SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

1) PLACER VS. JUDGE VILLANUEVA [126 SCRA 463; G.R.

NOS. L-60349-62; 29 DEC 1983]
Tuesday, February 03, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Petitioners filed informations in the city court and they certified
that Preliminary Investigation and Examination had been conducted and
that prima facie cases have been found. Upon receipt of
said informations, respondent judge set the hearing of the criminal
cases to determine propriety of issuance of warrants of arrest. After
the hearing, respondent issued an order requiring petitioners to submit to
the court affidavits of prosecution witnesses and other documentary
evidence in support of the informations to aid him in the exercise of his
power of judicial review of the findings of probable cause by petitioners.
Petitioners petitioned for certiorari and mandamus to compel respondent
to issue warrants of arrest. They contended that the fiscals certification
in the informations of the existence of probable cause constitutes
sufficient justification for the judge to issue warrants of arrest.
Issue: Whether or Not respondent city judge may, for the purposeof
issuing warrants of arrest, compel the fiscal to submit to the court the
supporting affidavits and other documentary evidence presented during
the
preliminary
investigation.
Held: Judge may rely upon the fiscals certification for the existence of
probable cause and on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. But,
such certification does not bind the judge to come out with the warrant.
The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for
the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of issuing magistrate. Under
Section 6 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the judgemust satisfy himself of
the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. If on
the face of the information, the judge finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscals certification and require submission of the affidavits
of witnesses to aid him in arriving at the conclusion as to existence of
probable cause.

2) Soliven vs Makasiar

on October 29, 2011

Constitutional Law Presidents Immunity From Suit Must Be Invoked by

the President

Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He together with others was
charged for libel by the president. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit
against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a
complaint affidavit because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He
grounded his contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued.
However, if a president would sue then the president would allow herself
to be placed under the courts jurisdiction and conversely she would be
consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a
president, the president may not be able to appear in court to be a
witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a
person other than the president.
HELD: The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of
immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and
functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being
the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring
all of the office-holders time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by
virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office;
not by any other person in the Presidents behalf. Thus, an accused like
Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the President is complainant
cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case
from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President
from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the
protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the courts jurisdiction.
The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the
Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and
imposed by any other person.

3) Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 (1986)

F: The challenged SW was issued by the resp. judge on 5/10/84. The

petitioner''s house was searched 2 days later but none of the articles
listed in the warrant was discovered. The officers conducting the search
found 1 colt Magnum revolver & 18 live bullets w/c they confiscated. They
are now the bases of the charge against the petitioner.

RULING: Search warrant issued by resp. judge is hereby declared null and
void and accordingly set aside. The petitioner claims that no depositions
were taken by the resp. judge in accordance w/ Rule 126, Sec. 4 of the
ROC, but this is not entirely true. Depositions were taken of the
complainant''s 2 witnesses in addition to the affidavit executed by them.
It is correct to say, however, that the complainant himself was not
subjected to a similar interrogation. By his own accounts, all that resp.
judge did was question Capt. Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit only
"to ascertain among others, if he knew and understood the same," and
only bec. "the application was not yet subscribed and sworn to." The
suggestion is that he would not have asked any questions at all if the
affidavit had already been completed when it was submitted to him. In
any case, he did not ask his own searching questions. He limited himself
to the contents of the affidavit. He did not take the applicant''s deposition
in writing and attach them to the record, together w/ the affidavit
presented to him. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the
Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence
of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it
will be found later that his declarations are false. (Mata v. Bayona.) The
applicant was asking for the issuance of the SW on the basis of mere
hearsay and not of info. personally known to him. His application,
standing alone, was insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant
sought.
It was, therefore, necessary for the witnesses themselves, by their own
personal info., to establish the applicant''s claims. Even assuming then
that it would have suffied to take the deposition only of the witnesses and
not of the applicant himself, there is still the question of the sufficiency of
their depositions. A study of the deposition taken from witnesess Esmael
Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who both claimed to be "intelligence
informers," shows that they were in the main a mere restatement of their
allegations in their affidavits, except that they were made in the form of
answers to the questions put to them by the resp. judge. One may well
wonder why it did not occur to the resp. judge to ask how the witness
could be so certain even as to the caliber of the guns, or how far he was
from the window, or whether it was on the first floor or second floor, or
why his presence was not noticed at all, or if the acts related were really
done openly, in the full view of the witnesses, considering that these acts
were against the law. These would have been judicious questions but they
were injudiciously omitted. Instead, the declaration of the witnesses were
readily accepted and the warrant sought was issued forthwith. SOL-GEN
ARGUES THAT THE PETITIONER WAIVED WHATEVER DEFECT WHEN THE
PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED TO THE SEARCH AND MANIFESTED
HIS CONFORMITY IN WRITING. We do not agree. What we see here is
pressure exerted by the military authorities, who practically coerced the
petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as guaran

