed by the
Sandiganbayan:
o It is hardly necessary for this Court to order the dismissal
of the original information and then direct the filing of a
new one charging the proper offense. The reason for this
is obvious. The prosecution did not commit a mistake in
charging the proper offense; rather, it merely failed to file
an information sufficient to charge the offense it intended
to charge, namely, violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No.
3019. Section 14, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure apparently relied upon by accused Cabo
contemplates a situation where the accused will be
charged with an offense different from or is otherwise not
necessarily included in the offense charged in the
information to be dismissed by the Court. In the case at
bar, however, accused Cabo will not be charged with a
different offense or with an offense that is not necessarily
included in the offense charged in the original information,
but with the very same offense that the prosecution
intended to charge her in the first place, that is, violation of
Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019.[28]
All told, the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of
discretion when it ordered the re-arraignment of Cabo on the
amended information. Double jeopardy did not attach by virtue of
Cabos conditional arraignment on the first information. It is
well-settled that for a claim of double jeopardy to prosper, the
following requisites must concur:
o (1) there is a complaint or information or other formal
charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction;
o (2) the same is filed before a court of competent
jurisdiction;
o (3) there is a valid arraignment or plea to the charges; and
o (4) the accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is
otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express
consent.
The first and fourth requisites are not present in the case at bar.
o
78

Venue to Rule 113
Cabos conditional arraignment was had a condition that on
amendment of the information, she will waive any objection under
sec 14 rule 110 and under double jeopardy.
Initially, it must be pointed out that the Sandiganbayans practice

of conditionally arraigning the accused pending reinvestigation of
the case by the Ombudsman is not specifically provided in the
regular rules of procedure. In People v. Espinosa, however, the
Court tangentially recognized the practice of conditionally
arraigning the accused, provided that the alleged conditions
attached thereto should be unmistakable, express, informed and
enlightened. The Court ventured further by requiring that said
conditions be expressly stated in the order disposing of the
arraignment. Otherwise, it was held that the arraignment should be
deemed simple and unconditional.
In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan Order dated May 14, 2004
unequivocally set forth the conditions for Cabos arraignment
pending reinvestigation of the case as well as her travel abroad.
o Among the conditions specified in said order is if it should
be found that there is a need to amend the present
indictment x x x, then the accused shall waive her right to
object under Section 14, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure and her constitutional right to be
protected against double jeopardy.
o Cabo was duly assisted by counsel during the conditional
arraignment and was presumably apprised of the legal
consequences of such conditions. In fact, she signed the
minutes of the proceedings which could only signify her
informed acceptance of and conformity with the terms of
the conditional arraignment.
Thus, Cabo cannot now be allowed to turn her back on such

conditions on the pretext that she affirmed her conditional
arraignment by means of a written manifestation. To begin with,
there is no showing that the Sandiganbayan ruled on her written
manifestation and motion that she be allowed to merely confirm
her previous plea on the original information. It is likewise doubtful
that Cabo may legally confirm her conditional arraignment by
means of a mere written motion or manifestation. Section 1(b),
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court explicitly requires that (t)he
accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally
enter his plea.
2.
79
Leticia and Johan were charged with the murder of Jesus. They
were both found guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Leticia contends she was not arraigned on the amended
information for which she was convicted. Her argument was that
the flawed understanding of the rules on amendment and
misconception on the necessity of arraignment in every case.
Issues:
Whether what was involved in this case was a formal amendment
Whether arraignment was necessary
-
A mere change in the date of the commission of the crime, if the

disparity of time is not great, is more formal than substantial. Such
an amendment would not prejudice the rights of the accused since
the proposed amendment would not alter the nature of the offense.
The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the
amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense under
the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer
be available after the amendment is made, when any evidence the
accused might have would no longer be available after the
amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might
have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information, as
amended.
The need for arraignment is equally imperative in an amended
information or complaint. This, however, pertains only to
substantial amendments and to formal amendments that do not
charge an offense different from that charged in the original
complaint or information, do not alter the theory of the
prosecution, do not cause any surprise and affect the line of
defense and do not adversely affect the substantial rights of the
accused, such as an amendment in the date of the commission of
the offense.
Facts:
-
KUMMER V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 174461, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013

LIBONGCO
Kummer v People
ER:
-
On 19 June 1998, between 9 and 10 pm, Jesus Mallo, Jr. (Jesus),

accompanied by Amiel Malana (Amiel), went to the house of Leticia
Kummer (Leticia).
o Leticia opened the door. At this point, her son and coaccused, Johan, shot Jesus twice. Both Jesus and Amiel ran.
When Amiel turned, he saw Leticia leveling and firing her
gun at Jesus, hitting him at the back and causing him to fall
flat on the ground.
o Leticia and Johan scoured the pathway up to the place
where Jesus was laying flat. When they saw Jesus was
dead, they put down their guns and flashlight and pulled
Jesus 3 to 4 meters away from the house.
The following morning, policeman Danilo Pelovello (Danillo) went to
Leticias house and informed her that Jesus was found dead in front

Venue to Rule 113
of her house. Danilo conducted an investigation through inquiries

among the neighbors, who denied having knowledge of the
incident.
Prosecution filed an information for homicide against Leticia and
Johan. Both accused were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. They
waived the pre-tiral and the trial on the merits followed.
o Leticia denied the charge and claimed that they were all
asleep at the house in the evening of homicide. She
claimed that they were awakened by the sound of stones
being thrown at their house, a gun report and the banging
at their door.
o Believing it was the NPA, Johan got a gun and fired twice
outside to scare the people causing the disturbance. The
ruckus continued, so Johan got a shotgun and fired it. The
noise stopped and they all went back to sleep.
RTC found prosecutions evidence persuasive, and found both
Leticia and Johan guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Leticia contended before the CA that the RTC committed reversible
errors in its appreciation of the evidence. CA rejected petitioners
arguments and affirmed the RTC judgment.
On appeal, one of Leticias contentions was that she was not
arraigned on the amended information for which she was
convicted. Her argument was that the flawed understanding of the
rules on amendment and misconception on the necessity of
arraignment in every case.
Issue:
Whether what was involved in this case was a formal amendment
Whether arraignment was necessary
Ratio:
In this case, a change of date is a formal amendment
-
Sec. 14, Rule 110 of the ROC permits a formal amendment of a

complaint even after the plea but only if it is made with leave of
court.
o It also provided that it can be done without causing
prejudice to the right of the accused.
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information
may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court,
at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and
during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave
of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the
rights of the accused. However, any amendment before plea, which
downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any
accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon
motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and
with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving
the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties,
80
especially the offended party. If it appears at any time before

judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or
information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper
offense in accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided the
accused [would] not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may
require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
A mere change in the date of the commission of the crime, if the
disparity of time is not great, is more formal than substantial. Such
an amendment would not prejudice the rights of the accused since
the proposed amendment would not alter the nature of the offense.
The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the
amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense under
the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer
be available after the amendment is made, when any evidence the
accused might have would no longer be available after the
amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might
have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information, as
amended.
It is not even necessary to state in the complaint or information the
precise time at which the offense was committed except when time
is a material ingredient of the offense. The act may be alleged to
have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at
which date the offense was committed as the information will
permit. Under the circumstance, the precise time is not an
essential ingredient of the crime of homicide.
Arraignment is not necessary

-
Arraignment is indispensible in bringing the accused to court and in

notifying him of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. The importance of arraignment is based on the constitutional
right of the accused to be informed
o Procedural due process requires that the accused be
arraigned so that he may be informed of the reason for his
indictment, the specific charges he is bound to face and
the corresponding penalty that could be possibly meted
against him.
The need for arraignment is equally imperative in an amended
information or complaint. This, however, pertains only to
substantial amendments and to formal amendments that do not
charge an offense different from that charged in the original
complaint or information, do not alter the theory of the
prosecution, do not cause any surprise and affect the line of
defense and do not adversely affect the substantial rights of the
accused, such as an amendment in the date of the commission of
the offense.

Venue to Rule 113
-
An amendment after the plea and during trial, in accordance with

the rules, does not call for a second plea since the amendment is
only as to form. The purpose of an arraignment is to inform the
accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, has
already been attained when the accused was arraigned the first
time.
D.FILING OF INFORMATION
RECONSIDERATION
IF
THERE
IS
1. RAMISCAL V. SANDIGANBAYAN,
SEPTEMBER 15, 2010 LOPA
PENDING
G.R.
MOTION
FOR
NOS. 172476-99,
BRIG.
GEN.
(Ret.)
JOSE
RAMISCAL,
JR.,
petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 172476-99. September 15, 2010.
DOCTRINE:
- The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, sanction the
immediate filing of an information in the proper court upon a finding of
probable cause, even during the pendency of a motion for
reconsideration. Neither can it bar the arraignment of the accused,
which in the normal course of criminal procedure logically follows the
filing of the information.
- The court must proceed with the arraignment of an accused within 30
days from the filing of the information or from the date the accused has
appeared before the court in which the charge is pending.
EMERGENCY RECIT:
Ramiscal was a retired AFP officer and former president of AFPRetirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). During his
incumbency, the BOD of AFP-RSBS approved the acquisition of 15,020 sq.
m. of land for development as housing projects. On August 1, 1997 AFPRSBS as represented by Ramiscal Jr., and Flaviano the attorney-in-fact of 12
individual vendors executed and signed a bilateral Deed of Sale (1st Deed)
over the subject property at the agreed price of P 10,500.00 per sq. m.
After the payment @ P 10,500.00 per sq. m., Flaviano executed and signed
a unilateral Deed of Sale (2nd Deed) over the same property with a
purchase price of P 3,000.00 per sq. m. Thereafter the 2nd Deed was
presented by Flaviano for registration which became the basis of the
Certificate of Title of the said property.
Ombudsman found Ramiscal et. al. probably guilty of violation of
Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 and falsification of public documents and filed in the
Sandiganbayan 12 informations for violations of the same. 1st MR: panel
of prosecutors still found probable cause. Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N.
Gutierrez approved the recommendation of the panel of prosecutors,
81
forwarded the same to the Sandiganbayan. 2nd MR was filed. Upon

receipt of the final findings of the Ombudsman, the Sandiganbayan
scheduled the arraignment of petitioner. Ramiscal refused to enter e plea =
plea of guilty and SB denied petitioners motion to set aside his
arraignment pending resolution of his second motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion when it
denied petitioners motion to set aside his arraignment pending resolution
of his second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans finding of
probable cause against him? NO!
- The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, sanction the
immediate filing of an information in the proper court upon a finding of
probable cause, even during the pendency of a motion for
reconsideration. Neither can it bar the arraignment of the accused,
which in the normal course of criminal procedure logically follows the
filing of the information.
- The court must proceed with the arraignment of an accused within 30
days from the filing of the information or from the date the accused has
appeared before the court in which the charge is pending.
FACTS:
- Petitioner Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. was a retired officer of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP), with the rank of Brigadier General, when he
served as President of the AFP-Retirement and Separation Benefits
System (AFP- RSBS) from 5 April 1994 to 27 July 1998.
- During Ramiscals term as president of AFP-RSBS, the Board of Trustees
approved the acquisition of 15,020 square meters of land situated in
General Santos City for development as housing projects.
- AFP-RSBS, represented by petitioner, and Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano, as
attorney-in-fact of the 12 individual vendors, executed and signed
bilateral deeds of sale over the subject property, at the agreed price of
P10,500.00 per square meter. Ramiscal forthwith caused the payment to
the individual vendors of the purchase price of P10,500.00 per square
meter of the property.
- Flaviano executed and signed unilateral deeds of sale over the same
property. The unilateral deeds of sale reflected a purchase price of only
P3,000.00 per square meter instead of the actual purchase price of
P10,500.00 per square meter. Flaviano presented the unilateral deeds of
sale for registration. The unilateral deeds of sale became the basis of
the transfer certificates of title issued by the Register of Deeds of
General Santos City to AFP-RSBS.
- Luwalhati R. Antonino, the Congresswoman representing the first district
of South Cotabato, which includes General Santos City, filed in the
Ombudsman a complaint-affidavit against Ramiscal, along with 27 other
respondents, for (1) violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known

Venue to Rule 113
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; and (2) malversation of
public funds or property through falsification of public documents.
- Ombudsman found Ramiscal et. al. probably guilty of violation of Sec.
3(e) of RA 3019 and falsification of public documents and filed in the
Sandiganbayan 12 informations for violations of the same.
- Ramiscal filed his first MR of the Ombudsmans finding of probable
cause against him. Sandiganbayan disposed of petitioners first MR.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OMB-OSP) recommended that

petitioner be excluded from the informations. On review, the Office of
Legal Affairs (OMB-OLA) recommended the contrary, stressing that
petitioner participated in and affixed his signature on the contracts to
sell, bilateral deeds of sale, and various agreements, vouchers, and
checks for the purchase of the subject property. The memoranda of
OMB-OSP and OMB-OLA were forwarded for comment to the Office of
the Ombudsman for Military (OMB-Military). OMB-Military adopted the
memorandum of OMB-OSP recommending the dropping of petitioners
name from the informations. Acting Ombudsman Margarito Gervacio
approved the recommendation of the OMB-Military. However, the
recommendation of the OMB- Military was not manifested before the
Sandiganbayan as a final disposition of petitioners first motion for
reconsideration.
- A panel of prosecutors was tasked to review the records of the case.
After thorough review, the panel of prosecutors found that petitioner
indeed participated in and affixed his signature on the contracts to
sell, bilateral deeds of sale, and various agreements, vouchers, and
checks for the purchase of the property at the price of P10,500.00 per
square meter. The panel of prosecutors concluded that probable
cause existed for petitioners continued prosecution. Ombudsman Ma.
Merceditas N. Gutierrez approved the recommendation of the panel of
prosecutors. Upon receipt of the final findings of the Ombudsman, the
Sandiganbayan scheduled the arraignment of petitioner.
- Meanwhile, on 26 January 2006, petitioner filed his second motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against
him.
- On 26 February 2006, petitioner was arraigned. For his refusal to enter a
plea, the Sandiganbayan entered in his favor a plea of not guilty. On 9
March 2006, petitioner filed a motion to set aside his arraignment
pending resolution of his second motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against him.
- The Sandiganbayan pointed out that petitioners 2nd MR of the
Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against him was a prohibited
pleading. The Sandiganbayan explained that whatever defense or
evidence petitioner may have should be ventilated in the trial of the
case. In its assailed 5 April 2006 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan denied
for lack of merit petitioners motion to set aside his arraignment
82
ISSUES: Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion when it

denied petitioners motion to set aside his arraignment pending resolution
of his second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans finding of
probable cause against him? NO!
HELD: No!
RATIO:
- The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by
Administrative Order No. 15, Series of 2001, sanction the immediate
filing of an information in the proper court upon a finding of probable
cause, even during the pendency of a motion for reconsideration. If the
filing of a motion for reconsideration of the resolution finding probable
cause cannot bar the filing of the corresponding information, then
neither can it bar the arraignment of the accused, which in the normal
course of criminal procedure logically follows the filing of the
information.
- Under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as the
Speedy Trial Act of 1998, the court must proceed with the arraignment
of an accused within 30 days from the filing of the information or from
the date the accused has appeared before the court in which the charge
is pending, whichever is later. The 30-day period shall be counted from
the time the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused,
which is when the accused appears before the court.
- Under Section 7, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, petitioner can no longer file another motion for
reconsideration questioning yet again the same finding of the
Ombudsman.
- The Court does not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsmans finding of
probable cause. The Ombudsman is endowed with a wide latitude of
investigatory and prosecutory prerogatives in the exercise of its power
to pass upon criminal complaints.
- While it is the Ombudsman who has the full discretion to determine
whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan,
once the case has been filed with said court, it is the Sandiganbayan,
and no longer the Ombudsman, which has full control of the case.
Absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion, this Court will not
interfere with the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction and control over a case
properly filed before it. The Sandiganbayan is empowered to proceed
with the trial of the case in the manner it determines best conducive to
orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the case. There being no
showing of grave abuse of discretion on its part, the Sandiganbayan
should continue its proceedings with all deliberate dispatch.
- The mere filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court does not by itself merit a suspension of the proceedings before
the Sandiganbayan unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction has been issued against the Sandiganbayan.

Venue to Rule 113
whereby the investigation of the charge for purposes of

prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive
branch, the term "proceedings" should now be understood
either executive or judicial in character: executive when it
involves the investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the
trial and judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of
investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty
person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution should
be sufficient to toll prescription.
E.PRESCRIPTION
1.
PANAGUITON V. DOJ, G.R. NO. 167571, NOVEMBER 25, 2008

LUCENARIO
Panaguiton vs. DOJ

Emergency Recitation:
CAWILI and his business associate TONGSON filed 3 checks in favor

of PANAGUITON as payment for a loan.
1993 - The 3 checks were dishonored and they didnt pay.
PANAGUITON filed a complaint for violation of BP 22 with the QC
Prosectors Office.
1995 DOJ found probable cause against CAWILI only and
dismissed against TONGSON.
o PANAGUITON appealed the dismissal against TONGSON
1997 Chief State Prosecutor ordered reinvestigation against
TONGSON.
1999 Assistant Prosecutor did not conduct the reinvestigation and
ordered the case dismissed against TONGSON on the ground of
prescription. Basis was that Act No. 3326 provides that the action
for violation of special acts (i.e. BP 22) prescribed in 4 years, and
such period is interrupted only when proceedings are instituted. In
this case, the cause of action accrued in 1993 when the checks
bounced. So now it has prescribed.
PANAGUITON contends that the period has been interrupted since
he already instituted proceedings when he filed a complaint with
the Prosecutors office.
ISSUE: W/N the action has prescribed. NO
HELD: Case has not prescribed!
Ratio:
Act No. 3326 provides that the period of 4 years is interrupted by the
institution of proceedings. We have to understand that in 1926 when it was
passed, the justice of the peace had the function of performing preliminary
investigation. Hence, the period was suspended when the party instituted
judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment since this was the
first step taken in the investigation or examination of offenses partakes the
nature of a judicial proceeding. But this is no longer the current procedure!
The SC explained beautifully:
While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in

Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appear before "investigation and
punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change in set-up
83
Reason for this interpretation: The injured party cannot be deprived

the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not
under his control. When he initiated the proceedings with the
prosecutors office, it was not his fault that it took the office all those years
to act on it.
FACTS:
1992 Rodrigo CAWILI borrowed various sums of money amounting

to P1,979,459.00 from Luis PANAGUITON.
Jan. 8, 1993 Both CAWILI and his business associate Ramon
TONGSON issued and signed 3 checks to cover the amount. These,
however, were dishonored for inusfficiency of funds or closure of
account. PANAGUITON made a demand for payment but to no
avail.
Aug. 24, 1995 PANAGUITON filed a complaint for violation of BP
22 against CAWILI and TONGSON before the Quezon City
Prosecutors Office.
During the preliminary investigation, only TONGSON appeared and
filed his counter-affidavit. He claimed that he had been unjustly
included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had lent
money to Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Moreover, like
petitioner, he had lent various sums to Cawili and in appreciation of
his services, he was offered to be an officer of Roma Oil
Corporation. He averred that he was not Cawili's business
associate; in fact, he himself had filed several criminal cases
against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he
had issued the bounced checks and pointed out that his signatures
on the said checks had been falsified.
PANAGUITON countered by presenting several documents showing
Tongson's signatures, which were purportedly the same as the
those appearing on the checks. He also showed a copy of an
affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to
be Cawili's business associate.
Dec. 6, 1995 City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable
cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against
Tongson.

Venue to Rule 113
Case vs. CAWILI was pursued. PANAGUITON filed a partial appeal

with DOJ with respect to the dismissal of the case vs. TONGSON.
July 11, 1997 - Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo directed
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of
the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
March 15, 1999 - Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga
(ACP Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against Tongson without
referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's
resolution. She stated that :
o The case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326,
as amended, which provides that violations penalized by
B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years. In this case,
the four (4)-year period started on the date the checks
were dishonored, or on 20 January 1993 and 18 March
1993. The filing of the complaint before the Quezon City
Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did not interrupt the running
of the prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial,
and not administrative proceedings. Thus, considering that
from 1993 to 1998, more than four (4) years had already
elapsed and no information had as yet been filed against
Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to
him had already prescribed.
PANAGUITON appealed to DOJ but DOJ ruled that the action has
prescribed. On MR, DOJ reversed and found that it had not
prescribed. But on another MR, DOJ again reversed and found that
the action has prescribed.
Basis of DOJ: Zaldivia v. Reyes, a case involving the violation of a
municipal ordinance, in declaring that the prescriptive period is
tolled only upon filing of the information in court.
PANAGUITON contends that what is applicable in this case is Ingco
v. Sandiganbayan, wherein this Court ruled that the filing of the
complaint
with
the
fiscal's
office
for
preliminary
investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive
period.
Petitioner also notes that the Ingco case similarly involved the
violation of a special law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, petitioner
notes. He argues that sustaining the DOJ's and the Court of
Appeals' pronouncements would result in grave injustice to him
since the delays in the present case were clearly beyond his
control
ISSUE: W/N the action for violation of BP 22 has prescribed NO.

HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court
of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and
84
SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9 August

2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is
ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner.
RATIO:
Act No. 3326 entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of
Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription
Shall Begin, is the law applicable to offenses under special laws which do
not provide their own prescriptive periods. The pertinent provisions read:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless

otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the
following rules: (a) x x x; (b) after four years for those punished by
imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years;
(c) x x x
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the

commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if
the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy.
We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An
offense under B.P. Blg. 22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less
than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine, hence, under
Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4) years from the
commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at the time, from
the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position that
only the filing of a case in court can toll the running of the prescriptive
period.
HISTORY:
When Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary
investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace,
thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment," and the prevailing rule at the time was that
once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary
investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.
But the procedure is different now! In People v. Olarte, SC held that the
filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for
purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does,
interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the
court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the
merits. In addition, even if the court where the complaint or information is
filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already

Venue to Rule 113
represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender, and
hence, the prescriptive period should be interrupted.
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, which
involved violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No.
3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which are both
special laws, the Court ruled that the prescriptive period is interrupted by
the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against
the accused.
In the more recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Interport Resources Corporation, et al., the Court ruled that the nature and
purpose of the investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange
Commission on violations of the Revised Securities Act, another special
law, is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in
criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.
The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case53 is instructive,
thus:
While it may be observed that the term "judicial
proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before
"investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the
subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of
the charge for purposes of prosecution has become the
exclusive function of the executive branch, the term
"proceedings" should now be understood either executive
or judicial in character: executive when it involves the
investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial
and judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of
investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty
person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution should
be sufficient to toll prescription.
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to
obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control.
A clear example would be this case, wherein petitioner filed his complaintaffidavit on 24 August 1995, well within the four (4)-year prescriptive
period. He likewise timely filed his appeals and his motions for
reconsideration on the dismissal of the charges against Tongson. He went
through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from
the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City
Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed
resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the
delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated the
active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer
setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its
misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do
not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be
allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances
85
beyond their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and
inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
2.
PEOPLE V. ROMULADEZ, G.R. NO. 166510, APRIL 29, 2009

MAGTAGNOB
People v Romualdez
Topic: Prescription
EMERGENCY DIGEST
Quick Facts:
Romualdez was charged with violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. The information from 1976 to February 1986, Romualdez, being then
the governor of Leyte, used his influence (brother-in-law or Marcos) and
held another position as ambassador to China, Saudi Arabia and USA while
still performing his duties as Governor. He also received compensation for
his services.
Romualdez moved to quash the information on the ground of prescription,
saying that the 15-year prescriprion under the Anti-Graft law has lapsed.
The preliminary investigation of the case for an offense committed
on or about and during the period from 1976 to February 1986
commenced only in May 2001 after a Division of the
Sandiganbayan referred the matter to the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Sandiganbayan- quashed the info on another ground (mentioned also in
the motion), but did not find merit on the argument of prescription.
Romualdez did not appeal the decision of not finding merit on the
argument of prescription as the information was still quashed.
People appealed. Subsequently, the court found GADLEJ in the act of
Sandiganbayan in quashing the information.
Romualdez appealed and again raised the argument that the action is
already barred by prescription.
Issue: W/N The action has prescribed. YES, it has prescribed.
Ratio:
The act complained of happened during the period of 1976 until February
1986. However, the subject criminal cases were filed with the
Sandiganbayan only on 5 November 2001, following a preliminary
investigation that commenced only on 4 June 2001. The time span that
elapsed from the alleged commission of the offense up to the filing of the
subject cases is clearly beyond the 15 year prescriptive period provided
under Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 3019.
Even though the PCGG had attempted to file similar criminal cases against
Romualdez on 22 February 1989, said cases were quashed based on
prevailing jurisprudence that informations filed by the PCGG and not the
Office of the Special Prosecutor/Office of the Ombudsman are null and void

Venue to Rule 113
for lack of authority on the part of the PCGG to file the same. Hence, it did
not toll the running of the prescriptive period.
The rule is that for criminal violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 (AntiGraft law), the prescriptive period is tolled only when the Office of
the Ombudsman receives a complaint or otherwise initiates its
investigation.
Doctrine:
For criminal violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, the prescriptive period
(15 years) is tolled only when the Office of the Ombudsman
receives a complaint or otherwise initiates its investigation.
The action intiated by the PCGG did not toll the running of the
prescriptive period because it is not a proper body.
COMPLETE DIGEST:
Facts:
The Office of the Ombudsman charged Romualdez before the
Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019
(R.A. 3019), as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. The Information reads:
That on or about and during the period from 1976 to February 1986 or
sometime prior or subsequent thereto xxx accused Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez, a public officer being then the Provincial Governor of the
Province of Leyte, while in the performance of his official function,
committing the offense in relation to his Office, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally with evident bad faith, cause undue injury to the
Government in the following manner: accused public officer being then the
elected Provincial Governor of Leyte and without abandoning said position,
and using his influence with his brother-in-law, then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, had himself appointed and/or assigned as Ambassador to foreign
countries, particularly the People's Republic of China (Peking), Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia (Jeddah), and United States of America (Washington D.C.),
knowing fully well that such appointment and/or assignment is in violation
of the existing laws as the Office of the Ambassador or Chief of Mission is
incompatible with his position as Governor of the Province of Leyte,
thereby enabling himself to collect dual compensation from both the
Department of Foreign Affairs and the Provincial Government of Leyte in
the amount of US $276,911.56 or its equivalent amount of P5,806,709.50
xxx to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the aforementioned
amount of P5,806,709.50.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Romualdez moved to quash the information on two grounds, namely: (1)
that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute the offense with
which the accused was charged; and (2) that the criminal action or liability
has been extinguished by prescription.
86
(will focus on Prescription)

To support his prescription argument, Romualdez posited that the
15-year prescription under Section 11 of R.A. 3019 had lapsed
since the preliminary investigation of the case for an offense
committed on or about and during the period from 1976 to
February 1986 commenced only in May 2001 after a Division of the
Sandiganbayan referred the matter to the Office of the
Ombudsman. He argued that there was no interruption of the prescriptive
period for the offense because the proceedings undertaken under the 1987
complaint filed with the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) were null and void pursuant to the Supreme Court's ruling in
Cojuangco, Jr. v. PCGG and Cruz, Jr. [sic]. He likewise argued that the
Revised Penal Code provision that prescription does not run when the
offender is absent from the Philippines should not apply to his case, as he
was charged with an offense not covered by the Revised Penal Code; the
law on the prescription of offenses punished under special laws (Republic
Act No. 3326) does not contain any rule similar to that found in the Revised
Penal Code.
The People opposed the motion to quash. On the issue of prescription, the
People argued that Section 15, Article XI of the Constitution provides that
the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public
officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees,
shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel, and that
prescription is a matter of technicality to which no one has a vested right.
Sandiganbayan - granted Romualdez' motion to quash in the first
Resolution assailed in this petition on the ground that the information did
not constitute the offense charged. BUT Sandiganbayan found no merit
in Romualdez' prescription argument.
People filed an MR re quashal on the ground that the information did not
constitute the offense charged- Sandiganbayan denied the MR. (NOTE:
Romualdez did not appeal re his prescription argument which the
Sandiganbayan found not to have merit).
People filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 (NOT re prescription)
Romualdez responded with a Motion to Dismiss with Comment Ad
Cautelam, wherein he xxx likewise raised before this Court his argument
that the criminal action or liability had already been extinguished by
prescription, which argument was debunked by the Sandiganbayan.
The Court ruled in favor of People, granting the petition for certiorari. The
Decision then proceeded to determine that the quashal of the information
was indeed attended with grave abuse of discretion, the information
having sufficiently alleged the elements of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No.

