(1943) Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. II, No. 3

OL.II NO.
NOVEMBER 1943
NTELLIGENCE
ULLETIN
FOR USE OF MILITARY
O j J i ^ L Y . i NOT
TO t l
fc^
!YXIKTELLIGENC
Intelligence Bulletin
VOL. II, NO. 3

MID 461
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

War Department
Washington 25, D. C.
November 1943
NOTICE
The Intelligence Bulletin is designed primarily for the use of
junior officers and enlisted men. It is a vehicle for disseminating
to them the latest information received from Military Intelligence
sources. In order to insure the widest possible use of this bulletin,
its contents are not highly classified; however, it is for the ex
clusive use of military personnel. Reproduction within the mili
tary service is permitted provided that (1) the source is stated,
(2) the classification is maintained, and (3) one copy of the pub
lication in which the material is reproduced is sent to the Dis
semination Unit, Military Intelligence Division, War Depart
ment, Washington 25, D. C.
It is recommended that the contents of this bulletin be utilized

whenever practicable as a basis for informal talks and discussions
with troops.
Eeaders are invited to comment on the use that they are making
of the Intelligence Bulletin and to forward suggestions for future
issues. Such correspondence may be addressed directly to the
Dissemination Unit, Military Intelligence Division, War De
partment, Washington 25, D. C. Requests for additional copies
should be forwarded through channels for approval.
55476543vol. 2, No. 3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
P A R T O N E : G E R M A N Y
S E C T I O N I.
G E R M A N SOLDIER D E S C R I B E S T E R R O R OF SICILY R E T R E A T ,
1. Introduction
2. R e t r e a t in Sicily
3. A General W a s Bitter
II.
III.
\
2
S I X - B A R R E L R O C K E T W E A P O N ( T H E " N E B E L W E R F E R 41")
1.
2.
3.
4.
Introduction
Description
:
Note on Operation
H o w t h e German Army Uses I t
16
1. I n t r o d u c t i o n
2. G e r m a n E s t i m a t e of Our Tactics
3. G e r m a n Principles of Defense
a. Obstacles
b. Protection of Defenses
c. Observation Posts
d.
Communicating
Preparation
20
Reserves
f. Defense Tactics
g. Opening of Fire
h. Conclusions
IV.
16
17
18
18
19
19
an Alarm__'
of Mobile
20
20
21
21
W E A K N E S S E S OF ARTILLERY D E F E N S I V E POSITIONS
22
2. H o w Faults Were T o Be Corrected
a. Precautions Against Damage by Fire
b . Further Construction of Firing Positions
c. Track Discipline
d. Alternate Positions
:
e. "Last Covering Height"
_____
f. Conclusion
V.
TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF F L A K IN THE F I E L D
2. H e a v y Flak
a. General
b . Employment
c. Employment
3. Light Flak
a. General
b . Employment
c. Employment
VI.
___
in Rear Areas
in Forward Areas
1. Improvised Bangalore Torpedoes

2. N e w Army C a p
11
22
22
22
23
24
24
25
25
26
in Rear Areas
in Forward Areas
MISCELLANEOUS
10
13
14
P R I N C I P L E S OF D E F E N S E A G A I N S T A I R B O R N E T R O O P S
e.
Page
26
27
27
30
30
33
33
34
35
37
37
38
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART T W O :
IH
JAPAN
Page
SECTION I.
II.
N E W JAPANESE
WEAPONS
39
1. Introduction
2. Pull-type Hand Grenade
a. Description
b. Table of Characteristics
c. Operation
d. Booby-trapping Possibilities
3. Offensive Hand Grenade
a. Description
b. Operation
4. Model 1 (1941) 47-mm AT Gun
5. Booby Traps
a. Device Using a Parasol
b. Device Using a Flashlight
c. Device Using a Pipe
d. Device Using a Bottle
39
39
39
40
40
42
42
42
43
43
45
46
-46
47
48
N O T E S ON J A P A N E S E LANDING OPERATIONS
49
1. Introduction
2. Action Before Landing
a. Selection of Landing Points
b. Reconnaissance of Landing Points
c. Selection of Time for Landings
3. Action During Landing
a. Water and Terrain Difficulties
b. Overcoming Resistance
c. Communication and Liaison
d. Duties of Debarkation Work Units
4. Action After Landing
III.
ANTIAIRCRAFT
MEASURES
1. General
2. At Sea
a. Weapons
b. Tactics
3. While Landing
4. On Land
IV.
49
49
49
50
50
51
51
51
56
56
57
59
---
SOME D E F E N S E TECHNIQUES USED BY JAPANESE
1. As Seen by Observers
2. According to Documents
V.
MORALE,
1.
2.
3.
4.
64
64
65
CHARACTERISTICS OF JAPANESE SOLDIER
Introduction
General
Enemy Instructions
Army-Navy Relations
59
60
60
60
62
62
66
66
66
67
69
IV
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART T H R E E : UNITED
NATIONS
Page
70
SECTION I. SOME H E A L T H R U L E S FOR F A R EAST AREAS
1. Introduction
2. Insect Carriers of Diseases
a. Mosquitoes
b. Lice
c. Fleas
d. Ticks
e. Mites
f. Flies
3. Animals; Diseases Acquired from Them
a. Rabies (mad-dog bite, hydrophobia)
b. Snake Bite
c. Leeches
4. Venereal Diseases
5. Sunburn, Sunstroke, and Heat Exhaustion
6. Minor Wounds
II.
How
To
70
70
71
75
76
77
78
78
80
80
80
82
83
84
85
PROTECT YOUR F E E T
1. Introduction
2. Regarding Care of Feet
3. Regarding Footwear
a. Fitting Shoes
b. Care of Shoes
c. Care of Socks
4. Regarding Foot Troubles
a. Sweaty Feet
b. Blisters
86
86
86
87
87
87
87
88
88
88
ANNEX
How
TO IDENTIFY W A R GASES
89
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
FIGURE 1. German Rocket Six-barrel Projector (side view)
FIGURE 2. German Rocket Six-barrel Projector (front view)
FIGURE 3. New German Army Cap
FIGURE 4. Japanese Pull-type Hand Grenade
FIGURE 5. Japanese Grenade Booby Trap_
FIGURE 6. Japanese Offensive Hand Grenade
FIGURE 7. Model 1 (1941) 47-mm AT Gun
1
FIGURES 8-11. Japanese Booby Traps
10
12
38
41
42
43
45
46-48
PART O N E :
Section I.
GERMANY 1
GERMAN SOLDIER DESCRIBES

TERROR OF SICILY RETREAT
1. INTRODUCTION
A letter found in an abandoned German gun posi

tion near Troina, Sicily, gives a fairly comprehensive
picture of what went on in the mind of at least one
enemy soldier during the retreat.
Possibly because their training has stressed offensive
problems at the expense of defensive problemsthe
customary proportion has been 10 to 1many German
soldiers seem to lack enthusiasm for the defense.
Readers of the Intelligence Bulletin will recall a num
ber of articles in which high-ranking German officers
have been quoted as expressing dissatisfaction, not
only with the preparation of defensive positions, but
with the defensive tactics of small units. This letter
indicates that, although a number of factors can con
tribute to the lowering of the German soldier's morale
while he is on the defensive, XL S. artillery barrages
play a substantial part in crippling the enemy's will to
fight.
1
On page 8 of Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. II, No. 2, the caption under figure
3 should read "Pulk Used for Winter Transport of German Light Machine
Gun." In line 12 of the same page, the word "panoramic" should be inserted
immediately before the word "sights."
INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
IT. S. soldiers have been conducting a type of "psy

chological warfare"perhaps without realizing it. It
must be remembered that a German's mind is as vul
nerable as his body. This particular letter reveals a
state of uncertainty and depression which might be
called the symptom of a contagious mental illness. It
is to be hoped that, under the pressure of our attacks
and counterattacks, this illness will spread throughout
the German Army.
An order issued by the commanding general of the
Hermann Goering Division is added, to illustrate how
pessimism and fear can be communicated from one
German soldier to another.
2. RETREAT IN SICILY
23 July 1943.
DEAR FAMILY:
I want to send you a report about these past few days, so that
in case I never come home, you will know what we are putting
up with down here in Sicily.
Two days after the British and the Americans had landed,
they had gained so much ground, and had succeeded in bring
ing so many troops, that it was impossible to anticipate a battle
with equal forces. On 14 July we missed being captured by just
1 hour. We took up a new position, which the Americans
promptly covered with artillery fire, costing us our first victims.
From this position we retreated againtoward the flankand
took up still another position. This move nearly sealed our
fate. I am supposed to keep my vehicle near the commander,
and serve as a communication trouble-shooter. Whenever the
telephone line is damaged by artillery fire, the order is "Get out
and repair." (We are fighting in the central sector, and are
opposing crack U. S. and Canadian troops.) Such an order
GERMANY
SOLDIER DESCRIBES TERROR OF SICILY RETREAT
came at 2100 on 20 July, three nights ago. Right after we had

left our position, such a terrific barrage started that an infantry
sergeant swore he had never experienced anything like it, even
in Russia. Many were killed. Several of my comrades and I
were right in the thick of it. It is impossible to describe the
terror of that experience. We pressed our faces to the ground
and waited for a direct hit, or flying fragments, to take our
lives.
Meanwhile, people back home in Germany were vacationing,
going to cafes and movies, and enjoying themselves. I asked
myself "Where is the justice which is supposed to exist?"
At 0400 we got back to our position. At least, we were still
alive. We could hear machine-gun and rifle fire. We went to
sleep, anyway, although our commander had already departed.
Half an hour later, I was awakened suddenly. There were orders
for me. The Americans were in the immediate vicinity, and all
lines had to be disconnected. We were 10 men altogether. We
had a large personnel carrier and a small one. It was necessary
to go slowly on the dirt roads, but on the highway we traveled as
fast as the vehicles would go. At a junction a car was lying on
its side, constituting a road block. It seemed impossible to take
the vehicles any distance across country, because of the nature of
the ground, but we made it. Then it happened. We rounded a
curve and ran into concentrated rifle and machine-gun fire. I felt
as if God had suddenly put a wall of flying steel in front of me!
At this moment I thought of all of you.
I had to get the car through, and somehow or other I succeeded
in doing it. Afterward, the man in the seat beside me looked at
me and I looked at him. We were white as chalk. But we had
survived. (May God always be with me ! I am asking this, and
I know you are asking it, too.) A short distance away friends
were waiting for us. They had observed everything through field
glasses. When we reported that the other car could hardly be
expected to come through, our 22-year-old lieutenant, who was
already there, gave us a tongue-lashing. He said that he had
expected more of us to get through, and that we should be ashamed
to say such things. I had to hold myself back in order not to

leap at his throat. He didn't know the whole story, of course,
inasmuch as he had left the position an hour earlier. However
some of the missing men eventually got through by foot.
A little town, which by now had been occupied by the Ameri
cans, was shelled by our artillery. In return, the American ar
tillery fired on our positions, costing us a number of wounded
and forcing us to change our position once again. We had re
treated 30 kilometers 2 and had had only a single day of rest.
But here "rest" meansair attacks! ( I am obliged to admit that
while I have been fighting in Sicily, I have seen only two German
airplanes.) Hostile enemy air reconnaissance discovered us, and
the next day the Americans placed artillery barrages on our new
est position. I t became a miserable hell, and we had to abandon
it that evening.
As a rule, we travel only at nightin pitch dark, without lights,
and seldom on a main road. You can imagine what this means
especially when we are forever under fire. At noon of this day,
I was ordered to take out a detail and look for our motorcycle
runner, who was missing up front. We searched for him until it
was nearly dark, but without success. We returned, hoping to get
some sleep after the misery of the past two days, but found that
everyone had moved again to a new position, taking advantage of
the darkness.
We had a corporal with us who said he knew the route of march,.
but he gave us faulty directions. A hundred times we had to
drop to the ground because of hostile planes. Planes are always
aroundnothing but American and British ones, unfortunately.
We rode through a town, but had to stop 500 yards beyond it,
inasmuch as we didn't know whether this road was still in Ger
man hands. Here we experienced a bombing attack. The town
was very badly hit. Moreover, our vehicles were being shot at by
mortars. We were terribly frightened, but we had to get through.
Luckily, every bullet does not kill, and our venture succeeded.
2
1 kilometer equals approximately % mile.
GERMANY
We had already been posted as missing and our lieutenant him

self had gone out to look for us. Not only were we safe, but our
motorcycle runner had returned safely, too!
Our infantry had repulsed two heavy attacks. As a result, our
light truck, which was all shot up, could be towed. While we
were taking care of this, British planes appeared overhead. A
moment later a nearby explosion threw my assistant driver and
myself out of the car. I happened to land in the fairly soft
earth of a bomb crater, and wasn't badly hurt. But my assistant
driver was thrown onto the hard surface of the road and was still
lying there when I found him. I took him to a field hospital.
He had suffered head and face injuries. I feel very close to this
fellow, since he and I have been through so many sad hours to
gether. He will soon be with us again.
We are always being pursued. Half the time we don't know
what day or date it is. As you can probably guess, I have been
writing this letter piecemeal from time to time. I started it a
week ago. How many new positions we have retired to since then !
This past Sunday we were in still another one, and again the
American artillery covered us. You have no idea what it is like
to hear shells whizz over your headall night longeverlast
ingly. It's so hard to sleep ! At 0500 on Monday I had to go out
trouble-shooting. The line was down in seven places. My car
passed a field aid station, where there were men who had literally
been torn to pieces. A ghastly sight! I couldn't eat anything
that noon. All that day our position was shelled. We kept run
ning and flopping down under the carup and down, up and
down. Suddenly, at 1900 a terriffic barrage came at us, and again
my detail and I had to take down the communication lines while
the others departed. Several times we had to stop, jump out,
and take cover. The shells seemed to whistle past, a yard ahead
of us or a yard behind us. At 0200 the next morning we were
safe again. Unfortunately, I had developed a bad boil on my
right knee. This morning they lanced it. It was very painful.
Again we have taken up new positions. For the moment it is
55470543vol. 2, No. 3
still quiet herebut for how long? The whole thing will start
all over again.
Today we learned that Mussolini had been kicked out. This
means the end of Fascism, too. Will Italy turn against us now?
Whatever will become of us is debatable. It can hardly be sup
posed that this event will turn out for the good.
Incidentally, Hans Maier and most of my other friends are all
with the Services of Supply, 30 to 40 kilometers to the rear. I
don't suppose anything much will happen to them. My comrade
Huebner is in Germany by now, and has probably visited you and
told you a small part of what is going on. He has had damn
good luck. Do you know that recently wTe were awakened at
0300 because mail had arrived? At that time I received your
letters of the 7th and 11th of July, as well as a newspaper and
two picture post cards from Schala, who was vacationing in
Allgaou. He said, "From a wonderful rest and furlough days,
the heartiest greetings." You can't imagine what I felt like
when I read that. Hourly I fight for my life, and then suddenly
I get Schala's post card. I just haven't the heart to answer it.
28 July 1943.
Yesterday things were fairly quiet in our new position, although
occasionally we could hear artillery in the distance. A tremen
dous number of planes passed overhead. Flak is constantly being
fired, yet I have never seen a plane shot down. Our Luftwaffe
must be employed elsewhere, because I still haven't seen any Ger
man planes to speak of. Tonight there is a terrific thunderstorm
going on, and our comrades who are further up front must be
wretchedly uncomfortable. I can hardly stand listening to the
noise any longer. The lightningcoupled with everything that
has happenedshatters my nerves. I find it impossible to sleep
after a storm like this. All I can manage are little naps, in which
I have bad nightmares. Oh, if I could only have a roof over my
head again! We're always sleeping on the ground, and in a
different place every night.
GERMANY
29 July 1943.
Last night we moved out without having been fired on. Even
in transit, we did not encounter what we call "magic fire"
(Feuerzauher). This is the name that we give to the insane ar
tillery barrages that the enemy places on us. Around midnight
we arrived at our new position. While sleeping on the ground,
we heard reverberations, as if we were sleeping in a basement
while somebody upstairs was moving furniture. So even
though we weren't directly under the "magic fire," we weren't
allowed to forget it. . . .
Our food is good. Every day we also receive a bit of hard
candy, half a cake of chocolate, and a box of "Attikah" cigar
ettes. The cigarettes don't last long, however. You have no
idea how much one smokes, just to distract one's thoughts. As
to myself, I must report that I am having a great deal of trouble
with my ears. The artillery fire, together with the clouds of
dust that we endure while we are traveling, deprives me more
and more of my hearing. I really hear very badly now, and can
notice it myself. This gives me a very insecure feeling. Since
I was last in the hospital, I haven't had any pus in my knee
so that seems to be coming along all right. But my sense of
hearing is something I'll never be able to regain entirely. If I
live, I'll always have a certain degree of deafness.
Two of our men remained too long under cover during an
artillery barrage, and while they were there, the unit moved out.
They didn't rejoin us until the following day. They were
threatened with a court-martial. These fellows may have been
a little bit to blame, but such a threat is too severe and very de
pressing. One can very easily fall into a "bad light" here.
Everything is construed as "dereliction of duty," and the sever
est punishments are decreed.
1 August 1943.
Sunday again. Will I ever be able to mail this letter ? Oh, I
wish I could tell you, my beloved ones, what we are going
through in this campaign! Our infantry suffers even more.
Yesterday I lost a very good comrade. Everything is against

us. The hostile artillery fires with its heaviest-caliber guns on
our road of retreat. Right now the "Tommy" is attacking. It
won't last long. Our only possible line of retreat is through
burning fields and woods and towns subjected to artillery fire.
The future looks terribly dark. . . .
3. A GENERAL WAS BITTER
There were many other German soldiers in Sicily who

felt as did the writer of this letter. An order of General
Conrath, commanding general of the Hermann Goering
Division, testifies eloquently to the fact that the BritishAmerican onslaught dealt a sledgehammer blow to the
morale of a unit which formerly had been the pride of
the German Army.
During the past few days, I have had the bitter experience of
watching scenes which are not worthy of a German soldier, par
ticularly not of a soldier of the Hermann Goering Division.
Men came running to the rear, hysterically crying because they
had heard the detonation of a single shot fired somewhere in the
distance. Others, deceived by false rumors, moved whole columns
to the rear. In one instance, supplies were senselessly distributed
to soldiers and civilians by a supply unit which had fallen victim
to a rumor. I wish to state that not only the younger soldiers,
but also noncoms and warrant officers, were guilty of panicstricken behavior.
Panic, "Panzer fear," and the spreading of rumors are to be
eliminated by the strongest possible measures. Cowardice and
withdrawal without orders are to be punished on the spot, and,
if necessary, by the use of weapons.
I shall apply the severest measures of court-martial against
such saboteurs of the fight to free our nation, and I shall not hesi
tate to pronounce death sentences in serious cases.
I expect all officers to use their influence in suppressing this
undignified attitude throughout the Hermann Goering Division.
Section II. SIX-BARREL ROCKET WEAPON

(THE "NEBELWERFER 41")
I. INTRODUCTION
Whenever the fortunes of the German Army take a

new turn for the worse, Nazi propagandists attempt to
encourage the people of the Reichand influence pub
lic opinion in neutral countriesby spreading rumors
of new and formidable developments in German ord
nance. Recently the Nazis have been releasing propa
ganda declaring that spectacular results are being
achieved with the German six-barrel rocket projector
known as the Nebelwerfer (smoke mortar) 41. Actu
ally, this is not a particularly new weapon. Its name,
moreover, is extremely misleading. In the first place,
the Nebelwerfer 41 is not a mortar at all, and, in the
second place, it can accommodate both gas-charged and
high-explosive projectiles, as well as smoke projectiles.
It would be just as foolish to discount the German
claims 100 percent as it would be to accept them unre
servedly. Although fire from the Nebelwerfer 41 is
relatively inaccurate, one of the weapon's chief assets
appears to be the concussion effect of its high-explosive
projectiles, which is considerable when the weapon's six
barrels are fired successively, 1 second apart. The highexplosive round contains 5 pounds of explosive; this is
9
10
comparablein weight, at leastto the high-explosive

round used in the U. S. 105-mm howitzer.
In view of the mass of misleading information which
has been circulated regarding the Nebelwerfer 41or,
as the Germans sometimes call it, the Do-Gerdtait is
hoped that junior officers and enlisted men willfindthe
following discussion both timely and profitable.
2. DESCRIPTION
The Nebelwerfer 41 (see figs. 1 and 2) is a six-bar

reled (nonrotating) tubular projector, with barrels 3 to
3% feet long and 160 mm in diameter. The projector
Figure 1.German Six-barrel Rocket Projector (side view).

X
U. S. soldiers in Sicily promptly nicknamed the Nebelwerfer U the

'Screaminsr Mimi."
GERMANY
SIX-BARREL ROCKET WEAPON
is mounted on a rubber-tired artillery chassis with a

split trail.
There is no rifling; the projectiles are guided by three
rails, each about %-inch high, which run down the
inside of the barrels. This reduces the caliber to
approximately 150 mm.
The barrels are open-breeched, and the propellant is
slow-burning black powder (14 pounds set behind the
nose cap). This propellant generates gas through 26
jets set at an angle. As a result, the projectiles rotate
and travel at an ever-increasing speed, starting with the
rocket blast. The burster, which is in the rear twosevenths of the projectile, has its own time fuze. The
range is said to be about 7,760 yards.
The barrels are fired electrically, from a distance.
They are never fired simultaneously, since the blast
from six rockets at once undoubtedly would capsize the
weapon. The order of fire is fixed at 1-4-6-2-3-5.
The sighting and elevating mechanisms are located
on the left-hand side of the barrels, immediately over
the wheel, and are protected by a light-metal hinged
box cover, which is raised when the weapon is to be
used.
Each barrel has a metal hook at the breech to hold the
projectile in place, and a sparking device to ignite the
rocket charge. This sparker can be turned to one side
to permit loading and then turned back so that the
"spark jump" is directed to an electrical igniter placed
in one of 24 rocket blast openings located on the pro
jectile, about one-third of the way up from the base.
12
Figure 2,German Six-barrel Rocket Projector (front view).
About one-third of the length of the projectile extends

below the breech of the weapon.
The projectile itself resembles a small torpedowith
out propeller or tail fins. The base is flat, with slightly
rounded edges. The rocket jets are located about onethird of the way up the projectile from the base, and
encircle the casing. The jets are at an angle with the
GEEMAKY-SIX-BARREL ROCKET WEAPON
13
axis of the projectile so as to impart rotation in flight,

in "turbine" fashion.
The propelling charge is housed in the forward part
of the rocket. A detonating fuze is located in the base
of the projectile to detonate the high-explosive or
smoke charge. In this way, on impact, the smoke or
high explosive is set off above ground when the nose
of the projectile penetrates the soil.
3. NOTE ON OPERATION
The following note on the operation of the Nebel

werfer 41 is reproduced from the German Army peri
odical Die WeJirmacht. It is believed to be substan
tially correct.
The Nebelwerfer 4-7, or Do-Gerat, is unlimbered and placed in
position by its crew of four men. As soon as the protective cover
ings have been removed, the projector is ready to be aimed and
loaded. The ammunition is attached to the right and to the left
of the projector, within easy reach, and the shells are introduced
two at a time, beginning with the lower barrels and continuing
upward. Meanwhile, foxholes deep enough to conceal a man in
standing position has been dug about 10 to 15 yards to the side
and rear of the projector. The gunners remain in these foxholes
while the weapon is being fired by electrical ignition. Within
10 seconds a battery can fire 36 projectiles. These make a droning
pipe-organ sound as they leave the barrels, and, while in flight,
leave a trail of smoke (see cover illustration). After a salvo has
been fired, the crew quickly returns to its projectors and reloads
them.
JO470O43vol. 2, No. ?,
14
4. HOW THE GERMAN ARMY USES IT
The following statements have been made by a highranking German Army officer, and may be accepted as
an authoritative expression of German ideas concerning
the employment of this weapon.
Units of Nebeltruppen (smoke-laying troops) are organized as
rocket-projector regiments (Werferregimenter), which are fully
motorized and therefore extremely mobile. A rocket-projector
regiment is divided into battalions and batteries, like those of the
artillery. Since rocket-projector regiments are capable of play
ing a decisive part in battle, they may be concentrated at stra
tegically important points along a front. . . . The organi
zation of a rocket-projector regiment is much like that of a
[German] motorized artillery regiment; organizationally, the
motor vehicles and signal equipment of both are also much the
same. Since the projector units usually are kept close behind the
forward infantry line, their batteries may also be equipped with
antitank guns. Because of the light construction of the projectors,
a 3-ton prime mover is sufficient for traction purposes, and can
also carry the gun crew and some of the ammunition. . . .
The Nebelwerfer 41 can fire three different types of projectiles:
high-explosive shells, incendiary projectiles, and smoke projectiles.
The high-explosive shells include those with supersensitive fuzes
and those with delayed-action fuzes. The latter can penetrate
reinforced cover. Because of their fragmentation and concussion
effect, high-explosive shells are used primarily against personnel.
It has been found that the concussion has not only been great
enough to kill personnel, but occasionally has caused field fortifi
cations and bunkers to collapse.
The incendiary projectiles are psychologically effective, and
under favorable conditions can start field and forest fires.
The smoke projectiles are used to form smoke screens or smoke
zones.
GE'RMANJYSIX-BARREL ROCKET WEAPON"
15
[This Die Wehrmacht article naturally does not discuss the

possible use of gas-charged projectiles.]
Kocket-projector troops are employed as battalion and regi
mental units, in keeping with their task of destroying hostile
forces by concentrated fire. One of the advantages of the Nebel
werfer Jfl is that it can mass its projectiles on a very small target
area. By means of a shrewd disposition of the batteries, a care
fully planned communication system, and a large number of
observation posts with advanced observers, the infantry can
assure for itself maneuverability and a concentration of its fire
power upon the most important points. Projectors are placed
well toward the frontalmost without exception, at points for
ward of the artilleryso that they will be able to eliminate
hostile command posts, destroy hostile positions, and even repulse
sudden attacks effectively. The firing positions of the projectors
are always carefully built up so that the weapons can give strong
support to the infantry.
In Russia, during the winter of 1942-43, many breakthrough
attempts by hostile forces were repulsed by direct fire from rocketprojector batteries.
Section III. PRINCIPLES OF DEFENSE

AGAINST AIRBORNE TROOPS
1. INTRODUCTION
The German Army is not relaxing its long-standing

vigilance in the matter of taking precautions against
possible attacks by United Nations airborne troops.
A German Army document of 8 April 1943 discusses
methods that the enemy believes we are likely to em
ploy, and summarizes the German principles of de
fense against such attacks. The Germans admit that
we can choose from a variety of tactics in planning an
airborne offensive, and that our chances of achieving
surprise are very great. Acknowledging that we may
try to deceive them with ruses and stratagems, the
Germans warn their soldiers to be prepared for all
kinds of unexpected and unpleasant surprises. They
point out that our parachute troops and air-landing
troops are likely to be employed in "the most fantastic
ways," and explain that for this reason each German
soldier must be trained to meet any crisis decisively
and with speed.
The following statements are paraphrased from the
German document.
16
GERMANY
DEFENSE AGAINST AIRBORNE TROOPS
17
2. GERMAN ESTIMATE OF OUR TACTICS

