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Alexander Dubcek and the Prague Spring

Who was Alexander Dubeck?

Alexander Dubcek was a political figure in Czechoslovakia whose political reforms
caused the Warsaw Pact to keep an eye on the developments in the communist country. Raised
by communist party member parents, Dubcek later came to develop his own views on the
communist values. He moved rapidly up through the party ranks, becoming party leader in 1968.
Dubceks short term rule over Czechoslovakia proved that the Soviet Union and the rest of the
communist nations in the Warsaw Pact will not stand ideally by and allow a communist nation to
question their practices.
In 1955, at the age of thirty-four, Dubcek attended the Higher Political School (HPS) in
Moscow. There he discovered that every lesson was tightly wrapped in Marxist and Leninist
interpretations. While at HSP, Dubcek realized that the Russians practically ignored any political
ideas that were Critical or different from Stalinist practices or Leninist theories. While studying
political economics he began to question Lenin; was Lenin really a marxist? Dubcek began to
see some variations between Marxist and Leninist practices but he did not voice these theories.
Dubcek did come across a passage in Lenins work: State and Revolution and Leftism: The
Infantile Disease of Communism, that had an impact on who he was a leader, once the socialist
revolution was victorious in an advanced country, this country would assume leadership in the
international socialist movement.1 Dubcek interpreted this suggestion by Lenin and thought that
Russia was not a good fit for a socialist experiment. Dubcek believed in socialism and wanted to
learn everything he could about it to make it better so that he could achieve in Czechoslovakia
1 Jiri Hochman, Hope Dies Last: Autobiography of Alexander Dubcek, (New York, NY: Kodansha, 1993), 70.

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what Lenin stated in the passage from Lenin work.. The studying and readings that Dubcek came
across were not the only things that helped shape his political ideas. Having Russian friends at
HPS, Dubcek spoke openly with them about information from the party meetings such as the
secret speech given by Nikita Khrushchev, leader of the communist party of Russia.
Khrushchev gave this secret speech on February of 1956 revealing something to Dubcek that was
shocking. Khrushchev pointed out Stalin's criminal nature and discredited Stalinist, disposing
himself of his rivals.2 Khrushchev announced the actions of Stalin and his cult one more than
one occasion and with each occasion he released more and more information of the acts
completed by them, Dubcek finally discovered that Stalin had been a murder.3
Political Journey
After graduating from HPS Alexander Dubcek went on to serve as Regional Party
Secretary for Western Slovakia in Bratislava. With this title he was the hub of all political
implementations of the region, making him the most powerful political figure for Western
Slovakia.4 His first major political issue was that of the leader of the communist party of
Czechoslovakia, Antonin Novotnys constitutional reform in 1959. He did not completely agree
with some of the clauses that were in this new constitution. Some of these included: adding the
adjective Socialist to the name of the state, Dubcek did not believe that this was justified by
Czechoslovakias stage of development.5 It also arranged that the ruling position in the state was
that of the Communist Party. Dubcek states that he, could not voices these opinions directly in
1959 or 1960, but during the years to come he pointed out several times in his public
2 Tony Kemp-Welch, Khrushchev's Secret Speech and Polish politics: The Spring of 1956, (Europe-Asia Studies
48, no. 2: 181, 1996), Business Source Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed November 24, 2015).
3 Hochman, Hope Dies Last, 72.
4 Dietrich Andre Loeber, Ruling Communist Parties and Their Status Under Law,(The Netherlands, Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, 1986), 186.
5 Hochman, Hope Dies Last, 80.

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appearances that the Partys leading place in the society had not been won forever: it had to be
constantly earned by the Partys activities, and reconfirmed by public confidence and support.6
The most unfortunate of the clauses was that of the self governing Slovak political structure. The
Board of Commissioners, which administer state policies in Slovakia was completely abolished
along with other central branches of central institutions.7 To Dubcek, Novotny was arrogant and
incapable of doing his job as leader of Czechoslovakia. Now Dubeck knew that in order to
oppose Novotny, he would have to prepare and wait for just the right moment to strike.
In 1962, after many disagreements with Novotny, Dubcek was sent back to Prague where he
was elected a member of the Slovak Party Presidium and appointed a Slovak Party secretary.
Dubceks pan to oppose Novotny seemed unreachable all the way from Prague. Dubcek however
did not give up, he reached out to old connections and worked his way back up to the national
level politics and was elected a member of the crucial commission, later known as the Kolder
Commission, which investigated the repressions of 1950s.8 Working with the Kolder
Commission opened Dubcek eyes to the to the horrible torture of the victims, mostly Communist
Party members, and he began to believe in his reformist views and knew that his time to oppose
Novotny was approaching.
With the Kolder Commission, Dubcek worked feverishly to get a voice during the
Czechoslovak Central Committee in April of 1963. Novotny refused to allow Dubcek to speak
but he did not give up. Dubcek was determined to gain justice for those who were tortured and
imprisoned unjustly. When he was denied the floor he submitted a speech in which he exposed
some party members who had a direct involvement in the repressions of the 1950s and demanded
6 Hochman, Hope Dies Last, 81.
7 Hochman, Hope Dies Last, 81.
8 Paul Hollander, Political Will and Personal Belief : The Decline and Fall of Soviet Communism, (New Haven, CT,
Yale University Press, 1999), 192. eBook Collection (EBSCOhost), EBSCOhost (accessed November 24, 2015).