Venue to Rule 113
3019, the offense with which Romualdez was charged.
Romualdez filed a Motion for Reconsideration, placing
renewed focus on his argument that the criminal charge against
him had been extinguished on account of prescription.
Court- denied Romualdezs MR, saying We did not rule on the issue of
prescription because the Sandiganbayan's ruling on this point was not the
subject of the People's petition for certiorari. While Romualdez asserted in
his Motion to Dismiss Ad Cautelam filed with us that prescription had set in,
he did not file his own petition to assail this aspect of the Sandiganbayan
ruling, hence he is deemed to have accepted it; he cannot now assert that
in the People's petition that sought the nullification of the Sandiganbayan
ruling on some other ground, we should pass upon the issue of prescription
he raised in his motion.
Hence this second motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether the action against Romualdez has already prescribed. YES, it has
prescribed.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the Second Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED.
The Decision dated 23 July 2008 and the Resolution dated 9 September
2008 in the instant case are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition is
HEREBY DISMISSED. No pronouncements as to costs.
RATIO:
Romualdez was charged with violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, or the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed on or about and during the
period from 1976 to February 1986. However, the subject criminal cases
were filed with the Sandiganbayan only on 5 November 2001, following a
preliminary investigation that commenced only on 4 June 2001. The time
span that elapsed from the alleged commission of the offense up to the
filing of the subject cases is clearly beyond the 15 year prescriptive period
provided under Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 3019.
Admittedly, the PCGG had attempted to file similar criminal cases
against Romualdez on 22 February 1989. However, said cases were
quashed based on prevailing jurisprudence that informations filed by the
PCGG and not the Office of the Special Prosecutor/Office of the
Ombudsman are null and void for lack of authority on the part of the PCGG
to file the same. This made it necessary for the Office of the Ombudsman
as the competent office to conduct the required preliminary investigation
to enable the filing of the present charges.
The initial filing of the complaint in 1989 or the preliminary
investigation by the PCGG that preceded it could not have
interrupted the 15-year prescription period under Rep. Act No.
87
3019. As held in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, the investigatory power of the

PCGG extended only to alleged ill-gotten wealth cases, absent previous
authority from the President for the PCGG to investigate such graft and
corruption cases involving the Marcos cronies. Accordingly, the preliminary
investigation conducted by the PCGG leading to the filing of the first
information is void ab initio, and thus could not be considered as having
tolled the 15-year prescriptive period, notwithstanding the general rule
that the commencement of preliminary investigation tolls the prescriptive
period. After all, a void ab initio proceeding such as the first preliminary
investigation by the PCGG could not be accorded any legal effect by this
Court.
The rule is that for criminal violations of Rep. Act No. 3019,
the prescriptive period is tolled only when the Office of the
Ombudsman receives a complaint or otherwise initiates its
investigation. As such preliminary investigation was commenced more
than fifteen (15) years after the imputed acts were committed, the offense
had already prescribed as of such time.
Further, the flaw was so fatal that the information could not have been
cured or resurrected by mere amendment, as a new preliminary
investigation had to be undertaken, and evidence had again to be adduced
before a new information could be filed. The rule may well be that the
amendment of a criminal complaint retroacts to the time of the filing of the
original complaint. Yet such rule will not apply when the original
information is void ab initio, thus incurable by amendment.
The situation herein differs from that in the recent case of SEC v. Interport,
where the Court had occasion to reexamine the principles governing the
prescription of offenses punishable under special laws. Therein, the Court
found that the investigative proceedings conducted by the Securities and
Exchange Commission had tolled the prescriptive period for violations of
the Revised Securities Act, even if no subsequent criminal cases were
instituted within the prescriptive period. The basic difference lies in the fact
that no taint of invalidity had attached to the authority of the SEC to
conduct such investigation, whereas the preliminary investigation
conducted herein by the PCGG is simply void ab initio for want of authority.
Indeed the Court in 2006 had the opportunity to favorably rule on the same
issue of prescription on similar premises raised by the same respondent. In
Romualdez v. Marcelo as in this case, the original preliminary investigation
was conducted by the PCGG, which then acted as complainant in the
complaint filed with the Sandiganbayan. Given that it had been settled that
such investigation and information filed by the PCGG was null and void, the
Court proceeded to rule that [i]n contemplation of the law, no proceedings
exist that could have merited the suspension of the prescriptive periods.
Besides, the only proceeding that could interrupt the running of
prescription is that which is filed or initiated by the offended party before

Venue to Rule 113
the appropriate body or office. Thus, in the case of People v. Maravilla, this
Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the municipal mayor for
purposes of preliminary investigation had the effect of suspending the
period of prescription. Similarly, in the case of Llenes v. Dicdican, this Court
held that the filing of a complaint against a public officer with the
Ombudsman tolled the running of the period of prescription.
In the case at bar, however, the complaint was filed with
the wrong body, the PCGG. Thus, the same could not have
interrupted the running of the prescriptive periods.
It would be specious to fault Romualdez for failing to challenge the
Sandiganbayans pronouncement that prescription had not arisen in his
favor. The Sandiganbayan quashed the information against him, the very
same relief he had sought as he invoked the prescription argument. Why
would Romualdez challenge such ruling favorable to him on motion for
reconsideration or in a separate petition before a higher court?
Notably, private respondent had already raised the issue of
prescription in the very first responsive pleading he filed before the Court
the Motion to Dismiss with Comment Ad Cautelam dated 14 April 2005.
3.
DISINI V. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO.169823, SEPTEMBER 11,

2013 MUTI
Muti: Long and kagulo yung case. Tried my best to explain. First ER is in
my own words. The expanded ratio is in the courts words just in case you
dont want my own words lol.
ER: DISINI, a close associate of Marcos and husband of Imeldas first
cousin, was charged in two informations for the crime of corruption of
public officials under RPC and violation of R.A. 3019. In summary, the
informations provide that DISINI had offered, promised and given gifts and
presents to Marcos in consideration of obtaining for Burns & Roe and
Westinghouse the contracts, respectively, to do the engineering and
architectural design of and to construct the PNPPP (Power Plant in Bataan).
Disini moved to quash the information on the ground of prescription,
among others. Issue is whether the offenses charged in the informations
have prescribed. NO!
Impt dates for reference:
1974: contracts were awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse
1982: effectivity of B.P. 195
1986: PCGG investigation led to the discovery of the unlawful act
1991: filing of criminal complaint
R.A. 3019
Pacificador
committed
from 10 to
provides that the prescriptive period is 15 yrs. However,

case provides that the 15yr-period would not apply to crimes
prior to the effectivity of B.P. 195 which amended the period
15 yrs. The information alleged that the crime was committed
88
from 1974 to 1986. Thus, the prescription period in this case should be
10yrs.
Now, when will the 10yr start to run? Commission of crime. If not known,
from the time of discovery. Disini contends that it should start in 1974
when the contracts were awarded. SC says no. During the Marcos regime,
no person would dare to assail the legality of those contracts so they were
assumed regular. Further, the unlawful acts were only discovered by the
PCGG in its investigation in 1986. Therefore, 1986 is the starting point.
Lastly, when is it interrupted? Filing the complaint or information in the
office of the public prosecutor for purposes of the preliminary investigation.
Here, the complaint was filed in 1991. Only five years have (1986-1991).
NO PRESCRIPTION!
Expanded emergency ratio
1) Period of prescription (10 yrs)
RPC: 15 yrs. R.A. 3019: 15 yrs din but prior to its amendment, the
prescriptive period was only 10 years. It became settled in People v.
Pacificador, however, that the longer prescriptive period of 15years would
not apply to crimes committed prior to the effectivity of B.P. 195, which
was approved in 1982, because the longer period could not be given
retroactive effect for not being favorable to the accused. Thus, with the
information alleging the period from 1974 to 1986 as the time of the
commission of the crime charged, the applicable prescriptive period is 10
years.
2) When prescription starts to run (1986)
RPC: day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or their agents. R.A. No. 3019: day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
DISINI argues that the prescriptive period began to run from 1974, the time
when the contracts for the PNPP Project were awarded to Burns & Roe and
Westinghouse. Notwithstanding the highly publicized and widely-known
nature of the PNPPP, the unlawful acts or transactions in relation to it were
discovered only through the PCGGs exhaustive investigation. Before the
discovery, the PNPPP contracts, which partook of a public character,
enjoyed the presumption of their execution having been regularly done in
the course of official functions. Considering further that during the Marcos
regime, no person would have dared to assail the legality of the
transactions, it would be unreasonable to expect that the discovery of the
unlawful transactions was possible prior to 1986.
3) When prescriptive period is interrupted (1991)
Prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against
the guilty person. The prevailing rule is that irrespective of whether the
offense charged is punishable by the RPC or by a special law, it is the filing
of the complaint or information in the office of the public prosecutor for
purposes of the preliminary investigation that interrupts the period of
prescription.

Venue to Rule 113
Consequently, prescription did not yet set in because only five years
elapsed from 1986, the time of the discovery of the offenses charged, up to
April 1991, the time of the filing of the criminal complaints in the Office of
the Ombudsman.
FACTS:
The Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations charging DISINI in

the Sandiganbayan with corruption of public officials, penalized under
Article 212 in relation to Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code (First
case/Criminal Case No. 28001), and with a violation of Section 4(a) of
Republic Act 3019 (R.A. No. 3019), also known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (Second case/Criminal Case No. 28002).
Gist of information for first case:
HERMINIO T. DISINI, conspiring together and confederating with the

then President Marcos, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously offer, promise and give gifts and presents to Marcos xxx all
for and in consideration of accused Disini seeking and obtaining for
Burns
and
Roe
and
Westinghouse
Electrical
Corporation
(Westinghouse), the contracts to do the engineering and architectural
design and to construct, respectively, the Project,
o said Ferdinand E. Marcos, taking undue advantage of his
position and committing the offense in relation to his office and
in consideration of the aforesaid gifts and presents, did award
or cause to be awarded to said Burns and Roe and
Westinghouse, the contracts to do the engineering and
architectural design and to construct the Project, respectively,
which acts constitute the crime of corruption of public officials.
Gist of information for second case:
HERMINIO T. DISINI, conspiring together and confederating with

MARCOS, being then the close personal friend and golfing partner of
Marcos, and being further the husband of the first cousin of then First
Lady Imelda and family physician of the Marcos family, taking
advantage of such close personal relation, intimacy and free access,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, in connection
with the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP)Project ("PROJECT") of
the National Power Corporation (NPC) at Morong, Bataan:
o request and receive from Burns and Roe, a foreign consultant,
the total amount of $1,000,000.00,more or less, and also from
Westinghouse
Electric
Corporation(WESTINGHOUSE),
$17,000,000.00, more or less, both of which entities were then
having business, transaction, and application with the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, all for and in
consideration of accused DISINI securing and obtaining, the
contract for the said Burns and Roe and Westinghouse to do
the engineering and architectural design, and construct,
respectively, the said PROJECT xxxx
DISINI filed a motion to quash, alleging that the criminal actions had
been extinguished by prescription, and that the informations did not
89
conform to the prescribed form. The Prosecution opposed the motion to

quash.
DISINI voluntarily submitted himself for arraignment to obtain the
Sandiganbayans favorable action on his motion for permission to
travel abroad. He then entered a plea of not guilty to both
informations.
The Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated its first assailed
resolution denying the motion to quash. Motion for reconsideration was
also denied.
ISSUE: Whether the offenses charged in the informations have prescribed

NO! (there are a number of crimpro issues but this case is under
prescription so I will only tackle the prescription part)
RATIO:
In resolving the issue of prescription, the following must be considered,

namely: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the
time when the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time
when the prescriptive period is interrupted.
The period of prescription for the offense charged
The crime of corruption of public officials charged in the first case is

punished by Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code with the" same
penalties imposed upon the officer corrupted." Conformably with
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, 27 the period of prescription for
this specie of corruption of public officials charged against Disini is 15
years.
As for the second case, Disini was charged with a violation of Section
4(a) of R.A. No. 3019. By express provision of Section 11 of R.A. No.
3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, the offenses
committed under R.A. No. 3019 shall prescribe in 15 years.
o Prior to the amendment, the prescriptive period was only 10
years. It became settled in People v. Pacificador, 28 however,
that the longer prescriptive period of 15years would not apply
to crimes committed prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 195, which was approved on March 16, 1982, because the
longer period could not be given retroactive effect for not being
favorable to the accused. With the information alleging the
period from 1974 to February1986 as the time of the
commission of the crime charged, the applicable
prescriptive period is 10 years in order to accord with
People v. Pacificador .
The time when the period of prescription starts to run
For crimes punishable by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof

provides that prescription starts to run from the day on which the
crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their
agents.
As to offenses punishable by R.A. No. 3019, Section 2 of R.A. No.

332629 states: Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of

Venue to Rule 113
the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The time when the prescriptive period is interrupted
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted

against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting double
jeopardy.
Application to the case at bar:
Xxx we held in a catena of cases, that if the violation of the special law
was not known at the time of its commission, the prescription begins to
run only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful
nature of the constitutive act or acts. Corollary, it is safe to conclude
that the prescriptive period for the crime which is the subject herein,
commenced from the date of its discovery in 1992 after the Committee
made an exhaustive investigation. When the complaint was filed in
1997, only five years have elapsed, and, hence, prescription has not
yet set in. The rationale for this was succinctly discussed in the 1999
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, that "it
was well-high impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have
known these crimes committed prior to the 1986 EDSA Revolution,
because of the alleged connivance and conspiracy among involved
public officials and the beneficiaries of the loans." In yet another
pronouncement, in the 2001 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130817), the Court
held that during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to
question the legality of these transactions.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded to hold here that the prescriptive

period began to run from 1974, the time when the contracts for the
PNPP Project were awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse.
Although the criminal cases were the offshoot of the sequestration
case to recover ill-gotten wealth instead of behest loans like in
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto, the connivance and conspiracy among the public officials
involved and the beneficiaries of the favors illegally extended rendered
it similarly well-nigh impossible for the State, as the aggrieved party, to
have known of the commission of the crimes charged prior to the EDSA
Revolution in 1986. Notwithstanding the highly publicized and widelyknown nature of the PNPPP, the unlawful acts or transactions in relation
to it were discovered only through the PCGGs exhaustive
investigation, resulting in the establishment of a prima facie case
sufficient for the PCGG to institute Civil Case No. 0013 against Disini.
Before the discovery, the PNPPP contracts, which partook of a public
character, enjoyed the presumption of their execution having been
regularly done in the course of official functions. 32
Considering further that during the Marcos regime, no person would

have dared to assail the legality of the transactions, it would be
unreasonable to expect that the discovery of the unlawful transactions

was possible prior to 1986.
We note, too, that the criminal complaints were filed and their records
transmitted by the PCGG to the Office of the Ombudsman on April 8,
1991for the conduct the preliminary investigation. 33 In accordance with
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code 34 and the ruling in Panaguiton, Jr.
v. Department of Justice,35 the filing of the criminal complaints in the
Office of the Ombudsman effectively interrupted the running of the
period of prescription. According to Panaguiton:
o In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,
which involved violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code
(R.A. No. 8293), which are both special laws, the Court ruled
that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of
proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused.
In the more recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Interport Resources Corporation, the Court ruled that the nature and
purpose of the investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange
Commission on violations of the Revised Securities Act, another special
law, is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the
DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive
period.
o The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case is
instructive, thus: While it may be observed that the term
"judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before"
investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the
subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of the
charge for purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive
function of the executive branch, the term "proceedings"
should now be understood either executive or judicial in
character: executive when it involves the investigation phase
and judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With
this clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted
against the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his
prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription.
The prevailing rule is, therefore, that irrespective of whether the
offense charged is punishable by the Revised Penal Code or by a
special law, it is the filing of the complaint or information in the office
of the public prosecutor for purposes of the preliminary investigation
that interrupts the period of prescription. Consequently, prescription
did not yet set in because only five years elapsed from 1986, the time
of the discovery of the offenses charged, up to April 1991, the time of
the filing of the criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman.
F.CONTROL AND DIRECTION OF CRIMINAL ACTION

1.
90
PINOTE V. AYCO, 477 SCRA 409 NARVASA

Venue to Rule 113
State Prosecutor Pinote v. Judge Ayco
Topic: Control and Direction of Criminal Action
ER: Judge allowed the defense to present 2 witnesses in the absence of the
State prosecutor. Allowed the latter to cross-examine them though, but
prosecutor refusedsaying the proceedings mentioned are void. Filed a
complaint against Judge for gross ignorance of the law, and abuse of
authority.
As a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the
control and direction of the public prosecutor. Crimes are an affront to the
Philippine People as a whole, and this is the reason why a public prosecutor
is necessary to protect state interest, vindicate the rule of law. Judges
act of allowing the presentation of the defense witnesses in the absence of
complainant public prosecutor is a clear transgression of the Rules which
could not be rectified by subsequently giving the prosecution a chance to
cross-examine the witnesses. Judge Ayco is hereby ordered to pay a fine of
P5,000.00 with warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.
Facts:
Judge Roberto L. Ayco (RTC) allowed the defense in People v. Vice
Mayor Salvador Ramos for violation of Section 3 of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1866, to present evidence, consisting of the testimony of two
witnesses, even in the absence of State Prosecutor Pinote who was
prosecuting the case.
State Prosecutor Pinote was undergoing medical treatment at the
Philippine Heart Center in Quezon City at such times.
On the subsequent scheduled hearings of the criminal case, State
Prosecutor Pinote refused to cross-examine the two defense witnesses,
despite being ordered by Judge Ayco, he maintaining that the proceedings
conducted in his absence were void.
State Prosecutor Pinote subsequently filed a Manifestation saying
Judge Aycos act of allowing the defense to present evidence in his absence
was erroneous and highly irregular. He thus prayed that he should not be
coerced to cross-examine those two defense witnesses and that their
testimonies be stricken off the record.
Judge Ayco, instead considered the prosecution to have waived its

right to cross-examine the two defense witnesses.
Prosecutor Pinote filed against Judge Ayco a complaint for Gross

Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority and Serious Misconduct.
91
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA): finds respondent to have

breached Rule 110 Sec 519 and accordingly recommends that he be
reprimanded.
SC:
2.
As a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the

control and direction of the public prosecutor.
If the schedule of the public prosecutor does not permit, however,
or in case there are no public prosecutors, a private prosecutor
may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office
or the Regional State Prosecution Office to prosecute the case,
subject to the approval of the court.
o Once so authorized, the private prosecutor shall continue
to prosecute the case until the termination of the trial even
in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority
is revoked or otherwise withdrawn.
Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People of the
Philippines as a whole and not merely to the person directly
prejudiced, he being merely the complaining witness.
o This is the reason why a public prosecutor is necessary to
protect state interest, vindicate the rule of law.
Judges act of allowing the presentation of the defense witnesses in
the absence of complainant public prosecutor is a clear
transgression of the Rules which could not be rectified by
subsequently giving the prosecution a chance to cross-examine the
witnesses.
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS V. WHELAN, G.R. NO. 190487, APRIL 13,
2011 ORTIZ
DOCTRINES:
A criminal case may be dismissed after an initial finding of

probable cause by the prosecutor, the issuance of an information,
and a complaint has been filed in court, when the Secretary of
19
Sec. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. - All criminal actions

commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the prosecutor. In case of heavy work schedule or in
the event of lack of public prosecutors, the private prosecutor may be
authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional
State Prosecution Office to prosecute the case subject to the approval of the
Court. Once so authorized to prosecute the criminal action, the private
prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case up to the end of the trial
even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked
or otherwise withdrawn.

Venue to Rule 113
Justice reconsiders the existence of probable cause and orders the
withdrawal of the information.
An MR on a criminal case without the public prosecutors

participation will not be acted on.
Government agencies and instrumentalities should be represented

in cases by the OSG.
ER: MSPI caused the importation of bet slips and facilitated its release from
Clark Special Economic Zone, without paying duties and taxes. Bureau of
Customs filed a criminal complaint against the officers of MSPI before the
DOJ. The state prosecutor found probable cause and recommended the
filing of informations against them with the CTA. The Secretary of Justice
reversed the finding of the State Prosecutor and ordered the withdrawal of
the information. BoC filed MR to the SOJ, denied. BOC, elevated the matter
to CA. Meanwhile, the Prosecutor filed before the CTA a Motion to Withdraw
Information with Leave of Court. BoC filed an oppostion. CTA granted the
prosecutors motion to withdraw and dismissed the complaint. BoC filed a
MR to CTA, CTA merely noted the MR without action
ISSUE: w/n CTA gravely abused its discretion by merely noting without
action petitioners MR. (NO)
All criminal actions commenced by complaint or information are

prosecuted under the direction and control of public prosecutors. In
the prosecution of special laws, the exigencies of public service
sometimes require the designation of special prosecutors from
different government agencies to assist the public prosecutor. The
designation does not, however, detract from the public prosecutor
having control and supervision over the case.
Facts:
Mark Sensing Philippines, Inc. (MSPI) caused the importation of 255,
870,000 pieces of finished bet slips and 205, 200 rolls of finished thermal
papers from June 2005 to January 2007. MSPI facilitated the release of the
shipment from the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ), where it was
brought, to the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) for its lotto
operations in Luzon. MSPI did not pay duties or taxes, prompting the
Bureau of Customs (petitioner) to file, under its Run After The Smugglers
(RATS) Program, a criminal complaint before the Department of Justice
against herein respondents MSPI Chairman Peter Sherman, Managing
Director Michael Whelan, Country Manager Atty. Ofelia B. Cajigal and
Finance Manager and Corporate Secretary Teodoro B. Lingan, along with
Erick B. Ariarte and Ricardo J. Ebuna and Eugenio Pasco, licensed customs
broker who acted as agents of MSPI, for violation the Tariff and Customs
Code of the Philippines.
The state prosecutor found probable cause against respondents and
accordingly recommended the filing of Information against them.
Respondents filed a petition for review before the Secretary of Justice
during the pendency of which the Information was filed before the Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA).The information charged forty (40) unlawful importations
of 255, 870 pieces of finished printed bet slips and 205, 200 rolls of
finished thermal papers from Australia worth around $1.2 M imported and
92
delivered from Clark Special Economic Zone to the PCSO with taxes worth
around Php 15.9 M.
However, the Secretary of Justice reversed the State Prosecutors
Resolution and accordingly directed the withdrawal of the Information.
Bureau of Customs filed an MR to SoJ which was denied.
Bureau of Customs elevated the case by petition for certiorari to the CA
while the Prosecutor Lao-Tamano filed before the CTA a Motion to Withdraw
Information with Leave of Court to which petitioner filed an Opposition.
Respondents, on their part, moved for the dismissal of the Information. CTA
granted the withdrawal and dismissed the information. Bureau of Customs
MR to CTA was noted without action.
Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether the CTA gravely abused its discretion by merely noting
without action petitioners MR. (NO)
Held:
It is well-settled that prosecution of crimes pertains to the executive
department of the government whose principal power and responsibility is
to insure that laws are faithfully executed. Corollary to this power is the
right to prosecute violators. All criminal actions commenced by complaint
or information are prosecuted under the direction and control of public
prosecutors. In the prosecution of special laws, the exigencies of public
service sometimes require the designation of special prosecutors from
different government agencies to assist the public prosecutor. The
designation does not, however, detract from the public prosecutor having
control and supervision over the case.
The CTA noted without action petitioners motion for reconsideration. By
merely noting without action petitioners motion for reconsideration, the
CTA did not gravely abuse its discretion. For, as stated earlier, a public
prosecutor has control and supervision over the cases. The participation in
the case of a private complainant, like petitioner, is limited to that of a
witness, both in the criminal and civil aspect of the case.
Parenthetically, petitioner is not represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) in instituting the present petition, which contravenes
established doctrine that "the OSG shall represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in
any litigation, proceeding, investigation, or matter requiring the services of
lawyers.
IN FINE, as petitioners MR of the CTA Resolution did not bear the
imprimatur of the public prosecutor to which the control of the prosecution
of the case belongs, the present petition fails.
3.
FLORES V. GONZALES, G.R. NO. 188197, AUGUST 03, 2010 PEREZ DE TAGLE
DOCTRINE: THE TRIAL COURT IS NOT BOUND TO ADOPT THE RESOLUTION OF THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, IN SPITE OF BEING AFFIRMED BY THE APPELLATE COURTS, SINCE IT
IS MANDATED TO INDEPENDENTLY EVALUATE OR ASSESS THE MERITS OF THE CASE AND IT
MAY EITHER AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE. RELIANCE ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ALONE WOULD

Venue to Rule 113
BE AN ABDICATION OF THE TRIAL COURTS DUTY AND JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE A
PRIMA FACIE CASE.
*A lot of procedural stuffs happened in this case. FYI.