The United Nations have an excellent understanding of the
two main methods of airborne attack:
(a) A raid in which landings are made in the immediate
vicinity of the objective, so that a surprise attack may be under
taken.
(b) An attack in which landings are made at some distance
from the objective, and at a place where no effective immediate
defense is anticipated. The United Nations units then group
themselves, and prepare to advance and launch a planned attack.
In the first type of attack, the opposition will attempt a num
ber of separate small raids by parachutists, in an effort to gain
possession of important objectives as quickly as possible. (The
British, especially, will try to destroy these objectives at once in
order to cause confusion.) These small detachments of para
chutists with special tasks to perform may be dropped at night,
some hours before the main attack. After landing, they will
make the most of natural concealment, so as to approach their
objectives unobserved.
In the second type of attack, the landings are very often pre
ceded by air bombardment, followed immediately by the first
wave of parachutists. However, it is always possible that, in
order to gain complete surprise, a landing will not be preceded
by bombingor even that the opposition will try to create a diver
sion and deceive us by bombing an entirely different objective.
British parachute troops have been practicing night operations
for a long time. Hence it is necessary to be constantly alert.
It must be expected that well-trained parachutists will be ready
to fight a few seconds after landing.
The United Nations can drop parachutists on terrain of vir
tually any type. It is quite feasible to drop parachutists on
stony, irregular ground (as at Narvik) ; on ground covered with
thick, low growth and even with orchards (as on Crete) ; and
on ground crisscrossed by canals and ditches (as in Holland).
The dropping of parachutists is out of the question only on
18
ground where there are many high-tension cables, in deeply

ravined or thickly populated areas, or in woods where the trees
are tall. It is self-evident, however, that the employment of
parachute troops on a fairly large scale will call for open ground.
Since such a tremendous amount of ground is suitable for the
landing of parachutists and even of transport glidersthe latter
can land in remarkably confined spacesone must select and indi
cate on maps only those areas which are especially advantageous
for the landing of large numbers of parachutists and gliders, or
which are conceivably suitable for landing transport planes.
A battalion of parachutists needs a jumping area of 800 by 300
yards. The landing and debarkation of an air-landing battalion
on an airfield of medium size takes 45 minutes, provided hostile
forces do not interfere. It takes longer if artillery is carried.
Since it is by no means necessary for transport gliders to land
on airfields proper, these aircraft must be regarded as especially
dangerous. Small gliders can dive and get beneath the fire of the
defense. Also, since gliders are armed with machine guns, they
can return fire effectively. Although gliders can often be used
at night, they require a certain amount of light in the sky to land
satisfactorily.
It must be expected that gliders will be used in carrying out
isolated raids. For example, two 30-seater "Horsa" gliders were
used in a British raid near Trondheim. It is known that the
opposition is building a large number of these and of 60-seat
"Hamilcar'' gliders, as well.
3. GERMAN PRINCIPLES OF DEFENSE
a. Obstacles
We [the Germans] must erect obstacles on landing grounds

and in areas likely to prove inviting to parachutists and gliders.
Obstacles will be erected in front of, or all around, localities
strategically important to the defensefor example, entrances
to areas containing important establishments.
GERMANYDEFENSE AGAINST AIRBORNE TROOPS
19
Mines and wire can be especially effective against parachutists

and air-landing troops. (The "S" mine is excellent for this pur
j)ose.) In fact, the opposition is so aware of the danger of minefields to airborne troops that they will respect and avoid any area
that they have reason to believe is mined. However, to help deter
the opposition from attempting to land, dummy minefields, as well
as true mines spaced far apart, must be maintained as though
they were dangerous, thickly laid fields.
AH types of dummy defense works should be employed. The
defenders, as well as the attackers, must use imagination and
cunning.
Poles, ditches, piles of wood and broken furniture, farm wagons
piled with junk and with their wheels removed, and large mounds
of earth, stones, or manure can also prove effective obstacles.1
b. Protection of Defenses
Defenses must have all-around protection. For this reason

important defense works must be barricaded all-around against
raids by airborne troops. Also, all the inhabited area within a
defended work must be covered by automatic weapons. Since
batteries are very inviting targets, it will be necessary to provide
a sufficient number of sentries and machine guns to protect them.
Vehicles must never be concentrated in areas not adequately de
fended.
c. Observation Posts
Observation posts must be maintained on all high landmarks

(such as church steeples); this must be done everywhere, even
in rear areas. Such observation posts are indispensable, especially
in occupied territory, for spotting parachutists in time to give
warning.
1
See Intelligence Bulletin Vol. I, No. 11, pp. 48-51 for other Axis methods
of obstructing airfields.
20
d. Communicating an Alarm
Telephone lines are extremely vulnerable to destruction by air
borne troops. Therefore, there must always be an alternative
method of communicating an alarm. Church bells, bugles, or
drums may be employed.
e. Preparation of Mobile Reserves
As a general rule, even in preparation for minor attacks, it is
best to have mobile reserves available to serve as "commando
hunters." Machine guns, antitank guns, or 20-mm dual-purpose
guns should be mounted on the trucks that the reserves will use,
so that it will be possible to open fire from the vehicles. Machine
pistols and hand grenades should be provided, andif possible
light portable searchlights.
Flak personnel can be employed locally as combat squads.
Tanks and armored cars, if available, will offer the best possible
means of combatting airborne troops.
f. Defense Tactics
The defense must be conducted offensively. Therefore, do not
split up your forces, but make arrangements for a strong shock
reserve. If observation posts and reconnaissance units have not
supplied precise information, attack decisively whichever hostile
group seems to be tactically the most dangerous. An extended
period of inaction can have unfortunate consequences.
Use your reserves economically. All objectives of interest to
the enemy must be adequately manned, even if your own attack
is in progress. The main thing is to have an intuitive grasp of
what the airborne attackers' real intentions are, and not to allow
yourself to be deceived by diversionary attacks, dummy parachut
ists, and so on.
GERMANYDEFENSE AGAINST AIRBORNE TROOPS
21
g. Opening of Fire
The chances of your being able to hit parachutists during their
descent are very slight. It will be advisable to open fire only at
close range. Experience has shown that fire is likely to be most
effective just after the parachutists have touched the ground,
while they are detaching themselves from their parachutes, and
while they are trying to regroup themselves.
If it is not possible to cover with fire the locality in which
parachutists are landing, there may be some advantage in plac
ing sweeping machine-gun fire on the attackers while they are
still in the aireven if they are not within close range.
Transport planes flying overhead should be subjected to fire
as long as they are within range. Just before parachutists are
to be dropped, transports slow down and become extremely
vulnerable targets.
h. Conclusions
It must be recognized that the British and Americans have
made great progress in developing their methods of airborne
attack, and that they are capable of undertaking airborne oper
ations on a large scale. Whenever they believe that circum
stances are favorable, they will attempt to achieve decisive suc
cesses by using large numbers of airborne troops behind our
coastal defenses. For this reason we must continually examine
our defensive measures and keep them up to date.
When an airborne attack occurs, we must be able to estimate
the situation with lightning-like speed, dispatch accurate infor
mation to the proper quarters, and launch a determined attack
without regard to losses, even if we are outnumbered.
55470543vol. 2, No. 3
Section IV. WEAKNESSES OF ARTILLERY

DEFENSIVE POSITIONS
1. INTRODUCTION
In Sicily the positions of the Armored Artillery

Regiment of the Hermann Goering Division were so
unsatisfactory that on 23 July the regimental com
mander felt it necessary to issue a sharply worded
order requiring that certain outstanding weaknesses
be corrected at once. The commander had just re
turned from a visit to the batteries. His most signifi
cant statements are either quoted or paraphrased in
this section.
2. HOW FAULTS WERE TO BE CORRECTED
a. Precautions Against Damage by Fire
The regimental commander said, at the beginning of

his order:
We are in danger of suffering great damage by fire, not only
as a result of incendiary bombs, but because of the carelessness
of our own soldiers. I notice that, in spite of my repeated
written and oral warnings, the requisite measures for protection
against damage by fire have not been put into effect. I shall
hold the commanding officers of units responsible if adequate
measures are not at once ordered and carried out.
The expression "repeated warnings" is interesting.

Any weakness continually displayed by this regiment,
once regarded as a superior outfit, may sooner or later
become apparent elsewhere in the German Army,
GERMANY
ARTILLERY DEFENSIVE POSITIONS
23
granting the existence of such pressure as the United

Nations were able to bring to bear in Sicily. Even if
the weaknesses noted by this particular regimental
commander are not at present widespread, they are at
least symptomatican indication that the harder we
hit, the more rapidly German efficiency is likely to
decline.
The order stipulated that fire trenches be constructed
around guns and ammunition supplies in such a way
as not to interfere with the quick removal of camou
flage, when necessary.
In every position sufficiently large detachments of
fire sentries were to be ready day and night with the
necessary equipment such as Feuerpatschen (fire
brooms), filled water containers, and so on.
Prime movers and emergency trailers were to be
kept nearby, so that guns could be removed quickly in
case of danger or damage by fire or enemy shelling.
Commanding officers were to check regularly to make
sure that these measures were being followed.
b.
Further Construction of Firing Positions
It was pointed out that the necessary attention still

was not being paid to the construction of firing posi
tions: the digging-in of the guns, the preparation of
enough foxholes for proper cover, and the construction
of ditches for ammunition, with shells and cartridges
kept separate. The detachments in gun positions and
observation-post personnel were not to rest until every
thing was under cover. This work was to be done at
night. In order to preserve, as far as possible, the fight
24
ing fitness of over-tired elements in action in the firing

positions and observation posts, the rear services were
to be utilized for such additional digging.
c. Track Discipline
In some instances deep, conspicuous tracks led into

the firing positions. No attention had been paid to the
planning of routes which would afford at least some
semblance of camouflage against air observation. Dis
organized driving in and out-that is, the movement of
guns without an intelligently devised track planhad
been the cause of this. The regimental commander re
minded his battery commanders that one of their pri
mary duties was to take care of this aspect of the
camouflaging of firing positions. He ordered battery
commanders to inspect all positions from suitably high
terrain points, for the purpose of taking advantage of
all natural camouflage for tracks, and of visualizing
how the positions would appear to hostile aircraft.
d.
Alternate Positions
Alternate positions were not being occupied with

the requisite speed, when such moves were dictated by
the situation. The regimental commander ordered that
batteries be made more mobile so that new positions
could be occupied without difficulty. He pointed out
that the shelling of German positions over open sights
(with time and percussion fuzes and smoke shells) could
be expected to force the abandonment of these posi
tions. Too often, he said, batteries supplied with a
large amount of ammunition, but insufficiently mobile.
GERMANY
ARTILLERY DEFENSIVE POSITIONS
25
had been utterly destroyed in a matter of hours by con

centrations of hostile fire.
e.
"Last Covering Height*'
The importance of a "last covering height" was some

thing that all members of the regiment seemed to have
forgotten completely, the regimental commander said.
He ordered that, inasmuch as most of the observation
posts were on forward slopes or on gentle inclines, no
tices be put up in places most exposed to the hostile
forces, and that these signs read "Warning! Last cov
ering height! Now you are observed by the enemy!"
He required that the routes from observed positions to
headquarters and observation posts be clearly marked
with sign posts and that, if necessary, approach trenches
be constructed to these positions after dark.
f.
Conclusion
The final words of the order are perhaps the most

revealing.
To sum up, units containing elements which still are inexperi
enced or stupid or apathetic must be taken in hand, and ener
getically taught and controlled by the officers in command of
these units. If this is done, the heavy casualties that we have
been incurring up to the present time may be avoided in the
future. In particular, the most careful measures are to be under
taken everywhere for the organization of an air-raid warning
system. Each unit commander will see to it that the system
operates smoothly and that any man who fails to perform his
duty is punished ruthlessly. I have repeatedly stressed the
principles contained in this order. Only when they are adhered
to by everyone will the artillery avoid heavy casualties and, by
maintaining its "strength, be able to carry out its task.
Section V.
TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT
OF FLAK IN THE FIELD
1. INTRODUCTION
The original German doctrine regarding the employ

ment of German Air Force flak artillery in thefieldhas
steadily been undergoing modification. German man
uals formerly described the responsibility of flak in the
field as primarily, and almost exclusively, antiaircraft
defense; the engagement of ground targets was re
garded as secondary, and only to be undertaken in an
emergency. Although the older manuals admitted the
possibility of using light flak to reinforce the fire of
heavy infantry weapons, and of using heavy flak to sup
plement antitank and other artillery, such employment
was described as exceptional. There was nothing to
suggest, for example, the now extensive use of the 88
mm antiaircraft gun in an antitank role.
The transition from the defensive doctrine of the
earlier manuals to the more aggressive modern concep
tion seems to date from the introduction of the Flak
Corpsunits of which first appeared during the Battle
of France. The Flak Corps was created to perform the
tasks described in the following enemy notes.
The Flak Corps is a wartime organization, and constitutes an
operational reserve of the commander in chief of the German
Air Force. It combines great mobility with heavy fire power.
It can be employed in conjunction with spearheads composed of
armored and motorized forces, and with nonmotorized troops in
26
GERMANY
TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF FLAK IN THE FIELD
27
forcing river crossings and attacking fortified positions. It can

also be deployed as highly mobile artillery to support tank
attacks.
The Flak Corps can take part in antitank defense on a broad
front, and can be employed in ground engagements at strongly
contested points. Its capabilities are tremendous in antiaircraft
defense, because its great mobility enables it to rush flak concen
trations to strategically important points, and to transfer flak
strength from one area to another, as required.
It is also responsible for protecting forward ground organiza
tions of the German Air Force.
As these notes show, flak in the field is now intended

to serve as a powerful and highly mobile striking force.
The emphasis laid on its employment in the ground
role, and in an offensive capacity in conjunction with
spearhead formations, is most important. Experience
has verified that these principles are actively practiced
in the field.
2. HEAVY FLAK
a. General
In operations with the field army, the 88-mm gun, as

a result of its great mobility, has become almost the
universal weapon of heavy flak. Larger calibers are
usually encountered only in areas where the defense is
static.
The heavy flak battery consists either of four or six
guns (usually 88's), with two light guns (20-mm) for
close protection. Six-gun batteries are becoming in
creasingly common. In theory the heavy battery con
sists of two platoons, but in practice it is rarely divided
in this manner. All the guns are generally fitted with
28
shields, to protect the detachments against small-arms

fire, and with two sightsa telescopic sight for the
direct engagement of ground targets, and a panoramic
sight for indirect laying. In the interests of mobility,
the fire-control equipment is often left behind. In addi
tion to time-fuze high-explosive ammunition, armorpiercing and percussion-fuze high-explosive ammuni
tion is normally carried. To avoid the muzzle flashes
which, at night, readily give away the gun positions,
the Germans now make widespread use of a flashless
propellant.
The 88-mm gun can be put into action in about 2
minutes. If necessary, it can be fired from its mount,
but against ground targets only.1 Since the normal
mount is conspicuous because of its height, the gun is ex
tremely vulnerable to artillery fire. Whenever possible,
therefore, the gun is dug in so that only the barrel
appears over the top of the emplacement. (Actually,
the time factor and the frequent moves do not always
permit the Germans to devise effective concealment.)
Realizing that destruction of hostile observation posts
constitutes an indirect method of protecting their
heavy flak guns, the Germans try to accomplish this
at every opportunity.
The 88-mm guns can open fire on armored vehicles
at 2,500 yards with fair prospect of success, but are most
effective at ranges of about 1,000 to 1,500 yards. They
may fire at ranges of as much as 4,000 yards, if other and
1
Against ground targets on the Eastern Front, the Germans have used
a self-propelled 88-mm gun, called the "Ferdinand." See Intelligence Bul
letin, Vol. II, No. 1, a 1.
GERMANY
TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF FLAK IK THE FIELD
29
more inviting targets are not available. With the aid

of a forward observation post, 88's sometimes engage
such targets as troop concentrations at ranges of as
much as 6,000 yards.2 The following are examples of
the penetration performance with the 88-mm Flak 36,
the most common model of this gun:
Thickness of armor
Range (yards)
Perpendicular (no angle of

impact)
30 angle of impact
110 mm (4.33 in)

101 mm (3.97 in) __
92 mm (3.62 in)
84 mm (3.30 in)
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
_. _ _
_ _ _
__
__
129 mm
119 mm
110 mm
100 mm
(5.07 in).
(4.68 in).
(4.33 in).
(3.93 in).
It is estimated that the following figures are correct

for the 88-mm Flak 41:
Thickness of armor
Range (yards)
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
150 mm
140 mm
130 mm
121 mm
30 angle ef impact
Perpendicular (no angle of

impact)
(5.91 in) _ __
(5.51 in)
._
(5.12 in) ___
(4.76'in)
175 mm
164 mm
153 mm
142 mm
(6.89 in).
(6.46 in).
(6.02 in).
(5.59 in).
The telescopic sight is.graduated up to 10.340 yards, and theoretically it

would be possible to engage targets up to this range. In indirect fire, when
the panoramic sight is used, the maximum range of the 88-mm Flak 36 is
11,445 yards with time-fuze high-explosive ammunition, and 16,132 yards
with percussion-fuze high-explosive ammunition.
Corresponding maximum ranges with the 88-mm Flak 41 are:
Yards
Direct fire (with telescopic sight)
11,770
Indirect fire (with panoramic sight) :
Using time-fuze HE
13, 561
Using percussion-fuze HE
22, 091
55470543vol. 2, No. 3
30
b. Employment in Rear Areas
In rear areas heavy flak has the normal task of pro

viding antiaircraft protection for ports, airfields,
dumps, headquarters, and points of importance on lines
of communication. Predictors and/or auxiliary pre
dictors are employed, and mobile radio-location equip
ment may also be allotted. Although flak units in rear
areas primarily have the task of providing antiaircraft
protection, even these units are normally provided with
armor-piercing and percussion-fuze high-explosive am
munition, and therefore can operate against any hostile
troops or armored vehicles which may break through.
The heavy flak's degree of preparedness to meet such
attacks naturally depends on the distance between the
guns and the front.
c. Employment in Forward Areas
It is in the employment of heavy flak batteries at

tached to the Army, for operations in forward areas,
that current German methods depart most noticeably
from the doctrine expressed in earlier manuals.
Formerly, German doctrine outlined a primary anti
aircraft role, a secondary antitank role, and, under ex
ceptional circumstances, employment in a field-artillery
role. It may be said that the antitank role now has
assumed virtual priority, for experience has shown that
the 88-mm gun has become an indispensable complement
to the German Army's antitank artillery. A certain
proportion of heavy batteries in forward areas is still
deployed in an antiaircraft role, chiefly to protect for
ward airfields, and during periods of inactivity or prep
GERMAXY
TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF FLAK INI THE FIELD
31
aration the antiaircraft role still predominates. For

example, an assembly prior to an attack will usually
be protected by heavy guns, and under these conditions
the ground role is assumed only in the event that the
Germans are subjected to a surprise attack. However,
once battle is joined, whether in attack or defense (and
especially when armored forces are involved), the heavy
flak guns are usually employed against ground targets
only, and the antiaircraft role becomes the exception.
If necessary, even guns originally deployed to give anti
aircraft protection to forward airfields are sometimes
pressed into service as antitank weapons.
The employment of heavy flak batteries naturally
varies considerably, depending on the terrain and the
nature of the fighting. In open country the 88-mm
gun's long range gives it a distinct advantage as an
antitank weapon. In North Africa, where so often
there was no well-defined "line," heavy flak batteries
often served as the nucleus of defensive "hedgehogs."
In an advance the primary function of the batteries
usually has been to provide antitank protection during
the movement of German armored vehicles. The 88's
have also been known to accompany tanks in an as
sault-gun role. Although the battery is the normal fire
unit, large numbers of 88-mm guns have occasionally
been employed under one command when the situation
has required that maximum antitank strength be con
centrated at a single point.
A striking example of the value of heavy flak in
defense is afforded by the final phases of the Tunisian
32
campaign, in which heavy flak units frequently pro

vided the backbone of German resistance to the Allied
advance. For this purpose several units were formed
into mobile battle groups, a procedure which had been
resorted to on previous occasions, and which pre
sumably is dictated by the stress of circumstances.
These flak battle groups are purely temporary units,
formed for a specific purpose. They consist of a
number of platoons, usually with two heavy and three
light guns each, and may be employed either alone or
in combination with other arms. They are used both
in defense and in attack. Since they are mobile strik
ing forces, there is always a possibility that they will
be used by the Germans in attempts to repel landings
on the European continent. They would afford a
means of rapid counterattack in threatened sectors.
The employment of these temporary units, which has
become increasingly common, demonstrates the flexi
bility of flak organization in the field and the extent to
which the Germans use heavy flak to complement anti
tank artillery.
The employment of a heavy flak battery is naturally
governed by the type of operation that is being under
taken by the Army unit to which it is attached. Al
though the lessons learned from desert warfare are not
necessarily applicable to other theaters, the activity
of a heavy flak battery during the early stages of the
German counteroffensive in Cyrenaica in May 1942
affords some very good tactical illustrations. During
this action the battery accompanied the Army unit to
GERMANY
TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF FLAK INI THE FIELD
33
which it was attached, and provided protection both

against air attacks and tank attacks. The ground role
predominated. Not only were tank engagements
fought by day, but at night the battery was deployed
in an antitank role to protect its "parent" Army unit.
The battery was continually on the move during the
day. More than once it detached some of its guns to
strengthen another Army unit, and at other times it,
in turn, was given added strength. When opposition
was expected, the battery took up an antitank siting,
generally on high ground and facing the piobable line
of attack. The choice of this position was not hard
and-fast. The battery moved to a different position
when reconnaissance had established the location and
course of the hostile tanks. When in position, the
battery often had to site its guns so that they faced
in two directions, because of uncertainty as to the
exact line of attack.
3. LIGHT FLAK
a. General
Light flak units operating in the field are generally

equipped with 20-mm guns (single- or four-barreled),
sometimes with 37-mm (1.45 in.) guns, and once in a
great while with 50-mm (1.97 in.) guns. A light bat
tery normally consists of four platoons of 20-mm guns,
or three platoons of the larger caliber light guns, with
three guns to each platoon.
Light flak guns are especially useful in combatting
surprise attacks, because of the.rapidity with which
34
these pieces can be put into action. The 20-mm Flak

30, for example, can be put into action in about half a
minute, and in extreme emergencies all light flak guns
can be fired (although with a limited traverse) from
their mounts. In addition, it is known that self-pro
pelled models of the 20-mm and 37-mm calibers exist
and can engage both air and ground targets. Like the
heavy guns, the light guns in the field are usually fitted
with shields for protection against small-arms fire.
They are also fitted with flak sights and/or telescopic
or linear sights, and carry armor-piercing ammunition
in addition to percussion-fuze high-explosive ammuni
tion. Light flak guns may engage ground targets, es
pecially "soft-skinned" vehicles, at ranges of as much
as 800 yards, but are most effective at ranges up to about
300 yards. The following are examples of the penetra
tion performance of the 20-mm Flak 30 firing armorpiercing projectiles:
Thickness of armor
Range (yards)
Perpendicular
30 angle of impact
100
200
300
400
31 mm (1.22 in)
29 mm (1.14 in)
27 mm (1.06 in)
25 mm (0.98 in)____ _
48 mm (1.89 in).
44 mm (1.73 in).
41 mm (1.61 in).
38 mm (1.50 in).
b. Employment in Rear Areas
In rear areas light flak batteries have the normal task

of giving antiaircraft protection to such vital points as
airfields, bridges, railroad stations and junctions, head
quarters, and depots. For this purpose batteries are
GERMANYTACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF FLAK IK. THE FIELD
35
generally deployed as a whole, with the guns sited by

platoons. Although the antiaircraft role predominates,
these batteries constitute an important element in the
ground defense plan for the vital rear points they are
protecting, and are prepared to engage any armored
or other forces which may succeed in penetrating to
that depth.
c. Employment in Forward Areas
Light batteries attached to Army units in forward

areas may also operate as a whole, but platoons are usu
ally detached to perform special tasks.
On the march, platoons are generally spaced at in
tervals along the column, or are sited at particularly
vulnerable points along the routesuch as bridges, de
files, or crossroadsand subsequently "leapfrog" for
ward. Their principal task is to protect the column
against attack by low-flying aircraft; their secondary
task is to engage ground forces.
In battle light flak units afford protection for head
quarters, field artillery concentrations, infantry concen
trations, engineer units, motor parks, and so on. Also,
it is sometimes considered necessary to assign a light
platoon (three guns) to a heavy flak battery engaged in
antitank workpresumably because, under certain cir
cumstances, the two light guns belonging to the two bat
teries do not afford enough protection. In all these
tasks the antiaircraft role predominates, but engage
ment of personnel and armored vehicles is also regarded
as highly important and often takes place. Experience
36
has shown that during tank attacks, light guns, as well

as heavy guns, have ignored air targets and have con
centrated on hostile armored vehicles, leaving German
ground units to defend themselves against air attack by
means of rifle and light machine-gun fire. (As previous
issues of the Intelligence Bulletin have explained, Ger
man Army training stresses the importance of smallarms fire in defense against low-flying aircraft.)
It will be seen that whereas heavyflakwhichis well
suited to combat ground targets, partly because of its
penetration performanceis now being given wide tac
tical employment in a ground role, light flak with the
Army still clings pretty much to the principles outlined
in German pre-war manuals. Although the capability
of light flak in a ground role is always something to take
into account, this type of employment seems to be the
exception, rather than the rule.
NOTE.This section has dealt solely with German Air Force flak.
There are also (1) Army flak (Heeresflak) units, which include
"mixed" battalions (containing both heavy and light batteries) as
part of the artillery, and (2) light companies (Flu), which have
light guns only, as part of the infantry. These other types are
not numerous, however. As a rule, they are GHQ troops, and are
attached to army units in much the same way that German Air
Force flak units are attached. Recent enemy documents show that
an Army flak battalion, consisting of two heavy batteries and one
light battery, is now included in the tables of organization of
armored and motorized divisions.
Section VI. MISCELLANEOUS

1. IMPROVISED BANGALORE TORPEDOES
Besides employing a standard Bangalore torpedo,

the Germans make considerable use of improvised
versions. The materials used in constructing weapons
of this type depend entirely on local resources, while
the method of construction follows one of two general
principles:
a. The tubular model, which is not built to any par
ticular dimensions, utilizes any convenient length of
piping, such as a drain pipe or metal water pipe. The
pipe is filled with explosive, and each end is plugged
with a piece of wood or any other suitable material
that may be at hand. A detonator and a length of
safety fuze are fitted to one end.
b. The other version consists of a plank, or any con
venient length of timber. At one end a number of
charges are laid side by side. The exact number de
pends on the task to be performed. These charges are
fastened to the plank by means of wire or stout cord.
A detonator and a safety fuze are attached to the
charge at the far end. A typical example is a speci
men which was captured recently; it consisted of a
plank, 6% feet by 1% inches by 1 inch, to which 15
y2-pound (approx.) slabs of TNT had been tied.
These were to be detonated by means of a detonator
55470543vol. 2, No. 3
37
38
and a length of safety fuze that would give a delay of

30 seconds.
2. NEW ARMY CAP
The adoption of a standard field cap (Ewheits

miltze) for the German Army has been ordered (see
fig. 3). The cap, which resembles that worn by XL S.
railroad men, will replace the former German garrison
("overseas") cap. If the visor interferes with the
handling of weapons or equipment, the cap will be
worn back to front. Units wearing a black field uni
form will wear a black cap. Generals caps will have
gold cord around the top; all other officers' caps will
have silver cord around the top.
PAKT TWO: JAPAN
Section I. NEW JAPANESE WEAPONS

1. INTRODUCTION
Several new types of Japanese weapons are described

in recent reports from observers in combat areas of the
Pacific. These weapons include:
a. A hand grenade which is actuated by a pull-type
igniter;
b. A small, smooth-surfaced hand grenade which is
actuated by striking the fuze against a hard surface
as in the case of the Model 91 and the Model 97 gre
nades; *
c. A 47-mm antitank gun which is completely mod
ern in design; and
d. Four types of booby traps.
2. PULL-TYPE HAND GRENADE
a.
Description
This grenade, which has an over-all length of 3%

inches and a diameter of 2 inches, is easily distinguished
from Models 91 and 97 because it has no lengthwise
grooves. The weapon has five traverse grooves, how
ever, and it also has a lead cover which is grooved to
1
Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. II, No. 1, included a section devoted to these

and other grenades and mines which have booby-trapping possibilities.
39
40
provide a grip for the fingers in removing the cover.

