l)ershina Cable

Vol. 20 No. 6

56th Field Artillery Brigade

June 1983

P II: Keeping the Bear at bay

by Paul Rapp

U.S. negotiators emphasize that tht TNF

(Ediror's Noce: The following was writ1en

by Le. Col Paul Rapp, USA-Ret. and reprinttd by permission from The Rerirtd Officer Magazine, April 198J.)

Heralded as the mo,st accurate ballistic

missile ever built, it is capable of delivering a
nuclear warhud hundreds of miles into
enemy territory to strike within feet of its
intended target. Instead of just hitting "within the ballpark," it is designed to seek out
home plate. It is the fim ballistic missile
capable of maneuvering as it nears its in
tended targ<t, and reputed to be the weapon
most fe.ared by Moscow.
The system is Pehing II, currently said to
be the Army's and perhaps tht nation's highest-priority missile system. And it has taken
on a political role as well as its basic one of a
9

theater nuclc.ar weapon4 Because iu 1,000

plus-mile range would reach inside the Soviet

homeland in minutes, and because of its
touted accuracy, it has captured the dose
attention of the Soviets, who have offered
strenuous objections and threats to its planned deployment. Thus the 34-foot Pershing
II becomes a strong b,rgaining chip in any

modemi1ation is not expected to match

Soviet totals, but only to regain~ respectable

deterrent effect.
Thus the new TNF will have a primary
mission of countering the 340 or more threewarhead SS-20 missiles now deployed by the
Soviets and placed well within range of
Bonn, Oslo, Paris, Brussels, London, Rome
and even Madrid. With the introduction of
Pershing II, the Russians would for the first
time also experienct being on tbc end of an
intermediate-range missile trajectory and a

powerful nuclear destructive force ,h..

would be only eight to 10 minu,es away. As
might be exp<:ctcd, the Soviets arc not
pleased with the thought. It is believed by
some to be the major incentive behind rhc
Kremlin's recent string of one-sided proposals-,nd might eventually lead to serious
negotiations by the Soviets for reduction in

nuclear weapons.
To date, howcvtr, the Soviets have declined the 'zero-zero" offer by President
Reagan wherby he would cancel dep!O)'mtnt
of Pershing II and the cruise miuile if all
Russian SS-20s, S5-4s and SS-Ss targeted

discussion with the Kremlin regarding reduc- aga.i.nst We-stern Euro~ are destroyed. So..iet
rion or t liminalion of theat~r nuclear Foreign Minister Andrei Grom)'ko has ofweapons.
fered, in tum, 10 reduce the tactical "nukes" .

AIMED AT SOVIETS
If deployment to West Germany starts in
December 1983 a.s scheduled, and ,II indications are that it will, Pershing II will be the

Tougher drug stance

to weed out abusers
by Thoma, Copeland
Officers and senior enlisted personnel
can be separated from the Army for
first-time drug use under a new policy
eff.:ctive July l. In addition, the policy
calls for mandatory urinalysis testing at
lea.st onc,e a ycu for pe:oplc in sensitive

duty positions. However, the 56th FA

Bde.'s Commanding General's policy is
that testing will be done at least twice a
year.

Under the new policy, all officers,

warr,nt officers and senior enlisted (E6
and above) determined to be illegal drug
users will be immedi..ely separated
from the Army.
The term 'determined to be' includes
soldiers who arc identified through urinalysis and confirmed drug abusers by
either ADAPCP or medical screening.
Additionally, initiation of separation
proceedings does not necessarily me.an
automatic scpuation. Sep.ar,uion actions

will be made at the lowest possible level.

When the recommendation for elimination reaches the General Court Martial/
Convening Authority (GCM/CA) for
officers, he/she may disapprove the recommendation and direct other disposition or forward it t0 Department of the
Army (DA) to be handled as any other
recommended elimination.