4) People of the Philippines v. Zenaida Bolasa

Facts:An informer told the police that an illegal transaction of prohibited

drugs werebeing conducted at a certain house in Sta. Brigida St.
Karuhatan Valenzuela MetroManila. PO3 Salonga and Carizon together
with SPO1 Fernando Arenas immediatelyproceed to the said house. Upon
reaching the house, they peeped through a smallwindow and saw a man and
woman repacking suspected marijuana. They enter thehouse and introduce
themselves as police officers and confiscated the tea bag andother drug
paraphernalia.Afterwhich, the police officers arrested
the two,ZenaidaBolasa and Roberto de los Reyes. Upon examination by
the NBI, the tea bags wereconfirmed as marijuana. Zenaida Bolasa and
Roberto de los Reyes were chargedwith violation of Sec.8 of Article II of
Republic Act 6425 otherwise known asDangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The RTC
convicted them of the crime charged.Accused Bolasa asserts that the search and
her arrest was illegal. She insiststhat the trial court should not regard
the testimony of PO3 cCarizon crediblebecause he does not have personal
knowledge regarding the conduct of the arrestand search making his testimony
a hearsay.Issue:Whether or not the arrest and seizure were validRuling:No.
The Supreme Court held that the arrest was invalid because the
arrestingofficers had no personal knowledge that at the time of their
arrest, accused-apellants had just committed, were committing or about
to commit a crime. Thearresting officers also have no personal knowledge
that a crime was committed norhave a reasonable ground to believe
that the accused committed the crime. Andaccused appellants were not
prisoners who have escaped from a penalestablishment.With respect to
the seizure of the tea bags,the court held that it is also invalidbecause the
objects were not seized in plain view. There was no valid intrusion andthe
evidence was not inadvertently discovered. The police officers
intentionallypeeped through the window to ascertain the activities of
appellants inside the room.In like manner, the search cannot
be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle, aconsented warrantless
arrest, a customs search, or a stop and frisk situations. The court
stated that the arresting officers should have
first conducted asurveillance considering that the identities and
addressed of the suspected culpritswere already ascertained.
After conducting the surveillance and determining theexistence
of probable cause, they should have secured a warrant prior to effectinga
valid arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal ab initio, the
accompanying

5) People v Alunday
6) People v Cruz
Aggravating Circumstance Evident Premeditation
On December 25, 1996, Tingas joined a cockfight. He let his brother-inlaw de la Cruz install the gaff on his game cock. Unknown to Tingas, de la
Cruz betted against his cock. When Tingas cock won, he was advised to
collect the bet from his brother-in-law, feeling betrayed he challenged de

la Cruz into a fist fight. Cooler heads parted the two. Later de la Cruz
returned with a bolo and hacked to death Tingas.
ISSUE: Whether or not evident premeditation is present thus making de
la Cruz guilty for murder.
HELD: The following were not shown to concur on the part of de la Cruz:
a.)

Time when he decided to commit the crime,

b.) An overt act showing that de la Cruz clung to his determination to

commit the crime,
c.)
Lapse of a sufficient period of time as to that would allow de la Cruz
to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
In this case, de la Cruz killed Tingas no later than when the fistfight was
over. No sufficient time lapsed for him to plan the killing of Tingas.
Therefore, hes only guilty of homicide.

apprehended 17 February1988 after close surveillance for 3 month of the

CID in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17 of the arrested aliens opted for selfdeportation. One released for lack of evidence, another charged not for
pedophile but working with NO VISA, the 3 petitioners chose to face
deportation proceedings. On 4 March1988, deportation proceedings were
instituted against aliens for being undesirable aliens under Sec.69 of
Revised
Administrative
Code.
Warrants of Arrest were issued 7March1988 against petitioners for
violation of Sec37, 45 and 46 of Immigration Act and sec69 of Revised
Administrative Code. Trial by the Board of Special Inquiry III commenced
the same date. Petition for bail was filed 11March 1988 but was not
granted by the Commissioner of Immigration. 4 April1988 Petitioners filed
a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The court heard the case on oral
argument
on
20
April
1988.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain
petitioners pending determination of existence of probable cause.
(2) Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches and seizures by CID
agents.
(3) Whether or Not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to
petitioners.

