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Political Realignment: Is the 2016 Campaign What It Truly Feels Like?

Discussions on American political science and elections can do one of two things: induce
a quick slumber or incite a riot. It is worth considering that such a pair of extremes in reaction
says something about the state of affairs in the world of American politics. To those who are
brought to their feet by political issues, every election season may give the greatest sense of
urgency and uncertainty, making some think that earth-shattering change is eminent. A reality
such as that is usually not the case, with well-understood and studied political norms instead
standing true and maintaining their efficacy. However, in this years presidential contest, a trend
has taken hold of the American electorate that should not be ignored.
Two candidates, Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders, have run campaigns that are
appealing to pluralities of the American electorate that reach across previously established party
lines. Both candidates are also activating voters, or motivating partisans who initially say they
are undecided or planning to defect from voting, in primaries that were previously thought to be
non-factors, especially young voters and self-identified independents (Dillipane 79). These two
trends are notorious indicators of a true political realignment, or a systematic rearrangement in
the supporters of each party (Campbell 210). It is within all likelihood that by November of this
year, either or both of the afore mentioned candidates will have reorganized the American
electorate in a way that changes the way people identify their party of choice, although more so
in the case of Mr. Trump. Thusly, it can be said that the preferences of the American voter have
shifted from the previously understood norms and that the American political landscape is facing
a potentially tremendous change and a possible realignment.
There must be a way for observers to know that this is the case, and not just an
overreaction to a short-term political upheaval that could correct itself. One must not only

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consider the typical conditions of a realignment to decide, but also look at previous American
realignments to find possible parallels, specifically the 1932 realignment (the most recent in
American history) that launched the Democratic party into multiple decades of dominance. Such
similarities could very well be the indicators that the United States is in the midst of the election
that catalyzes its next realignment.
Before any massive parallels can be drawn between 1932 and 2016, it must first be
determined if this election season fulfills the basic requirements of a realignment, otherwise this
inquiry serves no purpose. One of the most important features of a realigning election, as
determined by Saurzopf and Swanstrom, is a sharp increase in voter turnout, as a marked
increase indicates a short-term circumstance capable of mobilizing previously inactive voters
(Saurzopf and Swanstrom 75). Thus far in the 2016 campaign, nearly 30 percent of all eligible
voters in primary states, both Democratic and Republican, have cast votes, a number only ever
seen in the record year of 2008, according to the Pew Research Center (Desilver 2016).
Furthermore, if voter turnout is separated by each party, one will find that Republican primary
turnout has increased from the nearly 10% average of eligible Republican voters since 1980 to
17.3% so far in 2016 (Desilver 2016). Similarly, Democratic primary turnout has rebounded in
2016 from its low of 6.3% of eligible voters in 2012 to 11.7% in 2016 (Desilver 2016). This kind
of marked increase cannot and should not be dismissed simply because these number come from
primaries and not the general election. Primaries attract far fewer voters than general elections,
and this increase in primary voters should be viewed as a precursor to an explosion of general
election turnout to come (Desilver 2016). By this common measuring stick, the American
electorate is primed for a realigning election.

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With the largest prerequisite for realignment now in place, we can now attempt to
determine causality for the potential realignment in the context of the candidates in the race and
then compare that with the potential causality of the 1932 realignment. This is begs the issue of
why Mr. Trump and Senator Sanders, the candidates who inspire this discussion, are carrying
such popularity with them. So as to not fall out of favor with the candidate and risk the threat of
a Twitter lashing for not being fair, Mr. Trump shall be taken first. Since January 1st of 2016, Mr.
Trump, a man that has never ran for a political office before the presidency in his life, has yet to
poll lower than nearly thirty percent on a national average, with that number increasing to nearly
forty percent with a now narrowed field, as per the Real Clear Politics AVERAGE OF ALL
accredited national GOP primary polls (Realclearpolitics.com 2016).
One reason for his consistent success could be the nature of the primary process itself.
Collingwood suggests that when voters enter into their decision making, information about
candidate policy positionsis relatively rare, leaving voter decisions somewhat of an enigma,
defaulting to name recognition and personal character traits (Collingwood 233). For this reason,
especially name recognition, Donald Trumps rise is less surprising in the early stages of primary
season. After lengthy research of the 2012 primary and debate season, Stewart has come to the
conclusion that there is a moderately strong relationship between speaking time and caucus and
primary results, with a systematic bias toward front-running candidates (Stewart 375). As that
applies to 2016, Donald Trump has consistently been given the most chances to speak in primary
debates, something most evident in South Carolina when he spoke two minutes more than the
next most talkative participant, Ted Cruz, at 15 minutes and 59 seconds (Weiland 2016). One
can align that speaking time with the poll average provided earlier and see Stewarts point.