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harsher punishment.9 He also criticized former communist party leader of Czechoslovakia,

Klement Gottwald for not preventing the witch-hunt that killed many innocent people. This did
not set well with Novotny, but it did open the door for Dubcek. Being a member of the Slovak
Party Central Committee Presidium, Dubcek was considered for the candidacy of First Secretary.
Dubcek had the had a better chance of being elected because of his work with Slovak national
interest. At the end of April 1963, Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee plenary
session Ducek assumed the office of Slovak Communist Party Central Committee First
Secretary, highest office of the communist party in Slovakia, and had received a full membership
to the Czechoslovak Communist Party Presidium.10

The Beginning of Prague Spring

After many attempts to be brought down by Novotny. Dubcek prevailed. On January 5,
1968, Dubcek was elected as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. In the
beginning Dubcek had a mostly positive Soviet response. According to Kieran Williams, even
at the very start, the positive Soviet response to Dubceks election was accompanied by
awkwardness and ambiguity over signals and indices.11 Many eyes were on Dubcek and his next
actions once he became leader of Czechoslovakia. On January 10, just five days after he was
elected, Dubcek was invited to Moscow to meet with Soviet leaders at the end of the month.
Shortly after he received a phone call from Hungarian Leader Janos Kadar congratulating him on
his election and asked to meet with Dubcek before he went to Moscow. On January 20th Dubcek
met with Kadar to explain that Czechoslovakia was due for a reform.12 Kadar suggested that
9 Hochman, Hope Dies Last, 86.
10 Hochman, Hope Dies Last, 87.
11 Kieran Williams, The Prague Spring and its aftermath, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 4.
12 Kenneth N. Skoug Jr., Czechoslovakias Lost Fight for Freedom, (Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1991), 64.

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before Dubcek made any sudden actions that he should first unify the Presidium.13 The Presidium
was divided after Novotny was removed from it a few weeks earlier. Dubcek needed to prove his
authority. He went to Moscow to meet with General Secretary of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev and assured the Soviets that
Czechoslovakia was committed to the socialist camp, numerous countries devoted to socialism.
In his meeting with the Soviets, he explained that he wanted his party to develop a genuine
democratic centralism and get rid of the petty-bourgeois and their anarchist tendencies.
Brezhnev made sure that Dubcek understood that he had the full support of the Soviets but he
needed to make some revisions in his speech about the reform. Brezhnev did not hesitate to
inform the new leader of Czechoslovakia that he would be under close surveillance.14 Dubcek
left Moscow with confidence that the Soviets were in agreement with his reform policy.
After his meeting in Moscow, Dubeck returned to Prague with high hopes for his reform
course. February marked the twentieth anniversary of the February 1948 Communist takeover in
Czechoslovakia which meant that there would be many visits by Soviet leaders to Prague.
Dubcek gave the speech he presented in Moscow, but he did not make the changes that the
Soviets had asked of him and not only did that raise concerns with the Soviets but with but with
East Germany as well. In his speech he talked passionately about Czechoslovakia making its
own path and a new type of democracy would come into play. He was also adamant about
establishing good relations between all countries in Europe.15 These statements were a surprise to
the Soviets because they had previously requested that he change those areas of his speech and

13 Williams, Prague Spring, 64.

14 Williams, Prague Spring, 66-67.
15 Karen Dawisha, The Kremlin and the Prague Spring, (Los Angeles, California: University of California, 1984),
18-20.

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he had not. After expressing his concern to Dubcek, the Soviet leadership still supported him in
order to support socialism.
Down with Censorship
Censorship after the February encounter with the Soviet Union was a must in order to
maintain face with the USSR. Dubcek believed that lessening the restrictions on freedom of
speech would rejuvenate the economy and the society of Czechoslovakia.16 Changes were taking
place in the leadership of Czechoslovakia. Amongst these changes was that of Jiri Hendrych,
head of the partys Ideological Commission.17 Hendrych gave weekly briefings every Thursday
to editors of newspapers on what they could and could not print. It was people like this that were
responsible for the continuation of censorship. Soon after the January election, Hendrych was
removed, writers and editors were pleased that they were no longer being told what they could
write but they were confused by the silence. The silence was part of a compromise with
Novotny, he had been promised dignified treatment by the public, meaning he would receive no
bad press after a vote of no confidence removed him from office.18 Up until this point the public
was being left in the dark on issues that were happening within the party. The loosening of
censorship caused deeper investigations into the Stalinist injustices, and gave way for the truth
about Novotnys downfall. The people were tired of the silence from Rude pravo, the partys own
daily newspaper, and were beginning to turn towards non-party papers.19 Now the idea of
rediscovery was outside of the partys control. People soon began to turn to their TVs and on
February 4th watched Czechoslovakian scholar Eduard Goldstucker expose Novotnys downfall.