Officials have smed that they would

lik-c to keep sepamion proceedings at

the lowest levels. That way, a unit commander at the company/battery level
can begin proceedings. In those cases
where the soldier has more than 18 years
in the service, ,he final decision for elimination rcsu with DA.
All soldiers in ...sensitive Military
Occupational Specialities .,ill undergo
urinalysis testing at lcut once a ycu.
Brig. Gen. William s...w, 56th FA
Bde. Comman<ier, has stated that because of the nature of the unit, testing
will b don at least twice a year. Urinalysis testing is used regularly by commanders to identify marijuana and hard
drug users. Until now it has not been
mandatory for any speciality.
The new policy is the latest in the
Army's continuing battle against illegal
drug use withi" its ranks.
"Simply stated, said an Army Drug
and Alcohol official, "drug abuse is incompatible with military service and
consequently will not be tolerated in the
Army. Soldiers who abuse drugs jeopardiz:e their O'Vn s.afcty1 their careers, and
the safety and welfare of those who
work with them."
Maj. Ralph F rick, th brigade Judge
Advocate, reiterated this point by saying, "This policy only continues th
Army's trend that we would rather separate soldien from the military than

try to rehabilitate them."

first new mi!sile in 20 ve~rs to bt itationed in

Europe and aimed at the Soviet Union. It will

replace the original 400-mile-rang Pershing
missile tha, is nearing its 20ch anniversary as
a successful nuclear detencnt on a readiness

status within the forms of West Germany.

The new Pershing ll missil,s will be swapped
with the older ones on a one9onone basi.s, a
fact often overlooked when discussing nuclear totals.
The replacement missile was at first plonned to have tht same 400-mile range as the
agin,, original Pershing. But because of the
conunucd Soviet buildup of long-range, offense-orienttd and MIRVed SS-20 missiles
and Backfire Bomber units, the NATO
ministers a~rccd in December 1979 that it
was tsscntaal, to go a step further and
modernize the Pershing II by extending its
ran~e as a counter to the increased threat. In
addnion to 108 Pmhing II missiles, this
emerging two-pronged NATO Tactical
Nuclear Force (TNF) is to include some 4M
nuclear tipped, ground-launched cruise missiles to be based in several European countries. The idea is to convinet the Sovieu that
an invasion by them would extract an unac
ceptable price.
The Russians claim that nuclear forces on
both sides of the Iron Curtain arc currently
about equal and the deployment of Pershing
II and cruise missile would upw that "balance' to their disadvaruagt. However, in
recent months, Defense Secretary Casper
Weinberger has said time nd again that such
claims arc nonsense, and that as a result of
the SS-20s with their triple warhead,, the
Soviets now have a six-to-one edge over the
West in intermediaterange launchers and
warheads in Europe. NATO sources report a
difference of at least fouT to one. Whatev<r
the case, Pershing II and the cruise missiles
arc to help narrow the gap.

to 162 to "equal" the number of missiles

owned by England and France, but would
-1imply move ,hem to another position rather
than have them destroyed. In making rhe
offer, he chost 10 ignore the fact that the SS20s carry three independent warheads while
the French and English countcrpam are singles. In effect, Gromyko was trying 10 equate
162 with 486. The offer was declined.
The continuing role of Pershing II as a
pawn was recntly resuttd by We1t German
foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher
who told the Council of Europe ,he Soviets
"'ill be strious about reduction talks onlv if
convinced the U.S. will go ahud with 'deployment plans. He said he was inclined 10
believe the Russian~ were rtady wlch .serious
negotiations "but only if it is clear beyond
ny doubt" that the West 'will stick to itS
decision to deploy irs missilts if there is no
agreement at the negotiatinJ table."
French President Francois Mitterrand has
made similar declarations, Stating that the
U.S. should cling "with all cleuness" to its
decisions.
OPPOSITION PROGRAMS, RALLIES
Opposition to the Pershing ii sysctm is
not confined 10 the Russians but also comes
from the clergy, Congress and various anti
nuke groups in Westcm Europe and the
United States. Some objections are based on
moral ground., , on com, on a concern that
the system is not technically possible or, in
the case of the West Germans where the
Pershing II missiles ""ould be stationed, on
an understanding but perhaps misdirected
fear for their own welfare. Some portions of
this opposition, particularly in West Germany, are Soviet fermented. In other areas,
such sponsorship is questionable. but the end
result can be the- s.amt. And ,even where

objections are sincere and spontaneous and

can't be blamtd on tht Communim, it
would be reasonable to assume the actions
arc deeply appreciated by them and arc bting
exploited to whatever extent possible.
con11nued on pege I

Keeping the Soviet bear at bay

mns ract. Such ,n agreemtnt would be welcomed in some form or another by most
Americans, but unfortunately, there is no
rc,dily appucnt companion diurmament
clamor uking place behind the Iron Curtain.
D isarm:amtnt and Fretzt protest ac1ivity
setms d iretted at rhe U.S. and can be ex
pcctod to accelerate during the coming summer, both home and abroad.