ER:
Facts
Issue
Flores files a complaint affidavit against Lim before the City

Prosecutor of Cebu City for estafa. [DENIED NO PROBABLE
CAUSE]
o Flores MR [DENIED]
Flores Petition for Review with SOJ [DENIED]
o Flores MR [GRANTED!!]
o Prosecutor ordered to file the case with the MTTC.
Prosecutor files case with the MTCC
Lim MR with SOJ to annul the above order [GRANTED!]
o Prosecutor files Motion to Withdraw with MTCC [DENIED!]
MTCC explains that it can decide w/n there is

probable cause by its own self.
Lim MR
Flores certiorari with the CA to annul order of the SOJ which led to
the Motion to Withdraw
o DENIED
Flores Rule 45 to the SC
MTCC suspends proceedings in anticipation of final ruling of CA
certiorari case.
(main):
WHETHER OR NOT THE JUNE 20, 2007 RESOLUTION OF THE
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, DENYING RESPONDENT LIMS MOTION TO
WITHDRAW INFORMATION AND FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE,
RENDERED THE DISPOSITION OF THE PETITION BEFORE [THE]
COURT OF APPEALS ACADEMIC [yes]
Held:
The trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary
of Justice, in spite of being affirmed by the appellate courts, since it
is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the
case and it may either agree or disagree with the recommendation
of the Secretary of Justice. Reliance on the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice alone would be an abdication of the trial courts
duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case
This was precisely what the MTCC did when it denied the Motion to
Withdraw Information in its June 20, 2007 Resolution, and it
correctly did so. In view of the above disquisitions, and while the
disposition of the issue of whether or not the Secretary of Justice
acted with grave abuse of discretion in not finding probable cause
93
against Lim may be persuasive, the MTCC is not bound to dismiss

the case or to withdraw the Information. For these reasons, the
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals has effectively
become moot and academic.
COMPLETE
Facts:
Flores filed a complaint affidavit against Lim for estafa before the
City Prosecutor of Cebu City.
o Basically, Flores alleged that Lim tricked him and his fellow
incorporators of Enviroboard Manufacturing (EMI) into
buying several pieces of compact processing equipment
from a company called Compak. It turned out that Lim was
connected to Bendez International (Bendez), which was the
exclusive distributor of Compak equipment.
o Lim allegedly lied about the price of the equipment and
misrepresented that he cancelled the sale of one of the
equipment when, actually, he didnt!
The City Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution dated January

16, 2005 dismissing the complaint for lack of probable cause.
o MR of Flores DENIED.
Petition for Review of Flores to Secretary of Justice DENIED.

o MR of Flores was GRANTED!
Thus, due to the MR of Flores, the SOJ directed the Prosecutor to

file the case in the MTCC. So it was filed with the MTCC.
Meanwhile, Lim files an MR with the SOJ regarding the order that
compelled the Prosecutor to file the case with the MTCC.
GRANTED!!
o Flores filed a petition for certiorari with the CA to annul
this.
While the CA certiorari case was pending, the Prosecutor filed a

Motion to Withdraw in the MTCC to comply with the SOJs order
(from Lims MR).
o MTCC denies!! It explains that it has already acquired
jurisdiction and therefore can determine for itself whether
there is probable cause or not. It is not bound by the SOJs
determination it says.
Lim then MRs this order of the MTCC
Finally, the MTCC suspends its proceedings while the CA certiorari

case remains pending.
Eventually, the CA rules that the last order of the SOJ (granting
Lims MR and ultimately leading to the Motion to Withdraw) was
perfectly valid.
o Flores, aggrieved, files a Rule 45 Petition for Review on
certiorari to challenge this ruling.

Venue to Rule 113
Issues
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE JUNE 20, 2007 RESOLUTION OF THE

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, DENYING RESPONDENT LIMS MOTION TO
WITHDRAW INFORMATION AND FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE,
RENDERED THE DISPOSITION OF THE PETITION BEFORE [THE]
COURT OF APPEALS ACADEMIC? [Yes]
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE COULD RULE

IN A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION ON THE VALIDITY, WEIGHT,
ADMISSIBILITY, AND MERITS OF PARTIES DEFENSES, EVIDENCE,
AND ACCUSATION?20 [not ruled upon; see footnote for what
the court said]
Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02726 is declared MOOT AND
ACADEMIC. Consequently, the assailed Decision dated March 6, 2008 and
the Resolution dated May 28, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in the said case
are SET ASIDE.
Ratio:
20
[O]nce a complaint or information is filed in Court, any disposition

of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the
accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the
fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of
criminal cases even while the case is already in Court, he cannot
impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and
sole judge on what to do with the case before it.
The
determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and
competence.
A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed
to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does
not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the
accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of
the investigation.
As jurisdiction was already acquired by the MTCC, this jurisdiction
is not lost despite a resolution by the Secretary of Justice to
withdraw the information or to dismiss the case, notwithstanding
the deferment or suspension of the arraignment of the accused
and further proceedings, and not even if the Secretary of Justice is
affirmed by the higher courts
Suffice it to state that these matters are best addressed to the MTCC, where they will be
thoroughly ventilated and threshed out in the resolution of Lims motion for reconsideration of
the MTCC June 20, 2007 Resolution, and eventually, if the trial court denies the motion, during
the trial on the merits before it.
94
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of

the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may
be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as
far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or
appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or
information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be
left entirely for the determination of the Court
Verily, it bears stressing that the trial court is not bound to adopt
the resolution of the Secretary of Justice, in spite of being affirmed
by the appellate courts, since it is mandated to independently
evaluate or assess the merits of the case and it may either agree
or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
Reliance on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice alone would
be an abdication of the trial courts duty and jurisdiction to
determine a prima facie case. Thus, the trial court may make an
independent assessment of the merits of the case based on the
affidavits and counter-affidavits, documents, or evidence appended
to the Information; the records of the public prosecutor which the
court may order the latter to produce before it; or any evidence
already adduced before the court by the accused at the time the
motion is filed by the public prosecutor. The trial court should make
its assessment separately and independently of the evaluation of
the prosecution or of the Secretary of Justice. This assessment
should be embodied in the written order disposing of the motion to
dismiss or the motion to withdraw the information.
This was precisely what the MTCC did when it denied the Motion to
Withdraw Information in its June 20, 2007 Resolution, and it
correctly did so. In view of the above disquisitions, and while the
disposition of the issue of whether or not the Secretary of Justice
acted with grave abuse of discretion in not finding probable cause
against Lim may be persuasive, the MTCC is not bound to dismiss
the case or to withdraw the Information. For these reasons, the
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals has effectively
become moot and academic upon the issuance by the MTCC of its
June 20, 2007 Resolution. The March 6, 2008 Decision and the May
28, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals affirming the Secretary
of Justice will really make no difference anymore.
B.CIVIL ASPECT OF A CRIMINAL CASE (RULE 111)
A.RULE IN CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM DELICT

Venue to Rule 113
1.
BUN TIONG V. BALBOA, G.R. NO. 158177, JANUARY 28, 2008

PUNO
BUN TIONG v BALBOA
Sps. Bun Tiong filed a Rule 45 petition questioning the RTC decision which
made them liable.
ISSUE:
1.
ER
Sps. Balboa filed complaint for sum of money with the RTC against Sps.
Bun Tiong. Then they ALSO filed a SECOND case for BP 22 in the MTC.
The MTC case acquitted Caroline and no indemnity was ordered paid to
Sps. Balboa.
The RTC case found Sps. Bun Tiong civilly liable for amount claimed. This
was affirmed by CA.
Sps Bun Tiong filed present case claiming that the CA erred by not taking
cognizance of the MTC case thereby allowing double recovery and forum
shopping.
SC ruled that when the case was filed, the rule applicable was Section 1,
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Court which allowed separate actions for the
recovery of the criminal and civil liability of the party. (VERSUS PRESENT
RULE: deemed instituted na together)
CONCLUSION: since the civil case was filed first, it may proceed
independently of the criminal (BP 22) case. No forum shopping and no
double recovery on the civil liability.
FACTS
In Feb 1997, Sps.Balboa filed with the RTC Manila a complaint for Collection
of Sum of Money (P5,175,250) against Sps. Bun Tiong. The amount covered
three post dated checks issued by Caroline.
Five months after, separate criminal complaints for BP 22 were also filed
against Caroline with the MTC of Manila by the Sps. Balboa.
The RTC Manila found Sps. Bun Tiong liable and dismissed their
counterclaim. Caroline appealed the decision to the CA which affirmed the
RTC decision. (SA RTC liable for the amount)
However, in 2001, the MTC acquitted Caroline since her guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt. She was merely found civilly liable for
the amounts of the issued checks. Sps. Bun Tiong sought partial
reconsideration of the MTC decision and prayed for the deletion of the
award of civil indemnity. This was denied so they appealed to the RTC as an
appellate court. The appeal was granted and the award of civil indemnity
was deleted. (Sa MTC acquitted of ALL liability)
95
2.
Whether the CA erred in allowing Balboa to recover

twice for the same obligation when it failed to take
cognizance of the MTC case NO.
Whether action of filing cases in the MTC and RTC
constitute forum shopping NO.
HELD: Petition Denied.

RATIO
ON FORUM SHOPPING
Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause, on the supposition that one or the other
court would render a favorable disposition. It is usually resorted to by a
party against whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one
forum, in an attempt to seek and possibly to get a favorable opinion in
another forum, other than by an appeal or a special civil action for
certiorari.
There is forum shopping when the following elements concur: (1) identity
of the parties or, at least, of the parties who represent the same interest in
both actions; (2) identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, as the
latter is founded on the same set of facts; and (3) identity of the two
preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action
will amount to res judicata in the action under consideration or will
constitute litis pendentia.
SC BEFORE RULED (old rule)
In Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corp. v. Asia Dynamic Electrix
Corp., the Court ruled that there is identity of parties and causes of action
between a civil case for the recovery of sum of money as a result of the
issuance of bouncing checks, and a criminal case for the prosecution of a
B.P. No. 22 violation. Thus, it ordered the dismissal of the civil action so as
to prevent double payment of the claim.
The Court stated:
x x x The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish
the offender to deter him and others from committing the
same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform
or rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order.
The purpose, meanwhile, of the civil action is for the
restitution, reparation or indemnification of the private

Venue to Rule 113
offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by
reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused.
Hence, the relief sought in the civil aspect of I.S. No. 00-0100304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300 is the same as that sought
in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493, that is, the recovery of the
amount of the checks, which, according to petitioner,
represents the amount to be paid by respondent for its
purchases. x x x
In Hyatt and Silangan, the Court applied Supreme Court Circular
No. 57-97 effective September 16, 1997, which provides:
1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall
be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no
reservation to file such action separately shall be allowed or recognized.
96
SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.

When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under
the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising
from the same act or omission of the accused.
This was later adopted as Rule 111(b) of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Under the foregoing rule, an action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from an offense charged is necessarily included in the criminal
proceedings, unless:
(1) there is an express waiver of the civil action, or
(2) there is a reservation to institute a separate one, or
(3) the civil action was filed prior to the criminal complaint.
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas

Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil
action separately shall be allowed.
Since the Balboas instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action,
then the collection case filed with the RTC may proceed independently of
Criminal Cases Nos. 277576 to 78, and there is no forum shopping to speak
of.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the
offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the
check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed.
Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral,
nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay
the filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are
not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the
court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first
lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof
has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action
upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is
granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2
of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
BUT THE ABOVE IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE SINCE CASE WAS
FILED PRIOR TO SC CIRCULAR
The complaint for sum of money was filed before the criminal case and
PRIOR to the adoption of Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97 on September
16, 1997. Thus, at the time of filing, the governing rule is Section 1, Rule
111 of the 1985 Rules of Court, to wit:
ON CIVIL LIABILITY
Even under the amended rules, a separate proceeding for the recovery of
civil liability in cases of violations of B.P. No. 22 is allowed when the civil
case is filed ahead of the criminal case. Thus, in the Hyatt case, the Court
noted, viz.:
x x x This rule [Rule 111(b) of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure ] was enacted to help declog court dockets which are filled with
B.P. 22 cases as creditors actually use the courts as collectors. Because
ordinarily no filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the
payee uses the intimidating effect of a criminal charge to collect his credit
gratis and sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is not even informed
thereof. The inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case is expected to
significantly lower the number of cases filed before the courts for collection
based on dishonored checks. It is also expected to expedite the disposition
of these cases. Instead of instituting two separate cases, one for criminal
and another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and tried. It should be
stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules is to discourage the
separate filing of the civil action. The Rules even prohibit the reservation of
a separate civil action, which means that one can no longer file a separate
civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance
when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed

Venue to Rule 113
ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourage the
consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. We have previously observed
that a separate civil action for the purpose of recovering the amount of the
dishonored checks would only prove to be costly, burdensome and timeconsuming for both parties and would further delay the final disposition of
the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where petitioners
rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court,
resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted.
B.INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION

1.
SIMON V. CHAN, G.R. NO. 157547, FEBRUARY 23, 2011 QUIJANO-BENEDICTO
HEIRS OF SIMON VS. CHAN (2011)

Doctrine: There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability
arising from the issuance of an unfunded check prohibited and punished
under BP 22.
EMERGENCY DIGEST
Eduardo Simon was charged by Elvin Chan of violating BP 22 in the MeTC
of Manila. More than three years after, Chan commenced a civil action in
the MeTC for the collection of the principal amount of P 336,000 coupled
with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment. Chan argued that
BP 22 falls under Art. 33 of the Civil Code in fraud, for such offense to be
civilly tried independently.
MeTC granted the writ of preliminary
attachment and was implemented (Simon's Nissan car was attached).
Simon filed an urgent MTD on the ground of litis pendentia (Criminal case).
MeTC granted the MTD. MR denied. RTC upheld the dismissal of the case.
CA reversed the decision and remanded the case to the trial court. CA held
that the civil case is an independent civil action for damages on account of
fraud under Article 33 of the Civil Code and may proceed independently
even if there was no reservation as to its filing.
Issue:
Whether or not Chans civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded
check was an independent civil action. - NO
action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the

civil action prior to the criminal action. xxx
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall
be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation
to file such civil action separately shall be allowed. xxx
Moreover, the application of the rule would not be precluded by the
violation of any assumed vested right, because the new rule was adopted
from Supreme Court Circular 57-97 that took effect on November 1, 1997,
which states that:
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, the following rules and guidelines shall henceforth
be observed in the filing and prosecution of all criminal cases under
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which penalizes the making or drawing
and issuance of a check without funds or credit:
1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall
be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action,
and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be
allowed or recognized.
Chans separate civil action to recover the amount of the check involved in
the prosecution for the violation of BP 22 could not be independently
maintained under both Supreme Court Circular 57-97 and the aforequoted
provisions of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, notwithstanding the
allegations of fraud and deceit.
COMPLETE DIGEST:
Facts:
The Office of the City Prosecutor filed an information in the MeTC Manila
charging the late Eduardo Simon with a violation of BP 22. 21 More than
three years later Elvin Chan filed in the MeTC of Pasay City a civil action for
the collection of the principal amount of P336,000.00, coupled with an
application for a writ of preliminary attachment. MeTC in Pasay City issued
a writ of preliminary attachment, which was implemented through the
sheriff attaching a Nissan vehicle of Simon. Simon filed an urgent motion
to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for
damages, pertinently averring:
xxx
On the ground of litis pendentia, that is, as a consequence of the pendency
21
The Court reversed the CA's decision. There is no independent civil action
to recover the value of a bouncing check issued in contravention of BP 22.
This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, effective December 1,
2000, which relevantly provides:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - (a) When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted
with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil
97
That sometime in December 1996 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Elvin Chan to apply on
account or for value Landbank Check No. 0007280 dated December 26, 1996 payable to cash in
the amount of P336,000.00 said accused well knowing that at the time of issue she/he/they did
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full
upon its presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the
date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for Account Closed and despite
receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Elvin Chan the amount of the
check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after
receiving said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Venue to Rule 113
of another action between the instant parties for the same cause before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch X (10) entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Eduardo Simon", docketed thereat as Criminal Case No.
275381-CR, the instant action is dismissable under Section 1, (e), Rule 16,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, xxx
MeTC Pasay granted the MTD (on the ground of litis pendentia) and the
application to charge Chan's bond for damages.
It held that even
assuming the correctness of Chans submission that the case for sum of
money is one based on fraud and hence falling under Article 33 of the Civil
Code, still prior reservation is required by the Rules,
"In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party
during the pendency of criminal case provided the right is reserved as
required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence."
RTC in Pasay City upheld the dismissal of Chans complaint, and affirming
MeTC's decision in toto. CA overturned RTC decision. It quoted the case of
DMPI Employees Credit Association vs. Velez, where the SC pronounced
that only the civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action. Speaking through Justice Pardo, the
Court held:
"There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent
civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The reservation and waiver referred to refers only to the civil
action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged.
This does not include recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34,
and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or
omission which may be prosecuted separately without a reservation".
Rule 111, Section 3 reads:
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided
in Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall
proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party
recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action.
CA held that the changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
pertaining to independent civil actions which became effective on
December 1, 2000 are applicable to this case. CA also denied the MR.
98
Issue:
Whether or not Chans civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded
check was an independent civil action. - NO
Held:
Wherefore, petition for review on certiorari granted. CA decision reversed
and set aside. MTC decision reinstated.
Ratio:
The issue was settled by the Court in Banal vs. Judge Tadeo Jr. where the
Court stated that:
xxx
Civil liability to the offended party cannot thus be denied. The payee of the
check is entitled to receive the payment of money for which the worthless
check was issued. Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to
recompense. xxx
However, there is no independent civil action to recover the value of a
bouncing check issued in contravention of BP 22. This is clear from Rule
111 of the Rules of Court, effective December 1, 2000, which relevantly
provides:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - (a) When a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right
to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action. xxx
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be
deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file
such civil action separately shall be allowed. xxx
Section 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases
provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall
proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party
recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action.
The provisions of the ROC, even if not yet in effect when Chan commenced
the civil case on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless applicable. The
retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a
person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally
objectionable. As a general rule, no vested right may attach to, or arise
from, procedural laws. Any new rules may validly be made to apply to
cases pending at the time of their promulgation, considering that no party
to an action has a vested right in the rules of procedure, except that in
criminal cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if they permit or
require a lesser quantum of evidence to convict than what is required at
the time of the commission of the offenses, because such retroactivity

Venue to Rule 113
99
would be unconstitutional for being ex post facto under the Constitution.

Moreover, the application of the rule would not be precluded by the
violation of any assumed vested right, because the new rule was adopted
from Supreme Court Circular 57-97 that took effect on November 1, 1997.
The Circular states that:
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the
following rules and guidelines shall henceforth be observed in the filing and
prosecution of all criminal cases under BP. 22 which penalizes the making
or drawing and issuance of a check without funds or credit:
1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be
deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or
recognized. xxx
3. Where the civil action has heretofore been filed separately and trial
thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal
action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance
with the pertinent procedure outlined in Section 2 (a) of Rule 111
governing the proceedings in the actions as thus consolidated.
Circular No. 57-97 specifically states that the criminal action for violation of
B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. It also
requires the complainant to pay in full the filing fees based on the amount
of the check involved. Generally, no filing fees are required for criminal
cases, but because of the inclusion of the civil action in complaints for
violation of B.P. 22, the Rules require the payment of docket fees upon the
filing of the complaint. This rule was enacted to help declog court dockets
which are filled with B.P. 22 cases as creditors actually use the courts as
collectors. Ordinarily no filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual
damages, the payee uses the intimidating effect of a criminal charge to
collect his credit gratis and sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is
not even informed thereof. The inclusion of the civil action in the criminal
case is expected to significantly lower the number of cases filed before the
courts for collection based on dishonored checks. It is also expected to
expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of instituting two separate
cases, one for criminal and another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed
and tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules is to
discourage the separate filing of the civil action. The Rules even prohibit
the reservation of a separate civil action, which means that one can no
longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court.
The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil
action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourage
the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. Where petitioners rights
may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort to
a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted. In view of
this special rule governing actions for violation of B.P. 22, Article 31 of the
Civil Code cited by the trial court will not apply to the case at bar.
A perusal of the Civil Case and the Criminal Case ineluctably shows that all
the elements of litis pendentia are present. First, the parties involved are
the same. Secondly, the information and the complaint in both alleged that
Simon had issued Landbank Check No. 0007280 worth P336,000.00
payable to "cash," thereby indicating that the rights asserted and the
reliefs prayed for, as well as the facts upon which the reliefs sought were
founded, were identical in all respects. And, thirdly, any judgment rendered
in one case would necessarily bar the other by res judicata; otherwise,
Chan would be recovering twice upon the same claim.
C.DEATH OF THE ACCUSED

1. ASILO V. PEOPLE, G.R. NOS. 159017-18, MARCH 09, 2011 RAZON
Asilo v. People
G.R. Nos. 159017-18
March 9, 2011
Doctrine: Death of the accused before final judgment extinguishes the

criminal liability as well as the civil liability arising from the crime, but the
claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if
the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict.
Emergency Digest:
Facts: Visitacion Bombasi (BOMBASI) is the lessee of a store near the
public market in Laguna. Prior to the termination of the lease contract,
Mayor Comendador (COMENDADOR) wrote BOMBASI and ordered that
they demolish their store, but the latter refused to do so. BOMBASI
reasoned that there was no legal basis for the ejectment because the lease
contract is still binding. Instead of filing an unlawful detainer case against
BOMBASI in order that they can litigate in court, COMENDADOR ordered the
demolition of the store with all their improvements and goods therein.
Thus, BOMBASI filed a case for damages before the RTC against
Comendador and other officials of the municipality. Likewise, a criminal
case was filed against them.
Pending judgment, COMENDADOR died. The lower court found
COMENDADOR guilty of the charges, but dismissed the criminal case
against him but adjudged him solidarily liable for damages with other codefendants. MR was denied. Thus, an appeal of the decision was filed
questioning the judgment for civil liability.
Issue: Whether or not civil liability not arising from crime is extinguished
by the death of the accused? NO

Venue to Rule 113
Ratio: Death of Mayor Comendador during the pendency of the case could
have extinguished the civil liability if the same arose directly from the
crime committed. However, in this case, the civil liability is based on
another source of obligation, the law on human relations. In causing or
doing the forcible demolition of the store in question, the individual natural
defendants did not only act with grave abuse of authority but usurped a
power which belongs to our courts of justice; such actuations were done
with malice or in bad faith and constitute an invasion of the property rights
of plaintiff(s) without due process of law.
Complete Digest:
Facts:
Visitacion Bombasis late mother entered into a lease agreement

with the municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna for a lot and store. The
contract has a duration of 20 years.
BOMBASI took over the store when her mother died. A fire razed
the public market but the store remained intact. Yet, prior to the
termination of the lease contract, Mayor COMENDADOR wrote a
letter for BOMBASI to vacate the store in order for the municipality
to reconstruct the public market.
BOMBASI refused to heed the request and challenged

COMENDADOR to file an unlawful detainer case so they can litigate
in court. But instead of filing a case in court, COMENDADOR
ordered the demolition of the store by virtue of a resolution from
the Sanguniang Bayan authorizing COMENDADOR to demolish the
store being occupied by BOMBASI using legal means.
Thereafter, municipal administrator ASILO wrote BOMBASI directing

her to vacate as demolition will take place the following day.
BOMBASI replied alleging that there is no legal right to demolish
the store in the absence of a court order and that the Resolutions
did not sanction the demolition of her store but only the filing of an
appropriate unlawful detainer case against her. She further replied
that if the demolition will take place, appropriate administrative,
criminal and civil actions will be filed against COMENDADOR, ASILO
and all persons who will take part in the demolition.
Demolition happened. Thus, a case for damages was filed against

the municipality, COMENDADOR, and other municipal officials.
Thereafter, a criminal complaint for violation of Anti Graft and