On one side of this grenade, fitted to the top and bottom,
are two rings. These could be used for carrying the
weapon, or for anchoring in case it is used as a booby
trap.
b. Table of Characteristics
Over-all length
Length of body
Length of cover
Diameter of body
Diameter of cover
Body (material)
Cover (material)
Weight (total)
Weight of
Weight of body
Loading factor
Filler
filler
3% inches.
2% inches.
1 inch.
2 inches.
iy 8 inch.
Cast iron.
Lead.
449 grams.
39.5 grams.
509.5 grams.
8.7 percent.
Granular TNT.
c. Operation
To remove the lead cover, depress the cover thumb

release on the side of the grenade (see fig. 4). The
cover then screws off in iy2 turns. This exposes the
firing string. When the firing string is pulled, it draws
a friction igniter between two pieces of match composi
tion and fires them. The match composition, in turn,
fires a 5%-second delay train, which fires the detonator,
thus setting off the main charge.
JAPAN1NEW JAPANESE
Cover
thumb release
41
WEAPONS
Firing string
Brass plate
Match composition
Lead cover
Friction
Delay train
( 5 j sec)
Detonator
Figure 4.Japanese Pull-type Hand Grenade.
42
d. Booby-trapping Possibilities
Since this grenade can be activated by a pull on the

firing string, it is better adapted to booby-trapping pur
poses than the Model 91 and the Model 97 grenades.
The grenade booby-trap sketch (taken from a Japa-
Figure 5.Japanese Grenade Booby Trap.
nese document) in figure 5 is of the pull type. The

enemy may rig up such booby traps on dead soldiers in
battle areas in a manner so that a pull of a leg or some
other part of the body will cause detonation.
3. OFFENSIVE HAND GRENADE
a. Description
This grenade is small in comparison with the Model

91 and Model 97 Japanese grenades (see fig. 6). It is
JAPANNEW JAPANESE WEAPONS
Firing pin-
Sleeve
Safety-pin hole
Fir ing-pin
retainer spring
Breather hole
Delay train
Grenade body
Booster-
Figure 6.Japanese Offensive Hand Grenade.
43
44
3.5 inches long and 1.75 inches in diameter, and weighs

approximately 10 ounces. Because of its light weight,
the grenade can be thrown almost as far as a baseball.
This fact indicates that the weapon is designed pri
marily for use in offensive operations. It is called
"offensive" hand grenade in this section because its
model number is not known.
The body of the grenade is smooth and cylindrical,
both inside and outside, and has a rim at each end. Its
nonserrated body is an additional help in distinguishing
the weapon from the other types of Japanese hand
grenades. It is closed by a threaded plug, which has a
hole in the center to receive a threaded fuze.
The workmanship of the grenade is good, and ord
nance experts consider the fuze an improvement over
that of the Model 91 and Model 97 grenades.
b. Operation
A sleeve that holds the firing pin and the firing-pin

retainer spring in place is held to the fuze by means of
a small screw. The detonator booster is crimped to the
lower part of the fuze body. The safety pin, which pre
vents the firing pin from striking the primer, is held in
place by a cord. To arm the grenade, remove the safety
pin and strike the head of the weapon against some
hard object, such as a helmet. Thus the operation is
like that of the Model 91 and 97 grenades.
4. MODEL 1 (1941) 47-MM AT GUN
This new Japanese weapon is a split-trail piece of

modern design (see fig. 7). Its silhouette is low, and
JAPAN
NEW JAPANESE WEAPONS
4 5
its tread is unusually wide. Because of these features,

plus the fact that the wheels are fitted with pneumatic
tires, it is evident that the piece is adapted for towing
by a motor vehicle.
Figure 7.Japanese Model 1 (1941) 47-mm AT Gun.
The barrel of this weapon is extremely long, and is

heavily reinforced at the muzzle. This indicates a high
muzzle velocity. The trails, also unusually long, are
equipped with a locking yoke and handles. The wide
tread and small wheels permit a wide traverse. A wide
shield, cut away at the bottom, is provided.
A complete check has not been made on the ammuni
tion used for this weapon. However, the armor-pierc
ing round is 15.5 inches long and weighs 6 pounds
5 ounces, complete. The case, made of brass, is
unusually large and long, and is necked down to take
the 47-mm projectile. The projectile has a red tip, a
black body, and a white band just in front of the cop
per rotating band.
5. BOOBY TRAPS
Four types of booby traps which the Japanese may

use in future operations are described below. The
46
sketches and explanatory wording were compiled from

various Japanese notes. They may have been copied
from enemy military instructions or they may have been
devised by individual Japanese soldiers with technical
experience.
a.
Device Using a Parasol

Phial containing
sulphuric ocid
Detonating fluid
Mixture of detonating
and ignition fluid
Detonating fluid
Ignition fluid
Mixture of
heat producing acid.
Figure 8.
This booby trap apparently is a combined explosive

and incendiary device. Opening of the parasol prob
b.
Device Using a Flashlight
Explosive
Switch
Bicycle ball bearings
(probably used as schrapnel)
Dry cell battery
Figure 9.
JAPAN
NEW JAPANESE WEAPONS
47
ably breaks the acid vial, which in turn, ignites the det
onating and ignition mixtures.
In this type of booby trap, the flashlight switch is
used to connect a circuit through an electric detonator.
When the switch is pressed, the explosive is ignited.
c.
Device Using a Pipe
Threaded joint
Explosive
Figure 10.
" A " is probably a safety pin, which, while inserted,

prevents the unscrewing of the pipe stem. When the
device is placed as a bobby trap, the safety pin would be
removed; after this, unscrewing of the stem would
release the striker pin, which would fire the percussion
cap and explosive.
48
d.
Device Using a Bottle

Rubber cork
Mixture of
potassium chlorate
and
(T.N. unreadable)
Air space
Benzine or kerosene
Sulphuric acid
Figure 11.
If the bottle is picked up and shaken, or if it is tipped

over, sulphuric acid coming in contact with the mixture
in the cork would cause a small explosion and ignite the
benzine. This type of booby trap is probably designed
primarily for its incendiary effect.
Section II. NOTES ON JAPANESE

LANDING OPERATIONS
1. INTRODUCTION
The information contained in this section has been

extracted from several translated Japanese documents
dealing with landing operations. Some of the state
ments come from enemy field manuals, while others ap
pear to be based on results of landing maneuvers. In
connection with this section, reference should be made
to information previously published in the Intelligence
Bulletin and other M. I. D. publications on Japanese
landing operations. For example, Intelligence Bulle
tin, Vol. I, No. 8, included a lengthy article which was
paraphrased from a translated enemy document titled
"Amphibious Tactics Based on Experiences at Wake."
In the paragraphs which follow, the reader must bear
in mind that he is reading Japanese doctrine, some of
which is experimental, and he must not confuse it with
our own doctrine on landing operations.
2. ACTION BEFORE LANDING
a. Selection of Landing Points
In selecting landing points, take into consideration the prob

ability that hostile forces have a lot of mechanized vehicles and an
excellent network of roads and other means of communication.
The landing points should be suitable for landing installations,
49
50
and especially convenient for the landing and subsequent advance

of vehicles.
In landing on hostile coasts where breakers are anticipated, it
is best to select one or two alternate landing points because the
actual condition of the surf may be different from that which was
expected. For example, we had expected large breakers at one
of the points considered for landing in the Philippines, but a
close reconnaissance revealed that they were small. Therefore we
landed there the first day. Toward nightfall, the surf became
rough, so we changed anchorage and continued the landing opera
tions at another point, where the surf was not heavy.
b. Reconnaissance of Landing Points
A thorough air reconnaissance of proposed landing points must
be made by a competent officer who is scheduled to participate in
the landings. Also, air photos must be made and distributed to
each unit designated to take part in the landings. These photos
must show views of the landing points during high tide and also
during low tide.
Keconnaissance of landing points from the sea must be carried
out secretly and quickly. If possible, this reconnaissance, with
the aid of air photos, should determine passages and points navi
gable by boat. Reconnaissance of coasts with unusual charac
teristics must be continued, even after the first wave of troops has
landed. This is especially true if the first wave lands at high
tide, because at low tide it may be necessary to change the route
of approach or even the landing point.
c. Selection of Time for Landings
Ordinarily, landing operations will start early enough to allow
the front-line units to reach shore at dawn. Where an attack by
a superior air force, or an advance up a long defile, is expected
after landing, it may be necessary to start landings about mid
night, so that most of the personnel will be landed by dawn.
On shores where it is difficult to land at night, a daylight
landing in force may be necessary.
JAPAN
NOTES ON LANDING OPERATIONS
51
3. ACTION DURING LANDING

a. Water and Terrain Difficulties
When the nature of the terrain around the landing point can
not be determined in advance, it will be necessary to rely on a
compass and navigational skill in landing. As much information
as possible should be gained from tide charts, air photos, and
sailing directories.
If the characteristics of the coast necessitate the use of more
than one landing place, collapsible boats, ponton boats, rafts,
and so forth will be used.
In seas where the current is swift and parts of the landing
point are obscure, each boat should carry a searchlight- as a navi
gational aid. Preferably, an experienced naval man should
handle the searchlight.
b. Overcoming Resistance
(1) General
It is fundamental that we gain as much surprise as possible
in landing operations. Surprise can sometimes be gained, at
least for a time, by maneuvering the first wave of landing craft
or by approaching by a roundabout route.
In countering resistance by hostile forces, Army troops usually
will handle the land opposition, and the Navy will take care
of the opposition on water. However, to handle the destruction
of small hostile boats and to give direct cover to the convoy, the
Navy generally depends on the D engineer regiment's armored
boats and other special craft.
When landing on a coast directly defended by fortified posi
tions, the fighting usually begins with the arrival of the landing
craft offshore. Under heavy fire from such land positions, it is
not only difficult, as a rule, to control units, but it is usually
impossible to carry out a planned attack. Therefore, officers of
all ranks in the front-line units must make the most thorough
preparations to deliver a surprise attack or to counter the hostile
52
attack successfully. These first-line units must strike hard

against the enemy's [United Nations] weak points, and advance
resolutely to the advance line agreed upon previously. They must
also take advantage of deficiencies in the hostile plan offireand
of any other weaknessesand it must be clearly remembered that
the hostile forces will have many wTeak points.
(2) With Artillery

When artillery is firing from transports to cover landings, the
divisional commander must closely watch the progress of the
landing units and give orders to fire at the right time. Premature
fire might seriously expose our plans.
To give direct support to the infantry in their battle near the
water's edge, part of the field artillery and mountain artillery is
sometimes attached to the first-line infantry and landed in the
first echelon. This attached artillery is often given the task
of advancing into the hostile lines, immediately after landing, for
the purpose of neutralizing fire from loopholes of fortifications
and of neutralizing the weapons protecting the hostile flanks.
The artillery landed with the first echelon of infantry must at
all costs follow the first-line units as supporting weapons. Liaison
with adjacent artillery units in the forward area must be main
tained so that the development of the artillery battle may be
coordinated and controlled.
The infantry commanders must give the accompanying artillery
units any assistance necessary for changing positions, or moving
forward.
Immediately after landing, positions for artillery should be
chosen near the point of arrival. If possible, these positions
should not be on a distinct coast line. They must be well con
cealed from the air and easy to enter quickly. Also, these posi
tions should be inaccessible to hostile tanks.
(3) With Tanks

The first-line infantry commander decides, according to cir
cumstances, whether he will use attached tanks at the water's edge
JAPANNOTES ON LANDING OPERATIONS
53
or in the battle after landing. Tanks to be used at the water's

edge are allotted to the first-line infantry battalions for close
cooperation in the infantry fighting. The battalion commanders
must consider the strength of the hostile forces, the amount of
light, the nature of the terrain, and especially the difficulties in
volved in landing tanks: and they must not hesitate to allot these
weapons to the different companies. Tanks to be used in the
battle after landing may be coordinated with the general plan,
detached to subordinate units to break through the main hostile
defense lines, or used as the cores of the assault units.
The tanks cooperating in the battle at the water's edge must
also reconnoiter the hostile positions and the adjacent terrain.
They will lose no opportunity to demolish systematically all the
wire entanglements, protections against flank attack, fortified po
sitions, lighting equipment, and so forth. The tank commander
quickly takes control of his subordinates, maintains close liaison
with the infantry and artillery, and warns against advancing
recklessly and getting cut off from friendly forces. If necessary,
the commander stops the tanks and. after determining the loca
tion of our troops and studying the "lay of the land," he may
choose hostile localities easy for maneuvers, or dead ground, and
then wipe out objectives at close quarters.
The leaders of tank platoons must keep in touch with neighbor
ing tanks and also with their company commanders. They must
see to it that no hitches occur in the fighting after daybreak.
Tanks landed during the daytime to assist the infantry fighting
are given protective cover by infantry and engineer troops who
are fighting near the water's edge. The tanks assemble quickly
near the landing point and complete their battle preparations,
such as amending orders, removing waterproof equipment, and
so forth. In cooperation with the front-line infantry and artil
lery, these tanks neutralize hostile flank defenses and small ob
stacles, take key points, and crush hostile counterattacking units.
54
(4) With Special Assault Detachments

If necessary, each company commander should organize and
train in advance a special assault detachment. These detach
ments are designed to neutralize fortifications and to reduce cen
ters of resistance, generally by attacking them from the rear.
Personnel of the detachments use automatic weapons, demolition
bombs, armor-piercing bombs, hand grenades, flame throwers, gas,
smoke, and demolition charges placed in groups. Depending
upon circumstances, it may be possible to block loopholes and use
flame throwers from the beginning.
I t is best to put all members of the special assault detachment
in one landing boat so that they may push forward to the infantry
front line immediately after landing, and carry out their duties
with as much speed and secrecy as possible.
(5) By Use of Smoke

Smoke can be used so as to cover our operations, prevent illu
mination of our movements by searchlights, cause deficiencies in
the hostile plan of fire, or prevent the enemy [United Nations]
from paying attention to other developments.
How smoke will be used should be determined according to
weather conditions (particularly the direction of the wind), ac
cording to our plans, and according to the available manpower
and the quality and quantity of our smoke equipment. Smoke
may be spread directly in front of the hostile positions, it may
be laid on the enemy [United Nations] objectives, it may be
used so as to split up the coast on which we land, or it may be
thrown as a curtain on the flanks and over the sea between the
opposing forces.
When surrounding the hostile forces with smoke, it is some
times a good idea to combine it with toxic smoke.
The time for starting the emission of smoke depends on the
strength and disposition of the hostile forces, our situation and
plans, the amount of light, and the speed and direction of the
JAPAN
55
wind. Necessary preparations must be made in advance so that

smoke may be emitted as soon as it is ordered.
At night do not use smoke merely to interfere with search
lights and artillery fire, but use it for the first time when the
advance ashore is obstructed.
With a moderate wind velocity, 10 to 20 smoke candles (float
ing type) thrown upon the sea at the same time will form an
effective smoke cover for about iy2 miles.
When making a frontal or flanking smoke screen with the
wind to your back, you can make the smoke continuous by throw
ing two of the floating smoke candles on the sea at the same
time and providing an interval of about 20 yards between each
pair of candles.
An armor-plated boat can carry about 150 floating smoke
candles.
Four to seven men will be needed to carry out a smokeemission assignment involving the use of floating smoke candles
and smoke generators.
First-line units which lay smoke screens in landing operations
generally use grenade dischargers, smoke shells, discharging
smoke candles, smoke candles, and so forth. When the wind is
blowing toward the landing point at a speed greater than that
of the landing boats, lay a smoke screen spread out widely o\7er
the water. This can be done if each boat emits smoke as it
moves toward the landing point. As far as possible, each boat
moves in the thin part of the screen. If there is a cross wind
or head wind, personnel in the first boats to land should lay a
smoke screen immediately, in front or to the flank, in order to
facilitate the landing operation.
Artillery and debarkation work units on transports lay smoke
screens against important parts of the hostile positions, such as
observation posts, searchlights, and flank-defense preparations.
Depending upon the direction of the wind, it is sometimes advan
tageous to use red smoke shells along with the other shells.
Eight smoke candles discharged from a boat with a simultane
56
ous firing device will cover a frontage of about 50 yards at the

water's edge. When using the Type 99 discharging smoke candles
(old type of discharging smoke candle), fire them when about
350 yards from the shore.
c. Communication and Liaison
The success of the landing operations largely depends upon the
close cooperation between the units landed for immediate combat
and the debarkation work units. Therefore, the liaison officers
must do everything possible to unite the efforts of these units.
For liaison and communication, do not wTait until a regular
boat and communication network is established, but use boats,
radios, flag and light signals, and, when the anchorage is close,
lay a cable. It is also possible to use carrier pigeons.
Anchorage headquarters must immediately build a lookout
tower for the purpose of establishing command liaison with ships
and boats at sea.
d. Duties of Debarkation Work Units
Immediately upon landing, the debarkation work units must
make a quick reconnaissance of the coast line and the traffic
ashore, and then hastily construct on-the-spot landing installa
tions and open traffic routes.
For landing large or heavy equipment, it is necessary to choose
the most suitable places. These need not necessarily be the orig
inal landing points. When unloading motor vehicles, gun car
riages, and so forth, the work units must lay steel mats, wheel
mats, boards, and so forth. If possible, tractors, trucks, and some
times tanks or armored cars should be used. The work units must
arrange for the necessary equipment to carry out these operations.
However, each regular combat unit must make plans for its own
unloading beforehand, and must prepare pulleys, nets, and other
equipment before embarking.
To reduce losses, it is necessary to spread out on the1 landing
shore the various installations, the troops, and the munitions and
JAPAN
57
other supplies. Troops and materiel should be disposed so as to

prevent confusion. Each combat unit must keep in close touch
with the work unit for its landing sector. It is important that
each fighting unit quickly move its men, horses, and vehicles away
from the coast.
When the line of advance from the coast is limited, unloading
installations easily become crowded together. It is necessary to
do everything possible to disperse these, and to establish traffic
routes parallel to the shore.
When possible, utilize to the fullest extent any native labor.
Also seize any shipping in the landing area and utilize it in the
landing operations.
4. ACTION AFTER LANDING
The traffic control organization is assisted by sentries in the
task of directing vehicles and personnel from the landing points
to the various unit combat sectors.
While the troops are embarking, the division commander must
allot bicycles to the infantry and engineer units which are to lead
the advance, or to the reserves who are to be thrown into the
battle quickly at any opportunity to exploit success. At the time
of landing the division commander must lose no opportunity to
let the men have their bicycles. Depending upon circumstances,
the bicycles are assembled on the coast at the various landingpoints. The main object in using bicycles is to supplement short
ages in motor vehicles for long-range operations, especially dur
ing pursuit, and to increase the division's mobility.
Each unit should be in position to summon its vehicles quickly
from the landing area or the vehicle-assembly point. Vehicles
landed in the area of the division traffic-control organization
should first be collected at the assembly point before following the
unit to which they are allotted.
As a rule, vehiclesespecially motor vehiclesshould avoid
advancing parallel to each other or going in a reverse direction.
A vehicle repair center must be set up as the units move into
58
action. To accomplish this, part of the vehicle-repairing organi

zation must be landed as quickly as possible.
Particularly for the sake of increasing our maneuverability,
commanding officers of all ranks should pay attention to achiev
ing quick capture of hostile communication facilities, especially
motor vehicles, railroads, and repair shops.
The quick repair of demolished and obstructed roads is of the
utmost importance. Regardless of the aid of engineers, all troops
should be charged with opening up their o^Yn line of advance.
The division commander must attach the necessary engineers to
the front-line troops for landing operations, and give to the re
mainder the task of repairing roads, railroads, bridges, and so
forth. I t is essential that engineers quickly repair roads and
bridges.
Section III. ANTIAIRCRAFT MEASURES

1. GENERAL
The following notes on Japanese antiaircraft meas

ures were obtained from U. S. observers and from
enemy documents.
Observers report that, until recent months, the anti
aircraft defenses on Japanese naval ships have been
more accurate and more concentrated than the landbased antiaircraft fire. This distinction is no longer
true, the observers say, because of improvements in the
quantity and quality of land-based weapons.
The nature of antiaircraft fire over enemy targets
can frequently be predicted by evaluating certain fac
tors concerning the target. For example, if the target
has tactical or economic importance but is far distant
and has not been visited in recent months, all types of
antiaircraft guns may be encountered. However, they
usually are not numerous and the crews are poorly
trained. A less important but remote target frequently
has only medium and light antiaircraft guns. A
new target under development and not previously
attacked may have no antiaircraft defense. The num
ber and caliber of guns at frequently bombed targets
will, as a rule, be continually increased. Apparently
the enemy feels that such targets are strategically
important to us because we bomb them often.
59
60
2. AT SEA
a. Weapons
The size of Japanese sea-borne antiaircraft weapons

generally is in proportion to the size of the ships.
Merchant ships of 5,000 or more tons frequently carry
heavy guns, while those between 3,000 and 5,000 tons
usually carry medium guns. As a rule, smaller mer
chant vessels are armed only with light weapons, but
torpedo boats and even smaller vessels usually mount
medium guns, while heavy guns are always found on
destroyers and larger naval vessels.
In arranging antiaircraft weapons on ships, the
Japanese concentrate the guns at the bow and stern
in order to obtain effective vertical (or near vertical)
fire. Antiaircraft machine guns and pom-pom guns
are generally placed on the top bridge or near the bow
and stern. Light machine guns and rifles are placed
around the front, back, and sides of transports in
order to "cover" dead space caused by equipment.
Sandbags are used to secure the tripods of the light
antiaircraft weapons, and also to protect personnel
from hostile fire and sea waves.
b. Tactics
Japanese ships usually execute sharp evasive move

ments, with frequent changes in course, when attacked
by aircraft. These tactics, the Japanese admit, lessen
the accuracy of antiaircraft fire.
The following notes were extracted from translations
of Japanese documents dealing with antiaircraft de
fenses.
JAPAXANTIAIRCRAFT MEASURES
61
Air sentries and soldiers will report airplanes according to the

direction of the clock, using such expressions as "2 o'clock di
rection."
Open fire against hostile planes as soon as they come within
effective range. Fire heavily, concentrating on the most threat
ening targets, and seek to break up the hostile plan of attack
before it can be executed.
In firing at aircraft with rifles and light machine guns, it is
essential to have a good position. Rest your body and your left
elbow on the gunwale and keep alert. Fire when the ship is at
the top or at the bottom of a wave. Get the bearing of the hostile
planes, align your sights, and then use following fire. If the
hostile aircraft are over 2.000 feet high, and if their cross-country
speed is smallr you will find it profitable to fire on fixed lines.
The following are the most important points in anti

aircraft firing:
a. Do your best to judge the height of aircraft with your meas
uring instruments, and to judge their course and speed with your
naked eye.
b. Because of the pitching and rolling of the ship, the heightfinder generally is accurate only to within 4 to 5 degrees. If the
pitching and rolling is considerable, special adjustments are made,
or corrections are made when the boat is level.
c. When attacked by a dive bomber, wait until the plane pulls
out of its dive and then try to shoot it down.
d. Against a torpedo bomber, it is necessary to open fire quickly
and try to shoot it down at a range of more than 1,000 yards.
Since the torpedo bombers fly low over the water as they come
in to attack, fire shrapnel at them with field artillery and moun
tain artillery guns, which are distributed aboard ship. A rapid
rate of fire should be used.
To prevent hostile planes from strafing at low altitudes, small
balloons should be raised quickly.
62
3. WHILE LANDING
The protection of landing coasts against air attacks is the
responsibility not only of the divisional antiaircraft dispositions
but also of each individual unit commander. In accordance with
this policy, the first-line units must form detachments for anti
aircraft protection while landing, and must prepare for air raids
immediately after landing. These detachments and the unload
ing units must dig the necessary protective trenches near the shore.
During landing operations, antiaircraft boats must be properly
disposed, and part of the antiaircraft artillery company must be
landed immediately for shore protection.
When hostile planes dominate the skies, try to use the weapons
attached to the large and the small motor landing boats.
Boats which are not being used should be hidden immediately in
the shade along the edge of the water, or camouflaged with ma
terials similar to the surroundings.
If boats in use are attacked, the formation and the direction of
travel should be changed immediately.
To reduce damage from hostile bombs, transport ships should
be anchored in an irregular formation. Anchoring in a straight
line would limit thefieldof fire of machine guns. As a precaution
against bomb damages, ships should be anchored some distance
apart.
4. ON LAND
According to observers, Japanese land-based antiair

craft guns usually open fire while United Nations planes
are still out of range, and continue firing until our air
craft are well away from the target. In-most cases the
fire is of the barrage type, although a good deal of aimed
fire has been encountered.
In one Southwest Pacific area, Japanese searchlights
were slow in picking up planesperhaps because the
JAPAN
ANTIAIRCRAFT MEASURES
63
planes approached in a glide. However, after picking

the planes, the searchlight crews held them well.
One crew observed two or three banks of searchlights.
Each bank consisted of 12 searchlights, and each acted
as a unit. In the meantime, 15 or 20 other searchlights
operated individually. Individual searchlights were
spaced at intervals of not more than 400 yards along the
shore of the defended area.
Section IV.
SOME DEFENSE TECHNIQUES

