(1943) Intelligence Bulletin, Vol.I, No. 5

FOR USE OF MILITARY PERSONNEL ONLY
NOT T O BE REPUBLISHED
VOLUME 1
NUMBER 5
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
January I943
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

WAR DEPARTMENT
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
WAR DEPARTMENT
NO. 5
Washington, January 1943
MIS 461
NOTICE
The Intelligence Bulletin is designed primarily for the
use of junior officers and enlisted men. It is a vehicle for
the dissemination to them of the latest information
received from Military Intelligence sources. In order to
secure the widest possible use of this bulletin, its contents
are not classified. It is for the exclusive use of military
personnel, however, and no part of it may be published
without the consent of the Military Intelligence Service,
except in the case of Task Forces and Overseas Theaters
of Operation. Commanders of these organizations are
authorized to reproduce any item in the Intelligence
Bulletin, provided they maintain the classification of the
information and give its source.
It is recommended that the contents of this bulletin be
utilized whenever practicable as the basis for informal
talks and discussions with troops.
in
"The Americans are very poor at scouting, patrolling, and security

measures; so the effects of a sudden attack and the benefits to be gained
therefrom should always be kept in mind."
from a Japanese Army training manual.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART O N E : GERMANY
Page
SECTION
I. INFANTRY TACTICS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
II.
Introduction
The Meeting Engagement
The Deliberate Attack
The Pursuit
Defense
Village Fighting
a. Attack
b. Defense
MINEFIELDS IN DESERT TERRAIN
1. Types of Mines
a. German Teller Mine
b. German "S" Mine
c. Italian "B4" Mine
d. "Wooden Box'1
2. Patterns
a. Regular Pattern
b. Regular Pattern Offset
c. Random Mines
3. Spacing
4. Marking
5. Use of Booby Traps
6. Use of Anti-personnel Mines
7. Gaps
a. Width
b. Method of Closing
c. Marking
d. General
8. Tactical Siting
9. Miscellaneous Information
10. Conclusion
III.
10
10
11
11
12
12
12
12
13
13
14
14
USE OF SMOKE
15
1. General
2. Smoke Equipment
a. General Equipment
b. Equipment of Smoke Troops
15
16
16
17
VI
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION I I I . U S E OP S M O K E C o n t i n u e d .
3. Use of Smoke in t h e Field
a. Attack
b. Defense
c. Miscellaneous Instructions
Page
jg
19
19
20
IV. 5 0 - M M L I G H T MORTAR
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
21
General
Elevation
Line
Loading a n d Firing.
Misfires
Ammunition
21
24
25
25
26
26
V. SECURITY I N T H E F I E L D
28
PART T W O : JAPAN
SECTION
I. J A P E S T I M A T E O F U. S. L A N D T A C T I C S
1. Introduction
2. " U . S. MethodsOur Countermeasures"
a. Attack
. __
b. Defense
c. Night Fighting
d. Pursuit and Retreat
e. Security Measures
f. Tanks
g. Other Vehicles
h. Vulnerability of the Rear
29
. ._.
I I . N O T E S ON R E C E N T F I G H T I N G I N T H E S O U T H W E S T P A C I F I C .
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
III.
Introduction
Individual Characteristics
Noises During N i g h t A t t a c k s
Bivouac Defense
Deception
Equipment
Conclusion
THE INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Introduction _
Reaction in B a t t l e
E a r l y Training
Counsel on Field S e r v i c e - .
Uniforms
IV. SERVICE R I F L E
..
29
29
31
33
34
34
35
35
35
36
37
37
37
38
38
39
39
40
42
42
42
45
50
51
53
TABLE OF CONTENTS
VII
PART T H R E E : ITALY
Page
SECTION
I. 81-MM
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
II.
MORTAR
As a Whole
Bipod
Base Plate
Sight
Ammunition
55
55
57
57
57
58
___^
TORPEDO BOMBER
59
PART FOUR: UNITED NATIONS

SECTION
I. T H E
MOROCCAN SOLDIER
62
1. Introduction
2. The Extracts
II.
BRITISH TRAINING AND USE OF DOGS
1.
2.
3.
4..
III.
62
62
66
Introduction
Supply of Dogs
Tactical Use of Dogs
Training
a. General
b. Messenger Dogs _
c. Patrol Dogs
d. Sentry Dogs
66
67
67
68
68
68
69
70
RUSSIAN ANTITANK TACTICS
71
1. Introduction
2. Various Methods Employed
a. Organization of Terrain
b. Use of Artillery
c. Air Support
d. Use of Antitank Rifle
e. Recent Trends
IV.
71
71
71
73
75
75
77
NOTES ON BRITISH ANTITANK TACTICS
1. Regarding Positions
a. In Depth
b. Changing Sites
c. In North Africa
V- BRITISH INDOOR WAR GAME
1. Introduction
2. Suggested Procedure
a. By the Attackers
b. By the Defenders
c. Regarding Administrative Duties
78
__
78
78
79
79
81
81
82
84
84
85
TABLE OF CONTENTS
L I S T OF ILLUSTRATIONS
FIGURE
FIGURE
FIGURE
FIGURE
FIGURE
FIGURE
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Painted Sign Indicating Axis Minefield Gap

German 50-mm Light Mortar
Another View of the German 50-mm Light Mortar
Japanese Service Rifle
Italian 81-mm Mortar
Savoia-Marchetti (SM-79) Torpedo Bomber; Two Views
and Recognition Silhouettes
FIGURE 7. Sand Model War Game
Page
13
22
23
54
56
60
83
PAKT ONE: GERMANY
Section I. INFANTRY TACTICS
1. INTRODUCTION
At present German infantry tactics naturally are of the
greatest interest and importance to American fighting
men. Official German doctrine covering infantry tactics
is clean-cutso much so that when an American reads
it, he is likely to fall into the dangerous error of assuming
that the Germans always will follow certain methods.
There is in circulation a popular theory to the effect that
the Germans are fond of set procedures. Even if there is
an element of truth in the theory, it must not be sup
posed that German military thought is inflexible. German
commanders often show great imagination and adapta
bility in difficult situations. Although the following
German doctrine is official, American troops will find that
the enemy does not hesitate to depart from it. Its
chief value for us is that it suggests what we may some
times, although not always, encounter.
49962942
INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
2. THE MEETING ENGAGEMENT

In a meeting engagement a commander dispenses with pre
liminary preparations and deploys straight into battle. A com
mander will not accept the challenge of a meeting engagement
unless he feels that his troops and leadership are numerically or
otherwise superior to those of the enemy, or that, by waiting to
prepare a deliberate attack, he would sacrifice ground he cannot
afford to lose. Sound tactical decisions in the initial stages are
essential. The worst mistake of all is hesitation.
The advance guard will delay the enemy and seize important
positions, such as those suitable for artillery observation posts.
The advance guard may (1) attack, with a limited objective; (2)
defend its existing position; or (3) withdraw to more favorable
positions.
The main body will deploy immediately. (It must be remem
bered that a withdrawal by the advance guard is likely to interfere
with this deployment.) It is wrong to wait for further information
in the hope that it will clear the situation. Lost time never can be
regained. The time available decides whether the commander
should concentrate his troops before launching them in an attack,
or whether he should launch them when, and as, they become
available.
The meeting engagement normally will take the form of a frontal
attack by the advance guard, combined with one or more encircling
attacks by the main body.
3. THE DELIBERATE ATTACK

The object of the deliberate attack is to surround and destroy
the enemy. A strong, rapid encircling attack can be decisive, pro
vided that it really comes to grips with the enemy and that the
enemy is pinned down by frontal pressure, which will be exercised
mainly by fire.
INFANTRY TACTICS
Encircling forces must move in depth if they are not to be out

flanked. All encircling attacks sooner or later become frontal.
In all attacks the commander will select a Schwerpunkt, or point
of main effort, where the bulk of his forces will be employed. The
considerations involved in choosing this point are: (1) weakness
in the enemy defense; (2) suitability of the ground for cooperation
of all arms, but especially for tanks; (3) lines of approach; (4)
possibilities of supporting fire, especially by artillery.
Boundaries and objectives are allotted to attacking units. This
does not mean, however, that a unit must distribute troops over all
the ground within its boundaries. It will choose within its bound
aries the best line or lines of advance and utilize its troops accord
ingly. A Schwerpunkt battalion can be allotted about 450 yards
of front, while a battalion which is attacking in an area removed
from the point of main effort can be given 1,000 yards or more.
Once an attack has been launched, it must drive straight on to
its objective, regardless of opposition. It is wrong for the fore
most attacking troops to turn aside to deal with threats to their
flanks. This is the task of the troops which are following them.
A breakthrough must be in sufficient depth to prevent the enemy
from establishing new positions in the rear. A breakthrough
cannot be successful until the enemy artillery positions are cap
tured. This is the special task of the tanks.
As soon as enemy resistance weakens at any point, all available
fire and forces must be concentrated to insure the success of the
breakthrough.
Since artillery support is essential, artillery must be kept well
forward.
4. THE PURSUIT
If the enemy is able to withdraw under cover of a rear guard,
the attack has failed. He must then be pursued. The object
of pursuing forces will be to encircle and destroy him. For this,
infantry and artillery alone are not sufficient. Aircraft will
attack defiles on the enemy's line of retreat, and motorized

elements will attempt to pierce his front and encircle his flanks.
A point of main effort and clear orders are just as necessary in this
operation as in any other.
The task of the pursuing forces is to interfere with, and if
possible stop, the enemy's withdrawal so that he can be dealt
with by the slower-moving infantry and artillery, which wilLbe
following up. The motorized elements pursuing the enemy may
find themselves in great difficulties because of the speed with
which they move and because of the exposed positions in which
they may find themselves. They must be prepared for this, and
will rely on aircraft and the slower-moving infantry and artillery
to assist them in due course.
5. DEFENSE
A point of main effort is as necessary in the defense as it is in
the attack. A defensive position has no value if the enemy can
avoid it by passing around its flanks. Essentials of a defensive
position are (1) a good field of fire for all arms, but especially for
the artillery; (2) good observation; (3) concealment; (4) natural
protection against tanks; and (5) factors permitting the fire from
weapons to be concentrated in front of the main line of resistance.
The position is divided into advance positions, outposts, and a
main position. The forward edge of the main position is known
as the main defensive line.
The task of the advance positions is to deny good observation
points to the enemy and to hinder his advance. They will be
approximately 6,000 to 8,000 yards in front of the main position,
and mines and obstacles must be used to strengthen their area.
The defenders of advanced positions normally will consist of small
mobile forces. Their principal task is to force the enemy to
deploy. They will be withdrawn according to a definite schedule.
The outposts are responsible for the immediate protection of
the main position. Their tasks are (1) to prevent the enemy from
INFANTRY TACTICS
surprising the forces holding the main position; (2) to mislead the
enemy as long as possible over the dispositions and situations of
the main position; and (3) to protect advance observation posts as
long as possible. Outposts will be withdrawn when the situation
makes it inevitable. As a rule, they are from 2,000 to 3,000 yards
in front of the main position.
The main position must be defended in depth. This is of the
utmost importance. Areas, rather than lines, will be defended.
If the enemy should succeed in penetrating the position, he will
be faced by a series of defended areas which can support each
other by fire, so that in the end he collapses under the concentrated
fire placed on him. A battalion will defend from 800 to 2,000
yards in depth.
The withdrawal of advance posts and outposts must be planned
carefully so that they will avoid getting in the line of fire of the
main position.
Penetration must be met by immediate local counterattacks,
with limited objectives. Small parties of infantry carry out these
coi nterattacksif possible, against the enemy's flanks. Unless
tanks are available, a deliberate counterattack will succeed only
if it is carried out by superior forces and as a surprise against one
or both flanks of the enemy penetration. Like any other deliberate
attack, it requires thorough planning.
6. VILLAGE FIGHTING
Troops are too easily attracted to villages. These afford some
cover from fire, but also draw it. It is important to note that
they may become traps.
a. Attack
In attack, villages should be by-passed whenever possible.
However, when this is done, the enemy must be pinned down in
the village, chiefly by artillery fire.
If villages must be attacked, heavy supporting fire will be
placed on the outskirts, especially on isolated buildings and small

clusters of houses.
The leading troops will avoid the streets, and will fight their
way through back yards and gardens until they reach the far
end of the village. Small independent groups are preferable for
this work. Their tasks must be laid down accordingly, and each
group must have its own supporting weapons.
Reserves must move close behind these leading groups, which
may easily get into difficulty.
b. Defense
Well-built villages make good defense areas. Their edges are
shell traps; therefore, the main line of resistance should be either
inside or outside the village, not on the edges.
If a village is favorably situated, it should be turned into a
defense area organized in depth. The irregular shape of its
approaches should provide ample opportunities for flanking fire.
Villages afford especially good antitank positions.
Reserves must be held in readiness outside the village to deal
with the enemy's probable attempts to by-pass.
Section II. MINEFIELDS IN DESERT

TERRAIN
The following notes deal with the Axis technique of

laying minefields in the North African desert. It must
be emphasized that an important Axis purpose in laying
minefields is to create and spread fear among United
Nations troops. Cool heads and common sense, as well
as a sound understanding of enemy methods, are therefore
"musts" for all personnel.
1. TYPES OF MINES
Although the Germans and Italians use several types
of mines in desert warfare, including captured mines as
well as those of Axis manufacture, it has been reported
that the enemy recently has shown a preference for the
following:
a. German Teller Mine
This is a 19-pound antitank mine containing 11 pounds
of explosive (tolite). It is shaped like a disk, 12 inches
in diameter and 4 inches high. The firing pressure is
about 350 pounds.
7
b. German
M
S " Mine
The "S" mine is an anti-personnel weapon containing

1 pound of tolite and 350 steel shrapnel balls. It is
cylindrical, 4 inches in diameter, and 5% inches high
"S" mines may be fired either by push-igniters or pulligniters. These mines are buried, but when they are
fired, they are thrown about 3 feet above the ground
before detonating.
c. Italian "B4" Mine
This is a 3%-pound anti-personnel mine containing %

pound of T. N. T. and scrap metal fragments. It is
cylindrical, 3 inches in diameter, and 5 inches high. In
use, B4 mines are concealed, but not buried. A trip wire
is attached to the trigger of a B4. When the wire is
tripped, it releases a striker, which fires the mine.
d. "Wooden Box"
A new and unusually effective type of mine has been

encountered during the present Egyptian-Libyan offen
sive. The mine consists of a wooden box containing nine
blocks of guncotton and measuring about 18 inches in
length, with inside dimensions of the box given as 11 by
8 by 2% inches. The mine is fitted with a sensitive
detonator, which is activated by about 35 pounds pres
sure. Since the mine is made of wood, the British probe
for the mine with a bayonet, instead of using their regular
mine detector. This is done with the bayonet at an
angle to the surface of the ground, rather than perpen
dicular.
2. PATTERNS
Most minefields are laid in patterns. Prisoners of war
state that these may vary considerably, and that they are
decided upon by the officer in charge of a particular task,
who must take into consideration local conditions and the
type of defense that is contemplated. Among the pat
terns very frequently encountered are the "regular
pattern" and the "regular pattern offset."
a. Regular Pattern
This is the most common. Mines in a row are spaced

at equal distances, with equally distant rows, and with
the mines of one row equally spaced between the mines
of the previous row. A variation in this method is to
vary the distances between rows. In no reported case,
except for scattered mines, has the distance between
mines in a row been unequal.
b. Regular Pattern Offset
By means of a pacing drill, a certain variety is intro

duced into the regular pattern. The distance between
mines in any one row is equal, but one row is slightly offset
from the previous row, and the next row is again offset by
a different distance. Once a few mines have been located,
the pattern soon becomes apparent and mines will be
found where expected.
c. Random Mines
In front of most regular minefield belts, and par

ticularly in front of gaps, there may be found mines
49962942
10
scattered at random and unmarked. These are either

continuous at very wide and irregular spacing, or in
groups more closely spaced but not laid in any pattern
inside a group.
3. SPACING
The average spacing observed between mines in a row
is 6 yards; it has never been less than 3 yards and seldom
greater than 10 yards, except in scattered fields. The
commonest distances observed between rows are 5 yards
and 10 yards.
Shallow minefields usually consist of from two to four
rows of mines. Deep minefields generally consist of
several belts of mines with considerable distances between
belts, and with seldom more than eight rows of mines in
any one belt. A single belt may be of any depth up to
200 yards.
4. MARKING
Often the front edge of forward minefields is not
marked. The rear edge normally is marked by some form
of fence, usually with a trip wire on short pickets, al
though cattle-fence, concertina wire, and rock piles are
sometimes used. Instances of unmarked rear edges have
been reported. The distance between the front fence, if
there is one, and the rear fence may be anything from
100 to 800 yards.
A common marking is a single row of concertina wire
running along the center of a field parallel to the rows of
mines. In a large minefield there may be several un
11
marked rows of mines in front, then a row of concertina

wire, more mines, then concertina wire, and so on, finish
ing up with a row of concertina wire on the rear edge.
Only one case has been reported of continuous wire
running irregularly within a field. Little information is
available regarding signs used to mark fields, except those
mentioned under "Gaps" (see par. 7, below). It is be
lieved that a skull of crossbones indicates the presence of
anti-personnel mines or booby traps.
In rear areas enemy minefields may be expected to be
well marked with cattle fences and warning notices in
German and Italian.
5. USE OF BOOBY TRAPS
No booby traps have been found fitted to captured
British mines used by the Axis. Fields of Teller mines
have been found, with a number of the mines fitted with
booby traps. In one case Teller mines were in groups of
20, with about one-third fitted with pull-igniter traps and
one-third with push-igniter traps. Teller mines, each
fitted with a pull-igniter and a loop of wire projecting
above the top of the mine as a trip wire, have also been
found, but it has been the exception rather than the rule
to find booby traps attached.
6. USE OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES
Increasing use of the Italian B4 anti-personnel mine
was noted during September, 1942, before the British
Eighth Army cracked the El Alamein line. These fields
12
contained gome "S" mines, but mostly the B4's.

Spacing of B4 and "S" mines ranged from 7 to 10 yards
between mines in a row. The layout usually consisted
of mines and wooden pegs set alternately, 4 to 5 yards
apart, with trip wires from the mines running to the
wooden pegs on both sides of each mine.
7. GAPS
Little information is available about gaps through
minefields, but the following conditions were reported
from Egypt:
a. Width
Widths of 7 and 10 yards were observed.

b. Method of Closing
Gaps are usually closed by means of two or three rows

of Teller mines, with boards placed on one or all of the
rows to insure detonation of mines if a vehicle attempts
to pass through. Normally, gaps are kept closed.
c. Marking
In the northern sector of the El Alamein line, two types

of gap markers were found:
(1) Painted signs.Painted signs (see fig. 1) may
appear on either side of a gap.
(2) Luminous tubes.Luminous tubes 1 inch long
have been placed on the tops of mines to mark a route
for patrols. These tubes are visible 3 yards away.
13

16"
I*
16"
Figure 1.
d. General
It is reported that gaps are a favorite place for laying
Teller mines without any marking wire or signs. Gaps
are sometimes protected by unmarked groups of mines
scattered in front of the gap.
8. TACTICAL SITING
One report states that the minefield is usually 215
yards to 325 yards in front of the main line of resistance,
is covered by fire, and is observed by outposts. In
another report the distance from the main line of re
sistance to the main minefield is given as varying from
215 yards to 1,080 yards. A listening post was also
located by a patrol 100 to 150 yards behind a minefield.
It definitely can be stated that it is the enemy's practice
by day to cover all main minefields with small arms fire
from close range, and by night to maintain anti-lifting
14
patrols and outposts, often located within the minefield

itself.
9. MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION
Until recently most mines were laid on the surface.
Now a greater proportion of fields have the mines buried,
but mines are often badly concealed so that by daylight
their positions can, with practice, be located by eye.
This should not be relied upon, however.
Teller mines, and sometimes captured British mines,
have been found laid two or three on top of one another.
The bottom mine may be laid upside down. Such
groups are occasionally booby-trapped.
10. CONCLUSION
A most important point to remember is that the for
ward edge of a main minefield is often unmarked. Fur
thermore, whether the main field is marked or unmarked,
there may be some scattered mines laid at random and
unmarked in front of this field. Also, enemy minefields
normally consist of several shallow belts laid in depth,
with considerable gaps between belts rather than in one
belt consisting of a large number of rows.
Section III. USE OF SMOKE
1. GENERAL
The fact that the Germans are fully equipped to utilize
chemically produced smoke at any time cannot be too
widely known.
Smoke may be used by any arm; in addition, regular
smoke-producing units (Nebelwerferabteilungen) of varying
sizes, as well as engineer units trained to handle smoke
projectors, may be assigned to provide smoke support
when it is needed.
Although slightly irritating, smoke is harmless, unless
it is mixed with chemical warfare gas. Being practically
the same color as natural fog, smoke is distinguished by its
greater density and sharper outline, as well as its sudden
rise and disappearance. Its density and extension de
pend upon weather and terrain. Favorable conditions
for the use of smoke are: a steady, moderate wind, damp
atmosphere, clouded sky, falling temperature, early morn
ing or late evening hours, and bare, flat terrain. Un
favorable conditions for the use of smoke are: a very
weak wind, a strong, gusty wind constantly changing its
15
16
direction, or no wind at all; dry atmosphere, sunshine,

heat, and hilly or covered terrain.
2. SMOKE EQUIPMENT
The normal marking for German smoke ammunition is
a broken white line and white lettering, including the
identifying abbreviation Nb.
a. General Equipment
The following types of smoke equipment are likely to
be used by all arms:
(1) Smoke hand grenade 39.This closely resembles a
stick hand grenade in shape. The head of the 39 is filled
with a standard smoke mixture, and its handle has three
horizontal corrugations at the screw cap so that it is
possible to distinguish by touch between this and the
stick hand grenade. The discharge of smoke lasts from
1 to 2 minutes. The total weight of the smoke grenade
is about 2 pounds.
(2) Smoke hand grenade 41.This is a small smoke
generator (very similar to the smoke candle 39see
below) in a cylindrical metal case. It weighs about
IK pounds.
(3) Smoke candle 39.This is used to lay small local
screens of short duration. Its airtight and watertight
cylindrical metal container is filled with standard smoke
mixture. The candle weighs about 4 pounds and is fitted
with a carrying handle. It can be placed on the ground
and ignited, thrown by hand, or hurled by means of a sling
passed through the carrying handle. The candle burns
USE/ OF SMOKE
17
from 4 to 7 minutes. Sometimes a number of candles

are placed together to increase the density of the screen.
(4) Smoke generator Il.In addition to using several
older types of smoke generators, the Germans employ a
new type, the 41, to screen long buildings, bridges, bat
tery positions, and other vital areas for periods up to 2
hours. The generator, a strong iron drum strengthened
by two iron bands, has a double bottom and a removable
lid, and is fitted externally with a spigot and a steel projec
tion tube. Several pieces of necessary equipment are
attached to the inside of the lid. In operation, compressed
air expels the smoke acid (20 gallons). The empty weight
of the generator is 280 pounds.
(5) Improvised smoke projector.The Germans also
have an improvised smoke projector which can fire a
special smoke generator (known as model 34) as far as
547 yards.
' b. Equipment of Smoke Troops '
Troops especially designated and trained as smoke units
use the following equipment:
(1) Smoke mortars 35 and J+0.These are two different

models of a 4.14-inch smoke mortar.
The 35 fires a
stream-lined bomb a distance of about 3,000 yards,
whereas the 40 has a maximum range of some 6,500 yards.
1
Other arms may be equipped with adaptations of the materiel mentioned
in this article. German tanks, for example, are fitted at the rear with a rack
which can hold 5 smoke candles. These candles are dropped into place from
the interior of the tanks; they cannot be projected. Certain infantry and
artillery weapons can fire smoke shells, and it is possible to fit several types
of aircraft with smoke-producing installations.
49962642
18
(2) Smoke mortar d.Although the Germans speak of

one of their weaponsthe Nebelwerfer das a mortar, it
actually resembles a small gun, and has six barrels set in a
circle like the chamber of a revolver. The mounting con
sists of a pair of rubber-tired wheels and a split trail. The
barrels are not rifled, but have straight grooves inside
them. The projectiles are 5.91-inch rockets, shaped like
artillery shells. The six rounds are fired electrically at
1-second intervals. The rate of fire, including the time
required to reload, is 6 rounds every 90 seconds. This
weapon has a maximum range of 6,670 yards and can ac
commodate H. E. (high explosive), smoke, or gas-charged
shells.
(3) Smoke vehicle.-A special smoke vehicle, built on a
3-ton semi-tracked chassis, is equipped to carry a large
number of smoke generators in racks, from which they
can be removed rapidly for use.
3. USE OF SMOKE IN THE FIELD
Army and corps commanders allot smoke troops,
equipment, and ammunition to subordinate formations
for large-scale screening operations. It is customary for
the division commander to decide on the use of smoke and
how it is to be coordinated with artillery fire and troop
movements. Concentrated effect, as in other arms of the
service, is what the Germans usually aim for when they
employ smoke. The extent, object, duration, and direc
tion of the smoke screen are contained in the commander's
orders. When smoke is required in limited areas, it is
USE OF SMOKE
19
generally furnished by smoke-producing ammunition

fired by the combat units themselves.
Captured documents indicate that the Germans fully
realize how greatly the use of smoke may hinder the work
of nearby friendly troops and supporting weapons. Inde
pendent use of smoke is permitted only when the effect
of the smoke is limited to the area of the command using
it. In other cases, the use of smoke is regulated by a
higher commander than those immediately concerned.
Official German military doctrine outlines the follow
ing uses for smoke:
a. Attack
(1) Concealing the movements made in preparation for an
attack, so as to gain surprise;
(2) Assisting movements which involve the crossing of open
ground;
(3) Covering the initial crossing of a river in the face of the
enemy;
(4) Blinding concealed enemy firing positions and suspected
observation posts, preventing such defensive weapons as machine
guns from operating effectively;
(5) Economizing on ammunition, and reducing the artillery's
task;
(6) Taking the place of covering fire, to some extent;
(7) Assisting the main effort of the attack;
(8) Concealing weakness in the secondary attack or gaps in the
attacking forces;
(9) Protecting the flanks.
b. Defense
(1) Blinding enemy observation posts;
(2) Concealing activities in the forward defense areas;
20
(3) Concealing troop movements to prevent observation from

ground and air.
Throughout German training it is emphasized that

smoke must always be laid on the enemy and not on
friendly troops. An interesting suggestion is that screens
sometimes be put down merely as a deceptive measure to
mislead the opposition as to German intentions.
c. Miscellaneous Instructions
In the following miscellaneous instructions laid down

for German troops to follow when they find themselves
fighting in smoke, it should be noted that no distinction
is made between hostile and friendly smoke:
(1) Smoke hinders defense more than it hinders attack;
(2) Route-finding by compass is essential;
(3) Units should be guided through preassigned sectors;
(4) Close combat is decisive; upon contact with United Nations
forces, attack them immediately with the bayonet, hand grenades,
and battle cries;
(5) Careful preparation of fire plans is essential in defense;
(6) Certain points of danger should be protected by units
armed with the bayonet;
(7) Counterattack should take place, as a rule, after a smoke
screen clears;
(8) Gas masks should be worn until it is definitely known that
no chemical warfare gas is mixed with the smoke.
Section IV. 50-MM LIGHT MORTAR
1. GENERAL
The standard light mortar of the German Army is the
,50-mm. This is comparable in a number of ways to our
60-mm, although ours is the superior weapon on the
whole, especially as to maximum range, precision, and
all-around performance.
The following table affords a basis for a comparison of
the two weapons:
Caliber
Weight in action
Length of barreL__
Maximum range
Minimum range
Traverse
Rate of
fire
Type of bomb
Overall length
Maximum diameter
Weight
German 50-mm Mortar
U. S. 60-mm Mortar
50 mm
31 lbs
18 in
568 yds
55 yds
600 mils (change in deflection)=3345'
6 rounds can be fired in 8
seconds, but this rate
cannot be maintained
60 mm
42 lbs
28.6 in
1,935 yds
100 yds
140 mils (70 either way)=
757'
Maximum: 1 round in 2
seconds; normal:
1
round in 4 seconds
this can be maintained
AMMUNITION FOR ABOVE

