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Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poes
disqualification in the presidential elections for
having allegedly misrepresented material facts in his
(Poes) certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is
a natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both
being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition,
holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners
assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending
that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic
issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had
jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on
questions regarding qualification of a candidate for
the presidency or vice-presidency before the
elections are held.
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in
connection with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, refers to contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the "President"
or "Vice-President", of the Philippines which the
Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not of
"candidates" for President or Vice-President before
the elections.
2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of
discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen.
The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing
fundamental law on respondents birth, provided
that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."
Tracing respondents paternal lineage, his
grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latters
death certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen.
His citizenship was also drawn from the presumption
that having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo
would have been born in 1980. In the absence of any
other evidence, Lorenzos place of residence upon
his death in 1954 was presumed to be the place of
residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou
would have benefited from the "en masse
Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in
1902. Being so, Lorenzos citizenship would have
extended to his son, Allan---respondents father.
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allans
son to Bessie, though an American citizen, was a
Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as
evidenced by the respondents birth certificate. The
1935 Constitution on citizenship did not make a
distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the
child, thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage and
the allegation that respondent was born only before
the assailed marriage had no bearing on
respondents citizenship in view of the established
ISSUES:
(1) Did the DOJ Panel gravely abuse its discretion in
holding that there is probable cause to charge
accused with crime of rape and homicide?
(2) Did respondent judges de Leon and Tolentino
gravely abuse their discretion when they failed to
conduct a preliminary examination before issuing
warrants of arrest against the accused?
(3) Did the DOJ Panel deny them their constitutional
right to due process during their preliminary
investigation?
(4) Did the DOJ Panel unlawfully intrude into judicial
prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in
the information as an accused?
HELD:
(1) NO. Valid determination -- A probable cause
needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not, a crime has been committed and was
committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not
be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt,
neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt.
(2) NO. Valid arrest -- In arrest cases, there must be
a probable cause that a crime has been committed
and that the person arrested committed it.
Section 6 of Rule 112 provides that upon filing of
an information, the RTC may issue a warrant for the
accused.
Clearly then, our laws repudiate the submission that
respondent judges should have conducted
searching examination of witnesses before issuing
warrants of arrest against them.
(3) NO. There is no merit in this contention because
petitioners were given all the opportunities to be
heard.
The DOJ Panel precisely requested the parties to
adduce more evidence in their behalf and for the
panel to study the evidence submitted more fully.
(4) NO.
Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the
faulty assumption that the decision whom to
prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative
of courts and beyond executive and legislative
interference.
In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the
executive department whose principal power and
responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully
executed. A necessary component of this right is to
prosecute their violators.
THE ISSUE