USED BY THE JAPANESE
1. AS SEEN BY OBSERVERS
Particularly in some of the less active combat zones,

the Japanese do practically no moving about dur
ing the daytime, and do no firing until attacked. These
tactics, plus excellent use of alternate positions, help
the enemy to achieve surprise whenever day attacks
occur.
Almost all enemy positions in certain areas of level
country were dug deep into the ground and were mu
tually supporting. Back of these positions the enemy
sited a large number of mortars. The crews for these
weapons apparently determined in advance the exact
range to the dug-in positions. And after United Na
tions forces had assaulted these positions and had taken
over part of the area, the Japanese mortars opened a
terrific barrage. The enemy soldiers still occupying
dug-in positions lay low until the barrage stopped and
then counterattacked.
Revetments, either of logs or concrete, were con
structed at night around some Japanese positions as a
protection from artillery fire.
In the jungle the enemy frequently digs observation
posts close to our own positions, primarily to prevent
our forces from infiltrating into the area they occupy.
64
JAPANSOME JAPANESE TECHNIQUES
65
In some areas the Japanese open fire with mortars,

machine guns, and rifles immediately after our forces
start an artillery or mortar barrage, or a concentration.
Part of this enemy fire is trained on areas from which it
is suitable for our troops to launch an infantry attack,
and part of it is laid down on fixed lines.
2. ACCORDING TO DOCUMENTS
The following extracts on Japanese defense tactics

were taken from translations of Japanese documents:
Only to defend is not enough; always to attack is going too far.
Even in cases where our mission is only to defend, if we fall
into a purely defensive attitude, we will not have enough men,
no matter how many thousands may be available. In such cases
we would suffer great losses because the enemy [United Nations],
with insufficient forces to assault us, would undertake to destroy
us by artillery fire alone. To rest on the defensive is death.
When the hostile forces come, you must smash their offensive
organization with a brisk, vigorous attack, and instill fear in them.
Then they will keep their distance. On such occasions you must
withhold reserves for counterattacks, and at the proper time these
must be directed against the rear flanks of the hostile forces.
When hostile reconnaissance units encounter our positions, they
will first start a searching fire with automatic weapons. You
must not return this searching fire, because such action would give
away additional positions.
In the jungle the enemy [United Nations] attack usually be
gins with automatic rifle fire. Since the effective range of these
weapons is about 50 yards, we can control their fire by cutting
50-yard-long fire lanes in front of our positions.
Even when we fire at night, the hostile forces return the fire
with trench mortars. Therefore, it is a good idea to change the
positions of heavy weapons immediately after they are fired.
For this purpose, always have alternate positions ready.
It will be advantageous if we can draw hostile fire with dummy
positions, false defensive structures, and dummy soldiers.
Since it is easy for the enemy [United Nations] to outflank us
in the jungle, it is well for us to break up their movement, or to
frustrate their plans by changing our positions.
Section V .
1.
MORALE, CHARACTERISTICS
OF JAPANESE SOLDIER
INTRODUCTION
One of the primary aims of the Intelligence Bulletin

is to provide enlisted men and junior officers with all the
useful information possible about the individual enemy
soldier they expect to face in battle. A considerable
amount of this type of information has appeared in pre
vious issues of the bulletin, and reference should be
made to it because very little repetition is published in
this periodical. Vol. I, No. 12 of the Intelligence Bul
letin contains an index which should prove helpful in
making such references.
2.
GENERAL
In both oral and written instructions, the Japanese

have placed great emphasis on such subjects as "mili
tary discipline," '"improving morale," "reforms in the
service," "improvement of fighting power," "dying for
the Emperor," and "brotherly teamwork" between in
dividuals, units, and the various arms and services.
However, the state of morale and combat qualities de
sired by Japanese leaders are frequently missing. This
is borne out by our observers in the field, by documen
tary evidence, and by prisoners of war.
66
JAPANMORALE. CHARACTERISTICS OF JAPANESE SOLDIER
67
The good characteristics of the individual Japanese

soldier are summed up as follows:
a. Physically, he is hardy and strong.
b. In prepared defenses, he usually is tenacious unto
death (this was not true in some instances in the fight
ing on Attu).
c. He is bold and courageous, particularly when his
comrades are around and when he has terrain and fire
power advantages.
d. Because of good training, he is generally "at
home" in the jungle.
e. His discipline (especially fire discipline) is usual
ly good.
The poor characteristics may be summed up as fol
lows :
a. He is usually subject to panic when confronted by
the unexpected.
b. He is not always steadfast in battle.
c. Usually his marksmanship is poor.
d. Under certain conditions, he is unimaginative; he
is a poor thinker when thrown l' on his own.''
Observers agree that there is nothing "super" about
the Japanese soldier, and that he has the usual human
frailties.
3. ENEMY INSTRUCTIONS
Various Japanese instructions on morale and aggres

siveness in combat are given below. They were ob
tained from enemy sources.
Form an unshakable group unity through harmonious relations.
"The advantages of heaven and earth are of no avail against the
68
unity of men" is an ancient but true maxim. Always maintain a

calm spirit in battle, and forgive others generously. By forming
around our commanding officers a unity like that of a blood
brotherhood, we can overcome all difficulties.
Manifest your morality on the battlefield. Morality is might in
battle. Deal with your neighboring unit in a spirit of friendship
and respect. Kespond immediately to the needs of others in an
emergency. When another unit lacks some items, share what you
have with themeven the most precious rations and ammunition
are not for your use alone. You should know that kindness to
others will always be repaid.
Kead the training manual thoroughly, observe strictly the battle
regulations, and never do things'your own way. The training
manual is a guide which must be strictly followed regardless of
the enemy or terrain; there is no need to change the manual.
On the battlefield there are some who are prone to neglect the
regulations, or thoughtlessly fail to keep them in mind.
When assigned a duty, first of all consult the manual and
familiarize yourself with the instructions regarding your specific
assignment. Then, after the battle, go over your instructions step
by step and determine what mistakes you made. You must realize
that the training manual is the guide and mainstay of the unit.
I t is the enemy's [United Nations] nature to be weak to the
strong and strong to the weak; therefore, if we show any passive
ness, hesitancy, or weakness, they will increasingly take advantage
of it. Each unit and each individual, realizing this fact, must
boldly and resolutely attack and crush the enemy's morale and
put them in a shrinking, retreating frame of mind.
JAPANMORALE,, CHARACTERISTICS OF JAPANESE SOLDIER
69
4. ARMY-NAVY RELATIONS
The following translation of a Japanese document

indicates that in at least some areas there is an out
moded, shortsighted relationship between the Army and
Navy.
For the sake of future relations, the Army units will give proper
respect to the fact that the Navy has shown power in every area.
In addition to recognizing and respecting the hardships the Navy
has experienced, the Army units must try to keep trivial prob
lemssuch as those involving billeting or suppliesfrom causingany feeling of estrangement between the two services. Indeed,
the fundamental basis of ultimate victory in the coming operation
is dependent upon the close spiritual unity of both the Army and
the Navy.
Also, the mutual exchange of salutes between Army and Navy
personnel must be strictly enforced.
PAKT THKEE : UNITED NATIONS
Section I. SOME HEALTH RULES
FOR FAR EAST AREAS

1. INTRODUCTION
The information in this section was prepared under

the direction of the Surgeon General of the U. S. Army,
in a War Department pamphlet titled " Health Precau
tions for the Far East." Extracts from the pamphlet
are reproduced below in order to insure a wide dissemi
nation of this information among enlisted men and
junior officers.
In connection with this section, reference should be
made to a similar article, "Some Health Rules for
North Africa and the Middle East," which appeared in
Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. I, No. 9, pages 65 to 78. That
article dealt mainly with the health aspects of water
supply, foods, clothing, and housing in the North
African and Middle East areas. Since this informa
tion is also applicable to the Far East areas, it will not
be repeated here.
2. INSECT CARRIERS OF DISEASES
The most important insect carriers of disease are

listed below, together with brief discussions of-the dis
70
UNITED NATIONS-HEALTH RULES FOR FAR EAST
71
eases that they may carry and applicable precautionary

measures.
a. Mosquitoes
(1) Malaria
Malaria, which is spread only by the bite of the female
anopheles mosquito, is a serious disease, and its danger
cannot be overestimated. Anopheles mosquitoes feed
during dusk or night periods, and possibly during the
day when the light is greatly reduced, as in deep, shaded
jungles or inside of dwellings. With the exception of a
few of the mountainous areas, great numbers of mos
quitoes, many of which may act as carriers of malaria,
are found throughout the Far East.
Man is the reservoir of malaria. Eighty to 90 per
cent or more of the native inhabitants of some regions
are infected with this disease. Anopheles mosquitoes
become infected when they feed on (bite) a human being
who has malaria. After an incubation period of from
14 to 40 days, these mosquitoes are capable of transmit
ting the disease. While most anopheles mosquitoes
breed in slow-moving streams, lagoons, and swamps,
several varieties of malaria-carrying mosquitoes breed
in small collections of water about houses. Unless care
is taken, they may enter buildings through carelessly
opened screen doors, torn screens, cracks at the junction
of tiled or corrugated roofs with walls, and so forth.
During the day these mosquitoes hide in corners and
other parts of the house where there is little light but
come out to feed after dark.
72
Preventive measures include the following:

(a) Sleep in screened rooms or under mosquito nets.
Inspect screens, doors, and mosquito nets at regular in
tervals, and search for live mosquitoes in those parts of
the house where there is little light.
(b) After dark, stay indoors in properly screened
buildings as much as possible.
(c) When it is necessary to be out of doors after dark,
move about continually.
(d) If possible, select camp sites on wind-swept
ground away from areas infested with mosquitoes and
far removed (at least 1% miles) from native villages
(the inhabitants of which are usually infected and act
as a reservoir of malaria).
Additional measures that may be applicable include:
(a) The use of head nets, gloves, and mosquito boots,
along with other mosquito-proof clothing covering the
entire body. Mosquitoes are able to bite through the
material ordinarily used in shirts and other lightweight
clothing.
(b) Mosquito repellents applied to all exposed parts
of the body at regular intervals.
(c) Insecticide sprays used inside airplanes and in
living quarters in the early morning and late afternoon,
and at other times when necessary.
(d) Quinine and atabrine do not prevent malaria.
However, these drugs are of definite military value
in that they do prevent clinical symptoms of malaria
as long as they are taken, and thus afford a means
of keeping troops fit during periods of emergency
UNITED NATIONS
HEALTH RULES' FOR FAR EAST
73
in the field. Such drugs should be used only under

special conditions and when advised by medical officers,
flight surgeons, or local health authorities. The present
War Department policy advocates 0.1 gram of atabrine
(IY2 grains or one tablet) once daily at the evening meal
for six days each week (total, 0.6 gram or six tablets
per week). An alternative method of administration
which has been found satisfactory in some areas is to
give 0.05 grain of atabrine (one-half tablet) once daily
at the evening meal for six days each week, and a dose
of 0.1 gram (one tablet) at the evening meal on the
seventh day (total, 0.4 grain or 4 tablets per week). If
atabrine is not available, take quinine sulfate 0.6 gram
(10 grains or two tablets) after the evening meal each
day. (Circular Letter No. 153, Surgeon General's
Office, dated 19 August 1943.)
(e) The estive-autumnal type of malaria may give
rise to strange symptoms, entirely different from the
usual chills and fever. It is therefore advisable, when
residing in or traveling from malarial areas, to suspect
malaria when the cause of an illness is unknown, re
gardless of whether or not there is fever. A medical
officer should be consulted and advised of the recent pos
sibility of exposure.
(2) Dengue Fever
Dengue fever, or breakbone fever, is apt to occur in
any part of southern Asia and is common in eastern
India, the Netherlands East Indies, and along the coast
and on the islands of the China Sea and the Sea of
74
Japan. The "yellow fever mosquito/' Aedes aegypti,

is the carrier in southern Asia, whereas Aedes albopictus
most commonly carries dengue fever in China and
Japan. These mosquitoes feed (bite) during the day
but usually not in bright sunlight. Although this dis
ease is rarely fatal, it may be the cause of much disa
bility among troops. The precautionary measures out
lined in (1) (a) and (d) and (a), (b), and (c) above,
under preventive measures for malaria, are also ap
plicable for protection against dengue fever.
(3) Filariasis (elephantiasis)
This disease, often called elephantiasis, is caused by
several different types of small worms that can be in
jected into man by the bite of mosquitoes. These worms
travel through the lymphatic channels, frequently block
ing them. While the disease ordinarily does not cause
any serious incapacity, chronic swelling of the legs and
scrotum may develop, and it seems certain that sooner
or later all individuals affected will suffer some ill
effects.
Since the disease is prevalent throughout the Par East
and chances for exposure are great, it is likely that con
siderable numbers of soldiers will be affected by it.
Methods for protection against malaria as outlined in
(1) (a), (b), (c),and (d), (a), (b), and (c) above, also
will prove valuable in preventing filariasis.
(4) Yellow Fever
Yellow fever has never been reported from Asia.
However, the Aedes aegypti mosquito (the carrier of
yellow fever) is found throughout the East, The trans
UNITED NATIONS
HEALTH RULES FOR FAR EAST
75
portation of infected individuals or of infected mos

quitoes by airplane or ship from an area where yellow
fever is present is a serious hazard, for by either of
these means the disease could be introduced into the
Far East. If it were introduced, its spread undoubt
edly would be rapid.
b.
Lice
Body lice are small, gray, flat, six-legged, wingless in

sects. In the Far East they are the carriers of the
epidemic form of typhus fever (not to be confused with
typhoid fever) and louse-borne relapsing fever.
Typhus fever is prevalent in the hill country of India
and throughout all of China. It occurs sporadically in
other parts of the Far East.
To keep from getting lice, the following measures are
advised:
(1) Frequent bathing (when a satisfactory water
supply is available) ;
(2) Frequent changes into freshly laundered and
pressed clothing;
(3) Careful selection of sleeping quarters so that
clean bed clothing is used;
(4) Avoidance of native habitations and close contact
with louse-infested individuals (sleep and eat only in
the best accommodations available) ;
(5) Use of Army-issue insecticide powder on the
seams of clothing and on bedding as indicated; and
(6) In the presence of mass louse infestation, group
delousing methods as outlined in paragraphs 57 to 66,
inclusive, FM 21-10, and additional instructions on de
76
lousing that are issued from time to time, may be

employed.
c.
Fleas
Fleas are small, wingless, brown or black insects with

a flat body, small head, and large legs. In addition to
being annoying, rat fleas are the carriers of bubonic
plague and endemic or flea-borne typhus fever. Rats
and other wild rodents suffering from these diseases in
fect the fleas. At death the fleas leave the rat in search
of a new host and infect man. The finding of dead
rats or other dead rodents may indicate that these dis
eases, especially plague, are prevalent.
Plague in man (human plague or bubonic plague)
was reported throughout most of 1942 from the Dutch
East Indies, Java, Madura, West Java, New Caledonia,
parts of China, India, French Indo-China, and Burma.
Although not reported recently, the disease is known to
be present in many of the towns and villages of central
China and the seaports of Japan.
Plague in wild rodents is known to be present con
stantly in several large areas in central Asia, in north
eastern China, and in Manchuria.
Endemic or flea-borne typhus fever is found in the
Malay Peninsula, the Dutch East Indies (where it is
called shop typhus), the lowlands of India, and ports of
the China Sea.
Neither the plague nor the endemic form of typhus
fever is likely to be of importance to individuals if the
precautionary measures outlined under "Lice" (b
UNITED NATIONSHEALTH RULES FOE FAR EAST
77
above) are followed, and rats and rat-infested buildings

are avoided.
d. Ticks
Ticks can be identified by their flat, oval body, small

head, and comparatively large abdomen. In the Far
East ticks are carriers of tick-borne relapsing fever, a
disease which is found in Western and Central Asia and
in China. In Northern India they transmit Indian
tick typhus.
Precautionary measures include:
(1) Measures outlined under ''Lice" (b above).
(2) Avoid native homes, especially at night, when
the ticks come out of the walls.
(3) Avoid sleeping on the ground, particularly in
long grass, or resting near the trunks of trees (ticks
hide in grass and under the bark of trees during the
day).
(4) Always examine your bed for ticks before turn
ing in.
(5) Examine skin and clothing for ticks at least
twice daily. Remove all ticks and kill them. Never
squash a tick on the skin or attempt to pull it out.
Cover the tick with a good coating of oil, vaseline, gaso
line, paraffin, or even spit. After a few moments the
tick will let go and be easy to remove. The tick should
then be killed by burning or by crushing between two
stones.
(6) The site of the tick bite should be cleaned and
treated with an antiseptic such as iodine or alcohol.
78
e. Mites
Mites are small insects resembling fleas. In different

parts of the Orient they are the carriers of various
forms of mite typhus. These diseases are common in
Java, New Guinea, Malaya, Japan, India, and Burma.
In Southern China their bite causes a skin disease
known as "coolie's itch."
Mites are usually found in association with rodents
(particularly rats), with birds, and possibly in the
flowers of certain palm trees. They are most com
monly found in areas that are subject to flood and in
recently cut-over jungle lands; they are most numerous
in the late spring and early summer.
Precautions include:
(1) When possible, avoid mite-infested areas.
(2) Wear clothing that protects the skin, such as longtrousers tucked into boots, long sleeves, and so forth.
(3) Use Army-issue insecticide powder and insect
repellents on skin and clothing.
f. Flies
Certain fly-borne diseases are of importance in Asia.

(1) Common House Fly
By mechanical means, flies are capable of carrying
intestinal disease germs from filth and fecal matter to
the food of man. Infectious material from the ulcers
of yaws and Oriental sore may be carried byfliesin the
same manner, and eye diseases may be transmitted
mechanically by these insects.
UNITED NATIONS
79
General precautionary measures (see par. 35, FM

21-10; also AR 40-205):
(a) Destruction of flies by swatting, trapping, poi
soning, and so forth;
(b) Elimination of fly breeding places by careful and
complete disposal of wastes and refuse (human excreta,
manure, garbage, rotten fallen fruit, and other organic
matter);
(c) Use of insect repellents (sprays) ;
(d) Use of nettings and/or screens; and
(e) Protection of foods.
(2) Myiasis (fly boils)
The bites of certain types of flies (especially botflies
and gadflies) may cause deep-seated abscesses or boils
that heal with difficulty in the absence of medical atten
tion. In the process of biting or alighting, the flies de
posit their eggs or larvae (maggots, grubs) in or on the
skin, open wounds, nostrils, or ear canals. The eggs of
some of these flies may be carried by other insects, mos
quitoes, for example. The development of the maggots
in these locations is accompanied by bacterial infection
and subsequent boil formation. Surgical removal of
the growing fly larvae is necessary for cure.
(3) Sand flies
Sandflies transmit a virus disease known as pap
pataci fever or sandfly fever. This disease is of a mild
nature but is prevalent over practically all the Ear
East, where it may cause considerable disability. Evi
dence indicates that sandflies also are capable of trans
80
mitting the organisms causing Oriental sore, and may

be responsible for the spread of kala-azar or Dumdum
fever, a serious disease affecting many people in the
Orient.
3. ANIMALS; DISEASES ACQUIRED FROM THEM
Animals are not only the hosts of insect carriers of

disease (par. 2: rat fleas, lice, dog ticks, and so forth),
but also may be directly responsible for the spread to
man of diseases which these animals themselves con
tract. The following animal-borne diseases are likely
to be encountered in this part of the world:
a. Rabies (mad-dog bite, hydrophobia)
This can be acquired from both wild and domestic

animals. This disease is of great importance through
out southern Asia, especially in India, and also in parts
of the Dutch East Indies, where great packs of dogs are
kept as food. In the case of a bite by an animal thought
to be rabid, the wound should be cleansed as thoroughly
as possible, any available antiseptic applied, and a phy
sician consulted as soon as possible. If practicable,
save the animal for observation and examination.
b. Snake Bile
Poisonous snakes are found throughout tropical and

temperate Asia. The majority of them do not attack
man unless disturbed. Cobra venom contains a power
ful poison which affects the nervous system, while the
venom of the vipers affects the red blood cells. In case
UNITED NATIONS
8 1
of snake bite, identification of the offending snake is

less important in the Far East than in other areas, since
the antivenom usually available is effective against both
types (polyvalent). The presence of an undigested or
partially digested "ball" of food in the snake's stomach
may indicate the amount of venom injected into the
victim. When a venomous snake kills, a part of its
venom is used up; thus the presence of a visible food ball
in its stomach may mean that its poison sacs were rela
tively empty and therefore that probably only a small
amount of venom was injected at the time of biting the
person.
Take the following precautions:
(1) Wear boots when required to walk in snake-in
fested areas.
(2) Avoid the careless touching of shrubs, brush,
trees, tree branches, and so forth, or walking near ledges
where snakes may be hiding.
(3) Examine clothing and shoes before getting
dressed, and always look in cupboards, drawers, and
other dark places before reaching into them.
(4) Have a flashlight or other source of light avail
able at the bedside so that the floor may be examined
before getting out of bed in the night.
(5) If bitten by a snake, the following procedures are
recommended:
(a) Immediately apply pressure or a tourniquet
(rubber tubing, belt, piece of shirt, string, vine, or weed)
above the bite, no tighter than a snug garter. This will
stop the venous-blood return toward the heart and keep
82
the poison from getting into the general.circulation.

The tourniquet should be released for a few seconds
every 10 or 15 minutes to permit some circulation.
(b) Under field conditions, and in the absence of
medical care, do not make an incision, but instead place
a 3- or 4-inch square sheet of thin rubber (rubber from
a condom or similar material) over the site of the fang
punctures, and, by vigorously sucking and kneading
with the teeth, remove as much venom as possible during
a period of 5 minutes. The rubber sheeting will pre
vent sucking the venom into the mouth. Wash the
wound and the rubber sheeting and repeat the sucking
and kneading at frequent intervals while removing the
patient to the nearest medical officer or other physician.
If no rubber sheet is available, blood from the fangpunctures may be sucked into the mouth directly. In
this case, the person sucking should rinse out his mouth
with water at frequent intervals to lessen any danger
of his becoming poisoned from the venom.
(c) If practicable, kill the snake and take it to the
physician for inspection.
(d) Whisky or other alcoholic drinks must not be
given.
(e) Keep the patient from exerting himself, for this
will increase blood flow and thus cause more venom to
be absorbed.
c. Leeches
Leeches look like thick, short worms. They are

troublesome in India, the Malay Peninsula, and the
UNITED NATIONS
83
Dutch East Indies. They are of two types, the large

"horse" leech found in fresh water, and a small jungle
leech found on shrubs and in tall grass in the vicinity of
streams and rivers. They attach themselves to man for
the purpose of sucking blood, and, although they are not
dangerous in themselves, the site of their bite frequently
becomes infected.
Precautions:
(1) Wear long trousers tucked into high shoes. The
leech is capable of slipping through the eye-holes in
shoes, or through coarse stockings; therefore the
tongues of shoes should be sewn to the sides.
(2) Do not pull off the leech, for if the mouth parts
are left in the wound, an infection may take place. Re
move the leech by touching it with the lighted end of a
cigarette, by prodding it with a knife, or by applying
common table salt, wet tobacco, or other chemical irri
tant harmless to the skin.
(3) To prevent infection, immediately apply a suit
able antiseptic to the bite.
4. VENEREAL DISEASES
Venereal diseases are prevalent throughout Asia. In

some areas, up to 100 percent of the native population
may be infected with one or more of these diseases,
which include the following: Syphilis, gonorrhea, chan
croid (or soft chancre), lymphogranuloma venereum
(tropical bubo), and granuloma inguinale.
Briefly, it may be said that in the vast majority of
cases venereal diseases are contracted through sexual
contact, although syphilis may be acquired by kissing.
84
5. SUNBURN, SUNSTROKE, AND HEAT EXHAUSTION
Personnel accustomed to climatic conditions in the

United States fail to evaluate the intensity of the sun's
rays nearer the equator. As a consequence, serious skin
burns and sunstroke may occur after relatively short
exposure. It also must be remembered that severe sun
burn may be acquired from the reflection of the sun,
although protected overhead, when in small boats on
tropical waters. Exertion in hot and/or humid cli
mates, with resulting loss of fluid and salt by sweating
may cause heat exhaustion even in physically fit in
dividuals. Glare from water or sand in intense sun
light often results in severe eye irritation, and mechan
ical irritation may be produced by wind and blowing
sand and dust.
Precautions: The following precautions are sug
gested :*
(a) Wear suitable headgear (sun helmet) when ex
posed to the sun.
(b) Do not expose large areas of the body surface to
direct rays of the sun for more than a few minutes at a
time unless a thorough tan has been acquired and then
only during the early morning or the late afternoon.
(c) The use of a superior grade of dark sun glasses
is advisable. The Calabar lenses now widely used by
Army Air Forces personnel are satisfactory.
(d) Early recognition of the warning signs of heat
stroke and heat exhaustion (dizziness, headache, blur
1
Reference should be made to the list of precautions given on pages 71

and 72 of Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. I, No. 9.
UNITED NATIONS
85
ring of vision, nausea and/or vomiting) and early firstaid treatment of these conditions. Medical attention
should be obtained as soon as possible.
(e) Avoid or reduce to a minimum the consumption
of alcohol.
6. MINOR WOUNDS
Wounds do not heal rapidly in tropical climates and

infection is likely to take place. Minor wounds (cuts,
scratches, abrasions, insect bites, and so forth) should
be treated by application of iodine or other antiseptics.
Burns should be covered with boric-acid ointment or
sulfanilimide powder and a dry dressing applied. All
wounds should receive medical attention as soon as prac
ticable. See FM 21-11.
Section II. HOW TO PROTECT

YOUR FEET
1. INTRODUCTION
This section is based on a pamphlet titled " Watch

Your Step/ 7 which was published by the British Army.
The pamphlet is prefaced with the following state
ments :
"Your feet are among your principal weapons."
"They need just as careful attention as your rifle."
"If you fail to look after them, you are a hindrance,
and not a help, to the Army."
"Therefore, constantly read this pamphlet until you
know it by heart, and above all, carry out the simple
instructions it contains."
These statements and the information which follows
are as important to IT. S. troops as to the British. It
will pay you to read this section more than once.
2. REGARDING CARE OF FEET
To avoid sore feet:

a. Remove shoes as soon as convenient after a march;
b. Wash your feet as often as possible;
c. Dry thoroughly, especially between the toes; and
d. Wash your socks at every opportunity.
To harden your feet:
a. Wash in cold water, using soap freely;

86
UNITED NATIONS
HOW TO PROTECT YOUR FEET
87
b. Rub the bottom of your feet with soap or grease; and

c. Soak the feet in a solution of salt.
3. REGARDING FOOTWEAR
a. Fitting Shoes
The best time to fit shoes is on a hot day and after physical
exercise. This is true because the foot expands in length and
width y^ to y2 inch when the soldier is on the march in hot
weather.
Always fit shoes over army socksnever over the bare foot
and always stand up and walk a little while determining a fit.
The sides of the shoe should feel comfortable and should show
no signs of bulging.
b. Care of Shoes
After having been worn, shoes deteriorate fast if not used often
thereafter.
Rub a light coating of some acceptable leather preserver on the
inside of the shoes at least once per week, but:
(1) First remove all dust and dirt (if necessary, use a damp
cloth).
(2) Put paper or some similar substance inside wet shoes so
that they will keep their shape while drying. (Dry slowly.)
(3) Remember that it is better to apply leather preserver when
your shoes are warm and slightly damp. (Apply the preserver
until the leather is flexible.)
c. Care of Socks
Excessive rubbing, sweating, or boiling in water will cause wool

to shrink.
Always mend your socks from the inside. If the edges curl,
they must be trimmed.1
1
FM 21-10, par. 108c (2) has the following to say about socks :
"Darned socks, or socks with holes in them, should not be worn on the
march because they will cause abrasions and blisters. Wearing two pairs
of socks will aid in preventing friction between the shoes and the feet."
88
INTELLIGEiNCE BULLETIN
If your socks are worn out and none are available for issue at
the time, you can give good protection to your feet by wrapping
them in a triangular piece of cotton cloth, or even paper, and then
putting on your shoes. Your medical officer will show you how
this is done.
4. REGARDING FOOT TROUBLES

a. Sweaty Feet
Symptoms of sweaty feet are tenderness, local areas of redness,
and the tendency of the skin to peel off.
Treat sweaty feet as follows:
(1) Wash them with soap and water; and
(2) Dry them thoroughly and apply foot powder.
b. Blisters
Treat blisters as follows: 2

(1) Kemove the obstacle which caused the blister;
(2) Clean the blister gently with soap and water;
(3) Apply an antiseptic;
(4) Sterilize a needle by passing it slowly through aflame,and
then run the needle through the blisterin at one side and out
the otherto drain out the fluid;
(5) Do not remove the skin covering the blister; and
, (6) Apply an antiseptic to the area, cover it with absorbent
cotton, and cover the latter with a piece of adhesive tape.
NOTE : Often you can manage to march in comfort with a blister
if you fit a piece of cloth or bandage under your foot, over the
instep, and around the ankle. Buckle the cloth over the outer
ankle bone, pulling it tight. This arrangement lessens the fric
tion between the shoe and the foot.
Serious abrasions and ingrowing toenails should be shown to
the medical officer at once.
2
FM 21-10, par. 108c (3) (b), has the following to say about treating
blisters:
"If blisters have appeared on the feet, they should be painted with iodine
and then emptied by pricking them at the lower edge with a pin which has
been passed through a flame."
ANNEX
HOW TO IDENTIFY WAR GASES
The name, symbol, and other means of identifying

the common war gases made for the armed forces of
Germany, Japan, Italy, France, and the United States
are given in the comparison chart shown on the fol
lowing pages. For reasons of security, the other gases
of the United States and the Axis countries are not
listed.
The chart, compiled by the U. S. Chemical Warfare
Service, is designed primarily to help in the identifica
tion of gases used by the enemy, and to afford a means
for quick comparison with U. S. gases of the same
nature. French and Italian gases are included because
of the probability that the Germans possess gases manu
factured by these countries.
In marking gas shells, the Germans may use a cross
or a band to mean the same thing.
89
WAR GAS
Physiological classification
Common name
Odor
Tactical
class
Sternutator
Faint aromatic
Harassing...
Systemic poison.
Faint phosphorus
Casualty..,
Bromacetone
Lacrimator
Old leaves bitter
Harassing.]
Brombenzylcyanide
Lacrimator
Sour or bitter sweet.__ Harassing..
Benzyl bromide
Lacrimator
Aromaticwatercress _ Harassing..
Cyanogen bromide
Chloracetophenone
Lacrimator.
Lacrimator.
Piquantbitter
Apple blossoms
Casualty...
Harassing...
Chlorine
Lung irritant.
Bleaching powder
Casualty...
Chlorpicrin.
Lung irritant.
Flypaper
Casualty...
Sternutator..
Shoe polish
Harassing..
Diphenylcyanarsine
Sternutator
Bitter almonds.
Harassing...
Diphosgene.
Lung irritant.
Musty hay.
Casualty....
Ethyliodoacetate
Ethyldichlorarsine
Lacrimator
Pear juice
Bitingfruity..
Harassing..
Casualty...
Bitter almonds.
Casualty...
Geraniums
Casualty...
Adamsite
Arsine
,.
Diphenylchlorarsine
!
Vesicant and lung irritant

Hydrocyanic acid
Lewisite
Lewisite and mustard...
Methyldichlorarsine
Mustard
Systemic poison (paralyzant).