HE
HE
8.5 in
9.54 in
50 mm
60 mm
2 lbs
2.96 lbs
21
22
AMMUNITION FOR ABOVEContinued
HE
filling
No. of charges, or
zones
PropellantMarkings
Fuze
TNT
1
TNT
4
Nitrocellulose
Bomb painted dull red,
stenciled in black
Percussion._
Nitrocellulose
HE, yellow; practice,blue
Superquick
The 50-mm is muzzle-loaded and trigger-fired, and is

designed for high-angle fire onlythat is, for fire at angles
of not less than 45 degrees. Our 60-mm is muzzle-loaded,
BARREL HANDLE
CLEANING ROO BRUSH CASE.
Figure 2. German 50-mm Light Mortar.
23
5 0-MM LIGHT MOTAR
has a smooth bore, and is not trigger-fired. It is designed

for high-angle fire at angles of from 40 to 85 degrees.
Although sights will be found with German 50-mm
mortars manufactured before 1938, the mortars manufac
tured during or after that year are laid on the targets or
aiming stakes by means of a white line on the barrel. Our
60-mm has the M4 sight, as does our 81-mm mortar.
Q U I C K - RELEASE
LEVER
'/
-\
ll/ffM//
BARREL HANDLE.
SLIDING COLLAR
//
Jntt
TRIGGER LEVER
///->
Tljl
J l
Ik
f
LEVELLING HAMOLE
/t=St/I/Mi
^ |
^
ELEVATING SCREW
SLEEVE.
LLVELLING
TTl
y1
^ ^ * \
BARREL HINGE PIN 1
HEAD
\
^P"***
BUBBLE H0USIN6
COVER (OPEN)
Jgg^^^
HANDLE
TRAVERSING
\6ftACKET
HANDWHEEL
Figure 3. Another View of the German 50-mm Light Mortar.
24
The 50-mm is a two-man load. One man carries on

his back the base plate with traversing and cross-leveling
gear. The other carries on his back the barrel and the
elevating screw pillar. Our 60-mm is a two-man load,
also; a corporal carries the base plate and sight, while the
No. 1 man carries the mortar and bipod.
2. ELEVATION
Range for the 50-mm is indicated on an arc fixed on
the left side of the barrel by the rear edge of an indicator
hinged on the traversing bracket. The arc is graduated
from 60 to 520 meters, and the indicator can be folded
down when the mortar is dismantled.
A rough adjustment of elevation can be effected in the
following manner: Pressing a quick release lever unlocks
the catch of the sliding collar connected to the upper end
of the elevating screw pillar. The collar is then free to
slide along its guide and the barrel can be elevated by
means of the barrel handle.
As soon as the range ordered is approximately indicated
on the range scale, the sliding collar is locked in its guide
by the release of the quick-release lever. Fine adjust
ments are effected by rotation of the sleeve of the elevat
ing screw pillar.
The U. S. 60-mm mortar has a permanent firing table,
which is fitted to the tube. For ammunition of present
manufacture, a firing table card is included with each
complete round container. This table gives elevation
(degrees) corresponding to various ranges throughout
the field of fire, and also gives the change in deflection
50-MM LIGHT MO'RTAR
25
(mils) due to one turn of the traversing control of the

mount. The latter feature permits direct introduction
of deflection corrections in case the sight is lost or becomes
unserviceable.
3. LINE
The mortar can be laid either direct or by means of

aiming stakes. Rough adjustments for line are effected
when the position of the base plate is altered, with the
traverse set at zero.
A deflection scale is engraved on the cross-bar joining
the two leveling handles, and consists of a double row of
graduations. The interval between the graduations in
each row is 20 mils, but the rows are offset, so that the
graduations on one are halfway between the graduations
in the other. Thus the scale indicates deflections to the
nearest 10 mils.
The total traverse is 600 mils (3345')that is, 300 mils
(1652/30//) each side of zero. Fine adjustments are
made by rotation of the traversing handwheel until the
required deflection is indicated on the scale.
4. LOADING AND FIRING
During loading and firing of the 50-mm mortar, the
layer's position is on the left, behind the mortar. He
lies on his belly, holds the leveling handles, and presses on
the base plate with his forearms. The loader, who lies
to the right of the layer, loads by inserting the bomb in
the muzzle, tail down.
49962942
26
After releasing the bomb, the loader's right hand in

stantly goes to the trigger, and both loader and layer
lower their faces to the ground. Meanwhile, the layer
still holds the leveling handles and continues to steady
the base plate by resting his weight on it. On the order
to fire, the loader pulls the trigger slowly and evenly to
the rear.
5. MISFIRES
When a misfire of the 50-mm occurs, the trigger should

be pulled againseveral times, if necessary. A German
training manual warns that the detachment should wait
1 minute before unloading, in order to avoid accidents
caused by possible delayed fire. On the other hand, when
a misfire of the U. S. 60-mm occurs, the No. 3 man im
mediately strikes the barrel several times with a heavy
nonmetallic instrument, such as a 2- by 4-inch timber,
or, if this is not available, with the cleaning rod or with
his heel. The mortar crew then waits at least 1 minute
before removing the round.
6. AMMUNITION
The bomb fired from the 50-mm is a streamlined H. E.
bomb of the anti-personnel type, with a finned tail unit
which carries the cartridge. The bomb is fitted with a
quick-acting nose fuze with booster. (The German
name for this bomb is the 5-cm. Wgr. 36.)
The body is of mild steel with walls 4-mm thick, and
has a cylindrical portion near the head. A screw-threaded
5 0-MM LIGHT MORTAR
27
fuze hole is formed at the head, and the base end is simi
larly prepared to receive the cartridge container portion
of the tail unit. The body contains a bursting charge
of T. N. T. weighing approximately 4% ounces.
The tail unit consists of a mild (not hardened) steel
cartridge container, to which 8 blades formed in pairs,
are spot welded to form the fin.
The fuze (Wgr. Z. 38) is a quick-acting nose percussion
fuze with a graze pellet and booster. It arms itself ap
proximately 60 yards from the muzzle of the barrel; until
then it is safe.
The U. S. 60-nun mortar uses an H. E. shell (designa
tion: Shell, H. E. M49A1, w/PDF M52, 60-mm mortar)
against personnel and light materiel targets. The action
of the fuze is superquick. For use in the field, it
is issued assembled to the shell as a component of the
complete round. To arm the fuze, it is necessary only to
remove the cotter pin.
Section V . SECURITY IN THE FIELD
A German order giving instructions regarding security

measures is published here as a matter of interest to our
own forces.
In view of a regrettable loss which has occurred, it is necessary
to call attention to often-repeated orders concerning security.
All commanders, adjutants, liaison officers, doctors, and orderlies
will be impressed immediately and most strongly with the fol
lowing points:
Written orders and marked maps must contain only informa
tion which is essential for other ranks to know. All supple
mentary information about the general plan of operations will be
given verbally.
Important orders and situation maps must never be taken into
the front line.
Matches, hand grenades, or other means of producing fire must
always be kept at hand for the immediate destruction of orders in
cases when delay involves danger. The division will carry out
periodic inspections in order to supervise the execution of this
order.
Great care must be exercised during telephone conversations,
since the English appear to tap connections.
Radio messages may be sent in the clear only when delay would
entail grave danger.
28
PAET TWO: JAPAN
Section I. JAP ESTIMATE OF U. S.
LAND TACTICS
1. INTRODUCTION
What Japanese staff officers think of the land warfare
tactics used by U. S. forces is set forth in an official Japa
nese document. These beliefs indicate clearly why the
Japs have specialized in infiltrating, surprise, and decep
tive tactics to such a great extent against our forces.
Although the enemy may be in a mood to alter some of
his beliefs by now, a study of what he thinks of us as
fighters should be beneficial, as well as interesting. You
will notice that the Japanese contradict themselves more
than once in the document. Extracts from it are given
below:
2. "U. S. METHODS-OUR COUNTERMEASURES"
One peculiarity of the U. S. forces is that the orders of the
higher commanders are passed down in minute detail and leave
little room for initiative by subordinates. For this reason, if
29
30
the supreme commander does not display a great deal of ability,

a versatile change of tactics to cope with the situation as it de
velops is not possible.
American strategy is based on fighting a battle of fortified posi
tions, but their rules for the conduct of battles encourage mobile
warfare. In actuality, however, this is not often practiced in
training and maneuvers.
Under normal conditions, the Americans display their might in
carefully planned operations; but once their planned strategy is
spoiled, they must get one or two high commanders to straighten
things out. Hence, we must grasp every opportunity not to give
them time to do this.
In order to capture one of their positions, we must induce them
to come outside their fortifications and fight a decisive battle, or
else all efforts must be made to put a hitch in their plans; we must
practice a policy of throwing them into confusion.
Also, because American tactical ideas are simple, deceptive
displays of force are one of the most valuable of all our strategic
weapons.
Again, because the character of the American is simple and
lacking in tenacity, they also lack tenacity in their tactics and
battle leadership; and if they meet with one setback, they have
a tendency to abandon one plan for another. For this reason,
we must not fail to hammer at this weakness.
The Americans are very poor at scouting, patrolling, and se
curity measures; so the effects of a sudden attack and the benefits
to be gained therefrom should always be kept in mind.
The Americans make much of firepower, especially the power of
artillery, and lay only small stress on bayonet assaults. So, under
the cover of night, fog, or a smoke screen, we must take advantage
of the lack of flexibility of their plans, cut down the advantage they
may have gained by having registered their artillery fire on us,
and lead our .troops into an attack which will decide victory
or defeat.
The decision of the U. S. forces to attack or defend will depend
JAP ESTIMATE, OF U. S. LAND TACTICS
31
largely on their estimates of the strength of their artillery com

pared to ours, so it is essential that we conceal our artillery
strength and thereby cause them to underestimate it.
The Americans regard the enemy artillery dispositions as most
important. For this reason, if we utilize mobile warfare and either
conceal our batteries or establish fake artillery positions, we may
reap great benefits.
The U. S. forces vigorously recommend the offense, and con
stantly practice it in maneuvers and training; and, unless they
feel a definite inferiority in manpower and more particularly in
artillery, the view should be taken that they will attempt an
offensive.
As the rise of the U. S. forces took place during the World War,
it is no wonder that they developed a definite tendency toward
position warfare. Even in encounters that are not according to
the "book," their leadership follows a fixed path; and they are
extremely fearful of enemy counterattacks. For this reason, it is
especially necessary for us constantly to utilize mobile warfare
tactics.
a. Attack
(1) Plans.The Americans do not minutely reconnoiter the
movements of the enemy, and they are especially poor at deter
mining the direction from which enemy attacks will come. They
simply make broad plans for combatting enemy attacks against
their fortified positions, but have no idea of our active defense.
We must search for ways of attack and defense against the Ameri
cans with their superior firepower; and we must avoid a stationary
defense as much as possible. Even when we unavoidably are
fully on the defensive, we must work to keep our forces mobile.
In an active defense, if we base our defense on firepower in our
advanced positions and do not seize every opportunity to counter
attack, we will never make any gains. However, if the U. S.
forces should have a marked superiority in firepower, we must
plan an active defense by disposing our forces so as to increase
32
the units in the reserve. Do this by increasing the frontages

assigned to front-line units. In doing this, we multiply our
chances to use reserves for flanking.
(2) Leadership.If the U. S. forces are in a meeting engage
ment or in an attack on a position (excluding heavily fortified
positions), their columns usually will first diverge and then
deploy. In deciding on the plan for deployment, they consider
the enemy artillery fire as a factor of first importance. Their
dispositions will usually be made on a much narrower front than
our assembly positions, and therefore room for their maneuvering
will be lessened.
It will be beneficial to study the methods of deployment of the
U. S. forces. It should be remembered that at this time commu
nication facilities will not be complete. Also, as their leaders
will not have regained control as yet, we may, by maneuvering,
discover good opportunities to strike. For this reason, do not
relax your reconnaissance of the enemy's movements.
It is bad judgment not to use an assault to bring about a final
decision. American assaults usually appear to be penetrations
of enemy positions which have already lost all power of resistance
(that is, after fire superiority has been gained); and their training
in hand-to-hand fighting is not sufficient. Because of this, it
is well to consider ways of destroying them by desperate fighting
within our defensive positions.
We must not overlook the fact that the Americans, who believe
in a principle of mutual support, are paradoxically inclined to
reckless and headlong advances; and at times, they do not consider
a coordinated advance, but, instead, rush forward alone. Conse
quently, when their forces are separated, crush them individually,
or endeavor, with a counterattack by all your forces, to deliver
a crushing blow.
(3) Meeting Engagements.In meeting engagements, it is usual
for the Americans to commit their forces only when control has
been regained, so take advantage of this by sending up an advance
guard to hold fast, and use your main body to maneuver and
JAP ESTIMATE OF U. .&. LAND TACTICS
33
strike at the enemy's flanks. Again, because the initial artillery

fire of the enemy will be unorganized, bring up to the front at
once a strong force of artillery to press the enemy. It is essential
that the initiative be taken from him and that he not be allowed
to regain it.
Their- advance guards have a tendency to carry out independent
attacks, and also often deploy their front line too broadly. By
advancing one body of our troops, we can make the enemy deploy
prematurely in most cases. Also, by bringing up an advance
guard, we can gather our offensive strength in one spot for a
decisive attack, break through the enemy front line, and strike
the main body during deployment.
In dawn attacks, there are times when contact between opposing
forces is lost. Therefore, when you fear that the Americans
may launch a dawn attack while you are changing your disposi
tions in preparation, carry out a small attack against them;
this will take advantage of the fact that while they are advancing
to the line of departure, their covering fire will not yet be ready.
Or, depending on circumstances, if you are well acquainted with
the terrain within the enemy's lines, you may make a major
counterattack.
Thus, while American attacks are not to be feared, it is most
desirable that we investigate fully the ways of combatting the
enemy's superior firepower. An attack or defense based on
firepower will never bring good results when used against the
U. S. forces.
b. Defense
The American defense does not utilize the ideas incorporated in
our active defense system.
In cases when there is not much time, their organization of fire
is weak and there are gaps in it. The machine guns are particu
larly fond of displaying their independence, and coordinated fire
between machine-gun units is not often seen.
499629426
34
When there is time to spare, they display magnificent, system

atic organization of fire by using many types of weapons, and aim
it in front of the position; but they have no minute organization
of fire (that is, fire distribution by squads, and so on).
From the preceding, it can be seen that when they are pressed
for time, the American dispositions, and especially their organiza
tion of fire, are not coordinated. Therefore, we must not fail to
move fast and attack quickly, giving them no time in which to
prepare their positions.
However, on the whole, in deciding on a plan of attack against
American positions, the possibilities of maneuver must not be
overlooked. Utilize a deceptive display of strength in order to
draw the enemy out of his positions. When he attacks, by using
your infantry guns, keep him from breaking through. Then
practice the principle of manifesting your whole might in a coun
terattack.
C.
Night Fighting
Insofar as night fighting is concerned, the Americans are unlike

our troops, who can attack at night and bring about decisive
results; instead, they simply use the night hours to better their
preparations.
In view of the American organization of their military forces,
national characteristics, and habits, it is best for them to make
use of superior firepower and not indulge in night fighting. This
is a point of which we should take advantage.
d. Pursuit and Retreat

American pursuit of the enemy starts only when the enemy has
left his position and has begun the retreat. In the drill regula
tions, it is emphasized that the whole result of battles may be
decided by energetic pursuits. In actuality, because they fear
enemy counterattacks and demand order in the ranks, their
manner of pursuit is not vigorous. And if their pursuit is delayed
JAP ESTIMATE OF U. S. LAND TACTICS
35
by forces of the enemy, they will finally go on the defensive in

order to collect their strength.
In general, their leadership in a retreat is very incapable. For
this reason, once you have defeated them, great advantage may
be gained by pursuing them relentlessly.
e. Security Measures
Duty in the field is poorly performed by the Americans, espe
cially their security measures and patrols that operate over short
distances. Because of this, concealment of our movements and
execution of surprise attacks are comparatively easy, particularly
at night. Their use of cover and concealment is poor.
f. Tanks
Their tanks are considered able to fight independently, but
coordinated action with the infantry is difficult. In consideration
of this, after the tanks have smashed the enemy positions, their,
infantry is brought up to exploit the gains. But calm individual
soldiers, well trained in throwing explosive charges, will be able
to destroy the tanks.
The movement of their tanks is extremely skillful and they are
able to pass through practically any type of terrain. However,
their antitank measures, on the whole, are crude and if we use
our tanks well, we may crush the enemy line or break through
without much difficulty.
g. Other Vehicles
A great many motor vehicles are included in the organization
of the U. S. forces, who are thoroughly experienced in using them.
They plan strategic and tactical actions with them that are un
thought of by us. In a place where vehicles can travel, regardless
of how bad the roads may be, you must consider that they will
try to use them.
36
h. Vulnerability of the Rear

Since the rear of the U. S. forces seems very vulnerable, threats
and raids on their rear confuse them extremely and produce many
advantageous possibilities for the conduct of operations.
Section II. NOTES ON RECENT FIGHTING

IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
1. INTRODUCTION
Issues No. 3 and 4 of the Intelligence Bulletin contained
considerable information dealing with tactics and materiel
used by the Japs in the Solomon Islands fighting. Addi
tional information on the action in the Solomons, as well
as in other Southwest Pacific areas, is presented in this
issue.
2. INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS
Members of a Marine battalion in the Solomons agree
that at night Japanese often can be detected by a char
acteristic odor, which resembles the gamy odor of ani
mals. One Marine, through his sense of smell, detected a
Jap walking along a road with himthe Jap was killed.
It is interesting to note that the Japanese are able to
detect us by smell. A Jap scientist has described the odor
of a white person as being pungent, rancid, sweetish, or
bitter to his race.
37
38
3. NOISES DURING NIGHT ATTACKS

The Japs are very well trained to move silently in
jungle areas. They deliberately make noises at times,
however, to distract our attention and to deceive us, or to
draw our fireespecially that of automatic weapons.
These noises are made by firing rifles, mortars, and fire
crackers, by beating on bamboo sticks, and by loud talking
and yelling. Frequently, Japanese attacking units sneak
up ahead of the noise makers and are ready to throw hand
grenades and fire at our positions if our troops openfireat
the noises. On other occasions, the Japs infiltrate small
patrols to attack our forces from the rear while the noises
are being made.
4. BIVOUAC DEFENSE
When the Japs bivouac in the jungle, they prepare an
all-round defense. One bivouac position, captured by a
Marine battalion in the Solomons, was occupied by a
reinforced rifle company. Foxholes were of the standing
type and tunneled in, with well camouflaged overhead
protection. Some of the holes were connected by ropes,
probably to guide soldiers at night. The area was roughly
circular, and presented no flanks and no weak spots.
Snipers were placed about in trees to protect automatic
weapons. Low and narrow fire lanes, extending 1 to 2 feet
above the ground, had been cut in all directions. The
lanes were hard to see unless troops were crawling. Only
the low brush was cut, and the lanes appeared like tunnels
RECENT FIGHTING
SOUTHWEiST PACIFIC
39
in the jungle. Weapons fired low through them hit

several of our men in the lower legs and ankles.
5. DECEPTION
The Japs have tried numerous tricks to sneak up to

within knife- or grenade-range of our forces at night, or to
lure them into the range of these weapons. Although
many of the Japs speak good English, their accent almost
always gives them away to a careful listener. They try
hard to learn our passwords, and sometimes they cut in on
our radio or telephone lines to get information.
After certain night operations in the Solomons, our
troops found dead Japs wearing our helmets.
Also, a Jap was found dead with a light machine gun
strapped to his back in such a manner that it could be
fired. It is believed that guns of this tye were moved
from place to place in this way, with one man carrying the
gun and the other firing it. The Japs also have been ob
served while running from tree to tree, firing one or two
shots from each position. This creates the illusion of
large numbers of troops.
6. EQUIPMENT
During the Milne Bay operations, the Japanese em
ployed at least two light tanks which were heavily armed
with automatic weapons. The tanks had strong lights
which threw powerful rays 200 yards. The lights were
controlled in such a manner that it was practically im
possible to shatter them by point-blank fire. The tanks
40
were heavily greased, and sticky grenades would not cling

to them. They were finally immobilized by breaking the
tracks.
Cans of luminous paint were found in the Solomons.
Apparently the Japs had planned to use the paint to assist
movements at night.
7. CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions, drawn by officers and men of
a Marine battalion, are based on their fighting experience
against the Japs in the Solomons:
a. Because the helmet silhouette is an easy way to
detect friend from foe at night, it should be borne in mind
that the Jap will use our helmets if he can get away with
it, and positive identification cannot be based on that
factor alone.
b. Telephone lines should be carefully concealed, and
never laid on trailsbecause the Japs cut or tap them
and use them as guides to our command posts.
c. Remember that darkness is just as good cover for us
as for the Japs.
d. Jap noises are harmless. Wait until "pay-dirt"
targets present themselves at night before opening fire.
e. Our men should always dig in, and our automatic
weapons should have protection against grenades.
f. During daylight hours strong patrols should be sent
out to interfere with enemy reconnaissance (on which they
base their attacks) and to interfere with their rest.
g. Each man should be equipped with at least 4 hand
grenades.
RECENT FIGHTING
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
41
h. Location of friendly troops should be known to all

our units or detachments.
i. Snipers strategically placed in trees are very effective
in daytimegive the Japs some of their own medicine.
j . All guard and sentry details must be posted in
pairswhile one man is challenging, the other must
cover his partner from the flank, ready to handle any
emergency.
k. Challenging at night must be done skillfully. The
challenger must remain unseen in the shadows of a tree
or building, and not permit the challenged person to come
within knife-range of him until his identity has been
definitely established as okay. The password should not
be used unless necessary to secure positive identification.
If used, the password should be spoken in a stage whisper.
1. Commanders should be mentioned by nicknames.
Mention an officer or noncom by rank and that individual
has a fine chance of being showered with grenades.
m. Troops should be well instructed in Jap tactics, but
they also should be impressed with the fact that American
fighting men can, and have, outfought this wily enemy.
n. The jungle puts a premium on individual and squad
action.
o. Strict compliance with all basic rules of hygiene and
sanitation is all-important. The individual must learn
to conserve drinking water. All local water must be
considered contaminated, and must be treated before
drinking.
Section III. THE INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER
1. INTRODUCTION
The Intelligence Bulletin seeks to acquaint our junior
officers and enlisted men as far as possible with the char
acteristics, training, and background of enemy troops.
Such information has been given in each of the four pre
ceding monthly issues of this publication. Particular
reference is made at this time to the following sections
which dealt with the Japanese: "Section I. GROUND
FORCES," issue No. 1; "Section I. CHARACTERIS
TICS OF THE JAPANESE" and "Section II.
GROUND FORCES/' issue No. 2; "Section II. THE
SOLOMON ISLANDS CAMPAIGN/' issue No. 3; and
"Section I. FIGHTING IN THE SOLOMON IS
LANDS/' issue No. 4. Additional information about
the Japanese follows:
2. REACTION IN BATTLE
The information in this paragraph comes from several
captured Japanese diaries. It shows that the Japanese
42
43
have a healthy fear of our weaponsparticularly bombersand that their morale can be shaken. However, the
quotationsbelowshould not be interpreted as being
counter to previous information describing the tenacity,
fanaticism, treachery, and brutality of the Japs in battle.
Apart from the morale aspect, these extracts reveal that
certain weaknesses existed in the Japanese defenses at
some points.
The extracts:
"Due to our antiaircraft guns being ineffective, the enemy
(U. S. planes) circles around and drops their bombs on essential
places. As we have only rifles, our only alternative is to flee
from that area. It doesn't seem soldierly for us to flee as we
watch the planes.
" . . . I believe if friendly planes were hereeven the inferior
seaplanesthe enemy would disappear. I often think that anti
aircraft guns and machine guns are not very effective."
"Several bombs were dropped. Even though there is little

damage, the bombing is very dreadful. It is a horrible thing
just to think of the restless souls of the human beings. The
workers seem to scatter like small spiders at the same time the
alarm sounds off. It is true that even the soldiers have in mind
to flee as they watch the enemy planes. The higher officers
would flee before anybody else.
"Even as an enemy, they deserve praise. It is very difficult
for their bombs to hit the target. However, we are in fear on
account of lack of armament.
"This time I think it is truly hopeless when I watch them over
our head. Our force is shooting more and more at the enemy.
However, not even one bullet seems to hit anything.
"Thus, in a battle the air assault is very fearful. No matter
44
what I do, I would rather be alive, and return to stay near Shizuko
(his wife)."
"Our combat planes cannot get close to the enemy Flying
Fortresses. It's very regrettable that the only alternative is for
us to flee from being killed."
"Last night 1 stood guard at the working place, but there was
no air raid. Even the motor sound of the automobiles would get
us all excited. We started to construct the air raid shelters at
0500 hours. However, it was behind schedule. There is not
even a single high official who can look into the future.
"An air assault occurred at 0930 hours, and every soldier fled.
The deck officer was very displeased and gave a lecture. 'It is
soldierly to die by a bullet.' Such boastful talk was made by
him. However, when it comes to actual bombardment, he would
disappear first, and the subordinates are very unpleasant about
this situation."
". . . Many commanders like to take into battle with them as
many of their men as possible, but, in contrast to this, I myself
(a lieutenant) am inclined to leave behind many of those who are
not really fit (due to injuries and sickness). Can it be that I am
not sufficiently ruthless? It is a matter regarding which some
self-examination is necessary. I am worried because I cannot
unconcernedly overlook another's troubles and the feeling grows
on me that as a commander I am lacking in sincerity. I feel that
I am becoming detached from my comrades through insufficient
mental discipline.
"Diligent people talk of their hopes.
"Lazy people bemoan their misfortunes.
"I will rectify my lack of mental discipline by diligence and
industry."
45
"I (a lieutenant) don't know whether it is because the No. 1

