Who Are We, Anyway?

By Riley Wilk
Interaction with the other is deemed vital due to its role in allowing one to more fully
understand oneself. While this explanation is not inaccurate, overemphasis on it risks devaluing the true
import and impact of the other on the Self1. Without the Other, there is no need for one to express
oneself because one understands one's own inward expression2 inherently. It is only once the Other's
presence is felt that one feels tight in one's skin3, as the impossibility of complete and accurate
expression becomes evident. It is only then that the saying diverges from the said, that the concept of
signification both comes into existence and becomes a necessity. It is only then, thus, that a self, by its
very nature, is, or even can be, created. This reinforces the extent to which a self is inherently for-theother; the purpose of a self is to express a Self in a manner most effectively interpretable by an Other.
Each interaction, then, is either a forging or a honing of a self. Which of these it is depends on the
perceived difference between the currently expressed facades4 of the two parties involved. When one is
forced to act in a manner or realize things contrary to their currently expressed facade, it creates an
inner conflict over how to resolve this dissonance, whether to incorporate this into a revised version of
the current facade or create a new facade, itself different enough to resolve the dissonance. This is
particularly notable with regard to Marlow. He is still faced with this conflict even upon his return,
perhaps partially prompting him to tell his story in an attempt to find some sort of resolution, because
he simply tries to distance himself from the events he sees and experiences and the resultant dissonance
he feels, neither resolving it with his generally held facade nor establishing a separate self. His absolute
unwillingness to resolve what he goes through with his own view of himself and his enforced distance
from it is mostly bluntly reflected when the helmsman dies and he selectively obsesses over the blood
on his shoes. Rather than face the reality of what he has experienced, he only views in with regard to
his previous self, neither advancing nor expanding. Bohannon at times is guilty of the same mistake;
for much of her story, she sees it as necessary to resolve all of her experiences with her previous self as
opposed to establish a new self. It is only once the others force her into a new self with the symbolic act
of renaming her that she realizes the level of dissonance is too great for her to understand the society to
any effective extent while resolving all interactions and experiences to Bohannon, and while she does
occasionally relapse, her knowledge that it is impossible to fully reconcile Redwoman with Bohannon
is reflected in her creation of Bowen. Kurtz, on the other hand, is quick to establish a new self, being
well versed in acting how others expect of him, enabling his rise and worship both in his company life
and outpost life. It is the dramatic shift in influence of his selves on his perceived Self, though, that is a
major contributor to his inability to ever effectively leave; his focus on his newly created self has
prevented his previous self from surviving intact. These examples, however, focus primarily on a
particular type of differentiation of self, that in which a single oneself can possess multiple selves that
are sufficiently independent so as not to require reconciliation of one self's actions with the rest of the
selves. Such selves can be termed major facades. This focus on major facades is not meant to devalue
the importance of minor facades, the variations that compose major facades; the explanation thereof is
that minor facades, while more important at their core to most interaction and identity as a whole, are
so ubiquitous as to be scarcely identifiable. Each other encountered creates a new framework for
interaction, necessitating the creation of a new minor facade for each involved party, starting from an
established major facade and making alterations as necessary, based on perceptions of the other, to
effectively establish the intended interaction. These minor facades combine and reinforce each other to
form major facades, from which further minor facades are drawn. These facades, therefore, form the
basis of all interaction, through which each network of facades is more carefully refined. It is uncertain,
though, how representative these facades are of the Self they mask or if the Self can even be said to be
of the same form as the facades.