Corrupt Practices Act was filed against them. Sandiganbayan
consolidated the civil and criminal cases.
During pendency of case, one of the accused died. Thus, case

against him was dismissed without objection from prosecution.
Thereafter, COMENDADOR likewise died. Sandiganbayan rendered

decision finding accused guilty of the charges in the criminal case.
100
In the civil case, COMENDADOR is adjudged solidarily liable for

damages in favor of BOMBASI.
COMENDADORs wife questioned the liability despite death,
alleging the death extinguished even the civil liability.
Sandiganbayan denied the same in MR. Thus, petitions for review
on certiorari before SC.
Issue: Whether or not civil liability not arising from crime is extinguished
by the death of the accused? NO
Held: WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision
of the Sandiganbayan dated 28 April 2003 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. The Court affirms the decision finding the accused Paulino
S. Asilo, Jr. and Demetrio T. Comendador guilty of violating Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019. We declare the finality of the dismissal of both the
criminal and civil cases against Alberto S. Angeles as the same was not
appealed. In view of the death of Demetrio T. Comendador pending trial,
his criminal liability is extinguished; but his civil liability survives. The
Municipality of Nagcarlan, Paulino Asilo and Demetrio T. Comendador, as
substituted by Victoria Bueta Vda. De Comendador, are hereby declared
solidarily liable to the Spouses Bombasi for temperate damages in the
amount of P200,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00.
Ratio:
Death of Mayor Comendador during the pendency of the case

could have extinguished the civil liability if the same arose directly
from the crime committed. However, in this case, the civil liability
is based on another source of obligation, the law on human
relations. In causing or doing the forcible demolition of the store in
question, the individual natural defendants did not only act with
grave abuse of authority but usurped a power which belongs to our
courts of justice; such actuations were done with malice or in bad
faith and constitute an invasion of the property rights of plaintiff(s)
without due process of law.
The Court is in one with the prosecution that there was a violation
of the right to private property of Bombasi. The accused public
officials should have accorded due process of law guaranteed by
the Constitution and New Civil Code. The Sangguniang Bayan
Resolutions as asserted by the defense will not, as already shown,
justify demolition of the store without court order. This Court in a
number of decisions held that even if there is already a writ of
execution, there must still be a need for a special order for the
purpose of demolition issued by the court before the officer in
charge can destroy, demolish or remove improvements over the
contested property. The pertinent provisions are the following:

Venue to Rule 113
Before the removal of an improvement must take place, there must
be a special order, hearing and reasonable notice to remove.
Section 10(d), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:
(d) Removal of improvements on property subject of execution.
When the property subject of execution contains improvements
constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the
officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements
except upon special order of the court, issued upon motion of the
judgment obligee after due hearing and after the former has failed
to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court.
The above-stated rule is clear and needs no interpretation. If
demolition is necessary, there must be a hearing on the motion
filed and with due notices to the parties for the issuance of a
special order of demolition. This special need for a court order even
if an ejectment case has successfully been litigated, underscores
the independent basis for civil liability, in this case, where no case
was even filed by the municipality.
The requirement of a special order of demolition is based on the

rudiments of justice and fair play. It frowns upon arbitrariness and
oppressive conduct in the execution of an otherwise legitimate act.
It is an amplification of the provision of the Civil Code that every
person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.
Notably, the fact that a separate civil action precisely based on due
process violations was filed even ahead of the criminal case, is
complemented by the fact that the deceased plaintiff Comendador
was substituted by his widow, herein petitioner Victoria who
specified in her petition that she has "substituted him as petitioner
in the above captioned case." Section 1, Rule III of the 1985 Rules
in Criminal Procedure mentioned in Bayotas is, therefore, not
applicable. Truly, the Sandiganbayan was correct when it
maintained the separate docketing of the civil and criminal cases
before it although their consolidation was erroneously based on
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 which deals with civil
liability "arising from the offense charged."
It must be noted that when Angeles (first accused who died) died,
a motion to drop him as an accused was filed by his counsel with
no objection on the part of the prosecution. The Sandiganbayan
acted favorably on the motion and issued an Order dismissing all
the cases filed against Angeles. On the other hand, when Mayor
Comendador died and an adverse decision was rendered against
him which resulted in the filing of a motion for reconsideration by
101
Mayor Comendadors counsel, the prosecution opposed the Motion

specifying the ground that the civil liability did not arise from delict,
hence, survived the death of the accused. The Sandiganbayan
upheld the opposition of the prosecution which disposition was not
appealed. Civil liability of Mayor Comendador survived his death;
and that of Angeles could have likewise survived had it not been
for the fact that the resolution of the Sandiganbayan that his death
extinguished the civil liability was not questioned and lapsed into
finality.
2. PEOPLE V. BAYOT, G.R. NO. 200030, APRIL 18, 2012 RESPICIO

EMERGENCY
Accused convicted Rape. Appealed CA. Died while on CA.
What happens?
Crime Dissolved. Civil Liab ex delicato dissolved.
Note sources of obligation: Law, delict (criminal and civil ex delicto
liability), quasi delict, contract, quasi contract
Civil Liab from other causes of action still alive (that from Law,
quasi delict, contract, quasi contract. E.g., in the civil code fraud
and injury also liable damagesthis one arises from law)
Prescription of Civil Liab from causes of action other than delict is
tolled by the filing of the Crim case.
PEREZ, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision [1] dated 9 May 2006 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00269 affirming with modification
the Decision[2] dated 31 July 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental, 6th Judicial Region, Branch 61, in
Criminal Case No. 98-2025, finding herein appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina
(appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, committed
against AAA,[3]
Appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina was charged with Rape
the RTC convicted appellant of the crime of rape and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay AAA the amount
ofP40,000.00 as indemnity with costs.
Aggrieved, appellant appealed the aforesaid RTC Decision to this

Venue to Rule 113
Court by filing a Notice of Appeal dated 6 September 2000. [7] In light,
however, of this Courts pronouncement in People v. Mateo,[8] the case was
transferred to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review per Resolution [9]
dated 4 October 2004.
In a Decision dated 9 May 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed
appellants conviction with the modification increasing the award of
indemnity from P40,000.00 toP50,000.00. It likewise awarded moral
damages in favor of AAA in the amount of P50,000.00.
extinguished only when the death of the

offender occurs before final judgment;
[Emphasis supplied].
Applying the foregoing provision, this Court, in People v.
Bayotas,[16] which was cited in a catena of cases, [17] had laid down the
following guidelines:
1.
Death of the accused pending appeal of his

conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As
opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, the
death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on
the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore.
2.
Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives

notwithstanding the death of [the] accused, if
the same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the
Civil Code enumerates these other sources of
obligation from which the civil liability may arise
as a result of the same act or omission:
However, in a letter dated 29 May 2006, [11] Dr. Juanito S. Leopando,

Penal Superintendent IV of the New Bilibid Prison, informed the Court of
Appeals that appellant died at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital on 4
December 2004. Attached in his letter is the original copy of appellants
Certificate of Death.[12]
Nonetheless, the Public Attorneys Office still appealed, on behalf of
appellant, the aforesaid Court of Appeals Decision to this Court via a Notice
of Appeal[13] dated 31 May 2006, which was given due course by the Court
of Appeals per Resolution[14] dated 19 January 2007. The Court of Appeals
also directed the Chief of the Judicial Records Division to forward the entire
records of the case to this Court.
102
ISSUE:
what happens when the accused dies on appeal?
a) Law
RATIO
b) Contracts
Taking into consideration appellants death, this Court will now
determine its effect to this present appeal.
Appellants death on 4 December 2004, during the pendency of
his appeal before the Court of Appeals, extinguished not only his criminal
liability for the crime of rape committed against AAA, but also his civil
liability solely arising from or based on said crime. [15]
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x
e)
3.
Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, specifically

provides the effect of death of the accused on his criminal, as well as civil,
liability. It reads thus:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally
extinguished.
Criminal
liability
is
totally
extinguished:
1.
By death of the convict, as
to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
xxx
xxx
Quasi-delicts
Where the civil liability survives, as explained in
Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor
may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action and subject to Section 1,
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended. This separate civil
action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation
upon which the same is based as explained
above.

Venue to Rule 113
4.
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a

forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil
action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private-offended party instituted
together therewith the civil action. In such case,
the statute of limitations on the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the pendency of the
criminal case, conformably with [the] provisions
of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should
thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription. [18]
From the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused

pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well
as the civil liability ex delicto. The rationale, therefore, is that the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand
as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil
liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the
criminal case.[19]
Evidently, as this Court has pronounced in People v. Olaco and
People v. Paniterce,[20] it is already unnecessary to rule on appellants
appeal. Appellants appeal was still pending and no final judgment had
been rendered against him at the time of his death. Thus, whether or not
appellant was guilty of the crime charged had become irrelevant because
even assuming that appellant did incur criminal liability and civil liability ex
delicto, these were totally extinguished by his death, following the
provisions of Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code and this Courts ruling
in People v. Bayotas.
Remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the

Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding of
mistrial
ER:
[Super short facts, tons of JJlook at Ratio and talk about Hammurabi and
Thomas a Becket; this case also cited two US cases, but they didnt apply.
Look at Ratio.]
There was a shooting in Bulacan which killed Alex Vinculado and injured his
twin and uncle. The RTC decided that Diego (alleged gunman + bodyguard)
is guilty of murder, while Mayor Galvez was acquitted. The People now
appeal the acquittal of Galvez. ISSUE: W/NOT an acquittal may be
appealed (NO). HELD: The rule is that a remand to a trial court of a
judgment of acquittal brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari
cannot be had unless there is a finding of mistrial. The doctrine that
"double jeopardy may not be invoked after trial" may apply only when the
Court finds that the criminal trial was a sham because the prosecution
representing the sovereign people in the criminal case was denied
due process.
In this case, the judge clearly decided and weighed all the pieces of
evidence. There was no mistrial.
FACTS:
-
In the same breath, the appealed Decision dated 9 May 2006 of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00269 finding appellant
guilty of the crime of rape, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and
ordering him to pay AAA P50,000.00 as indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral
damages had become ineffectual.
D.ACQUITTAL
1.
PEOPLE V. TIRSO VELASCO, G.R. NO. 127444, SEPTEMBER 13,

2000 SANCHEZ
People v. Velasco
DOCTRINE:
103
There was a shooting in Bulacan which killed Alex Vinculado and

injured his twin brother and uncle.
o 3 criminal Informations were filed1 for homicide and 2 for
frustrated homicide against Galvez (Mayor of San Ildefonso
Bulacan) and Diego (alleged bodyguard)
o These were withdrawn and a 4 sets of Informations were
filed for MURDER and FRUSTRATED MURDER, including a
violation of unauthorized carrying of firearm outside his
residence.
Case was transferred to Manila, and RTC DECIDED:
o The trial court found the accused Godofredo Diego guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of murder and
double frustrated murder.
o However, it acquitted Mayor Honorato Galvez of the same
charges due to insufficiency of evidence. It also absolved
him from the charge of illegal carrying of firearm upon its
finding that the act was not a violation of law.
The acquittal is now challenged via Petition for Certiorari (65)
ISSUE:
-
W/NOT certiorari is proper to question the acquittal of an accused

(Yes, for this case only. Exceptional circumstances)
W/NOT a judgment of acquittal may be reviewed by the SC (NO.
This is double jeopardy)
HELD: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.

Venue to Rule 113
RATIO:
[1st issue]
-
The recent untimely demise of respondent Galvez at the hands of

alleged assassins (not discounting too the earlier dismissal of
respondent judge from the service) may arguably have rendered
these matters moot and academic, thus calling for a dismissal of
the petition on this basis alone.
The Court however is not insensitive to nor oblivious of the
paramount nature and object of the pleas forcefully presented by
the Government considering especially the alleged new directions
in American jurisprudence taken by the doctrine of double
jeopardy.
[2nd issue]
-
[The Court went into a huge JJ discussion about the history and
etymology of jeopardy, lol. It cited Justinian, The Code of
Hammurabi, St. Jerome, King Henry II & Thomas a Becket]
At this juncture, it must be explained that under existing American
law and jurisprudence, appeals may be had not only from criminal
convictions but also, in some limited instances, from dismissals of
criminal charges, sometimes loosely termed "acquittals." But this is
so as long as the judgments of dismissals do not involve
determination of evidence, such as when the judge:
o (a) issues a post-verdict acquittal, i.e., acquits the
defendant on a matter of law after a verdict of guilty has
been entered by a trier of facts (a jury);
o (b) orders the dismissal on grounds other than insufficiency
of evidence, as when the statute upon which the
indictment was based is defective;
o []
o Interestingly, the common feature of these instances of
dismissal is that they all bear on questions of law or
matters unrelated to a factual resolution of the case which
consequently, on appeal, will not involve a review of
evidence. Its logical effect in American law is to render
appeals therefrom non-repugnant to the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
The People cite two US Cases to subject Velasco to a second trial,
(WHICH ULTIMATELY FAILED): [These cases allowed an appeal
despite acquittal]
o Wilson involved an appeal by Government of a postverdict ruling of law issued by the trial judge resulting in
the acquittal of the defendant due to pre-indictment delay
(a delay between the offense and the indictment
prejudiced the defendant) after a verdict of guilty had been
entered by the jury. But it was not an acquittal that
104
involved factual resolution. It was one anchored on an

extraneous cause. The acquittal was not based on
evidence.
o US v. Scott involved an accused who, having been
indicted for several offenses, himself moved for the
dismissal of two (2) counts of the charges on the ground
that his defense was prejudiced by pre-indictment delay.
The trial judge granted the motion. Government appealed
the dismissals but the appellate court rejected the appeal
on the basis of double jeopardy. This time the US Supreme
Court reversed, holding that "(w)here a defendant himself
seeks to avoid his trial prior to its conclusion by a motion
for a mistrial, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not offended
by a second prosecution. Such a motion by the defendant
is deemed to be a deliberate election on his part to forego
his valued right to have his guilt or innocence determined
by the first trier of facts."
The inapplicability of this ruling to the case at bar

is at once discernible. The dismissal of the charges
against private respondent Galvez was not upon
his own instance; neither did he seek to avoid trial,
as it was in Scott, to be considered as having
waived his right to be adjudged guilty or innocent.
Here, trial on the merits was held during which
both government and accused had their respective
day in court.
Under Philippine law, the requisites of double jeopardy are:(a) a
valid complaint or information; (b) before a competent court before
which the same is filed; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the
charge; and, (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the
case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.
o It bears repeating that where acquittal is concerned, the
rules do not distinguish whether it occurs at the level of the
trial court or on appeal from a judgment of conviction. This
firmly establishes the finality-of-acquittal rule in our
jurisdiction. Therefore, as mandated by our Constitution,
statutes and cognate jurisprudence, an acquittal is final
and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy,
whether it happens at the trial court level or before the
Court of Appeals.
However, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of
acquittal brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be
had unless there is a finding of mistrial. The doctrine that "double
jeopardy may not be invoked after trial" may apply only when the
Court finds that the criminal trial was a sham because the
prosecution representing the sovereign people in the criminal case
was denied due process.

Venue to Rule 113
-
The petition at hand which seeks to nullify the decision of

respondent judge acquitting the accused Honorato Galvez goes
deeply into the trial court's appreciation and evaluation in esse of
the evidence adduced by the parties. A reading of the questioned
decision shows that respondent judge considered the evidence
received at trial.
o These consisted among others of the testimonies relative
to the positions of the victims vis--vis the accused and the
trajectory, location and nature of the gunshot wounds, and
the opinion of the expert witness for the prosecution.
o While the appreciation thereof may have resulted in
possible lapses in evidence evaluation, it nevertheless does
not detract from the fact that the evidence was considered
and passed upon.
This consequently exempts the act from the writs limiting requirement of
excess or lack of jurisdiction. As such, it becomes an improper object of
and therefore non-reviewable by certiorari. To reiterate, errors of
judgment are not to be confused with errors in the exercise of jurisdiction.
2.
CHING V. NICDAO, G.R. NO. 141181, APRIL 27, 2007 SANTOS
SAMSON CHING vs. CLARITA NICDAO and HON. COURT OF APPEALS

(2007)
DOCTRINE:
Civil
liability
is
not
extinguished
by
acquittal:
1.
where
the
acquittal
is
based
on
reasonable
doubt;
2. where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not
criminal
but
only
civil
in
nature;
and
3. where the civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of
which the accused is acquitted.
ER: Nicdao was charged eleven (11) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang (BP) 22. The MTC found her of guilty. The RTC affirmed. Nicdao filed
an appeal to the Court of Appeals. CA reversed the decision and acquitted
Nicdao. Ching is now appealing the civil aspect of the case to the Supreme
Court.
Ching argues that notwithstanding respondent Nicdaos acquittal by the
CA, the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction and authority to resolve and
rule on her civil liability. He anchors his contention on Rule 111, Sec 1B:
The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be
deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or
recognized. Moreover, under the above-quoted provision, the criminal
action for violation of BP 22 necessarily includes the corresponding civil
action, which is the recovery of the amount of the dishonored check
representing the civil obligation of the drawer to the payee.
Nicdao contends: the CAs decision is equivalent to a finding that the facts
upon which her civil liability may arise do not exist. The instant petition,
105
which seeks to enforce her civil liability based on the eleven (11) checks, is
thus allegedly already barred by the final and executory decision acquitting
her.
Issue: WON Ching may appeal the civil aspect of the case within the
reglementary period? YES and WON Nicdao civilly liable? NO.
Held:
Ching is entitled to appeal the civil aspect of the case within the
reglementary period. Every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable. Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction
of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. Ching
correctly argued that he, as the offended party, may appeal the civil aspect
of the case notwithstanding Nicdaos acquittal by the CA. The civil action
was impliedly instituted with the criminal action since he did not reserve
his right to institute it separately nor did he institute the civil action prior to
the criminal action.
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders
judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot
appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in
double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or the
accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the
case within the period therefor.
NO. NICDAO is not civilly liable. A review of the case leads to the
conclusion that Nicdaos acquittal likewise carried with it the extinction of
the action to enforce her civil liability. There is simply no basis to hold
respondent Nicdao civilly liable to Ching. CAs acquittal of respondent
Nicdao is not merely based on reasonable doubt. Rather, it is based on the
finding that she did not commit the act penalized under BP 22. In
particular, the CA found that the P20,000,000.00 check was a stolen check
which was never issued nor delivered by Nicdao to Ching. CA did not
adjudge her to be civilly liable to petitioner Ching. In fact, the CA explicitly
stated that she had already fully paid her obligations. The finding relative
to the P20,000,000.00 check that it was a stolen check necessarily
absolved respondent Nicdao of any civil liability thereon as well. The
acquittal carried with it the extinction of her civil liability as well.
FACTS: (dami kwento from direct examination to cross
examination)
CHING, a Chinese national, filed criminal complaints for eleven (11)

counts of violation of BP 22 against respondent NICDAO.
Consequently, eleven (11) Informations were filed with the First
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Dinalupihan-Hermosa,
Province of Bataan
At about the same time, fourteen (14) other criminal complaints,

also for violation of BP 22, were filed against respondent NICDAO
by Emma NUGUID, said to be the common law spouse of petitioner
CHING.
Allegedly
fourteen
(14)
checks,
amounting

Venue to Rule 113
to P1,150,000.00, were issued by respondent Nicdao to Nuguid but

were dishonored for lack of sufficient funds. The Informations were
filed with the same MCTC.
At her arraignment, NICDAO entered the plea of "not guilty" to all
the charges. A joint trial was then conducted for the criminal cases.
In the criminal cases, CHING and Imelda Yandoc, an employee of
the Hermosa Savings & Loan Bank, Inc., were presented to prove
the charges against NICDAO
CHING averred that the checks were issued to him by NICDAO as
security for the loans that she obtained from him.
Their transaction began sometime in October 1995 when NICDAO
with her husband, proprietor/manager of Vignette Superstore,
approached him to borrow money in order for them to settle their
financial obligations. They agreed that NICDAO would leave the
checks undated and that she would pay the loans within one year.
However, when CHING went to see her after the lapse of one year
to ask for payment, NICDAO allegedly said that she had no cash.
CHING claimed that he went back to NICDAO several times more
but every time, she would tell him that she had no money.
THEN, Nicdao allegedly got mad at him for being insistent and
challenged him about seeing each other in court.
Because of Nicdao's alleged refusal to pay her obligations, CHING
deposited the checks that she issued to him. The checks were
dishonored by the bank for being "DAIF."
Shortly thereafter, CHING and NUGUID wrote a demand letter to
NICDAO which, however, went unheeded.
Accordingly, they separately filed the criminal complaints against
NICDAO.
Another witness presented by the prosecution was IMELDA, an
employee of the bank. She basically testified that the checks
issued by NICDAO bounced.
NICDAO s DEFENSE. They had several witnesses including Nicdao.
NICDAO stated that she only dealt with NUGUID, she denies that
she borrowed money from CHING. She admitted however, that she
obtained a loan from NUGUID but only for 2.1 Million and the same
was already fully paid.
In addition, Nicdao also presented and identified several cigarette
wrappers at the back of which appeared computations. She
explained that Nuguid went to the grocery store everyday to collect
interest payments. The principal loan was P2,100,000.00 with 12%
interest per day. Nuguid allegedly wrote the payments for the daily
interests at the back of the cigarette wrappers that she gave to
Nicdao.
With respect to the P20,000,000.00 check, Nicdao admitted that
the signature thereon was hers but denied that she issued the
same to Ching. Anent the other ten (10) checks, she likewise
admitted that the signatures thereon were hers while the amounts
22
106
and payee thereon were written by either Jocelyn Nicdao or

Melanie Tolentino, who were employees of Vignette Superstore and
authorized by her to do so.
NICDAO claims that she was told by her employee that one of her
checks was missing. She could not explain how it came to CHINGs
possession. (that was the 20,000,000 check presented to the bank
that CHING says that NICDAO allegedly owes apparently nanakaw
daw accdg to NICDAO)
MCTC disbelieved Nicdaos claim that the P20,000,000.00 check
was the same one that she lost in 1995. It observed that ordinary
prudence would dictate that a lost check would at least be
immediately reported to the bank to prevent its unauthorized
endorsement or negotiation. Nicdao made no such report to the
bank. Even if the said check was indeed lost, the MCTC faulted
Nicdao for being negligent in keeping the checks that she had
already signed in an unsecured box. NICDAO CONVICTED OF 14
COUNTS OF BP 22.
Appeal to RTC. Affirmed.
Appeal to CA. Reversed. NICDAO ACQUITTED. Nicdao fully paid
the loans and NUGUID befriended NICDAO to gain access to
Vignette Superstore where NICDAOs blank and pre-signed checks
were kept. In essence CA stated that the 20M check was stolen
from Nicdao.
With the finding that respondent Nicdao had fully paid her loan
obligations to Nuguid, the CA declared that she could no longer be
held liable for violation of BP 22. It was explained that to be held
liable under BP 22, it must be established, inter alia, that the check
was made or drawn and issued to apply on account or for value.
According to the CA, the word "account" refers to a pre-existing
obligation, while "for value" means an obligation incurred
simultaneously with the issuance of the check. In the case of
respondent Nicdaos checks, the pre-existing obligations secured
by them were already extinguished after full payment had been
made by respondent Nicdao to Nuguid. Obligations are
extinguished by, among others, payment.
CHING appeals to the SC. He urges the Court to review the findings
of facts made by the CA as they are allegedly based on a
misapprehension of facts and manifestly erroneous and
contradicted by the evidence.
Ching argues that notwithstanding Nicdaos acquittal by the CA,
the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction and authority to resolve and
rule on her civil liability. He invokes Section 1, Rule 111 of the
Revised Rules of Court and SC Circular No 57-97. 22
SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Venue to Rule 113
NICDAO says that it is barred under Section 2(b), Rule 111 of the
Revised Rule of Court23. She states that the CA has already made a
finding to the effect that the fact upon which her civil liability might
arise did not exist.
ISSUES: 1) WON CHING can appeal the civil liability? YES

2) WON NICDAO is civilly liable? NO.
HELD/RATIO:
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Notwithstanding Nicdaos acquittal, petitioner Ching is entitled to appeal
the civil aspect of the case within the reglementary period. "every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." Under the pertinent
provision of the Revised Rules of Court, the civil action is generally
impliedly instituted with the criminal action. At the time of petitioner
Chings filing of the Informations against Nicdao the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted.
As a corollary to the above rule, an acquittal does not necessarily carry
with it the extinguishment of the civil liability of the accused. Section
2(b) of the same Rule, also quoted earlier, provided in part:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the
civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment
that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
It is also relevant to mention that judgments of acquittal are required to
state "whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove
the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or
omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist."
Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act
or omission of the accused. x x x
SC Circular 57-97
1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily
include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall
be allowed or recognized. x x x
23
SEC. 2. Institution of separate of civil action. - Except in the cases provided for in Section 3
hereof, after the criminal action has been commenced, the civil action which has been reserved
cannot be instituted until final judgment in the criminal action.
xxxx
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist.
107
In Sapiera v. Court of Appeals, the Court enunciated that the civil liability is
not extinguished by acquittal: (a) where the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt; (b) where the court expressly declares that the liability
of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature; and (c) where the
civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which the
accused is acquitted.
Thus, under Article 29 of the Civil Code
ART. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the
ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil
action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such
action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the
defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for
damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable
doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that
effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the
acquittal is due to that ground.
Moreover, the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a
finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused
did not commit the act or omission imputed to him.
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders
judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot
appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in
double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or the
accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the
case within the period therefor.
THUS, CHING correctly argued that he, as the offended party, may
appeal the civil aspect of the case notwithstanding Nicdaos
acquittal by the CA. The civil action was impliedly instituted with
the criminal action since he did not reserve his right to institute it
separately nor did he institute the civil action prior to the criminal
action.
Following the long recognized rule that "the appeal period accorded to the
accused should also be available to the offended party who seeks redress
of the civil aspect of the decision," the period to appeal granted to
petitioner Ching is the same as that granted to the accused. With petitioner
Chings timely filing of the instant petition for review of the civil aspect of
the CAs decision, the Court thus has the jurisdiction and authority to
determine the civil liability of Nicdao notwithstanding her acquittal.
2nd ISSUE: The acquittal oft Nicdao likewise effectively extinguished her
civil liability

Venue to Rule 113
A review of the case leads to the conclusion that respondent Nicdaos
acquittal likewise carried with it the extinction of the action to enforce her
civil liability. There is simply no basis to hold respondent Nicdao civilly
liable to petitioner Ching. First, the CAs acquittal of respondent Nicdao is
not merely based on reasonable doubt. Rather, it is based on the finding
that she did not commit the act penalized under BP 22. In particular, the
CA found that the P20,000,000.00 check was a stolen check which was
never issued nor delivered by respondent Nicdao to petitioner Ching. As
such, according to the CA, petitioner Ching "did not acquire any right or
interest over Check No. 002524 and cannot assert any cause of action
founded on said check," and that respondent Nicdao "has no obligation to
make good the stolen check and cannot, therefore, be held liable for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22."
With respect to the ten (10) other checks, the CA established that the loans
secured by these checks had already been extinguished after full payment
had been made by respondent Nicdao. In this connection, the second
element for the crime under BP 22, i.e., "that the check is made or drawn
and issued to apply on account or for value," is not present.
Second, in acquitting respondent Nicdao, the CA did not adjudge her to be
civilly liable to petitioner Ching. In fact, the CA explicitly stated that she
had already fully paid her obligations.
3.
COSCOLUELLA V. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R.NO. 191411, JULY 15,

2013 SUPERABLE
G.R. No. 191411 || RAFAEL L. COSCOLLUELA, Petitioner, vs.

SANBIGANBAYAN (FIRST
DIVISION)
and
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 191871 || EDWIN N. NACIONALES, ERNESTO P. MALVAS,
and JOSE MA. G. AMUGOD, Petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST
DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, Respondents. July 15, 2013. (NONS)
DOCTRINE: Under Rule 111, Sec. 2 of the Rules, the acquittal in the
criminal case will bar a subsequent civil action only when the judgment
explicitly declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist. Thus, absent any declaration from the court, the
aggrieved party is not precluded from instituting a subsequent civil action.
EMERGENCY RECIT
FACTS: The Ombudsman Office in Visayas received a letter complaint in
2003 about the alleged anomalous purchase of medical and agricultural
equipment amounting to PhP 20M. The Ombudsman investigated this and
a recommendation that charges be filed against Coscolluela (the Governor
108
of Negros Occidental who caused the purchase), Nacionales, Amugod and

Malvas. However, it was only in 2009 that Acting Ombudsman Casimiro
approved the recommendation, and the Information was only filed in that
year. Coscolluela, et. al. filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the
ground that their right to speedy disposition of cases was violated due to to
the eight year delay. The Sandiganbayan denied this.
ISSUE: Whether Coscolluela, et. al.s acquittal will bar a civil action
for recovery? NO!
HELD: While it is true that Coscolluela, et. al. were acquitted (due to the
long delay), this does not mean that a subsequent civil action arising from
a delict will be barred. Under the Rules, only when the judgment of
acquittal states that the act or omission from which the civil liability did not
exist will there be a bar. Here, no party was given the chance to present
evidence. Thus, the Court cannot make a pronouncement on whether
Coscolluela, et. al. actually committed the acts or omissions from which
civil liability may arise. Hence, the Province of Negros Occidental is not
precluded from instituting a subsequent civil action.
FACTS:
Rafael Coscolluela was the governor of the Negros Occidental, serving

three terms until June 30, 2001. During his tenure, Edwin Nacionales
served as his Special Projects Division Head, Jose Amugod as
Nacionales subordinate, and Ernesto Malvas as Provincial Health
Officer.
The Visayas Ombudsman office received a letter complaint on

November 9, 2001, requesting them to investigate the anomalous
purchase of medical and agricultural equipment for PhP 20million,
which happened around a month before Coscolluelas term ended.
The Final Evaluation Report was issued on April 16, 2002 which
upgraded the complaint to a criminal case. As a result, Coscolluela, et.
al. submitted their counter-affidavits.
On March 27, 2003, Graft Investigation Officer Caares prepared a

resolution finding probable cause against Coscolluela et. al. for
violation of Sec. 3(3) of R.A. No. 3019 and recommended the filing of
the Information. This was submitted to Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas
Miro, who then recommended the approval of the information on June
5, 2003. However, it was only on May 21, 2009, that Acting
Ombudsman
Casimiro
approved
the
Information.
The
Information was only filed before the Sandiganbayan on June
19, 2009.
Coscolluela, et. al. only learned of the Caares resolution and the filing
of the Information after they received a copy of the latter shortly after
its filing with the Sandiganbayan.