16 Williams, Prague Spring, 67.

17 Dawish, Kremlin and the Prague Spring, 21.
18 Williams, Prague Spring, 67-68.
19 Williams, Prague Spring, 69.

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In March of 1968 censorship was completely abolished.20 For the first time since 1948, free
media provided a wide platform for the expression of public opinion.21
As rediscovery and censorship were issues of the public, heads of the Central Committee
departments were being replaced. The Presidium, or legislative body, and the Central Committee,
non-governing but in charge of day to day party policy, were not communicating with each other
and the Presidium was scared that they were losing control of their country.22 The tensions
between the Presidium and the Central committee were caused by Novotny supporters and
Novotny himself still being a member of the Presidium. A new member of the Presidium stated,
that the impression had already arisen that the Presidium was not in control.23 Liberalizers
within the Presidium believed that the Central Committee would have to remove Novotny and
his supporters from the Presidium. On March 21st Novotny announced that he was surrendering
his position in the Presidency, Head of State. Dubcek was not able celebrate the fall of Novotny
for very long, on the same day Dubcek was summoned to Dresden Germany to meet with the
Eastern bloc to discuss economic cooperation. By April six of the ten members of the old
Presidium including Novotny and Hendrych had been replaced. These members were the heart of
Novotnys team and with their replacement the Presidium would no longer be divided and
unresponsive.

Dresden Summit March 23, 1968

20 Williams, Prague Spring, 69.

21 Hochman, Hope Dies Last, 143.
22 Williams, Prague Spring, 69.
23 Williams, Prague Spring, 70.

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Dubcek believed he was traveling to Dresden, East Germany to discuss economic cooperations
of the Eastern Bloc, communist governed countries. However, upon arrival Dubcek realized that
Brezhnev was not entirely honest with him about the conference. Upon arrival Dubcek noticed
that the Romanians and the Yugoslavs were not in attendance. According to the weekly summary
of published by the CIA it was unclear whether or not the Romanians were not invited or if they
decided not to attend, in the past they have denounced examination of the internal affairs of
another party intervention.24 Instead of talking about economic cooperation, German
Communist leader and host, Walter Ulbricht, opened the meeting by stating that the issue was the
situation in Czechoslovakia. Dubcek was criticized for having lost all control and, in the leaders
of the Eastern Blocs eyes, allowed opinions of borderline counterrevolution conspiracy in
Czechoslovakia. When asked to inform the leaders of his partys policy plans, Dubcek was not
prepared for this question he went to Dresden under the impression of talking about economic
cooperation between the Eastern Bloc members not conspiracy theories. Dubcek went to explain
that his plans for ending class antagonism and its consequences for party operations. He did
admit that the situation needed consolidating, but argued that the party could best achieve it
through non-coercive measures.25 Dubcek explained that since censorship had been abolished
that, neither the Party or the government could determined the contents of the newspaper Our
[The Party] business was to manage the affairs of the state, to protect citizens rights and wellbeing, and to run a prosperous economy.26 Being better prepared for this type of discussion
Brezhnev, along with the other representatives attacked Dubcek with statements such as, your
[Dubcek] leadership and government have basically taken nothing in hand. You do not lead. You
24 Weekly Summary - The Dresden Summit Conference 1968-03-29c, (Central Intelligence Agency, Internet
Archive), 13.
25 Williams, Prague Spring, 71.
26 Hochman, Hope Dies Last, 142.

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do not govern.27 Not everyone was so radical as the Soviets. Hungarian leader, Janos Kadar,
argued that counter-revolution had not yet in progress in Czechoslovakia but he warned Dubcek
that it was possible for the same events that took place in Hungary could happen in
Czechoslovakia. 28 This meeting marked the real beginning of the crisis in Czechoslovakia.29

The Heartbeat of Prague Spring

April 10, 1968, the four-thousand word Action Program had been adopted and published by the
Central Committee. Since February 1968, the Action Program had been rewritten to fulfil the
accommodations set forth by the Bloc, mainly the Soviet Union. The document itself was sixty
pages long. According to the weekly summary of the publishing of the Action Program, the
revised programs importance lies in its being a binding guide for the party.30 The Action
Program was the set of the reform taking that were taking place in Czechoslovakia. This program
stressed intra party democracy and the importance of qualifications, initiative, responsibility, and
risk taking measures of the Party.31 The program guarantees personal rights and liberties, such as
freedom of assembly, speech, and religion. and it called for a qualified freedom of the press and
the right to travel abroad.32 Not only were human rights stated in the program but it also gave
clear direction of the Partys role within the state. The party was no longer to control the court
system, freed from political factors33 As a compromise, the action program stated that the
27 Williams, Prague Spring, 72.
28 Williams, Prague Spring, 72.
29 Dawisha, Kremlin and The Prague Spring, 39.
30 Weekly Summary - Czechoslovaks Publish Party Action Program 1968-04-19b, (Central Intelligence Agency,
Internet Archives), 13.
31 Skoug, Lost Fight for Freedom, 90.
32 Weekly Summary - Czechoslovaks Publish Party Action Program 1968-04-19b, (Central Intelligence Agency,
Internet Archives), 13.
33 Weekly Summary - Czechoslovaks Publish Party Action Program 1968-04-19b, (Central Intelligence Agency,
Internet Archives), 13.