Battalion has had so many casualties, but all ranks of commanders
seem to have lost some of their offensive spirit . . .
"I feel strongly that if the enemy adopts guerrilla tactics, we will
have no alternative but to adopt similar tactics. I have told
Captain Horita that we must make a desperate attack at the
enemy supply lines and billets, but he won't listen to me.
"The regimental headquarters has decided to move forward as
the enemy in front has been repulsed by our 1st Battalion. I
recommend that since none of our troops could be observed along
the road, it was too early to move forward but the recommenda
tion was rejected. Unwillingly we pushed forward, with the 3d
platoon at the head. As expected, when we reached the ravine
Corporal Komatsu and 5 men were killed, and Corporal Yamamoto
and 2 men wounded . . . "
"June 17.. . . (en route to Southwest Pacific island) Although
I am not to think about such things until this military objective
is ours, as I was gazing at the stars I felt as though I saw Yuriko's
face (his girl friend)."
"July 3.Going south. Wind came up in the afternoon and
the boat rocked violently because of the high waves. During
the night, while watching the waves, we began thinking about
home and various other things and we became very depressed . . ."
3. EARLY TRAINING
Physical training and conditioning play an equally
important part in the development of the Japanese soldier.
The Japanese have been quick to realize the advantages
of mechanization and motorization, but they fully realize
46
that in many of the areas in which their troops must

operate, such equipment can be used only to a limited
extent. Furthermore, they feel very strongly that in
warfare the machine can never take the place of man.
All their training is based on the theory that troops must
be prepared to operate under any conditions without the
advantages of motor- or even horse-drawn transport.
The process of conditioning and hardening the soldier
begins with his earliest recruit training. Physical drill,
wall-scaling, road marches (a good part of which is done
at double time up hill as well as on the level), fencing,
bayonet training, ju-jitsu (called "judo" by the Japanese),
and swimming occupy much of the soldier's time. The
strictly military training is frequently carried out under
adverse weather conditions, and, even in the earliest stages,
is made to simulate battle conditions as realistically as
circumstances will permit.
Because training in schools and universities does much
to furnish the army with recruits who are already partially
conditioned and toughened, the Japanese soldier is brought
to a state of physical fitness very soon after his induction
into the service. He needs this early conditioning because
his training during the rest of his service will include long
marches and maneuvers with full pack and equipment
under a hot summer sun in Formosa or other tropical
areas, or long periods of tactical exercises in the cold
winters of Hokkaido and "Manchoukuo," frequently fol
lowed by a night in open bivouac in the snow without fires
or lights of any kind. Men who have experienced these
hardships find, under the stress of battle, that they have
47
become accustomed to physical strains and are freer to

concentrate on overcoming the other difficulties which
might confuse them in action.
Japanese training doctrine calls for special emphasis on
field exercises, and insists on a maximum degree of realism
in their execution. Whenever possible the enemy is
represented by troops, not by flags or dummies; and
trenches, barbed wire, and other obstacles are actually
constructed in the area over which the troops are to oper
ate. Every effort is made to simulate the noise, confusion,
and befuddled vision which so frequently exist in actual
battle, in order to accustom officers and men to that
peculiar state known as the "fog of war." Artillery and
machine-gun barrages are fired over the heads of friendly
troops, and live grenades and mortars are used, although
with reduced charges. So realistic was the training of the
divisions which were rehearsing in the hills near Canton
for the attack on Hong Kong that the troops suffered "a
number of casualties." No considerations, either political
or humane, are ever allowed to interfere with what the
high command believe to be the one and only purpose of the
training programthe production of fighting men.
All soldiers in the Japanese Army receive basic infantry
training during their recruit period and take frequent
refresher courses throughout their term of service. The
training is progressive and thorough. Instruction pro
ceeds systematically from the School of the Soldier to
exercises involving large units and combined arms. In
addition to this purely peace-time training, many officers
and men were rotated through the ranks of active divi
48
sions on the China front before joining units destined to

take part in the major campaigns of the present war.
Service in China was considered a very important part of
the training program, and every effort was made to give
this experience to the largest possible number of men.
The Japanese have made conscientious use of the facilities
afforded for small-unit training in the comparatively quiet
areas of China and for higher unit and combined staff
work in the more active sectors.
In all field exercises, the Japanese soldier is required to
make full use of the terrain for cover and concealment.
He is taught to improvise simple camouflage by using
grass, twigs, branches of trees, and even by plastering
himself with mud. Each combat soldier is provided with
an individual camouflage net which he uses when on
scouting or sniping duty. All men in the infantry and
engineers are trained in the duties of scouts or snipers
and much time is devoted to instruction in infiltration
methods. Normally, in combat, only selected men are
used for this type of work, but all those units fighting in
jungle areas have been greatly benefited by the fact that
all officers and men have had some experience in main
taining themselves, and in operating for days at a time,
individually or in small groups, behind the enemy's lines.
Night operations play an important part in the training
of Japanese troops of all arms. An effort is made to get
every combat soldier out once a week on some sort of
night problem with special emphasis being laid on indi
vidual, squad, and platoon exercises. More than half of
the six weeks of intensive training engaged in by the
49
troops designated for the attack on Hong Kong was

devoted to night operations. Their efforts were well
repaid, for the key point in the British defense line on the
Kowloon peninsula was captured after some two hours
of fighting when a Japanese infantry battalion and a few
engineers launched a well-timed and perfectly coordi
nated night attack against the position and caught the
defenders completely by surprise.
Recent manuals bearing on various aspects of the
training of officers stress the necessity of developing
initiative in all grades, and the danger of adhering too
rigidly to previously formulated plans when the situation
demands a change in the course of action. That the
Army has taken this to heart and can apply it in even the
most complicated form of engagement was demonstrated
at Kota Bharu (East coast of Malaya) where the repulse
of the Japanese landings in the north and central sectors
of the beach necessitated a change of plans in the midst
of the engagement, involving the movement of men,
barges, and even ships to the southern flank. This
difficult maneuver was carried out in the face of the
enemy, after the troops had suffered considerable losses,
and during the hours of darkness. The Malayan cam
paign contains numerous other examples of rapid changes
in tactics by troops whose first attempts to advance had
been blocked by determined enemy resistance. Japanese
troops are still taught to move forward regardless of losses
when no other method presents itself, but officers are
trained to seek out the soft spots in an enemy line and to
50
make their plans flexible enough to take advantage of

any change in the situation which may occur.
Mass singing is used extensively. The Japanese say
that martial marching songs heighten morale and that
the beat of the music aids the rhythm of breathing,
thereby easing fatigue. This feature has obviously been
borrowed from the Germans, whose army has for many
years recognized the value of mass singing.
4. COUNSEL ON FIELD SERVICE
The information in this paragraph was taken from a
Japanese manual called "Battlefield Discipline" (Senjin
Kunreri).
a. A moment's negligence may result in an unexpected catas
trophe. Be constantly on your guard. Do not despise your enemy
or the natives. Do not be negligent after a small success. Know
that carelessness brings disaster.
b. Sentry duty is important. Upon the sentry rests the safety
of an army; he also represents the discipline of an army. Those
on sentry duty must devote their person to their tasks, which must
be sternly carried out. Accord the sentry high respect.
c. Ideological warfare is an important phase in modern conflict.
Destroy propaganda and falsehoods of the enemy by your un
shakable faith in the cause for which your Empire stands, and
endeavor to spread Kodo (literally, the "Imperial Way").
d. Rumors arise from a lack of confidence. Do not be misled;
do not be agitated by them. Firmly believe in the strength of
the Imperial Army and deeply trust your superiors.
e. Control your anger and suppress your grudges. The
ancients said, "Consider anger your enemy." A moment's
violence often leaves cause for a long regret.
f. There is nothing more to be regretted than to fall a victim
51
to disease on the field. Be particularly mindful of your health

so that you may not be unable to serve because of excesses.
g. Take to heart this saying of an ancient warrior: "My
sword is my soul; my horse is my fortune." Always take good
care of your arms and supplies, and give humane attention to
animals on the field.
h. Be honest always; consider exaggerations and lies as dis
honorable.
5. UNIFORMS
Extreme caution should be exercised in identifying the
Japanese soldier by means of clothing and personal
effects. Japanese troops in recent campaigns often
have exhibited a complete lack of uniformity in dress.
In the majority of cases reported in Malaya, Japanese
noncoms and privates wore uniforms of a cloth similar
to our khaki drill. Officers wore slightly darker or greener
khaki. The badge of rank usually was worn on the
collar. A soft fatigue cap was worn underneath the steel
helmet, which is much deeper than our old type and
which is also distinguishable by a five-pointed star in
the front center. In Burma, the Japanese were some
times found wearing Chinese hats (peaked with a round
crown). Footwear consisted of black or brown boots
or tabi (canvas shoes, with heavy rubber soles, in which
the big toe is separated from the remainder of the foot),
with puttees up to the knee.
However, there were several deviations from the above
standard attire, arising from pure necessity or from
deliberate attempts at disguise.
Some of the prisoners were wearing pajamas and
52
even Chinese civilian dress. Captured Japanese equip

ment often included a soft straw hat, shorts, sweat
shirts, and canvas shoes, which prisoners explained as
part of their evening change in tropical weather. In
stances have been reported by our troops of Japanese
soldiers wearing captured British gas capes, Indian
uniforms, and Malayan clothes. Such variations in dress
have been observed principally on the front-line troops,
who are fond of discarding their own cheap apparel for
British clothing, both to disguise their identity and to
satisfy their instinct for loot.
From the foregoing, it will be understood that the
uniform is not always a foolproof means of identifying
a Japanese soldier. In addition, it is advisable to study
his facial and physical characteristics, especially so as to
be able to distinguish him from our ally, the Chinese.
(See Section I, Characteristics of the Japanese, Intelligence
Bulletin No.
2.)
Section IV. SERVICE RIFLE
The Japanese service rifle is a simplified Mauser type

with an action similar to our M-1903 (Springfield). Its
official name is the Meiji 38th-year pattern (1905) rifle.
Its caliber is .256 inch (6.5 mm). The weapon has not
been changed since 1905, and the bulk of Japanese in
fantry is armed with it, or its carbine form.
The Japs are known to have a larger (bore) rifle of the
same pattern, but it has not been used on a quantity
basis. Its caliber is .303 inch (7.7 mm), enabling the
enemy to use the British .303-inch Mark VII small-arms
ammunition. The rifle has been used to some extent as a
sniper's weapon, mounted with a telescopic sight.
The caliber .256 rifle is operated very much in the same
manner as our M-1903 with the exception of the safety
lock, which is easily figured out. This safety lock is
much more awkward to operate than that of our M-1903.
The rifle itself is a manually operated and bolt-action
weapon, which takes 5 rounds in a clip, as does our M
1903. The bolt-stop is of the Mauser type; it is located
on the left rear of the receiver and is pivoted on its for
ward end. To withdraw the bolt, the back end is pulled
out.
53
54
The barrel
feet 2 inches
bayonet. It
is made long
is 31.4 inches long, and the rifle itself is 4

without bayonet and 5 feet ){ inch with
is too long for easy handlingit probably
to compensate for the small stature of the
Figure 4. Japanese Service Rifle,
average Japanese. This length gives them a good reach

in bayonet fighting. The rifle is equipped with a long
knife bayonet, in the use of which the Japanese soldier
receives a great deal of training.
The bolt handle is not bent down like' that on our
M-1903 and, consequently, catches in underbrush and is
not so fast in operation. The sights are graduated from
433 yards to 2,598 yards. The leaf sight has an open "V"
notch with no windage adjustment. The rifle is not so
accurate as ours, especially at ranges greater than 300
yards.
All in all, the American soldier equipped with an Ml
or 1903 rifle is far better armed than the Jap soldier with
this "squirrel" rifle.
PART THREE: ITALY
Section I. 81-MM MORTAR
1. AS A WHOLE
The 81-mm Italian mortar Model 35 is a smooth bore,
high-angle fire, muzzle-loading Stokes-Brandt type
weapon. Remarkably similar in construction to the 81
mm American Ml, this mortar is a standard Italian
Army weapon.
The following table gives comparative data regarding
the two wreapons:
Italian 81-mm Mortar
Caliber
Total weight in ac
tion.
Weight of barrel
Weight of bipod
Weight of base plate.
Internal length of
barrel.
Max. range (light
bomb).
Max. range (heavy
bomb).
Traverse
Elevation
Method of firing
Practical rate of fire_
U. S. 81-mm Mortar
81 mm (3.2 in)
135 lbs
81 mm (3.205 in)
136 lbs
47
42
46
46
44.5 lbs
46.5 lbs
45 lbs
45.55 in
lbs
lbs
lbs
in
4,429 yds
3,288 yds
1,640 yds
1,275 yds
150 mils (826'15")
40 to 90
percussion
18 rpm
180 mils
40 to 85
percussion
18 rpm
55
56
The barrel is a smooth-bored, steel tube fitted with a

hollowed and threaded base cap which in turn is fitted to
the socket in the base plate. The base cap is axially
bored, and is threaded to accommodate the striker. A
band and lifting handle are fastened to the breech end
of the barrel.
Tcave rsmg gear.

Yoke.
Barrel.
Elevating gear.
Figure 5. Italian 81-mm Mortar
81-MM MORTAR
57
2. BIPOD
The bipod consists of tubular steel legs, an elevating

mechanism, and a traversing mechanism. The legs have
spiked feet, and their spread is limited by an adjustable
chain. To absorb shock on the legs during firing, a spring
is linked with the chain. The cross-leveling mechanism
is locked with a locking nut.
The elevating mechanism consists of a vertical screw
operating in a threaded tube. The screw is actuated by a
gear-and-handle mechanism of conventional design.
The traversing mechanism consists of a horizontal screw
operating through a threaded T-yoke, the lower end of
which forms a bearing for the elevating screw. An oper
ating handle is secured to one end of the traversing screw,
and a sight bracket to the other.
Two shock absorbers are mounted in a housing secured
to the yoke, and are clamped to the barrel with a clamping
collar.
3. BASE PLATE
The base plate is rectangular. It has three socket

seats and a carrying handle. This is still another respect
in which it is similar to the American Ml.
4. SIGHT
The elevating quadrant provides for vertical adjustment

from 40 to 90 degrees.
The lateral deflection scale, graduated in conventional
58
mils from 0 to 6,400, is equipped with a sliding scale be

neath it to facilitate traverse readings. From the defi
nition of a mil as that angle which at any range subtends
1/1000 of the range, errors in deflection can readily be
estimated and corrected.
5. AMMUNITION
Two types of semi-fixed high explosive ammunition,
a heavy and a light bomb, are used in this Italian mortar.
Both are painted gray with an orange nose. Contrary to
American practice, the propelling charge and fuze are not
incorporated in the Italian bombs.
The maximum range of the mortar is 4,429 yards for
the 7.2-pound light bomb, and 1,640 yards for the 15.1
pound heavy projectile. The corresponding American
bombs used with the 81-mm M l weigh 6.92 pounds and
15.05 pounds, and have maximum ranges of 3,288 yards
and 1,275 yards, respectively.
Section II. TORPEDO BOMBER
The land-based Savoia-Marchetti (SM-79) bomber is

the most widely used of several types of aircraft employed
by the Italian Air Force. This aircraft has long been the
mainstay of the bomber squadrons, and has been adapted
successfully for torpedo-carrying purposes.
The SM-79 is a large, low-wing, tri-motored monoplane
of metal and plywood construction. The engines,
approximately 1,000 horsepower each, give the aircraft,
when used as a bomber, a speed of almost 300 miles per
hour. When a torpedo is carried, the plane has a top
speed of about 200 miles per hour. The SM-79 nor
mally carries a crew of fourtwo pilots, a radio operator,
and a bombardier.
The depth settings of the torpedoes carried vary ac
cording to the size of the target. When employed
against convoys, the aircraft carry torpedoes with several
settings, the planes with deeper settings always attacking
the larger vessels. These settings are adjusted by special
torpedo mechanics and cannot be altered in flight.
An attack by torpedo bombers is usually made at dawn
or dusk. Dusk is considered preferable since the air
59
60
craft may make a low, unobserved approach toward the

target, which is silhouetted against the horizon. The
attacks are always made from the east since this is the
Figure 6. Savoia-Marchetti (SM-79) Torpedo Bomber; Two Views and
Recognition Silhouettes
TORPEDO BOMBER
61
direction of poorest visibility. Daylight attacks are

suicidal and are very seldom attempted.
Early in the war Italian aircraft torpedo attacks were
usually made by individual aircraft and were not pressed
home. Recently, however, these attacks have been
better coordinated and many of them have been made at
comparatively close range.
Torpedo squadrons are believed to have the highest
morale of all units of the Italian Air Force. Their
efficiency is such that Germany has sent squadrons to
Italy for instructions in torpedo tactics. Italian aircraft
torpedoes are believed to be superior to those of German
design and are probably used by the German Air Force.
PART FOUR: UNITED NATIONS
Section I. THE MOROCCAN SOLDIER
1. INTRODUCTION
The information in this section was extracted from an
article written by a Spanish infantry captain. It deals
with the characteristics of the Moslem soldier in Spanish
Morocco and how to get along with him.1 Basically, this
soldier is very much like Moslem soldiers in other parts
of North Africa; therefore, it is believed that a study of
him will aid our troops who come in contact with Moslems
in the African theater of operations.
2. THE EXTRACTS
Centuries of warfare have developed notable military virtues
in the Moroccans. They are born warriors, and possess in the
highest degree the characteristics of a perfect infantry soldier.
They are industrious and economical, good walkers and runners,
agile, well disciplined, strong, good at hand-to-hand fighting,
tenacious in defense, and pitiless in attack. They possess, more
over, an enviable instinct for making the most of opportunities
1
A Moslem is a believer in the faith established by Mohammed, whose

writings and revelations constitute a sacred book, the Koran.
62
THE MOROCCAN SOLDIER
63
offered by the terrain, fully exploiting them in retreat as well as

in attack.
Military forces made up of such elements must naturally be
excellent; but it takes skillful veteran officers to command them.
The Moroccan is not urged on by the sentiments that inspire
the Spanish soldier, such as patriotism, sense of duty, self-denial,
spirit of sacrifice, and so forth. He does his work, nearly always
because of the inspiration and personal magnetism of his leader,
and such leadership is fostered only by the leader's display of
intelligence, force of will, rectitude, skill, and, above all, valor.
Aside from his military qualities, the Moroccan soldier possesses
other characteristic traits that his officers should know: He is
haughty and proud because, being a Moslem, he believes that his
religion and his race are superior to all others; he is distrustful,
because deep down in his heart he is convinced that every action
in life has a selfish end in view; he is mercenaryof necessity and
as a natural defense against the unfailing greed of his neighbors;
and he is crafty, because since childhood he has had to keep con
stantly on guard to defend his own interests and his family, in a
country where so far only cunning and force have carried the day.
As a result of these traits, the Moroccan soldier will seem com
plex and difficult to a young officer. One simply must learn to
know him; and for that purpose one must observe him, study him,
and treat him accordingly.
In dealing with these troops it will be found quite profitable to
mingle to some extent with the subordinates, to enter into their
feelings and get to know them, demonstrating a suitable measure
of friendly confidence such as will afford opportunity for them to
present any claims or complaints they may have, or ask any
question that may be troubling them. Such consultations should
even include the soldier's personal affairs, and he should come to
his officers for help and advice. He may without doubt be
expected to do so, and perhaps more frequently than one might
wish, as soon as he notices that his officers lend an attentive ear
and take an interest. This trait, together with the characteristic
64
obstinacy of the Moroccan, may become a source of annoyance;

but there is no better way for an officer really to attach a Moroccan
soldier to his person and induce him to do his best in the faithful
performance of duties assigned.
The writer does not possess sufficient experience to offer sub
stantial advice, and we shall limit ourselves to quoting a few sug
gestions from our lamented great master in matters Moroccan,
none other than General Capaz:
"Be extremely polite, since nothing could more easily wound a
Moslem than insolence or contempt. Be of firm character, with
out weaknesses; and if you show indulgence, let it always be pre
ceded by punishment. Avoid insulting and angry speech. The
native chiefs never shout as they speak their sentences, and you
might set them a bad example.
"Wear correct uniforms, and avoid showy attempts at imitating
the dress of the natives.
"Be equitable in your decisions; because impartiality is for a
Moslem the height of justice.
"Always keep your word, and never go back on an agreement.
"Ask for a service in such manner that you would seem to be
asking for collaboration; and the service will be rendered more
willingly.
"Respect the man's religion, and take care not to offend him.
It would be an outrage to their feelings for you to attempt to
explain to them a passage from the Koran, or to say that you have
a Koran in your possession.
"Pass in silence over their beliefs and superstitions. They will
tell you all sorts of funny superstitions; and you should not agree,
or disagree, or smile. Simply remark: 'That may be.'
"The so-called good Moroccanwho admires European things
and possibly speaks Spanish quite correctly, and who publicly
advertises his repugnance to his creed and takes alcohol freelyis,
generally speaking, not the type of man to be very much trusted.
"In your dealings with Moslem authorities, show them consid
eration; but do not strike too great a note of familiarity with
THE MOROCCAN1 SOLDIER
65
them. They will not understand your condescension and will

not fail to regard it as a sign of weakness.
"Look with indifference upon events as they happen; if you
give too much praise, they will regard it as cringing.
"Don't talk about war; and if you do, avoid dwelling too much
on their cooperation or praise their valor and loyalty. If you
do not follow this advice, you will hear them saying later that
success was due entirely to their help.
"Do not lend your presence too readily at festivities, banquets,
or more casual entertainment in your behalf; because the invita
tion will, as a rule, be followed by some request for a favor.
"There is one thing in particular that the young officers must
keep in mind. Upon arrival, they will readily find admirers.
But do not abandon yourself to your vanity. Servility is only
one of their modes of intrigue; and a Moslem is addicted to in
trigue so much that it constitutes part of his character no less
than the Yibala is a regular part of his dress.
"In cases of doubt or hesitationand such cases are bound to
arise for a newly arrived officerit will be necessary to suspend
judgment and consult.
"If the occasion arises, something will have to be done. If you
make a mistake you will lose prestige. If you confess your ignor
ance, they will lose respect for you. Under such circumstances
one must nonchalantly pronounce certain magic words which can
be acquired from the natives and the purpose of which is to gain
time. For instance, 'We shall have to see . . . But let me see
. . . Tomorrow;' or simply make a promise, more or less as fol
lows: 'Don't worry . . . things are bound to go right, if it is the
Lord's will . . .,' and so forth."
Section II. BRITISH TRAINING AND USE

OF DOGS.
1. INTRODUCTION
The United States, Great Britain, Canada, and Ger
many are among the nations that recognize the import
ance of training dogs for war duties. The extensive use
of dogs in World War I, as well as the popular peacetime
activity of training dogs to take part in obedience trials,
provided a backlog of experience for the men who now
must train large numbers of dogs for work in the field.
In nearly all nations, dogs have been used in police work;
their trainers are in great demand for the wartime emer
gency need. To mention an outstanding force, the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police long have been expert at
schooling dogs to search for evidence in criminal cases,
apprehend the more desperate type of criminal, and
locate missing persons in thickly wooded areas.
The British Army, especially, has been making great
progress in the training of dogs for war work. The
personnel conducting its Dog Training Center have been
selected from men who were recognized as successful dog
66
BRITISH TRAINING AND USD OF DOGS
67
trainers in civilian life. The following notes deal only

with dog training methods used by the British Army.
2. SUPPLY OF DOGS
The breeds of dogs most useful for war work are the
Alsatian, the Dobermann Pinscher, the Big Airedale, and
the Rottweiler. The age at which their training generally
starts is from 1 to 2 years; after this, a dog is likely to have
acquired set habits, and consequently is harder to school.
Inasmuch as civilians have been generous about lending
pets for the duration, the British Army has had no trouble
in obtaining an adequate supply of dogs. Incidentally,
mongrels have proved so satisfactory for war work that
no effort is made to secure pedigreed stock. The British
have found that mongrels with a strong Alsatian strain
make especially good candidates, because of their quiet
ness, dependability, ruggedness, and speed at detecting a
body scent.
3. TACTICAL USE OF DOGS
A dog is trained to perform only one of three specific
types of work. It may be trained as a messenger dog, to
carry messages from outposts to company or headquarters
and return; as a patrol dog, to advance ahead of night
patrols and to indicate by pointing the approximate
location of any human beings in the line of advance; or
as a sentry dog, to be stationed at such vulnerable points
as forward machine-gun posts to indicate any hostile
advance against the position.
68
4. TRAINING
a. General
Dogs are tested first for gun-shyness. About one-third
of the dogs are rejected for failure to pass this test. Next,
the dogs are assigned to their trainers, and are given about
two weeks in which to become accustomed to them. The
dogs are taught to recognize certain simple, easily dis
tinguished commands. All trainers use uniform com
mands. Throughout the training period, the dogs are
conditioned to ignore human beings seeking to pet them,
and all wild and domestic animals, including other dogs.
b. Messenger Dogs
Each prospective messenger dog is assigned to two

trainers. It is taught to shuttle back and forth between
the trainers, and over gradually increased distances. As
soon as the dog can perform this work satisfactorily, its
trainers take it to the headquarters of a unit. One of the
trainers remains at a fixed position at the headquarters,
while the other takes the dog to an outpost with which
communication is desired. When the dog is released
from the outpost, it makes its way back to the unit head
quarters and its other master. Afterward, the dog can
be released from the headquarters to return to the outpost
when necessary. A good dog will find the right man if
he is anywhere within a quarter of a mile from the position
where the dog last saw him.
Messages are carried in a hollow, lightweight leather
collar. This collar is put on the dog only just before the
BRITISH TRAINING AND USE OF DOGS
69
animal is released, and is removed as soon as it arrives at

the other post. This is the psychological basis of the
training. Each dog is taught to understand that when
ever the collar is attached, a trip to the other master is
required.
Experienced trainers need an average of 6 weeks if they
are going to teach a dog to work with them in this manner.
Some dogs have been trained to operate over distances up
to 8 miles. Three-fourths of a mile to 1 mile, however,
is the maximum distance over which they are expected to
operate under service conditions.
Once a dog has been trained, only two weeks are
needed to accustom him to work with new masters. The
battalion, or other unit to which the dog will be attached,
furnishes the new men, who come to the Dog Training
Center to work with the animal for the two-week period
before taking it back to the unit.
Little effort is made to develop a dog's speed at deliver
ing messages. Instead, emphasis is placed on developing
its dependability, and on teaching it how to get past a
variety of difficult obstacles. The theory is that if a dog
gets through at all, its speed is bound to be greater than
that of any human messenger. It is also recognized that
a dog has a tremendous advantage over a human messen
ger in crossing bad ground, negotiating obstacles, and
presenting a small and difficult target to enemy fire.
c. Patrol Dogs
Patrol dogs are trained to pick up body scent, to point

out the direction from which it comes, and to work in
70
complete silence at all times. They are used only at night.

