Rathfelder 1

You Are Dead Wrong: Investigating the Effects of Digital Media Content on Individual Issue
Opinions

Amy Rathfelder

Professor van Doorn

May 3, 2013

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Introduction and Model
There are few influences in the 21st century that have as much power over the political
system than the media. With the decline of print media, the digital age media, including Internet
and television, has built a dominant presence in American society and for this reason, it is a topic
that is often explored and studied by political scientists because of its undeniable effects on
American politics. In this study, I will look at media in a more in-depth manner through an
experimental methodology designed to examine the relationship between the content of digital
media and the extremity of individual issue opinions:
MEDIA CONTENT

EXTREMITY OF ISSUE OPINION

SOURCE CONSISTENCY (conditional variable)

Review of Literature
Does media content impact the extremity of issue opinions? This is the question that is
the inevitable result of developing and evolving technology and the move into the digital age. As
the 21st century progresses, Americans are relying more on digital mediatelevision and Internet
as news outlets, and less on print media (Sullivan 2012). The progression of technological and
digital media has paralleled a shift in American politics to a more polarized, extremist
environment, to the point where it is becoming increasingly difficult to find independent voters
with neutral positions on policies and issues (Galston and Pietro 2006). Specifically, Galston and
Pietro (2006) define polarization as the division of public opinion into two extremes: Republican
and Democrat, or right wing and left wing, respectively. So how does this shift in media to a
more biased content environment impact an individuals opinion on a specific issue? Recent
literature suggests that media has a polarizing effect on the mass and elite levels of the American

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electorate (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008). Because of this general finding, I hypothesize a
similar effect at the individual level as well. Biases evident in media content and a more selective
source consistency will result in more extremist and polarized individual issue opinions.
In addressing this hypothesis, I will look first at the concepts of media content and media
availability. Despite the ongoing debate of the impacts of polarized media, the majority of
political scientists agree that most media has some type of bias (Morris 2007). Media content in
terms of my research will be defined as such: The views and opinions expressed in the source the
individual consumes to gather political news. Bias in the media thus becomes extremely
important. As Morris (2007) concludes, the 21st century media environment of ubiquitous and
biased media has made it harder than ever to pinpoint moderate and more balanced reporting.
This consensus of a noticeable bias in new media is solid among political scientists. However,
there is a continued debate as to the leaning of this bias not only among the political community,
but in the media itself. America sees it daily. Politicians, pundits, commentators, authors, and
journalists argue continuously over which side is represented more clearly in the news. In the
literature reviewed, there is the same lack of consensus. Groseclose and Milyo (2005) find
evidence of a heavy liberal bias in both print and digital media by a cross-data analysis method.
Eric Altermans (2003) findings contradict this, as he presents evidence that liberal bias in the
news is a useful myth, or something Americans know is not necessarily true but choose to
believe anyway. Alterman finds that the media is actually more conservative (though he concedes
that it is possible to find evidence for a liberal bias as well), and concludes that this is due largely
to the fact that that conservatives howl so much louder and more effectively than liberals
[because of this], big media is always on its guard for liberal bias but gives conservatives a free
pass (2003, 3). These two conflicting conclusions are a small part of a large debate that has no

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foreseeable end. Ultimately, however, the most important conclusion in terms of this research is
evidence from Morris, who reiterates the conventional wisdom that content of political news is,
on the whole, less and less moderate and balanced (2007). Support comes from Yi Xiang and
Miklos Sarvary (2007), who find that media bias is evident in both conservative and liberal
forms. Additionally, David Baron finds evidence of a persistent bias in the media, one that has
increased as media has expanded in outlet options (2006). With so many outlets to select political
news from, news consumers cannot possibly watch them all. That is why, as Markus Prior (2005)
argues, media choice makes it easier for individuals to find their preferred content. In highchoice environments, the impact of ones preferences increases, and indiscriminate viewing
becomes less likely (Prior 2005, 579). Thus, the conventional wisdom of the literature reviewed
supports overwhelming evidence of a media bias, both liberal and conservative, that has
intensified as the digital media environment has grown. Moreover, evidence in the literature
indicates that as media biases and options increase, news consumers become more consistent in
media selection based on their political ideology.
The studies that present evidence of a bias in the media are with some exceptions
generally credible and clear. Altermans work is the most questionable, as his finding of a more
conservative leaning is not based on any type of data collection, only an analysis of comments
from primarily conservative pundits. As a self-identified liberal, there is a stronger possibility
that his book carries some bias. Priors study is cohesive as well, but its intentas is the case
with the rest of the sources reviewedis to study the larger concept of the general American
electorate. It does not address specific opinions that individuals form in response to media biases
and self selection. As explained later in the methodology, this research will provide a more
focused evaluation of the relationship between individual issue opinions and media content with