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leading role of the country would remain with the Party. This clause was put in place in hopes to
ease the Soviet fear of losing communist control. To Dubcek and his allies this program was in
no way to dismantle socialism, they still believed in socialism and that democracy was a
significant element to keeping it alive in the country. Dubcek and the Party believed that this
program would rectify the past injustices and by honest political action it would regain the trust
that it once had.34 This action plan was the single most important outcome in April.

May Day
May Day of 1968 was a day of true celebration in Prague. Dubcek said that even mother nature
was their to show her support for the Prague Spring.35 May Day was a celebration and people
showed up with smiling faces and their own homemade banners that no one told them what they
could and could not write on them. Dubceks supporters came out in full swing for this
celebration. One man stated that Dubcek was genuinely popular because he believed in his
ideals and trusted the people, out of all of the people in the party leadership Dubcek was the least
authoritarian.36 The support for the Prague Spring was clear on May Day.
Although May Day was a jubilant celebration, on May 3rd a massive student demonstration
happened at the Jan Hus statue in Old Town Square.37 New non-party programs such as KAN,
Club of Engaged non-Partisans, read works from Karel Capek, Why I am Not a Communist,
and rallied thousands of students to stand with Dubcek and his action programs. This was a red
flag to the Soviets and other Eastern Bloc parties and it infuriated Brezhnev. After much
contemplation on how he [Brezhnev] should handle the situation, the conclusion for a meeting
34 Hochman, Hope Dies Last, 150
35 Hochman, Hope Dies Last, 150.
36 Skoug, Lost Fight For Freedom, 95.
37 Skoug, Lost Fight for Freedom, 95.

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with Dubcek and his entourage were to be summoned to Moscow for a meeting with the Soviets
and the East Bloc.

From Celebrations to Summons

The summons to Moscow on May 3 was indeed one of short notice. Dubcek and his team left
immediately and upon arrival in Moscow at 2:00 am the meeting started immediately. Brezhnev
wasted no time in telling Dubcek that he had lost complete control of his society and that his
action program would do nothing but restore capitalism.38 Dubcek replied with a two hour
presentation on how his recent policies were intended to raise the authority of the party not to
move towards capitalist ways. He explains that since the policies have been put in place that the
moral of the society of Czechoslovakia has improved and that the leading role of the party was in
way to be taken from them. He explained that the role of the party will not be open for discussion
and that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia will not allow anyone to oppose it. After the
presentation Brezhnev refers back to the Dresden Summit conspiracy theories, reading
documents and clippings from anti-soviet newspapers. Chairman of parliament, Josef Smrkovsky
spoke on these readings. He [Smrkovsky] said, the anti-socialist must be given no chance to
instigate counter-revolution.39 After making this statement Brezhnevs attitude towards
Smrkovsky seemed to lighten. He continued by saying that the Soviet and Eastern Bloc members
wanted the Party of Czechoslovakia to understand that now is the most crucial period in the
history of your state and party for the building of socialism.40 Select members like Russian
leader, Alexei Kosygin were furious at Dubcek for beating around the bush and not having a
direct plan on how to deal with these anti-socialist. Kosygin suggested that these people be
38 Skoug. Lost Fight for Freedom, 96.
39 Williams, The Prague Spring, 77.
40 Williams, The Prague Spring, 78.

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imprisoned and that Dubcek needs to start being the real leaders of this party.41 The Soviets
also called for the suppression of KAN and to reintroduce censorship.42 Dubcek reassured the
Soviets, like he had done time and time again, that precautions had been taken against KAN and
those similar to them. With the conclusion of this meeting the two sides split ways and Dubcek
and his colleagues returned to Prague.

Crisis Period
Once Dubcek and his team left Moscow the Bloc began to make a plan of action for intervention
in Czechoslovakia. They believed that the situation was not under control and that if Dubcek
could not regain control of the situation then they would be forced to step in. These preparation
begin in early May following the most recent Moscow meeting. In Dawishas book, The Kremlin
and the Prague Spring, she writes about her findings on this matter. Four separate military
decision were made that increased the probability of military involvement. These decisions were
as follows;
a. to hold extensive and prolonged Warsaw Pact maneuvers in Czechoslovakia beginning in June;
b. to press as an urgent matter for the permanent stationing of Soviet troops on Czechoslovakias
western frontier;
c. to use military maneuvers and presence of Soviet troops as minator diplomacy to deter antiSoviet behavior and to support conservative elements in their attempts to stage a comeback;
d. to prepare for an invasion should all other means fail.43
These decisions to use the military as a back were precautionary measures that the Eastern Bloc
would use as an alternative if the situation in Czechoslovakia did not improve. The Soviets and
their counterparts in the Eastern Bloc used these decisions as guidelines for when the real
communist, conservatives, need their help to keep from having a counter-revolution like they

41 Williams, The Prague Spring, 78.

42 Dawisha, The Kremlin and the Prague Spring, 77.
43 Dawisha, the Kremlin and the Prague Spring, 93-94.

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were fearing. From East Germany there came a memorandum stating, Dubceks leadership is
guilty of treason against its allies and the provisions of the Warsaw Pact make possible an
intervention which would be in keeping with the interests of the socialist countries.44 The East
Germans pledged their support to the Bloc in this memorandum stating that the intervention of
the Bloc would involve the East German Troops. With the support of East Germany the Soviets
believed that they had a moral and legal right to intervene militarily in Czechoslovakia if antisocialist governments were to be established. This gives a new understanding to how concerned
the true communist were with the developments in Czechoslovakia and just how far they were
willing to go to keep out any opposing forces.