Vesicant
Casualty...
Vesicant
Casualty...
Vesicant and lung irritant
Vesicant
Garliconion.
Casualty...
Nitrogen mustards._
Vesicant
Faint fishsoft soap.
Casualty-
Phenyldichlorarsine.
Vesicant and lung irritant.
Bitter almonds
Casualty..
Phosgene
Lung irritant
Musty hay
Xylyl bromide
Lacrimator
Pungentlilacs
90
CasualtyHarassing.
INFORMATION CHART
Symbols, names, and shell markings of

French
German
Adamsit_--
-- 1 white band
B-Stoff
T-Stoff: 1 white
band.
T-Stoff
Italian
Japanese
Yellow body, red

nose.
Yellow body, red
nose.
Adamusaito: 1 red
band.
A r u s h i n : 1 blue
band.
M a r t o n i t e or
No. 9.
Camite or No.
United States
DM:1
band.
red
8A
BA.
Buromushian-ben- BBO.
jiru: 1 green band.
Buromuben-jiru
21.
Cyclite or No.
14.
Ce-Stoff
T-Stoff: 1 white
band.
Cloroccetafenone:
Yellow body, 1
white band.
Chlor: 1 green band. Bertholite

Klop: 1 green band Aquinite.
Clark I: 1 blue
band.
Clark II or Cyan
Clark: 2 blue
bands.
Perstofl or K-Stoff:
2 green bands.
Jodessigester
Dick: 3 green
bands.
Blausaure: 1 green
band.
Winterlost
._.
ON.
Enso
_ _ Cloropicrina
Rationite or No.
16: 1 whiteband.
1 white band
Difenilclorarsina:
Yellow body,
red nose.
Red nose
Surpalite
Difosgene
Cl: 1 green
band.
Kurorupikurin: 1 PS: 2 green
yellow band (?).
bands.
Jifuenirukurorua- DA: 1 red
rushin: 1 red band.- band.
Jifuenirushianarushin: 1 red band.
-- Jihosugen: 1 yellow
band (?).
Vincennite or
Manganite.
1 red band . .
DC: 1
band.
red
DP: 2 green
bands.
ED: 2 green
bands.
1 green band
Lewisite
Buromushian
Kuroruasetofuenon:
1 green band.
Seisan: 1 brown AC:

band.
. . Ruisaito: 1 white L: 2 green
and 2 yellow bands. bands.
1 white and 2 vellow HL: 2 green
bands.
bands.
Methlv Dick: 1 yellow band.

Lost or Senf: 2 yel- Yperite or No. 20 I p r i t e : Yellow
low bands.
body, 1 green
band.
Stiekstoffibst: 1 vellow band.
Pflffikus: 1 white Sternite or No Fenildiclorarsina
band.
22.
D-Stoff: 1 green Collongite or Fosgene: Yellow
band
No. 5.
body, 1 white
band.
T-Stofl: l green
band.
MD.
Masutado or Iperit- H: 2 green

to: 1 white and 2
bands.
yellow bands.
HN.
PD.
Hosugen: 1 yellow
band.
CO: 1 green
band.
91
SECURITY
"Remember that your loved ones at home are far more inter
ested in your safe return than in where you are now and what
you are doing."
''A golden rule to observe when talking about military matters
where you may be overheard: 'Think twice before you say any
thing ; then keep your mouth shut'."
"It is certainly not more blessed to give military information
than to receive it."
From a Canadian Army Training Memorandum.
U. S . G O V E R N M E N T P R I N T I N G O F F I C E : 1 9 4 3
DECEMBER 1943
OL.II NO. 4
NTELLIGENCE
ULLETIN
FOft USE OF MILITARY

PERSONNEL ONLY.. NOT
TO B E ^ l l B L I S H E D
INTELLIGENGE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT *.-#&WASHINGTON, D. C
'
'
II-
Intelligence
II
bulletin
VOL II, NO. 4
MID 461
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

War Department
Washington 25, D. C.
December 1943
NOTICE
The Intelligence Bulletin is designed primarily for the use of
junior officers and enlisted men. It is a vehicle for disseminating
to them the latest information received from Military Intelli
gence sources. In order to insure the widest possible use of this
bulletin, its contents are not highly classified; however, it is for
the exclusive use of military personnel. Reproduction within
the military service is permitted provided that (1) the source is
stated, (2) the classification is maintained, and (3) one copy
of the publication in which the material is reproduced is sent
to the Dissemination Unit, Military Intelligence Division, War
Department, Washington 25, D. C.
It is recommended that the contents of this bulletin be utilized
whenever practicable as a basis for informal talks and discus
sions with troops.
Headers are invited to comment on the use that they are mak
ing of the Intelligence Bulletin and to forward suggestions for
future issues. Such correspondence may be addressed directly
to the Dissemination Unit, Military Intelligence Division, WaiDepartment, Washington 25, D. C. Requests for additional cop
ies should be forwarded through channels for approval.
(i)
55915043vol. 2, No. 4
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART ONE: JAPAN
Page
SECTION I. DEFENSE AGAINST AIRBORNE FORCES
1. Introduction
2. General
3. Preparations
a. General
b. To Defend Airfields
4. Combat Tactics-___
a. General
b. Against Parachute Troops.
c. Against Air-landing Troops
II.
NOTES ON AIR TACTICS USED BY JAPANESE
1. Introduction
2. Bombing Attacks
a. During the Day
b. At Night
3. Torpedo Attacks against Convoys
4. Fighter Attacks against Bombers
5. Defense at Night
III.
How
...
JAPANESE RAIDERS DEMOLISH ARTILLERY
13
13
13
13
14
14
14
15
15
15
JAPANESE DEFENSE NOTES _
1. Introduction
2. Defense Plans for " X " Area
a. General
b. Tactical Points
c. Supplies
d. Communication
3. Coastal Defenses
a. Reconnaissance
b. Tactics
10
11
11
___.
1. Introduction
2. The Treatise
a. Organization..
b. Personnel
c. Weapons
d. Supplies and Equipment
e. Training
f. Approach.
__.
g. Main Points in the Attack
IV.
17
17
17
17
17
18
18
19
1"
I9
TABLE OF CONTENTS
III
IV. JAPANESE DEFENSE NOTESContinued.

4. Comments on Pantelleria Defense
5. Antiaircraft Observation
Page
20
20
V. SUPPLEMENTABY NOTES ON BOOBY TEAPS AND MlNES__
1. Introduction
.
2. Use of Pull-type Grenade
a. With 75-mm Shell
b. Attached to a Rifle
c. Attached to a Door
d. Attached to Loose Rocks
e. Attached to Felled Trees
3. Use of Antitank Mines
:
.
VI. JAPANESE SENTEIES
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Introduction
Positions-
Special Orders
Observation
Combat Tactics
Communication, Movement, Relief
2 1
21
21
22
23
24
24
25
25
27
27
28
28
29
29
30
PABT TWO: GEEMANY

SECTION I. GEEMAN MACHINE GUNS AND NOTES ON THEIE USE
1. Introduction
2. TheMG34
a. Table of Characteristics
b. Method of Operation^.
c. Use as Light Machine Gun
d. Use as Heavy Machine Gun
i_
e. Use as Antiaircraft Machine Gun
f. Use in Armored Vehicles
3. TheMG42
1'IJL
b. Method of Operation
c. Construction
' _
d. Use as Light Machine Gun
e. Use as Heavy Machine Gun
f. Use as Antiaircraft Machine Gun
g. Possible Use in Armored Vehicles
31
31
32
32
34
35
36
37
38
39
39
39
40
40
41
41
41
IV
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION
I.
II.
GUNSContinued.
4. German Tactical Doctrine
a. General
.
b. Attack
c. Defense
d. Conclusion
GERMAN MACHINE
Pag6
.
'.
IT. S. SOLDIERS DISCUSS GERMAN MG TACTICS
1. Introduction
2. Comments by U. S. Soldiers
III.
IV.
45
45
45
USE OF INFANTRY WEAPONS AGAINST PARACHUTISTS
1. Introduction
2. The Document
a. General
b. Useof the Rifle.-l
c. Use of the Machine Gun
41
41
43
43
44
.___
54
'__.
USE OF TANKS WITH INFANTRY
54
54
54
55
55
57
1. Introduction
2. The Document
a. Attack
b. Defense
c. Notes on Use of Ammunition
d. Peculiarities of Winter Fighting
57
57
57
60
62
62
V. MISCELLANEOUS
64
1. Engineer Reconnaissance
2. The German Soldier Writes Home
3. "Dig or Die"
64
64
65
PART T H R E E : UNITED NATIONS

SECTION I. SECURITY FIRST
1.
2.
3.
4.
II. How
^^-
U. S. ARTILLERY TERMS DIFFER FROM BRITISH. _
1. Introduction
2. The List
III.
67
Introduction
Careless Questions
How the Homefolks May Err
Security Violations
75
75
75
A CASTAWAY'S DIARY
1. Introduction
2. The Diary
67
68
71
72
79
79
79
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Page
FIGURES 1-5. Japanese Booby Traps

22-25
FIGURE 6. Rear Sight of MG 34___^__.

_
33
FIGURE 7. Two Views of MG 34 on Bipod Mount

34
FIGURE 8. German Method of Firing MG 34 from Bipod Mount

35
FIGURE 9. MG 34 on Tripod Mount

36
FIGURE 10. MG 34 on Antiaircraft Mount

37
FIGURE 11. MG 34 in Action without Bipod or Tripod

38
FIGURE 12. MG 42 on Bipod Mount

40
FIGURE 13. German Vehicle Traps

47
FIGURE 14. German Machine Guns Sited for Mutual Support

51
FIGURE 15. German Tactical Employment of Supplementary Ma

chine-gun Positions
53
Section I. DEFENSE AGAINST

AIRBORNE FORCES
1. INTRODUCTION
Some Japanese tactical plans for use against air

borne forces are presented in an enemy treatise which
is paraphrased below. The document outlines the
tactics that hostile airborne forces are expected to use,
and then discusses countermeasures planned by the
Japanese.
2. GENERAL
The Japanese believe that airborne forces are most

vulnerable to ground attacks from the time their trans
port planes [and gliders] arrive over the landing area
to the time when these forces complete their assembly
for combat. A well-coordinated attack by the de
fenders during this period is the "key to victory/'
the enemy document states. Other important defen
sive factors include thorough reconnaissance and se
curity measures in advance, to prevent surprise at
tacks, and the establishment of perfect communication
and liaison between various units of the defending
forces (especially in the case of air-ground communica
tions and liaison).
Regarding the plan of attack by United Nations

forces, the document reads:
In connection with landing operations by ground troops, the
opposition [United Nations] may dispatch airborne troops in
land for the purpose of capturing important military points,
key communication centers, and important military installations,
such as our airfields or other areas suitable for landings.
Thus the hostile forces will try to gain the initiative at the
beginning of the landing operations. To maintain this initiative
as the operations progress, the opposition, by close coordination
with its ground fighting, may try to throw our rear into con
fusion by use of airborne forces: to cut lines of communication
(especially transportation routes and communication lines), to
interrupt troop movements, and to destroy command and liaison
systems. Or, the enemy may use airborne troops in the areas
where their ground forces are fighting, in an effort to make a
decisive attack immediately.
To arrange successful countermeasures to the above tactics, it
is necessary that our commanders be certain in their judgment of
where and when the hostile forces will attack.
It is also necessary that commanders be prepared to engage
small numbers of hostile airborne troops who may be landed
in the interior [of an island or a considerable distance back of
the major ground operations] for the purpose of throwing the
inhabitants into confusion. Our forces should look for any
change in the attitude of the inhabitants [as a means of detect
ing whether or not they may be hiding hostile troops].
3. PREPARATIONS
a. General
Regarding Japanese preparations for airborne at

tacks, the enemy treatise reads:
The commander of the security detachment must work very
closely with all units concerned, especially the air units, in
DEFENSE AGAINST AIRBORNE FORCES
detecting hostile plans and in disseminating this information.

The commander will strengthen security measures in accordance
with intelligence gained from air reconnaissance and from
various intelligence reports and observations.
The security-detachment commander will bear in mind that
hostile forces will often land at dawn or at dusk, and that first
of all, they will usually make a thorough reconnaissance, estab
lish a detailed plan of attack, and execute strafing and bombing
attacks.
Because of this hostile reconnaissance, the security forces must
try to conceal themselves completely against air observation,
and, when the strafing and bombing starts, must fight back
fearlessly and courageously.
In seeking concealment from the air:
(1) Use forests, buildings, and so forth, and their shadows
as well;
(2) Cover with camouflage nets the positions which are
exposed; and
(3) Disperse troops and execute movements rapidly if the
orders above cannot be complied with.
It is especially necessary for security-detachment commanders
to keep communication facilities in good order so that there
will be no hitch in troop movements during an emergency.
The security-force commander Will arrange for construction
of defensive positions in areas suitable for airborne landings
and in the vicinity of vital points which hostile airborne forces
may try to capture. The commander also will make a proper
tactical distribution of antiaircraft units and of other troops
necessary to the defense.
Suitable places for hostile landings are:
(1) Airfields and terrain suitable for aircraft landings;
(2) Flat ground which has few, if any, obstacles;
(3) Roads without obstacles;
(4) Terrain on which planes can taxi; and
(5) Bodies of water which can be used by seaplanes.
55915043vol. 2, No. 4
If the security-force commander feels that the enemy

[United Nations] is planning an airborne attack in a particular
area, he will strengthen its defenses by concentrating tank units
there, as well as other additional troops. Their advance will
be concealed from air observation.
Preparations must also be made for hostile "hit-and-run" at
tacks. (In these attacks enemy troops expect to be removed by
planes after accomplishing their mission.)
b. To Defend Airfields
Regarding security measures for airfields, it is necessary to

guard each airfield and its perimeter, as well as the planes and in
stallations. Preparations must be thorough. A careful check
must be made on civilians going in and out of the airfield.
Security measures must be especially strict at night.
The distribution of the airfield security force may vary accord
ing to its strength, the enemy situation, and the adjoining terrain.
However, strong means of security must be placed near the
planes and the more important installations.
In making the proper distribution of security forces at airfields,
it is necessary to place antiaircraft observation sentries at the
required points and to have adequate patrols to make rounds
through the areas adjacent to the field.
The defense measures will also include the skillful utilization
of terrain and other natural objects; the construction of barriers,
positions, and so forth; and the establishment of adequate com
munication with nearby units.
In areas suitable for airfields or runways, it is necessary to
place obstacles, or otherwise make it impossible for hostile air
borne troops to use these areas. It is best to use such obstacles
as wagons, barrels, and boxes, because they can be removed
quickly iri case our own aircraft need to use the areas.
In keeping watch over the civilians going in and out of the
airfield, it is necessary to check their movements carefully and
to inspect their clothing and anything that they carry. Individ
DEFENSE AGAINST AIRBORNE FORCES
ual civilian movements will be prohibited. The internal situa

tion [regarding civilian inhabitants] will be investigated, and if
necessary, communication with the outside will be stopped. It is
especially necessary to take constant precautions concerning the
movements of civilian families.
With regard to tactics that the Japanese may use

against airborne troops, the enemy document says:
4. COMBAT TACTICS
a. General
When hostile transport planes get within range, we will first

concentrate antiaircraft fire in an effort to destroy airborne troops
While they are still in the planes, or while they are parachuting
down. From the time of landing, the fire of artillery, machine
guns, rifles, mortars, and grenades will be used against the in
vaders. Before the hostile troops are able to concentrate their
strength, the rifle unit [or units] will make a quick, determined
assault, and the tank unit, coordinating with the riflemen, will
attack and crush the opposition.
Combat tactics against airborne troops which have been able
to concentrate in a landing area corresponds, in general, to ground
combat tactics. Appropriate movements by tanks and other
mobile units are especially valuable for this type of fighting.
It is necessary to annihilate the hostile troops before reinforce
ments can arrive by air or overland.
Since hostile planes usually will continue to support airborne
troops after their landing, it is necessary for our antiaircraft units
to resume antiaircraft fire immediately after the hostile troops
have landedexcept in unusual circumstances.
Since the attacking airborne troopsespecially paratroopers
will attempt to use the transportation facilities, weapons, and
equipment in the landing area, we must take the necessary counter
measures.
In case of a surprise attack, precautions will be taken so that
secret documents and materiel will not fall into hostile hands.
INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN!
b. Against Parachute Troops
Parachute troops generally jump when the speed of the trans

port planes is approximately 135 miles per hour and when the
altitude is about 450 feet or more. The jumping is completed
within 20 to 30 seconds. During this period the parachutists are
easy targets for the various antiaircraft weapons, including machine-gun and rifle fire.
While descending, parachutists carry only such weapons
as pistols and grenades. For their full equipment they must
rely on reaching packs which are parachuted down separately.
Therefore, they are weakest from the moment they near the
ground to the time they are able to reach their equipment and
get ready for action. During this time it is essential that we
launch an especially fierce and daring attack.
Furthermore, shelling at the time of landing is very effective,
since casualties are inflicted not only by shell fragments but
by the shell-scarred areas which cause sprains and broken bones.
We also should make every effort to capture dropped equip
ment and supplies before the parachutists can reach them.
Hostile forces sometimes try to make a display of force by
dropping dummy men and materiel. The genuineness of these
must be determined at once.
c. Against Air-landing Troops
At present the enemy [United Nations] lands from 10 to 20

riflemen per glider or plane. It is necessary to annihilate these
groups individually just after they land and before they can
effect a concentration. Heavy fire by artillery and machine-gun
units and crushing assaults by tanks are especially effective.
Section II. NOTES ON AIR TACTICS

USED BY JAPANESE
1. INTRODUCTION
The notes presented below on Japanese air tactics

were extracted from various intelligence reports deal
ing with the South Pacific area They are not com
plete and are presented here merely as examples of
enemy combat methods. Our observers generally
agree that the Japanese vary their tactics a great
deal, and that tactics used in one area may be dif
ferent from those in another theater of operations.
In general, U. S. airmen have found that the Jap
anese fly better than they shoot, and that their Navy
fliers appear to be better than their Army pilots.
The Japanese during recent weeks have been mak
ing a large proportion of their bombing attacks at
dusk.
2. BOMBING ATTACKS
a. During the Day
Japanese bombers usually drop their bombs at high

altitudes, while flying in a V of V's formation. For
protection, they have a tendency to depend more on
altitude than on clouds. However, the enemy, quick
7
to take advantage of bad weather, is likely to attack

under very poor atmospheric conditions. These at
tacks are made in good formations, which are held
after the bombs are dropped.
Japanese bomber formations usually consist of 9,
18, or 27 planes.
In some sectors Japanese Army Air Force bomber
operations have followed a fairly regular and charac
teristic pattern, roughly along these lines:
(1) Assembling units and moving them forward
from rear airfields;
(2) Making photographic reconnaissances of the
targets;
(3) Delivering the attack;
(4) Repeating the attack; and
(5) Withdrawing to rear airfields.
Operation (1) was designed to achieve surprise by
keeping aircraft out of view of our photo-reconnais
sance flightsuntil the last moment.
In follow-up attacks, Japanese bombers generally
are persistent until their losses become very heavy.
In their relatively new practice of making attacks
at dusk with medium bombers, the Japanese nave
often used as many as 40 to 50 escorting fighters.
These attacks have usually been followed up by singlebomber harassing raids at intervals throughout the
remainder of the night.
Dive bombers also have been used in making attacks
at dusk. The fighter escort generally consisted of 30
to 40 planes.
Lately our pilots have noted that Japanese escort

fighters have a tendency to work in pairs.
In one instance 21 Japanese medium bombers, ac
companied by a large fighter escort, made a high-level
attack from 23,000 feet, while a smaller formation of
light bombers carried out a low-level bombing and
strafing attack.
The medium bombers pressed home their attack
despite the fact that a large percentage of them were
destroyed or damaged by our fighters before reaching
the target. The original formation was broken, but
the bombers were still able to reach their objective
when reformed into three flights, each consisting of
four bombers and flying in a tight diamond-bow for
mation. The Japanese apparently had little fire con
trol, and the bombers carried out no evasive tactics
except to nose down after passing the bomb-release
line.
The escorting fighters appeared to use a generous
amount -of white tracer.
The light bombers flew at approximately 200 to 220
miles per hour while making their bombing and
strafing runs.
b. At Night
The Japanese apparently feel that moonlight bomb

ing operations are not materially different from the
same thing by day. They generally precede their
raids with the usual reconnaissance, fly in formation,
and use the normal pattern-bombing procedure with
light bombs.
10
In a recent attack on a U. S. Navy surface force,

Japanese medium bombers approached during dark
ness, in 2 formations of 12 planes each. One plane
detached itself from the formation and flew parallel
to the course of the ships on one side, for a distance
of 5,000 yards. During this run, it dropped float
flares at intervals of about 600 yards. The plane
then flew about 5,000 yards across the course of our
ships, to the front, and dropped a second line of flares
at approximately the same intervals. Finally this
planed dropped a red flare and a green flare abreast
of the formation and outside of the parallel row of
flares.
Eecent action in the South Pacific has disclosed a
Japanese tendency to employ intruder tactics. On at
least one occasion a returning flight of friendly bomb
ers was joined by a Japanese plane which followed the
traffic pattern, turned on its landing lights, buzzed
the control tower at about 500 feet altitude, and then
proceeded to make a bombing run on nearby shipping.
This attack occurred after dark but during a full
moon period when visual recognition was most
difficult.
3. TORPEDO ATTACKS AGAINST CONVOYS
Approximately 25 Japanese torpedo planes attacked

one of our convoys in the following manner:
The planes came in at angles of about 45, covered
with three levels of fighters up to 20,000 feet. The
planes dropped their torpedoes from heights of 20 to
50 feet, while flying at about 250 miles per hour.
The fighters strafed several of our ships during,

and after, the period when the torpedoes were being
dropped.
4. FIGHTER ATTACKS AGAINST BOMBERS
Observers report that Japanese fighter pilots gen

erally are skillful in the use of clouds for cover before
coming in close to attack our bombers. They are also
adept at approaching from the direction of the sun.
In some areas most of the enemy fighters have made
their attacks from the 10- and 11- or the 1- and 2
o'clock directions. They apparently preferred to fly
parallel to the bombers before attacking, and were
often first sighted 2 or 3 miles to the left or right,
where they awaited an opportunity for, frontal at
tacks. Usually the attacks came from below, and
were both single and coordinated, depending on the
number of fighters involved. In one instance, one
fighter attacked at 5 o'clock and a second at about 2
o'clock. Each made a pass and then shifted to the
other's position and repeated the,process.
The enemy pilots usually opened fire at an estimated
range of about 500 yards. After an attack, they halfrolled and dived to accomplish their breakaway. 3?he
attacks usually were fairly continuous for about 15 to
20 minutes.
5. DEFENSE AT NIGHT
The Japanese in recent months have increased the

number of fighter planes used for defense of airfields
55916043vol. 2, No. 4
12
daSCTELLIGENCE BULLETIN!
at night. In some cases, enemy searchlights have been

operating in conjunction with the fighters. The
searchlights track the targets until the fighters give a
signal, and then all searchlight activity ceases. The
fighters then attack from the 5- to 7-o 'clock direc
tion, high or low. Sometimes enemy fighters have
turned on plane searchlights when approaching our
bombers. The fighters usually worked in pairs, with
both twin- and single-engined fighters being used.
Section III. HOW JAPANESE RAIDERS

DEMOLISH ARTILLERY
1. INTRODUCTION
During the course of fighting in the South Pacific,

the Japanese have developed what they call raidingdemolition detachments for the purpose of destroying
United Nations artillery and mortars. The organiza
tion, equipment, weapons, and tactics used by these
detachments are described in a Japanese treatise which
is quoted below. The introduction to the treatise ex
plains that the methods of destroying hostile artillery
and mortars vary according to the situation at a given
time. However, this "guide" deals with "the ac
complishment of the mission in a short time by a raid
ing detachment.''
2. THE TREATISE
a. Organization
The organization and strength of the raiding-demolition de

tachment depends on the number of guns to be destroyed and
whether we [Japanese] attack with surprise or by storm. How
ever, we usually attack with surprise and suddenness. The
detachment generally consists of a demolition section, a rein
forcement [reserve] section, and a covering section, in addition
to the commander.
When the raid is against a hostile battery of four guns, the
basic strength will be as follows:
(1) Demolition section15 men, in 5 groups of 3 men each;
1 group is assigned to each gun, and 1 is held in reserve;
13
14
(2) Reinforcement sectionone section of riflemen, who act

as reserve for the demolition section; and
(3) Covering sectionone section of riflemen who protect
the flanks.
However, if an insufficient number of personnel are available
at a certain time, it may be necessary for one section of rifle
men to execute all three tasksdemolition, reinforcement, and
cover. Only a demolition section was used during the early part
of the Buna battle, and it gained success by surprise attacks.
Later, when the hostile forces guarded their guns more closely,
we used all three sections.
b. Personnel
Personnel of the raiding-demolition detachment must be es

pecially calm and fearless. Each man must be quick-witted and
always ready to take advantage of opportunities. Therefore it
is not necessary that the leader be an officer. A noncom, or
even a private, may be preferable. (During the Buna battle
most of the raiding personnel were volunteers. Some of them
were so earnest about their work that, after accomplishing their
set mission, they searched out other guns and destroyed them
with left-over explosives.)
c. Weapons
It is necessary that each man of the detachment carry three

or more hand grenades.
Members of the reinforcing and covering sections carry rifles.
The demolition section carries 12 hand grenades (preferably
tied together in groups of 3) ; 8 armor-rupturing mines; 8 to 10
explosives (igniters and slow-burning fuzes included); about 12
matches, or cigarette lighters (these must be moisture-proof);
4 picks; and smoke candles, if available.
d. Supplies and Equipment
Although the amount of rations depends upon the distance

to the objective, normally it is necessary to carry a week's
supply.
HOW JAPANESE RAIDERS DEMOLISH ARTILLERY,
1 5
Preferably, the regular type of ammunition is carried.

All men are equipped as lightly as possible.
e. Training
The detachment must learn as many pertinent details as pos

sible about its mission by studying intelligence reports and maps,
and, if possible, by first-hand observation.
The commander selects an assistant, and then rehearses the
plan of attack with the detachment. This includes the route
and disposition of the men during the approach, their disposi
tion during the attack, and the training in demolition methods to
be used. Each man must thoroughly understand his duty and
its application to the objective as a whole.
f. Approach
The essential point in approaching the objective is secrecy.