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known bias by investigating how opinions change in response to friendly and hostile media.
Ultimately, these findings regarding media content and environment have generated an excellent
basis upon which to build my own experimental design and draw more specific conclusions.
Source consistency is a vital condition in determining the medias effect on the extremism
of American politics. Political scientist Elihu Katz defines source consistency as the notion that
people selectively expose themselves to like-minded media content and states that it is among
the most influential factors in mass communication (1996, 27). Media choice in the digital age
presents viewers with so much media that they cannot possibly consume all of it, and will
therefore select their media outlets based on their preexisting political parties, beliefs, etc.
(Sunstein 2007, 5). Thus, media consumers in the digital age are much more likely to be
consistent in their content selection. This is the basic consensus of the literature subsequently
reviewed from Stroud and Iyengar and Hahn. By using data from two National Annenberg
Election surveys and the 2004 presidential election, Stroud finds evidence from analysis that
suggests political beliefs do indeed motivate media use patterns (2007, 341). She finds that
[a] substantial proportion of the publicconsumes media sharing their political
predispositions. Of the media types evaluated in this study, 64 percent of conservative
Republicans consume at least one conservative media outlet compared to 26 percent of
liberal Democrats. In contrast, 43 percent of conservative Republicans consume at least
one liberal outlet while 76 percent of liberal Democrats consume at least one liberal
outlet. These striking percentages document the extent of partisan selective exposure in
the contemporary media environment (2007, 358).
Additionally, Iyengar and Hahn use findings from an online experiment to conclude that [as] the
possibility of selective exposure to political information increases[P]eople prefer to encounter
information that they find supportive or consistent with their existing beliefs (2009, 35).
Conclusions from these authors indicate that preexisting beliefs will indeed determine personal
filtering patterns and therefore source consistency.

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The authors reviewed presented clear and valid studies, but there are a few areas in which
the literature was lacking. Strouds (2007) dataset drew only from 2004, which was an election
year. This presents a challenge to the findings, because there is research showing that a sense of
political polarization in the electorate and the media is heightened during an election year
(Coffey and Green, 2007). While not all data is based off of election years, a more reliable study
would have worked to vary datasets in order to present more general and less biased conclusions.
My own research will take place in a non-election year in order to avoid this bias. Generally,
however, evidence and conclusions about selective exposure and source consistent viewers is
cohesive and strong. There is solid consensus in the political community that most news
consumers choose sources that mirror their own viewpoints. Because of media bias discussed
earlier, most of these media contents are not presenting a moderate viewpoint and will most
likely result in higher levels of political extremism.
In terms of political psychology the cognitive dissonance mechanism theory is one that
applies directly to this study. This theory relates to the formation of the extremism of issue
opinionsnamely, the audience reaction to biases and inconsistencies in digital media.
Cognitive dissonance in this study is defined as according to Festinger: A psychological state in
which an individuals cognitions, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors are at odds (1962, 3).
Festinger, who put forth the theory, acknowledges that it has implications in multiple different
areas of life, including political psychology (1962, 16). The studies and literature investigating
the effects of cognitive dissonance on political attitudes have been, for the most part, inconsistent
in their findings. Authors Sendhil Mullainathan and Eboyna Washington applied cognitive
dissonance to favorability ratings of candidates that their research subjects had previously voted
for, while hypothesizing that [c]ognitive dissonance theory predicts that the act of voting for a

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candidate leads to a more favorable opinion for the candidate in the future (2009, 86). By
examining presidential opinion ratings of voting-age eligibles and ineligibles a year into the
presidency of Barack Obama, Mullainathan and Washington conclude that the resulting opinions
of the eligibles from both parties were two to three times more polarized than the opinions of the
voting-age ineligibles (2009, 86). Their general finding states that political beliefs will become
more polarized in response to consistent and inconsistent influence (Mullainathan and
Washington 2009). However, there is literature that contradicts this. By examining data from two
online experiments that tested the effects of opinionated news and interactions with individual
political partisanship on information processing and attitude changes, political scientist Lauren
Feldman finds that exposure to like-minded media and hostile media supports a model of direct
persuasion. Message processing and attitude change follow the direction of the news opinion,
with little variation by partisanship, offering no evidence that opinionated news intensifies
attitude differences among partisans relative to [non-biased news] (2011, 163). Feldmans
findings illustrate the inconsistency of prior literature in exploring the effects of exposure to
differing viewpoints. B.R. Warner finds that given media fragmentation, increasing extremism in
response to favored media is possible, but it is more evident in the conservative condition than
the liberal one (2010, 442). Diana Mutz and Paul Martin (2001) conversely find that extremism
is possible in all forms, and that the increasingly polarized political attitudes in the electorate has
motivated new media producers to provide an increasing dearth of centrist opinions in the news.
These conclusions are representative of a general lack of consensus in the literature regarding
how cognitive dissonance affects resulting political attitudes. How will individuals respond to
viewpoints that make them uncomfortable or are hostile to their preconceived notions, especially
if the condition of source selectivity and personal filtering is applicable? I hope to contribute to