Dubceks Concerns
While the Soviets were feverishly working on their plans to control the issues in Czechoslovakia,
Dubcek returned to Prague and concentrated on what he felt necessary. An issue that was close to
his heart was the rehabilitation of the people from the 1950s injustices. before the end of May
there was a law drafted pertaining strictly to these people and the wrongs that had been done to
them.45 Dubcek worked diligently to get this law approved. The law would ensure judicial
rehabilitation of the victims of Stalins terror would be taken care of, not only them but writers,
journalists and resistance fighters as well. His rehabilitation plan included helping those who
were, in Dubceks eyes, wrongly punished out of prison and having their records cleaned.
Dubcek was also concerned with pleasing the Soviets and the rest of the Eastern Bloc and took
steps to work towards the demands set forth by them at the Dresden and Moscow summit. The
Presidium and Secretariat members made it their mission to bring the media back in line.46
44 Dawisha, the Kremlin and the Prague Spring, 95.
45 Hochman, Hope Dies Last, 152.
46 Williams, The Prague Spring, 81.

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Several editors were invited by the Presidium to plead their case about the rebellious nature of
their papers. After hours of discussion the Presidium backed the editors paper and left them to
make the changes required to keep the media in line and the thought of revolution silent. With
Dubcek and the rest of the Presidiums support, employment changes were made within the
media. There was a new, open-minded staff who were willing to try Western-style press and
directed the public directly about party policies.47
Growing Concerns from the East
As Dubcek and his supporters were trying to get the situation in Czechoslovakia under control,
the plans for intervention were being made. A summit meeting was held without any
Czechoslovak representation on May 8th. Bloc members called for hard and speedy action in
Czechoslovakia.48 After this meeting anti-Czechoslovakia activity increased. Concerns escalated
when American tanks and troops were confirmed in Czechoslovakia. There were reports about
Soviet troop movement in Poland towards Czechoslovakia.49 Czechoslovakia answered for these
tanks and troops were there to strictly film a movie in south Prague, The Bridge at Remagen.
Czechoslovak diplomats assured the Soviets that the tanks for owned and operated by
Czechoslovak citizens. As for the American Troops, these were over two hundred American
and German actors that would be apart of the film. Little did producer, David Wolper know that
this would be pretext for military action.50
Throughout May, Moscow brought their indifferences directly to Czechoslovakia. Soviet Premier
Andrei N Kosygin and Minister of Defense A. A. Grechko arrived in Prague on May 17th to try
and persuade Dubcek to set limits on freedom of expression and to confirm the monopoly on
47 Williams, The Prague Spring, 82.
48 Skoug, Lost Fight for Freedom, 97.
49 Dawisha, The Kremlin and the Prague Spring, 111.
50 Skoug, Lost Fight for Freedom, 98.

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power of the Communist Party.51 More interventions were to be made in the months to come in
order to assess the progress that Dubcek and his team were making. First Chairman of the Czech
National Council, Cestmir Cisar, he stated that, having more political parties would open the
door for a possible relapse into capitalism and that there was a need to defend socialism by force.
52

The visit of these two men were evident that Moscow was making last minute decision to

intervene in Czechoslovakia because of their paranoia. The purpose of these visits seem to
demand military moves in Czechoslovakia. These forces were ready to regain control of the
country even if it took a coup. The end of May was a mix of emotions for those of the Soviet
Union and Czechoslovakia. The growing support of the reform was creating a problems for the
communist of in Moscow and Czechoslovakia was in fear of possible military intervention.
Decisions were made in late may to have military action move on Czechoslovakia in June by the
Prague government. These actions were approved in hopes to bring the Prague situation under
control without too much force. However the Soviets had a different plan, troops were sent into
Czechoslovakia in with numbers greater than what was agreed upon by the government. This
was a sign that the Soviet Union could not and would not be disinterested in Czechoslovakian
affairs.53
A decision to hold congress elections were pushed forward along with these military actions. The
date was decided for September 9th. Along with this decision Dubcek explained that antisocialist forces would be strategically silenced. His plan was to shift the nomination process to
the conservative district level.54 Other measures were taken by the Presidium to keep out radical
influence. Cisar was assigned with the task of making sure that selection of candidates for
51 Skoug, Lost Fight for Freedom, 101
52 Skoug, Lost Fight for Freedom, 101
53 Dawisha, The Kremlin and the Prague Spring, 131.
54 Williams, The Prague Spring, 84.