Venue to Rule 113
Coscolluela, et. al. filed a Motion to Quash on the ground that his right
to speedy disposition of cases was violated when the charges against
him were resolved 8 years after the original complaint was initiated.
The Ombudsman filed their Opposition, explaining that the delay was
due to the fact that the Information had to go through careful review
and revision before its approval. Coscolluela, et. al. never even raised
any objections to the delay in the proceedings.
The Sandiganbayan denied the Motion to Quash for lack of merit
because the preliminary investigation was actually resolved 1 year and
4 months from the filing of the original complaint. As these issuances
had to undergo careful review and revision through the various levels
of the said office, the period of delay i.e., from March 27, 2003 to May
21, 2009, or roughly over six (6) years cannot be deemed as
inordinate and as such, Coscolluela, et. al.s constitutional right to
speedy disposition of cases was not violated.
Coscolluela, et. al. filed a MR, arguing that the two time periods should
not be considerated as distinct and separate, and thus the eight year
delay was prejudicial to their right to speedy disposition of cases. This
was denied, hence this petition to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: (Not important) Whether Coscolluela et. al.s right to speedy

disposition of cases was violated? YES;
(Relevant to Civil Aspect of a Criminal Case) Whether Coscolluela, et.
al. can still be civilly liable because of their acquittal YES!
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby GRANTED. The assailed
Resolutions dated October 6, 2009 and February 10, 2010 of the First
Division of the Sandiganbayan are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The
Sandiganbayan is likewise ordered to DISMISS Crim. Case No. SB-09-CRM0154 for violation of the Constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases
of petitioners Rafael L. Coscolluela, Edwin N. Nacionales, Dr. Ernesto P.
Malvas, and Jose Ma. G. Amugod, without prejudice to any civil action
which the Province of Negros Occidental may file against petitioners.
RATIO:
(Not relevant to topic)
Coscolluela, et. al.s Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases was
violated.
A persons right to the speedy disposition of his case is guaranteed

under Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
This constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal

proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or
administrative in nature, as well as all proceedings, either judicial or
quasi-judicial. In this accord, any party to a case may demand
expeditious action to all officials who are tasked with the
administration of justice.
109
Jurisprudence dictates that the right is deemed violated only when the
proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for
and secured; or even without cause or justifiable motive, a long period
of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
Hence, in the determination of whether the defendant has been denied
his right to a speedy disposition of a case, the following factors may be
considered and balanced: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for
the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the
accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.
Here, it is clear that Coscolluela, et. al.s rights were violated.
First, it is observed that the preliminary investigation proceedings took
a protracted amount of time to complete. Under the Rules of Procedure
of the Office of the Ombudsman, the conduct of preliminary
investigation is only terminated once Ombudsman approves the
recommendation of filing the Information or dismissing it. Here, the
investigated was only terminated on May 21, 2009 when Ombudsman
Casimiro approved the filing of the Information.
Second, the delay in the Ombudsmans resolution of the case remains
unjustified. The Office of the Ombudsman has the inherent duty not
only to carefully go through the particulars of case but also to resolve
the same within the proper length of time. Its dutiful performance
should not only be gauged by the quality of the assessment but also by
the reasonable promptness of its dispensation. There was
extraordinary complication (e.g. difficult case, etc), which could justify
why there was an eight year delay in the preliminary investigation
proceedings.
Third, the Court deems that Coscolluela, et. al. cannot be faulted for
their alleged failure to assert their right to speedy disposition of cases.
Coscolluela, et. al. were unaware that the investigation against them
was still on-going. Again, they were only informed that there was
actually a case when they were notified of the Information filed before
the Sandiganbayan. Peculiar to this case, Coscolluela, et. al. were only
asked to comment and not file counter-affidavits, which is the proper
procedure to follow in a preliminary investigation. They had no reason
to believe that the case was still pending before the Ombudsman.
It was the Office of the Ombudsmans responsibility to expedite the
same within the bounds of reasonable timeliness in view of its mandate
to promptly act on all complaints lodged before it. Coscolluela, et. al.
had no obligation to follow up on the prosecution of their case
Fourth, the Court finally recognizes the prejudice caused to Coscolluela,
et. al. by the lengthy delay in the proceedings against them.
Lest it be misunderstood, the right to speedy disposition of cases is not
merely hinged towards the objective of spurring dispatch in the
administration of justice but also to prevent the oppression of the
citizen by holding a criminal prosecution suspended over him for an
indefinite time. Akin to the right to speedy trial, its "salutary objective"

Venue to Rule 113
is to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and
expense of litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined
within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and
consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose.
It is the government that bears the burden of proving its case beyond
reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it difficult or
impossible for the government to carry its burden. Closely related to
the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such
delay. Different weights should be assigned to different reasons or
justifications invoked by the State.
Because of the long delay in the resolution of the cases, the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it refused to
quash the Information.
The acquittal of Coscolluela, et. al. does not mean that they are
not civilly liable.
While Coscolluela, et. al. are acquitted, it does not necessarily follow
that they are entirely exculpated from any civil liability, assuming that
the same is proven in a subsequent case which the Province may opt
to pursue.
Under Rule 111, Sec. 2 of the Rules, the acquittal in the criminal case
will bar a subsequent civil action only when the judgment explicitly
declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise
did not exist.
As stated in the case of Abejuela v. People, citing Banal v. Tadeo, Jr.:

o "While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable
by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because
it is a crime but because it caused damage to another.
Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what
gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and moral
duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused
to another by reason of his own act or omission, done
intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be
punishable by law."
Here, the dismissal was due to the violation of Coscolluela, et. al.s
right to speedy disposition of cases. No party was given the chance to
present evidence. Thus, the Court is unable to make a definite
pronouncement as to whether Coscolluela, et. al indeed
committed the acts or omissions from which any civil liability
on their part might arise as prescribed under Section 2, Rule
120.
Thus, the Province is not precluded from instituting a subsequent civil

case based on the delict if only to recover the amount of
P20,000,000.00 in public funds attributable to petitioners alleged
malfeasance.
110
E.PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
1.
DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION V. JANIOLA, G.R. NO. 184861,

JUNE 30, 2009 TANDOC
Dream Works filed a BP 22 case against Janiola. Janiola subsequently

instituted a civil complaint for rescission against Dream Works. Janiola
sought to suspend the proceeding in the criminal case since there was a
prejudicial question in the civil case. According to Janiola, the civil and
criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or intimately related such
that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or innocence
of the accused would necessarily be determined. Was there prejudicial
question? Nope. For two reasons:
1.
2.
Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is

understood in law as that which must precede the criminal
action and which requires a decision before a final
judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which
said question is closely connected. The civil action must be
instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action.
It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense
charge (B.P. 22) is the issuance of a bad check. this Court has
held in a long line of cases that the agreement surrounding the
issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for
violation of BP 22.
FACTS:
-Dreamworks filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22 against
private respondent Janiola with the MTC on February 2, 2005
-On September 20, 2006, private respondent Janiola, joined by her
husband, instituted a civil complaint against petitioner Dreamworks by
filing a Complaint dated August 2006 for the rescission of an alleged
construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages
-Janiola filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated July 24, 2007 in
Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, alleging that the civil and criminal cases
involved facts and issues similar or intimately related such that in the
resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined.
-Dreemworks opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal
cases in an undated Comment/Opposition to Accuseds Motion to Suspend
Proceedings based on Prejudicial Question on the grounds that: (1) there is
no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon
which the bouncing checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue
from the issue of whether private respondent violated BP 22; and (2)
Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the elements of
a prejudicial question is that the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the

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subsequent criminal action; thus, this element is missing in this case,
the criminal case having preceded the civil case
-MTC granted the suspension
ISSUE: W/on the suspension was proper.
HELD: Nope
RATIO:
- Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is
understood in law as that which must precede the criminal
action and which requires a decision before a final
judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which
said question is closely connected. The civil action must be
instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action.
=Sec. 7 of Rule 111, which applies here and now provides:
SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.The elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner interprets Sec. 7(a) to mean that in order for a civil case
to create a prejudicial question and, thus, suspend a criminal case, it must
first be established that the civil case was filed previous to the filing of the
criminal case. This, petitioner argues, is specifically to guard against the
situation wherein a party would belatedly file a civil action that is related to
a pending criminal action in order to delay the proceedings in the latter.
On the other hand, private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code
which provides:
Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any
criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall
be governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall
promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of
this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Private respondent argues that the phrase before any criminal prosecution
may be instituted or may proceed must be interpreted to mean that a
prejudicial question exists when the civil action is filed either before the
institution of the criminal action or during the pendency of the criminal
action. Private respondent concludes that there is an apparent conflict in
the provisions of the Rules of Court and the Civil Code in that the latter
considers a civil case to have presented a prejudicial question even if the
criminal case preceded the filing of the civil case.
We cannot agree with private respondent.
it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a change in phraseology
by amendment of a provision of law indicates a legislative intent to change
the meaning of the provision from that it originally had. In the instant
case, the phrase, previously instituted, was inserted to qualify the nature
of the civil action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the
111
criminal action. This interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of

subsequent directly before the term criminal action. There is no other
logical explanation for the amendments except to qualify the relationship
of the civil and criminal actions, that the civil action must precede the
criminal action
- Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the institution of the
criminal complaint and from the time that private respondent allegedly
withdrew its equipment from the job site. Also, it is worth noting that the
civil case was instituted more than two and a half (2 ) years from the
time that private respondent allegedly stopped construction of the
proposed building for no valid reason. More importantly, the civil case
praying for the rescission of the construction agreement for lack of
consideration was filed more than three (3) years from the execution of the
construction agreement.
-Evidently, as in Sabandal, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the
cases involved here show that the filing of the civil action was a mere
afterthought on the part of private respondent and interposed for delay.
And as correctly argued by petitioner, it is this scenario that Sec. 7 of Rule
111 of the Rules of Court seeks to prevent. Thus, private respondents
positions cannot be left to stand.
- Moreover, The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not Determinative
of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action
-Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract or
agreement to support the issuance of the check/s or that the checks were
issued for valuable consideration does not make up the elements of the
crime. Thus, this Court has held in a long line of cases that the agreement
surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the
prosecution for violation of BP 22. In Mejia v. People, we ruled:It must be
emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge is the
issuance of a bad check
2.
PIMENTEL V. PIMENTEL, G.R. NO. 172060, SEPTEMBER 13,

2010 TEVES
Joselito PIMENTEL v. Maria Chrysantine PIMENTEL and PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES
Topic: Prejudicial Question
ER: Maria filed a case for frustrated parricide against Joselito, dated
August 30, 2004, raffled on October 25, 2004 in the RTC QC.
Subsequently, she filed a case for annulment of marriage, dated
November 4, 2004, filed on November 5, 2004. Joselito received the
summons for annulment on February 7, 2005, THUS, on the 11th he filed a
motion to suspend proceedings in the RTC of QC, claiming that the filing of
the annulment case raised a prejudicial question against him. (annulment
was filed in Antipolo) RTC and CA would rule that there was no such
prejudicial question.
Was there a prejudicial question? NOPE. First, as provided by the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, one of the elements is that the civil case is filed before

Venue to Rule 113
the criminal case. This was not fulfilled, as the information for frustrated
Parricide was filed before the civil case for annulment of marriage.
Second, the issues of anulment are not intimately intertwined with that of
parricide, thus there is no prejudicial question to speak of. There is a
prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both
pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be
preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
The main issue in annulment is the existence of psychological
capacity such that he would be incapable of performing the
essential obligations of marriage, whilst the main issue in parricide is
whether or not the victim was killed by the accused.
COMPLETE
FACTS:
Maria Chrysantine Pimentel (Maria) filed a case for frustrated parricide
against Joselito Pimentel (Joselito), dated August 30, 2004 before the
RTC of Quezon City and raffled to Branch 223 on October 25, 2004.
Subsequently, she filed a case for annulment of marriage, dated
November 4, 2004, filed on November 5, 2004. Joselito received
summons for the annulment on February 7, 2005.
Thus, on February 11, 2005, Joselito filed an urgent motion to suspend the
proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of
a prejudicial question. He asserted that since the relationship between the
offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of the
Civil Case would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him
before the RTC Quezon City. The RTC dismissed the petition for lack of
merit, and on appeal to the CA, it was also denied.
ISSUE: Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a
prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for
frustrated parricide against petitioner.
HELD: Petition has no merit. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We
AFFIRM the 20 March 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 91867.
RATIO: The civil case must be instituted FIRST, before the criminal case. As
provided by the Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the elements for a prejudicial question are:
i. the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action;
and
ii. the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed. [emphasis supplied]
In this case, the first element was clearly lacking as Information for
frustrated Parricide was dated on August 30, 2004 and raffled to the RTC
Q.C. on October 25, 2004. Meanwhile, the civil action was dated on
November 4, 2004 and subsequently filed on November 5, 2004. It is clear
112
that the civil case was filed after the filing of the criminal case. Thus, the
requirement in Sec. 7, Rule 111 was not met.
Assuming arguendo that the civil case for annulment was filed before the
criminal case of parricide, the petition would still fail. A prejudicial question
when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists
in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the
criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the
civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of
the accused in the criminal case.
In parricide, the key element is the relationship between the offender and
the victim, punishing any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants,
or his spouse. However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not
similar or intimately related to the parricide case.
The issue in the civil
case for annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in
parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since
Joselito was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he
performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as
a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of
causes independent of petitioners will.
At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and
respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in
case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect
on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of
the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since
at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to
respondent.
3.
SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES

SEPTEMBER 18, 2013 TIU
V.
PEREZ,
G.R.
NO.192253,
ER: San Miguel Properties and BF Homes entered into contracts of sale
while the latter was under receivership and represented by Atty. Orendain.
BF Homes sold 130 residential lots to San Miguel, which sales were
embodied in 3 transactions. All the TCTs covered by the first 2 transactions
were duly delivered to San Miguel, but the TCTs falling under the 3 rd
transaction were withheld by BF Homes because Atty. Orendain allegedly
was no longer its receiver at the time of such transaction. For failure to
deliver the TCTs despite repeated demands, San Miguel filed complaintaffidavit with the Las Pias City Prosecutor for violation of PD 957. At the
same time, San Miguel filed an action for specific performance with the
HLURB. The Prosecutor dismissed the complaint because there existed a
prejudicial question, requiring the suspension of the criminal action until
the issue of BF Homes liability is first determined by the HLURB. San
Miguel brought the issue first to the DOJ and later to the CA, which all
affirmed the Prosecutor, leading to San Miguel filing the case with the SC.
Meanwhile, while the HLURB was inclined to dismiss the specific

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113
performance case before it, the Office of the President ordered it to rule
thereon. Can the HLURB case an administrative case be a
prejudicial question to the PD 957 case a criminal case? Yes. The
essential elements of a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7, Rule
111 of the Rules: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed. True, the concept of a prejudicial question
involves a civil action and a criminal case. But contrary to San Miguels
submission that there could be no prejudicial question to speak of because
no civil action where the prejudicial question arose was pending, the action
for specific performance in the HLURB raises a prejudicial question that
sufficed to suspend the proceedings determining the charge for the
criminal violation of Sec. 25 of PD 957. [IMPORTANT] This is true simply
because the action for specific performance was an action civil in nature
but could not be instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose
jurisdiction over the action was exclusive and original.
interference that could unduly hinder the rescue of the distressed

company; and (e) the lots involved were under custodia legis in view of the
pending receivership proceedings, necessarily stripping the OCP Las Pias
of the jurisdiction to proceed in the action.
- The SEC eventually terminated BF Homes receivership.
Facts: Petitioner San Miguel Properties Inc. (San Miguel) purchased from
B.F. Homes, Inc. (BF Homes), then represented by Atty. Florencio B.
Orendain (Orendain) as its duly authorized rehabilitation receiver, 130
residential lots situated in BF Homes Paraaque for about 106M. The
transactions were embodied in 3 separate deeds of sale. The TCTs covering
the lots bought under the 1 st and 2nd deeds were fully delivered to San
Miguel Properties, but the TCTs purchased under the 3 rd deed of sale were
not delivered to San Miguel.
- San Miguel appealed the resolutions of the OCP Las Pias to the DOJ, but
the DOJ Secretary denied the appeal, agreeing with the OCP Las Pias
because there is still pending complaint for specific performance where the
HLURB is called upon to inquire into, and rule on, the validity of the sales
transactions involving the lots in question and entered into by Atty.
Orendain for and in behalf of BF Homes.
- BF Homes claimed that it withheld the delivery of TCTs because Atty.

Orendain had ceased to be its rehabilitation receiver at the time of the
transactions after being replaced as receiver by FBO Network Management
pursuant to an order from the SEC. Essentially, BF Homes refused to
deliver the despite demands.
- Thus, San Miguel filed a complaint-affidavit in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Las Pias City (OCP Las Pias) charging the directors and
officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of titles in violation of Sec. 25, in
relation to Sec. 39, of PD 957.
- [NOTE] At the same time, San Miguel sued BF Homes for specific
performance in the HLURB, praying to compel BF Homes to release the
TCTs in its favor.
- In their joint counter-affidavit, the directors and officers of BF Homes
refuted San Miguels assertions by contending, among others that: xxx (c)
the claim should have been brought to the SEC because BF Homes was
under receivership; (d) in receivership cases, it was essential to suspend all
claims against a distressed corporation in order to enable the receiver to
effectively exercise its powers free from judicial and extra-judicial
- The OCP Las Pias rendered its Resolution, dismissing San Miguels
criminal complaint for violation of PD 957 on the ground (a) that no action
could be filed by or against a receiver without leave from the SEC that had
appointed him; (b) that the implementation of the provisions of PD 957
exclusively pertained under the jurisdiction of the HLURB; (c) that there
existed a prejudicial question necessitating the suspension of the
criminal action until after the issue on the liability of the
distressed BF Homes was first determined by the SEC en banc or
by the HLURB; and (d) that no prior resort to administrative jurisdiction
had been made; (e) that there appeared to be no probable cause to indict
respondents for not being the actual signatories in the three deeds of sale.
- Undaunted, San Miguel elevated the DOJs resolutions to the CA on

certiorari and mandamus, contending that the DOJ Secretary had acted
with GADALEJ. The CA affirmed the DOJ and held that while the general rule
is that the rule on prejudicial question applies to civil and criminal actions
only, an exception to such rule is provided in Quiambao vs. Osorio, where
an issue in an administrative case was considered a prejudicial question to
the resolution of a civil case which, consequently, warranted the
suspension of the latter until after termination of the administrative
proceedings.
- In the meantime, the HLURB Arbiter ruled that the HLURB was inclined to
suspend the proceedings until the SEC resolved the issue of Atty.
Orendains authority to enter into the transactions in BF Homes behalf.
The HLURB Board of Commissioners agreed with the same, citing the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
- San Miguel Properties appealed to the Office of the President
(OP), which reversed the HLURB Boards ruling and remanded the
case back to the HLURB.
Issue: Whether or not the HLURB administrative case brought to compel
the delivery of the TCTs could be a reason to suspend the proceedings on
the criminal complaint for the violation of Sec. 25 of PD 957 on the ground

Venue to Rule 113
of a prejudicial question? Yes. Action for specific performance, even if
pending in the HLURB, an administrative agency, raises a prejudicial
question BF Homes posture that the administrative case for specific
performance in the HLURB posed a prejudicial question that must first be
determined before the criminal case for violation of Sec. 25 of PD 957
could be resolved.
Held: A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in
a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
in the criminal case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal. It is determinative of the criminal case, but the jurisdiction to try
and resolve it is lodged in another court or tribunal. It is based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but is so intimately connected with
the crime that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. The
rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting
decisions.
- The essential elements of a prejudicial question are provided in
Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related
to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.
- The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a
criminal case. Yet, contrary to San Miguels submission that there
could be no prejudicial question to speak of because no civil action
where the prejudicial question arose was pending, the action for
specific performance in the HLURB raises a prejudicial question
that sufficed to suspend the proceedings determining the charge
for the criminal violation of Sec. 25 of PD 957. [IMPORTANT] This
is true simply because the action for specific performance was an
action civil in nature but could not be instituted elsewhere except
in the HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action was exclusive and
original.
- [IMPORTANT] A prejudicial question need not conclusively
resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused. It is enough for the
prejudicial question to simply test the sufficiency of the allegations
in the information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the
criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed
to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of
the crime have been adequately alleged in the information,
considering that the Prosecution has not yet presented a single
piece of evidence on the indictment or may not have rested its
case. A challenge to the allegations in the information on the
ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits
of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit.
- In this case, the determination of whether the proceedings ought to be
suspended because of a prejudicial question rested on whether the facts
114
and issues raised in the pleadings in the specific performance case were so
related with the issues raised in the criminal complaint for the violation of
PD 957, such that the resolution of the issues in the former would be
determinative of the question of guilt in the criminal case. An examination
of the nature of the two cases involved is thus necessary.
- An action for specific performance is the remedy to demand the
exact performance of a contract in the specific form in which it was
made, or according to the precise terms agreed upon by a party
bound to fulfill it. Evidently, before the remedy of specific
performance is availed of, there must first be a breach of the
contract. The remedy has its roots in Article 1191 of the Civil Code.
- Accordingly, the injured party may choose between specific
performance or rescission with damages. As presently worded,
Article 1191 speaks of the remedy of rescission in reciprocal
obligations within the context of Article 1124 of the former Civil
Code which used the term resolution. The remedy of resolution
applied only to reciprocal obligations, such that a partys breach of
the contract equated to a tacit resolutory condition that entitled
the injured party to rescission. The present article, as in the former
one, contemplates alternative remedies for the injured party who is
granted the option to pursue, as principal actions, either the
rescission or the specific performance of the obligation, with
payment of damages in either case.
- On the other hand, PD 957 is a law that regulates the sale of
subdivision lots and condominiums in view of the increasing
number of incidents wherein "real estate subdivision owners,
developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their
representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly"
the basic requirements and amenities, as well as of reports of
alarming magnitude of swindling and fraudulent manipulations
perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers
and operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles
free from liens and encumbrances.
- PD 957 authorizes the suspension and revocation of the
registration and license of the real estate subdivision owners,
developers, operators, and/or sellers in certain instances, as well
as provides the procedure to be observed in such instances; it
prescribes administrative fines and other penalties in case of
violation of, or non-compliance with its provisions.
- Conformably with the foregoing, the action for specific
performance in the HLURB would determine whether or not San
Miguel Properties was legally entitled to demand the delivery of the
remaining TCTs, while the criminal action would decide whether or
not BF Homes directors and officers were criminally liable for
withholding the TCTs. The resolution of the former must obviously
precede that of the latter, for should the HLURB hold San Miguel
Properties to be not entitled to the delivery of the TCTs because
Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to represent BF Homes in

Venue to Rule 113
the sale due to his receivership having been terminated by the
SEC, the basis for the criminal liability for the violation of Sec. 25 of
PD 957 would evaporate, thereby negating the need to proceed
with the criminal case.
ecercised discretion and showed that he analyzed before deciding. Lack of

notice and hearing: deprivation of right to due process.
Facts:
Community Rural Bank filed an estafa complaint against several

individuals (unnamed in the case) in the office of the prosecutor. 6
informations were filed after the preliminary investigation and 2 of
which were raffled to the respondent judge Talavera.
The judge issued a warrant of arrest with no bail after the appeal of
the finding of the Fiscal with the DOJ was denied, MR also denied.
Thereafter, the accused filed a Motion for Reinvestigation to Lift the
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest. However, the Bank nor tits counsel
was furnished a copy of the motion and there was also no hearing
on the motion.
Despite this, the judge still granted the Reinvestigation. (Patay ka

boy). The reinvestigation was conducted but again, the Bank was
not notified of the proceeedings.
The joint resolution of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Caballero

reversed the earlier findings of the Investigating Fiscal. On the
same day, a Motion to Dismiss was filed by Caballero.
Neither the bank now counsel was notified of the Motion and
neither was there a hearing. (At this point, hes just asking for it).
The motion to Dismiss was granted and the accused were released.
The Bank filed an MR with Opposition/Comment to the Motion to

Dismiss and Omnibus Motion for the Reinstatement of the Criminal
Information and for the Recall of Order for Release (Basically an MR
on all the things the Judge f-ed up.) arguing that it had been
deprived of due process. MR was denied. Hence, the administrative
case.
PA RT I I I
RULE 112- PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
1.
115
COMMUNITY RURAL BANK V. TALAVERA, 455 SCRA 34 VELASQUEZ
Community Rural Bank v. Talavera, 455 SCRA 34

Emergency Recit (Read the whole case na rin para suave recit, short lang
naman): Community filed and administrative case against Judge Talavera
(RTC 28, Cabanatuan). Community filed a complaint for estafa against
several accused (unnamed). The judge issued a warrant of arrest. The
accused filed a motion for reinvestigation with the judge (beforehand, they
already appealed the findings of the fiscal in the preliminary investigation).
There was no notice and there was no hearing. A reinvestigation was
granted and was conducted, again without notice. The Resolution
recommended dismissal. The Judge dismissed, again without notice and
hearing.
Issue: Did the judge commit gross ignorance of the law? Yes
Ratio: Dept. Order No. 223 states that A motion for reinvestigation may be
filed based on newly discovered evidence and must be filed before the DOJ
Secretary rules on an appeal from the resolution of the preliminary
investigation. In this case, nagrule na yung DOJ and wala ring newly
discovered evidence. The reinvestigation was filed 3 months after the
decision of the DOJ. The case also discussed that judges should be cautious
in granting reinvestigations because a preliniary investigation is not the
occasion for a full and exhaustive display of the parties evidence, which
needs to be presented only to engender a well-grounded belief that an
offense has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof. Regarding motion to dismiss: inadpot lang nung judge yung
resolution kahit sabi lang lack of absence tapos sa order ng judge to
dismiss sabi lang meritorious without discussing why. He should have
Issue: Did the judge commit gross ignorance of the law?