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existing literature by providing a clearer result in this experiment to provide more clarity to the
conflicting findings.
Media has undergone a revolution since the 20th century in the transition to the digital
age. Technology-dependent Americans have never had such easy access to such an infinite
library of newsit is literally everywhere we look, and is available with the click of a button. As
media has changed, so too has the average American consumer, leaving political scientists and
communication scholars with fascinating phenomena that demands further investigation and
study. How exactly has the American media consumer changed in regard to the effect that media
has? Is media really the most prominent factor in how we form our individual opinions on issues
or who to vote for or what party we affiliate with? While I cannot answer all of these questions in
a standalone study, issue opinions and how the media impacts them will provide me with ample
data and questions to answer. The extremism of both the American electorate and the individuals
opinion is something that parallels the rise of new media, and is therefore a relationship that is
and will be of great importance as we continue to work toward a world with an increased
reliance on technology.
Theory
Based on prior literature, I hypothesize first that the results of this study will show higher
levels of extremism in the individuals who are source consistent. This is expected based on
literature findings of increasing extremism in response to ideologically consistent sources
(Warner 2010). The more consistent the source, message of the source, and the political ideology,
the more extreme the scores will be. If the source and message are inconsistent with the ideology,
the resulting opinion will still be relatively extreme because the individual will reject the media.

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If the source is inconsistent with the ideology, the opinion will also be relatively extreme but
could potentially deviate toward the center. I hypothesize further that there will be noticeable
quantifiable differences in the scores of participants exposed to consistent sources as opposed to
inconsistent ones. While it is hard to theorize or predict the responses of an individual exposed to
a consistent source and ideology and an inconsistent message, the basic hypothesis is that the
scores will be varied and non-homogenous. In order to accept the hypothesis, there must be a
statistically significant discrepancy in the scores from across the experimental groups and well as
more extreme scores for those who take in more consistent media.
Methodology
Introduction
How does media content affect the extremism of issue opinions? To answer this question,
a quantitative experiment is designed which attempts to relate extremism in political beliefs and
exposure to biased media sources. Specifically, this research will extend the work of previous
studies by examining the effect of media content and source consistencies and inconsistencies on
specific issue opinions, rather than general political affiliations.
There are multiple goals of this study. I would like to provide insight to a somewhat
conflicted general consensus on the effect of biased media on political polarization in general
while presenting a more specific look into this phenomenon by looking at specific issue
opinions. The experimental method is ideal for investigating this, as the logic of the design offers
stronger conclusions in determining the causality of the relationship between these two variables.
Measures

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Defining the measures in my experiment first requires an operational definition of my
three variables. My independent variable of media content is the actual media being engaged and
the bias that comes along with it. For example, if an individual chooses to watch the evening
news on Fox, their media content would be the views and reporting styles presented on the Fox
News Channel. Recent literature has concluded that the greater the media options, the more
likely consumers are to filter their media selection to predispositions or political opinions and
consume media that matches their own views (Prior 2005). Thus, their media content usually
mirrors their political beliefs. Participants will be randomly assigned to a specific media type and
content. This removes the possibility of self-selection and simulates an environment in which
there is a disconnect between the source reputation and the reporting bias.
The conditional variable of source consistency is defined as the consistency in source
reputation/bias and ideological belief. An individual identifying themselves liberal would be
source consistent if he or she were watching MSNBC reporting from a liberal perspective, but
inconsistent if exposed to MSNBC reporting a conservative perspective. In attempting to
measure source consistency, I will rely on the post-survey, which asks respondents a question
about their political ideological beliefs. I will then compare their answers to the media they were
exposed to in order to determine whether or not they had a consistent news source.
Finally, the dependent variable will be defined as the extremism of the individuals
opinion resulting from the media they are exposed to in the experiment. The media I will using is
an adaptation and play on source reputation. I will be writing mock-ups of articles someone
might find on the Fox News website reporting from both a liberal and conservative perspective
on a consistent issue, and I will do the same for two articles written by MSNBC, which is a
traditionally liberal source. In regard to validity, the measures used aim to be as valid as possible.