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In the end, Mr. Trump had not laid out any true policy specifics early in the campaign for
early primary voters to truly consider, but he does have a brand associated with his name that
transcends politics. So, then, there must be a deeper political reason for Mr. Trumps rise in the
early stage of the campaign that has carried him thus far. In the early primary state of South
Carolina, an ABC exit poll showed that 52 percent of Republican primary voters felt betrayed
by Republican politicians, with similar results being yielded in Iowa and New Hampshire
(Shepard 2016). This is indicative of the sentiment of the Republican primary voters early on in
2016, and could be related to a number of ongoing issues that the Republican Party currently
faces in government like healthcare, slowed economic growth, and entitlement reform. So it is
possible that voters, Republican and not alike, who previously were not active in the political
process are now ousting the current form of the GOP for something new.
Subsequently, the issue of electability or viability could explain Mr. Trumps continued
popularity in the latter stages of the primary season. In a 1980 study, Norrander concluded that
electability (ability to win in November) played a role in vote choice but only for states holding
primaries later in the nomination calendar (Collingwood 233). Polls from early primary states in
2016 reflect these findings, with only about 20 percent of Iowa caucus-goers and 12 percent of
New Hampshire primary voters pick[ing] can win in November as the most valuable
characteristic in their chosen candidate (Barone 2016). But later in the process with the field
narrowed and November looming near, the issue is more pressing and sometimes requires voters
who care about viability and electability to compromise for another candidate. This could be the
case with Mr. Trump, as by now many of the remaining primary voters could be of the opinion
that Mr. Trump is the only candidate capable of winning the Republican nomination and carrying

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a plurality of voters to the polls in November. Again, the issue of policy itself does not prevail
here.
As for the Democratic side, Bernie Sanders is not the front-runner for the Democratic
Party, nor will he ever be. Somehow, though, the Sanders campaign has managed to narrow a
spread of twenty-four percentage points between himself and Hillary Clinton to only seven and a
half points on average as of April 4th, as per the Real Clear Politics AVERAGE OF ALL
accredited national primary polls (Realclearpoltics.com 2016). As for how this is possible, one
must consider the theories of The American Voter, a work that pinnacled the field of political
science in the area of elections, realignments, and party identification. As per the theories of The
American Voter, the partisan balance shifts when a new generation of young voters, in response
to a profound event, enters the electorate with a partisan imprint that distinguishes it substantially
from the rest of the electorate (Notpoth 149). This shift in partisan balance could explain the
mobilization of the youth vote toward Bernie Sanders, as Sanders beat Hillary Clinton 84
percent to 14 percent among Democrats aged 17 to 29 (Silver 2016). However, the scholars
Erikson and Tedin would take issue with this generational approach as prescribed by The
American Voter. To them, voters across ages change party identification as they vote for the
opposite party under extraordinary circumstances (Notpoth 149). No one is saying that Senator
Sanders is attracting voters from the far right, but the same issues that are driving voters in the
direction of Donald Trump with parallels to the Great Depression and New Deal like economic
growth are also driving them toward the Senator, just in a different way.
As this compares to the New Deal realignment, similar circumstances dominated the
political landscape, with the Great Depression being a great national crisis, leading to a conflict
regarding governmental politics and the association of the major parties with relatively clearly