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membership in the new Central Committee elections were to be an internal party matter and that
the media was to agree with the party.55 In giving this order Dubcek was attempting to assure the
Soviets, that he was aligned with them on the matters of Czechoslovakia.This is clear evidence
that Soviet interference was strong in the Presidium and they were working towards regaining
control of the media.
The Soviets were pleased with the results of May. Dubcek continued to profess Czech loyalty to
the Communist Camp and the Soviets were confident that the leadership of the Communist Party
of Czechoslovakia could find a solution for the crisis.56 The Soviets soon sent an invitation to
Czechoslovakia on June 11th to return to Moscow to discuss new measure that could be taken in
Czechoslovakia. Dubcek made excuse after excuse as to why he could not make it immediately
to Moscow, he put on the hat of a leader trapped by his own country.57 Dubcek was trapped
because of the media following his every move and insisted that a confidential meeting like the
Soviets requested would be impossible but that he could take a holiday in July or August.
Dubcek wanted to oblige his Soviet friends yet he was afraid to do so in public out of fear of
losing his supporters.58

Two Thousand Words

Foreign troops were continuing to flood Czechoslovakia. Ludvik Vaculik drafted a manifesto on
July 27th. This manifesto was written to everyone of Czechoslovakia and urged for the
acceleration of reform and dismissal of its opponents.59 The manifesto pointed out that non real
institutional changes had been made since January. Vaculik reached out to the ordinary citizen
55 Williams, The Prague Spring, 84.
56 Williams, The Prague Spring, 84.
57 Williams, The Prague Spring, 86.
58 Williams, The Prague Spring, 86.
59 Skoug, Lost Fight for Freedom, 104.

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to launch strikes and establish their own watchdog committees throughout the country.60 Quickly
members of the Presidium were quickly called to meet, some not even having had time to read
the document itself. At the meeting Smrkovsky expressed that measures to needed to be taken
immediately or it would be too late and the would be taken out of their hands and into the
Soviets. Smrkovsky also made this statement, if we do not vurb these expressions now it will be
ascribed to us that we betrayed the socialist revolution. i will not associate my name with that
if we do not put a stop to this now, then tanks will solve it.61 With the manifesto calling for
strikes it was evident that the Presidiums actions were needed and needed to happen in a hurry.
on June 28, the manifest was condemned a call to counterrevolution.62
The reaction to the manifesto was outrageous. The publics reaction was enthusiastic and rallied
behind Vaculik. Two Thousand Words became a call to resist Moscow.63 Forty thousand Czech
citizens were now backing the manifesto.

The Soviets Respond

It has been determined that the Soviet embassy in Prague received the manifesto well before
Dubcek and his team. Dubcek received a phone call from Brezhnev before he even had time to
read the manifesto. To the Soviets this was proof of counterrevolutionary operations were taking
place in Czechoslovakia. The Soviets called for another Dresden style meeting to happen in early
July to discuss the issue of the manifesto and the measures that were to be taken against it. After
receiving a letter from the Soviet union calling for a summit to be held on July 7th, Dubcek
replied saying that members of the Presidium were attended regional conferences and could not
60 Williams, The Prague Spring, 90.
61 Williams, the Prague Spring, 90.
62 Skoug, Lost Fight for Freedom, 105.
63 Skoug, Lost Fight for Freedom, 105.

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attend the meeting.64 Brezhnev was not going to give up and allow Dubcek to put off a meeting
with the Soviets about the rising problems in Czechoslovakia that were to come due to the
manifesto. Dubcek tried and tried to avoid the meeting with reassurances from Cernik that they
were soon to be back in control of the media.
On July13th, Dubcek received a call from Kadar urging Dubcek to go to Warsaw. Dubcek
explained that he and his Presidium had met and came up with a proposal of conditions to be
presented to Brezhnev.
1. The Presidium agreed that they were not prepared for a joint meeting and that bilateral
talks should come first, including all European socialist countries. 2. The Presidium would offer
to host a multilateral meeting in Prague during the party congress. 3. The Presidium would not
launch a populist or nationalist campaign against the letters and would strive to maintain good
relations with the other parties. 4. A response to the Soviet letter would be drafted. 5. Within
three days the Presidium were to present a situation report and propose measures against the
rightist threat and a counterrevolutionary uprising.65
Kadar did not seem disturbed by these conditions but he also did not express his support for
Dubceks decision to postpone the Warsaw meeting. The Soviet and the Eastern Bloc replied by
rejecting the bilateral discussions and restating that multilateral meetings would be held but it did
not give a specific date as to when they would be held. A Soviet ambassador reported to Moscow
that Dubcek was blinded by popularity and failed to see the rightest threats. He believed that
Dubceks authority was a dangerous delusion by only being just enough to keep the country on
the socialist path.66
Brezhnev and the rest of the The Five - Poland, Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria - made their
way to Warsaw on July 14th and sent a joint letter to the entire Central Committee, The Warsaw
letter. The letter laid out a warning to the Central Committee. The letter stated that there were
64 Williams, The Prague Spring, 92.
65 Williams, The Prague Spring, 94.
66 Williams, The Prague Spring, 95.