During operations the master and his dog work several
paces in advance of the patrol. If the wind is coming
from a direction from which opposition is expected, there
is a much better chance of success. Detecting a body
scent ahead, the dog points, indicating the direction.
The dog's master signals the patrol leader, who can
either take steps to deal with the opposition or attempt
to evade it.
A U. S. Signal Corps officer reports that during a
demonstration he witnessed, two of these dogs picked out
men hidden in woods and ditches at distances of 100 to
150 yards, and accurately pointed the direction. The
experienced trainers were able to estimate the approximate
distance simply by noting the degree of excitement shown
by the dogs and the eagerness with which they tugged at
their leads. Another officer, after working with a night
patrol which had used a patrol dog, reported that the
animal was invaluable in helping the patrol to avoid
opposition while carrying out reconnaissance.
d. Sentry Dogs
Sentry dogs are assigned to fixed defensive positions,

where they pick up the sound or body scent of anyone
approaching and give instant warning. They have
proved especially valuable in the defense of machine-gun
posts. As soon as a human being comes within about
80 yards of a gun position, the dog gives warning. Sentry
dogs also are used extensively in the guarding of airdromes.
Section III. RUSSIAN ANTITANK TACTICS
1. INTRODUCTION
The Russian Army had forced upon it in June 1941
the major portion of Germany's armored forces. The
Russians were driven back several hundred miles east
ward during the first few months of the campaign, but,
at the same time, they were studying the German tactics.
And in the fall of 1941, when the Germans made an allout attack for Moscow, the Soviets put into effect certain
antitank tactics that finally halted the German drive.
These tactics, in general, involve placing the various
antitank weapons in considerable depth and supporting
them with heavy artillery, infantry, and frequently with
aircraft. They are designed to break up the massed
attacks made at relatively weak points by German tanks.
2. VARIOUS METHODS EMPLOYED
a. Organization of Terrain
Selection of terrain which limits or prevents the maneu
vering of tanks is a major factor in breaking up armored
attacks. In fact, the Russians consider that denial of
71
72
maneuverability is half the battlethe enemy must not

be allowed to choose his ground or the time of attack.
The Russian defenses against armored vehicles are
based mainly on "islands of resistance" disposed in
depth. More often than not, these areas of resistance
are centered around towns and villages or other built-up
places. The Russians acquired considerable experience
in organizing defenses in towns and villages during the
revolutionary and Polish campaigns of 1918-1921. Their
facilities for such defensive activity have been increased
since that time by the systematic training of women and
children, who operate the aircraft warning system, help
to organize the defenses, and sometimes act as snipers.
To consolidate a town's defenses, armed detachments of
soldiers and civilians are disposed at strategically im
portant sites. Stone dwellings are used for emplacing
heavy machine guns, either on the roofs or through
windows. Antitank and antiaircraft guns are emplaced
so that they can be fired down roads or streets, along with
machine-gun fire. Tank mines and barriers are placed
along likely approaches. Barricades are constructed for
street fighting in case a penetration should occur.
Over areas selected for defense against tanks, the
Russians frequently construct thousands of X-shaped
tank obstacles by crossing three pieces of heavy steel
rails or beams, and by driving them partly into the
ground or wiring them together on top of the ground.
Tanks approaching these obstacles must either slow down
or maneuver around them. Artillery is sited to open
fire as the tanks approach the obstacleswhich, there
73
fore, serve much the same purpose as the British minefields in North Africa.
Well in advance of their defended positions, the Rus
sians install thousands of prefabricated individual con
crete pillboxes. These are moved on trucks to the areas
which need them. Holes are dug into the ground ac
cording to a planned scheme, and the pillboxes are then
dropped into the holes. The pillboxes are distributed in
great depth along the main highways. They are arranged
so that an enemy, concentrating on destroying a certain
pillbox, encounters oblique or flanking fire from others.
b. Use of Artillery
The Russians rely on artillery as their main weapon in

fighting tanks. They make particular use of an 85-mm
dual-purpose gun. Other pieces used extensively include
76-mm and 45-mm guns.
Usually the artillery opens up with long-range fire
against moving or assembling tanks. Barrages are em
ployed to disorganize tank combat formations, to cause
casualties, and to separate the tanks from the infantry
and accompanying artillery. In addition to stationary
guns, a mobile reserve of antitank guns is always available.
If the Germans are able to attack after the long-range
shelling, the Russians do not put their antitank system
into effect until the tanks cross their line of departure and
break through the forward positions.
How the Russians emplace their 45-mm and 76-mm
guns and fortify the areas where they are located are told
74
in the following article written by a Soviet artillery officer:

"Fortifying 45- and 76-mm gun positions is hard work, but it
pays large dividends in combatting German tanks. Crews are
taught not only to dig in and to camouflage quickly, but also to
mine sectors in front of their batteries. When time permits, two
or three alternate positions are dug for each gun and are used to
confuse the enemy in spotting our gun positions. Artillery fire
from these positions is also frequently imitated in order to draw
enemy fire.
"Open positions are soon knocked out by enemy tanks or air
craft. Therefore, a platform with all-around traverse is built
first. Beside it is dug a hole into which the gun may be lowered.
Ditches, 1% yards deep, for personnel and ammunition, are dug
on each side of the platform. The hole and the ditches are cov
ered with logs, poles, and a }i-jaxd thickness of earth to guard
against shell and bomb splinters. About 2 to 3 yards from the
emplacement, another ditch is dugthis one for reserve ammuni
tion. In battle, enemy tanks and planes make it very difficult to
bring up additional ammunition from the rear. At some distance
from the gun positions, dugouts 3 to 4 yards long and 2 yards
wide, with inclined entrances, are dug for the horses. These dug
outs are covered with poles, leaving a gap 1 to 1^ feet wide to
admit enough light to prevent restlessness.
"In the spring battles, the Red Army artillery was organized in
depth. The 45-mm guns were emplaced on the front lines, and
were protected by other antitank defenses. The crews were able
to set up minefields in front of the gun positions, as well as ob
stacles, and also to lift the mines when necessary. In addition,
each artillery battalion and, in some cases, each artillery battery,
had a mobile reserve of 5 to 8 combat engineers equipped with
4 to 5 mines each. Their function was to mine unguarded tank
approaches after the direction of the enemy attack had been
definitely ascertained. These mines proved highly effective in
stopping and even in destroying many enemy tanks."
75
c. Air Support
The Russians insist on thorough air reconnaissance to

safeguard their forcesparticularly infantryfrom sur
prise tank attacks. If there is any possibility of a clash
with enemy armor, mixed columns of infantry, artillery,
and tanks are employed, closely supported by aircraft.
Russian close-support aircraftincluding the highly
respected Stormovik planesoften have achieved good
results in attacking German tanks and other armored
vehicles.
d. Use of Antitank Rifle
The following information about the use of the Russian

antitank rifle was originally published in the Red Star,
official Soviet Army publication:
"A Soviet artillery battery was on the march when the column
was suddenly attacked by six enemy tanks. A Red Army private
armed with an antitank rifle jumped off a caisson, took position
behind a mound, and opened fire. He inflicted sufficient damage
on the leading tank to cause the remainder of the enemy tanks to
delay their attack for a few minutes. The battery was given a
chance to deploy and open fire, and the surprise attack was beaten
off. Four of the six German tanks were put out of action.
"In many similar instances antitank rifles have proved effective
against enemy tanks. The light weight, portability, and rapid
fire power of this weapon permit its crew to go into action in so
short a time that it can cover units on the march, at rest, or in
battle.
". . . The greatest success has been attained by squads con
sisting of two or three antitank rifles placed 15 to 20 yards apart.
Such units can bring effective fire to bear on a target, and have
76
a greater chance of putting it out of commission than fire by a

single rifle would have.
"In selecting positions for antitank rifles, detailed reconnais
sance of the target area should be made, in addition to the usual
local reconnaissance. Eliminating dead spots and protecting
against the most likely routes of enemy tank approach are most
important considerations. The positions should be echeloned so
as to be mutually supporting with fire from the flanks. Antitank
rifles in artillery batteries are generally grouped on the most ex
posed flank of the gun positions. In all cases, the squad leader
should select his own position so as to have maximum observa
tion and, at the same time, personally control the actions of the
antitank rifles.
"In fortifying these positions, it has proved impracticable to
construct emplacements with roofs because of increased visibility
to the enemy air force and lack of 360 traverse. The best types
of emplacements are open and circular in shape, with a diameter
large enough to permit free movement of the crew for all-around
traverse and to protect the gun and crew from being crushed by
enemy tanks. Narrow communication trenches connect the gun
positions with each other as well as with the rear. Both emplace
ments and trenches are constructed without parapets; the extra
dirt is utilized in building false installations to draw enemy fire.
It is practically impossible for tanks to spot such fortifications,
and the rifles are able to fire on them for the longest possible
time. Also, protection against aerial bombardment is increased.
"In the preparation of antitank fire, the rifleman should select
five or six key reference points at different ranges, measure the
distance to them, and study the intervening terrain. When
actually firing, he should fire at stationary tanks whenever possible
and not take leads at ranges over 400 yards. Aim should always
be taken at the vulnerable parts, taking advantage of any hesita
tion or exposure of the sides of the enemy tanks.
"Antitank defense must be drawn up so as to protect the anti
77
tank rifle units fully, by means of all available obstacles, mines,

and fire power."
e. Recent Trends
Recent trends in Russian antitank tactics are discussed

in an article appearing in the "Red Star." An extract
from this article follows:
Correctly disposed and camouflaged, antitank weapons can and
do stop the German tanks. One case of a recent battle is recorded
in which three antitank guns of the regimental artillery held off
56 German tanks in an all-day battle and destroyed 5. Another
case records 35 to 40 German tanks attempting to cross a river,
over a single bridge. One well-placed antitank gun destroyed 5
German tanks and forced the remainder to seek other means of
crossing.
Communication with the chief of the artillery unit, with the
infantry commander, and with adjacent units is usually by radio.
All artillery and antitank defenses are subordinated to the
sector commander.
No set rule can be laid down as to the density of antitank
weapons on any sector. The system depends upon the' terrain
and the local situation. In general, there should be greater
density toward the rear. An attack by a large number of tanks
is met at the front lines by artillery and rifle fire. Then antitank
rifles and destroyer tanks come into play. If the enemy tanks
still break through, they run into tank obstacles defended by
flanking and rear antitank fire. Soviet infantry at this point
attempts to cut off the German infantry from its tank support.
The enemy tanks then continue to run into tank destroyers and
an increasing number of minefields.
Where Soviet tanks are used in the defense, they must not be
pushed out front, but must be scattered to the rear and dug in to
await a possible breakthrough, where they can do their best work.
Section IV.
NOTES ON BRITISH
ANTITANK TACTICS
1. REGARDING POSITIONS
a. In Depth
Like the Russians, the British are firm believers in dis
tributing their antitank weapons in depth. This not only
goes far toward preventing encirclement, but results in
"smothering1' the tank waves. Whenever possible,
antitank defensesincluding traps, obstacles, and minesshould be so located that enemy vehicles will be channel
ized, or caught in positions where they will be subject
to flanking fire. The flanks of tank echelons, although
often protected by accompanying artillery, are especially
vulnerable, partly because the visibility of the tank gun
ners is severely limited and partly because tank leaders
are instructed to dash forward and gain their objective
even if this involves dangerous exposure of flanks.
78
NOTES ON BRITISH ANTITANK TACTICS
79
b. Changing Sites
Once a gun has opened fire, its position is given away

by the flash, which may be seen both by air and ground
observers. Therefore, the only means of protection is a
change of position. The coordination of such moves is
vastly important, because even one change may upset or
alter the defensive layout as a whole. The British recog
nize that more training is required in the reconnaissance
and layout of positions, especially with reference to the
selection and coordination of alternative positions. Also,
the guns should be so sited that they are defiladed from
enemy ground observation. To accomplish this, it is
frequently necessary to dig pits for the guns, just deep
enough to allow the gun barrels to have traversing room
above the ground. Slit trenches are provided for person
nel and ammunition.
c. In North Africa
In the North African campaign, the British usually

boxed in their battle positions completely with mines,
providing an all-around defense. Such minefields, ac
cording to American observers, are normally marked with
a barbed-wire fence, usually consisting of one to three
strands. British-laid minefields along the enemy front
were well covered by automatic weapons, while the dead
spaces in between were covered by infantry mortars.
The minefields were sited and laid by British engineers.
80
Other information obtained by our North African ob

servers included the following:
"The normal fire unit is the single gun. Where possible, guns
are sited so as to be mutually supporting. A favorite gun posi
tion appeared to be behind a slight ridge, defiladed from the front,
exchanging fire across the front of a neighboring gun, which, in
turn, fired across its front. Some guns, especially 47 mm, are
sighted to the rear so as to catch the tanks in their engine com
partments or thinner armored portions after they have passed.
"The decision to employ guns on portee or on the ground is
reserved to the battery commander.
" . . . A typical position for the 57-mm gun is a shallow em
placement similar in plan to the standard emplacement for our
37-mm gun (M3). A low parapet of loose dirt is built up in front
of the gun, just high enough to permit the muzzle of the piece to
swing through its maximum traverse. Deep slit trenches for the
protection of the crew are habitually provided. Ammunition
chests are likewise dug in. It was observed that in level, open
terrain, such an emplacement provided a high measure of con
cealment, especially if the muzzle were fully depressed so as to
rest on the parapet. By doing this, the characteristic shape of
the gun was concealed . . . "
Section V. BRITISH INDOOR WAR GAME
1. INTRODUCTION
The British Infantry Company Commanders' School
suggests that greater realism can be added to indoor war
games by using two identical sand-table models in each
exercise. This enables two groups to oppose each other,
one on the offensive and the other on the defensive. The
tables should be placed in separate rooms, preferably
adjoining each other and as nearly sound-proof as possible.
Such an arrangement is a particularly good training
medium for platoon commanders and squad leaders; it is
stimulating in that two sides are actually pitted against
each other. The procedure offers a wide training scope,
because the instructor can take up with each group war
problems extending from the plan of the platoon com
mander down to the detailed action of each individual
soldier. To derive the greatest benefit, students should
give their orders and otherwise conduct themselves as in
actual warfare. Wearing of gas masks would give added
realism to the exercise.
81
g2
2. SUGGESTED PROCEDURE IN DETAIL

An instructor and, preferably, two assistants should
coordinate the exercise. They act as umpires, with the
senior instructor moving from one group to the other to
explain each situation as it would appear to the other
side and assess the fire effect and casualties.
Each side is given a written report dealing with the
situation at the start of the exercise and the mission it is
to accomplish.
Realism can be added by having colored pegs to repre
sent the platoon commander, squad commander, and so
on. Also, cotton or wool could be used to represent
smoke and the burst of high explosives.
The instructors should keep students strictly to what is
practical, reminding them when necessary of the factors
of time and space in connection with transmitting in
formation and executing their plans. Distances, ranges
of weapons, visibility, and the existence of streams, banks,
woods, bogs, railroads, and mire as antitank obstacles or
otherwise, need interpretation to students until they have
as vivid an impression of the country depicted by the sand
model as they would have if they were on the ground
itself. Emphasis should be given to the actual position
of students and the exact routes taken when on recon
naissance. For instance, would they be riding, walking,
running, or crawling? Are their weapons loaded? If so,
what is the position of the safety catch? Would they use
their binoculars? Would the sun reflect from their
83
BRITISH INDOOR WAR GAME
celluloid map cases, and thereby give the enemy sniper

an easy shot with his telescopically sighted rifle?
W///m%K^//%w^
Spectators
a
Commanders
of Platoon
and Sections
vj
("I
/Assistant
'Instructor
a
a
Commanders
of Platoon
and Sections
Assistant
Instructor
D
Instructor moves from room to room
1%%%%%%%%%%%^^
Figure 7. Sand Model War Game
84
The instructors should see that the following points,

among others, are brought out:
a. By the Attackers
(1) The plan and orders of platoon and squad com

manders ;
(2) Routes of advance and formation;
(3) Position of antitank rifle, mortar, and Tommy gun;
(4) Action when fired on;
(5) Use of smoke;
(6) Action on reaching objective;
(7) Withdrawal (if applicable);
(8) Messages.
b. By the Defenders
(1) Orders by platoon and squad commanders for

occupation of position;
(2) Orders regarding the digging of weapon pits;
(3) Concealment of squad posts and fields of fire;
(4) Antiaircraft protection;
(5) Antigas protection;
(6) Position of platoon headquarters and platoon
weapons;
(7) Covering of road blocks;
(8) See that squad leaders know the position of platoon
headquarters, that they know who is on the right and left,
and that they prepare range cards;
(9) The position of wire (if applicable).
BRITISH INDOOR WAR GAME
85
c. Regarding Administrative Duties.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Ammunition supply;
Evacuation of casualties;
Feeding;
Provision of spare clothing;
Position of platoon truck;
Latrines;
Duty rosters;
Organization of platoon for work.
The instructor and his assistants should see that the

action is not slowed upthe tempo should tend to in
crease toward the end of the exercise. To help achieve
this result, the instructor can allow the student less time
to take action on the information he brings them dealing
with the movements and actions of the opposing sides.
The height of interest is reached at the conclusion when
both sides are brought together, and the instructor points
out the dispositions of the opposing forces on the respec
tive sand models and relates the moves and counter moves
made by both sides during the exercise.
U. S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING O F F I C E : 1 9 4 2
FOR USE OF MILITARY PERSONNEL ONLY

N O T TO BE REPUBLISHED
VOLUME 1
NUMBER 6
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
February 1943
li
PLEASE DO HT
li '"?
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

WAR DEPARTMENT
Readers are invited to comment on the use that
they are making of the Intelligence Bulletin and to

forward suggestions for future issues. Correspond
ence may be addressed directly to the Publications
Branch, Dissemination Group, Military Intelligence
Service, War Department, Washington, D. C.
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
WAR DEPARTMENT
NO. 6
Washington, February 1943
MIS 461
NOTICE
The Intelligence Bulletin is designed primarily for

the use of junior officers and enlisted men. It is a
vehicle for the dissemination to them of the latest in
formation received from Military Intelligence sources.
In order to secure the widest possible use of this bulle
tin, its contents are not classified. It is for the exclu
sive use of military personnel, however, and no part
of it-may be published without the consent of the Mili
tary Intelligence Service, except in the case of Task
Forces and Overseas Theaters of Operation. Com
manders of these organizations are authorized to re
produce any item in the Intelligence Bulletin, provided
they maintain the classification of the information and
give its source.
It is recommended that the contents of this bulletin
be utilized whenever practicable as the basis for infor
mal talks and discussions with troops.
"Fools say that you can only gain experience at your own
expense, but I have always contrived to gain my experience
at the expense of others."
Bismarck.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART O N E : JAPAN
Page
SECTION
I. DOCUMENTS DEALING WITH JAPANESE WARFARE
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
II.
III.
Introduction
Approach Tactics
Deployment Tactics
Combat Tactics
.
Observations of Jap Officers
a. Marching Through Jungle
b. Night Attacks
Notes by a Marine Commander
a. Handling Personnel
b. Pointers on Close Combat
C Use of Machine Guns
d. Miscellaneous
Notes on Defense
a. Selecting a Position
b. Disposition
c. Construction
d. Various Other Preparations
Instructions to Landing Parties
a. When Opposed
b. Procedure After Landing
Security Measures
i
Regarding U. S. Soldiers
11
12
13
13
13
14
14
14
15
15
15
16
17
EXTRACTS FROM DIARIES
18
1. Introduction
2. The Extracts
18
18
COMMENT BY PRISONERS
1. Introduction
2. The Comments
a. Regarding
b. Regarding
c. Regarding
d. Regarding
e. Regarding
27
27
27
27
28
28
29
29
Organization
Equipment
Supplies
Medical Care
Suicide
v
vi
TABLE OP CONTENTS
P A E T T W O : GERMANY
Page
SECTION
I. 50-MM ANTITANK
GUN
1. General
2. Table of Characteristics
3. Description of Component Parts
a. Tube
b. Recoil System
c. Breech Mechanism
d. Safety Arrangements
e. Firing Mechanism
f. Sights
g. Elevating Mechanism
h. Carriage
4. Ammunition
5. Crew
II.
31
__
U S E OF 20-MM G U N AGAINST GROUND TARGETS
1. Introduction
2. Extracts from the Document
a. General
b. Action During Assembly
c. Action During Attack
d. Fire
,
_.
e. Movement
f. Defense
g. On the March
h. Tanks
3. Extract from a German Newspaper's Comment
on the 20-mm Gun

III.
ATTACKS ON CONCRETE FORTIFICATIONS
1. Preparation
2. Assault
IV.
ARMORED FORCE TACTICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Introduction
The Box
Method of Advance
Method of Fighting if Attacked on the Move.
Attack Led by Tanks against a Single Defense
Area
a. Phase 1
b. Phase 2
31
32
33
33
33
33
34
34
35
36
36
36
37
38
38
38
38
38
39
39
40
40
40
40
41
42
4&
42
44
44
44
45
48
4
49
49
TABLE OF CONTENTS
VII
SECTION IV. ARMORED FORCE TACTICS IN THE MIDDLE EASTContinued.
5. Attack Led by Tanks against a Single Defense

AreaContinued.
c. PhaseS
d. Phase 4
e. Phase 5
f. Conclusions
V. WINTER FLYING PROBLEMS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Runways
Skis
Storage Problems
Starting Cold'Motors
Antifreezing Methods
Page
50
50
51
51
52
52
53
57
59
61
VI. MISCELLANEOUS
63
1. Field Patching of Armored Troop Carriers (Half

tracked)
2. Map Signs for Obstacles
63
65
PART THREE: UNITED NATIONS

SECTION
I. How To USE YOUR EYES AT NIGHT
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
66
Introduction
Adjusting for Darkness
Getting Your Eyes Ready
Using Your Eyes Properly
Contrast Helps Night Vision
Vitamins
Remember These Things
II. BRITISH TRAINING NOTES_
66
67
69
71
72
73
74
1. Introduction
.
2. Four Essentials to Victory
a. The Right Beginning
b. Efficiency of Subordinate Units
c. Fighting Spirit
d. Battle Drill
3. Organization of Training
4. Individual Training
a. Enlisted Men
b. Officers
c. Noncommissioned Officers and Specialist
Cadres
d. Sniping
--
e. Maintenance
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VIII
SECTION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
II.
B R I T I S H TRAINING N O T E S C o n t i n u e d .
page
5. Collective Training;
a. Instructions by the Commander
b. Rules to Observe during Training
c. Operations to Be Taught
d. Unit Drills
e. Night Training
f. Crossing Minefields
6. General Practices
a. Infantry vs. Tanks
b. Artillery
c. Antitank Gurts
d. Concealment
e. Organized Rest
f. Map Reading and Navigation
g. Assault Courses
h. Observation
i. Marching
j . Speed of Vehicles
k. Cooperation
III.
USE OF TROUSERS AS LIFE PRESERVER
1. Introduction
2. The T e c h n i q u e ^
IV.
_s
How
N E W ZEALAND
TROOPS
89
89*
89
.
PENETRATE
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82
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83
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84
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86
86
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87
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88.
W I R E OB
STACLES
92
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
Triple Concertina Fence

Double Apron Fence
:
Two Double Apron Fences, Close Together.
Combined Wire Obstacles
Comment
92
93
94
94
95
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
FIGURE 1. German 50-mm Antitank Gun
FIGURES 2-3. Details of the German 50-mm Antitank Gun
FIGURES 45. German Armored Force Tactics
_
FIGURE 6. German Aircraft on Skis
FIGURE 7. German Aircraft Engine-Heating Device
FIGURE 8. German Field Repair Patch for Armor
FIGURE 9. German Map Signs for Obstacles
FIGURE 10. Trousers Used as a Life Preserver
33
34,35
46,47
^4
^
.---
64
90
PART O N E :
Japan
Section I. DOCUMENTS DEALING WITH