continued frOIII pege 1

These so-called "peace mo,ements or
nuclear freeze groups have continuing pro
gram, and are olten orchcsrratcd nlliu in
Europe :md 1n the U.S. They he found
support at home among isolated members of
Congress, such as Sons. Mark Hatfield (R
Ore.) ,nd Edmd Ktnncdy (D-Mm.). Both
have publicly called for a halt to the nuclear

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three reasons: First, by extending Pershing's

rang< from oo miles to more ,han 1,000
milts, th< primary deterrent factor comes
from th, missile's direct thrut to lacilttiC$.
West German protc.sters, of course, have a within tht Soviet homeland, rather 1han
more personal in tercst and, to a degree, face a against targets in ,he Federal Republic of
Catch-22 proposition. Th, Ruuians are Germany. Secondly, if it tvcr should be
making the mo51 of i,. Such public opposi- nrccss:ary lO detonate a. nuke within West
tion in West Germany gets open support Germany, Pershing II is said to be 10 rimes
from visiting Soviet government officials and more accurate than ,he original missile and
through a propa,anda blitt bastd on partial ihus more ufcly targeted to avoid friendly
information and misinformation. Other ob- areas. And, Pershing's ne.,. accuracy also
jections result from not fully mining the means it can carry a "cleaner and smaller
yitld warhead that can penetrate point targ<ts
altrrnati't'cS.
By th< ""ay of background, NATO dt- and prove more militarily dfectivt wnhou,
cided H years ago to rely on U.S. long-range inflicting damage on neighboring nonmilit
nuclc~r weapons I such as Tit.an, Minuteman ary areas. This ability 10 pluck an airfield or
and Poseidon, "' its insurane< againu the tank assembly area from tht face of the map
massive Str<n~h of Warsaw Pict convention- without dest.roying nearby nonurgets is r<
al armies. Th" powerful, high-yield nuclear fcrred to within P.rshing circles as "surKical
deterrent force, from bases within the Conti- utraction. " The net result is substant11I n:

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from a Western viewpoint if ,he effect is to
simply lock-in the 1iMO-On< Soviet adnn
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Pershing Notebook
Class "A"s mandatory
Beginning July I, soldiers traveling in ~niform through public placts, including air
terminals, mun wear thtir complete Class A uniform. including dress coat.
The new policy, designed to improve ,he Army's image, affem all soldiers traveling
10 or from ,heir home stations on temporary duty, p<rmanent ehangc of station or
leave. It docs not apply to soldiers travelong within or around th,ir duty Station,, or for
commuting to ind from work.

When troveling on TOY, PCS or leavt through the-/ublic sector soldiers may nn,
wear rhc black windbre,ker or/ullover sweater inn< of rht dross coat.
When actually enrouce aboar a pub~c mode of trlnsportation, soldiers may remove
,he green coat.
Soldiers rnvtling by private or commercial transportation may wear civilian clothing, unless 01herwi1c directd by their commanders.
Soldiers traveling aboard DOD or MAC flighu will war the uniform designated by
th<ir commanders. Civilian clothing is authorized if required.

DEERS Enrollment Deadline

Beginning July 1, the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the uniformed Services
(CHAMPUS) will only paydaims of the family members of active duty and mired
military personnel whou farnilics are enrolled in the Defense Enrollmen1 and Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS). After that date, CHAM PUS will use DEERS inform
uon 10 verify and pay claims.
According 10 deftnce huhh officials, DEERS is designed to imporvc mmagement
and to ensure that milimy bcncfiu such as health factilitios and CHAMPUS are used
only by eligible personnel.
Active duty and retired military personnel ,re automatically <nrooled, but their
family memben should be regiSttrred with DEERS 10 ensure that they are in enterec
in,o the sysm. Thou who are nor yet cnrooled in DEERS or who require updatct of
their records ,hould contact their military personnel office /or mistance.

Contracts honored
The Army says it will honor the re-cnlinmcnt comminments made 10 those female
soldim who no"' hold jobs a,, nuclear, biol01:ical and chemical warfare specialist - and
MOS recently closed to "'omen u a result of the Women in ,he Army Policy Group
Recommendations.
It has been ttport the Army was considereing allowing some 400 femal< soldiers who
hold the MOS ro re-up because of a shortage of personnel in the fidd. However,
officials say re-onlinment contract obligations arc ,he primary reason for letting them
my on the job.
"When the Army originally closed the MOS 10 women it also announce i, would
honor the re-up committments 10 soldiers already holding it. Some of rhosc soldim
have obligations to nay in for another six years, said one official.

