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Michelle Josephine Eden M.

Silva
Case Digests on Agrarian Law and Social Legislation
1. Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines vs. Honorable
Secretary of Agrarian Reform
Facts:
The 3 cases question the constitutionality of the Agrarian Reform Program.
The contention of the petitioners in one case is that the provision of RA 6657
regarding the modes of payment of just compensation is unconstitutional
insofar as it requires the owners to accept just compensation in less than
money, which is the only medium of payment allowed.
Issue: Whether or not payment of just compensation other than money is
allowed
Ruling:
Petition granted.
Ratio:
RA 6657 allows the payment of just compensation by means of LBP Bonds,
Shares of Stocks in government-owned or controlled corporations, and tax
credits.
It cannot be denied that the traditional medium for the payment of just
compensation is money and no other. However, we do not deal here with the
traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary
expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited area is
sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps
local purpose. What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of
expropriation.
Agrarian
Reform program
will involve not mere
millions of pesos. The cost will be tremendous. Considering the vast areas of
land subject to expropriation under the laws before us, we estimate that
hundreds
of billions of pesos will be needed, far more indeed than the amount of P50 bi
llion initiallyappropriated, which is already staggering as it is by our present
standards. Such amount is in fact not even fully available at this time. It is
assumed that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty
when they called for agrarian reform as a top priority project of the
government. It is a part of this assumption that when they envisioned the
expropriation that would be needed, they also intended that the just
compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but a less
conventional if more practical method.

2. Baranda vs. Baguio


Facts:
Herein petitioners are the children of the late Lumen Baranda. She also
executed an affidavit that the said parcels of land are not tenanted and have
no tenancy obligation whatsoever. Baranda had a loan with a bank and failed
to pay the loan on its maturity date. The said parcels of land were foreclosed
and then sold at public auction to respondent BANK, being the highest
bidder. The land was later sold to herein respondents. Lumen Baranda
continued in possession and occupation of the said properties but failed to
raise the necessary amount to repurchase the said properties.
The land was possessed by the sheriff pursuant to the courts order. Thus
petitioners claim that they are the tenants and cultivators-owners of the
disputed landholding, and as such, they are entitled to security of tenure,
and that it is only the Court of Agrarian Relations that has original and
exclusive jurisdiction to decide and settle questions involving tenancy
relationship.
Issue: Whether or not plaintiffs are tenants and thus entitled to security of
tenure.
Ruling:
Petition denied.
Ratio:
It is crystal clear that no tenancy relation exists between petitioners and
respondent BANK, and as such, petitioners are not entitled to security of
tenure. The essential requisites of tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties
are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3)
there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is
personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests. All these requisites
must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties.
The absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a
cultivator thereof, or planter thereon, ade jure tenant. Unless a person has
established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of
tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the government
under existing tenancy law. Granting that petitioners are the actual tillers
since 1972, they are tillers as owners and not as tenants. In fact, their
mother, Lumen Baranda, executed an affidavit that the said properties are
not tenanted and have no tenancy obligation whatsoever.
3. Bonifacio vs. Dizon; 177 SCRA 294
Facts:
Olimpio Bonifacio filed before the Court of Agrarian Relations, seeking the
ejectment of private respondent Pastora San Miguel from Bonifacio's two-

hectare agricultural land. Judgment was rendered in favor of Bonifacio.


Pastora appealed but was denied by the court. Bonifacio later died and so his
heirs continued the case and asked to comply the writ of execution of
judgment. Private respondent Pastora San Miguel moved to quash the writ of
execution. This was opposed by petitioners who in turn sought the issuance
of a writ of demolition and an order declaring Pastora San Miguel in contempt
of court for allegedly re-entering the subject land. The judge came up with a
decision annulling the writ of execution.
Issue: Whether the ejectment case survived Bonifacios death, thus entitling
his heirs to pursue the case.
Ruling:
Petition granted.
Ratio:
In Section 36 (1), R.A. 3844, ejectment of an agricultural lessee was
authorized not only when the landowner-lessor desired to cultivate the
landholding, but also when a member of his immediate family so desired. In
so providing, the law clearly did not intend to limit the right of cultivation
strictly and personally to the landowner but to extend the exercise of such
right to the members of his immediate family. Clearly then, the right of
cultivation as a ground for ejectment was not a right exclusive and personal
to the landowner-lessor.
Petitioners are not only the heirs and successors-in-interest, but the
immediate family members of the deceased landowner-lessor as well. The
right to cultivate the landholding asserted in the CAR Case not being a purely
personal right of the deceased landowner-lessor, the same was transmitted
to petitioners as heirs and successors-in-interest. Petitioners are entitled to
the enforcement of the judgment in the CAR Case.
4. Castillo vs. CA, 205 SCRA 529
Facts:
Respondent is the agricultural tenant of the petitioner in the latter's parcel of
land with fruit-bearing trees. The petitioner requested the respondent to
allow him to construct a resthouse in said land. But violated the agreement
and started to cut fruit-bearing trees on the land in question and filled with
adobe stones the area devoted by the private respondent to the planting of
vegetables.
The complaint asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction which
was granted.
The petitioner, on the other hand, contends that the private respondent is
not his agricultural tenant; that respondent Alberto Ignacio is merely a
smudger of the landholding in question; that he did not ask permission from