JAPANESE WARFARE
1. INTRODUCTION
All the information given in this section was taken
from translations of Japanese documents of various
types; most of them were written within the past few
months. They deal almost exclusively with warfare in
jungle areas. In some instances, the information has
been rearranged or paraphrased in order to make it
more logical and readible.
2. APPROACH TACTICS
After having passed through the enemy lines, and while making
a reverse turn in the jungle (attack from the rear), absolute
secrecy is still essential to success in attacking the enemy. Each
unit will bear this in mind, and will see that each individual
soldier clearly understands our plan of attack.
Special precaution must be taken in regard to the following
points:
a. Cooking operations must be carefully concealed, both day
and night. Cooking must cease at least 1 hour before daybreak,
50613643Vol. 1, No. 6
INTELLIGENCE; BULLETIN
and the fire must be extinguished completely. In going to a

river for water or bathing, it is necessary to select the naturally
concealed places, or to camouflage a place from enemy ai
observation.
b. During the approach in thick forest, liaison is made chiefly
by telephone and messenger. Prohibit the use of radio. These
methods are to be changed only after the attack is started.
c. If the approach is along a road, the road should be wide;
if not, remove the weeds near it. However, do not let the
changes become visible from the air. Units making a round
trip should strictly enforce rules for passing on the left flank,
and should prevent delay in the advance.
d. Do not make the forest thin by such action as would damage
the large trees near roads and bivouac areas.
e. Progress through clearings and open places in the jungle,
must be made swiftly and in an orderly manner. Again, when
enemy planes are overhead, the unit is required to stop tempo
rarily, even in a forest, if there is any possibility of being'
observed.
f. It is necessary to take precautions against talking out
loud or shouting, even in the forest, because of native spies,
enemy sound detectors, and enemy scouts. This is especially th|
case when close to the enemy position. Again, if the natives are
being sighte.d, it is necessary to kill them immediately.
g. During the movement of each unit, it is necessary to organize
an observation party to carry out strict supervision and obser
vation of this movement and to take various other precautions.
h. The approach-march speed of units in the forest'must be
the same as that of heavy fire weapons. Include in original plans
the sending ahead of time of a supply of ammunition and a
12-day supply of provisions.
i. It is necessary for each unit to secure close control in
thick forest, using rest periods to reassemble the main force.
JAPANWARFARE REVEALED BY ENEMY DOCUMENTS
Particulary because of soldiers being delayed and falling out of

rank, it is necessary for leaders to keep strict supervision.
3. DEPLOYMENT TACTICS
a. The commanders (accompanying an advancing construction
unit), together with engineer personnel, will go to the jump-off
position being prepared for the division, and will select and
mark the sectors to be occupied by the various units. Especially
try to scatter each unit involved in the initial fighting, selecting
good camouflaged positions. You must take all precautions
against enemy discovery. In case you are discovered and receive
shells from the enemy, you must be prepared to take any meas
ures necessary.
b. Then each front-line commander will reconnoiter his ter
rain in preparation for advancing, will indicate the nature of
routes to be taken, and will select the next stopping place
(deployment line).
c. Movement of the main division force to the jump-off posi
tion must be made one night before the day. of attack. It is
very important to carry out these instructions without confusion,
shortening the day of readiness in front of the enemy as much
as possible.
d. Each infantry regiment in the division jumproff position
(generally about 3% miles inside the forest) will make a deploy
ment. Then each battalion in the first line will select a bat
talion deployment position, temporarily on a line generally
about iy2 miles inside the forest. Deploy after advancing to
this line on the route which is already constructed, and again
prepare for attack.
e. Each company on the first line will naturally have the
approach route open up to the time the battalion advances into
the jump-off position, and will approach to approximately V/2
miles from the edge of the forest (same as the battalion deploy
ment line) and make a deployment. Then the preparation of

the attack will be made. Afterwards, a leader is required to
make a reconnaissance before the attack. Hereafter, at dusk,
you will advance to the line at the edge of the forest; if neces
sary, crawl through the jungle zone, and immediately rush on
to the enemy position after giving the signal.
As it is best for each flank unit to make a rush at the same
time, the time should be regulated. Therefore, consider the
distance of the forest line and plan for a simultaneous rush.
f. When approaching the enemy, the possibility of encounter
ing enemy patrol and security units must be taken into con
sideration. It is necessary to annihilate them, as far as possible,
and not make any errors. It is necessary to make plans for
immediate annihilation of lookout facilities and microphones of
enemy artillery organizations when they are discovered.
g. During an approach to an attack, each commanding officer
must take the responsibility for maintaining the direction of
advance and make the line of development parallel to the enemy
line. Even though there are times when enemy fire is received,
it is necessary to control the subordinates and not let the unit
become confused.
4. COMBAT TACTICS
a. Control of units is the key to successful^attack in a dense
forest (jungle). When each flank unit makes a rush at the same
time, as one group, no matter what the position may be, it can
be taken.
b. Flanks of enemy positions can easily be discovered by lights
tracer bullets. Therefore, every effort should be made to msh
from the flanks. It is also very important to assault by imme
diately chasing the retreating enemy without stopping. Wheai
the enemy has observed our assault, he will retreat and concen
trate his fire on the point just evacuated. At this time give a
part of the unit the previous duty (the assault), and make a
suicide attack into the enemy positions, especially at the antitank
gun position. Attack the remaining enemy with mopping-up
action. I t is very important to make a complete annihilation
by dawn.
c. The enemy is very fearful of our assault, and each unit has
a tendency to gather into groups. Against such an enemy, hand
grenades are very effective.
d. The units rushing the area around an airdrome must try to
avoid setting equipment on fire or spilling gasoline. Shoot at the
rubber tires and not at the engine of a plane.
e. When advancing to an attack through a dense forest, take
precautions on open ground as there may be cases when there is
a zone of concentrated enemy fire.
f. When a large number of enemy prisoners are taken during
the progress of combat and are looked after by small groups of
guards, it is best to take away their weapons and remove their
shoes.
g. Take measures to prevent attacks on the left, right, front, and
rear of the friendly force. Moreover, carry out the signs of the
commanding officer and select each ranking officer to carry out
controlled leadership, taking precautions to maintain the thrust
to the end.
5. OBSERVATIONS OF JAP OFFICERS

This paragraph consists of tactical opinions given by
all officers of a Japanese battalionafter they had expe
rienced considerable combat against United Nations
forces in Southwest Pacific islands. A preface to the
document stated, "Each unit creates necessary devices,
based on these opinions, after considering the enemy
combat methods.''
INTELLIGENCE. BULLETIN
a. Marching Through Jungle

(1) Leave some distance between the engineer unit and the
units that follow. Moreover, have liaison men advance at least
200 to 525 yards ahead.
(2) The leader at the head must always allow for deviation of
compasses.
(3) It is advisable to assemble each unit when resting, as it is
customary to march over the road in single column.
(4) Because jungle units carry lights, the commanding officer
must advance his unit by leaps and bounds from one defiladed
area to another.
(5) The engineer unit must regularly report to the command
ing officer in the rear regarding the status of preparations and
terrain features at the front.
(6) Camouflage of each individual and each gun must be
thorough. Moreover, when crossing a grassy plain, camouflage]
by using the grass.
(7) If enemy planes are overhead while you are in a grassy
area, lie prone in the tall grass and hide the body by placing grass
over it with both hands.
(8) Generally, infantry assistance is necessary for heavy
weapons units. The minimum is one platoon for a machine gun
and one platoon for an infantry battalion gun.
(9) The rate of march for a unit during a day should be about
4 to 6 miles.
(10) It is advantageous to select a route where water supply
is possible.
(11) Although it is best to relieve the engineer unit each day,
the leading officer in the front should continue his duty.
(12) When bivouacking in the jungle, it is best to begin sleep
at 3 o'clock. Cooking must be performed at the last resting place
before reaching the bivouac area, which should be, completed be
fore the units arrive. This is safe and also tends to hide the biv
ouac area, making it difficult of discovery by enemy planes (at

least two men from each squad should be sent forward to prepare
the area).
(13) Be at ease while cooking. Use "marsh reed" and bamboo
to make fires. It is necessary to cook in several places, not just
one. Moreover, it is important to be ready to put out fires imme
diately in case enemy planes should appear.
(14) During this military operation, there was never a time
when we were discovered by enemy planes while in the jungle.
It is significant that enemy prisoners never move, even at night,
when planes fly over.
(15) When in flat country, the commander should be in the
center of his unit. When on a hill, he should be at the highest
point.
b. Night Attacks
(1) Never be overconfident with aerial photographs, especially
those taken before enemy occupation, because he will make
changes. Pictures of areas directly to our front are extremely
necessary for the execution of the attack, and they should be dis
tributed at least down to the first-line assault company. This is
especially necessary when maps are not available.
(2) It is important to have sufficient time to move into a jumpoff position for an attack. Going long distances to an assault
without eating on the way will only tire personnel.
(3) It is advantageous to use as leaders the fatigue personnel
of the navy and the present area guides.
(4) It is very important to consider the effective zone of enemy
artillery and mortar fire. If units are rushed into the jump-off
position when the enemy artillery is not neutralized, useless dam
age may result. Only the cadre should advance, and it is ideal to
set the time for departure of attack about 10 minutes beforehand.
(5) If artillery fire is not received, it is best to assault without
hesitation because heavy losses may result if time is spent in idle

complaints.
(6) Most of the fire from enemy positions consists of light
tracer bullets. Therefore, the enemy line becomes clear and dis
tinct. It is impossible to attack the front or to assault with a/large
force. It is important to send one or two squads around to make
an assault on the flank. To make a simultaneous attack, wait for an
opportune time and then yell. The noise is very successful in
demoralizing the foe.
(7) If a rush is made into the enemy firing line, concentrated
enemy artillery fire will always be received; therefore, it is best
to rush only when close to the enemy. After penetrating the
firing line, engage the scattered enemy soldiers again. Therefore,
it is necessary to leave one unit (one squad) behind to carry out
the mopping-up work.
(8) It is very important for the cadre and men to immediately
cut communication and liaison lines within a position.
(9) There is an inclination for the subordinates to scatter by
themselves when concentrated enemy fire is received, and it is
necessary to mark the position of the company commander and
control the men (subordinates) for a wholehearted assault. More1|
over, give the men a positive reason for, and an outline of, the
company's conduct of battle. It is also necessary to place in each
group someone able to use a compass.
(10) The majority of losses are caused by artillery and by pur
suing gun fire. Therefore, when they cannot be neutralized, it is
necessary for a plan of suicide occupation. In artillery positions
there are many automatic weapons with formidable protection, and
other strong establishments.
(11) There are many dead spaces within the enemy position.
Give the first-line unit adequate front to investigate the dead
space and use this to expand the success of battle from the rear
and to the flanks. It is also advantageous to assault. In general
we do not investigate dead spaces skillfully.
JAPAN
WARFARE REVEALED BY ENEMY DOCUMENTS
(12) Complete silence is necessary, since concentrated fire can

be received even within a position.
(13) Do not use radios, because fire will be concentrated in
their vicinity.
(14) The liaison between regimental and battalion headquarters
must be carried out by wire, orderly, and other means.
(15) The control of soldiers' voices and markings for com
manding officers is inadequate. Therefore, it is necessary for
thought to be given to these matters the day before the attack
begins.
(16) To carry on the battle after daybreak, the heavy guns
must advance during the nightadvancing over long distances
after daybreak is impossible. A section of the heavy gun cadre
must advance behind the first line, reconnoitering the route of
advance, and have the unit in the immedate rear pay strict at
tention.
(17) The enemy usually fires on our jump-off position all night
long. It is necessary to advance to the front of the rear unit
during a lull in the firing.
6. NOTES BY A MARINE COMMANDER
The information in this paragraph was taken from a

Japanese bulletin, prepared by a Marine (Naval Land
ing Party) commander and designed especially for unit
commanders of Marine forces. The bulletin appar
ently was written before the Japanese met severe op
position in the Southwest Pacific Islands.
a. Handling Personnel
Would you throw away the lives of your men, who have been
placed in your keeping by the Emperor, by recklessly sending
them on a frontal charge in the face of the enemy fire and ignor
50613643- Vol. ], No. 6
10
ing your own shortcomings in leadership and strategy ? As a

commander, bear this well in mind.
In a word, your object must be to attain the greatest results
with the smallest sacrifice. If you order your men to advance,
they will obey you in any circumstances and at all times. But
remember that before doing this, you are to take the minutest
precautions. Do not forget to explain to your men, as carefully
as if they were little children, how and in what direction to ad
vance, the places to watch, and what to do when shelled or at
tacked by hand grenades.
For example, how many men would have come through un
scathed if they had been ordered to "lie down until your head is on
the ground." This may sound like a graceless criticism of men
who have given their lives, but I believe many men have become
casualties through their own carelessness and want of caution.
It is true that we have dedicated our lives to the nation and will
not begrudge them at any time, but we want to accomplish some
thing by our deathnot die uselessly. We want to die gloriously.
We hope for a death worthy of a Samurai . . . and we owe it
to the men under our command to enable them to do likewise,;
If you do this, as the commanders of a unit, your mind will have
a measure of peace.
In maneuvers, we have always had it emphasized that we must
get a grasp of actual conditions. During the battle of east
Hwatelo (in China) a certain unit commander boasted that he
had decided to make a charge, and thereby greatly. embarrassed
his company commander. I believe this was a case of blind de
cision. We had been ordered by the battalion commander to
strengthen our position and defend it to the deaththis meant,
if your arms are broken, kick the enemy; if your legs are injured,
bite him; if your teeth break, glare him to death. This spirit is
expressed in the words "defense to the death." The time to launcfe
a charge is when the enemy has reached the limit of exhaustion, as
laid down in the manual. In defense, we believe that if you can
11
hang on to a position with one light machine gun, one platoon

can successfully crush the enemy.
The unit commander must not give up hope or make pessimistic
statements. In a battle, always remember the "4 to 6 ratio"if
4 of our men are knocked out, consider that we have got 6 of the
enemy. Whatever may be our own losses, strive to keep up morale.
The more violent the fighting, the calmer and firmer must be the
commander's bearing, orders, and words of command. It is also
important, in the interest of morale, not to let the personnel of the
unit know the number of killed and wounded, or their names.
Heavy enemy shelling also affects morale, and sometimes troops
will not fight as they should. The effect is still more marked when
there are casualties.
Some young soldiers think it heroic to expose themselves to the
enemy. Take care of this, particularly in a battle of positions.
When fighting is protracted, there is a tendency to get accus
tomed to the enemy, and relax vigilance against enemy fire and
hidden enemies. We have been sniped time and again. Pay par
ticular attention to this.
b. Pointers on Close Combat
Too long a halt in the same area will result in drawing con
centrated fire from the enemy, and is inadvisable. The propor
tion of hits from bullets is smaller while you are moving than
when you are stationary. In a charge, if you meet concentrated
fire from the enemy at close quarters and lie down and stay
glued to the same spot, you cannot advance. Also, the longer
you halt, the more your will to advance is blunted, and the
greater your casualties. Therefore, charges must be made with
determination and daring. A daring and determined attack is
the key to victory.
In a charge, the platoon commander must be at the head, as
indicated in the manual. The charge is the moment when hard
ship and fatigue reach their climax, from the commander of the
12
unit down to the last man. At this time, if everyone is deter

mined to carry out the unit commander's orders without hesita
tion, and if the platoon commander advances at the head of his
men, the spirit of daring and solidarity aroused in the company
will enable them to penetrate the enemy position.
"After victory, tighten your helmet strings" (an old Japanese
proverb). After fierce fighting, or during a pause in the battle,
the mind is apt to relax. - This is the most dangerous moment.
Even men who are daring and determined during a charge have
a tendency to be cowardly as soon as the fighting changes to
mopping-up operations, and only scattered fire and small numbers
of enemy troops are encountered.
c. Use of Machine Guns

In a naval landing party (Marines), there is virtually no
necessity7 for a machine-gun company. It is preferable to
include in each company a machine-gun platoon under the com
mand of the rifle company commander. From the nature of a
naval landing party, there is practically no occasion on which
a machine-gun company joins in the action as an independent
unit with its six machine guns. As a rule, each platoon is
detached, and is organized under the rifle unit company com
mander. This is particularly true in the case of street fighting
and fighting at close quarters. Even if a machine-gun company
were independent, it would be difficult for it to put up a vigorous
fight without the support of the rifle units. Nowadays machinegun squad training is the main consideration in machine-gun
training, and the need for machine-gun company exercises is not
particularly felt.
All machine-gun personnel, with the exception of the gunner,
must be armed with rifles. This is especially necessary in street
fighting, fighting at close quarters, and so on. Even when
attacking and advancing, the carrying of rifles never impedes
the advance. In case of an enemy attack, it is easy to make a
13
sortie with the machine-gun ammunition personnel. The ideal

rifle for machine-gun personnel is the 1911 model carbine, which
is nearly 12 inches shorter than the 38-year type, model 1905.
d. Miscellaneous
The gun loopholes of a position must always be screened with
pieces of cloth or matting. If the enemy can see through them,
his snipers may fire at them, or he may concentrate his fire on
them. This is particularly necessary in the case of openings for
heavy machine guns, which must be large on account of the angle
of fire.
Even when an action is going on, arms must always receive
proper care; otherwise numbers of such arms as rifles, care of
which is apt to be neglected, will be found red with rust. I t
must be impressed upon the men that exchanging fire with the
enemy, is not the only battletaking proper care of arms is a
great battle in itself.
7. NOTES ON DEFENSE
This "Outline on Defense" was dated Sept. 1, 1942,
and was distributed on at least one Southwest Pacific
Island.
Special attention should be given at this period to the follow
ing matters concerning defense:
a. Selecting a Position
When selecting a defensive position, bear in mind that the
enemy in attacking may not establish an extensive field of fire,
but may concentrate fire power in a surprise attack from ex
tremely close range. Special consideration should be given to
concealment from the air.
14
b. Disposition
The enemy will approach through the jungle and may attack
from all sides, especially from the rear. As a counter measure,
deploy all units, from squads to regiments, in circular formation,
changing the original frontal positions as the enemy advances.
Utilize oblique and flanking fire to the fullest effect.
c. Construction
(1) To the extent that time permits, construct strong defensive
works, including shelter if possible. (Australian methods are
most incorrect.)
(2) Provide positions for grenade dischargers, light machine
guns, machine guns, and other appropriate heavy firearms. De
pending on the enemy situation, either fire in the anticipated di
rection or hold your fire to avoid disclosing your positions and
inviting destruction.
(3) Various types of obstacles should be constructed within
the jungle where they will be least expected by the enemy, there
by affording opportunity to strike the enemy at selected places.
(4) Establish ammunition dumps in locations affording max
imum protection from detonation by enemy bombs. When stor
ing large amounts of ammunition, construct dumps in several
places.
(5) Endeavor to deceive the enemy by constructing dummy
loopholes, dummy soldiers (with steel helmet, knapsacks, and
so on), and dummy trenches.
(6) Each squad should look after its own water containers*:
making full use of empty cans abandoned by the enemy.
d. Various Other Preparations

(1) Use every means to secure as much ammunition as possible.
The company in particular should utilize captured weapons to the
15
best advantage (especially automatic rifles, captured ammunition,

and hand grenades).
(2) Consider the fire sectors covered by rifles, light machine
guns, hand grenades, and so on. Do not omit the preparation of
hand grenades.
(3) Allow the enemy to approach very close, then fire calmly at
individual targets.
(4) Use ammunition sparingly if it should become scarce.
.(5) Do no make a sortie or counterattack heedlessly, simply be
cause the enemy has approached. Such actions may have immedi
ate advantage but casualties will soon result, and it will be difficult
to maintain the position. Remain calm as the enemy approaches,
and fire to annihilate.
(6) Pay close attention to sanitation, considering the length of
time your position will be occupied.
(7) Make certain that adequate provision is made for drainage
of quarters, water supply installations, lines of communication, and
so on.
(8) In the absence of the enemy, assign one section as lookouts.
8. INSTRUCTIONS TO LANDING PARTIES

a. When Opposed
When opposition is expected, it is best to begin operations before
dawn so that occupation is possible at dawn.
Make your landings with the boats in column formation. Or,
if the situation demands, use the line formation.
If the landing point is steep, dash under the position so that you
will be under the angle of fire.
b. Procedure After Landing

(1) All white troops and police will be captured. In case they
resist, they will be killed by shooting and bayoneting.
16
INTELLIGENCE -BULLETIN
(2) All white persons and Chinese (including women and chil
dren) will be thoroughly searched and all arms confiscated. They
will be assembled and confined in a suitable place.
(3) As it is difficult to distinguish Germans and Italians from
other whites, they will all be confined together.
(4) Native policemen will be disarmed and confined; however,
since they are to be used later for police work, they should be
treated with consideration.
(5) In case there are any Japanese, they should be released at
once.
(6) Beware of small land mines, especially in the vicinity of
the pier.
(7) Do not stupidly drink water or eat anything, as it may be
poisoned.
(8) Installations, machinery, goods, and so on will be used later,
so do not willfully destroy them.
(9) All radio equipment will be confiscated.
(10) When searching persons, all notes and other written docu
ments must be confiscated, and their contents inspected. The
necessary steps will be taken so that at a later time the holder of
each document may be identified.
(11) Be especially careful not to destroy furniture, water tanks,
ice boxes, safes, and so on.
(12) Cans of food and other useful things should not be punc
tured with the bayonet in order to inspect them.
(13) It is forbidden to waste food and other material will
fully.
9. SECURITY MEASURES
Concerning the secrecy of the battle plan, the following items
must be understood thoroughly:
a. During the daytime, there should never be any cooking;
b. Absolutely do not expose any bright lights, even though you
are handicapped by darkness:
17
c. Do not throw any fording materials in the river;

d. Do not talk loudly;
e. Since the natives in this area are not trustworthy, soldiers
must not discuss troop movements;
f. Do not use native roads;
g. Do not say "Oi Oi" (English equivalent of "hello"), as this
shows that one is not well mannered.
10. REGARDING U. S. SOLDIERS

a. They do not like the jungle at night;
b. They fear our night attacks, especially our battle cry;
c. They use grenades within their positions;
d. Their artillery uses one "leading" shell out of every five shells;
e. They do not make sorties while in a defensive position, and
they respect our fire power.
50613643Vol. 1, No. 6
Section II. EXTRACTS FROM DIARIES
1. INTRODUCTION
These extracts are presented primarily to show how
the Japanese react to our attacks, and to give their
version of the results we have obtained. The names of
the Japanese who have written these diaries have been
omitted. The extracts are presented in the order of
their dates; each subsection represents a different diary.
2. THE EXTRACTS
"April 18. . . . Enemy planes dropped bombs and strafed us
with machine-gun fire. Our antiaircraft guns and machine guns
fired fiercely but were unable to score. Three planes pursued them
and disappeared^ in the volcanic smoke. After that, looking
toward the west pier, a cloud of dark black smoke was rising.
The blaze looked dreadful. Looking carefully at the blaze, the
mast of a ship could be seen directly in front. So I knew, for
the first time, that the ship (navy transport ship Komaki Mam,
8,500 tons) had been hit by a bomb. In a little while, a truck
with many casualties came to my post and inquired the way to
the hospital.
"After returning to the tent, I listened to stories from each
sentry who had returned. The ship had arrived yesterday, loaded
with many bombs and much ammunition, and was to have been
18
JAPAN
19
unloaded this morning. At about 1100 hours, the entire ship was
wrapped in flames. The ammunition exploded violently, and it
was dangerous even to approach the vicinity. All the ships that
were near changed their anchorage. Since it would not do to
leave it a target for enemy aircraft, the patrol ships and cruisers
which were staying in the harbor fired upon the burning ship to
sink it, but their projectiles could not hit below the water line
because they were so close. The noise caused by the explosion
of the projectiles and the rise of flames sky-high in the darkness
made a gruesome scene. Even after all of us had prepared for
bed, there was noise and vibration that seemed to crumble heaven
and earth. Perhaps this was the explosion of the ship's magazine.
. . . For the first time, the mighty force of the bomb was known.
"At this place, there are, it is believed, approximately 9,000
prisoners. They must all be very happy after seeing today's
bombings. Among them there were some who clapped their
hands. All the members of my unit who heard this agreed that
it was better to kill them off one after another. . . . However, if
we changed places and were in their position, we might also be
as happy as they. I guess it is natural to be happy. And yet,
knowing that the prisoners were happy, I presume it is natural
to say 'Finish them off'."
(Marginal note.) "The stern of the ship exploded and sank.
Just the tip part of the ship remained above the water. A
little after 1900 hours, there was a great reverberation. Probably
the big bombs which were loaded on the stern exploded all at
once. Immediately platoons No. 2, No. 3, and No. 4 assembled
their emergency unit members. We fell in immediately and
climbed into the cars in groups. I t appeared that fire from the
ship had spread to the warehouse, which was on the right bank.
Upon going there, we saw that burning fragments from the ex
plosion had dropped on the warehouse. All at once, the situation
was critical, because there were considerable provisions and am
munition within, and all around the vicinity there were moun
20
tains of all kinds of gasoline and oil. The ammunition exploded

repeatedly, fuel fires flared up, and the area was a sea of flames.
"The crude oil that surged up from the hold spread on the sea
surface and burned furiously. Furthermore, the wind fanned the
flames. The disastrous scene was gruesome and undescribable.
Many times, I have seen pictures in the news of bombed and ex
ploding oil tanks, but actually to see it is a horror utterly beyond
imagination.
"April 19.Just as I was thinking of gaining some muchneeded sleep last night, I was asked to go on fatigue duty for
No. 4 Company, so I hopped on a vehicle and hurried to the com
pany area. At the place, one of the barracks was blown in half.
The soldiers carried their government issue articles, personal be
longings, and various kinds of weapons and arms to the material
storeroom. When I went to the destroyed place, the trees and
leaves were in fragments. Below was a big pool of blood . . .
"The company commander and platoon commander gave orders,
one after another. However, it seems as though everyone's face
had forgotten how to smile. For a while, each one seemed to
have forgotten the work, and, without a word, just stared. After
being scolded by the platoon commander, they started to work
silently. It was the work of cleaning up the debris. Even the
injured worked.
"The badly wounded were said to have died . . . Two died
instantly. One barely lived on the way to the hospital and died.
Without a doubt, life is beyond determination. Thus, it is prob
ably quite regrettable to die now without killing even one enemy.
They probably did not die happily. This also is fate . . ."
"June 11.In the afternoon, while wearing full equipment, we
practiced sliding down rope ladders in preparation for landing
operations. Reduced the time for completing the operation from
2 minutes on the first attempt to 1 minute on the second try."
JAPAN
EXTRACTS FROM "DIARIES
21
"Aug. 13.Natives brought us nine Australian prisonersfive

men, three women, and one child.
"Aug. 14.About 0800 hours, we decapitated or shot the nine
prisoners."
"Aug. 24.Our plan to capture Guadalcanal Island came un
avoidably to a standstill, due to the appearance of the enemy
striking force. In order to give quick assistance to our men and
officers, and to stimulate the morale of the Imperial Forces and the
national prestige, also because of the fact that it is a very important
place for our Imperial Forces, it was decided that the attempt to
capture will be carried out tomorrow, the 25th. Disregarding the
enemy air attacks, we advanced straight ahead, crossing the equa
tor to the South Pacific Ocean. Today we had three enemy air
attacks but suffered no damage. Moreover, the uneasiness of
voyages and escort was greatly reduced with the reinforcement of
our light cruisers. It added to our display of power.
"Aug. 25.Six enemy planes attacked our convoy at 0605 hours,
while officers and men were smoking and resting on the top deck
after a hasty breakfast. The first bomb scored a direct hit on
the flagship Jintsu. Her bridge was in flames. We were ordered
to the upper crew's quarters, but our ship also suffered a direct
hit on the bridge. I escaped to a corner of the crew's mess hall.
Though I lost control of myself because of the fire caused by the
explosion, I only sought for a safe spot. That short and fierce
bombing has caused great confusion on the top deck; I still fear
an aerial attack. The fierce fires increased greatly in the interior
of the ship, and all menibers prepared the metallic raft. Fearing
an explosion in the ammunition stores, they drifted quickly away
toward the South Seas.
"Although our men and officers were rescued by patrol boats
from the convoy and felt relieved for a while, the enemy attacked
us again. They bombed our convoy but we escaped. We who
22
have been through these attacks can scarcely believe that we have
survived such fearful and difficult experiences.
"Our casualties were great. The Kinryu Maru received two di
rect hits and sank. Observing this gave me a feeling of deep
emotion. For the Landing Party, August 25 was one of the
most dangerous days and must be remembered as our resurrection
day."
"Sept. 2.Stuck fast in the jungle. Our unit could do noth
ing. In the afternoon, one enemy light cruiser and one transport
came brazenly into port during broad daylight. Evidently they
brought troop reinforcements. At night there were many hits
from the enemy trench mortars. We at the front realized this
was the end and made up our minds for death.
"Sept. 3.The situation became worse. We retreated with
our telegraph set. On this date, it seems that the front-line units
were completely annihilated before noon.''
Sept. 20.While we were marching, enemy planes dropped
bombs in the rear and then machine-gunned us. After this the
planes attacked us without a let-up.
"Sept. 21.Day of rest to ready for the trip back. Thirtysix men out of 238 have malaria.
"Sept. 22.The enemy has 40,000 troops, mostly Australians.
For that reason their fighting power is great. On account of
the second Coral Sea battle, our Navy is unable to carry out a
landing at Port Moresby. We must wait until about November
before another force is organized. There is no replenishment;
of the food supply, which is enough for only one more day. A
food detail went out today, but 7 to 9 days will pass before their
return. What to do for the men and patients is a serious prob
lem. We have no medicine for malaria, wounds, and colds.
Patients merely wait for death, or for natural healing."
JAPAN
23
Sept. 25.When on the way to attack Guadalcanal, on the