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forces within Czechoslovakia that could and would defend socialism. These forces at any time
could be called and would be called upon to step up their efforts to support the Soviet point of
view. This letter pointed out that Czechoslovak party had failed to safeguard the leading role of
the party and democratic centralism67 as the action program had promised. This letter was
published along with the committees response by the Czechoslovak press. This publication of
the letter informed Prague of the events in Czechoslovakia threatened the socialist foundations of
the country and that unity of the entire bloc.68 The letter stated that it was not only the duty of the
committee to regain control but that the bloc had a duty to its allies in dealing with anti-socialist
forces and help restore the socialist system in Czechoslovakia. It became clear with the printing
of the Warsaw letter and the response from the committee that the thought of counterrevolutionary forces were not within the public, but within the party itself. A meeting was held
on July 19th to discuss the already published response to the Warsaw letter and to propose the
talks with the Soviet Union be held closer to home. On July 22nd the Soviets responded and the
talks were to be held in Cierna nad Tisou on the 29th.
The Meeting at Cierna nad Tisou
This meeting was between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. Brezhnev opened the meeting
very similarly to the Dresden and Moscow summits.69 He started by taking newspaper clippings
from the recent developments in Prague. During this meeting it was brought to Dubcek and the
rest of the Presidium how Moscow really saw Czechoslovakia, nothing more than an
appendage of the Soviet Union.70 The discontent with the Soviets was learned at the this
meeting. Brezhnev expressed his central issue was that of the free press. By allowing the free
67 Skoug, Lost Fight for Freedom, 117.
68 Dawisha, The Kremlin and the Prague Spring, 208.
69 Williams, The Prague Spring, 100.
70 Williams, The Prague Spring, 100.

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writers to dictate his [Dubcek] policy was absurd.71 Brezhnev called these free writers
imperialist and if not imperialist then they were doing the work of the imperialist.` Czechoslovak
protest to this statement were ignored all together. Dubcek answered Brezhnevs accusations
stating that although there had been isolated anti-socialist act, the party was firmly in control.72
This answer did not have the effect that Dubcek had hoped for and the meeting approached a
deadlock.
The next two days of the meetings were full of speeches and no negotiations were being made.
The meetings were at an impasse. Soviet speakers tried diligently to break the Presidium unity by
attacking member Cisar, who was not in attendance, in hopes of inspiring some of the Presidium
to agree. As these debates continued they only got worse. Dubcek was reduced to tears when
Ukrainian leader, Petro Shelest attacked reformers in Czechoslovakia.73 It was obvious that the
conference was going no where. Dubcek met with Brezhnev in his train car on the third day to
discuss the damages of the Warsaw letter. Brezhnev and Dubcek came to an agree that a bilateral
meeting be held between the five and Czechoslovakia. According to Williams there were six
oral promises made due to these bilateral meetings on the last day of the talks in Cierna nad
Tisou;
1. to safeguard the partys leading role; 2. to take the mass media in hand and cease all
polemics with other communist parties; 3.to issue a llaw that would disban KAN (Club
of Non-Party Engages) and the SDP (Socail Democratic Party); 4. to rescue the StB
from radical reforms by dividing Pavels interior ministry into a new ministry for the
protection of public order and a security ministry; 5. to guarantee that Bilak would not
be excluded from any future leadership; 6. to remove television director Pelkan,
Kriegel, and Cisar from their positions, if need be by convening a Central Committee
plenum within ten to fifteen days.74

71 Dawisha, The Kremlin and the Prague Spring, 256.

72 Dawisha, The Kremlin and the Prague Spring, 257.
73 Williams, The Prague Spring, 102.
74 Williams, The Prague Spring, 102.

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After the meeting Brezhnev announced that there would be another meeting on August 3rd were
a joint declaration of principles would be held in Bratislava.

Bratislava
August 3rd leaders of the five met with Dubcek to discuss the need to draw up a joint
declaration. After seven hours of debate most of the Czechoslovak amendments were placed into
the draft and the offended ones were removed.75 At the heart of the declaration was the decree of
each socialist states right to pursue its own form of socialism and for other socialist states right
to intervene if they feared counter-revolution.76 This declaration contained all the elements of
justification of invasion signed by all the participating states.77 The Bratislava Declaration was
seen as a victory on all fronts. Czechoslovakia acted on its obligations and defended socialist
achievements that would might lead to causes of intervention.78
Plans for Invasion
Although Czech leaders thought that the Bratislava Declaration was a win on all sides, plans to
invade Czechoslovakia were well underway before the meeting began and after the meeting they
did not cease to exist. Instead they grew into a more plausible event. Military exercises were
prominent in Czechoslovak territory and on August 10th, the Press Agency of the Soviet Union
announced that new exercises by the Soviet, East German, and Polish communication troops
would begin in East Germany, southern Poland and western Ukraine and stated that these
exercises would continue into September.79 Should Dubcek fail to act against the anti-socialist,
Soviet troops would invade Czechoslovakia. Brezhnev made one last attempt to insure that
75 Williams, The Prague Spring, 103.
76 Williams, The Prague Spring, 103.
77 Dawisha, The Kremlin and the Prague Spring, 268.
78 Skoug, Lost Fight for Freedom, 124.
79 Skoug, Lost Fight for Freedom, 124.