Identity
By Dupin
Identity is a peculiar concept given both how little we know of ourselves and how little we
know of others. Our own perceptions of ourselves are determined largely by the reactions of others to
the aspects of ourselves that we display. Our perceptions of others are determined by our interpretations
of the aspects of themselves that they choose to display. The levels of falsehood and inexpressibility
here are legion but also inevitable. It is impossible for any given self, regardless of its accuracy to the
wearer, to be accurately represented in expression, and it is similarly impossible for even this
inaccurate expression to be properly translated. As the selves thus employed are created and refined by
these inaccuracies, the problem only compounds itself. Interaction can therefore be said to consist of
two masks molding each other, revealing nothing about the faces underneath. This seems to result in an
inconvenient conclusion regarding relationships; namely, that continued interaction with a given other
and the facade they choose for the relationship results only in increased and more definite inaccuracy as
opposed to any true knowledge of the other. Even within this framework, though, this conclusion is not
as bleak as it sounds and raises questions regarding the nature of truth. If through a maintained
relationship, a particular self is refined and developed beyond the usual limited possibility, creating
through this investment an identity, irreal as it is, is created that can be more precise and exact than any
actuality due to the narrow framework in which it exists, this is arguably the greatest potential of selfexpression, of self-actualization, the most reasonable facsimile through which the essential
impossibility of communication can be evaded. If the oneself is defined itself by others, is this
expressible mask any less real than the inexpressible oneself? Is it any less true?
With the above in mind, interaction can be seen as a means of increasing potential for the
creation of more complex and varied selves. If interaction is neglected, the potential of the self is thus
limited, thus in turn capping understanding, depth, and possibility of growth. Isolation can thereby
create a dangerous spiral of lack of interaction preventing further interaction due to lack of necessary
capacity of identity. Interaction, contrarily, engenders further interaction, constantly widening the flow
of possibility for expansion, revision, derivation, integration, and recasting of self and other.
The idea of fiction has now been referenced several times and is likely a thread of thought
warranting exploration. How does the concept of fiction relate both the inherent falsity of self and the
necessity of interaction in establishing self? Clearly, fiction is a form of indirect interaction, as is all
writing, but with who? The role of indirect interaction itself is somewhat unclear, given the emphasis
on the face to face for any knowledge of the other. One key lacking of indirect interaction is that the
self being interacted with is predefined as opposed to engaging in a process of continual refining with
the other. Therefore, while indirect interaction can provide some of the benefits of direct interaction,
particularly the ability to expand a self or create new selves, it lacks relevance to actual interaction and
as a result cannot establish the skills of continuous reformation and development found in direct
interaction. Fiction is itself a unique sort of indirect interaction, though, because along with the implied
indirect interaction with the author's author self, indirect interaction exists with the characters, selves
that purportedly do not exist outside the realm of the narrative. But can this be truly said to be the case?
Characters certainly do not come from nowhere; they are by necessity based on the interactions of their
author and the selves seen and experienced by the author's oneself. In this sense, are they any less
selves of the author than the author's author self? Isn't any character interaction inherently an internal
dialogue exploring the concept of a self other to another self within the same oneself? Within this
frame, fiction can be said to offer more possibility of interaction, and thereby potential and expansion,
for the reader because more selves are presented and the fact of their irreality is not disguised. This
explains, then, Nordstrom's frustration; reality cannot be portrayed through portrayal of ostensible
reality, it can only be best approximated through the recognition of inherent irreality.

Masks
By Raisonneur
RAISONNEUR: Is everyone here?
RILEY WILK: I think so. But why are we here?
RAISONNEUR: How rhetorical was that question?
RILEY WILK: As little as possible.
RAISONNEUR: Well, you're writing an essay about identity.
RILEY WILK: Yeah, and as part of my idea I'm having different parts of my identity write introductory
bits. But what does that have to do with this?
RAISONNEUR: Do I really seem like the type to write an essay?
RILEY WILK: I guess not.
RAISONNEUR: There you have it, then.
DUPIN: It's a skit of some sort between us. It's rather meta, probably.
RILEY WILK: Alright, but will that work? This is supposed to be an essay.
DUPIN: The essay's still here. This could provide an interesting perspective.
RILEY WILK: Sure, it's nicely self-referential given the topic, but is it actually relevant?
RAISONNEUR: What better way to explore identity? And I was getting to that. Are we all here?
RILEY WILK: Yes.
RAISONNEUR: Let them answer for themselves. You aren't in charge here any more than the rest of
us.
RILEY WILK: I'm the one who's supposed to be writing the essay.
RAISONNEUR: Are you?
RILEY WILK: Well, if not, then who is?
RAISONNEUR: All of us.
DUPIN: Or none of us, depending on how you look at it.
RILEY WILK: What?
DUPIN: Considering we're all defined by and dependent on the influence of others, couldn't it be most
accurately said that it is those others writing this essay?
RILEY WILK: ...So you mean, in part, for example, Clarke Speed is writing this essay?
DUPIN: Of course.
RILEY WILK: That seems like something that isn't generally accepted.
DUPIN: On the contrary. If he isn't, at least one of you is doing something wrong.
RAISONNEUR: So, yes, that's established. Hudson, are you here? Haven't heard anything from you.
HUDSONWOLF: I'm not sure why I'm here, really. I mostly just play video games.
RAISONNEUR: Sure, now you do. But you used to encompass Dupin and myself, so you're relevant.
HUDSONWOLF: It just seems a bit arbitrary. By their very nature, these selves overlap.
RAISONNEUR: Indeed they do. But we're the important ones.
HUDSONWOLF: Who's to decide that? MonkeyJoe was important for years until I mostly replaced
him. I don't see him here, though.
RAISONNEUR: He's decidedly past. You're still here.
HUDSONWOLF: Does that make him any less relevant?
DUPIN: Hm. It's safe to say that most of these identities incorporate aspects of others in new ways to
create a unique identity, correct?
RILEY WILK: Some of us more than others. I mean, you're even named after one.
DUPIN: We all are. But that's beside the point. Shouldn't, say, Silas be here, then?
RAISONNEUR: The D&D paladin? He's just a character.
DUPIN: Aren't we all?