Kinryu Marie, a great fire was started by enemy aircraft.
Twenty were killed and several wounded.
"Sept. 29.As if waiting for the day to come, the enemy
planes circled overhead, looking for people to strafe. It is very
fierce and the soldiers can do nothing about it. The strafing
planes come 6 or 7 times during the day, so our troops suffered
considerably. We are awaiting the end of daylight on the 29th.
This is our very last general attack. At first we were able, to
our surprise, to advance, but as we neared the enemy airdrome,
the counterattack became as violent as death.
"The enemy uses light and heavy machine guns and various
modern weapons.
"The enemy's camouflage is truly efficient. We have found
it hard to discover the enemy, and have suffered unexpected
losses. At over 500 meters (nearly 550 yds.) his camouflage
cannot be distinguished, and great care must be taken. Training
against camouflage should also be carried out.
"Heavy enemy shelling greatly affects morale, and sometimes
troops will not fight as they should. The effect is still more
marked when it results in casualties. Unit commanders must
strive to stimulate morale, and be careful of their own action^
and attitude. (At such times the men always watch the expres
sion of their commander's face.)
"When under enemy fire, there is a tendency to fire light and
heavy machine guns at random, without looking at the target.
The commander must strictly maintain fire discipline.
"Grenade throwers are most effective in striking terror into
the enemy. However, a disadvantage is that their range is only
250 meters (about 275 yds.), and so there are few opportunities
of using them.
"Before going into action, succession of command must always
be clearly indicated. Unless this succession is defined right down
to the last soldier, and training carried out until this becomes
24
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
practically automatic, fighting may become confused if the unit

commander becomes a casualty. When the unit commander is
killed or wounded, the effect on the personnel is extremely great,
and morale tends to decline. On the other hand, even if one man
after another is killed, and the situation is tragic, if the men see
their commander's face full of vigor, their courage increases a
hundred-fold.
"Patrols must not return the enemy's fire. Some patrols have
penetrated an enemy position until they heard voices, and al
though eventually challenged and fired upon, have kept them
selves hidden and carried out their mission. Some of the enemy
understand the Japanese language. Take care not to be deceived
by the call 'Dare Ka V (Who goes there ?)"
"Oct. 6.After reporting to the unit commander, I talked with

the adjutant and obtained much information. I t seems that the
unit will depart tomorrow night to occupy the enemy advance
position. Before and after the departure many caught fever.
Many officers in the regimental headquarters and the battalion
headquarters died of fever. There are 20-odd patients in our
company. In the platoon, 13 persons were overcome by fever
and only 35 persons remained healthy. This is a ^ decrease in
strength. The sickness is more dreadful than enemy bullets.
"Oct. 7.Last night we started the advance and arrived at
Matanikau River. And, we are engaging in the defense on the
left bank area after relieving the 12th Company of the OKA
Unit. Early this morning enemy planes circled above us on
reconnaissance. In the afternoon, there were fierce gun fires
from the enemy artillery, and bombing and machine-gun fires
from the enemy planes. We had many casualties.
"Oct. 8.The bombing from the enemy planes was continued
until dark. I talked with the unit commander and decided to stay
in the present area. In the morning it was the same as yesterday,
JAPAN
25
but there also was fierce enemy bombings during clear-weather

periods in the afternoon. By the battalion order, we decided to
retreat, and we carried out the tragic retreat.
"Oct. 9.The 1st Company also carried out the retreat from a
hill. We assembled our strength in the position of the battalion
headquarters. The shells from enemy trench mortars dropped in
the center of the troop concentrations, and we fell into confusion.
As contradictions occurred successively in the division order, the
detachment order, and the regiment order, we suspended the
night attack upon the agreement of Unit Commander Tamuma
and Unit Commander Unoi, and endeavored to concentrate the
troops. The shells from the enemy trench mortar dropped near
us, and there were many casualties."
"Oct. 12.The enemy planes appeared in the vicinity of the
Hameawa (River), but there was no bombing. The gun fires from
the enemy were rare. Many soldiers fear the enemy gun fire and
the morale of the soldiers is very poor.
"Oct. 20.I am recovering from sickness. I rested all day to
day. After experimentation for 1 month, we invented the smoke
less fuel. (This is probably composed largely of alcohol.)
"The Kuma Unit, of the Ichiki Unit, met with the remnant.
They were all very thin due to lack of food. They were eating only
coconuts and grasses for one whole. month and living in the
jungle.
"Oct. 8.The 2d Company, which was sent out to meet the 3d
Company, encountered the enemy at the Matanikau River line
and nothing has been heard of it since.
"Oct. 10.The enemy which is confronting the 3d Battalion
totals 2,000 to 3,000 and are taking a formation to envelop the
battalion. The 3d Battalion is constantly withdrawing. The 3d
machine-gun unit with their leader (16 men in all) and the
battalion-gun unit all left their weapons behind and withdrew."
50613643Vol. 1, No. 6
26
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
"Nov. 6.It rains very heavily out here. I t has been raining
continuously since last night. The epidemic of sickness seems al
most incredible. I t seems like half of the neighboring field artil
lery unit has the beri-beri and diarrhea. During the morning we
worked on air raid shelters in the rain. Raining, no water, the
kindling does not burn!the hardships of the soldiers are beyond
their power.
"Nov. 14.At the end of the day, after being observed by enemy
patrol planes in the early morning, we were attacked by them.
They dropped 3 bombs in the 1st round, 2 in the 2d, and 2 in the
3d round. Our planes, which were usually escorting us, did not
happen to be there at that time. The conditions were pitiful after
the attack was over. Only 4 ships remained as we continued on our
course and reached our objective. Determination to make the
landing was felt by all on our 4 depot ships. We are determined
firmly to fight and avenge our soldiers who sacrificed their lives
in the Solomon Sea."
SECTION III. COMMENT BY PRISONERS
1. INTRODUCTION
Since this information has been obtained from pris
oners of war, it should be treated with considerable
reserve. However, our observers to date have found
the average Japanese prisoner to be more truthful in
his statements than are prisoners of other enemy
nationalities.
2. COMMENTS
a. Regarding Organization
Each rifle company normally has 190 men, but exist

ing conditions in some Southwest Pacific islands have
forced the number down to 120. The rifle company
platoon usually consists of 52 men, but the prisoner's
platoon had 70, and was therefore classed as "inde
pendent."
The battalion-gun company normally is divided into
3 platoons, each having 4 guns and about 70 men.
The mountain artillery battalion consists of approxi
mately 500 men.
27
28
b. Regarding Equipment
(1) Landing Boats.Each of those used at Buna

carried 30 fully equipped infantrymen, or 20 men
equipped as machine-gunners, or 10 horses.
(2) Flame Throwers.A prisoner "thought" that
each company is supposed to carry three flame throw
ers. Their use is primarily against fortifications and
armored vehicles, the prisoner said.
(3) Marks of Identification.One prisoner stated
that his identity disks had been sewn to his uniform.
These disks are made of black metal sheeting; they
are shiny at first, but rust after brief use.
Another prisoner said that all badges of rank were
removed by personnel in his unit before it left Rabaul
for action on an island to the south. All marines wore
a white cloth badge on the left side of the coats, over
the heart. The inscription on these badges included
name, rank, company, and date of birth.
(4) Eye Shield.These are issued to all troops as a
protection against sun glare, but are seldom used, be
cause they affect the eyes and are considered a nuisance.
c. Regarding Supplies
(1) Ammunition.One prisoner said that each rifle

man carries 60 rounds into the combat area, while others
stated that the number was 120. A supplementary sup
ply is carried by natives. Shells for the infantry bat
talion gun (70-mm) are packed five to a case, which
JAPAN
COMMENT BY PRISONERS
* 29
weighs about 75 pounds. Larger shells, for mountain

artillery, weigh about 20 pounds each.
Normally each soldier carries two hand grenades.
(2) Rations.The information on rations was con
flicting, probably because of the differing local tactical
and supply situations. One prisoner said each man in
his unit carried rations for 2 days upon landing, while
another's unit carried sufficient food to last for 20 days.
d. Regarding Medical Care
One prisoner stated that each Jap soldier was issued

10 antimalarial pills, to be taken one per day for 10
days. At the end of the 10-day period, they took a round
of smaller pills. The prisoner said he did not know the
nature of the pills except that they prevented malaria.
His unit had no malaria until the pills ran out. He
added that the Japs would not use mosquito headnets
because of the heat.
Another prisoner, questioned regarding malaria, said
about half of his unit was attacked by feverhe did not
know,if all were malaria cases. Light cases recovered
in 3 days, the serious ones took as long as 3 months.
e. Regarding Suicide
The following dialogue between a captured Japanese

warrant officer of the Naval Air Service and his inter
rogator is reported from the Southwest Pacific:
Q. After the war is over, what would you like to do ?
30
A. In accordance with our tradition, I would like you to allow

me to destroy myself.
Q. That is contrary to our ideas and we cannot allow that, but
if there is anything else which you would like and which we
have power to grant, we would like to do so.
A. I would like to have my hair cut.
PART TWO: GERMANY
Section I. 50-MM ANTITANK GUN
1. GENERAL
In the summer of 1941 the German Army replaced its
37-mm antitank gun with the 50-mm, model 38. To
date the 50-mm has proved one of the most effec
tive antitank guns that the Germans have at their dis
posal. Armor-piercing projectiles fired in this gun
weigh 4 pounds 9 ounces, and have been known to
pierce the armor of British infantry and cruiser tanks
as well as that of U. S. light and medium tanks. The
gun has proved especially effective in jamming tank
turrets by hits at the junction of the turret and hull.
These hits fuze the metal of the two parts together
and immobilize the turret. .
This gun usually is mounted on a split-trail carriage
with a shield of spaced armor plate. It is generally
towed by a half-track, and has a third wheel which
can be attached to the spade piece on the trail for man
handling the piece into position.
31
32
The Germans manufacture a self-propelled version

of this gun. Also, the gun is commonly mounted in
their Mark I I I tanks. When used in a Mark I I I tank,
it can be fired electrically, instead of by percussion,
and is used without a muzzle brake.
The 50-mm antitank gun fires armor-piercing shells,
high-explosive shells, and armor-piercing 40 shot.
This last has a windshield (light, streamlined nose)
and a tungsten carbide core. It gives a good armorpiercing performance at 500 yards. Incidentally, the
latest type of armor-piercing shell also has a wind
shield.
2. TABLE OF CHARACTERISTICS
Muzzle velocity
"
"
Maximum range__
"
"
Effective range _ _
"
"
Number of grooves
Twist
Rate of
Total weight of gun
Depression
Elevation
Traverse
-(AP)
(AP40)__.
(HE)
(AP)__ __
(AP40)___
(HE)
_ (AP)
(AP40)___
(HE)
fire
2,740 fs
3,940 fs
1,800 fs
1,540 yds
770yds
2,640 yds
1,000 yds
500-yds
2,000 yds
21
1 turn in 32 cals
16 rounds per min
1,626 lbs
18
27
65
GERMANY
50-MM ANTITANK GUN
33
Figure 1.German 50-mm Antitank Gun.
3. DESCRIPTION OF COMPONENT PARTS

a. Tube
The tube is of monobloc construction with a muzzle
brake attachment, and is 111.25 inches long without the
breech ring.
b. Recoil System
The recoil system consists of a hydropneumatic re

cuperator and oil buffer.
c. Breech Mechanism
The breech mechanism is of the horizontal slidingblock type. It works semiautomatically, and also can
be worked by hand.
506136"43Vol. 1, No. 6
34
d. Safety Arrangements
Unless the sliding breech block is properly closed,

the safety plunger will not enter its recess in the lower
face of the breech ring, and the gun cannot be fired.
If the safety plunger is not in its recess, the firing
shaft cannot be turned.
If the firing pin is not in the cocked position, the
breech cannot be opened, since the firing shaft is en
gaged with the safety plunger, which is in its recess.
e. Firing Mechanism
The firing mechanism is operated from the elevating

gear handwheel. It is a push-button attached to a wire
Breech mechanism lever.
Extractor releasing lever.
Guides.
Firing plunger.
Safe and f i r e lever.
^jiiiiiimni
L.
Breech ring.
Figure 2.Details of the German 50-mm Antitank Gun.
35
cable which actuates a lug on the cradle. This, in turn,
actuates the firing plunger upward on to the firing
shaft of the breech mechanism.
GERMANY
50-MM ANTITANK GUN
f. Sights
The firing bracket is mounted on the left trunnion,

and either a telescopic sight or an open sight can be
used. The sight bracket has lateral deflection gear, a
range drum, and means of adjustment for azimuth and
elevation. The telescopic sight is of three-power
magnification.
Dust cover,
Breech mechanism lever
ick pinion.
Actuating shaft.
Crank.
Sliding block.
Firing plunger.
Breech
block.
Safe and fire lever
iring shaft.
Safety plunge
Re-cocking shaft.
Figure 3.Details of the German 50-mm Antitank Gun.
Cap.
36
The range drum is so calibrated that when the maxi

mum range for armor-piercing shell (1,540 yards) is
reached, the gun automatically is sighted for high ex
plosive, beginning with 330 yards and going up to a
maximum of 2,640 yards.
g. Elevating Mechanism
The elevating gear is operated by a handwheel on the

left side of the carriage. It allows 27 degrees for ele
vation and 18 degrees for depression.
h. Carriage
The gun has a spaced armor-plate shield composed

of 2-mm to 4-mm plates about 1 inch apart. It has
spoked wheels of a light alloy, with solid rubber tires.
A third wheel can be attached to the spade piece so that
the gun can be moved by hand.
4. AMMUNITION
Type
AP tracer
shell.
HE shell
AP 40 shot
Weight of
complete
round
Length
Weight of
projectile
Fuze
Identifying
marks
9 lbs. 3 oz_ 21.4 in_ 4 lbs. 9 oz__ Base_ Black projectile.

7 lbs. 3 oz_ 23.7 in_ 3 lbs. 15 oz_ Nose_ Dark green pro
jectile.
2.025 lbs _ None Black projectile.
37
GERMANY5 0-MM ANTITANK GUN
PENETRATION DATA
Type shell
AP shell
Range
Angle
250 y d s . . _ 30
1,300 yds__ Normal

AP shell
Unconfirmed J330 yds___ 20
on AP 40
[440 yds_. 20
Compact
Plate-hardened
to same de
gree through
out.
Same
Same
Same
Penetration
60 mm (2.36")
60 mm (2.36")
90 mm (3.54")
64 mm (2.54")
NOTE.The above tests were fired with a limited supply of ammunition

and the results probably represent underestimates.
5. CREW
The crew consists of the gun commander, No, 1 (gunner).

No. 2 (loader and firer), Nos. 3 and 4 (ammunition
handlers), and No. 5 (chauffeur).
Section II. USE OF 20-MM AA/AT GUN

AGAINST GROUND TARGETS
1. INTRODUCTION
A German document, evidently written by a platoon
commander of an antiaircraft-antitank company, deals
with an antiaircraft-antitank battalion's use of the
20-mm dual-purpose gun against ground targets.
2. EXTRACTS FROM THE DOCUMENT
a. General
The 20-mm gun on a self-propelled mount combines the fire
power and mobility of an antiaircraft gun with the accuracy and
penetration of an antitank gun. It is insufficiently armored,
however, and this fault must be offset by making good use of
cover and by fire control.
The smallest unit in battle is the section of two guns. Use of
single guns, except for individual tasks like the engagement of
enemy observation posts, is exceptional. Ground observation is
most important; every spare man must be employed on it, and
must be made personally ambitious to spot targets.
b. Action During Assembly

During assembly, antiaircraft-antitank troops usually take over
protection against air and land attack. Guns must be sited so
38
GERMANYUSE OF 2 0-MM GUN AGAINST GROUND TARGETS
39
that attacking aircraft can be engaged from reverse slopes, while,

by moving the gun to a position on the forward slope, it is
possible to bring under fire the enemy approaching on the ground.
c. Acfion During Attack

The antiaircraft-antitank troops support the advance of the
infantry and other arms. For this purpose the antiaircraftantitank guns should be sited to a flank, to exploit their range
fully without endangering the advancing German troops. The
addition of 100 yards, more or less, to a flank hardly interferes
with the effectiveness of the 20-mm gun, whereas it does affect the
enemy's infantry weapons by widening the target.
When in action only the following remain on the vehicle:
driver and gun commander and Nos. 1 and 4.1 When the gun
commander is away on reconnaissance for a new gun position,
No. 3 takes his place. The other men (who are the ammunition
handlers) give protection and carry out flank observation. If
there is no mine-spotting section available, the ammunition han
dlers must search for mines in the ground to be passed over.
The platoon or section commander and his runners follow di
rectly in the rear of the attacking infantry or the assaulting en
gineer detachment. The commander reconnoiters good positions
and good targets for the guns.
d. Fire
Good fire discipline (including good observation) is of the
greatest value; this is gained by experience and will be made easier
by cooperation with the attacking troops and the various observa
tion posts. The sectors of fire must be assigned. Telescopes and
rangefinders will be used to the fullest.
1
The duties of Nos. 2 and 3 are not indicated.
40
e. Movement
Changes of position must be made quickly. Occupation of a
gun position from a flank must be avoided if possible. The guns
will advance by bounds. If they meet slight opposition which can
be broken by one section, the other section remains in reserve and,
after the action, leapfrogs forward as an advance section while
the first makes itself ready again.
When close to the enemyfor example, when breaking into his
positionsthe guns fire on the move. This forces the enemy to
take cover, and weakens his morale.
f. Defense
When bivouacking or holding a defensive position, the guns
occupy prepared positions under cover. Other alternative positions
are prepared, battle outposts are put out, and landmarks are
recorded.
9. On the March
On the march the battalion is disposed as follows:
No. 1 gunprotection to front and right.
No. 2 gunprotection to front and left.
No. 3 gunprotection to rear and right.
No. 4 gunprotection to rear and left.
Under air attack, a similar formation will be adopted. On the
section commander's orders, the troops will halt and openfire.Air
craft will be engaged only if they spot or attack the battalion's
own positions, if bridges or observation posts need protection, or
if the aircraft offer especially good targets.
h. Tanks
It has been proved that the gun, rightly used, can put even the
heaviest tanks to flight even if it cannot put them out of action;
GERMANYUSE OF 2 0-MM GUN AGAINST GROUND TARGETS
41
that is, by its high rate of fire it can jam turrets and gun mantlets.
The most effective range against tanks is under 400 yards. Every
effort must be made to attack them from the sides.
3. EXTRACT FROM A GERMAN NEWSPAPER'S

COMMENT ON THE 20-MM GUN
The duties of the anticraf t-antitank battalions are, above all, to
protect other units against low-flying attacks while on the march
and in action. For this purpose, the 20-mm gun is principally
used.
The battalions are part of the infantry's support. Troops of
these units are therefore trained as infantrymen; but, in addition,
they learn their own weapons, including training with different
sizes of rangefinders in height estimation. Otherwise, the train
ing corresponds to that of flak units. The antiaircraft-antitank
units (the platoon is the normal fighting unit) are located in the
column of march according to the prearranged operation order.
In case of surprise attack, fife is opened either immediately from
the tractor on which the gun is mounted, or else sections (which
are fully motorized) leave the column and occupy a position on
firm ground with a good field of fire, with the gun dismounted.
After fighting, the units catch up with their original position in
the line of march.
Antiaircraft-antitank guns use only tracer ammunitionhigh
explosive against aircraft, and, if necessary, armor-piercing am
munition against ground targets; they have a limited ceiling and
are used principally by day. Antiaircraft-antitank troops have
no listening apparatus or searchlight batteries and do not pretend
to rival the flak artillery. Further tasks include: protection of
divisional artillery against low-flying attack, participation in
ground fighting by neutralizing enemy machine-gun nests and
other strong points, or defense against single tanks.
50613643Vol. 1, No. 6
Section III. ATTACKS ON CONCRETE

FORTIFICATIONS
In the following report, British Intelligence officers

summarize German methods of attacking concrete for
tications.
1. PREPARATION
A typical attack is preceded by a short artillery concentration.
on the objectives. The artillery then lays down smoke. Under
the concealment that this affords, the infantry and its supporting
weapons get in position at short range. These supporting weap
ons will include antitank guns, and possibly field guns, placed
under command of the infantry, as well as heavy machine guns,
mortars, and infantry guns.
When the smoke clears, all weapons open fire on specific loop
holes allotted to them. Under cover of this fire the infantry
and engineers move in to the assault.
2. ASSAULT
The assault on pillboxes can be made in several ways, but all
these depend on the principle that if you are near enough to a
pillbox, you can get inside the angle of fire of its machine guns
and be safejust as you can when you are approaching a tank.
42
GERMANY
ATTACKS ON CONCRETE FORTIFICATIONS
43
Pillboxes, however, usually will be sited so that they are covered

by machine-gun fire from their neighbors. Therefore, pillboxes
can be attacked in this way only if supporting fire keeps the
embrasures of neighboring pillboxes shut, or if more smoke is
put down to isolate the particular fortification to be assaulted.
The actual attack on pillboxes may be made either with explosives
or with flame throwers.
Infantry sometimes can get close up under the embrasures and
push grenades inside. Engineers, who carry more powerful
charges, can blow up pillboxes and, by mounting charges on the
ends of poles, can attack embrasures that they cannot reach
otherwise. These pole charges are a common engineer weapon.
The infantry can improvise a similar charge by tying the heads
of six stick grenades around a complete central grenade.
Two sizes of flame throwers are carried by the engineers. The
range of both is claimed to be about 30 yards, but may in practice
be no more than 20 yards. The smaller can produce a jet of flame
for 10 seconds, the larger fpr 25 seconds. The larger must be
hauled on a two-wheeled trolley.
A method simpler than either of these has been used to neu
tralize pillboxesnamely, to plug the embrasures with sand bags,
which may be effective for a few moments.
Section IV. ARMORED FORCE TACTICS

IN THE MIDDLE EAST
1. INTRODUCTION
United Nations observers in Libya have reported
that there are four principles that German armored
units seldom fail to consider before advancing to
attack.
a. The primary role of the tank is to kill infantry.
b. The machine gun is therefore an important
weapon of the tank.
c. The tank can be successful only when it is used in
conjunction with all arms.
d. Tanks must be used in mass.
As a result of these views, the Germans will not fight
a tank versus tank battle if they can avoid doing so.
Moreover, their tactics are always based on having their
armor move with other arms, in close support, in the
form of a "box" or moving defense area.
2. THE BOX
The box is that part of the German column which
appears inside the solid lines in figure 5. It varies in
44
GERMANYARMORED FORCE TACTICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
45
size, but if an armored battalion is the basic unit, the

box might contain the following combat troops, in ad
dition to tank ground crews and other service troops:
1 battalion of motorized infantry, usually carried in
half-tracked, semi-armored vehicles; 1 battalion of
50-mm antitank guns; 1 battalion of 88-mm antiair
craft-antitank guns; 1 battalion of 150-mm closesupport guns, sometimes on self-propelled mounts; and
1 battalion of divisional field artillery. Under these
circumstances, the box would be approximately 2 miles
deep, with a frontage of 200 yards.
On the move or in the attack, the dispositions of the
guns in the box are as shown in figure 5; that is, the anti
tank and antiaircraft guns guard the flanks and the
front. The infantry guns and field guns usually are
inside the box only when the defensive is assumed.
The 88-mm, although a very effective antitank gun,
is included in the box primarily to protect the "soft
skinned" vehicles from air attack.
3. METHOD OF ADVANCE (see fig. 4a)
Over flat terrain the distances between the various
elements of the Grerman column are approximately as
follows: between the reconnaissance unit and the first
echelon of tanks, 5 to 10 miles; between the first and
second echelons of tanks, 1 mile; and between the sec
ond echelon of tanks and the box, 2 miles. The whole
formation is directed toward an objective which, if
46
Guns and tanks