the private respondent to construct a rest house on subject land, since as


owner thereof, he had the right to do so; that he was merely exercising his
right of ownership when he cut certain trees in the subject premises.
RTC rendered judgment declaring that no tenancy relationship exists.
Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court. The
respondent appellate court declared that there exists a tenancy relationship
between Alberto Ignacio and Gregorio Castillo and permanently enjoined the
latter from disturbing the respondent's peaceful possession as tenant of said
land. Hence, the instant petition was filed
Issue: Whether or not a tenancy relationship exists between the parties.
Ruling: Petition granted.
Ratio:
No.
The essential requisites of tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the
landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) the
purpose is agricultural production; (4) there is consideration which consists
of sharing the harvest; (5) there is consent to the tenant to work on the land
and (6) there is personal cultivation by him.
In the case, the element of personal cultivation is absent. Respondent
Ignacio is a businessman by occupation and this is his principal source of
income. He manufacturers hollow blocks. He also has a piggery and poultry
farm as well as a hardware store on the land adjoining the subject land. To
add to that, the respondent farms the riceland of one Dr. Luis Santos. It is
thus evident that the working hours of the respondent as a businessman and
his other activities do not permit him to undertake the work and obligations
of a real tenant.
5. Cecilleville Realty and Service Corporation vs. CA, 278 SCRA 819
Facts:
Petitioner Cecilleville Realty and Service Corporation is the owner of a parcel
of land. Private respondent Herminigildo Pascual occupies a portion
thereof. Despite repeated demands, private respondent refused to vacate
and insisted that he is entitled to occupy the land since he is helping his
mother Ana Pascual, petitioners tenant, to cultivate the land in
question. Thenceforth, petitioner instituted an ejectment suit against private.
MTC ruled that there was no tenancy agreement. RTC reversed the ruling of
the MTC. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but to no avail.
Issue: Whether or not there was a tenancy relationship?
Ruling: Petition denied.

Ratio:
Yes.
There is a clear tenancy relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant,
such that the defendant cannot be ejected from the premises like a common
squatter.
The defendant Herminigildo Pascual is occupying and working on the
landholding to help his mother, a bona-fide tenant. He is an immediate
member of the family and is entitled to work on the land. As the lower court
held:
Under Republic Act No. 1199, a tenant shall mean a person who, himself and
with the aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates
the land belonging to, or possessed by, another, with the latters consent for
purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the
share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or
ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy
system.
Similarly, the term immediate farm household is defined in the same section
as follows:
(o) Immediate farm household includes the members of the family of the
tenant, and such other persons, whether related to the tenant or not, who
are dependent upon him for support and who usually help him operate the
farm enterprise.
The defendant, although not the tenant himself, is afforded the protection
provided by law as his mother is already old and infirm and is allowed to
avail of the labor of her immediate household. He is entitled to the security
of tenure accorded his mother. His having a house of his own on the property
is merely incidental to the tenancy.
6. Central Mindanao University vs. DARAB, 215 SCRA 86
Facts:
In 1958, President Carlos Garcia issued a proclamation reserving for the
Mindanao Agricultural College, now the CMU, a piece of land to be used as its
future campus. That CMU will assist faculty members and employee groups
through the extension of technical know-how, training and other kinds of
assistance. In turn, they paid the CMU a service fee for use of the land. The
agreement explicitly provided that there will be no tenancy relationship
between the lessees and the CMU.
When the program was terminated, a case was filed by the participants of
the "Kilusang Sariling Sikap" for declaration of status as tenants under the
CARP. In its resolution, DARAB, ordered, among others, the segregation of
400 hectares of the land for distribution under CARP. The land was subjected
to coverage on the basis of DAR's determination that the lands do not meet
the condition for exemption, that is, it is not "actually, directly, and
exclusively used" for educational purposes.