A Title Carefully Selected to Match the Apparent Inclinations of the Reader

By People Too Numerous to List Or Even Remember
Imitation is a basic fact of humanity. It has been argued that it is our particular focus on
imitation that has allowed for the widespread development and adaptation of skills and, therefore, for
the advancement of the species as a whole. It is perhaps no great stretch, then, to consider that imitation
is the very basis of identity and interaction. This is at the same time, however, contrary to certain
societal beliefs. Through much of history, society has had a conflicted relationship with imitation; to
establish this in terms of example, imitation is seen at once as the sincerest form of flattery and a
bastard brother of originality. We are pressured at once to conform and subvert, to step in line and step
out, to fit in and to transcend. Imitation is, therefore, on somewhat rocky territory. From one
perspective, it is true that identity and interaction are centered on perception of what others would do in
a similar situation and what one would do in the situation of the other, as supported from different
angles by both Levinas' concept of substitution and social maxims such as the famed 'Golden Rule' of
Do unto others as you would have them do unto you. Beyond this, though, a logical extension of that
any given self is defined by the influence of others is that any action of that self is an attempt to imitate
a relevant action or perceived action of one or more of those influences. To restate this both for clarity
and emphasis, all action is in some form imitation.
What, then, does this mean of originality? At first glance, it may seem to signal a death knell for
anything that can be accurately considered originality. After all, if all actions are imitations, there is no
space for actions ex nihilo; all actions must have a basis and precedent. To conclude from this that
originality is nonexistent, though, is to discredit the full extent of the possibility created by imitation.
The clearest indicator of this is through divided imitation. As any self will have more than one
influence, any action, based on imitation as it is, will be subject to imitation of multiple sources and as
such cannot precisely replicate a previous action of any one influence. Therefore, all such actions with
multiple influences are inherently original. Language works as a convenient example here. The placing
of two known linguistic entities, phrases or axioms, in relation to each other creates an original
construct5; from a larger perspective, the rearrangement of words to form new meaning is inherently an
act of imitation due to the nature of words, but it is also an act of creation due to the new meaning
formed. One extension of this may already be apparent. Even in the hypothetical situation where an
action has only one known influence, though this is largely impossible due to the multitude on
influences weighing on any possible action, the inherent, unresolvable difference between the influence
and the actor will mean that the imitator's action will be an imperfect imitation of the influence and the
action will therefore be original precisely because of its imperfection. It must be pointed out here,
though, that the notion of perfection can be misleading regarding imitation; imperfection does not
imply a loss of quality or prevent a gain thereof. To use theatre as an example in following the
interrelation of action and actor, if the scenes of Hamlet are reordered, there has been no spark of
creation beyond the imitation of the original, yet something original and different has been produced
and the meaning has changed. If Waiting for Godot is run twice consecutively, the meaning changes
even though the play has not. Are these not examples of originality despite the extent to which they are
entirely composed of imitation? This is not the limit of originality, though. At the risk of reducing
originality to nothing by expanding it, actions mean nothing without context. The same thing said or
done by a different entity inherently has a different meaning. If Shakespeare's plays had been written
today, though this hypothetical must to some extent defer to the power of imitation in that today would
not be today without the existence of Shakespeare's plays, their reception and analysis would be
decidedly different6. The use of entity here is deliberate in that even the same oneself can give different
meaning to the same imitation, depending on the particular situation and state of self. To expand on a
previous statement, all action is inherently original because any given action exists in a different space