Position "c"
!!
The
"Box"
.T' h ' e ,.
"Box"
il
ii
II
Guns and tanks

Position "B"
II
2nd echelon of
'
tanks and artillery Jj
Tanks deployed
on a wide front
Position "A"
1st echelon of
li
tanks and artillery''
Reconnaissance
unit retiring
Tl
ii
U
II
II
II
Reconnaissance
|j
unit on a wide
front 11
n
^^
British tanks
attacking
11
ll
Track to |
objective
Figure 4.German Armored Force Tactics.
47
Field artillery battery

may not be deployed
50~mm AT
on each flank
The Box
88-mm Lt. AA
Motorized infantry,
mechanics, etc.
Mixed tanks, 3 lines,

"50 yards between tanks
I I i I
- 8 0 0 Yds
f t ?
ON
/ O
Covering force of Mk EC tanks,

heavy machine-guns,
machine-guns, 50-mm
50-mm
heavy
and 150-mm. Infantry guns
LEGEND
TANK
MOTORIZED INFANTRY
MACHINE-GUN (HEAVY)
*- ANTITANK-GUN (50-mm)
- INFANTRY-GUN (150-mm)
O - ANTIAIRCRAFT-GUN (88-mm)
Figure 5.German Armored Force Tactics (continued).
48
seized, will force the opposition to fight and thus be

come engaged on ground of German choosing.
On normal terrain each element of the German col
umn moves from high ground to high ground, and the
separate echelons of tanks are supported by field artil
lery, which moves behind them.
4. METHOD OF FIGHTING IF ATTACKED ON THE
MOVE
As soon as United Nations troops are reported to
be advancing and contact appears imminent, the box
halts and takes up a position for all-around defense.
This can be done very quickly because of the type of
formation it uses while on the move. As the United
Nations tanks advance, the German reconnaissance unit
falls back, and the two echelons of German tanks deploy
on a wide front, as illustrated in figure 4b, position "A."
If the United Nations troops continue to advance,
the Germans retire to position " B , " and force the op
position to attempt to break through one flank.
If the opposition attacks the German left flank, the
troops on the left of the box at position " B " fall back
to position " C . " If the opposing tanks pursue, they
not only are engaged frontally by the German tanks
from position " C , " but are caught in the flank by the
antitank and antiaircraft guns protecting the left side
of the box. The tanks of the German right flank at
position " B " then swing around and engage the at
tackers in the rear. If the artillery has accompanied
49
the tanks in the advance, it may either continue to sup

port them or may enter the box to increase its antitank
strength.
5. ATTACK LED BY TANKS AGAINST A SINGLE
DEFENSE AREA
The Germans realize that it usually is impossible for
an attack in depth to pass between two defense areas
or to cross the front of one defense area to attack an
other. The attack is therefore launched approxi
mately "head on." Such an attack may be carried out
in the following way:
a. Phase 1
The Germans will reinforce their reconnaissance

unit with tanks deployed on a wide front, and will drive
their covering force ahead until it is approximately
2,500 yards from the acrust" of the opposition's de
fense area (see fig. 5).
b. Phase 2
A most careful reconnaissance of the defender's po

sitions will then be carried but by a senior commander
in a tank, to decide which defense area to attack. In
Libya last winter, when British .defense areas were not
necessarily sited on high ground, a great deal depended
on whether the Germans could get a position about
2,000 yards from the British front on which to deploy
the German covering force. In figure 5 it is assumed
50
that the Germans found this, and are going to attack

defense area " B . "
c. Phase 3
The covering force now deploys as follows: Tanks,

generally Mark IV 's, take up a hull-down position on
the ridge, and with the fire of their machine guns at
tempt to pin the defense. They may engage visible
antitank guns with their 75-mm's. Under cover of this
fire, 50-mm antitank guns, heavy machine guns, and
close support 150-mm infantry guns are also deployed
in an attempt to knock out the antitank guns of the
defense or to kill their crews.
The majority of the weapons in the deployed cover
ing force are dependent on direct laying and therefore
can be blinded by smoke.
Under cover of the fire of their covering force, the
Germans form their rear in the following manner:
(1) Three rows of tanks, with about 50 yards be
tween tanks and about 150 yards between rows.
(2) When the tanks are in position, the box forms
in the rear, as illustrated. The infantry ride in their
carriers.
d. Phase 4
At zero hour the entire formation moves forward at

about 15 miles per hour, depending on the terrain.
As the tanks pass through their covering force, they
GERMANY
ARMORED FORCE TACTICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
5]
begin to fire, not so much with a view to hitting any

thing as for psychological effect.
Arriving at defense area " B , " some tanks drive
straight through to the far side, while others assist the
infantry in mopping up. The infantry usually do not
dismount from their carriers until they arrive in de
fense area U B , " when they fan out, using Tommy guns
extensively,
e. Phase 5
If the attack is successful, the covering force moves

forward into the captured area to stiffen the German
defenses that are being established there. The tanks
generally are withdrawn and serviced near what has
now become the rear of the former defense area.
f. Conclusions
It takes 2 or 3 hours to prepare and stage such an

attack.
If the attack proves successful, no minor counter
attack is likely to drive the Germans out. Their de
fense is very rapidly organized, inasmuch as all the
weapons they require are immediately available.
Such attacks are now being beaten off, and it is ap
parent that in the future they will not succeed without
considerably increased artillery support.
The whole form of the attack has been reduced by
the Germans to a "battle drill."
Section V.
WINTER FLYING PROBLEMS
1. RUNWAYS
From numerous experiences during the winters of
1940 and 1941, the German Air Force has found that
the maximum efficiency in winter operations is attained
by using wheeled landing gear as long as conditions
permit. Such use requires immediate rolling of the
runways after any appreciable snowfall.
Where heavy snowfalls are expected, the runways
are marked off in advance with relation to the prevail
ing wind direction, so that rolling can be started as
soon as the snow is about 2 inches deep. The runways
should be laid out to avoid take-offs over mounds of
snow or other irregularities of ground and to eliminate
as much as possible the necessity of making crosswind
landings.
Snow fences must be erected as a protection against
drifts. If the direction of the prevailing wind coin
cides with that of the runway, the fences are set at an
angle of about 25 to 30 degrees to the wind in order to
deflect the snow outwards. It is especially important
to place fences at the intersection and at the ends of
52
GERMANY
53
the runways, and to erect suitable warning markers

on all obstacles caused by such work.
Rolling should be carried out continuously to pre
vent the formation of dangerous snow heaps, and the
rolled surface subsequently raked to minimize ice form
ation. Taxi aprons, as well as main and auxiliary run
ways, should be kept clear of snow as long as possible.
2. SKIS
The change-over from wheels to skis (see fig. 6) is

usually made when the unrolled snow has reached a
depth of one-third of the diameter of the aircraft
wheels. When the snow is deeper, landing on wheels is
possible without risk of turning over, but take-off is
prevented by the high rolling resistance of the snow.
During this period, special take-off sledges are used.
These become detached as the aircraft rises, enabling
the plane to land on wheels.
To safeguard the undercarriage as much as possible,
landings and take-offs with skis should always be made
on snow which has not been rolled. Aircraft on skis
must be taxied only on snow-covered surfaces. Taxi
ing over snow mounds and slopes with sharp drops
should be avoided because the skis have a limited range
of deflection. As ski-equipped airplanes have a dan
gerous tendency to ground-loop in cross winds when
taxiing on ice or rolled snow surface, extreme care
should be taken to keep them from swinging. Multiengine aircraft may be taxied by the use of either out
54
board engine, but small curves cause high stresses in the

undercarriage and must be avoided. There are no
brakes on skis, since on deep soft snow the length of the
landing run is shorter than with unbraked wheels.
Figure 6.German Aircraft on Skis.
The normal length of take-off may be expected when

the snow is frozen and the temperature below zero, but
in warmer temperatures the friction coefficients may be
come very high, necessitating a longer run. If con
GERMANY
55
ditions are so unfavorable that it is impossible to take

off, a runway may be created in the snow by taxiing to
and fro repeatedly. The take-off run may be inter
rupted without danger, since an airplane on skis comes
to a standstill quickly if the engine is throttled. On
the take-off, the handling of aircraft with skis is the
same as for those equipped with wheels.
From the point of view of flying, there has been no
difficulty in operating the various types of aircraft with
skis attached, although speed and general effectiveness
are reduced between 5 and 15 percent. However, single
engine flight with a J u 88 so equipped is not possible,
and an He 111 with skis can barely maintain level
flight on one engine. The same principles apply to the
landing run as to the take-off, except in night landings.
Light is reflected in the direction of flight by flat ex
panses of snow on the field, which makes judgment as
to altitude impossible, unless the surface has been
walked on or ashes have been sprinkled to cut the glare
and provide identification marks.
The aircraft must not be allowed to come to a stand
still upon landing, but must be taxied immediately to
a previously prepared parking- place, equipped with
suitable wooden parking gratings which have been
smeared with a graphite paste or used engine oil so
that the skis will slide over them. Multi-engine air
craft, because of their size, require at least 10 parking
gratings while single-engine planes need only about 4.
56
The space between parked aircraft fitted with skis must

be twice as great as for those with wheels, because it is
not always possible to taxi accurately with skis.
The aircraft are placed on parking gratings so that
they will not freeze to the ground. If the bottoms of
the tires should become frozen, they must not be
forcibly freed but can be loosened either by applying
salt, saltwater, or hot air, or by inserting a wire between
the tire and the ground. Skis should not be loosened by
pushing the fuselage backward and forward, because
no undercarriage can stand the strain. Light aircraft
may be freed by shaking the wings, with the engine at
full throttle. Heavy planes must be jacked up so that
wooden gratings can be pushed under each ski. If the
equipment necessary for this is not available, the snow
must be shoveled away until only one-quarter of the ski,
at the center, is still standing on snow. It is then pos
sible to release the aircraft with full power by moving
the elevator and rudder.
It is not necessary to wax the skis, but after about 10
flying hours the sliding surfaces must be inspected for.
signs of wear, and light damage to the hard paper or
cement covering may be repaired quite easily. As the
stresses on the undercarriage are greater with skis than
with wheels, all parts must be carefully inspected at
least every 20 hours. In case of boat skis, the cover
must be freed from snow and ice before the take-off to
obtain complete freedom of motion. In milder
GERMANYWINTER FLYING PROBLEMS
57
weather, these skis must be drained of accumulated

snow water daily.
Aircraft fitted with skis must never be moved over
ground free from snow without using a special dolly
or some other device, nor should aircraft be dragged by
the tail skid, even when a moving device has been fitted
to the main skis.
3. STORAGE PROBLEMS
If it is impossible to heat the main hangars prop
erly, a separate living room, adequately heated, and a
warm, well-ventilated storeroom should be provided.
The temperature of the storeroom should not fall below
50 degrees Fahrenheit. Ground maintenance equip
ment, as well as all drums containing lubricating oil
and cooling fluid, should be housed under cover if space
is available, but at least one transport vehicle, engine
heater, and engine starter should be kept ready for im
mediate use in a warm place. As much gear as pos
sible should also be kept in heated storerooms. Every
thing left in the open has to be protected from the wind
and condensation by use of matting, tarpaulin, or
straw.
Rubber covers, inner tubes, and cables become sensi
tive to kinks and bends at temperatures below 4 de
grees Fahrenheit, but elasticity is restored at room
temperature. The most satisfactory temperature for
the storage of such articles is between 40 and 60 de
58
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
grees Fahrenheit, as prolonged higher temperatures are

detrimental to rubber. Since the capacity of batteries
falls off rapidly with extremely cold temperatures, it is
essential that they be removed from equipment left in
the open and stored in a warm place until needed.
They should be kept fully charged as discharged bat
teries are likely to freeze at temperatures below 32
degrees.
High-pressure containers should be kept under cover
and, if possible, not exposed to cold.
Lubricating oil and antifreeze solution must be
stored in protected sheds, heated, if possible, with spe
cial precautions against penetration of the drums by
water, snow, and ice. The containers, with the filler
on the top side, should always be placed on wooden
blocks, and should be protected against the weather on
all sides. If a warm storeroom is not available, it is
possible to warm the drums by covering them with a
tarpaulin and blowing in hot air from the engine heater.
Baking ovens made of stones and heated by a wood
fire may also be used to heat the drums.
Lacquers and certain other finishes (known as "air
plane dopes") are very sensitive to cold and dampness,
but the place where they are stored must not be directly
heated because of the danger of fire.
The lighters that are used for marking out landing
runways or obstructions have a very short life in low
temperatures, and so are stored during the day in a
warm room.
GERMANY
59
4. STARTING COLD MOTORS

When starting aircraft after a snowstorm, or after
prolonged inactivity, all drifted snow deposits must be
cleared away. The best way to do this is to open the in
spection holes, and thaw or blow away the snow. All
aircraft engines require some pre-heating, if they have
been left in the open when temperatures are below
freezing point. At temperatures below 4 degrees
Fahrenheit, it is especially difficult to start an engine
because the fuel, injected into the cylinder or atomized
by the carburetor, condenses on the cold walls of the
cylinder and intake pipes and prevents combustion.
The method generally used to heat the engine is to
cover it with a heavy canvas hood and force a draft of
hot air into the bottom opening. To do this, the Ger
mans use an engine heater (see fig. 7), which can
warm an airplane motor within 15 to 20 minutes, rais
ing the temperature of the engine approximately 50
degrees. This device heats air by passing it over burn
ing vaporized fuel and then blowing it through doublewalled canvas tubes into the hood placed around the
engine. The blower of this apparatus may be operated
by either a gasoline or an electric motor.
The pre-heating of lubricating oil appears to be the
main factor in speeding up cold-weather starting. Dur
ing cold starts, the lubricant becomes easily diluted by
the unburned gasoline in the cylinders, and the oil
sludge deposited in the engine dissolves. A much larger
quantity than usual is carried to the oil filter. For
60
this reason, it is essential that oil be removed and

thoroughly cleaned after each long flight. However,
if cleaning devices are connected to a rod in the cockpit,
the pilot should clean out the filter during flight. The
oil coolers and oil lines to engines should be covered
with felt or asbestos to keep in heat while the engine is
running. The Germans have also been experimenting
with the use of acetylene in starting aircraft engines at
very low temperatures, but no operational use of this
method has yet been reported.
Figure 7.German Aircraft Engine-Heating Device.
As variable-pitch propellers are subject to freezing,

the blades should be placed in take-off position, with a
small angle of attack, when the engine is stopped. Dur
ing cold starts, the pitch of the propellers should be
altered several times backwards and forwards by
operating the speed control. This insures that the con
trol mechanism and the oil servo-motor become filled
GERMANY
61
with the eold-starting mixture. This also applies to

electric, constant-speed propellers, where the pitchchanging mechanism should be operated over as large
a range as possible to distribute the grease uniformly
over the gears. This prevents the propeller from
changing pitch of its own accord. The gear mechanism
should be warmed if the air temperature is below 4
degrees Fahrenheit.
To protect the cooling system against frosts, a mix
ture of 50 percent glycol and 50 percent water is recom
mended. Any outside openings or vents leading to the
instruments should be covered when in flight, so that
snow or rain cannot enter the lines and freeze. All con
trol hinges should be covered with a thin oil to prevent
the collection of moisture and subsequent locking of
control surfaces.
5. ANTIFREEZING METHODS
The Luftwaffe has developed a special anti-ice paste
to be used on the wings, turrets, and tail unit when
there is danger of icing. However, as this paste causes
the camouflage paint on the aircraft to peel off, it is
applied only when there is real danger of ice formation.
When the snow is thick, the control surfaces are
likely to be damaged on take-offs and landings by pieces
of ice. Care must be taken to insure that the fuselage
and lower side of the wings and control surfaces are
snow- and waterproof, since snow may penetrate into
the aircraft and be deposited there. Subsequent
62
freezing may block the controls or the mechanism for

retracting and lowering the landing gear. At very
low temperatures, too tight control cables may contract
enough to tear away from their supports.
Since ordinary bombsights are electrically heated,
they are not affected by extreme cold, but the noses of
all bombs exposed to the airstream must be treated with
anti-ice paste.
To insure satisfactory operation of guns at low tem
peratures, maintenance must be carefully checked and
guns, appliances, and mountings tested before every
flight. During prolonged flights at very low tempera
tures, the guns should be operated at regular intervals
to prevent excessive cooling. Muzzle caps should be
fitted on all guns so that snow or ice will not enter the
mechanism. When Oerlikon " F F " 20-mm fixed can
non are mounted on aircraft operated under winter
conditions, they must be equipped with a special recoil
spring, as otherwise the gun may stick when it is fired.
Section V I . MISCELLANEOUS
1. FIELD PATCHING OF ARMORED TROOP

CARRIERS (HALF-TRACKED)
In the field the Germans have made use of an unusual
type of patch to cover holes pierced in the armor of
their half-tracked armored troop carriers.
The plates are secured by conical-headed bolts in
serted through the holes andin the case of patches
examined to dateheld by steel strips at the back (see
fig. 8). Apparently the plates have been designed espe
cially for this purpose. Their peculiar shape permits
them to be fitted anywhere on the armor service.
The plates are drilled in five places; the three top
holes are countersunk, while the lower two are not. It
is worth noting that in specimens of patching observed,
the fixing bolts did not fit into the countersinks. Al
though the reason for the three countersunk and two
plain holes is not entirely clear, it is quite possible that
one plate is meant to serve as a background or securing
platehence the two plain holes. This theory seems
borne out by the fact that the securing bars which
have been observed to date appear to have been make
shift jobs.
63
64
FIELD REPAIR PATCH FOR ARMOR
HOLE IN ARMOR
SECURINO
BOLT
HOLE FOR SPLIT PIN
SKETCH SHOWING METHOD OF SECURING PATCH

PLATE BY MEANS OF STEEL STRIPS. SECURING
BOLT PASSES THROUGH HOLE IN ARMOR AND
HOLDS PATCH PLATE ON ONE SIDE TO STEEL
STRIP ON THE OTHER.
8 3/4"'
SECTION
FRONT VIEW OF PATCH PLATE
Figure 8,
GERMANY
MISCELLANEOUS
65
2. MAP SIGNS FOR OBSTACLES

The following symbols, which the American soldier
may find on Grerman maps, are taken from a German
Army document.
+ x + I Close spaced A T minefield
--A
Symmetrically spaced minefield

Disposed A T mines
Dummy minefield
Anti-personnel minefield
Trip wire mines
Air bombs (5 in number)
Exploder point
Firing lead
Observed mines with exploder point
Single concertina
itiifttuAjfiujui Triple concertina
,
Marked lane
[ Concealed lane
<
Patrol lane
-XXX-
Plain wire fence
xxxxxxxxxxx
Wire obstacle in depth
Stone heaps and cans marking limits
XXXXXXXXX
l ll l l | I I
Concealed charges
Apron or double apron
Trip wire
Figure 9.
PART THREE: UNITED NATIONS 1
Section I. HOW TO USE YOUR EYES

AT NIGHT
1. INTRODUCTION
Modern war is often fought at night. This means
that men must learn to see in the darkor at least
to use their eyes in new and unfamiliar ways.
This article is written to tell you how to make the
best use of your eyes at night. It will help you,
whether your job is in an airplane or a tank, on a ship,
or driving a truck, or just getting about on your own
feet.
It will not give you the uncanny eyes of an owl or a
cat, but it may give you just the edge on the enemy you
need to get in the first shotand to get home.
You already know that when you go into a dark room
from a bright one, it is hard to see until your eyes have
become used to the gloom. At a movie it takes a min
ute or two to see the vacant seat. It may take another
minute or two to be able to recognize a friend. Dur
ing these minutes your eyes become more sensitive to
the faint light.
' I n Intelligence Bulletin No. 4 (December 1942), "Part Four: United
Nations," page 77, subparagraph c, substitute "2 degrees" for "20 degrees"
in the sentence which reads "The pole star is never more than 20 degrees
away from true north."
66
UNITED NATIONSHOW TO USE YOUR EYES AT NIGHT
67
2. ADJUSTING FOR DARKNESS

Your eyes adjust in two ways for seeing in the dark.
One way is by opening up to let in more light or to
make maximum use of what little light there is. This
works in the same way as a camera diaphragm, which
can be opened up wide for taking pictures in dim light.
Your eye pupils open wide in dim light and close to a
pin-point opening when the light is very bright.
But this is not the most important change in the way
your eye works in dim lighting.
You actually have two kinds of sight. Your day eyes
use one kind of vision cells known as "cones." They
are principally located in the very center of the eye.
Your night eyes use an entirely different kind of
cells, the rod cells, which are mostly around the outside
edge of the eye.
The rod cells used by your night eyes are color blind.
That is why '' all cats look gray at night.'' If you see
a colored light shining at night, and it looks red or
green or blue, it is only because it is bright enough so
that you can see it with your daylight eyes.
But your night vision is much more sensitive to light
of some colors than to others. Red is seen equally well
by night and day vision. Blue light, however, affects
your night eyes 1,000 times as much as it does your
day eyes. For this reason it is extremely dangerous to
use blue lights in a blackout because it affects the
enemy's eyes just as much as it does yours.
68
Night eyes lack the sharp vision for detail that your
day eyes have. If you want to see to read, if you want
to watch the dial of an instrument, if you must look at
a map, a road sign, or your watch, then you must use
your day vision. For this you must have good light
the more the better. Especially if the print or other
forms are small, the light must be bright.
Mght eyes are extraordinarily sensitive to faint light.
This is shown by calculations that an ordinary candle
flame could be seen at a distance of more than 100 miles
if the night were completely black and if haze, dust,
and the curvature of the earth did not interfere. A
lighted match is about as bright as a candle flame.
Under ordinary night conditions, a match can be seen
from a plane for many miles away.
Night vision is not in use as soon as you step into the
dark. It takes timea half hour or morebefore your
eyes are completely adapted to the dark. When you
leave a sunny street to go into a darkened theater, or
step from a brightly-lighted room into the dark out
doors, you are completely blind at first.
Then several things happen. First the pupil of your
eye dilates, letting more light into your eyes. This is
a mechanical action.
Next the cones of your day vision adapt to the dark
ness. This takes about 5 minutes, and after that you
feel more comfortable about moving around in the pitch
dark.
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69
After a much longer time, your rod vision adapts it

self to the darkness and you can begin to see shapes
and outlines in the gloom that were not even vague
bulking shadows when you first came in.
Just how this change-over from cone to rod cells is
accomplished is not completely understood, but it is at
least partly a chemical process.
The soldier who, at a command or an alert signal,
leaves a lighted room to run on duty without having
prepared his eyes is completely at the mercy of the
enemy insofar as his vision is concerned. By the time
he gains the use of his night eyes, the emergency may
be all over.
And even when your eyes are adapted to the dark,
flashing on a light, even for a very short time, may ruin
your night vision for another half hour. You can lose
in a few minutes all you gained by half an hour in the
dark. The brighter the light and the longer you look
at it, the more you lose.
3. GETTING YOUR EYES READY
Complete darkness is the best preparation for night
fighting. It pays to protect your eyes from light be
fore you start and while you are out. If you can't stay
in darkness, keep the lights around you as low as pos
sible and don't look straight at them. If it is neces
sary to look at any lighted object, be as quick as you
can about it. Experiments have shown that looking
70
at an instrument dial lighted only by radium paint will

cut down the distance at which you can see a friendly
or an enemy plane by 50 percent. Don't look at the
dial any longer than you must or the loss will be
greater.
Experienced gun pointers and spotters know that
they must not watch the flash of their guns as they
fire. The flash of a 6'-inch gun may dull the eyes for
a minute or more. Under continuous fire at dawn or
dusk it is impossible to aim some rapid-fire guns accu
rately at a target more than 7 times a minute if the
gunners watch the flash. At night the blinding effect
would be even greater. Looking away from the flash
gives almost complete protection. Luckily the flash
of rifles and small-caliber machine guns has much less
effect on the eyes.
There are several ways by which one can become
dark-adapted or maintain dark-adaptation, even
though working in a fairly bright light. Each method
is suitable for certain types of jobs, and each has its
limitations and dangers. A patch worn over one eye
will keep this eye ready for night duty at any time,
but vision from one eye alone is not as accurate as
binocular (two-eye) vision, especially in judging dis
tances of nearby objects. An individual may work in
red light, or wear close-fitting red goggles, either of
which are effective since red light has little effect on
the rod cells and leaves one ready for nearly instant
action in the dark. I t is wisest to consult a medical
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officer concerning the necessity for such preparation,

and the methods best suited for the task at hand.
4. USING YOUR EYES PROPERLY
Always remember that you must look a little to one
side in order to see best on a very dark night. Learn
to pay attention to things which are just a little on2 to
the side. Learn to keep from looking directly at any
object. As you feel your eyes drawn irresistibly toward
what you want to see, just let them slide on over it to the
other side and look again with the tail of your eye. It
takes practice to learn to do this without fail, but it
is worth the trouble to learn the trick.
And don't keep looking steadily to the same side of
an object. This will make it disappear, too.
Try it out yourself and see how your eyes at night
can play "parlor magic" tricks on you.
When in your darkened room or outdoors, hold up
your finger and look steadily at it. It will disappear.
Look a little to one side and it will appear again. But
if you keep staring at this side it will soon be gone
again. Move your eyes to the other side and back and
it will reappear.
This means that in searching the sea or the sky for
a dark object, you must look at first one area and then
another. When you think you have spotted something,
keep looking first on one side of the object and then
at the other, or above and below it.
72
But don't try to sweep your eyes over the sky or the
horizonyou can't see well while the eyes are moving.
"Scan" the sky, don't sweep over it. Night eyes are
slow in responding. At night a faint object may not
be recognizable until after you have looked near it a
number of times. If you have ever hunted quail in
the morning or watched deer in the dusk, you know that
you can look right at such a camouflaged object for a
while before you notice it. In darkness such an object
is even harder to pick out because you won't see it at
all if you stare. You have to look again and again at
points near it.
5. CONTRAST HELPS NIGHT VISION
Another thing that affects our vision at night is the
contrast between an object and its background. If the
thing observed is very different from its background, it
is much more easily seen. An airplane may be clear if
you look up at it against the night sky; but invisible if
you look down on it against the dark ground. A ship
may show up clearly against a star-lit sky, but fade
into the background if you are looking at it against a
background of dark water.
If light from the moon is reflected onto the under
side of an airplane from white clouds below, the plane
may become almost invisible from any angle.
To notice small differences in contrast, it is essential
to have clear vision. I t is for this reason that wind
shields must be kept clean and free of scratches or fog.
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These tend to scatter light in all directions and reduce