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ncntal U.S. or ar ,ca, was NATO's choice

over tht expensivt alttmativt of beefing up
ground troops, tank,, artillery and aireraft 10
match those forces immediately available to
the Warsaw Pact. Wm European nations ar
the tim< declined such buildup, albeit for
economic or other reasons. and nukes thus
remained the only choice. And for )) ycm,
the Strategy appears to havt been successful
in preventing wu.

As a further d ctcrrent and in hopes of

confining any nuclear use 10 its lowcsr denominator, the smaller, highly mobile, low
yitld, 400-mile-raage Pershing I was introduced by the U.S. Army in,o Europe in 19M
as part of a theaterbascd nuclear for. Three
U.S. Pershing artillery banalions and two
West German Air Foret "Gruppes subsequently targeted their missilu against possible enemy avenues of approach at or nt>r the
Wu, German border :md in E"t Germany.
There, for the P"t 20 years, tht system has
bn a part of NATO's nmegy of flexible
response and a major mca.ns to counter any
auauh from the ovttWhclming Warsaw Pact
tank and artillcry-dominad armies. Even
today, NATO conventional force,, alone,
aro generally belie"ed inadequate to stop a
determined :md prolonged conven,ional JItack from the Eut.
Because any such invasion by the Communisu would immediately place them on
Wost German soil, "nukes" fired into the
attacking forccs could be impacting on Germany, and could possibly take a 1011 of
frimdly citizens as well as tnemy uoops. In
additions, the longer it ukcs the U.S. pmident to release tht "nukes 10 the theater
eommander, :md the longer the delay by the
commander to employ them, dit de~r the
enemy might penetrate and the greater the
liklihood of friendly casualties. This has been
the case for two decades.
Pershing II, ho..,ever, is expected to better
the odds for Wm German rcsidcnu, particu,
larly 1ho1< in border areas.

THREAT TO FRIENDS REDUCED

With the planned deployment of Per,hing
II, the threat 10 fritndly Wtst German citizens ,unds to be greatly reduced for at least

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duction in casualiriu should a Pmhin~ II

ever nd to be deronad on the homeland.
Because Pershing II is rransponcd and
launched from a highlv mobile and elusi"e
rubMrtircd tn1ctor ua{lcr, and can bt set up
and fired "''lthin minutes, it would not be an
e.,y ,arger for deiection and thus reducu 1he
liklihood of attracting nuclear counterfirc 10
any particular area.
Persliing II detractors have arisen within
elements of the clergy where ,he system is
nor attacked singly but where the ust of
generic nucltar weapons has bn declartd
immoral. But even among church officials of
various dcnominuions there is disagreement
and reminders that such moral prostation,
are too one-sided and not al ..an balanced
against proven acu of aggression by the
Soviet Union. Other churchmen ha,e urged
caution in their recommendations. and th,u
while raking a moral n:md on uniluenl nucltar diu.nnamcnt to 1lso r~mtmbtr that nations have the right 10 defend rhcmschcs th<
best way ,hey can.
Limited congrossional opposition uke,
root in ,he expense assoiciated with the
Pershing II system that h.. experienccd , 10
pcrctnt inc.rca.se in development cost since iu

inception in 1979. Proponents, meanwhile,

~int out 1h11 10 percent is less than the
inflation rate for th< same period. At one
point 1.., Ixcembcr the Hous Appropriations Commince's Subcommincc on Oe.
lense cu, $500 million from Pershing lJ funds
bucd on a concem that .. exccuivc concur-

rency" was Je,ding to test failures, an argument resulting_ from ,he Army's reduction in
the number of test flighu from 28 10 18. A,
the samr time. it innructtd Manin Marrircu.
Aerosp~cc, the prime contn ctor, to acccltr..

ate production 10 meet the early deployment

plan. But, according 10 the Army, rhe accdcruion of production me-ans a saving of millions of dollars. In addition, the two pani,I
failures arc not excessive in ,he development
program for a missile that u,es 12,000 parts.
And evm those two mishds.. m Arm,
spokesman points out, rcsuhc from an easily remedied fabrication problem. no, a design flaw. Totally succc.,fuJ test flights have
proven 1ha1 to be correct.
June 1983