Held: GUILTY. Fined 20,000 and sternly warned that a repetition of the same
shall be dealt with more severely.
Ratio:

Venue to Rule 113
Judge should not have entertained the Motion for Reinvestigation.

The DOJ Secretary Cuevas already denied the appeal which
established the prima facie evidence against the accused.
o Dept. Order No. 223 (Rules Governing Appeals from
Resolutions
in
Preliminary
investigations
or
Reinvestigations): A motion for reinvestigation may be
filed based on newly discovered evidence and must be filed
before the DOJ Secretary rules on an appeal from the
resolution of the preliminary investigation
o In this case, the Motion for Reinvestigation was filed after
the DOJ had already denied the appeal. (In fact 3 months
after the denial)
o There was no newly found evidence.
The court should have exercised great restraint in granting the

reinvestigation
o Preliminary Investigation is prefatory and inquisitorial. It is
not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose
eexcept to determine whether a crime has been
committed, and whether there is probable cause to believe
that the accused is guilty of that crime. [26] A preliminary
investigation is not the occasion for a full and exhaustive
display of the parties evidence, which needs to be
presented only to engender a well-grounded belief that an
offense has been committed, and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof.[27]
It was wrong to grant the Motion to Dismiss:

o The Judge merely relied on the resolution of the Prosec
which merely recommended the dismissal of the case for
alleged insufficiency of evidence.
o The Judges order merely said: the MTD is meritorious and
granted, release the prisoners unless they are being
detained for some other lawful cause
o The order does not demonstrate and independent
evaluation or assessment of evidence. The dismissal as not
shown to be based upon the judges own individual
conviction that there was no viable case.
o Discretion should be exercised! This is because dismissing
the case is equivalent to a disposition of the case which is
clearly within the exclusive jurisdiction and competence of
the court.
We dont even need to talk about the lack of notice and hearing. Sobrang
lala lang nun. Elementary due process mandates that the other party be
notified of the adverse action of the opposing party
2.
116
SERAG V. COURT OF APPEALS, 473 SCRA 590 AQUINO
SEBASTIAN SERAG, LINO NAPAO, THOMIX SEGUMALIAN, JOSE OLIVER

SEGUMALIAN, RODOLFO TALANQUINES, ROQUE SANMILLAN, EDGAR STA.
CRUZ, ELEAZAR SAOL, NEMESIO PANUGOT, TEODORICO DELA CRUZ,
VICENTE DELA CRUZ, ABRAHAM DELA CRUZ and MARILYN SILFAVAN ,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MA. DAISY SIBYA, respondents.
Emergency Recit: Sibya was shot dead in front of his house. His driver
Salamat was wounded. The Provincial Prosecutor filed two Informations:
Murder and Attempted Murder. The Secretary of Justice downgraded the
charges from Murder to Homicide and Attempted Murder to Attempted
Homicide. The private complainant filed an MR. Meanwhile, the trial court
admitted the second amended information. The accused were arraigned.
Subsequently, the Secretary granted the private complainants MR and
ordered the Provincial Prosecutor to withdraw the second amended
information and to file, in lieu thereof, the separate Informations for Murder
and Attempted Murder, respectively. Issue: Whether the Secretary erred
when in acted on the MR despite knowing that the accused was already
arraigned based on the second amended information. The SC held that
under Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70, the Secretary of Justice may resolve
the said motion despite the arraignment of the petitioners:
SECTION 7. Action on the petition.The Secretary of Justice may
dismiss the petition outright if he finds the same to be patently
without merit or manifestly intended for delay, or when the issues
raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration. If an
information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed
resolution, the petition shall not be given due course if the accused
had already been arraigned. Any arraignment made after the filing
of the petition shall not bar the Secretary of Justice from exercising
his power of review.
Facts:
Atty. Jesus Sibya, Jr., a mayoralty candidate in San Joaquin, Iloilo

was shot to death in front of his residence. His driver, Norberto
Salamat III, was also wounded. The Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group in Iloilo City filed a criminal complaint for murder
and attempted murder against Lino Napao, then incumbent mayor
of San Joaquin, and Sebastian Serag.1
The Provincial Prosecutor filed two Informations (1) for Murder with
the Use of Unlicensed Firearms, and (2) Attempted Murder with the
Use of Unlicensed Firearms against Serag and Napao and seven
unidentified persons.2
Norberto Salamat III and Ma. Daisy Sibya, the widow of the
deceased, filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor a
Supplemental Complaint for murder, frustrated murder and
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866.

Venue to Rule 113
Accused Juan Napao and the 14 other additional accused filed on

August 16, 2002, a petition for review.
Pending the resolution by the Secretary of Justice of the said
petition for review, the proceedings were suspended.
Subsequently, however, the arraignment of the accused was set on
May 21, 2002. It was, thereafter, reset to June 6, 2002 which, by
agreement of the prosecution and the defense, was
intransferrable in character. It turned out that the day before
(May 20, 2002), the Secretary of Justice, in a Resolution, affirmed
the Joint Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor, downgrading the
charges from Murder to Homicide, and from Attempted Murder to
Attempted Homicide,
The Provincial Prosecutor filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second
Amended Information for homicide and attempted homicide in the
two cases, and for the court to admit the said second Amended
Informations. The private prosecutors opposed the motion and
moved for deferment, contending that the private complainant had
earlier filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution, and that
it would be premature for the Provincial Prosecutor to file a motion
for the admission of the Second Amended Information and for the
court to admit the same.
However, the RTC verbally granted the motion of the Provincial
Prosecutor, and admitted the Second Amended Information for
Homicide
RTC issued its Order granting the motion of the Provincial
Prosecutor for the admission of the Second Amended Information
for Homicide, and ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 926
without prejudice to its re-filing
the Information was re-filed in the MTC. Taking into account the
finding of the Secretary of Justice, the court held that the finding of
probable cause for murder against the accused did not bar it from
admitting the Second Amended Information for Homicide. Likewise,
the pendency of the private complainants motion for the
reconsideration of the May 20, 2002 Resolution of the Secretary of
Justice was not a valid reason for the deferment of the arraignment
of the accused for homicide.
The private complainant insisted that the admission by the RTC of
the Second Amended Information downgrading the crime charged
therein to Homicide and the arraignment of the accused therein on
June 6, 2002 were premature since the Secretary of Justice had not
yet resolved her motion for reconsideration of the May 20, 2002
Resolution.
the Secretary of Justice granted the MR of the private complainant,
setting aside Resolution No. 258. He further declared that he was
not proscribed from taking cognizance of and resolving the private
complainants MR notwithstanding the arraignment of the accused.
He directed the Provincial Prosecutor to withdraw the Second
117
Amended Information for Homicide and Attempted Homicide and to

file, in lieu thereof, separate Informations for Murder and
Attempted Murder, respectively, against the said accused.
Issues: (1)Whether the Secretary committed GADLEJ when it acted on the
MR and reversed his first Resolution. (2) Whether the Secretary erred when
in acted on the MR despite knowing that the accused was already
arraigned based on the second amended information.
Held: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit.
Ratio:
A motion is considered moot when it no longer presents a

justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become
academic or dead. Courts will not determine a moot question in
which no practical relief can be granted. However, the Court will
decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of
repetition, yet evading review.
The People of the Philippines was not estopped by the Prosecutors

insistence that the petitioners and the other accused be arraigned
on June 6, 2002 despite the pending petition for review of Juan
Napao, et al. and the motion for reconsideration of the private
respondent before the Secretary of Justice.
The fact of the matter is that during the hearing of June 6, 2002,
the Prosecutors moved for the deferment of the consideration of
the Provincial Prosecutors motion for the withdrawal of the Second
Amended Information for homicide because, in the meantime, the
private complainant had filed a motion for the reconsideration of
the Justice Secretarys Resolution. The latter cannot be stripped of
his authority to act on and resolve the motion of the private
complainant on the Prosecutors insistence that the accused be
arraigned on June 6, 2002.
Indeed, under Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70, the Secretary of

Justice may resolve the said motion despite the arraignment of the
petitioners:
SECTION 7. Action on the petition.The Secretary of Justice may

dismiss the petition outright if he finds the same to be patently
without merit or manifestly intended for delay, or when the issues
raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration. If an
information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed
resolution, the petition shall not be given due course if the accused
had already been arraigned. Any arraignment made after the filing
of the petition shall not bar the Secretary of Justice from exercising
his power of review.
3.
SORIANO V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO.162336, FEBRUARY 1, 2010 ARCEO
EMERGENCY DIGEST

Venue to Rule 113
The Office of Special Investigation (OSI) of BSP sent a letter to
Chief State Prosec. Zuo of DOJ. It attached 5 affidavits, which allegedly
served as bases for filing criminal charges for Estafa thru Falsification of
Commercial Documents and for Violation of RA 337 against Soriano. These
5 affidavits stated that Sps. Carlos appeared to have a loan of P8 million
with the RBSM, but had never applied for nor received such loan; that it
was Soriano, president of RBSM, who facilitated and received the loan; and
that it had never been authorized by the Board of Directors and no report
was submitted to the BSP. The OSI letter, which was not subscribed under
oath, requested that a preliminary investigation be conducted and criminal
charges be filed. Prosec. Fonacier conducted the preliminary investigation.
2 separate informations were filed against Soriano before the RTC. Soriano
moved to quash these informations on the ground that the court had no
jurisdiction over the offense. He alleged that the letter transmitted by BSP
to DOJ constituted the complaint and hence was defective for failure to
comply with the requirements of Sec. 3(a), Rule 112 of the RoC (address of
Soriano and oath and subscription).
Issue: WON the complaint complied with the requirements under
Sec. 3(a), Rule 112. Held: YES. Doctrine: We held in Soriano v. Casanova
that the letters transmitted by the BSP to the DOJ were not intended to be
the complaint, as envisioned under the Rules. They did not contain
averments of personal knowledge of the events and transactions
constitutive of any offense. The letters merely transmitted for preliminary
investigation the affidavits of people who had personal knowledge of the
acts of Soriano. We ruled that these affidavits, not the letters transmitting
them, initiated the preliminary investigation. Since these affidavits were
subscribed under oath by the witnesses who executed them before a
notary public, then there was substantial compliance with Sec. 3(a), Rule
FACTS:
The Office of Special Investigation (OSI) of BSP transmitted a letter
to Chief State Prosec. Zuo of the DOJ. It attached 5 affidavits, which would
allegedly serve as bases for filing criminal charges for Estafa thru
Falsification of Commercial Documents and for Violation of Sec. 83 of RA
337 against Soriano. These 5 affidavits, along with other documents,
stated that spouses Carlos appeared to have an outstanding loan of P8
million with the Rural Bank of San Miguel Bulacan (RBSM), but had never
applied for nor received such loan; that it was Soriano, president of RBSM,
who facilitated and received the loan; and that the P8 million loan had
never been authorized by RBSM's Board of Directors and no report thereof
had ever been submitted to the Department of Rural Banks, Supervision
and Examination Sector of the BSP. The letter of the OSI, which was not
subscribed under oath, requested that a preliminary investigation be
conducted and the corresponding criminal charges be filed against Soriano
at his last known address.
118
State Prosec. Fonacier proceeded with the preliminary

investigation. The investigating officer found probable cause and filed 2
separate informations against Soriano before the RTC of Malolos. The 1 st
Information was for estafa through falsification of commercial documents,
under Art. 315, par. 1(b), of the RPC. The 2 nd Information was for violation
of Sec. 83 of RA 337 (prohibition against DOSRI loans). It alleged that, as
Pres. of RBSM, Soriano indirectly secured an P8 million loan with RBSM, for
his personal benefit, without the written consent of the bank's Board of
Directors, without entering the transaction in the bank's records, and
without transmitting a copy of the transaction to the supervising
department of the bank.
Soriano moved to quash these informations on two grounds:
1.
2.
That the court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged; - (a)
the letter transmitted by BSP to DOJ constituted the
complaint and hence was defective for failure to comply
with the mandatory requirements of Sec. 3(a), Rule 112
(statement of address of petitioner and oath and
subscription); (b) the OSI officers were not authorized by the BSP
Gov. and Monetary Board to file the complaint.
That the facts charged do not constitute an offense. Estafa under
par. 1(b) of Art. 315 of the RPC is incompatible with the violation of
DOSRI law. If he acquired the loan as DOSRI, he owned the loaned
money and therefore, cannot misappropriate or convert it as in
estafa.
RTC denied the Motion to Quash. CA denied Sorianos petition for

certiorari. It held that the BSP letter was not a complaint, but a transmittal
letter only, which need not comply with Sec. 3(a) of Rule 112. It held that
the affidavits attached to the letter should be treated as the complaintaffidavits, which complied with the requirements set out in the RoC
subscribed and sworn to before a notary public and certified by State
Prosec. Fonacier, who personally examined the affiants and was convinced
that the affiants fully understood their sworn statements. Soriano went to
SC via Rule 65.
ISSUE: WON the complaint complied with the mandatory requirements
under Sec. 3(a), Rule 112 of the RoC and Sec. 18, (c),(d) of RA 7653. (YES).
*Note: Soriano moved to withdraw this issue from the petition due to the
promulgation of Soriano v. Casanova, which ruled on the validity of the
attached sworn affidavits. But, the SC still proceeded to rule on the same.
HELD: Petition is DENIED. Decision and Resolution of CA are AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
In Soriano v. Casanova, We held that the affidavits attached to the
BSP transmittal letter complied with the mandatory requirements under

Venue to Rule 113
the Rules of Court. To be sure, the BSP letters involved in Soriano v.
Casanova are not the same as the BSP letter involved in this case.
However, they are similar in the sense that they are all signed by the OSI
officers, they were not sworn to by the said officers, they all contained
summaries of their attached affidavits, and they all requested the conduct
of a preliminary investigation and the filing of criminal charges against
Soriano. Thus, the principle of stare decisis dictates that the ruling in
Soriano v. Casanova be applied in this case.
We held in Soriano v. Casanova that the letters transmitted by the
BSP to the DOJ were not intended to be the complaint. They did not contain
averments of personal knowledge of the events and transactions
constitutive of any offense. The letters merely transmitted for preliminary
investigation the affidavits of people who had personal knowledge of the
acts of Soriano. We ruled that these affidavits, not the letters transmitting
them, initiated the preliminary investigation. Since these affidavits were
subscribed under oath by the witnesses who executed them before a
notary public, then there was substantial compliance with Sec. 3(a), Rule
In Santos-Concio v. DOJ, instead of a transmittal letter from the
BSP, the Court was faced with an NBI-NCR Report with affidavits of
witnesses as attachments. Ruling on the validity of the witnesses sworn
affidavits as bases for a preliminary investigation, we held:
The Court is not unaware of the practice of incorporating all

allegations in a complaint-affidavit, but it does not pronounce
strict adherence to only one approach. The private offended party
or relative of the deceased may not even have witnessed the
fatality, in which case the peace officer or law enforcer has to rely
chiefly on affidavits of witnesses. The Rules do not preclude the
attachment of a referral or transmittal letter similar to that of the
NBI-NCR.
Thus, in Soriano v. Casanova, the Court held:
o ... The letters clearly stated that what the OSI of the BSP and
the LIS of the PDIC did was to respectfully transmit to the DOJ
for preliminary investigation the affidavits and personal
knowledge of the acts of the petitioner. These affidavits were
subscribed under oath by the witnesses who executed them
before a notary public. Since the affidavits, not the letters
transmitting them, were intended to initiate the preliminary
investigation, we hold that Sec. 3(a), Rule 112 of the RoC was
substantially complied with.
o A complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the
fiscal need not be filed by the offended party, unless the
offense subject thereof is one that cannot be prosecuted de
oficio.
119
A preliminary investigation can thus validly proceed on the basis of

an affidavit of any competent person, without the referral
document, like the NBI-NCR Report, having been sworn to by the
law enforcer as the nominal complainant. To require otherwise is a
needless exercise. The cited case of Oporto, Jr. v. Monserate does
not appear to dent this proposition. After all, what is required is to
reduce the evidence into affidavits, for while reports and even raw
information may justify the initiation of an investigation, the
preliminary investigation stage can be held only after sufficient
evidence has been gathered and evaluated.
Anent the contention that there was no authority from the BSP
Governor or the Monetary Board to file a criminal case against Soriano, we
held that the requirements of Sec. 18, par. (c) and (d) of RA 7653 did not
apply because the BSP did not institute the complaint but merely
transmitted the affidavits of the complainants to the DOJ. Since the
offenses for which Soriano was charged were public crimes, it can be
initiated by any competent person with personal knowledge of the acts
committed by the offender.
Thus, the witnesses who executed the
affidavits clearly fell within the purview of any competent person who
may institute the complaint for a public crime.
OTHER DOCTRINES:
1. The informations filed against Soriano do not negate each other. A loan
transaction under the DOSRI law (violation of Sec. 83 of RA 337) could be
the subject of Estafa under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the RPC.
The bank money which came to the possession of Soriano was

money held in trust by him for the bank, in his fiduciary capacity as
the President of said bank. It is not accurate to say that petitioner
became the owner of the P8 million because it was the proceeds of
a loan. The loan was supposed to be for Enrico Carlos. Thus,
Soriano remained the banks fiduciary with respect to that money,
which makes it capable of misappropriation or conversion in his
hands.
The next question is whether there can also be, at the same time, a
charge for DOSRI violation in such a situation wherein the accused
bank officer did not secure a loan in his own name, but was alleged
to have used the name of another person in order to indirectly
secure a loan from the bank. We answer this in the affirmative.
The prohibition in Section 83 is broad enough to cover various
modes of borrowing. It covers loans by a bank director or officer
(like herein petitioner) which are made either: (1) directly, (2)
indirectly, (3) for himself, (4) or as the representative or agent of
others. The foregoing information describes the manner of securing
the loan as indirect; names petitioner as the benefactor of the
indirect loan; and states that the requirements of the law were not

Venue to Rule 113
complied with. It contains all the required elements for a violation
of Section 83, even if petitioner did not secure the loan in his own
name.
2. A special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the
denial of a motion to quash. The proper procedure is for the accused to
enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special
defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and if after trial on the
merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner
authorized by law.
3. We find no compelling reason to grant the injunctive relief sought by

Soriano.
4.
SAMUEL LEE V. KBC BANK, G.R. NO. 164673, JANUARY 15, 2011
BASCARA
Samuel Lee v. KBC Bank, G.R. No. 164673, January 15, 2011
Quick Facts: Midas Corporation obtained two loans from KBC Bank. Both
were covered by a promissory notes and deeds of assignment which
transferred to KBC all of Midas rights to purchase orders issued by Otto
Versand, a German company. When Midas defaulted in paying the loans,
Otto Versand (via facsimile) disclaimed the purchase orders and said that it
never issued such orders. Lee and Lim were charged of Estafa. The State
Prosecutor found probable cause and so two informations for estafa were
filed against Lee and Lim. Lee and Lim filed a petition for review with the
DOJ challenging the State Prosecutors resolution saying that the findings
were only based on the facsimile message received from Otto Versand,
which constituted hearsay evidence. A motion to withdraw the cases for
Estafa was filed. This was initially granted but was subsequently set aside
by the CA.
Issue: Whether or not the admissibility of the facsimile message is a matter
best ventilated in a full blown trial and not in a preliminary investigation
YES
Ratio: Whether the facsimile message is admissible in evidence and
whether the element of deceit in the crime of estafa is present are matters
best ventilated in a full-blown trial, not in the preliminary
investigation. In Andres v. Justice Secretary Cuevas, the Court held that: [A
preliminary investigation] is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive
display of [the prosecutions] evidence. The presence or absence of
the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter
of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the
merits. In fine, the validity and merits of a partys defense or accusation,
as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better
ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation
level.
Facts
120
Midas Diversified Export Corporation (Midas) obtained a $1.4 M

loan from KBC Bank N.V. (KBC Bank), a Belgian company.
Samuel U. Lee (Lee), assistant treasurer and director of Midas,
executed a promissory note in favor of KBC Bank and a deed of
assignment transferring to KBC Bank all of Midass rights over a
purchase order issued by Otto Versand, a German company, which
covered a shipment of girls basic denim jeans amounting to $1.8
M.
Midas obtained another loan, amounting to $65K from KBC Bank.
Maybelle L. Lim (Lim), treasurer and assistant secretary of Midas,
executed a promissory note in favor of KBC Bank and a deed of
assignment transferring all of Midas rights over another purchase
order which
covered a shipment of boys bermuda jeans
amounting to $841K
Midas was considered in default in paying both loans.
When KBC Bank sent a letter to Otto Versand verifying the validity
of the purchase orders, Versand sent a facsimile message to KBC
Bank stating that it did not issue the purchase orders and that it
would not pay Midas any amount.
The manager of the corporate division of KBC Bank, Liza Pajarillo,
charged Lee and Lim of estafa.
In his Resolution, State Prosecutor Josefino A. Subia (State
Prosecutor Subia) found the existence of probable cause and
recommended that two counts of estafa be filed against Lee and
Lim.
Accordingly, two informations for estafa against Lee and Lim were
filed with the RTC.
After finding probable cause, Judge Winlove M. Dumayas (Judge
Dumayas) of the RTC issued warrants of arrest against Lee and Lim.
Lee and Lim filed a petition for review with the Department of
Justice.
o They challenged State Prosecutor Subias Resolution and
Order denying their motion for reconsideration and claimed
that the resolutions merely relied on hearsay evidence
which cannot be the basis for a finding of probable cause
In his Resolution, Secretary Hernando B. Perez (Secretary Perez)
directed the withdrawal of the informations filed against Lee and
Lim. Secretary Perez held that the facsimile message constituted
hearsay evidence and therefore inadmissible as evidence
KBC Bank filed a motion for reconsideration with the Department
of Justice.
Lee and Lim had not been arraigned. In a motion filed with the
RTC, Assistant City Prosecutor Nora C. Sibucao (Assistant City
Prosecutor Sibucao) prayed for the withdrawal of the informations
filed against Lee and Lim.
Judge Dumayas granted Assistant City Prosecutor Sibucaos motion
to withdraw the informations against Lee and Lim.