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Dubcek was taking care of the anti-social activities. He [Brezhnev] brought to Dubceks attention
several articles that violated the talks in Cierna. Dubcek assured Brezhnev that the Presidium
would take steps to control the media at its next meeting.80 As Soviet concern for the progress
of Czechoslovakia and the leadership of Alexander Dubcek was in question, the Soviets made
one last attempt to make Dubcek see reason and to act with vigilance against the anti-socialist.
Kadar was sent to speak with Dubcek and about the developments. Dubcek assured Kadar that at
the end of the month measures were to be taken using the Bratislava Declaration and the battle
against the rightist were top priority.81 Kadar gave no hint of the impending invasion of
Czechoslovakia and left the meeting with Dubcek and made his way to Moscow to put his seal
on the decision to invade Czechoslovakia.82

Operation Danube
On August 20, 1968, the Soviet Union moved 165,000 soldiers and 4,600 tanks into
Czechoslovakia.83 This was called Operation Danube and by the end of the week about half a
million foreign soldiers and 6,000 tanks roamed the country.84 Why had they come after a
compromise was made earlier in the month? The Soviets claimed that they had been asked to
intervene, but by who? Their arrival had been coordinated with Czechoslovak conservatives
who had signalled their willingness to take power and fulfil all the promises made by
Dubcek.85When Dubcek was informed of the troop movements into Czechoslovakia he was in a
Presidium meeting. Dubcek felt betrayed and he thought that he had done everything that he
80 Williams, The Prague Spring, 109.
81 Skoug, Lost Fight for Freedom, 110.
82 Hochman, Hope Dies Last, 173.
83 Williams, The Prague Spring, 112.
84 Williams, The Prague Spring, 112.
85 Williams, The Prague Spring, 112.

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possibly could to convince the Soviets that Czechoslovakia was to remain loyal to the
Communist Camp.86 Dubcek and his colleagues were taken prisoner and moved out of the
Central Committee building by the KGB, Soviet Union military police, and moved to the Ruzyne
airport.87 Shortly After Dubcek was separated from his counterparts and was forced to board a
Soviet plane to Ukraine. For the next two days Dubcek was left in the dark of the events that
were taking place in Czechoslovakia.
Back in Prague, a Central Committee meeting was called by Brezhnev with a special
session of the National Assembly to conducted to discuss new leadership for Czechoslovakia.
Also discussed at this meeting was the measures that were to be taken with the media. It was
decided that thirty editors would draft and issue propaganda support on radio and national
television to explain and rally support of the takeover.88 The radio and television talks did little to
gain support for the movement and the resistance soon followed.
By the morning, confusion and rage filled the streets in Prague. People left their cars to voice
their discontent that their city had been taken over in the dead of night. Attempts were made to
try and stop all pro-reformist views of the invasion on the radio, it was difficult to stop them.
Broadcasters continued to find a way and for two more days they found their way into hidden
offices and continued their broadcast. Radio played a huge role during the invasion. It inspired
the resistance and shed light on the lie that the invaders had been invited to enter
Czechoslovakia.89 Radio broadcast encourage the people of Prague to engage in conversation
with the troops, it is our only weapon90 it was evident that the non-violent revolution was taking

86 Skoug, Lost Fight for Freedom, 140.

87 Hochman, Hope Dies Last, 182.
88 Williams, The Prague Spring, 123.
89 Skoug, Lost Fight for Freedom, 143.
90 Skoug, Lost Fight for Freedom, 144.

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place in Prague and it had support. Sixteen auxiliary studios in and around Prague picked up the
broadcast after the main lines had been terminated. 91
The radio was not the only outlet of information to the public about the resistance to the
invaders. Dozens of organizations published statements rejecting the invasion and expressing
their support for Dubcek.92 The people demanded the release of Dubcek and his colleagues. They
would not be stopped just because of the removal of a few leading personalities.93 The main
focus of the resistance now was the release of Dubcek and the other popular leaders.94
Soviet authorities were not prepared to face the resistances politically. Secretly the Extraordinary
Fourteenth Party Congress met in secret to elect a working Presidium. The Congress is the
highest body of the Party, was excluding anyone who was rumored to be working with the Soviet
forces. The only hope that the Soviets had in convincing the leaders of Czechoslovakia to
support the new government was to negotiate the release of Dubcek and his colleagues.95 The
Soviets were in need of a new strategy.
The population of Prague was urged to comply with the intervention and told to remain calm in
these events. The resistance however had other ideas. The protest would continue in the days to
come and although these protest were nonviolent and the protesters were unarmed a number of
civilians were killed. During a protest at Prague Radio, the main radio station of the
Czechoslovak government information, Soviet tanks rammed the barricades and opened fire on
unarmed civilians. These actions did nothing but strengthen the resistance against the invasion.

91 Williams, The Prague Spring, 128.

92 Skoug, Lost Fight for Freedom, 145.
93 Skoug, Lost Fight for Freedom, 145.
94 Dawisha, The Kremlin and the Prague Spring. 323.
95 Dawisha, The Kremlin and the Prague Spring. 324-325.