Therefore, the men must be prepared to take a roundabout way
and cross difficult terrain without complaint.
It is necessary to refer to tall trees and other prominent land
marks en route in order to facilitate movement to and from the
objective. All movements must be made with good judgment,
and with the proper security measures in force.
Should the detachment be discovered by hostile forces, it
would be advisable to withdraw at once and change the route
of advance to another direction. Discovery by opposing forces
usually will cause a delay in reaching the objective.
One raiding-demolition detachment, dispatched to a distant
objective, made a detour and moved through a jungle area with
the aid of a compass. The detachment usually concealed itself
by day and collected information. Then, after searching and
marking the next line of advance, it approached the objective
at night.
g. Main Points in the Attack
When the objective has been approached, it is necessary to as

certain conditions and wait persistently for the opportunity to
16
attack with surprise. Just before attacking, it is advisable to

destroy the communication net in the vicinity of the line of guns.
Unless circumstances make it necessary, do not attack while the
guns are in operation, because practically all defending personnel
will be available at that time.
When it is necessary to attack by assault, the reinforcement sec
tion should fire and subjugate the gun crews. Each of the threeman groups of the demolition section except the one in reserve
will approach a gun and destroy it. At this time the covering
section will protect the flanks. If possible, it is advisable to acti
vate smoke candles to cover the demolition section while the guns
are being destroyed.
When the attack is made at night, it is advisable to throw hand
grenades at the main groups of hostile forces in an effort to cause
panic.
Under certain circumstances, it is best to attack and annihilate
the hostile gun crews before destroying the guns. Remember
that artillery is weak in close combat.
The following information concerns the destruction of enemy
[United Nations] guns and mortars:
(1) To destroy a trench mortar, drop one ignition hand gre
nade into the barrel.
(2) To destroy a cannon [any artillery piece], throw a Kessoku
[presumably several hand grenades tied together] into the bore
of the gun. To make the destruction absolutely sure, it is advis
able to demolish the gun barrel (in the vicinity of the muzzle)
with explosives or armor-rupturing mines. If possible, it is also
advisable to destroy the gun cradle. The tangent sight and other
laying apparatus should be crushed with picks.
(3) If time is available, it is advisable to drop the entire gun
into the sea or a river, or bury it in the ground. The same holds
true for the ammunition for the gun.
(4) The lenses of the panoramic sights should be brought back
as proof of successful destruction.
(5) When attacking a hostile artillery observation post, capture
and bring back as much observation equipment as possible.
Section IV. JAPANESE DEFENSE NOTES

1. INTRODUCTION
The following notes on Japanese defensive tactics

were paraphrased from translations of various enemy
treaties on this subject. Readers are cautioned to
bear in mind that these notes deal with combat methods
devised for use by the enemy, and that they must not
be confused with our own defense tactics.
2. DEFENSE PLANS FOR "X" AREA
Japanese plans to defend a certain area in the South

Pacific are outlined below. The area is not identified.
a. General
We will defend our present positions to the last maii, breaking
up hostile attacks by fire power and counterattacks. Our recon
naissance must be precise and systematic so that we may avoid
being taken by surprise. Those units on guard in the outer
areas will keep as much of their strength as possible in a mobile
state of readiness.
b. Tactical Points
Front-line companies will make reconnaissances of the area

extending 1 kilometer from the hostile positions, battalions will
be responsible for the first 2 kilometers, and the regiment for
over 2 kilometers.
You will use infiltration and raiding patrols to confuse the
enemy's rear.
17
18
INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN;
Upon discovery of a new enemy plan, you will display

initiative to disrupt those plans.
Every unit, from the smallest sentry group to the largest
company; must consider the probability of hostile artillery
attacks, and therefore strive to construct several alternate posi
tions, to the left, right, and rear, so that our defense will be as
mobile as possible.
Construct strong aerial-defense trenches.
Companies occupying positions the farthest forward will be
relieved in about two weeks by battalion- and regimental-reserve
units.
c. Supplies
"Get one of the enemy every time you shoot" is to be a maxim

of this fight. The defenders must shoot the big forms of the
enemy [United Nations] as they approach. As many provisions
and as much ammunition as possible must be stored in the front
lines. However, these supplies should be widely dispersed as a
protection against bombing.
d. Communication
It is preferable to lay telephone wires between every observation

post and company. Because of air attacks, important connec
tions must be doubled. Also, wires must not be laid in groups.
Men must be posted to guard wires, or reserve wires must be
prepared.
Communication between platoons or sections should be done by
signals or by the speaking-tube system. In front of hostile forces,
it is quite unnecessary to speak in a loud voice or to dispatch
messengers.
Kadio equipment and telephones must be installed in strong
air-raid shelters.
JAPANESE DEFENSE NIOTE;S
19
3. COASTAL DEFENSES
a. Reconnaissance
It is necessary to determine the landing plans of the hostile

forces at an early stage. Their movements must always be
observedespecially the activity of boats, torpedo boats, and
reconnaissance planes. Patrol of the adjacent sea area by boats
must not be left up to the Navy. Every unit must plan various
measures for coast patrol. It is necessary to practice various
methods of quickly reporting the discovery of hostile forces.
b. Tactics
Both day and night maneuvers must be held in rehearsing

tactics to use in defense against landing operations. It is neces
sary to develop various plans that the enemy [United Nations]
may use, and to work out the proper measures to counter these
plans.
When it is known that hostile forces will attempt a landing,
every unit must concentrate as much of its strength as possible
to annihilate the invaders on the beach. Even those who are sick
and wounded must, if at all possible, bear arms and participate
in the battle with grim determination.
It must be remembered that the hostile troops, upon landing,
will not be familiar with the situation and will have no con
structed positions. Furthermore, they will be confused, due to
poor liaison and lack of control, and will therefore be in a very
disadvantageous position. Under such conditions it is possible
for even one of our smallest units to destroy a large number of
the invaders by fierce and fast attacks.
On the other hand, if the invaders are given time to reorganize
and dig in, it will be very difficult to annihilate them later.
559150i3vol. 2, No. 4 1
20
4. COMMENTS ON PANTELLERIA DEFENSE
The following observations are made in connection with the

American and British attacks on the Italian island of Pantelleria:
(1) To counter the enemy's [United Nations] large-scale, over
whelming air attacks, it is essential to possess sufficient fighter
planes and absolutely complete antiaircraft defenses and ground
installations.
(2) To counter hostile landings, it is essential to possess strong
mobile forces for counterattacks, in addition to the fixed defenses
for combat at the water's edge.
(3) Isolated islands require an accumulation of sufficient water,
rations, and materiel.
(4) Evacuation of the inhabitants from Pantelleria was begun
only a short time before the surrender. Although both planes
and ships were used for this purpose, only a few hundred were
removed. It was a blunder not to have cleared out all the in
habitants before the decisive attack, regardless of their devotion
to their soil.
5. ANTIAIRCRAFT OBSERVATION
An antiaircraft observation party should have field glasses,

shutter field glasses, and simple communication equipment.
The party should take up positions where its members will
have a wide view and where the sound of planes can be easily
heard. These positions should be located so as to facilitate com
munication with the officer in charge and with the appropriate
antiaircraft units.
Antiaircraft observers must know how to distinguish between
hostile and friendly planes.
When any evidence of a hostile plane is detected, report to the
officer in charge and to the antiaircraft units in the vicinity. If
the identity of the plane cannot be determined, the procedure will
be the same.
Report to the officer in charge when a friendly plane is de
tected coming in our direction.
Section V. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES ON

BOOBY TRAPS AND MINES
1. INTRODUCTION
The information given in this section on Japanese

booby traps is largely supplemental to the article,
"Land Mines, Grenades, and Booby Traps," which
was published in Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. II, No.
1, pp. 1-15. While the Japanese have made no
extensive use of booby traps to date, it is known that
the subject has been under study in the enemy train
ing program.
(As a safeguard against booby traps, the Jap
anese have been observed beating trails ahead of them
with long bamboo poles.)
2. USE OF PULL-TYPE GRENADE
The Japanese pull-type hand grenade is well suited

for booby-trapping purposes, and the enemy may use
it extensively in future defensive operations. Details
of this grenade were presented in Intelligence Bulle
tin, Vol. II, No. 3, pages 39-42.1 Several ways in
which the Japanese may use this grenade as a booby
trap are illustrated below. Most of the diagrams
were taken from an enemy publication.
^ n Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. II, No. 3, p. 40, par. 2b (Table of Character
istics) "Weight of body" should be 409.5 grams instead of 509.5 grams.
21
22
INTELLIGEXCE BULLETIN!
a. With 75-mm Shell
Figure 1 shows how the Japanese tied a pull-type

grenade and a Model 91 grenade to a 75-mm shell to
form an improvised booby trap. This combination
was found by our troops during recent operations in
the South Pacific. The pull-igniter string of the pulltype grenade was tied to some vines which were
Figure 1.
stretched between two trees. A person or a vehicle

striking the vines would have activated the booby
trap, which was hidden in some grass nearby. De
tonation of the pull-type grenade would have set oft
the shell and the Model 91 grenade.
NOTES' ON BOOBY TRAPS AND MINE'S
23
In improvising booby traps similar to the above,

the Japanese are likely to use any type of highexplosive shell or other type of explosive conveniently
at hand.
b. Attached to a Rifle
The rifle in figure 2 is connected to the pull-igniter

string of the grenade by means of a string, cord, or
: :
:v.*-V. '- .V.-':-;: {;:./ :<'.':/: -...-.--.'^ *'^^--'^;:;V>;.;v:^:::^v^//^/^:.;:;/.vvyvV<v^. .v.;::-.i. ....:;..:
Figure 2.
wire. [& pull on the rifle will activate the grenade

and the attached shell. Instead of the rifle, the Jap
anese may use any other object they think will be
attractive to United Nations soldiers. The booby trap
illustrated in figure 2 is placed in a shallow hole and
then covered. It may also be concealed in grass or
bushes.
24
c Attached to
a Door
Figure 3.
Figure 3 shows how the pull-type grenade can be

rigged to a door. Opening the door will activate the
weapon.
d. Attached to Loose Rocks
O
o
Q
Figure 4.
NOTES ON BOOBY TRAPS AND MINES
25
This arrangement of the pull-type grenade works on

the same general principles as the other types. A
wire, string, or cord connects the pull-igniter to one
of several loose rocks, which are placed in a road or
trail for obstruction purposes. Lifting the rock con
nected with the grenade will activate it. Here, again,
the grenade may be tied to some other type of explo
sive at hand to increase the blast effect.
e. Attached to Felled Trees
Figure 5.
This arrangement is practically the same as in fig

ure 4. The grenade, tied to a mine in this case, is
attached to one or more of the felled trees by means
of a vine or string. Instead of trees the enemy might
use most any type of obstructing material.
3. USE OF ANTITANK MINES
All units in the Japanese Army are trained in the

extensive use of antitank mines.
26
These mines are likely to be found:

(1) On logical routes of approach to enemy
.positions;
(2) On bridges and their approaches;
(3) On all possible detours to antitank barricades;
and
(4) Under tank barricades of a temporary nature.
Section V I . JAPANESE SENTRIES

1. INTRODUCTION
At least a rough idea of how the Japanese use

sentries in the South Pacific areas may be gained from
the following collection of enemy information.
Japanese sentries usually form a "line of observa
tion on the foremost front line." They are given
specific instructions, some of which must be carried
out even if it means a stand to the death.
The enemy "sentry" is divided into "special guard"
and "double sentry." The special guard is posted at
strategically important points or at places where ef
fecting relief is difficult. It usually is composed of
a noncommissioned officer or a superior private as
leader and four to seven privates. This number may
be increased under certain circumstances. Part of the
guard is usually posted as observers while the re
mainder is concealed nearby. All men are armed with
rifles, and the group sometimes has a light machine
gun also.
A double sentry post is composed of a noncommis
sioned officer or a superior private as leader and "the
required number" of privates. Usually two to four
men at a time will be on duty. From outpost detach
ments (pickets) two men are sent out a distance of
about 400 yards to form a "double sentry."
559150 43 vol. 2, No. 4
27
28
2. POSITIONS
According to the Japanese, sentry positions must be

capable of all-around defense. The "most suitable"
places must not be selected, because they can be easily
fired upon by hostile forces. The positions must be so
concealed that they cannot be seen from a distance of
over 5 yards. The Japanese also lay stress against the
destruction of natural terrain features.
"The positions of those on observation duty (more
than two men) and those on relief must be close to
gether," one Japanese document states, "so that the
relief can be effected at the resting place. There
fore the relief party does not have to move its position
for the purpose of relieving those on observation
duty."
3. SPECIAL ORDERS
The "special orders'' for Japanese sentries are

given below.
Sentries must know:
a. The number of sentries;
b. The names of important roads, villages, and natural objects
[in the area] ;
c. The situation in regard to friendly units and patrols in
forward areas;
d. What ground must be particularly observed;
e. The article regarding precautions against gas attacks;
f. The position and the number of neighboring sentries, and
the methods of communication;
g. The position of pickets and your company, and routes to
them;
JAPANESE SENTRIES
29
h. The methods to use in observing, what postures to assume,

how to effect relief, how chemical troops move into action, and
what to do in case of hostile attacks;
i. How to signal and give alarms; and
j . Any other precautionary item.
4. OBSERVATION
In regard to instructions for observing, the Japanese

sources are quoted as follows:
Observation, in all directions, must be carried out constantly.
This may sound easy, but there are certain tendencies to avoid.
For example, the sentry who does not see hostile forces for
several days in his area is apt to become lax. In this state he is
likely to be fired upon before he sees the enemy, who more than
likely will then be able to get away. The enemy who ap
proaches must be killed, or, if possible, captured.
It is necessary that sentries make good use of their hearing.
In jungle areas, the sound of dead branches broken by footsteps
can usually be heard before anyone can be seen (unless the move
ment is over a road or trail). These sounds generally are fol
lowed by the shaking of bushes or branches and then, finally,
the appearance of the enemy.
If anything regarding hostile forces is discovered, it must be
reported immediately. If something occurs so suddenly that
time does not permit reporting, it is necessary to signal by fir
ing rapidly, or by some other means. The report will be made
later.
5. COMBAT TACTICS
Upon contact with hostile forces, Japanese sentries

have been instructed to take the following action:
Approach of the enemy [United Nations] will be signaled to
the sentry leader and neighboring sentries. (A sentry should
act at his own discretion. Contacts cannot be made.)
30
When the sentry (or sentries) is certain that the hostile

forces plan to continue advancing, fire will be withheld until
the latter are at point-blank range. Then the sentry will firefirst at the man carrying the automatic rifle and then at those
who follow him.
If the hostile forces are small, they will be shot or captured.
If large, we must start firing from a greater distance than that
outlined above. If the invaders attack persistently, we will use
hand grenades in driving them back.
With superior forces, the enemy may attack our rear; therefore
we must guard it carefully.
Sometimes, in retreat, the hostile forces are weak, and we
should follow up with fierce attacks.
The opposing forces will try to collect their dead, if any;
therefore we must guard against these efforts.
Each sentry leader will make a report after the hostile forces
have been driven away.
6. COMMUNICATION, MOVEMENT, RELIEF
A Japanese document stipulates that only hand sig

nals will be used for communication between sentries.
Communication for effecting reliefs will be done with
out speech or any other form of noise. Signals may
be given, according to the document, by pulling a
wistaria vine, or some other type of vine.
Sentries will be relieved at "dawn, dusk, and so
forth," the document states, "but we must be careful
that the route of relief is not detected by hostile
forces."
Sentries are required to mess alternately, and
quietly.
PAKT T W O : GERMANY
Section I. GERMAN MACHINE GUNS

AND NOTES ON THEIR USE
1. INTRODUCTION
This month the Intelligence Bulletin devotes two

sections to timely information regarding German ma
chine gunsa subject of particular interest to junior
officers and enlisted men. Readers who wish to in
vestigate this topic more extensively are referred to
two M. I. D. publications: "German Infantry Weap
ons" {Special Series, No. 14) and "The German
Squad in Combat77 {Special Series, No. 9). The for
mer is of value for its abundant technical detail, while
the latter contains useful information about the tacti
cal employment of a machine gun by the squad.
Two types of German-manufactured machine guns
are used by the German Army. These are the 7.92-mm
MG 34, which was introduced before the present war,
and the 7.92-mm MG 42, which was introduced in
1942 and which is gradually replacing the MG 34.
Both types are issued for use in the following roles:
a. As a light machine gun, fired from a bipod.
b. As a heavy machine gun, with a tripod and a
telescopic sight.
31
32
INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN"
c. As an antiaircraft machine gun, fired from single

and twin antiaircraft mounts.
Also, the MG 34 is mounted on nearly all German
tank and armored cars.
German machine guns normally remain in use in
the roles for which they are first issued. Production,
maintenance, and training are simplified, however,
by the Army's adoption of a single standard model.
(Any existing duplication is caused by the present
change-over period.) Ammunition is interchangeable
throughout.
The issue of ammunition to infantry is roughly as
follows:
Light machine gun:
Percent
Ball
Armor-piercing
Armor-piercing tracer
84
12
4
Heavy machine gun:

Ball
Armor-piercing
Armor-piercing tracer
82
10
._ 8
2. THE MG 34
Weight (unmounted)
Weight of bipod
___.
Weight of HvMG tripod
Weight of LMG light tripod_____
Over-all length of gun
Cyclic rate of fire
Practical rate of fire (LMG)
24 lbs
2y2 lbs
42 lbs
14 lbs 11 oz
48 in
800-900 rpm
150 rpm
GERMAN MACHINE GUNS AND NOTES ON THEIR USE
Practical rate of fire (HvMG)

Cooling
Cartridge feed
.
Ammunition carriage
Sights
33
300 rpm
Air
Flexible metal belt containing
50 rds (two or more of these
may be joined end to end)
or a drum containing 50 rds.
Belts carried in metal boxes;
weight, with 300 rds, 22 lbs.
. Blade front sight and leaf
rear sight graduated from
200 to 2,000 meters (see fig.
6). Telescopic sight when
used as HvMG.
sight leaf
Thumb nut for raising
sight
#or lowering
Figure 6.Rear Sight of MG 34 (showing relation between yards and
meters).
34
The gun is recoil-operated (by a barrel recoil of

% inch.) This action is assisted by muzzle blast.
The breech mechanism is of the Solothurn type
(rotating bolt head). Provision is made for semi
automatic fire.
Air-cooled jacKet
Front sigrit
Feed cover
Feed-cover catch
Plastic pistol
Figure 7.Two Views of MG 34 on Bipod Mount.
35
c. Use as Light Machine Gun (see fig. 7)
As a rule, the gun is fired from the bipod (see

fig. 8), although three very light tubular tripods are
Figure 8.German Method of Firing MG 34 from Bipod Mount.
carried by the company and are issued to the pla

toons as required. These light tripods are used
chiefly in antiaircraft defense, but occasionally ter
rain conditions may warrant the use of the gun from
this tripod against ground targets.
The open sights are graduated to 2,000 meters, but
German manuals give the maximum effective range as
1,500 meters (1,640 yards). The most effective range
seems to be between 650 and 850 yards.
The barrel must be changed after 250 rounds of
more or less continuous fire. Two spare barrels are
carried in separate barrel cases by members of the
light machine-gun detachment.
36
Bursts of 7 to 10 rounds are fired, and approxi

mately 15 aimed bursts can be fired in 1 minute.
d. Use as Heavy Machine Gun
When the MG 34 is used as a heavy machine gun,

it is mounted on a tripod known as the MG Lafette
34 (see fig. 9). The gun is carried in a cradle emClaws for attaching
Hinge clam
telescopic sight
Telescopic sight base
Figure 9.MG 34 on Tripod Mount.
bodying a spring buffer, which enables the gun to

recoil as a whole on its mount. This device adds
greatly to the stability of the mount without increas
ing the weight. Adjustable elevating and traversing
stops are provided; these enable the gun to be ele
vated and traversed within predetermined limits.
An automatic searching fire device is incorporated,
and is operated by the recoil of the gun in the cradle.
A telescopic sight is fitted, with provision for direct
fire up to 3,250 yards and for indirect fire to 3,800
GERMAN MACHINE GUNS AND NOTES ON THEIR
37
yards. Small targets usually are not engaged at

ranges of more than 1,500 yards.
Three spare barrels are carried.
e. Use as Antiaircraft Machine Gun
Figure 10.MG 34 on Antiaircraft Mount (using drum feed).
Four types of antiaircraft mounts are provided.

These are (1) the standard light tubular tripod issued
for the light machine gun (see Hg. 10) ; (2) the stand
ard heavy machine-gun tripod with an adapter; (3) a
monopod mount fixed in vehicles used for transporting
personnel; and (4) a twin mount carried in a small
horse-drawn, two-wheeled trailer. The standard tri
38
pods mentioned in (1) and (2) can rapidly be con

verted for antiaircraft use.
German soldiers are also taught to fire on aircraft
and ground targets by supporting the gun on another
man's shoulder (seefig.11).
Figure 11.MG 34 in Action without Bipod or Tripod.
Regardless of the method used, fire above a maxi

mum vertical range of 2,600 feet is prohibited.
f. Use in Armored Vehicles
Nearly all German tanks and armored cars are

armed with one or two MG 34 's, in addition to the
main armament. Under these circumstances the butt
39
is removed, and the gun is fixed in a special mounting

in the gun mantlet.
3. THE MG 42
Weight (unmounted)
Weight (with bipod)
Weight of HvMG tripod._____
Weight of LMG
Over-all length of gun
Cyclic rate of fire
Practical rate of fire (LMG)
Practical rate of fire (HvMG)_
Cooling
Cartridge feed
Ammunition carriage
Sights
20 lbs. (approx.)
2034 lbs
4314 lbs
14 lbs 12y2 oz
48 in
1,100-1,150 rpm.1
150 rpm
300-400 rmp
Air
Flexible metal belt containing
50 rds (two or more may be
joined end to end)
Belts carried in metal boxes;
weight, with 300 rds, 22 lbs.
Blade front sight and leaf rear
sight graduated from 200 to
2,000 meters. Also uses tele
scopic sight on tripod when
employed as a heavy machine
gun
The principle of operation is a combination recoil

and blow back. In place of the Solothum rotating
bolt-head action of the MG 34, there is a new system.
This involves a lateral separation of the bolt studs in
the cylinder from the bolts in the barrel extension.
1
German documents give the cyclic rate of fire as 1,500 rpm.
40
An improved feed mechanism is provided. Barrelchanging is extremely rapid.

No provision is made for firing single rounds.
c. Construction
The extensive use of stamping, riveting, and spot

welding gives the gun a less finished appearance than
that of the MG 34. There are few machined parts.
However, this does not mean that its life is shorter
or its performance inferior.
Use of MG 34 and the MG 42 as light machine
guns is comparable, except that, in the case of the
newer model, the higher rate of fire and the conse
quent "creep" of the gun makes shorter bursts (of
5 to 7 rounds) advisable. Twenty-two aimed bursts
can be fired in 1 minute.
d. Use as Light Machine Gun (see fig. 12)
feed-COver
colaft
Rear
(folded
Operating
sight
AA
ring sight
flash Wder
base
down)
Bipod
handle
Figure 12.MG 42 on Bipod Mount.
catch
41
e. Use as Heavy Machine Gun
The tripod lias been slightly modified to suit the

catches on the gun, but has not been altered in essen
tials. A new and slightly modified telescopic sight is
also in use.
German manuals advise bursts of 50 rounds for
best results.
As in the case of the MG 34, the barrel should be
changed after 250 rounds of more or less continuous
fire, although prisoners of war have stated that barrels
need not be changed until 400 rounds have been fired.
It has been suggested that the detachment may carry
more than 3 spare barrels, but this point has not yet
been established.
f. Use as Antiaircraft Machine Gun
Against aircraft the MG 42, like the MG 34, is

fired from light and medium tripods as well as from
single and twin mobile mounts.
g. Possible Use in Armored Vehicles
Although use of the MG 42 in tanks or armored

cars has not yet been reported, it is being used in the
"Ferdinand," and further development along this line
should be regarded as a distinct possibility.2
4. GERMAN TACTICAL DOCTRINE
a. General
(1) Light machine gun.While the basic princi

ples of the tactical use of the German light machine
"The "Ferdinand" is a new German heavy self-propelled gun.
Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. II, No. 2, pp. 1-^.)
(See
42
gun are not unusual, the following are especially

stressed in enemy doctrine: surprise, fire and move
ment, coordination of fire power, conservation of am
munition, and alternate positions.
(2) Heavy machine gun,When issued with the
heavy tripod, the MG 34 and the MG 42 are invariably
used as heavy machine guns, except in the case of a
surprise attack by a hostile force, when a gun may be
off its tripod and not in firing position. Because of
its dual nature, the weapon can be used as a light
machine gun under such circumstances.
In the German Army the heavy machine guns are
carried in the machine-gun company of the infantry
battalion. This company has twelve heavy machine
guns in addition to six 3-inch mortars.
The heavy machine gun is employed from open or
covered positions. In the case of open positions,
which may be taken up in battle, use is made of all
available cover. A position of this kind is normally
manned by a section (two guns) under the control
of the section leader. Covered positions are generally
on reverse slopes, and are normally manned by a whole
platoon (four guns), which the platoon commander
controls from a central command post.
The heavy machine gun. is prepared for action be
hind cover, and is placed in its firing position only
at the last moment.
Covered positions are almost always used when
overhead fire is to be delivered.
43
b. Attack
In the attack heavy machine guns covei1 the deploy

ment of the rifle companies from echeloned positions
sited on commanding ground. In a penetration
(Einbruch) the heavy machine gun, firing from posi
tions in the rear of the attacking troops, aims at centers
of resistance within the hostile position, and prepares
to give covering fire against counterattacks. Heavy
machine guns follow the attacking rifle companies
from position to position. Inasmuch as unified control
of this type of work is difficult, sections and platoons
are usually placed under the command of the rifle com
pany to exploit local successes. Single guns may even
be used in support of rifle squads or platoons to con
solidate ground gained and to cover the flanks; how
ever, this is practically the only time when heavy
machine guns are used singly.
c. Defense
In defense the heavy machine gun is normally sited

under the direction of the company commander. Sec
tions may be placed under commanders of advance
positions or, less often, commanders of combat out
posts. Otherwise, the heavy machine guns, although
employed in the sectors of rifle companies, will form
part of the battalion-fire plan. Their tactics involve
exploiting all the possibilities of fire as early, as
heavily, and at as long a range as possible. For this
purpose positions are taken up in, or just to the rear
of, the main line of resistance. Some heavy machine
44
guns may be sited forward as "silent" guns. It is a

German principle to site them for enfilade and cross
fire. The heavy machine guns are sited in covered
positions, with open positions forward of the main
line of resistance having been reconnoitered before
hand and echeloned in depth. Thus the guns are able
to move forward and engage any hostile force at
tempting to penetrate.
German doctrine stipulates that heavy machine guns
in the rear of the main line of resistance may not fire
overhead at ranges of less than 400 yards.
d. Conclusion
After the Battle of France a " Commander of Sup

porting Weapons" was instituted in the infantry bat
talion (normally, the commanding officer of the
machine-gun company). However, there is now rea
son to believe that heavy machine guns are increasingly
being allotted in platoon strength (four guns) to the
rifle companies, in whose sectors they are almost
always employed in attack or defense.
German training stresses cooperation between the
heavy machine guns and the battalion support weapons
(infantry guns and antitank guns and mortars). The
utmost attention is paid to the careful siting of fire
positions, as well as of alternate and dummy positions.
It has been found that the Germans make every effort
to gain surprise, and that their camouflage is usually
excellent.
Section II. U. S. SOLDIERS DISCUSS