and time, meaning by necessity that different forces are influencing the actor and creating an originality
even in the conscious or subconscious attempt of imitation.
If all action is original, what does it mean to be original? This question is inseparable from that
of what the faults are of imitation. Generally, the primary fault of imitation is said to be that it limits
perspective and fosters an unhealthy preference for the known over the unknown. Thus, originality is
action that challenges or subverts perceptions or combines influences in intriguing ways. This may
seem like a straight-forward definition, but it highlights the extent to which originality is not separate
from imitation but rooted in it.
This, inevitably, relates back to the self and the issue of how to expand selves and increase
understanding of the other. By recognizing that any self is by necessity a product of influence and the
actions thereby taken are therefore imitations and that this is not necessarily a negative reflection on the
originality of either, we free the self from the perceived paradox of creating something entirely original
while incorporating outside influence, for this is by nature impossible. By accepting that the self is
defined by others, the focus becomes on using these influences to craft ideas together in ways that can
be truly considered original despite and because of their bases. The greatest possible potentiality comes
from constant attempt to expand experience and influences, amassing more to draw from to create and
to know. Exploring is, then, the essence of living, and each other is a conduit to an entire other universe
of influences and experience. For each entity is completely original; to paraphrase a previous
supposition, any given experience and influence is original for each entity thus influenced due to the
inherent difference in translation. To know the other is then not only to know oneself but to know who
one could be.
The interpretation of a oneself as its own universe of influences and experience incorporates
itself conveniently with the concept of a oneself consisting of a self for each other encountered. We are
all legion; each entity is composed of a certain number of pairs of characters7. Whether Dunbar's
number impacts the number of selves and corresponding self-others is uncertain; it is possible that
beyond a certain limit, selves increasingly overlap and self-others begin to drop from memory. In any
case, each self of a oneself, defined as it is by perceptions of the apparent nature of the other and
composed of imitations sourced from a variety of influences, corresponds to experience and influence
of the oneself regarding the others of that oneself's experience. Each self therefore consists of a unique
selection and combination of influences deemed relevant to interaction with the corresponding other,
meaning each self is an original creation. Establishing new interaction is thereby an act of creation and
an opening of new potential and possibility; even as certain points of the universes of influence and
experience come into contact, new worlds open. The understanding that one's universe of perception is
not absolute is therefore key to expanding it. One must understand the limitations and absurdity of
one's own universe to be able to transcend it. The Russian is the most obvious exemplar of this outlook;
he seeks as much experience as he possibly can, lingering with those he sees as having complex
universes in order to expand his own by adding dimension. Similarly, Rogo transcends and ties together
multiple universes and the societal outlooks they represent by seeing none as absolute.
Who are we, then? We are everyone we have interacted with, learned from, loved, hated, or
been impacted by, combined in whichever ways we decide are most convenient for the situation at
hand, and yet we are none of them. We are nebulous others, caught in the impossibility of expression.
We are creatures of imitation, wearers of masks on a desperate search for the elusive notion of truth.
Perhaps the most powerful thing we can say about who we are, however, is that we do not know.

WOR(L)D WORK
SAYING VS. SAID: A representation of the fundamental impossibility of expression.
ABYSS: The unknown, the other, the uncertain possibility.
TRANSMOGRIFICATION: Replacement of one held facade with another, particularly in reference to
the same other.
SPEAK OF VS. SPEAK TO: Differing layers of accuracy of representation and influence.
KERYGMATICAL: Portraying of something as absolute.
THRESHOLD: Boundary of entrance or exit, potentially the point where a major facade must be
created.
CREATOR: Source of self. A hypothetical Creator beyond creation would be the source of hypothetical
true Self beyond created selves.
GOD-AS-UNKNOWABLE: The impossibility of communication on an entirely different level (Jesus
as major facade to better express self?). Creation as a means for God to know Himself?
BEYOND GOD: Can a being, even a God, exist without influence? What is God without Creation?
ACTUALIZATION: Accurate representation of something through action (impossible?)
FACE TO FACE: Interaction where selves are continually being refined and redefined.
MAJOR FACADE: Independent identity within an entity (though still overlapping and subject to many
of the same influences)
MINOR FACADE: Particular incarnation of a major facade for interaction with a particular other,
defined by selected influences deemed most relevant as compared to perceived other (which is itself a
minor facade)
FICTION: Interaction of hypothetical entities and their respective selves within the universe of an
author.
REALITY: See Fiction? (Each entity as an author, would Author (Creator) imply Author's reality as
objective reality?)

1 I use Self and Other here to refer to a complete oneself as opposed to a particular self of that oneself. Whether this is
identical to a hypothetical 'true' self or a sum of all selves is not investigated by this definition.
2 Impression?
3 I'll just put this here, I suppose: I apologize for the previous lack of full use of Levinas; I was paranoid of misusing
things, but by Levinasing Levinas, it becomes evident that differing from the general interpretation is not necessarily a
misinterpretation and as such I'll attempt to incorporate more Levinasian concepts, if perhaps redefining them in the
process. Though I suppose reuse of concepts by definition redefines them?
4 When referring to the expression of selves, I will generally refer to these expressed selves as facades both to alleviate
confusion and reinforce the layers of falsehood between Self, self, and perception.
5 To include an example that conveniently relates back to the inherent violence of encounters: War is hell. Hell is other
people.
6 I will, however, choose to ignore the potentiality and effects of the inevitable recreation of Shakespeare's plays by
random number generators, or monkeys on typewriters if preferred.
7 The reference to DNA via 'pairs of characters' was entirely unintentional but is perhaps interesting.