Issue: Whether or not the CMU land covered by CARP?


Ruling: Petition granted.
Ratio:
Yes.
The land is exempted from CARP. the DARAB found that the complainants
are not share tenants or lease holders of the CMU, yet it ordered the
"segregation of a suitable compact and contiguous area of Four Hundred
hectares, more or less", from the CMU land reservation, and directed the DAR
Regional Director to implement its order of segregation. Having found that
the complainants in this agrarian dispute for Declaration of Tenancy Status
are not entitled to claim as beneficiaries of the CARP because they are not
share tenants or leaseholders, its order for the segregation of 400 hectares
of the CMU land was without legal authority. w do not believe that the quasijudicial function of the DARAB carries with it greater authority than ordinary
courts to make an award beyond what was demanded by the
complainants/petitioners, even in an agrarian dispute. Where the quasijudicial body finds that the complainants/petitioners are not entitled to the
rights they are demanding, it is an erroneous interpretation of authority for
that quasi-judicial body to order private property to be awarded to future
beneficiaries. The order segregation 400 hectares of the CMU land was
issued on a finding that the complainants are not entitled as beneficiaries,
and on an erroneous assumption that the CMU land which is excluded or
exempted under the law is subject to the coverage of the CARP.
7. De Jesus vs. IAC, 175 SCRA 559
Facts:
Private respondents are owners of land. About four (4) hectares of such lot is
a fishpond possession of which has been with the petitioner since 1962 as a
lessee. On April 22, 1972, private respondents, as heirs of Spouses Eustacio
Calimbas and Modesta Paguio who in their lifetime were the registered
owners of the land, entered into a civil law contract of lease, with petitioner
de Jesus and one Felicisima Rodriguez.
Petitioner de Jesus and Felicisima Rodriguez formed a partnership over the
fishpond with de Jesus as the industrial partner and Rodriguez as the
capitalist. Upon the expiration of the civil law lease, Felicisima Rodriguez
gave up the lease but petitioner de Jesus refused to vacate the leased
premises despite repeated demands. On December 5, 1975, private
respondents filed a complaint for "Recovery of Possession with Damages".
The RTC ruled that petitioner is an agricultural lessee and not a civil law
lessee, therefore jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to the Court of
Agrarian Relations and not to the Court of First Instance.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is an agricultural lessee or a civil law lessee.


Ruling: Petition denied.
Ratio:
No.
The Agricultural Land Reform Code was enacted to help the small farmers
and to uplift their economic status by providing them a modest standard of
living sufficient to meet a farm family's needs for food, clothing, shelter,
education and other basic necessities. The law further protects the small
farmer by conferring upon him security of tenure over the landholding he is
working on. The leasehold relation cannot be extinguished by the mere
expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract or by the sale,
alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding.
Petitioner also contends that he is the sole cultivator of the fishpond. But on
review by the Court of Appeals these allegations gave way to a much
stronger evidence-the judicial admissions of petitioner himself, that he hired
many persons to help him cultivate the fishpond. Absent the requisite of
personal cultivation, petitioner de Jesus cannot be considered an agricultural
lessee. In the case of Evangelista v. Court of Appeals, 12 this Court held that
one cannot be said to be an agricultural lessee if he has not personally or by
his farm household cultivated the land in question.
8. Endaya vs. CA, 215 SCRA 109
Facts:
Spouses Natividad Trinidad and Cesar San Diego owned a piece of
agricultural land of rice and corn. As far back as 1934, private respondent
Fideli has been cultivating this land as a tenant of the Spouses San Diego
under a fifty-fifty (50-50) sharing agreement. A lease contract was executed
between the Spouses San Diego and one Regino Cassanova for a period of
four years and gave him the authority to oversee the planting of crops on the
land. The lease contract was subsequently renewed. During the entire
duration of the lease contract between the Spouses San Diego and
Cassanova, private respondent continuously cultivated the land, sharing
equally with Cassanova the net produce of the harvests.
Later, Spouses San Diego sold the land to petitioners. Private respondent
continued to farm the land although petitioners claim that private
respondent was told immediately after the sale to vacate the land. Due to
petitioners persistent demand for private respondent to vacate the land,
private respondent filed a complaint praying that he be declared the
agricultural tenant of petitioners.
Issue: Whether or not private respondent is an agricultural lessee and thus
has security of tenure.