Venue to Rule 113
KBC Bank filed with the Court a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In a Resolution, the Court referred the petition to the Court of
Appeals pursuant to Section 6, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court
In its Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside Judge Dumayas
Order. It held that the trial judge practically concurred with the
findings of the Secretary of Justice, contrary to the well-reasoned
findings of the investigating prosecutor and emphasized that a
preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties evidence but for the presentation
of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that
an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof.
Issue: Whether or not the admissibility of the facsimile message is a matter

best ventilated in a full blown trial and not in a preliminary investigation
YES
Held: WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS DENIED. THE COURT AFFIRMS THE
10 FEBRUARY 2004 DECISION AND 27 JULY 2004 RESOLUTION OF THE
COURT
OF
APPEALS
IN
CA-G.R.
SP
NO.
78004. THE
CASE
IS REMANDED TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL
JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 58, MAKATI CITY FOR EVALUATION ON
WHETHER PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS TO HOLD THE ACCUSED FOR TRIAL.
Ratio:
Whether the facsimile message is admissible in evidence and

whether the element of deceit in the crime of estafa is present are
matters best ventilated in a full-blown trial, not in the preliminary
investigation.
In Andres v. Justice Secretary Cuevas, the Court held that:
o [A preliminary investigation] is not the occasion for the full
and
exhaustive
display
of
[the
prosecutions]
evidence. The presence or absence of the elements
of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter
of defense that may be passed upon after a fullblown trial on the merits.
o In fine, the validity and merits of a partys defense or
accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies
and evidence, are better ventilated during trial
proper than at the preliminary investigation level.
Bonus
Judge Dumayas failed to make his own evaluation in granting the

motion to withdraw the informations. Judge Dumayas Order states
in full:
o This Court, after an in-depth scrutiny of the arguments
raised by the prosecution and private complainant, finds
121
the contentions of the prosecution to be sufficient and

meritorious.
o Accordingly, the Motion to Withdraw Information filed by
the Prosecution is hereby granted and the two (2)
informations for the crime of Estafa penalized under par. 2
(a) of the Revised Penal Code are hereby withdrawn from
the docket of this court.
Once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it rests on the
sound discretion of the court. The trial court is not bound to adopt
the resolution of the Secretary of Justice, since it is mandated to
independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case. Reliance
on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice alone would be an
abdication of its duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima
facie case. The trial court may make an independent assessment
of the merits of the case based on the affidavits and counteraffidavits, documents, or evidence appended to the Information;
the records of the public prosecutor, which the court may order the
latter to produce before the court; or any evidence already
adduced before the court by the accused at the time the motion is
filed by the public prosecutor.
In the present case, Judge Dumayas did not positively state that
the evidence against Lee and Lim is insufficient (2) include a
discussion of the merits of the case (3) assess whether Secretary
Perezs conclution is supported by evidence (4) look at the basis of
Secretary Perezs recommendation (5) embody his assessment in
the order and (6) state his reasons for granting the motion to
withdraw in the informations.
Judge Dumayas failure to make his own evaluation of the merits of the
case violates KBC Banks right to due process and constitutes grave abuse
of discretion. Judge Dumayas order granting the motion to withdraw the
information is void.
5.
OKABE V. GUTIERREZ, MAY 27, 2004, G.R.NO. 150185 CHAN
Okabe v. Gutierrez
DOCTRINE - In determining the existence or non-existence of probable
cause for the arrest of the accused, the judge should not rely solely on the
report of the investigating prosecutor.
The judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the
complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of
witnesses or transcripts of stenographic notes, if any) upon which
to make his independent judgment or upon which to verify the
findings of the prosecutor.
ER
Cecilia Maruyama executed an affidavit-complaint and filed the same with
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay. It charged Lorna Tanghal and

Venue to Rule 113
petitioner Teresita Tanghal Okabe with Estafa. It was alleged that
Maruyama entrusted money to Teresita, who was engaged in the business
of door-to-door delivery from Japan to the Philippines. Teresita failed to
deliver the money and even denied having received it. After a while,
Teresita returned only US$1,000 through Lorna Tanghal.
After the preliminary investigation, the 2 nd Assistant City Prosecutor

Vibandor came out with a resolution finding probable cause. The resolution
and the Information were approved by the City Prosecutor so the
Information was filed in the RTC of Pasay. The only documents that were
submitted along with the Information were the affidavit-complaint of
Maruyama and the resolution of Vibandor. RTC issued a warrant for
Teresitas arrest.
Teresita filed a verified motion for judicial determination of probable cause

and to defer proceedings/arraignment alleging that the only documents
appended to the Information submitted were Maruyamas affidavitcomplaint and the resolution of the investigating prosecutor. However,
arraignment proceeded and Teresita refused to enter her plea. RTC entered
a plea of not guilty. There was a rule 65 petition to the CA and the CA
affirmed the RTCs finding of probable cause.
ISSUE Whether the resolution and the affidavit-complaint submitted were

sufficient. NO!!!
RATIO - In determining the existence or non-existence of probable cause for
the arrest of the accused, the judge should not rely solely on the report of
the investigating prosecutor. It is not required that the complete or entire
records of the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to
and examined by the judge. What is required, rather, is that the judge
must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint,
affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcripts
of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his independent
judgment or upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor.
FACTS
Cecilia Maruyama executed an affidavit-complaint and filed the
same with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City. The
affidavit- complaint charged Lorna Tanghal and petitioner Teresita
Tanghal Okabe with estafa.
Maruyama alleged that:
o She entrusted Y11,410,000 to Teresita, who was engaged
in the business of door-to-door delivery from Japan to
the Philippines.
o Teresita failed to deliver the money and, at first, denied
receiving the said amount. Teresita returned only US$1,000
through Lorna Tanghal
122
During the preliminary investigation, Maruyama submitted the

affidavit of her witnesses and other documentary evidence.
2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Vibandor came out with a resolution
finding probable cause for estafa. Attached to the resolution was
the Information and Maruyamas affidavit-complaint. The City
Prosecutor approved the resolution and the Information.
Information against the petitioner was filed in the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City.
o Appended to the Information were:
The affidavit-complaint of Maruyama
The resolution of Investigating Prosecutor

Vibandor
The trial court issued a warrant for the arrest of Teresita. The latter
posted a bond, which was duly approved by the Presiding Judge of
Branch 79 of the RTC of Quezon City. This approved bond was
transmitted to the RTC of Pasig.
The trial court issued an order setting the petitioners arraignment
and pre-trial. An ex part motion for the issuance of the hold
departure order was also filed by the private prosecutor. This was
granted by the court.
Teresita filed a verified motion for judicial determination of
probable cause and to defer proceedings/arraignment
alleging that the only documents appended to the
Information
submitted
were
Maruyamas
affidavitcomplaint and the resolution of the investigating
prosecutor.
o Teresita claims that the affidavits of the witnesses of the
complainant, the counter-affidavit, and the other evidence
adduced by the parties should have been attached.
o She claims that the documents submitted were not enough
on which the trial court could base a finding of probable
cause.
o Lim v. Felix and Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals states that
the following should be submitted to the trial court to
enable it to determine the presence or absence of probable
case
(a) copies of the affidavits of the witnesses of the

complainant;
(b) the counter-affidavit of Okabe and those of her

witnesses;
(c) the transcripts of stenographic notes taken

during the preliminary investigation; and
(d) other documents presented during the said

investigation.
Teresita filed a Very Urgent Motion to Lift/Recall Hold Departure
Order. The private prosecutor opposed Teresitas motions. The
hearing of the motions was reset.

Venue to Rule 113
-
Teresita filed a manifestation objecting to her arraignment prior to

the resolution of her pending motions. The arraignment was again
reset.
Teresita filed a motion for the postponement of her arraignment
alleging that, in case the trial court ruled adversely thereon, she
would refuse to enter a plea. This was denied by the court. The
court stated that the denial was due to its finding of probable
cause for the petitioners arrest and that Teresitas motion for a
determination of probable cause was made after the court had
already found probable cause and issued a warrant of arrest.
On the day of arraignment, Teresita refused to plead and left the
courtroom because of her counsels advice. The court entered a
plea of not guilty.
Rule 65 to CA with a plea for a writ of preliminary injunction
o CA partially granted the petition in that the assailed order
of the trial court denying Teresitas motion for
reconsideration was denied.
o However, the appellate court cited the ruling of this Court
in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan. Thus, the appellate
court affirmed the assailed order of the RTC, based
on the respondent judges personal examination of
respondent Maruyamas affidavit-complaint, the
resolution of the investigating prosecutor and the
Information approved by the city prosecutor, a
finding of probable cause was in order.
Teresita filed a motion for partial reconsideration contending that
the CA erred in applying the ruling of this court in Cojuangco, Jr. v.
CA instead of Section 26, Rule 114 or the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Teresita posited that the said rule had superseded the
ruling in the Cojuangco case.
o However, CA held that the rule cannot be applied
retroactively because petitioner posted bail before the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari to the SC
the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the

petitioner based on the complete records, as required under Section 8(a),
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
RATIO
-
ISSUE Whether the honorable court of appeals made a reversible error in

ruling that respondent court complied with the constitutional requirements
on the issuance of warrant of arrest without probable cause, when the
respondent court merely relied on [the] (i) complaint-affidavit of cecilia
maruyama; (ii) resolution of the investigating prosecutor; and (iii) criminal
information. YES!!!
HELD - IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
assailed Orders dated August 25 and 28, 2000 and the Warrant of Arrest
issued by the respondent judge in Criminal Case No. 00-0749 are SET
ASIDE. The records are REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City, Branch 119. The respondent judge is hereby DIRECTED to determine
123
Section 6, Rule 112

o Before the RTC judge issues a warrant of arrest, the judge
must make a personal determination of the existence or
non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the
accused.
The duty to make such determination is personal and exclusive to
the issuing judge.
Section 1, Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
o The investigating prosecutor, in conducting a preliminary
investigation of a case cognizable by the RTC, is tasked to
determine whether there is probable cause.
If the investigating prosecutor finds probable cause for the filing of
the Information against the respondent, he executes a certification
at the bottom of the Information that there is a reasonable ground
to believe that the offense charged has been committed and that
the accused is probably guilty thereof. Such certification of the
investigating prosecutor is, by itself, ineffective.
The task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with
the court is to determine the existence or non-existence of
probable cause for the arrest of the accused.
o Probable cause is meant such set of facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the
Information or any offense included therein has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested.
In determining the existence or non-existence of probable
cause for the arrest of the accused, the judge should not
rely solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor.
It is not required that the complete or entire records of the
case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to
and examined by the judge.
o What is required, rather, is that the judge must have
sufficient supporting documents (such as the
complaint,
affidavits,
counter-affidavits,
sworn
statements
of
witnesses
or
transcripts
of
stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his
independent judgment or upon which to verify the
findings of the prosecutor.
Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
o Information or complaint filed in court shall be supported
by the affidavits and counter-affidavits of the parties and
their witnesses, together with the other supporting
evidence of the resolution.

Venue to Rule 113
-
If the judge is able to determine the existence or non-existence of

probable cause on the basis of the records submitted by the
investigating prosecutor, there would no longer be a need to order
the elevation of the rest of the records of the case. However, if the
judge finds the records and/or evidence submitted by the
investigating prosecutor to be insufficient, he may order the
dismissal of the case. The judge may even call the complainant
and his witness to themselves answer the courts probing
questions to determine the existence of probable cause.
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
o Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or
information, the judge shall personally evaluate the
resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence.
o If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of
arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already
been arrested pursuant to a warrant.
o In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the
judge may order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue
must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from
the filing of the complaint of information.
In this case, only the resolution and the affidavit-complaint
were submitted. The affidavits of Lorna Tanghal and the
document signed by her covering the amount of US$1,000 are
important as they would enable the judge to properly determine
the existence of probable cause.
o First. When respondent Maruyama handed the money to
the petitioner, she did not require the latter to sign a
document acknowledging receipt of the amount.
The
petitioner avers that it is incredible that Maruyama would
entrust P3,993,500 in Japanese Yen to her without even
requiring her to sign a receipt.
o Second. The affidavit of Hermogena Santiago, a witness of
the respondent, is unreliable, because it is based on
information relayed to her by Lorna Tanghal.
o Third.
The affidavit of Marilette G. Izumiya, another
witness of the respondent, is also unreliable, as it was
based on information relayed to her by Thelma Barbiran.
o Fourth. There is no indication in the resolution of the
investigating prosecutor that the petitioner received the
fax message of Lorna Tanghal.
o Fifth. The private complainant claims that the petitioner
tried to reimburse the P3,993,500 by remitting US$1,000 to
her. However, the latter admitted in her affidavit-complaint
that the document evidencing the remittance was signed
by Lorna Tanghal, not by the petitioner.
o Sixth. In her counter-affidavit, the petitioner alleged that
respondent Maruyama had no case against her because
124
the crime charged in the latters affidavit-complaint was

the same as that filed against her in the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Bulacan, which was withdrawn by the complainant
herself.
Seventh.
The investigating prosecutor stated in his
resolution that the private complainant established the
element of deceit. However, the crime charged against the
petitioner as alleged in the Information is estafa with abuse
of confidence.
RULE 113- ARREST
1.
PEOPLE V. DE LEON , G.R. NO. 169858, JANUARY 26, 2010 PINERA
PEOPLE V DE LEON (2010)

DOCTRINE: A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways
and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the
lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In this jurisdiction, the
operation is legal and has been proved to be an effective method of
apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and
legal safeguards is undertaken.
EMERGENCY RECIT:
De Leon was convicted under the DDA in the RTC, for selling and
possession of shabu. He assails his conviction, claiming that the buy-bust
operation against him was against the law. He also claims that the chain of
custody was not established.
According to the prosecution, an informant told the police that de Leon was
selling Shabu. Thereafter, Police Senior Inspector Nilo Wong formed a team
for a buy-bust operation with PO2 Magcalayo as poseur-buyer and SPO3
Mario Concepcion, PO2 Fernando Salonga, PO2 Cesar Collado, PO2 Edmund
Paculdar, and PO1 Emeterio Mendoza as team members. Wong then
handed to PO2 Magcalayo 2 pieces of PhP 100 bills as buy-bust money and
on which PO2 Magcalayo wrote his initials "NM." The team proceeded to
Sarmiento St., Barangay Sta. Monica, Novaliches, Quezon City, where the
informant introduced PO2 Magcalayo to De Leon as a buyer of shabu. De
Leon handed him a plastic of shabu and in exchange, the operative handed
him P200 in marked bills. After the exchange, de Leon was arrested by
police officers.
The plastic of shabu was brought by the police officers to the police station
where one of the police officers placed his initials on the plastic. It was

Venue to Rule 113
subsequently turned over to a police investigator who sent it to the crime
lab. A forensic investigator conducted examinations on it and determined
that it was shabu
In his defense, de Leon claims that he was going around looking for a loan,
and was suddenly arrested by the police officers. De Leon claims that the
buy-bust operation was full of irregularities, hence his arrest was illegal. He
notes that the Pre-Operation Report was full of discrepancies and that the
Joint Sworn Affidavit of Apprehension of the policemen who arrested him
failed to mention that they placed their markings on the plastic sachets.
Issue: Was the buy-bust operation valid?- Yes, VALID
Such irregularities cannot overturn the finding of the presence in

this case of the elements of violation to the DDA. A buy-bust
operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are
resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the
lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In this
jurisdiction, the operation is legal and has been proved to be an
effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due
regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.
Here, the buy-bust operation conducted by the police officers, who

made use of entrapment to capture appellant in the act of selling a
dangerous drug, was valid and legal. Moreover, the defense has
failed to show any evidence of ill motive on the part of the police
officers. Even de Leon himself declared that it was the first time he
met the police officers during his cross-examination. There was,
therefore, no motive for the police officers to frame up de Leon.
Likewise, the identity of de Leon as the person who sold the

dangerous drugs to the policeman and the one in possession of the
shabu cannot be doubted anymore. Such positive identification
prevails over his defenses of denial and alibi.
OTHER Issue: Was the chain of custody rule followed?- YES
A close examination of the law reveals that it admits of certain exceptions.
Thus, contrary to the assertions of de Leon, Sec. 21 of the DDA need not be
followed as an exact science. Non-compliance with Sec. 21 does not render
an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
inadmissible. What is essential is "the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
In the instant case, there was substantial compliance with the law
and the integrity of the drugs seized from appellant was preserved. The
chain of custody of the drugs subject matter of the case was shown not to
have been broken. The factual milieu of the case reveals that after the
policeman seized and confiscated the dangerous drugs, as well as the
marked money, de Leon was immediately arrested and brought to the
police station for investigation, where the sachet of suspected shabu was
marked with the officers initials. Immediately thereafter, the confiscated
125
substance, with a letter of request for examination, was submitted to the

PNP Crime Lab for examination to determine the presence of any
dangerous drug. Per the report, the specimen submitted contained shabu,
a dangerous drug. The examination was conducted by a Forensic Chemical
Officer of the PNP Crime Lab, whose stipulated testimony clearly
established the chain of custody of the specimens he received. Thus, it is
without a doubt that there was an unbroken chain of custody of the illicit
drug purchased from de Leon.
FACTS:
2 informations were filed against De Leon for the possession of

Shabu, in violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002. the possession of Shabu. On Feb. 16, 2004, he
was
arraigned and pleaded "not guilty" to the charges against him.
After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued.
During the trial, the parties agreed to stipulate on the testimonies

of Engr. Leonard Jabonillo, the Forensic Chemist, and Police Officer
1 (PO1) Oliver Estrelles24, the police investigator of these cases.
The prosecution thereafter presented PO2 Noel Magcalayo as its
witness. The defense, on the other hand, presented Rodante De
Leon, the accused himself.
The Prosecutions Version of Facts

o a confidential informant arrived at the office of the Station
Anti-Illegal Drug Special Operation Task Force at the
Novaliches Police Station in QC and reported the illegal
activities of a person named Rodante De Leon. Thereafter,
Police Senior Inspector Nilo Wong formed a team for a buybust operation with PO2 Magcalayo as poseur-buyer and
SPO3 Mario Concepcion, PO2 Fernando Salonga, PO2 Cesar
Collado, PO2 Edmund Paculdar, and PO1 Emeterio Mendoza
as team members. Wong then handed to PO2 Magcalayo 2
pieces of PhP 100 bills as buy-bust money and on which
PO2 Magcalayo wrote his initials "NM."
o The team proceeded to Sarmiento St., Barangay Sta.
Monica, Novaliches, Quezon City, where the confidential
informant introduced PO2 Magcalayo to De Leon as a buyer
of shabu. PO2 Magcalayo asked De Leon if he had shabu
and the latter answered in the affirmative and asked him
how much he would buy. PO2 Magcalayo handed the
24
that he was the investigator of these cases and in connection with the investigation
conducted by him, he received the evidence, namely: the Joint Affidavit of Apprehension
executed by PO2 Noel Magcalayo and PO2 Cesar Collado marked as Exhibit "E" and "E-1"; that
likewise prepared the request for examination marked as Exhibit "A" and submitted the
specimen to the Crime Laboratory and received the Chemistry Report marked as Exhibit "C";
that he received the Pre-Operation Report marked as Exhibit "E" as well as the buy bust money
marked as Exhibits "F" and "F-1", that he prepared the letter request to the City Prosecutor
Office marked as Exhibit "G"; and that Exhibit "A" contains superimposition of the date thereof."
(Order dated September 14, 2004).

Venue to Rule 113
money and, in return, appellant handed him 1 plastic

sachet. He then scratched his head, which was the prearranged signal that the transaction was consummated,
and thereafter arrested appellant. He recovered the buybust money from appellant as PO2 Collado approached
them and handcuffed appellant. Upon frisking appellant,
PO2 Collado discovered another plastic sachet on the
person of appellant.
o De Leon was brought to the police station for investigation.
PO2 Collado then placed his initials on the sachet he found
on appellant. The evidence was subsequently turned over
to the police investigator, PO1 Estrelles, who prepared a
request for its laboratory examination.
o PO2 Collado, PO1 Mendoza, PO2 Paculdar, and PO2
Magcalayo then brought the transparent plastic sachets
containing the white crystalline substance subject of the
buy-bust operation to the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Crime Laboratory, Eastern Police District on St. Francis
Street, Mandaluyong City for examination. Engr. Jabonillo, a
Forensic Chemical Officer, conducted a qualitative
examination on the specimens, which yielded positive
results for Shabu
Version of the Defense
o De Leon testified that, prior to his arrest, he was a police
officer of Station 7, Araneta, Cubao, QCand had been
connected with the PNP for 10 years. He allegedly went to
Brgy. Sta Monica to look for a kumpadre from whom he
intended to borrow money when a policemen accosted him
and poked their guns at him. The policemen asked him to
sit down. He told SPO3 Concepcion, whom he knew, that he
was a police officer but he was told to shut up and to
explain his side at the police station instead.
o Upon arrival at the station, his wallet, with his I.D. and
police badge, were taken from him. PO2 Magcalayo told
him that he had a fake police I.D. When appellant tried to
explain himself, PO2 Magcalayo allegedly kicked him
saying, "Hindi na uso ang pulis, sundalo na ang nakaupo
ngayon."
The following night, he was presented on inquest during which he
was charged with violation of Secs. 5 and 11 of RA 9165. He denied
all the charges against him claiming that the alleged shabu came
from the arresting police officers. He did not file a case against
them, because he had no money and because he knew that he was
not guilty.
On cross-examination, appellant further testified that he was a
follow-up operative at the Station Investigation Division of Police
Station 7. He admitted that he was separated from the service
because he was absent without official leave due to a business
126
problem he had to attend to. He likewise said that he did not know
his arresting officers, whom he saw then for the first time, and that
he was not familiar with RA 9165.
RTC convicted the appellant. Ruling of the Trial Court. CA affirmed
the judgment of the trial court. Appellant filed a timely notice of
appeal of the decision of the CA.
HELD: CAs Decision finding appellant Rodante De Leon y Dela Rosa guilty
of the crimes charged is AFFIRMED.
1) Whether the lower court was able to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt
It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial court which are

factual in nature and which involve the credibility of witnesses are
accorded with respect, when no glaring errors, gross
misapprehension of facts, and speculative, arbitrary, and
unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The
reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide
the credibility of witnesses having heard their testimonies and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the
trial.
In the prosecution for the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs,

the Court has reiterated the essential elements in People v.
Pendatun, to wit:
(1) the accused sold and delivered a prohibited drug to
another; and
(2) he knew that what he had sold and delivered was a
prohibited drug.
o Therefore, what is material is the proof that the transaction
or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of evidence of the corpus delicti. Corpus delicti is the
body or substance of the crime, and establishes the fact
that a crime has actually been committed. It has two
elements, namely: (1) proof of the occurrence of a certain
event; and (2) some persons criminal responsibility for the
act.
In the instant case, the prosecution sufficiently established the

elements of the crime. Appellant sold and delivered the shabu for
PhP 200 to PO2 Magcalayo posing as buyer; the said drug was
seized and identified as a prohibited drug and subsequently
presented in evidence; there was actual exchange of the marked
money and contraband; and finally, appellant was fully aware that
he was selling and delivering a prohibited drug. De Leon was
positively identified as the seller and the source of the plastic
sachet which contained Shabu
2) Whether the chain of custody was clearly established- YES

Venue to Rule 113
It is elementary that, in every prosecution for the illegal sale of

prohibited drugs, the presentation of the drug as evidence in court
is material. It is, therefore, essential that the identity of the
prohibited drug be established beyond doubt. What is more, the
fact that the substance bought during the buy-bust operation is the
same substance offered in court should be established. The chain
of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures
that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence
are removed.
To ensure that the chain of custody is established, the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165 provide:
o SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated,
Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources
of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody
of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody
and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall
be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest
office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further, that non-compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over
said items
A close examination of the law reveals that it admits of certain
exceptions. Sec. 21 of the foregoing law need not be followed as an
exact science. Non-compliance with Sec. 21 does not render an
accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
inadmissible. What is essential is "the preservation of the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would
be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
127
accused."
In the instant case, there was substantial compliance with the law.
The chain of custody of the drugs subject matter of the case was
shown not to have been broken. It was proven that PO2 Magcalayo
seized and confiscated the dangerous drugs, as well as the marked
money, appellant was immediately arrested and brought to the
police station for investigation, where the sachet of suspected
shabu was marked with "NM." Immediately thereafter, the
confiscated substance, with a letter of request for examination,
was submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination to
determine the presence of any dangerous drug. The examination
was conducted by one Engr. Jabonillo 25 whose stipulated testimony
clearly established the chain of custody of the specimens he
received. Thus, it is without a doubt that there was an unbroken
chain of custody.
the prosecution was able to prove that appellant is guilty of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs with moral certainty. In the
prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following
elements must be proved with moral certainty:
(1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified
as a prohibited or regulatory drug
(2) that such possession is not authorized by law
(3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the
said drug
o Here, appellant was caught in actual possession of the
prohibited drugs without showing any proof that he was
duly authorized by law to possess them. Having been
caught in flagrante delicto, there is prima facie evidence of
animus possidendi on appellants part. As held by this
Court, the finding of a dangerous drug in the house or
within the premises of the house of the accused is prima
facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi and is
enough to convict in the absence of a satisfactory
explanation.
3) Whether the buy-bust operation was valid
Appellant further argues that the buy-bust operation was full of

irregularities, rendering it illegal.
The arguments are specious. Such irregularities cannot overturn

25
that he is a Forensic Chemist of the PNP, that his Office received the request for laboratory
examination marked as Annex "A"; that together with the said request was a plastic sachet
marked as Exh. "B" which contained 2 plastic sachets marked as Exhibits "B-1" and "B-2"; that
he conducted the requested laboratory examination and, in connection therewith he submitted a
Chemistry Report marked as Exhibit "C", the finding thereon showing the specimen positive for
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride(SHABU) was marked as Exhibit "C-1" and the signature of
said police officer was marked as Exhibit "C-2"; that he then issued a Certification marked as
Exhibits "D" and "D-1" and thereafter turned over the specimen to the evidence custodian x x x.
(Order dated September 14, 2004).