GERMAN MG TACTICS
1. INTRODUCTION
"It's true that the Germans have a good machine

gun," a U. S. junior officer who fought in Sicily re
marked recently, "but, like many other German
weapons, it doesn't live up to all the latrine rumors
you hear. It doesn't walk on its hind legs or jump
through hoops or anything like that. It's just a good,
fast gun. I feel that the sooner our men understand
how the Germans use it tactically, the more success
we'll have in combating it."
German machine-gun tactics figure prominently in
the following comments by IT. S. soldiers who have
been up against the gun lately, and who can speak
with authority of the ways in which it is employed.
2. COMMENTS BY U. S. SOLDIERS
"What impresses me especially is the way the Ger

mans site their machine guns so as to deliver crossfire
from opposite sides of a road. I see a good deal of
this, because I'm a jeep driver. They generally try
to site guns at narrow places, such as defiles and
bridges. The Germans like our jeeps just as much
as we do, and they make a great effort to kill personnel
45
46
without damaging the vehicles. They're always very

much aware of salvage possibilities."
" German machine-gun fire is usually so lowoften about a foot and a half above the groundthat
we call it 'grass cutting.' The Germans know that
U. S. soldiers don't allow their wounded to lie around
any longer than is necessary, and that a man who
has a leg wound of some kind will probably need a
helping hand to get him to safety. It's fairly ob
vious that the Germans know the value of immobiliz
ing as many men as possible at one time.
" Although the German machine gun is first-rate as
to fire power, its dispersion is poor. One of my
friends had so much confidence in his ability to get
away from it that on one occasion, even though he
had already received a number of shoulder wounds,
he made a successful dash for safety, and then turned
and got the machine gunner with rifle fire. Three
shots in the stomach.
"The machine gunners lie in wait for us. They're
very patient. For example, they know that sooner or
later we're going to want a certain little piece of
commanding ground, or some spot that offers un
usually good defilade. They lie motionlessalways
well camouflagedfor as long as may be necessary,
and then let us have it.
"The Germans make every effort to stop vehicles.
Next to stopping a lot, they like to stop a few. Next
to stopping a few, they're satisfied if they can stop
U. S. SOLDIERS DISCUSS GERMAN MG TACTICS
47
just one. One of their methods involves the use of

two skillfully camouflaged vehicle traps [see fig. 13],
extending halfway across a road from opposite sides,
and with just enough space between the two traps for
a single vehicle to pass. As * a rule, the Germans
choose a piece of road with sizeable banks on each
side. Even if a vehicle detects the traps, the enemy's
German camouflaged
vehicle traps covered
by machine guns.
Figure 13.
purpose is served, for the vehicle then must slow

down in order to twist its way cautiously between the
traps. This presents a good opportunity for enemy
machine guns, well sited on each side of the road, to
place fire on the vehicle.1
1
When there is no rising ground flanking a road, the Germans construct

rectangular traps which extend from the center of the road well into the
fields on each side.
48
INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN;
"Under these circumstances the machine guns can

do a hell of a lot of damage unless they are neutral
ized at once.
"Vehicle traps are covered with tightly stretched
canvas, which is sprinkled with dirt the same color
as the road itself. I've even seen a good approxima
tion of dusty asphalt."
"It's amazing how those machine gunners can sit
around and wait. One morning we were going up a
hill. The Germans waited and gave it to us in the
back. They were down in holes clear over their heads,
with a harmless-looking little bush concealing each
man. In other words, they didn't open fire until the
split second when they were sure they could do the
greatest amount of damage.
"At night the enemy uses machine pistols a good
dealand machine guns, too. Once, around 2300, we
were up a valley. We'd been out there two or three
nights, and had gained pretty good control of the
place. An enemy patrol came down the valley, and
bumped into us. I'll never forget the speed with
which they opened fire after they were challenged.
There wasn't any interval of estimating the situation
or of just standing around! They threw grenades
almost as soon as the first English word was uttered,
and instantly followed up with machine-pistol fire. In
the dark those grenade-throwing babies can damn near
hit you from the sound of your voice! They seem able
to gauge where it comes from. I think it's reasonable
TJ. S. SOLDIERS DISCUSS GERMAN MG TACTICS
49
to suppose that they're trained to hurl grenadesor

something similar in weight and shapeat voices in
the dark. However, the Germans aren't so hot at
many other aspects of night fighting. In Sicily they
had to undertake a tremendous variety of night ac
tivity, for which they obviously had no particular
appetite.
"By the way, I saved my life once by speaking a
single German word at night, although the only ones
I know are nein (no) and ja (yes). The terrain was
very rocky, and the night was pitch-dark. I was sleep
ing about 15 yards from my machine gun. Suddenly
I woke up and realized that a German patrol had
filtered into the locality. A shadowy form crept
alongside me, and a voice asked Neunten Kompanief
which sounds enough like Mnth Company to be
understood readily. I whispered Nein! impatiently,
and then added Sssh! in a warning tone, to suggest
that we were running a great risk in saying anything
at all. He moved on, and I lay quiet. Presently I
heard the voice of one of the men who were awake
and manning my gun. He was challenging a Ger
man. Then I heard the opening of fire. It didn't last
long. The German patrol withdrew, and I got back
safely to my gun."
"It's true that the dispersion of their machine-gun
fire is poor.
"In retreat the Germans like to leave a few men
and maehine guns behind to cover the movement. The
50
idea is to make you think there are a hell of a lot of

Germans around when there are really just a few.
"When they're defending a town or a hill, they try
to fool you by luring you within range of their densest
fire power and then assaulting your flanks and rear with
machine-gun fire.
"In general, their machine-gun fire is very low.
You can throw yourself down and feel reasonably securebut you don't dare rise. As it is, there's only
a tiny margin of safety. Often, however, the German
can't prevent you from wriggling away, and then
getting up and making a dash for it. Twelve of us
did this once. We were inspecting an Italian truck,
which was about 50 yards from a small house. The
Germans had a machine gun on each side of the house
and riflemen inside it. When they opened up, we
dropped down, wriggled out of the dispersion areas
as fast as we could, and then ran. All 12 of us got
away without a scratch. Why the riflemen didn't get
us I don't know. However, I've heard a great many
U. S. soldiers comment that German rifle fire is not
as accurate as ours.
" I ' d like to add, too, that our Browning automatic
rifle is accurate at a greater range than the German
MG 42."
"The Germans are very clever at determining our
probable line of approach, and then siting machine
guns to cover it. One of their favorite practices is to
site three guns so that they will be mutually support
U. S. SOLDIERS DISCUSS GERMAN MG TACTICS
51
ing while covering a saddle between two small hills

as well as the side approaches [see fig. 14]."
Figure 14.German Machine Guns Sited for Mutual Support.
"There's no question about the Germans being very

adept at working out fields of fire.
"In a withdrawal or a retreat, the Germans destroy
everything that they can't take with them. Automatic
stuff, especially. It literally amounts to a * scorched
weapons' policy.
"Every once in a while we find them using our hel
mets and Ml rifles.
" Their light machine-gun fire is harassing as hell,
but I don't think much f its accuracy. As to height,
52
I'd say it averages about two feet above the groundoften enough to let you slither out of the dispersion
area. It's true that a man can dodge the fire in this
manner. We've done it often.
"They take high commanding ground and try for
long, grazing fire. In defense they can pick their own
ground, of course. In siting machine guns they often
use the military crest of a hill, as well as the base.
[Note: See the last statement in this section.]
"The Germans fight a good rear-guard action.
They're foxy. The U. S. soldier is a better fighter,
though. He's got guts, audacity, and ingenuity. Al
though he isn't crafty by nature, he soon learns to be
just as sly as the enemy. There's no doubt about itjAmericans learn fast."
"German supplementary positions are imagina-j
tively planned and used. At nightfall, for example, a
platoon or company is likely to move about half of its
machine guns up to the military crest of a hill, where
they fire intermittently throughout the night. The
other machine guns, still in the lower positions, remain
silent. The purpose of this is to deceive us as to where
the German strength is, and to lure our artillery into
making preparations to place fire on the military crest.
Then, before dawn, the Germans bring back the ma
chine guns from the supplementary positions. This
means that they are once again in full strength at the
base of the hill, and are ready to surprise us as we
advance [see fig. 15]."
U. S. SOLDIERS DISCUSS GERMAN" MG TACTICS
53
Figure 15.German Tactical Employment of Supplementary Machine-gun
Positions.
Section III. USE OF INFANTRY WEAPONS

AGAINST PARACHUTISTS
1. INTRODUCTION
The German Army attaches great importance to the

use of infantry weapons against parachutists. A Ger
man document acquired by United Nations forces in
Sicily discussed the technique of employing rifles and
machine guns for this purpose. The following ex
tracts from this document should be regarded as sup
plementary to a more general article, ''Principles of
Defense against Airborne Troops," which appeared in
Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. II, No. 3.
2. THE DOCUMENT
a. General
German infantry units must at all times be prepared to meet

surprise attacks by parachutists.
Hostile parachute troops jump from an altitude of 3,000 feet or
more, drop about 1,000 feet, and then open their parachutes; or
they may jump at an altitude of about 400 feet, and open their
parachutes after a drop of about 100 feet. One must reckon with
a speed of fall of from 16 to 20 feet per second. When the first
of these procedures is followed, the parachutists, in landing, are
dispersed over a large area. When a platoon of parachutists fol
lows the second procedure, it attains in the air a lateral dispersion
of from 425 to 750 yards, a depth of about 325 yards, and a differ
ence of altitude of 50 to 65 feet between jumpers.
54
USE OF INFANTRY WEAPONS AGAINST PARACHUTISTS
55
In employing infantry weapons against hostile parachute

troops, German soldiers will fire only on the order of a responsible
commander, such as a platoon commander or squad leader. The
individual parachutistsnot their parachutesconstitute the
proper targets.
While a parachutist is landing, he may be attacked with every
likelihood of success. At this time he must free himself from his
parachute, and is helpless. If his weapons are dropped sepa
rately, he must recover them. This, too, will occupy him for a
few moments.
All arms must participate in the task of crushing a parachute
attack. Moreover, the employment of every form of ground
defense for this purpose has the definite effect of breaking down
the morale of the hostile force.
b. Use of the Rifle
Riflemen will fire on hostile parachutists as soon as the latter

are within a range of about 425 yards. In a moderate wind, a
rifleman will aim at the center of his target. In a strong
wind, he will lead the moving target according to firing rules.
The rear sight will not be changed while fire is in progress.
Riflemen will also fire on ammunition and weapon containers.
Standing or kneeling firing positions should be assumed.
However, the situation may justify a prone position. Each
rifleman will fire at the parachutist nearest him. When the
parachutist jumps from an altitude of about 400 feet, the rifle
man will not have time to fire more than five aimed rounds.
c. Use of the Machine Gun
Machine gunners will use ordinary ball ammunition against

parachutists. It is advantageous to include armor-piercing
tracer bullets in ammunition belts, in a proportion of 1 to 3.
Fire will be opened with the rear sight set according to the
actual distance of the target. With reference to wind velocity,
the rules for aiming are the same as those in subparagraph b.
The rear sight will not be changed while fire is in progress.
56
IINTEiLLIGEN'CE BULLETIN?
The machine gun may be fired from a bipod, as a light gun,

or from a tripod, as a heavy machine gun; however, surprise
parachute attacks will generally compel a machine gunner to
fire from the shoulder of another man,
If parachutists are dropped in front of a position, they are
to be met with concentrated machine-gun fire. If they are
dropped beyond the fire position on the flank, they are to be
fired upon successively; that is, a machine gunner will fire on
the nearest parachutist, and will then fire on any who remain
in the line of sight. A volley of sweeping fire on scattered
parachutists is a waste of ammunition, and is strictly forbidden.
Section IV. USE OF TANKS

WITH INFANTRY
1. INTRODUCTION
The correct and incorrect ways of using infantry

with tanks, according to the German Army view, are
summarized in an enemy "document recently acquired.
In this document the Germans list the correct and in
correct methods side by side, an arrangement which is
also followed in this section, for the convenience of
the reader. The document is of special value and
interest, not only because the column headed "Right"
indicates procedures approved by the enemy, but be
cause there are implications, in the column headed
"Wrong," of certain errors that German units may
have made from time to time.
Extracts from the document follow.
2. THE DOCUMENT
a. Attack
Wrong
Right
Attack not thoroughly dis (1) Thorough discussions of recon

cussed in advance.
naissance and terrain will
take place. Riflemen and
tanks will maneuver jointly
as much as possible, in ad
vance.
57
58
Wrong
Right
Inadequate coordination be (2) The mission of protecting

armored elements not yet
tween armored and artil
discovered by hostile forces
lery units.
will be distributed among
artillery. (Flanks will be
screened by smoke.)
Failure of armored cars and (3) Armored cars used for obser
vation will maneuver with
tanks to maneuver jointly
tanks before an intended
in advance.
attack.
Distribution of too many (4) Tanks not intended for use in
tanks in proportion to in
an attack will be kept out
side the range of hostile fire.
fantry used in the attack.
Tanks deployed and distrib (5) For effective results, available
uted among small units.
tanksat least an entire
companywill be combined
for the assault.
The use of tanks in unrecon (6) Terrain must be reconnoit
noitered t e r r a i n when
ered, especially when an
attack at g r e a t speed
speed is essential.
is contemplated. Facilities
for mine clearance must be
at hand. If a tank deto
nates a mine, the remaining
tanks must halt while the
minefield is reconnoitered.
After this, the minefield
must either be cleared or by
passed.
(7)
A
number of tank command
All tank commanders absent
ers must always remain
on reconnaissance.
with the company.

Wrong
59
Eight
Tanks launched without a (8) The mission of tanks will be

widely understood.
clear statement of their
mission.
When a sector full of tank ob (9) Riflemen cross the sector first
and create passages, while
stacles has been taken,
the tanks provide covering
tanks are ordered to cross
fire from positions on slopes.
this sector in front of the
riflemen.
T a n k s advance so rapidly (10) Tanks advance only a shortdistance at a time. Rifle
that riflemen are unable to
follow.
men advance with the tanks.
When two successive objec (11) When two successive objec
tives have been taken, the
tives have been taken,
tanks ignore the possible
entire area between them
presence of hostile forces
must be made secure by
in areas between these ob
means of tanks, artillery,
jectives, even though an
assault guns or antitank
attack on still another ob
guns, and heavy weapons.
jective is not contemplated
at the moment.
Tanks within sight of posi (12) Responsibility f o r covering
fire is divided among artil
tioned hostile tanks ad
lery or heavy antitank guns.
vance without benefit of
If these are not available,
covering fire.
Pz. Kw. 3's and Pz. Kw. 4's
provide protection.
Tanks are ordered to hold a (13) As soon as an objective has
been taken, tanks are with
captured position, e v e n
drawn and are kept in
though heavy weapons are
readiness for use as an at
available for this purpose.
tacking reserve or in the
preparation of a new attack.
60
Wrong
Riflemen and light machine

guns remain under cover
during own attack.
Tanks take up positions so

close to hostile forces that
early discovery is inevita
ble.
Tanks remain inactive when

a mission has been com
pleted.
Right
(14) Riflemen and machine guns

cover the antitank riflemen,
who have the mission of
destroying hostile tanks
which may attempt to by
pass.
(15) If possible, tanks take up po
sitions outside the range of
hostile artillery fire. Tanks
which are compelled to take
up positions in the vicinity
of hostile forces do so as
late as possible, so that the
hostile forces will not have
time to a d o p t effective
countermeasures.
(16) When a mission has been com
pleted, tanks promptly re
ceive orders as to what they
are to do next.
b. Defense
Distribution of tanks along

the entire front.
(1) All available tanks are kept

together so that during an
enemy attack prompt action
can be taken against an ad
vantageous point. Tanks,
assault guns, and heavy
antitank guns must be kept
at a distance while firing
positions are being pre
pared.

Wrong
Subordination of tanks to
small infantry units for
the purpose of static de
fense.
After repulsing an attack,
tanks remain in the posi
tions from which they last
fired.
As hostile tanks approach,
own tanks advance, having
failed to take up advan
tageous firing positions be
forehand.
Tanks which have no armorpiercing weapons are sent
into battle against hostile
tanks.
When hostile tanks approach,

German riflemen and their
heavy arms remain under
cover, and leave the fight
ing against tanks with in
fantry to own tanks, as
sault guns, and antitank
guns exclusively.
61
Right
(2) When tanks have fulfilled

their task they are with
drawn behind the main line
of resistance, and are kept
in readiness for further
action.
(3) After repulsing an attack,
tanks move to alternate
positions as soon as heavy
arms or riflemen have taken
over the responsibility of
delivering covering fire.
(4) A firing front is created at a
t a c t i c a l l y advantageous
point in the area against
which the attack is directed.
Tanks deliver surprise fire
from positions on reverse
slopes, if possible.
(5) Tanks without armor-piercing
weapons are kept back, and
are used for antiaircraft
protection, as well as in es
tablishing communications
and in supplying ammuni
tion.
(6) All arms take part in defense
against hostile tanks. In
fantry accompanying the
tanks are kept somewhat
a p a r t , however, so that
tanks, assault guns, and
antitank guns are free to
engage the hostile tanks.
62
JENTESLUGENOE BULLETIN
Wrong
All available tank reserves

are compelled to remain
out of action because of
minor defects.
Tanks which must remain in
forward positions do not
dig in, and thereby consti
tute targets for hostile
artillery.
Right
(7) Kepairs will be arranged in

such a manner that a num
ber of tanks are always
ready for action..
(8) Tanks which are within range
of hostile observation must
be dug in as fast as possible.
In winter, they must be
hidden behind snow walls.
c. Notes on Use of Ammunition

When only a few hostile (1) When only a few enemy tanks
tanks attack, fire is opened
attack, it is best to wait un
early.
til they are within a favor
able distance and then de
stroy them with as few
rounds as possible.
Against a superior number (2) Fire is opened early on a su
perior number of tanks, to
of tanks, fire is opened at
force them to change direc
close range.
tion. High-explosive shells
are used at first. Since this
early opening of fire gives
away own positions, new po
sitions must be taken up.
Pz. Kw. 4's will fire hollow (3) Tanks which are short of 75
mm armor-piercing shells
c h a r g e ammunition at
must allow a hostile force to
ranges of more than 750
approach to a position with
yards.
in a range of 750 yards.
d. Peculiarities of Winter Fighting
Tanks are p l a c e d outside (1) "Tank shelters" are to be kept
for the exclusive use of
"tank shelters" when these
tanks, assault guns, and
shelters are being used for
mounted antitank guns.
other purposes.

Wrong
In deep snow, tanks do not

advance on roads.
Winter quarters are located
so far from the scene of
action that the tanks, if re
quired, may arrive too late.
W h e n "tank shelters" are

snowed under, departure is
possible only after hours
of extra labor.
In winter, tanks travel freely
over roads which have not
been used for a consider
able time.
In winter, tanks are ordered
to attack distant objectives.
63
Right
(2) In deep snow, tanks keep to

roads. An adequate num
ber of men are detailed to
assist if fresh snow falls.
(3) When action in appreciably
distant places is under con
sideration,
arrangements
must be m a d e for the
smaller unitsif possible,
never less than a platoon
to reach the scene of action
at the proper time.
(4) Paths leading from "tank
shelters" t o t h e nearest
roads are kept cleared.
Snow fences are provided
for e x i t s . Readiness of
tanks is always assured.
(5) Because of danger from land
mines, mine-clearance de
tachments always precede
tanks, especially if a road is
seldom used.
(6) All attacks consist of a num
ber of consecutive attacks
with "limited objectives/*
When these objectives have
been reached, the area is
cleared and reorganization
is completed before a new
attack is launched.
Section V. MISCELLANEOUS
1. ENGINEER RECONNAISSANCE
Engineer scout squads are sent out well in advance

of proposed Engineer activity, and are ordered to
report the following to their commander:
a. The disposition of hostile forces in relation to
German forces.
b. Details of the location in which work is to be
done, and of difficulties which will confront the
engineers.
c. The probable requirements as to men and ma
terials.
d. Recommendations as to the most suitable methods
of accomplishing the task.
e. The cover and concealment which will be avail
able during the approach.
f. The probable length of time required for the task,
g. Recommendations as to the advisability of seek
ing the cooperation of other arms.
2. THE GERMAN SOLDIER WRITES HOME
The German High Command is disturbed by what

it calls "carelessness amounting to treason" in the
German soldier's letters to his family and friends in
the Reich. Security violations are only one aspect of
the problem, it seems. Equally dangerous, according
64
MISCELLANEOUS
65
to the High Command, is the tendency to include in

letters to the Reich remarks which may weaken con
fidence in the armed forces.
Criticism 'of superiors is placed high on the list of
forbidden subjects. German soldiers are reminded
that they may submit justified complaints through
channels. They are ordered not to insert grievances
about officers and noncoms into letters which, when
circulated at home, are bound to make civilians wonder
how an army that contains unfit and inferior leaders
can be expected to achieve final victory.
German soldiers have been informed that complaints
about food and general treatment are also taboo.
"What can a wife or a mother do when she re
ceives such letters?" the commanding general of a
German army asks. "Nothing! The only possible
result is to arouse grave misgivings. Sometimes she
may even try to send him food from her own rations.
This is of no appreciable value to the man, and merely
deprives his home of food which is sorely needed
there. If complaints about bad treatment or insuf
ficient food are justified, these, too, may be submitted
to a proper military authority. Under no circum
stance are they to find their way into letters which
may undermine the morale of German civilians!"
3. "DIG OR DIE"
From the diary of a British junior officer:

During 6 April, shelling of my platoon was only fairly frequent.
In the course of half an hour, we counted 16 shells in the im
66
mediate vicinity of the post. We counted 80 to 100 shells in, or

near, this small area alone before the end of the day. The only
casualties were one killed, two wounded and half our breakfast
missing. We were dug-in in the usual way.
No comment.
PART THREE : UNITED NATIONS
Section I. SECURITY FIRST

1. INTRODUCTION
Every member of the Army, the Navy, the Marine

Corps, and the Coast Guard has a personal stake in
the matter of safeguarding military information.
Even so, the most patriotic individual is always hi
danger of forgetting that the enemy cleverly tries to
collect "small" facts and dovetail them so that the
"big" fact will emerge. A man may be eager to pre
serve the nation's safety and his own, but the moment
he forgets that the enemy's intelligence services work
subtly, instead of in a predictable manner, he becomes
easy prey for the Axis.
We fight the enemy not only with guns, but with
silence.
The security campaign will not end until the war
itself ends. This is wrhy the Intelligence Bulletin re
ports, from time to time, new and helpful security
information. This month a thought-provoking Item
has been paraphrased from an article published in a
South African Air Force pamphlet. The paraphrase
is presented below. It is followed by a note on unin
tentional compromising of security by Americans at
home, and how servicemen can remedy this. The sec
67
68
tion concludes with an extract taken from a War De

partment pamphlet.
2. CARELESS QUESTIONS
We hear a great deal about "careless talk," but

very little about "careless questions." Careless ask
ing is all too often responsible for careless telling!
While careless telling is seldom intentional, seemingly
careless asking sometimes is deliberately and scientifi
cally planned.
The enemy agentor the stooge whom he is bribing
or blackmailinghas motives very different from those
of one's mother, wife, sweetheart, or best friend. Un
fortunately, they all ask their questions in the same
casual, natural way.
Every day the most innocent catch phrases, such
as "What's new?" "How's everything?" "What's
the dope?" and "What do you know?" lead to the
committing of blazing indiscretions.
Love makes most people possessive. The people
who love usand this is especially true of women
are always eager to project themselves into our lives,
to share our experiences, at least with their minds
and hearts. We are accustomed to talk freely with
them. The habit, ingrained in so many of us, of "get
ting it off: our chest" to the person we love is hard
to overcome. Breaking the habit is particularly hard
for those of us who loyally observe the tradition of
writing home every week.
In the armed forces the relationships between differ
ent ranks are inevitably responsible for certain types
SECURITY FI'RST
69
of careless questions. The Senior asks the Junior a

question, perhaps out of politeness, or perhaps because
of an impulse to patronize. Junior is too overawed to
identify the question as "careless." The Junior asks
the Senior a question, perhaps because the Junior
wishes to appear a superior fellow who is going places,
or perhaps because he thirsts for information that is
none of his business. The Senior, especially if he
has only recently been promoted, is likely to find such
questions irresistible. Nor must we forget the Seniorto-Senior and Junior-to-Junior combinations. Natu
rally, we don't want our equals to get a jump ahead of
us. We want to know all the dope (only we try to ex
cuse ourselves by saying solemnly that we want to
"keep ourselves up to date"). In the service, then,
we fall into the habit of answering careless questions,
just as we do when we are speaking or writing to the
people we love.
What are the mechanics of the careless question % It
may be written, spoken directly, or telephoned. It
isn't always easy to answer exactly as we should, and
in a courteous manner. Because we are ordinary
human beings, we would prefer to talk freely. More
over, our reaction to the "careless question" is affected
by our familiarity with faces and our personal affec
tions or dislikes, and by our uncritical acceptance of
uniforms and insignia. These things are largely re
sponsible for our failure to detect questions of this
type and, in so detecting, to avoid giving a dangerous
answer.
70
KNTEILLIG'E'N'OE BULLETIN
The written question gives us more time for re

flection than does the question spoken directly or tele
phoned. For this reason the written question is a
little less dangerousbut only a little!
The directly spoken question involves an added
danger because of the rapid speed at which the aver
age conversation is conducted. Although one can see
and identify the speaker, analyze the tone of his voice,
and study his facial expressions, the conversational
"rate of fire" makes it impossible to examine every
question deliberately and carefully. However, if we
are able to show presence of mind, we can gain time
by asking a noncommittal counterquestion. This gives
us a moment in which to reflect.
The telephoned question is by far the most danger
ous. It is impossible for the staff of any switchboard
to check.the origin of each telephone call and the
credentials of each caller. Nor, in fact, is it the staff's
duty to do so. It must be assumed that an enemy agent
will have no trouble whatever in reaching by telephone
anyone with whom he wishes to speak. We all are so
accustomed to poor connections, people omitting or
mumbling their personal identifications, sudden re
quests for information, continually changing person
nel, and so on, that we are a little hesitant about
asking those ;who telephone usoften very high offi
cersto speak up, give their name and rank, specify
their job, hang up and let us ring them back, and so
forth. Internal and private lines are not absolutely
SECURITY FIRST
71
safe, either. There is no such thing as a telephone

line that can't be tapped.
In fact, the telephone is the happy hunting ground
of the bluffer who is an expert at asking questions
which will sound casual. In using the telephone,
moreover, he exposes his person to no risk at all.
It must be stressed again that an enemy agent asks
his "careless question" deliberately, whereas a friend
will employ the selfsame manner without any ulterior
motive. The iact that the technique is the same is
what causes all the trouble. We simply fall into a
habit of answering questions asked in a casual, friendly
tone. And sometimes, even if we do not answer a
question outright, we are likely to reply in such a
manner as to confirm or deny a statement related to a
military secret. We may do this merely by implication.
The question is what counts. It constitutes the first
danger to military security. The answer constitutes
the second danger, of course.
The seemingly unimportant question, the seemingly
unimportant answer. The light-hearted question, the
lighthearted answer. The flattering question, the flat
tered answer. The annoying question, the annoyed
answer. The careless question, and the careless answer.
Axis ammunition!
3. HOW
THE HOMEFOLKS MAY
ERR
Several reports have been received relating how par

ents, relatives, and friends of men overseas are unin
tentionally violating security regulations. These vio
72
lations involve the engraving on gifts of such secret

information as the name of a soldier's unit and his
arm of service. If soldiers with such information on
their persons should fall into the hands of the enemy,
it would greatly facilitate the latter's intelligence
work. In one instance the unsuspecting parents of a
soldier overseas purchased him an expensive identifi
cation bracelet with the following engraved on it: his
name, rank, serial number, APO number, Company
D, 300th Port Battalion, Transport Corps. Luckily,
a service-connected friend of the parents saw the
engravings before the gift was mailed, and pointed out
the security violations. Only the soldier's name, rank,
and serial number should have been engraved on the
bracelet.
4. SECURITY VIOLATIONS
So that troops in theaters of war may make full use of the

weapon of surprise, it is of the utmost importance that all
officers ancl men understand the seriousness of their responsi
bility for safeguarding military information. Enemy intelli
gence acquires much of its knowledge about impending opera
tions by piecing together bits of information carelessly circulated
by individuals who do not realize the importance of such bits of
information. No officer or enlisted man in the U. S. Army
has any excuse for failing to understand that the disclosure of
such information constitutes a serious breach of military disci
pline. The following examples of security violations are cited
and will be brought to the attention of all personnel to serve
as a warning:
a. A private stationed in a staging area wrote a letter to a
girl in which he listed several APO numbers with their geo
SECURITY FEEST
73
graphic locations. The private was tried by a general courtmartial and sentenced to 6 months at hard labor with forfeiture
of $30 per month for 6 months.
b. A lieutenant colonel stationed in a large city had access to
information involving troop movements and other matters vital to
national security. One evening the lieutenant colonel told a
woman over a public telephone that he was flying overseas the
next day and named his destination and probable time of arrival.
A high ranking officer was mentioned as being a passenger on
the same airplane. The lieutenant colonel was relieved from
active duty with the U. S. Army and reverted to inactive status.
c. A private disclosed to a group of civilians the location of a
regimental ammunition dump, the number of rounds of ammuni
tion on hand at the dump, and the number of men on guard. One
of the civilians reported the incident, stating that he had not
known of the ammunition dump's existence before the soldier
told him. The private was tried for disclosing military informa
tion knowingly and wilfully, found guilty, and sentenced to con
finement at hard labor for 3 months with suspension of $20 per
month for a like period.
d. A major, while serving on a staff in an active theater of
operations, wrote letters to friends in the United States which
disclosed order of battle and casualties, and contained violent
criticism of superior officers, including the general in command
of the entire operation. He was severely reprimanded by the
chief of staff of that command, transferred to a home station,
and reduced to his permanent grade of first lieutenant.
e. A major, while on temporary duty in the War Department,
sent a cable in the clear to the commanding general of the U. S.
Army forces in an overseas theater advising him that he was be
ing replaced by another officer. For disclosing this secret in
formation, the major was reduced to his permanent grade of
second lieutenant.
f. A sergeant, in conversation with two United Nations non
commissioned officers and in the presence of civilians- disclosed
74
exact details of a new and secret type of combat airplane. The

information revealed might have impaired the effectiveness of the
airplane and resulted in serious loss of lives among United Nations
forces. In any event, the information would have been of great
value to opposing forces, enabling them to adjust their combat
methods to meet this new weapon. The sergeant was sentenced to
5 years' imprisonment, total forfeiture of pay and allowances, and
dishonorable discharge from the U. S. Army.
g. A major in an advanced base of operations sent several rolls
of film to the United States without censorship. Many of the
pictures taken were of military installations. The major was
court-martialed and forfeited $50 a month for 6 months.
h. A sergeant in a theater of war disclosed results of enemy
action, casualties, and location of an APO address. He was
court-martialed, restricted to the detachment area for 3 months,
and required to forfeit $20 a month for the same period.
Section II. HOW U. S. ARTILLERY TERMS