Ruling: Petition denied.


Ratio:
Yes.
Under the law, agricultural lessees security of tenure by providing the
following: "The agricultural leasehold relation once established shall confer
upon the agricultural lessee the right to continue working on the landholding
until such leasehold relation is extinguished. The agricultural lessee shall be
entitled to security of tenure on his landholding and cannot be ejected
therefrom unless authorized by the Court for causes herein provided." 12The
fact that the landowner entered into a civil lease contract over the subject
landholding and gave the lessee the authority to oversee the farming of the
land, as was done in this case, is not among the causes provided by law for
the extinguishment of the agricultural leasehold relation. Transactions
involving the agricultural land over which an agricultural leasehold subsists
resulting in change of ownership, e.g., sale, or transfer of legal possession,
such as lease, will not terminate the right of the agricultural lessee who is
given protection by the law by making such rights enforceable against the
transferee or the landowner's successor in interest.
9. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. CA and Pascual G.R. No. 128557,
December 29, 1999
Facts:
Private respondent Jose Pascual owned three parcels of land. The
Department of Agrarian Reform placed these lands under its Operation Land
Transfer. Petitioner LBP refused to pay just compensation thus forcing private
respondent to apply for a Writ of Execution. Still, petitioner LBP declined to
comply with the order. Private respondent filed an action for Mandamus in
the CA to compel petitioner to pay the valuation determined by the PARAD
which the appellate court granted.
Issue: Whether or not the LBP can refuse to pay the landowner of the value
of just compensation.
Ruling: Petition denied.
Ratio:
It becomes its legal duty of LBP to finance the transaction when it agrees
with the appraisal of the DAR.
Petitionerparticipated
in the valuation proceedings held in the office of the PARAD through its coun
sel. LBP did not appeal the decision which became final and executory nor
did it even state in its petition that it is willing to pay the value determined
by the PARAD provided that the farmer beneficiaries concur thereto. These
facts sufficiently prove that petitioner LBP agreed with the valuation of the

land. The only thing that hindered it from paying the amount was the nonconcurrence of the farmer-beneficiary. But it has been ruled in previous
decisions that there is no need for such concurrence. Without such obstacle,
petitioner can now be compelled to perform its legal duty through the
issuance of a writ of mandamus.
10. Matienzo vs. Servidad, 107 SCRA 276
Facts:
Defendant Martin Servidad is the owner of an agricultural land He and
plaintiff Jose Matienzo executed a private instrument that the latter will take
care of the land but that they will share no percentage of the produce. Later,
defendant wrote plaintiff telling him not to "interfere with the plants" as they
had no agreement yet for that year, and that being the land-owner, he
should be the one to decide in accordance with the "tenancy law". From this,
petitioner protested.
Issue: Whether under the parties' agreements, plaintiff was instituted as an
overseer or as a tenant by defendant.
Ruling: Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
A tenant is defined under section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 1199 as a person
who, himself, and with the aid available from within his immediate
household, cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by another, with
the latter's consent for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the
landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a
price certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the
leasehold tenancy system. From the above definition of a tenant, it is clear
that absent a sharing arrangement, no tenancy relationship had ever existed
between the parties. What transpired was that plaintiff was made overseer
over a 7-hectare land area; he was to supervise applications for loans from
those residing therein; he was allowed to build his house thereon and to
plant specified plants without being compensated he was free to clear and
plant the land as long as he wished; he had no sharing arrangement between
him and defendant; and he was not obligated to pay any price certain to, nor
share the produce with, the latter.
11. Oarde vs. CA et al., 280 SCRA 235
Facts:
Plaintiffs in the case testified that they are tenant-tillers of the lands of
Guerrero and Molar, herein petitioners. Multiple witnesses took the witness
stand to testify for such plaintiffs. On the otherhand, defendants denied that