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contrasting programs for its solution (Norpoth 154). The economic and social problems facing
the United States in 2016 are certainly not the caliber of the Great Depression, but to many in the
American electorate there is a sense of betrayal from a major political party in government in
their handling of such issues, leading to a feeling of urgency and a groundswell of voter
mobilization. The same could be seen in 1932, where the nonpartisan segment of the electorate
that stayed aloof from electoral politics until a crisis like the Depression rouses it to political life
(Norpoth 149).
The current atmosphere in American politics and the seemingly odd rise of Donald
Trump and Bernie Sanders can be explained in similar ways. Both candidates face an electorate
angry at the current structure of governmental politics and seeking a radical change. In response,
both candidates seem to be showing signs of providing a new brand of party politics, while still
operating under the banner of the two existing American parties. After 1932, The Roosevelt
administration funded a variety of different programs in an attempt to revive economic activity
(Kantor 621). That is, after all, what Mr. Trump and Mr. Sanders are promising (although to be
fair, no one knows what Mr. Trump is really promising besides a large wall). If there were no
other indicators of realignment than such a parallel between platforms, this discussion would
hold no water. But when voter turnout spikes as it has thus far in 2016, and sentiment against an
established party among its own voters reaches a majority level, one must consider that those
voters are going to grow tired of the status quo of their party and seek something else, which
seems to be what is happening.
One can consider the implications of a Trump or Sanders White House once that actually
happens, but for now just consider the implications on the electoral politics themselves. Should
Donald Trump win the Republican nomination and then the general election, it will signify an

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abandonment of the current Republican Party platform by a majority of the country; after all, it
takes a majority to win the general in the first place unless you are George W. Bush. Similarly, if
Senator Sanders were to somehow come back in the delegate race and wins the nomination,
which is highly unlikely, and then again in November, the race will indicate a change in the
preferences of the American electorate in a way not before seen. These are the premises that
realignments, or systematic rearrangement[s] in the supporters of each party, are built upon
and are the reason that the nature of electoral politics change swiftly and severely as they did in
1932 (Campbell 210). It will not be until and long after the 2016 general election has concluded
that a definitive answer will be able to be given on this inquiry, but nonetheless a Trump or
Sanders win would signify a possibly lasting change in the American political landscape that the
United States has not seen for more than eighty years. With the possibility looming close over
the horizon, it is within reason that when history books are written, they will say that the
environment of the 2016 campaign was, indeed, what a realignment feels like. Should that hold
true, todays generations will be the first to experience a major political event in American
history not seen since 1932.

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Works Cited
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Campbell, David E. "The Young And The Realigning: A Test Of The Socialization Theory Of
Realignment." Public Opinion Quarterly 66.2 (2002): 209-234. Academic Search
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Collingwood, Loren, Matt A. Barreto, and Todd Donovan. "Early Primaries, Viability and
Changing Preferences for Presidential Candidates." Presidential Studies Quarterly 42.2
(2012): 231-55. ProQuest. Web. 29 Feb. 2016.
Desilver, Drew. So Far, Turnout in This Years Primaries Rivals 2008 Record.
www.pewresearch.org. Pew Research Center, 8 Mar. 2016. Web. 4 Apr. 2016.
Dilliplane, Susanna. "Activation, Conversion, Or Reinforcement? The Impact Of Partisan News
Exposure On Vote Choice." American Journal Of Political Science 58.1 (2014): 79-94.
Academic Search Complete. Web. 14 Apr. 2016.
Kantor, Shawn, Price V. Fishback, and John Joseph Wallis. "Did The New Deal Solidify The
1932 Democratic Realignment?." Explorations In Economic History 50.4 (2013): 620
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Norpoth, Helmut, Andrew H. Sidman, and Clara H. Suong. "Polls And Elections: The New Deal
Realignment In Real Time." Presidential Studies Quarterly 43.1 (2013): 146-166.
Academic Search Complete. Web. 5 Apr. 2016.
Saurzopf, Richard, and Todd Swanstrom. "The Urban Electorate In Presidential Elections, 1920
1996." Urban Affairs Review 35.1 (1999): 72. Academic Search Complete. Web. 4 Apr.
2016.

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Shepard, Steven. "5 Numbers That Explain Why Trump Won South Carolina." Politico.com.
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Silver, Nate. Why Young Democrats Love Bernie Sanders. www.fivethirtyeight.com.
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