DIFFER FROM BRITISH
1. INTRODUCTION
A list of common XL S. artillery terms and their

British equivalents is presented below. It is felt that
this list will be a considerable help to.our artillery
units since many of them may be in action beside
British units, or in support of British units, or vice
versa. The list of terms was compiled at a British
artillery school.
2. THE LIST
AMERICAN
BRITISH
Adjust
Correct.
Adjusting
Ranging.
Adjutant (S-l)
Administration Officer.
Aiming circle
Director.
Aiming stakes
Aiming posts.
Altitude (elevation)
Height or elevation.
Angle-of-site level.,
Sight clinometer.
Army Artillery Group
Army Group, R. A. (A. G. R. A.).
Army Artillery Group Com
mander
Commander, Army Group, R. A.
(C. A.G. R. A.).
Brigadier G e n e r a l , Army
Artillery
Brigadier, R. A. (B.R. A.).
Assignment
Role.
"At ease"
Rest.
75
76
IiNTEILLIGEA'OE BULLETIN
AMERICAN
BRITISH
"At my command"
,__. "Fire by order."
Attached
Under command.
Azimuth
Bearing.
Base deflection
Line.
Base line ;
.
Zero line.
Base piece
Pivot gun.
Base point
Zero point.
Apex angle.
Big "T" or Little "T"

Boresight
Test sights.
"Cease firing" (canceled by
"next elevation")
"Stop" (canceled by "Go on" or
fresh sequence of orders).
Check point
Witness point.
Chief of section
No. 1.
Commands
,
Orders.
:_,
Signals.
Communications
Coordinates (12.3-45.6) or 2356. Map reference 123456.
Corps Artillery Officer
Commander, Corps, R A. (C. C.
R.A. orM.G. R.A.).
Counterbattery accuracies:
P
50 yards.
Q
100 yards.
R
150 yards.
,_. Over 150 yards.
S
Continuous wave
,
Morse (key).
Deviation.
Line error.
Direct support
Supported arm can expect 60%
of its calls to be answered.

Div Artillery Commander
Commander, R. A. (C. R. A.).
Executive..,
Gun-position officer (G. P. 0.).
Fire Direction Center
._ Regimental Command Post.
Five rounds per gmu
Scale 5.
General support
In support.
Gunner
.__ Layer (No. 3).
HOW U. S. ARTILLERY TERMS DIFFER FROM BRITISH

AMERICAN
Gunner's quadrant--__,
"H" hour
,
Location (accurate)
Lost
Map reference 36.6-49.5
:
Mask
Mission
"Mission accomplished"
Observing line
"On No. 1 close mils"
77
BRITISH
"On No. 1 open mils"
Operations officer (S-3)

Overlay
Panoramic sight
Piece
Place mark
Platoon
.
Precision fire
Reciprocal laying
Record base deflection
Salvo
fire
Section
Sense
Sensing (U. S. method) :
"100 short"
"100 over"
"100 left"
"100 right"
Sheaf
Shift
Site
.
_.
___.
Field clinometer.
Zero hour.
Fix.
Unobserved (O. U.).
Map reference 366495.
Crest clearance.
Intention.
"Troop stand easy."
The line 0 . T.
"Concentrate minutes on
No. 1."
"Distribute minutes from
No. 1."
Adjutant.
Trace.
Dial sight.
Gun.
Bearing picket (B. P.).
Section.
Pin-point target.
Individual angles.
Eecord zero lines.
Troop fire, 2 seconds.
Subsection.
Spot (observe).
Correction (British method):
"Add 100."
"Drop 100."
"Eight 100."
"Left 100."
Subtension of troop at target.

Switch.
Angle of sight.
78'
AMERICAN
Standing
dure.
BRITISH
Operating Proce- The interchange of Liaison Of

ficers,
complete with cable and
wireless sets.
Unobserved
fire
Predicted fire.
_ K/T.
Voice radio
Volley
fire
Salvo or gun fire.

"X"
Eastings.
Map code.
"X Y" template
"Y"__
Northings.
"Y" azimuth
Grid bearings.
3.46 minutes.
1 mil
17.78 mils
1 degree.
6,400 mils
360 degrees.
Section III. A CASTAWAY'S DIARY

1. INTRODUCTION
A U. S. aviator, forced to parachute from his plane

in the South Pacific, spent two trying weeks on the
sea and on practically uninhabited islands before he
was rescued. He kept a day-by-day account of his
experiences, relating how he utilized his equipment,
the mistakes he made, and how he obtained food and
water.
A condensed version of this pilot's diary is presented
below. In addition to being interesting, his story is
believed to contain lessons which will be profitable for
other members of our armed forces. It is considered
that the safe return of this pilot to his squadron should
be attributed to his resourcefulness and the intelligent
use he made of his equipment. The fact that he knew
where he was and where he wanted to go, and knew
how to go about getting there saved him from a great
deal of futile wandering and mental distress.
The names of persons and places have been omitted
from the story.
2. THE DIARY
May 2 [1943]
The opening of the 'chute snapped me up short, and I was

able to look around and see my plane falling in two pieces
79
80
the tail section and about 6 feet of fuselage were drifting crazily
downward and the forepart was fluttering down like a leaf.
I tried to ease the pressure of the leg straps on my thighs
by pulling myself up to sit on the straps, -but was unable
to do so because of the weight and bulk of my life raft and
cushions. As a result, my thighs were considerably chafed.
I was so busy looking around that I didn't notice how fast I
was descending, and before I knew it I had hit the water. The
wind billowed the 'chute out as I went under, and I was able to
unfasten my chest strap and left leg strap at once; unfastening
the right strap took about 45 seconds, and I held on to the straps
as I was pulled along under water by the 'chute. I couldn't under
stand why I didn't come to the surfacethen I remembered that
I hadn't pulled the CO2 (carbon dioxide) strings of my life
jacket. As soon as I had done this, my belt inflated and I
came to the surface. I immediately slipped my life raft off the
leg straps, ripped off the cover, and inflated it.
During my descent I had hooked an arm through my back
pack strap so as not to lose it, but during the time I was struggling
under water it must have come off because, when I came up, I
saw it floating about 20 feet away. I paddled over and picked
it up, along with two cushionsone of which was merely a
piece of sponge rubber, 15 inches square and 2 inches thick.
After I got into the boat, I took the mirror from the back
pack and discovered a deep gash, about 1^4 inches long, on my
chin and another deep gash, about 3 inches long, on my right
shin. I took out my first-aid kit, examined the contents, and
read the instructions. I found that there was no adhesive
tape in the kitapparently it had not been replaced when the
kit was checked on the ship coming down from Pearl Harbor.
I sprinkled sulf anilamide powder on both wounds and put one
of the two compress bandages on my leg. I haven't any idea
how I got either one of these cuts. During this time I was
having brief spells of nausea, but did not vomit. However, in
A CASTAWAY'S DIARY
81
a short while I had a sudden bowel movement, probably as a

reaction from the shock and excitement. I felt very weak and
dizzy.
I began to take stock of my equipment and to figure out
where I was by consulting the strip map which I had in my
pocket. My chief aim was to reach the nearest land.
i As I sat in the boat, still dazed and faint, I realized that,
with the distance and prevailing northeast wind, I had little
chance of making one of the larger islands. As nearly as I
could figure out, I was about 10 miles east of a small island and
about 10 or 15 miles south of another. Beyond reaching land
I hadn't formulated any plans except to reach land.
About 50 minutes after I had crashed, I saw a friendly fighter
coming toward me from the west, about 50 feet off the water.
I immediately grabbed my mirror and tried to flash the plane.
The pilot wobbled the plane's wings, came in, and circled, and I
saw that it was my wing man. Five other fighters came down
and circled, apparently trying to get a fix on me, and I waved
to them.
Soon they went off toward the east, and I noticed to my con
sternation that dark cumulus thunderhead clouds were moving
in quickly from the northeast and that the sea was getting quite
rough. I realized that no planes would come out for me then
because of the approaching dusk. Just before sundown, rain
began falling, the wind became stronger, and the waves got higher
and higher. There wasn't much I could doI was still weak
and not a little scared. About all I did was to throw out my sea
anchora small rubber bracket on a 7-foot lineand cover myself
with my sail. Rain fell in torrents and the wind blew all night.
I bailed out water six or seven times during the night with the
small cup that the pump fits in and also with my sponge rubber
cushion, but there were always 2 or 3 inches of water in the
bottom. The rest of the time, I just huddled under my sail.
82
INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN!
May 3
The rain stopped about daybreak, but the sky was cloudy and
the sea still choppy. Off to the east I saw what appeared to be
two friendly fighters in the distance, but I knew they wouldn't
see me. As day approached, I saw that I had been blown about
10 miles south of the center of the island I was making for. The
wind was still from the northeast and I knew I would have td
paddle like the devil even to hold my own and not be blown
farther out to sea. I broke out one of my six chocolate bars and
ate part of it, but I wasn't hungry. I also took a swallow out of
my canteen, but I wasn't particularly thirsty. All day long I
rowed with my hand paddles, sitting backward in the raft. By
1600 my forearms were raw and chafed from rubbing against
the sides of the raft. I had stopped paddling only two or three
times during the day, to eat a bite of chocolate and take a swallow
of water. Rain began falling about 1600, and I hit a new low
point of discouragement when I realized that I had apparently
made no headway at all during the day.
After night fell, the rain continued in intermittent showers
until dawn. The sea was still rough and the wind was from the
northeast. I tried to continue paddling, but a large fish hit my
handI don't know what kind it wasin fact, I didn't even see
it, but the experience dissuaded me from rowing any more in the
dark. I threw out my sea anchor againthis time with the two
cushions tied on the line for additional weightand huddled
under my sail for the rest of the night. I don't recall that I slept
this night, or any night before I got to shoreI just seemed to
lie in a sort of coma.
May If,
When the sun came up, I found that I was south of the west
end of the island and about two miles farther out than I had
been the previous morning. I broke out another chocolate bar
A CASTAWAY'S DIARY
83
for "breakfast,'' drank a little water, and began to paddle again.

Some time during the day I got the idea of getting in the water
and swimming along with the raft. The only result of this
maneuver was that I lost one of my hand paddles, and I went
back to paddling with the remaining paddle and my bare hand.
The results of my continuous paddling were more heartening
this day, and by about 1500 I realized that I had covered quite a
little distance. Just about this time, however, a big storm came
from the northwest, and it began to rain again. Again I put out
my sea anchor with the cushions tied to it, and settled down under
my sail. It rained off and on all night with a northwest wind.
Although I was never very thirsty, I would catch rain on my sail
and funnel it into the pump cup, drink some of it, and use the
rest to keep my canteen filled. Before the storm came that after
noon, the sun had been quite hot and I had kept my head covered
with my sail and applied zinc oxide to my face. Earlier that
day I had seen four friendly fighters, going west along the south
shore of this island. I also saw a friendly patrol plane which
passed over early every morning and late every evening, but
because the sun was so far down each time, I was never able to
signal with my mirror.
May 5
At daybreak I saw that I had drifted to a point about 6 miles
south of the east end of the island. I had another chocolate bar
for breakfast and a little water, and I was considerably encour
aged when I found that the wind was blowing from the southeast.
This meant that I had a very good chance of reaching the island,
so I pulled in my sea anchor and began paddling. Some time
during the morning my remaining hand paddle slipped off in the
water and, forgetting that I had my life belt inflated, I jumped
overboard to retrieve it. Of course, I couldn't get under the
surface and soon gave up.
I stopped paddling only to take an occasional swallow of water,
and about 1800 I came close to the shore. The surf didn't look
84
ENTEILLIGE'dSPOE BULLETIN
too bad. I headed right ina mistake, as it turned out, for as

soon as I got in closer I found that the waves were at least 50 feet
high,1 the highest surf I've ever seen. About this time a big one
broke in front of me. I t was too late to turn back. I felt as if
I were 50 feet in the air when it broke, and all I could see in front
of me was the jagged coral of the beach. I tried to beat the next
one in, but it caught me just after it broke and tossed me end-over
the-kettle into the coral.
Fortunately, I missed hitting the sharpest coral and received
only a few cuts on my hands. My boat landed about 50 feet
away in a sort of channel leading into the beach. I tried to
stand up and found that I couldn't walk. Finally, I crawled
over to the little channel, got my boat, and dragged it up on a
small sandy beach. Since I had tied my belongings rather
securely to the raft, the only items that were missing were the
pump, the two cushions, and the can of sea marker. I was very
tired and very weak; I turned my raft upside down and lay
on it, with my sail over me, trying to sleep, but apparently I was
too tired to sleepI think I only dozed for periods of a few
minutes at the most.
May 6
At dawn I began to look for coconuts on the ground and
found one mature nut under a tree. The tree was about 25
feet high, and I immediately set to thinking how I could get
more of the nuts off it. I was, of course, too weak to climb and
I thought of cutting notches in the tree. I t was hopeless, and
I opened the one coconut. The seed had already sprouted and
there wasn't much milk in it; since I wasn't hungry, I ate only
a little of the meat.
Instead, I had my usual "breakfast" of a chocolate bar, laid
out my things to dry, cleaned my knife and gun as best I could,
and rested some more. Although my .45 had been wet almost
1
This height, estimated by the writer, is believed to be excessive.
A CASTAWAY'S DIARY
85
constantly and was quite rusty, the moving parts worked all
right after I had applied more oil to them.
Then I started out to find some pandanus nuts, having read
and reread my guidebook. I found a few, but they were so high
I couldn't get to them. In the afternoon I sorted my equipment
and rested. By this time I had decided to try reaching the
western end of the island. I wasn't sure whether there were
any Japs or natives on the island, but thought I might at least
run into some natives.
During the day I ran across a crocodile in a channel in the
coral beach, but we parted company at once,' without incident.
Toward evening, rain threatened. I made a coconut cup, im
bedded it in the sand, and rigged my sail around it so that it
would catch water and funnel it into the cup through a small
hole in the sail. The rain began when it got dark. I settled
myself on the ground under a tree and pulled my rubber boat
over me for shelter.
May 7
In the morning I worked out a plan for getting some coconuts.
I cut several notches in the trunk of the tree and then made a
sort of rope ladder with my sea anchor line, placed this around
the trunk so that it would slip, and pushed it _up as far as I
could. Climbing up by these means, I was able to reach and
twist off two coconuts. This was pretty exhausting work, so I
rested for a while and then filled my canteen with the rain water
that had accumulated in the coconut cup. I drank the milk
from the coconut and ate a little of the soft meat, but still I was
not very hungry. My store of chocolate bars was down to two,
so I decided to conserve them.
I then packed all my gear in my back pack, rolled up my life
raft, aiid set out to walk along the coast to the west end of the
island. There was a 100-yard stretch of coral between the water
and the beach, and it was not bad walking. Naturally, I was
glad I hadn't discarded by shoes in the water. Several times I
86
came to channels in the coral, usually at the mouths of small

streams, and then I would have to blow up my life belt and
swim across. At one such*place I saw more fish and tried to
catch one with my fishing line and pork-rind bait, but the fish
declined to bite.
Late in the day I came to a sandy beach, along which I
walked until it was dark. Then I made a crude lean-to of palm
fronds against a tree trunk, blew up my life raft, and settled
down on it with my sail as a cover. I smeared zinc oxide on my
faceI put either zinc oxide or vaseline on my face each morn
ing and night for protection against sunburn, and also periodi
cally put vaseline on the gash on my shin and on my hands,
which were cracked from the salt water. The snlfanilamide
powder was rather water-soaked, so I used vaseline instead.
Aside from a daily quinine pill, that was the extent of my doc
toring. Fortunately, the gash on my chin had closed pretty well.
That night I woke up from one of my periods of dozing to
find that the tide had come in. I scrambled around, moving my
gear to a dry spot, and discovered that the tide had carried
away my sail and my shoulder holster. Luckily, I had my .45
close to my side, but one of the two clips in the holster contained
all my tracer bullets.
May 8
In the morning, after I had eaten half of my remaining choco
late bar, I started walking again. Most of the time I walked
in the water up to my knees. Soon the coral ledge ended and
I had to strike inland because I couldn't get through the im
mense surf that was washing against the high rock and coral
of the shore. I would go inland a little way, parallel the coast
by clambering up and down the ridges, and then go back to the
shore to see if I could make my way along it. During the day
I saw two more crocodiles in a small lagoon and my only snake,
a small blue snake about iy2 feet long with a flat tail. During
the day I found several coconuts along the beach and on the
A CASTAWAY'S DIARY
ground, and I drank the

land, climbing one of the
life jacket and back pack
on my deflated life raft.
I was lying in mud.
87
milk. As dusk came on, I was in

ridges. It began to rain. I put my
on the ground, under a log, and lay
It rained all night, and by morning
May 9
During the morning I crossed more ridges, which ran down

to the shore from the central range. This was pretty tiring
mostly I would zigzag up them, and then slip and slide down.
I was always hopeful that I would be able to make my way
along the coast, but this was impossible. During the day I ate
some fern leaves and the remainder of my last chocolate bar.
At dusk I came down to the coast to see whether I had rounded
a particular rocky point. I found that I hadn't, and decided
to spend the night in a small cave in the coral, which was
about 100 feet above and, 150 feet back from the water. I
slept on my back pack and life jacket and used my deflated
raft as a cover. After sleeping spasmodically, I was awakened
at dawn by a wave breaking at the entrance to the cave.
May 10
In the morning, rain was falling and the wind was blowing;
I could make little headway over the rocks and coral so I took
to the ridges again. I ate some ferns, and about 1450 I came
onto the shore where there was a good sandy beach. The hills
were smaller, and there was a grove of coconut palms. I was
near the end of the island and could see the next one about 2 or
3 miles across the channel. In the shallow water I found two
small crabs and about eight mussels. I ate the crabs raw, and,
putting the mussels in my pocket, headed for a small bay. It
was a fine afternoon and I built a lean-to of sticks and palm
fronds and blew up my raft. I then tried some of the mussels
and found that they were rather unpleasantly slimy. When I
ate the rest the next day, I washed them first and they tasted
pretty good. It rained that night, and since my lean-to did not
88
prove to be as water-proof as I had expected, I got under my

boat.
May 11
The next morning I rested, and ate the meat and drank the
milk of a few coconuts. I decided not to build a fire because
of the possibility of attracting Japs, but to get to the next is
land and try to make contact with the natives. I filled my
canteen from a stream. Late in the afternoon a number of
friendly bombers and fighters came over going west and soon
returned. Both times I used my mirror to try to attract their
attention. I was quite weak and tired, but built a new and bet
ter lean-to. That night I dozed fitfully and the mosquitoes
were quite annoying. The only other noteworthy incident that
day was my first bowel movement since the one immediately
after parachuting into the sea.
May 12
In the morning I washed my clothes and set about making
some oars. I found two small pieces of lumber with a few
nails and a screw in them, and, using the nails and a screw, I
attached two sticks to the pieces of lumber to make a service
able pair of oars. Then I ran my sea anchor line around my
boat through the rings, and attached to it another piece of rope
that I had found. I made two loops in the rope for oar locks.
By looping the rope around my feet I could get leverage for
rowing. I used some sponge rubber from my back pack to make
pads for oaxs. I slit my back pack and inserted a couple of sticks;
this provided me with a sail. When I had completed my prep
arations in the evening, I gave mv craft a brief shake-down
cruise, dined on coconuts, and went to sleep.1
May IS
With the meat of two coconuts and my canteen of, water as
provisions, I set out early in the morning on my voyage to the
A CASTAWAY'S DIARY
89
next island. I went out to sea through a break in the reef and
soon found that, although my course was due west, I was head
ino- northwest. This was due to a north-northeast wind, and I
rowed constantly because of the possibility of being blown
south of the hook of the island. About noon I headed into a
sandy beach on the south shore of the hook and again found
to my dismay that I had underestimated the size of the surf.
;The waves caught me and tossed me onto a fairly smooth coral
ledge. I was under water for what seemed a very long time
actually about 45 secondsbut managed to hold onto my boat.
As I struggled to my feet I heard someone shouting and was
overjoyed to see two natives in a canoe about 50 yards off shore
waving to me.
I got into the canoe with all my gear except the back-pack
cover and we started east to the south shore of the point, where
we met two more natives in another canoe and put into the
beach. The natives brought some water and a taro from a hut.
After a while we started around the point and along the shore.
The natives asked me if I were thirsty, and when I said that
I was, we again put into the beach and went into another hut,
where I saw a collapsible Japanese boat. One of the natives
climbed a 50-foot coconut palm and brought me some coconuts.
Finally we pushed on to a village about halfway up the
coast. There I was greeted by the- chief. After being given
pineapple and taro, I was taken to another hut where it was
indicated that I was to sleep. I was given a corner of a low
platform, a clean bamboo mat, and a pillow and blanket. After
eating more pineapple and taro, I talked mostly with the chief's
son, who had been to a mission school and was quite interested
in America. After dark we all went to sleep.
Traveling from island to island for three days, the natives
managed to get me to the U. S. outpost, where I was picked up
and carried back to my organization.
U. S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING O f F I C E : 1 9 4 3
nro

(1943) Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. II, No. 3

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(1943) Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. II, No. 3

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OL.II NO.

FOR USE OF MILITARY

VOL. II, NO. 3

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

It is recommended that the contents of this bulletin be utilized

TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF F L A K IN THE F I E L D

1. Improvised Bangalore Torpedoes

SOME D E F E N S E TECHNIQUES USED BY JAPANESE

CHARACTERISTICS OF JAPANESE SOLDIER

SECTION I. SOME H E A L T H R U L E S FOR F A R EAST AREAS

GERMAN SOLDIER DESCRIBES

A letter found in an abandoned German gun posi

IT. S. soldiers have been conducting a type of "psy

SOLDIER DESCRIBES TERROR OF SICILY RETREAT

came at 2100 on 20 July, three nights ago. Right after we had

to say such things. I had to hold myself back in order not to

1 kilometer equals approximately % mile.

SOLDIER DESCRIBES TERROR OF SICILY RETREAT

We had already been posted as missing and our lieutenant him

SOLDIER DESCRIBES TERROR OF SICILY RETREAT

Yesterday I lost a very good comrade. Everything is against

There were many other German soldiers in Sicily who

Section II. SIX-BARREL ROCKET WEAPON

Whenever the fortunes of the German Army take a

comparablein weight, at leastto the high-explosive

The Nebelwerfer 41 (see figs. 1 and 2) is a six-bar

Figure 1.German Six-barrel Rocket Projector (side view).

U. S. soldiers in Sicily promptly nicknamed the Nebelwerfer U the

SIX-BARREL ROCKET WEAPON

is mounted on a rubber-tired artillery chassis with a

Figure 2,German Six-barrel Rocket Projector (front view).

About one-third of the length of the projectile extends

GEEMAKY-SIX-BARREL ROCKET WEAPON

axis of the projectile so as to impart rotation in flight,

The following note on the operation of the Nebel

4. HOW THE GERMAN ARMY USES IT

GE'RMANJYSIX-BARREL ROCKET WEAPON"

[This Die Wehrmacht article naturally does not discuss the

Section III. PRINCIPLES OF DEFENSE

The German Army is not relaxing its long-standing

DEFENSE AGAINST AIRBORNE TROOPS

2. GERMAN ESTIMATE OF OUR TACTICS

ground where there are many high-tension cables, in deeply

We [the Germans] must erect obstacles on landing grounds

GERMANYDEFENSE AGAINST AIRBORNE TROOPS

Mines and wire can be especially effective against parachutists

Defenses must have all-around protection. For this reason

Observation posts must be maintained on all high landmarks

GERMANYDEFENSE AGAINST AIRBORNE TROOPS

Section IV. WEAKNESSES OF ARTILLERY

In Sicily the positions of the Armored Artillery

The regimental commander said, at the beginning of

The expression "repeated warnings" is interesting.

ARTILLERY DEFENSIVE POSITIONS

granting the existence of such pressure as the United

Further Construction of Firing Positions

It was pointed out that the necessary attention still

ing fitness of over-tired elements in action in the firing

In some instances deep, conspicuous tracks led into

Alternate positions were not being occupied with

ARTILLERY DEFENSIVE POSITIONS

had been utterly destroyed in a matter of hours by con

"Last Covering Height*'