contrast. Careless night fighters have been known to
tolerate enough dirt on their windshields to double the
time it takes to see a plane moving along near by. And
sailors on ships sometimes let the salt from spray pile
up in blotches on the glass. This is courting death.
For the same reason it is important to keep down the
lights on your side of a windshield. Any light on your
side reduces the contrast because stray light spreads
over the whole glass and reflects in your eyes. That is
why you push up close to a window when you try to look
out at night. By coming up close, you shade part of the
glass and increase the contrast of the objects seen
through this part. If it is necessary to have any light
on your side, keep it as dim as you can and screen it
from the glass. This also helps your adaptation to
darkness.
6. VITAMINS
There has been a good deal of talk about the effect of
shortages of vitamins A and C on ability to see at night.
These are the vitamins in fresh vegetables, cheese, and
fruit. People who don't get enough of these vitamins
do become poor in night vision, but regular Army and
Navy rations supply plenty of these vitamins. Occa
sionally when boats are on long trips or when fighting
lasts until fresh foods are all gone, a shortage of vita
mins may occur. In these cases medical officers will
74
supply men who are likely to be on night duty with

vitamin capsules* Extra vitamins don't improve night
vision if your diet or your night vision is already
normal.
Night vision is affected by fatigue. Anything that
reduces your physical well-being has a greater effect on
night vision than on day vision. Experiments have
shown that hangovers, slight illnesses, or excessive
fatigue may double or even triple the amount of light
needed to see an object/ The night fighter must train
for his job as a boxer trains for a big match. The boxer
who is not at the peak of training is likely to be knocked
out. The night fighter whose eyes are not at the peak of
efficiency is likely to be killed.
7. REMEMBER THESE THINGS
a. Protect your eyes from light before you go on night

duty and while you are out.
b. Don't look directly at any light or illuminated
object. If you must, be quick about it.
c. Use the corners of your eyes. Night targets are
more clearly seen when you don't look directly at them.
d. Keep your eyes moving. Quick, jerky movements
and short pauses are better than long, sweeping move
ments and long pauses.
e. Keep your windshield spotless and free of scratches
and fog.
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f. Keep yourself wide awake and on the alert. Don't

break training. Use good sense about eating, drinking,
and smoking.
g. Practice what you know about seeing at night until
it becomes second nature to use your eyes to the best
advantage. Use every possible device to aid you in
learning to recognize ships, planes, and other important
objects from slight cues.
Section II. BRITISH TRAINING NOTES
1. INTRODUCTION
The following article is a summary of a set of train
ing notes prepared by the British Army, and should
prove of special interest to our junior officers. The
British stress the point that the object of all training is
success in battle. "Modern battles," they say, "are
fought by 'teams of fighters,' whether the team be a sec
tion, platoon, squadron, battalion, or regiment." They
reason that since good training instills confidence and
morale, their soldiers have an obligation to themselves
and their outfits to seize every opportunity to train.
2. FOUR ESSENTIALS TO VICTORY
a. The Right Beginning
Troops must be launched into battle correctly; otherwise, it is
difficult for large or small units to recover the initiative. All of
ficers must understand the conduct of battle operations, especially
with regard to their own level of responsibility.
b. Efficiency of Subordinate Units

Once the battle is joined, the issue passes to the junior leader
and his subordinate unit. If the junior leaders are not well
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BRITISH TRAINING NOTES
77
trained, and if the standard of minor tactics is bad, we failno

matter how good the higher leadership may be.
c. Fighting Spirit
If our troops are not mentally and physically fit and tough,
and do not have the "light of battle" in their eyes, again we
failhowever good the higher leadership and minor tactics.
All ranks must be made to feel the offensive spirit. They
must be trained to fight and to kill. Every soldier must be the
master of the weapons with which he is armed, and must be
ready and willing to use them. This applies to clerks, drivers,
cooks, and other specially employed men.
d. Battle Drill
Battle drill is a procedure by which we insure a common line
of approach to the battle problem of subordinate units, and a
common procedure within these units.
A good system of battle drill, wisely used, will permit the
speeding up of deployment and will enable the small unit to
develop its maximum battle power quickly.
If every officer and man in the field army and the training
depots is taught this common procedure, it will insure full
cooperation in battle. When all personnel are taught the same
battle drill, there need be no changes in methods when reinforce
ments arrive or when casualties require substitutions in junior
leaders.
3. ORGANIZATION OF TRAINING
Well organized training will produce good results. Individual
and collective training must be sandwiched, and the available
time allotted in accordance with the needs of the unit.
The degree of training that is possible will vary with local
conditions. Formations in reserve and in rear areas will be
78
able to devote their whole attention to training. Formations in

forward areas in contact with the enemy obviously will not be
able to do this; in these formations, however, units in local
reserve can do a great deal of training, and all units can do
something. Wherever you are, observance of the following
points is essential to produce good training:
(1) Prepare your programs well in advance.
(2) Be enthusiastic.
(3) Make all training interesting and varied.
(4) Introduce realism.
(5) Keep your training simple.
4. INDIVIDUAL TRAINING
a. Enlisted Men
The individual training of the rank and file should be based on
three main principles:
(1) The Grading of Every Man.Every man must be graded
carefully. After this, instruction is given in accordance with
the needs of the individual. The grading applies chiefly to
weapon-training subjects, gas, and specialist training, but a com
manding officer may grade for any other subject he wishes.
There are three grades:
Grade AMen who pass all tests, and are above the average.
These men are earmarked as potential noncommissioned officers or
specialists, and receive training as such.
Grade BMen who are average, and who require half the full
instruction.
Grade CMen who are below averagewho cannot pass their
tests, and who require the full-time instruction in all subjects.
The whole unit should be graded in this manner once every
three months.
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(2) Rewarding Merit.Men are dismissed from parade or

instruction if they are doing well. The instructor, after 30 min
utes, may fall out the good menor, if the whole squad is good,
let them all fall out.
b. Officers
(1) Preliminaries.Commanders must train their own officers.
Officers' days should be held at least once a week, wherever a unit
may be, and the following subjects are among those that must
be taught:
The technique of movement.
Battle drill, or general management of battle.
How to plan and carry out various types of operations,
Eeconnaissance and deployment.
The cooperation of all arms in battle.
Officers should be instructed first by means of situation models,
discussions, and demonstrations. The models need not be elab
orate, especially since sand models are easy to make. Next come
tactical exercises without troops, and then skeleton exercises. The
headquarters exercise, the artillery exercise, the signal exercise
all these are of the greatest value.
(2) Verbal Orders.Officers must learn to give simple and
clear verbal instructions. Orders will produce only the results
they deserve. You can train as much as you like, but unless your
plan is clear and your orders decisiveand unless junior com
mangers know not only what their immediate task is, but what
the main object isyou will not get the best results. (Often you
will get no results at all.) It is for this reason that officers must
have continual practice in giving verbal orders.
(3) Ground and Distance.All leaders must be trained in the
selection of ground. In country where features are not numerous,
80
it is of the utmost importance to be able to pick out dominating

ground. Most soldiers are bad at judging distance, but
experience will remedy this.
(4) Intercommunication.Efficient
communications, which
must be maintained throughout all phases of a battle, are pri
marily the result of training. All forms of communication must
be practiced. Within the infantry battalion's area of responsi
bility, visual signaling and radio, singly or together, may provide
the means at any time in battle whereby just the vital order or
item of information may be transmitted and received. These
means are complementary to each other, and alternatives must
always be provided when communication lines are of paramount
importance.
Regimental signaling personnel must be especially selected.
The standard of radio efficiency must be high in all units, in
cluding infantry battalions.
Infantry company commanders must practice indicating artil
lery targets and correcting artillery fire. Field officers and com
pany officers must continually practice together.
Good maintenance of equipment, especially wireless sets and
batteries, is vital. This includes routine testing.
Assistance in all communication problems must be a part of
the responsibilities of chief signal officers, officers commanding
divisional signals, and brigade and regimental section signal of
ficers. Full use should be made of these officers.
c. Noncommissioned Officer and Specialist Cadres

Noncommissioned officer and specialist cadres (for reinforce
ments) are necessary at all times. Formations and units in the
forward areas should train cadres in their rear echelon. It is
important to maintain a high standard in training for specialists.
81
To insure a uniform standard, specialists must be tested by a

neutral board.
d. Sniping
Every infantry battalion must have a proper sniping organiza
tion, so that the battlefield may be dominated.
It is suggested that each company should select two known good
shots for training as company snipers and in addition, one man in
each section to be trained as the section sniper. Wherever pos
sible, snipers should be issued telescopic sights or special sniping
rifles.
These snipers must be highly trained in fieldcraft, camouflage,
and marksmanship. Normally, they should be trained to work in
pairs.
Their main task will be to locate and kill enemy commanders and
reconnaissance parties.
e. Maintenance
The importance of daily routine maintenance inspections must
be taught to all ranks. There must be a morning and evening
maintenance period. All officers below the rank of major who
are in charge of vehicles should attend these periods. They
should not stand about idly, but should pitch in and do a good
job of work.
The daily maintenance task system must be introduced and
insisted on, so that it will become automatic under any condi
tions. The tasks for armored force vehicles may be based on
mileage, to some extent.
During maintenance periods, all specialists must carry out
maintenance on their particular equipmentwireless sets, mortars,
and so on.
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5. COLLECTIVE TRAINING
a. Instructions by the Commander
The commander must issue instructions covering the following:
(1) The object of the training.
(2) The principle on which it is to be based.
(3) The standard aimed at.
(4) The phases of war to be studied.
(5) How he wishes the available time to be used.
(6") Special instructions regarding night operations.
b. Rules to Observe during Training

The following are important points to observe during collective
training:
(1) The training must be mixed. During company training,
battery training, and so on, the whole battalion or regiment
with full equipment should go out once every two weeks.
(2) Collective training must be based on preparing all units
to live hard, move light, and fight simply.
(3) All arms must study how to operate efficiently without
taking their full equipment into every battle. In certain battles,
and in certain country, it may be possible to leave various types
of equipment out of the battle. The carrying of unauthorized
equipment in vehicles is forbidden.
(4) During unit training, every exercise must include dusk
and dawn operations. These are the times when things happen
in war.
(5) Realism must be injected into the training, and the con
ditions of the battlefield be reproduced as far as possible. Troops
must be trained to advance under cover of artillery and mortar
fire.
(6) Full-scale collective training should be real tests of endur
ance for commanders, staffs, and troops. They should be made to
face difficult situations when really tired. If they are not tough,
they will fail.
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c. Operations to Be Taught
The following operations must be taught and practiced:
(1) The attack planned in complete detail.
(2) The dusk attack.
(3). The night attack.
(4) Penetration of obstacles.

(5) Reorganizing and holding the ground gained.
(6) Disengagement and withdrawal.
(7) Defensive tactics.
(8) Counterattacks.
(9) Patrolling by day and night (from one leader and two
men to a platoon).
d. Unit Drills
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Movement by motor transport and on foot.

Reconnaissance and deployment.
Occupying a position by day and night.
Bivouacking.
Night attack.
Mine lifting and laying.
Infantry attacking with tanks.
Consolidating an objective.
e. Night Training
Efficient training in night work is most important. Whenever
possible, all units must carry out night training at least three nights
a week. A continuous week of night work is strongly recommended
for all training units. At first, all personnel must be taught how
to move, observe, and listen at night. All units must be able to
operate on dark nights, as well as when the moon is bright.
In training for a night attack, sufficient time must be allowed
before daylight for consolidation of an objective already won, and
for proper digging-in.
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INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
f. Crossing Minefields
All troops must be taught the technique of crossing a mine
field, which is similar to the technique of crossing a river. It
must include:
(1) Careful reconnaissance.
(2) Clearly marked routes and gaps.
(3) Alternative crossings.
(4) Mine-lifting party.
(5) Covering party and artillery support (if by day, smoke).
(6) Control and collecting points for motor transport
vehicles manned by officers. Maintenance of good
communications with an officer in charge of lifting
operations.
(7) Order of priority of crossing.
(8) Lights and tape for marking.
(9) Recovery posts.
(10) Lines of departure. Assembly and re-assembly areas.
(11) Wire-cutting party.
6. GENERAL PRACTICES
a. Infantry vs. Tanks
Infantrymen must be trained to stand their ground when
attacked by tanks. They must be taught that the heaviest pos
sible concentration of small arms fire must be directed against
all attacking tanks, from the moment they come within range,
to force the tanks to close down. When the tanks are close
enough, they must be attacked with sticky grenades.
All ranks must be taught the general characteristics of tanks,
and at training depots tanks should be attached for a few days
so that men may get used to them. All men must practice
remaining in slit trenches and allowing tanks to run over them;
also, they must ride as gunners in tanks. This will teach them
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that, at close range, tank guns cannot place fire on men in slit
trenches.
Tank-hunting parties must be trained so that they can go out
and destroy disabled tanks, and attack them when in bivouac.
b. Artillery
It is most important to train units to control their ammunition
expenditure, and to render ammunition returns; if this is over
looked, it leads to waste.
c. Antitank Guns
Antitank units must be trained in the selection of defiladed posi
tions, and taught to dig their guns in.
d. Concealment
It is of the utmost importance that all defense works be well
camouflaged and that all subordinate units have alternative posi
tions to which they can move. Troops must be taught to dig in at
once when taking up a position. This applies equally to artillery
and infantry.
There are three types of positions. They are constructed in
this order:
(1) Fire positions.
(2) Alternate fire positions
(3) Dummy positions (when there is time to make them).
e. Organized Rest
If all ranks are going all-out on fighting and training, it is es
sential to have organized rest. This must be adhered to strictly
by all personnel.
86
f. Map Reading and Navigation

Map reading and navigation can always be improved. It is a
great help in map reading if all commanders shade, in two or three
different colors, the high ground on their maps.
g. Assault Courses
All training units should make assault or blitz courses. These
are excellent for testing the fitness of all ranks. The courses can
be laid out on any piece of groundif possible, in an area in which
live ammunition can be used. Blank ammunition, smoke, and fire
works will provide realism. Battle inoculation must be intro
duced at all training depots and reinforcement camps. Troops
must be trained to advance under cover of artillery, mortar, and
small-arms fire. They must also be shot over.
h. Observation
(1) General.Too often during exercises infantry soldiers
confine their attention to the back of the man in front. They
fail to notice any objects or indications of military significance.
Trivial details may disclose a great deal to an alert mind and
keen senses.
Men must be taught to use their eyes. This training must be
systematic and progressive.
(2) A Suggested Exercise.A suggested form of exercise in
the latter stages of observation training is as follows:
A route is selected over varying terrain. The route should avoid
roads and tracks, and should pass through both open and close
countryif possible, where the going is moderate at first but
becomes rougher. Approximately 2 miles is sufficient for initial
exercises. A number of objects should be laid along the route, and
at varying distances from ita fixed bayonet projecting from a
87
bush, a steel helmet appearing above a rock, a clumsy imitation of

natural camouflage, trip wires, men placed in position both close at
hand and in the distance along skylines and crest lines, suspicious
movement of individuals, rifle and light machine-gun fire, and
prearranged noises and signals.
Students, accompanied by an instructor, follow the route and
note objects seen, and the kinds and directions of noises. The men
are not allowed to halt, but are kept on the move the whole time.
The exercise is done best with small squads. Men should not march
in formation, but should be at liberty to march as they please,
provided that the prescribed route is adhered to.
Common faults are:
(a) Confining one's attention to a single suspicious object for
too long and neglecting the rest of the area, thereby falling into
a trap.
This fault can be demonstrated to squads by surprise attacks
staged from a direction other than that in which their attention
is fixed.
(b) Focusing either on the foreground or on the distance;
thereby failing to include the whole perspective in one's sphere
of observation.
A squad on a recent exercise, after spotting individuals in the
distance, failed to observe a man with a light machine gun in the
open at 25 yards, and, once having spotted certain nearby objects,
failed to notice distant movements on skylines.
i. Marching
The fact that infantrymen often are carried by motor trans
port must not result in any reduction in the capacity for march
ing. Infantry must train to march at least 15 miles a day and
fight a battle at the end of it. There is always a tendency to
use vehicles for short journeys which could easily be done on
foot.
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INTELLIGENCE
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j . Speed of Vehicles
Speed limits for each type of vehicle are laid down to prolong
the lives of the vehicles, and to conserve spare parts and tires.
Excessive speeds and dangerous driving still are common and
unchecked. This is simple unit discipline, and must be enforced.
Ic. Cooperation
I t cannot be emphasized too strongly that successful battle
operations depend on the initial cooperation of all arms, whether
in armored or unarmored units.
No one arm, alone and unaided, can achieve successful results
in battle. In training it should be made clear at an early stage
that all arms must work together in the closest possible cooper
ation.
It will be stressed that intercommunication is a primary factor
in the cooperation of all arms.
Every man must know the exact location of his own imme
diate headquarters during all phases of the battle.
Section III. HOW TO USE TROUSERS

AS A LIFE PRESERVER
1. INTRODUCTION
The idea of using trousers as an auxiliary means of
keeping a man afloat was submitted to the Office of
Naval Intelligence by the commanding officer of the
Naval Training Station, San Diego, Calif. All recruits
trained at the station are taught the technique. This
technique, with illustrations, is given in the Intelligence
Bulletin because troops of all Army branches may be
placed in situations where such knowledge might mean
the saving of lives.
2. THE TECHNIQUE
The first step in the process is to tie each leg of the

trousers with a suitable string or cord about 3 or 4
inches from the bottom (study fig. 10). If no string
or cord is available, tie an overhand knot with each
leg. The trousers are then grasped in the position
commonly used for dressing and swung overhead from
the back. The man then jumps into the water, holding
the trousers at arms' length over his head. Upon strik
89
90
Figure 10.Trousers Used As a Life Preserver.
UNITED NATIONSUSE OF TROUSERS AS LIFE PRESERVER
91
ing the water, the trousers are inflated. If time and

facilities permit, wet the trousers thoroughly before in
flationthis enables them to hold air better.
Recruits at the San Diego station are also trained
to remove their trousers while in the water and pre
pare them for life preservers. The trousers are
slipped off and the overhand knot is tied in the end
of each trouser leg. The trousers are then brought
quickly over the head at arms' length, from back to
front, thereby inflating them with equal efficiency.
Tests have been made which prove that inflated
trousers will hold a man's weight in water for as long
as 2 hours. By re-inflating the trousers, the time can
be extended as long as the man can repeat the inflating
process.
To float or swim, after the trousers are inflated, the
man places the inverted crotch of the trousers under
his arms and chest.
Khaki cloth will hold air better than the more por
ous navy blue trousers. The navy white and khaki
have about the same inflation value.
Section IV. HOW NEW ZEALAND TROOPS

PENETRATE WIRE OBSTACLES
New Zealand troops have successfully used the fol

lowing methods of getting through wire obstacles in
the Middle East. In considering this report, the
reader should keep in mind that it refers to a New
Zealand rifle company which, in approaching enemy
wire, has two platoons forward. Each platoon has its
three sections forward, also. Nos. 3 and 4 of each
section carry wire cutters.
a. Triple Concertina Fence
As the leading sections approach a triple fence of

concertina wire, they deploy into a line and lie down
about 10 to 15 yards from the wire. Nos. 3 and 4,
under covering fire from supporting weapons, or from
the section's own light machine guns, dash forward
and throw themselvesrelaxedagainst two adjoin
ing pickets. Screw pickets normally will bend under
the weight, and the fence will partly go down. If a
strand of barbed wire runs through all the concertina
loops, and is tied to the pickets, it may have to be cut.
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93
No. 5 man runs forward almost simultaneously, and,

with his rifle held well in front of him at high port,
hurls himself full-length against the length of wire be
tween the pickets. As a result, the whole stretch of
wire flattens almost to the ground.
Nos. 1 and 2, with their light machine gun, move
quickly and carefully through the gap, and lie down
about 10 to 15 yards past the wire. The section com
mander and the remaining men follow closely, lying
down deployed in line, with Nos. 3, 4, and 5 joining
Nos. 1 and 2. If necessary, the light machine gun gives
covering fire while the rest of the section comes through.
Simultaneously, all other forward sections are doing
the same, and should be ready to resume their attack.
If the wires are not tied, two men may be sufficient to
crash the fence between pickets.
b. Double Apron Fence
In approaching a double apron fence, the sections

follow the method outlined above. Nos. 3 and 4 throw
themselves at the pickets (whether screw, angle-iron,
or wood), with rifle at high port. These men quickly
cut the top wire and any other fence wires that are tied
to the pickets. No. 5 then dashes forward as before,
throwing himself, with rifle held well out to protect his
face, onto the stretch of wire between the pickets. All
these men should throw themselves boldly, but with
muscles relaxed. The section then hurries through
94
the gap and deploys as before, ready to continue the

attack.
Another method is for Nos. 3 and 4 to jump into
the wire, cut the top few strands, and then fall1 on the
remaining wire to make it sag, the section moving
through as before.
c. Two Double Apron Fences, Close Together
The procedure described in sub-paragraph b, above,

is followed, except that Nos. 5 and 6 crash down the
second fence.
d. Combined Wire Obstacles
Sometimes troops encounter the combination of a

double apron fence, a triple concertina fence, and an
other double apron fenceall close together. In
breaking through these combined obstacles, six men are
used, two per fence, who jump in, cut wires if necessary,
and crash down on the fence. Here, as in the situa
tion covered by sub-paragraph c, it may be advisable
for the platoon to be divided so that only two gaps are
made, instead of one per section. Two adjoining sec
tions can then go through one gap; the remaining sec
tion, together with platoon headquarters, can go
through the other. A definite method should be prac
ticed and adopted by each unit.
Wiring gloves are advised for Nos. 3 and 4, but are
not essential inasmuch as the rifle will bear the brunt
of the contact with the wire. Burlap or some similar
UNITED NATIONS
HOW TROOPS PENETRATE WIRE
95
protection can be used around the hands, if necessary.

It can be wrapped around the knees, also, if the men
are in shorts. It is emphasized that this is not es
sential, however. Every man must realize the impor
tance of speed, and must feel strongly determined to
get through the wire.
e. Comment
The time in which a forward platoon gets through

wire varies from 6 seconds, in the case of troops encoun
tering triple concertinas, to less than a minute in the
case of troops encountering the combined wire obstacles.
Under cover of artillery and medium machine-gun fire,
an entire forward battalion has succeeded in getting
through wire in 2 minutes and immediately continuing
the attack.

(1943) Intelligence Bulletin, Vol.I, No. 5

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(1943) Intelligence Bulletin, Vol.I, No. 5

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FOR USE OF MILITARY PERSONNEL ONLY

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Washington, January 1943

"The Americans are very poor at scouting, patrolling, and security

MINEFIELDS IN DESERT TERRAIN

THE INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER

PART FOUR: UNITED NATIONS

BRITISH TRAINING AND USE OF DOGS

RUSSIAN ANTITANK TACTICS

NOTES ON BRITISH ANTITANK TACTICS

Painted Sign Indicating Axis Minefield Gap

PAKT ONE: GERMANY

Section I. INFANTRY TACTICS

2. THE MEETING ENGAGEMENT

3. THE DELIBERATE ATTACK

Encircling forces must move in depth if they are not to be out

attack defiles on the enemy's line of retreat, and motorized

placed on the outskirts, especially on isolated buildings and small

Section II. MINEFIELDS IN DESERT

The following notes deal with the Axis technique of

The "S" mine is an anti-personnel weapon containing

This is a 3%-pound anti-personnel mine containing %

A new and unusually effective type of mine has been

MINEFIELDS IN DESERT TERRAIN

This is the most common. Mines in a row are spaced

By means of a pacing drill, a certain variety is intro

In front of most regular minefield belts, and par

scattered at random and unmarked. These are either

MINEFIELDS IN DESERT TERRAIN

marked rows of mines in front, then a row of concertina

contained gome "S" mines, but mostly the B4's.

Widths of 7 and 10 yards were observed.

Gaps are usually closed by means of two or three rows

In the northern sector of the El Alamein line, two types

MINEFIELDS IN DESERT TERRAIN

patrols and outposts, often located within the minefield

Section III. USE OF SMOKE

direction, or no wind at all; dry atmosphere, sunshine,

from 4 to 7 minutes. Sometimes a number of candles

Troops especially designated and trained as smoke units

use the following equipment:

(1) Smoke mortars 35 and J+0.These are two different

Other arms may be equipped with adaptations of the materiel mentioned

of aircraft with smoke-producing installations.

(2) Smoke mortar d.Although the Germans speak of

generally furnished by smoke-producing ammunition

(3) Concealing troop movements to prevent observation from

Throughout German training it is emphasized that

In the following miscellaneous instructions laid down

Section IV. 50-MM LIGHT MORTAR

German 50-mm Mortar

AMMUNITION FOR ABOVE

The 50-mm is muzzle-loaded and trigger-fired, and is

CLEANING ROO BRUSH CASE.

Figure 2. German 50-mm Light Mortar.

5 0-MM LIGHT MOTAR

has a smooth bore, and is not trigger-fired. It is designed

Figure 3. Another View of the German 50-mm Light Mortar.

The 50-mm is a two-man load. One man carries on

50-MM LIGHT MO'RTAR

(mils) due to one turn of the traversing control of the

The mortar can be laid either direct or by means of

After releasing the bomb, the loader's right hand in