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The level of correspondence between my measures and the concepts they attempt to measure is
strong. Measuring the conditional variable of source consistency is more challenging. Given the
vast nature of beliefs and opinions that contribute to ones party identification, there is no way to
account for every single type of affiliation. I will instead ensure that the survey is content valid
by providing exhaustive answer options.
Cases/Sampling
This study requires a sample that will be drawn both in and outside of the Colleges
community. In order to avoid a sample that leans too far in a single ideological direction (e.g.,
more conservatives than liberals), the sample will be random. Random selection and assignment
will avoid homogeneity in beliefs and demographics and will ensure data that is as generalizable
as possible. The sample must also be large enough to ensure adequate numbers of conservatives
and liberals in each of the experimental groups, and to improve confidence in statistical analyses.
There will undoubtedly be participants who identify as Independent or are unsure of their
ideological identification. A large sample will guarantee enough participants that are more
partisan in their ideological beliefs.
Data Sources
As I am using an experimental methodology, I will be compiling my own data. After
being exposed to one of the four media options by random assignment, participants will take a
post-survey, which will be the source of my data. The post-survey will be composed of two
questions that will serve as measures for the resulting issue opinion and source consistency. The
first question will ask the participant their opinion after the experiment. The coding scale taken

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from ANES is a three-point scale (American National Election Surveys). In the example, the
issue of prayer in schools is used:
Should prayer be allowed in public schools?
1- Allow prayer in schools
2- No religion in schools
3- Dont know, no interest
The second and final question will ask the participants ideological political views, which will
allow me to determine source consistency. I am also using a coding scale developed by ANES:
Which of the following best describes your political ideological identification?
12345678-

Extremely liberal
Liberal
Slightly liberal
Moderate, middle of the road
Slightly conservative
Conservative
Extremely conservative
Unsure

In the final version of this survey, I also plan on asking participants questions regarding political
demographics to help with measuring ideological beliefs and in determining source consistency.
Two coding schemes will be used in analyzing this data. Both are taken from the American
National Election Surveys. To measure issue opinion, the three-point scale is used. The scale
measuring ideological beliefs is larger and encompasses eight points. In terms of reliability, the
main issues this study presents are in experimental conditions. A limitation of the experiment is
that opinions on only one issue are presented to the subject. The inability to present multiple
issues could make the data more unreliable. Someone attempting to recreate this experiment
could get different results depending on the issues. It is impossible to control for every opinion

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or political leaning, and this presents a limitation in a survey-experiment design such as this one.
More involved experiments that include multiple issue opinions could be designed, but in the
interest of resource limitations and time requirements, a single-issue design was selected as an
initial approach.
Analytic Techniques
I will be compiling my own data based on the ANES coding scales and will analyze them
by cross-comparison. I will use the difference of means and T-test as an analytic method. Data
will first be grouped according to media type: respondents exposed to the liberal source and the
respondents exposed to the conservative source. Within the groups, subgroups will be defined by
the source bias, indicated in the table below. This cross-comparison will allow me to test for the
independence of the variables by using a T-test and can ultimately help determine if the
relationship if significant.

CONSERVATIVE
PERSPECTIVE

LIBERAL PERSPECTIVE

CONSERVATIVE
SOURCE

SUBGROUP 1

SUBGROUP 3

LIBERAL SOURCE

SUBGROUP 2

SUBGROUP 4

Expectations
In order to see evidence of my proposed relationship, there will need to be statistically
significant differences in the data across the experimental groups. Based on my hypothesis, I
would expect source consistent participants to score differently than a participant exposed to an
inconsistent source. In accordance with my hypothesis, source consistent viewers should have
much more extreme scores than participants who are inconsistent in message, source, or
ideology. There should thus be noticeable differences in the resulting values. If the data is more
homogenous and the source consistent viewers do not have extreme scores, it would indicate that

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media content does not influence the extremity of issue opinions and would lead me to accept the
null hypothesis.
Strengths and Weaknesses
Like any study, mine presents both strengths and weaknesses in its execution and
analysis. By randomizing the sample and the media exposure, too much representation of a
single political bias in the results will be limited. The primary strength in this experiment is the
high level of internal validity. This is due to the experimental design, which will allow me to
have more confidence in determining the causality of the relationship. However, there is a low
level of external validity, which is a principal disadvantage. The inability to generalize the results
of this study comes from the specificity of measuring individual issue opinions, as well as the
issue presented in the study. Many people have different opinions on a variety of issues that do
not necessarily line up with their political beliefs. In general, the design of this experiment aims
to achieve a high level of internal validity, even if the results cannot necessarily be applied to the
general population.
Conclusion
Studying the impacts of media on the general electorate and more specifically on the
individual is vital to understanding the political environment we are currently living in. The
results of this experiment in particular can contribute to prior literature and draw basic
conclusions about how individuals absorb new media and subsequently base their political
viewpoints and opinions off of what they are exposed to. Ultimately, an awareness of the impact
of media bias on political polarization may motivate both media producers and consumers to
create and seek out more balanced and moderate views.

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