petitioners are tenant-tillers. The trial court held that Petitioners Molar and
Oarde were not lawful tenants of private respondents.
Issue: Whether plaintiffs in both cases are tenants of defendants in
possession of the land and cannot be ejected therefrom except for cause.
Ruling: Petition denied.
Ratio:
No.
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are the following: (1) the
parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land;
(3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is
personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests. All these must
concur to establish the juridical relationship of tenancy.
Markedly absent in the case of Petitioner Molar is the element of personal
cultivation. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that Molar
herself did not actually cultivate the land, nor did her immediate family or
farm household. Instead, she hired other people to do all phases of farm
work. Even her co-petitioner testified that she did not actually till the land
and that she merely paid laborers to perform such task.
12. Province of Camarines Sur vs. CA, 222 SCRA 173
Facts:
Camarines Sur passed a Resolution authorizing the Provincial Governor to
purchase or expropriate property to establish a pilot farm for non-food and
non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial
government employees, thus it filed two separate cases for expropriation
against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin, at the Regional Trial
Court, Pili, Camarines Sur.
The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of
inadequacy of the price offered for their property. In an order, the trial court
denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur
to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court
the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that
private respondents may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do
not prosper. They also asked that an order be issued to restrain the trial
court from enforcing the writ of possession, and thereafter to issue a writ of
injunction.
The Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur
must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the
plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project.

Issue: Whether or not the Province of Cam Sur must first secure the approval
of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of
the San Joaquins.
Ruling: Petition granted.
Ratio:
To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units
can no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of
roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc., without first applying for conversion
of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all
of these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect,
it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether
the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.
13. Roxas & Co., Inc. vs Court of Appeals, G.R. 127876, 17
December, 1999.
Facts:
Petitioner Roxas & Co. is the registered owner of three haciendas, Haciendas
Palico, Banilad and Caylaway. It filed with respondent DAR a voluntary
offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later
placed under compulsory acquisition by respondent DAR in accordance
withthe CARL. Petitioner tried to withdraw the VOS of Hacienda Caylaway but
the sane was denied.Thereafter, petitioner sought the conversion of the
three haciendas from agricultural to other use but the petition was likewise
denied.
Issue: Whether process of land acquisition under CARL observes due process.
Ruling: Petition granted in part.
Ratio:
For a valid implementation of the CAR Program, two notices are required: (1)
the Notice of Coverage and letter of invitation to a preliminary conference
sent to the landowner, the representatives of the BARC, LBP, farmer
beneficiaries
and
other
interested
parties;
and
(2)
the Notice of Acquisition sent to the landowner under Section 16 of the CARL.
They are steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative
due process. The taking contemplated in Agrarian Reform is not a mere
limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title
to and physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights
accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer beneficiary. The Bill of Rights
provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law. The CARL was not intended to take away
property without due process of law. The exercise of the power of eminent

domain requires
private property.

that

due

process

be observed

in

the

taking

of

14. Zamoras vs. Su, Jr., 184 SCRA 248


Facts:
Victoriano Zamoras, was hired by the respondent, Roque Su, Jr., in 1957
as overseer of his coconut land in Asenario, Dapitan City. Zamoras was
charged with the task of having the land titled in Su's name, and of assigning
portions to be worked by tenants, supervising the cleaning, planting, care
and cultivation of the land, the harvesting of coconuts and selling of the
copra. As compensation, Su paid Zamoras a salary of P2,400 per month plus
one-third (1/3) of the proceeds of the sales of copra which normally occurred
every two months. Another one-third of the proceeds went to the tenants
and the other third to Su. This system of sharing was regularly observed. Su
informed Zamoras in writing that he obtained a loan from the other
respondent, Anita Su Hortellano, and that he authorized her to harvest the
coconuts from his property "while the loan was outstanding." Zamoras was
not allowed to be an overseer anymore.
Issue: WON the petitioner was an employee or tenant of the respondents?
Ruling: Petition granted.
Ratio:
Petitioner is an employee.
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the
landholder and the tenant; (2) the subject is the agricultural holding; (3)
there is consent between the parties; (4) the purpose is agricultural
production; (5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and (6) there is a
sharing of harvests between landlord and tenant. The element of personal
cultivation of the land, or with the aid of his farm household, essential in
establishing a landlord-tenant or a lessor-lessee relationship, is absent in the
relationship between Su and Zamoras for Zamoras did not cultivate any part
of Su's plantation either by himself or with the help of his household.