Venue to Rule 113
128
the finding of the presence in this case of the elements of

violations of Secs. 5 and 11, Art. II of RA 9165.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and

means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing
the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In this
jurisdiction, the operation is legal and has been proved to be an
effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due
regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken. 23
In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that the buy-bust
operation conducted by the police officers, who made use of
entrapment to capture appellant in the act of selling a dangerous
drug, was valid and legal. Moreover, the defense has failed to show
any evidence of ill motive on the part of the police officers. Even
appellant himself declared that it was the first time he met the
police officers during his cross-examination. There was, therefore,
no motive for the police officers to frame up appellant.
Likewise, the identity of appellant as the person who sold the

dangerous drugs to PO2 Magcalayo and the one in possession of
the shabu cannot be doubted anymore.
Absent any proof of motive to falsely accuse appellant of such a grave
offense, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
and the findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility of
witnesses shall prevail over appellants bare allegation.
SPO2 De Dios et. Al as the source of their shabu. Caught in the act, the two
were arrested. They did not disclose their source of shabu, but they
admitted working for Lawrence Wangs modeling agency. They also
disclosed that they knew of a scheduled delivery of shabu early the
following morning, and that their employer (Wang) could be found at the
Maria Orosa Apartment in Malate, Manila. The police operatives decided to
look for Wang to shed light on the illegal drug activities of Frank and Junio.
Under surveillance, Wang came out of the apartment and walked
towards a parked BMW car. On nearing the car, police officers approached
Wang, introduced themselves, asked his name and, upon hearing that he
was Lawrence Wang, immediately frisked him and asked him to open the
back compartment of the BMW car. When frisked, they found an unlicensed
pistol. At the same time, in his car were bags of shabu, P650,000.00 cash,
electronic and mechanical scales and an unlicensed handgun.
3 informations were filed against Wang(Violation of Dangerous
Drugs Act, Illegal Possession of Firearms and Violation of COMELEC Gun
Ban). Wang filed a Demurrer to Evidence, praying for his acquittal and the
dismissal of the three cases against him for lack of a valid arrest and
search warrants and the inadmissibility of the prosecutions evidence
against him. RTC Judge Laguio granted the demurrer.
2.
Held:
PEOPLE V. LAGUIO, MARCH 16, 2007, G.R. NO. 128587 PINERA
G.R. No. 128587

March 16, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LAGUIO
DOCTRINE:
It is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act

indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the
view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable
cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. Hence the
warrantless arrest was illegal.
Finding that the warrantless arrest preceded the warrantless search
in the case at bar, the trial court granted private respondent's
demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of all the three charges for
lack of evidence, because the unlawful arrest resulted in the
inadmissibility of the evidence gathered from an invalid
warrantless search. Ipso jure, the warrantless search incidental to
the illegal arrest is likewise unlawful. Therefore, the evidence
obtained was illegal.
EMERGENCY DIGEST:
Facts: Police operatives sent an entrapment to catch Redentor Teck (alias
Frank) and Joseph Junio selling drugs. They were previously identified by
Issue: Whether there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police
operatives in this case despite the absence of a warrant of arrest and/or a
search warrant.
Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court, a peace

officer may arrest a person without a warrant under these grounds:
(a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect
where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there
is probable cause that said suspect was the author of a crime
which had just been committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who has
escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending.
For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto
under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to be valid, two requisites must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
o The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case
did not manifest any suspicious behavior on the part of
private respondent Lawrence Wang that would reasonably
invite the attention of the police. He was merely walking
from his apartment and was about to enter the parked
BMW car when the police operatives arrested him, frisked
and searched his person and commanded him to open the

Venue to Rule 113
compartment of the car, which was later on found to be

owned by his friend, David Lee. He was not committing any
visible offense then. Therefore, there can be no valid
warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a)
of Section 5. It is settled that "reliable information" alone,
absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in
the presence and within the view of the arresting officers,
is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would
justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.
Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under paragraph (b)
of Section 5. What is clearly established from the testimonies of the
arresting officers is that Wang was arrested mainly on the
information that he was the employer of Frank and Junio who were
previously arrested and charged for illegal transport of shabu.
Frank and Junio did not even categorically identify Wang to be their
source of the shabu they were caught with in flagrante delicto.
Upon the duos declaration that there will be a delivery of shabu on
the early morning of the following day, which is only a few hours
thereafter, and that Wang may be found in Maria Orosa Apartment
along Maria Orosa Street, the arresting officers conducted
"surveillance" operation in front of said apartment, hoping to find a
person which will match the description of one Lawrence Wang.
These circumstances do not sufficiently establish the existence of
probable cause based on personal knowledge as required in
paragraph (b) of Section 5.
The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court, is
that the warrantless arrest was illegal. Ipso jure, the warrantless
search incidental to the illegal arrest is likewise unlawful.
The Peoples contention that Wang waived his right against
unreasonable search and seizure has no factual basis. While we
agree in principle that consent will validate an otherwise illegal
search, however, based on the evidence on record, Wang resisted
his arrest and the search on his person and belongings. Moreover,
during arraignment, he continued to object to the validity of the
warrantless arrest and search.
Double Jeopardy Issue: An order granting an accuseds demurrer to

evidence is a resolution of the case on the merits, and it amounts to an
acquittal. Generally, any further prosecution of the accused after an
acquittal would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. It
may not be appeal under Rule 45 but one can file a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 based on GADALEJ
FACTS:
On 16 May 1996, at about 7pm, police operatives of the Public

Assistance and Reaction Against Crime of the DILG, namely,
Captain Margallo, Police Inspector Cielito Coronel and SPO3
129
Reynaldo Cristobal , arrested SPO2 Vergel de Dios, Rogelio Anoble

and a certain Arellano, for unlawful possession of shabu. During the
investigation, the 3 identified Redentor Frank Teck and Joseph
Junio as the source and then, they planned an entrapment
operation.
At around 11pm that same date, Teck and Junio were arrested while
they were about to hand over another bag of shabu to De Dios et
al. They informed the police operatives that they were working as
talent manager and gymnast instructor of Glamour Modeling
Agency owned by Lawrence Wang. Teck and Junio did not disclose
their source but admitted that
o they were working for Wang
o they knew of a scheduled delivery of shabu on May 17,
1996
o Wang could be found at the Maria Orosa Apartment in
Malate, Manila.
The police operatives decided to look for Wang. Coronel testified
that at about 2:10am of May 1, 1996, Wang came out of the
apartment. Wang was walking towards a BMW car when the 3
police operatives introduced themselves and immediately frisked
him upon hearing that he was Lawrence Wang. They found an
unlicensed gun, which they confiscated, inside the front right
pocket.
They asked him to open the back compartment of the BMW car and
found the ff:
(a) 32 transparent plastic bags of Shabu with a total weight
of 29.2941 kilograms
(b) cash in the amount of P650,000.00
(c) one electronic and one mechanical scales
(d) an unlicensed Daewoo 9mm Pistol with magazine.
Then and there, Wang resisted the warrantless arrest and search.
There were 3 separate informations filed against Lawrence Wang in
the RTC of Manila:
o Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act (Criminal Case No. 96149990)- possession of shabu, contained in 32 transparent
plastic bags, approximately 29.3 kgs
o Illegal Possession of Firearms (Criminal Case No. 96149991)- possessed 1) DAEWOO Cal. 9mm, automatic
pistol with one loaded magazine and one AMT Cal. .380
9mm automatic backup pistol with magazine loaded with
ammunitions
o Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban (Criminal Case No. 96149992)- was carrying the weapon along Maria Orosa St.,
Ermita, Manila
During his arraignment, accused Wang refused to enter a plea to
all the Informations and instead interposed a continuing objection
to the admissibility of the evidence obtained by the police

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operatives. So the court entered a not-guilty plea for Wang. Then, a

joint trial of the 3 consolidated cases followed.
On 6 Dec 1996, the prosecution rested its case and upon motion,
accused Wang was granted 25 days from said date within which to
file his intended Demurrer to Evidence.
On 19 December 1996, the prosecution filed a Manifestation to the
effect that it had rested its case only in so far as the charge for
Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act is concerned and not as
regards the other two cases. Accordingly, trial continued.
On 9 Jan 1997, Wang filed his undated Demurrer to Evidence,
praying for his acquittal and the dismissal of the 3 cases against
him for lack of a valid arrest and search warrants and the
inadmissibility of the prosecutions evidence against him. Although
the prosecution has not yet filed its opposition, Wang filed an
Amplification to his Demurrer on 20 Jan 1997.
On 12 Feb 1997, the prosecution filed its Opposition alleging that
the warrantless search was legal as an incident to the lawful arrest
On 13 Mar 1997, the Hon. Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr., granted Wangs
Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of all charges for lack of
evidence.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 by the
People.
ISSUES: [Go to ISSUE No. 2]

1) Whether the prosecution may appeal the trial courts resolution granting
Wangs demurrer to evidence and acquitting him of all the charges against
him without violating the constitutional proscription against double
jeopardy (NOT SO RELEVANT)- may not appeal under Rule 45 but shouldve
filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 based on GADALEJ.
Although Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure

states that any party may appeal, the right of the People to appeal
is expressly made subject to the prohibition against putting the
accused in double jeopardy. It also basic that appeal in criminal
cases throws the whole records of the case wide open for review by
the appellate court, that is why any appeal from a judgment of
acquittal necessarily puts the accused in double jeopardy.
General Rule: An order granting an accuseds demurrer to
evidence is a resolution of the case on the merits, and it amounts
to an acquittal. Generally, any further prosecution of the accused
after an acquittal would violate the constitutional proscription on
double jeopardy.
1st Exception: Galman v. Sandiganbayan presents one exception.
It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked
against this Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of
dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which represents the
130
sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process.

o Galman Case: Basically, the Court was constrained to
declare the sham trial a mock trial and that the
predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void
ab initio. Jurisdiction over cases should be determined by
law, and not by preselection of the Executive. (Based on
my understanding: the Presiding Justice received orders
from the President to transfer the case-obviously to get a
favorable decision- to the Sandiganbayan instead of the
Court Martial who then had exclusive jurisdiction over
criminal offenses committed by military men.
o People vs. Bocar: Where the prosecution is deprived of a
fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to
due process is thereby violated.
o The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of
basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their
jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due
process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot
be glossed over or disregarded at will.
o Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment,
(b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a
valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused
The lower court was not competent as it was

ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right
of the prosecution to due process. Hence, the first
jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of
the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial
before the lower courts amounts merely to a
continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not
expose the accused to a second jeopardy.
2nd Exception: Another exception is when the trial court commits
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing a criminal case by granting
the accuseds demurrer to evidence. In People v. Uy, it was held
that the fundamental philosophy behind the constitutional
proscription against double jeopardy is to afford the defendant,
who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard him from
government oppression through the abuse of criminal processes.
By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case
may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court upon a clear showing by the petitioner that the
lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely
reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due
process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. Such dismissal
order, being considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy.
o The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the

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sound discretion of the trial court and its ruling on the

matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave
abuse of discretion. This constitutes an exception to the
rule that the dismissal of a criminal case made with the
express consent of the accused or upon his own motion
bars a plea of double jeopardy.
The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the
trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied
the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham.
However, while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous
acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must
clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its
authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to
dispense justice.
However, in this case, People of the Philippines, through the Sec. of
Justice and SolGen, filed an appeal via a petition for Review under
Rule 45 and NOT a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
o The special civil action of certiorari and appeal are two
different remedies mutually exclusive; they are neither
alternative nor successive. Where appeal is available,
certiorari will not prosper. In the dismissal of a criminal
case upon demurrer to evidence, appeal is not available as
such an appeal will put the accused in double jeopardy.
Certiorari, however, is allowed.
o For being the wrong remedy taken by petitioner People of
the Philippines in this case, this petition is dismissible. Even
assuming that the Court may treat an "appeal" as a special
civil action of certiorari, the instant petition will
nevertheless fail on the merits.
2) Whether there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police
operatives in this case despite the absence of a warrant of arrest and/or a
search warrant. (RELEVANT)
There are actually 2 acts involved in this case: the warrantless

arrest and the warrantless search. There is no question that
warrantless search may be conducted as an incident to a valid
warrantless arrest. The law requires that there be first a lawful
arrest before a search can be made; the process cannot be
reversed. However, if there are valid reasons to conduct lawful
search and seizure which thereafter shows that the accused is
currently committing a crime, the accused may be lawfully arrested
in flagrante delicto without need for a warrant of arrest.
Finding that the warrantless arrest preceded the warrantless search
in the case at bar, the trial court granted private respondent's
demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of all the three charges for
lack of evidence, because the unlawful arrest resulted in the
131
inadmissibility of the evidence gathered from an invalid

warrantless search. Ipso jure, the warrantless search incidental to
the illegal arrest is likewise unlawful.
Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court, a peace
officer may arrest a person without a warrant: (a) when in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an
offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it, and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
o
None of these circumstances were present when the
accused was arrested. The accused was merely walking
from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was about to enter
the parked BMW car when the police officers arrested and
frisked him and searched his car.
a. For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in
flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to be
valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer. The accused was not committing any visible
offense at the time of his arrest that would reasonably
invite the attention of the police. The arresting officers
had no information and knowledge that the accused
was carrying an unlicensed handgun, nor did they see
him in possession thereof immediately prior to his
arrest
It is settled that "reliable information" alone,
absent any overt act indicative of a felonious
enterprise in the presence and within the view
of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to
constitute probable cause that would justify
an in flagrante delicto arrest.
b. Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under
paragraph (b) of Section 5. What is clearly established
from the testimonies of the arresting officers is that
Wang was arrested mainly on the information that he
was the employer of Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio
who were previously arrested and charged for illegal
transport of shabu. Teck and Junio did not even
categorically identify Wang as their source. These
circumstances do not sufficiently establish the
existence of probable cause based on personal

Venue to Rule 113
3.
knowledge as required in paragraph (b) of Section 5.

The police officers had no information, or
knowledge that the banned articles were
inside the car, or that the accused had placed
them there. The police officers searched the
car on mere suspicion that there was shabu
therein. They arrested him because of the
information relayed to them by one of those
whom they have previously apprehended in
connection with the delivery of shabu
somewhere also in Ermita, Manila.
Contrary to its position at the trial court, the People, however, now
posits that the warrantless search preceded the warrantless arrest
and that the warrantless arrest of the accused must necessarily
have to be regarded as having been made on the occasion of the
commission of the crime in flagrante delicto, and therefore
constitutionally and statutorily permissible and lawful.
o The conflicting versions as to whether the arrest preceded
the search or vice versa, is a matter of credibility of
evidence. It entails appreciation of evidence, which may be
done in an appeal of a criminal case because the entire
case is thrown open for review, but not in the case of a
petition for certiorari where the factual findings of the trial
court are binding upon the Court. Since a dismissal order
consequent to a demurrer to evidence is not subject to
appeal and reviewable only by certiorari, the factual finding
that the arrest preceded the search is conclusive upon this
Court.
o The only legal basis for this Court to possibly reverse and
set aside the dismissal order of the trial court upon
demurrer to evidence would be if the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion in excess of jurisdiction when it
ruled that there was no legal basis to lawfully effect a
warrantless arrest.
The Peoples contention that Wang waived his right against
unreasonable search and seizure has no factual basis. Based on
the evidence on record, Wang resisted his arrest and the search on
his person and belongings. The implied acquiescence to the search,
if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and
is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee. Moreover, the continuing objection to the
validity of the warrantless arrest made of record during the
arraignment bolsters Wangs claim that he resisted the warrantless
arrest and search.
VALDEZ V. PEOPLE, G.R.170180, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 DEVESA
132
Doctrine: For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court
has ruled that two (2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
ER: Bautista and 2 other barangay tanods were patrolling along the
National Highway in La Union when Valdez alighted from a mini-bus. The
tanods observed that Valdez was looking around after getting off the bus
so they approached him. Valdez was arrested and brought to the barangay
captains house wherein his bag was opened and marijuana leaves were
found therein.
Were the warrantless arrest and subsequent search valid? NO. (Therefore,
the marijuana leaves were inadmissible against Valdez. Invalid warrantless
arrest -> invalid warrantless search and seizure -> inadmissible in
evidence)
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides the only
occasions on which a person may be arrested without a warrant, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a)
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b)
When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c)
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
Valdez was not committing an offense at the time he alighted from the bus,
nor did he appear to be then committing an offense. The tanod did not
have probable cause either to justify petitioners warrantless arrest.
For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled
that two (2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
Complete Digest:
Facts: Bautista testified that while he and 2 other tanods were patroling
along the National Highway in Aringay, La Union, they noticed petitioner
Valdez, lugging a bag, alight from a mini-bus. The tanods observed that
petitioner, who appeared suspicious to them, seemed to be looking for
something. They thus approached him but the latter purportedly
attempted to run away. They chased him, put him under arrest and
thereafter brought him to the house of Barangay Captain Orencio Mercado

Venue to Rule 113
(Mercado) where he, as averred by Bautista, was ordered by Mercado to
open his bag. Petitioners bag allegedly contained a pair of denim pants,
eighteen pieces of eggplant and dried marijuana leaves wrapped in
newspaper and cellophane. It was then that petitioner was taken to the
police station for further investigation.
On the other hand, Valdez testified that after alighting from the bus, he
went to the house of a friend to drink water and then proceeded to walk to
his brothers house. As he was walking, Ordoo (tanod) approached him
and asked where he was going. Petitioner replied that he was going to his
brothers house. Ordoo then purportedly requested to see the contents of
his bag and appellant acceded. It was at this point that Bautista and Aratas
joined them. After inspecting all the contents of his bag, petitioner testified
that he was restrained by the tanod and taken to the house of Mercado. It
was Aratas who carried the bag until they reached their destination.
The RTC found Valdez guilty for violating the Dangerous Drugs Act. CA
affirmed.
Issue: 1) W/N the warrantless arrest and search were valid (to determine
the admissibility of the confiscated marijuana)
Held: NO.
At the outset, we observe that nowhere in the records can we find any
objection by petitioner to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the
case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to
the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest.
The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his
person. Petitioners warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the
basis of his acquittal.
However, to determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it
is indispensable to ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the
alleged contraband was lawful. The search, conducted as it was without a
warrant, is justified only if it were incidental to a lawful arrest. Evaluating
the evidence on record in its totality, as earlier intimated, the reasonable
conclusion is that the arrest of petitioner without a warrant is not lawful as
well.
Petitioner maintains, in a nutshell, that after he was approached by
the tanod and asked to show the contents of his bag, he was simply herded
without explanation and taken to the house of the barangay captain. On
their way there, it was Aratas who carried his bag. He denies ownership
over the contraband allegedly found in his bag and asserts that he saw it
for the first time at thebarangay captains house.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides
the only occasions on which a person may be arrested without a
warrant, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or
a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a)
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
133
(b)
When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c)
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
It is obvious that based on the testimonies of the arresting barangay tanod,
not one of these circumstances was obtaining at the time petitioner was
arrested. By their own admission, petitioner was not committing an
offense at the time he alighted from the bus, nor did he appear to
be then committing an offense. The tanod did not have probable
cause either to justify petitioners warrantless arrest.
For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court
has ruled that two (2) elements must be present: (1) the person to
be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer. Here, petitioners act of looking around
after getting off the bus was but natural as he was finding his way to his
destination. That he purportedly attempted to run away as
the tanod approached him is irrelevant and cannot by itself be construed
as adequate to charge the tanodwith personal knowledge that petitioner
had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to engage
in criminal activity. More importantly, petitioner testified that he did not run
away but in fact spoke with the barangay tanod when they approached
him.
4.
ROLITO GO V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R.NO.101837, FEBRUARY 11,

1992 - DEVESA
Rolito Go v. Court of Appeals

ER: Go was travelling in the wrong direction in a one way street (Wilson St.)
when he almost collided with Maguans vehicle. Go alighted from his car,
walked over to Maguan and shot him. He quicly boarded his car and left
the scene thereafter. An eyewitness of the incident was able to take down
Gos plate number and reported the same to the police, who subsequently
ordered a manhunt for petitioner. 6 days after the shooting, Go went to the
police station, accompanied by 2 lawyers to verify news reports that he
was being hunted by the police. The police detained him. Subsequently a
criminal charge was brought against him.
Was there a valid warrantless arrest? NO. There was no valid warrantless
arrest.

Venue to Rule 113
Go's warrantless "arrest" or detention does not fall within the terms of
Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which provides that "A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be created has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending or has escaped while being
Go's "arrest" took place 6 days after the shooting of Maguan. The
"arresting" officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of
Section 5(a), at the time Go had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the
"arrest" effected 6 days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as
effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed" within the
meaning of Section 5 (b). Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had
any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that Go was the gunman who
had shot Maguan.
Complete Digest:
Facts: On 2 July 1991, Eldon Maguan was driving his car along Wilson St.
(ONE WAY), San Juan, Metro Manila, heading towards P. Guevarra St. Rolito
Go entered Wilson St. and started traveling in the wrong direction. At the
corner of Wilson and J. Abad Santos Sts., Go's and Maguan's cars nearly
bumped each other. Go alighted from his car, walked over and shot
Maguan inside his car. Go then boarded his car and left the scene. A
security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take down Go's car plate
number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting
and there retrieved an empty shell and one round of live ammunition for a
9mm caliber pistol.
The following day, the security guard of the bake shop was shown
a picture of Go and he positively identified him as the same person who
had shot Maguan.
Having established that the assailant was probably Go, the police
launched a manhunt for Go. On 8 July 1991, Go presented himself before
the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted
by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith
detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station
134
at that time, positively identified Go as the gunman. That same day, the
police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated homicide against Go with
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. First Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio ("Prosecutor") informed Go, in the presence
of his lawyers that he could avail himself of his right to preliminary
investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of the provisions of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code. Go refused to execute any such waiver.
On 9 July 1991, while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor,
and before an information could be filed in court, the victim, Eldon Maguan,
died of his gunshot wound(s). Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor,
instead of filing an information for frustrated homicide, filed an information
for murder before the Regional Trial Court. No bail was recommended. At
the bottom of the information, the Prosecutor certified that no preliminary
investigation had been conducted because the accused did not execute
and sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code. In the afternoon of 11 July 1991, Go's counsel filed with the
prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and proper
preliminary investigation, alleging that the warrantless arrest of Go was
unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had been conducted before
the information was filed.
Issue: W/N Go was arrested legally without warrant for the killing of
Maguan, and is thus not entitled to be released pending the conduct of a
Held: No, there was no valid warrantless arrest.
Go's warrantless "arrest" or detention does not fall within the terms of
Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules ofCourt which provides that
"A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be created has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending or has escaped while being
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest
police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with
Rule 112, Section 7."
Go's "arrest" took place 6 days after the shooting of
Maguan. The "arresting" officers obviously were not present,
within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time Go had allegedly
shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected 6 days after the
shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting

Venue to Rule 113
had] in fact just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5
(b). The reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor General upon Umil
v. Ramos is, in the circumstances of this case, misplaced. In Umil v. Ramos,
by an eight-to-six vote, the Court sustained the legality of the warrantless
arrests of petitioners made from 1 to 14 days after the actual commission
of the offenses, upon the ground that such offenses constituted "continuing
crimes." Those offenses were subversion, membership in an outlawed
organization like the New People's Army, etc. In the instant case, the
offense for which petitioner was arrested was murder, an offense which
was obviously commenced and completed at one definite location in time
and space. No one had pretended that the fatal shooting of Maguan was a
"continuing crime."
Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal
knowledge" of facts indicating that Go was the gunman who had
shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been
derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting -one stated that Go was the gunman another was able to take down the
alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in
Go's wife's name. That information did not, however, constitute
"personal knowledge." It is thus clear to the Court that there was
no lawful warrantless arrest of Go within the meaning of Section 5
of Rule 113.
It is clear too that Section 7 of Rule 112 is also not applicable.
Indeed, Go was not arrested at all. When he walked into the San Juan Police
Station, accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the
disposal of the police authorities. He did not state that he was
surrendering. When the police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide
with the Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately scheduled a
preliminary investigation to determine whether there was probable cause
for charging Go in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan.
Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceeded under the erroneous
supposition that Section 7 of Rule 112 was applicable and required Go to
waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition
for carrying out a preliminary investigation. This was substantive error, for
Go was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right should have
been accorded him without any conditions. Moreover, since Go had not
been arrested; with or without a warrant, he was also entitled to be
released forthwith subject only to his appearing at the preliminary
investigation.
"surrendering" himself, in all probability to avoid the
implication he was admitting that he had slain Eldon Maguan or that he
was otherwise guilty of a crime.
135

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08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador.

Section 4, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.............................17

G.Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan......................................................17

J.Review of Decisions of the Ombudsman..............................................37

1. Department of Justice v. Liwag, February 11, 2005, G.R. No.

d.Filing of Information if there is pending Motion for Reconsideration 68

08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro:

B.Civil Aspect of a Criminal Case (Rule 111)..........................................80

The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases,

08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro:

Petitioner Manuel Isip (MANUEL) was charged with estafa (ESTAFA

HOWEVER, according to MANUEL, the transactions took place

MANUEL appealed his conviction, arguing that RTC Cavite has no

The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil

It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by

Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is

Here, MANUEL failed to establish by sufficient and competent

The information alleged that he received from a certain Leonardo

MANUEL however, once in possession of the above-described

08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro:

The checks issued in payment for assorted pieces of jewelry

Here, the information alleged that the spouses, in conspiracy,

The checks used by the SPOUSES to pay the jewelry were

The SPOUSES pleaded NOT guilty.

The Prosecution3 as well as the defense 4 presented their

RTC of Cavite rendered judgment that MARIETTA is guilty if B.P. 22

The RTC found that the transactions involved in these cases

The defense failed to substantially prove its allegations that

MARIETTA already passed away so the CA dismissed the case

MANUELs conviction was affirmed.

First, he states that the residence of the parties is immaterial and

08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro:

transactions is likewise inconsequential because it is where

during his leave of absence, he stayed in Cavite City; and

It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in

Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where

Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case

The complainant had sufficiently shown that the transaction

08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro:

2. LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. BELISATA, G.R. NO. 170298,

DARAB has the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate

The DAR is an administrative agency which cannot be granted

(from the CRIMPRO Tranquil Transcript)

(1) "all petitions for the determination of just

(2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses

Spouses Ralla donated land to their daughter, BELISATA.

The parcels of land were subject of Agrarian Reform and, in exchange,

Aggrieved LANDBANK filed ORIGINAL Petition for Determination of

No need for appeal with the DARAB.

Under Section 50, DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and

Believing that her lots were grossly underestimated, BELISATA filed a

08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro:

ISSUE: WON it is necessary that in cases involving claims for just

Thus, Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial

(1) "all petitions for the determination of just

(2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses

08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro:

jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain (for such are

The RTC allowed the formal amendment of the Information, but in

These deficiencies were the subject of the PEPCI peoples MOTION TO

3. BONIFACIO V. RTC OF MAKATI, G.R. NO. 184800, MAY 05, 2010

Gimenez, the representative of the Yuchengcos, filed a complaint for 13

allegation of the place of residence of the complainants