7) HARVEY V. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO [162 SCRA 840;

G.R. NO. 82544; 28 JUN 1988]
Facts: This is a petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners are the following:
American nationals Andrew Harvey, 52 and Jonh Sherman 72. Dutch
Citizen Adriaan Van Den Elshout, 58. All reside at Pagsanjan Laguna
respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Mission
Orders to the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to
apprehended petitioners at their residences. The Operation Report read
that Andrew Harvey was found together with two young boys. Richard
Sherman was found with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den
Elshout in the after Mission Report read that two children of ages 14
and 16 has been under his care and subjects confirmed being live-in for
sometime
now.
Seized
during
the
petitioners
apprehension
were
rolls
of
photonegatives and photos of suspected child prostitutes shown
inscandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Posters and
other literature advertising the child prostitutes were also found.
Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. They were

Held: While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it
violates the declared policy of the state to promote and protect the
physical, moral, spiritual and social well being of the youth. The arrest of
petitioners was based on the probable cause determined after close
surveillance of 3 months. The existence of probable cause justified the
arrest and seizure of articles linked to the offense. The articles were
seized as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore the articles are
admissible evidences (Rule 126, Section12 of Rules on Criminal
Procedure).
The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a validwarrant of
arrest is not an absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions to this
rule. 1.) Search is incidental to the arrest. 2.) Search in a moving vehicle.
3.) Seizure of evidence in plain view. In view of the foregoing, the search
done
was
incidental
to
the
arrest.
The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of any
irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from questioning its
validity. Furthermore, the deportation charges and the hearing presently
conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry made their detention legal. It is
a fundamental rule that habeas corpus will not be granted when

confinement is or has become legal, although such confinement was

illegal
at
the
beginning.
The
deportation
charges
instituted
by
the
Commissioner
ofImmigration are
in
accordance
with
Sec37
(a)
of
the
PhilippineImmigration Act of 1940 in relation to sec69 of the Revised
Administrative code. Section 37 (a) provides that aliens shall be arrested
and deported upon warrant of the Commissioner ofImmigration and
Deportation after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the
existence of a ground for deportation against them. Deportation
proceedings are administrative in character and never construed as a
punishment but a preventive measure. Therefore, it need not be
conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings. What is
essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien
intended to be arrested and deported. A fair hearing must also be
conducted
with
assistance
of
a
counsel
if
desired.
Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the State and done under
the authority of the sovereign power. It a police measure against the
undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be
injurious to the public good and tranquility of the people.

8) Bache & Co. Inc. et al vs BIR Commissioner Vivencio

Ruiz et al

on November 16, 2010

Search and Seizure Personal Examination of the Judge

On 24 Feb 1970, Commissioner Vera of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter
addressed to J Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against
petitioners for violation of Sec 46(a) of the NIRC, in relation to all other
pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sects 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209,
and authorizing Revenue Examiner de Leon make and file the application
for search warrant which was attached to the letter. The next day, de
Leon and his witnesses went to CFI Rizal to obtain the search warrant. At
that time J Ruiz was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he
instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of De Leon
and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, J Ruiz was informed that
the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer read to him
her stenographic notes; and thereafter, J Ruiz asked respondent Logronio
to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be
false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. J Ruiz
signed de Leons application for search warrant and Logronios deposition.
The search was subsequently conducted.
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been a valid search warrant.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Bache on three grounds.

1. J Ruiz failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness.
Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses
is necessary to enable him to determine the existence or non-existence of
a probable cause.
2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.
The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct
offenses under the Tax Code. As ruled in Stonehill Such is the
seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the
disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3
of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that a search warrant shall not
issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense.
Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph,
directing that no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense.
3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be
seized.
The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in
the Search Warrant
Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals,
columnars, receipts and disbursements books, customers ledgers);
receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks and securities;
contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded
messages; business communications, accounting and business records;
checks and check stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and
records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970.
The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the
Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that
the warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be
seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances
will ordinarily allow or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact
not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the

search and seizure or when the things described are limited to those
which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being
issued.

9) Prudente vs Dayrit Case Digest

FACTS:
The Chief of the Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Manila, Judge Abelardo Dayrit, for the issuance
of Search Warrant for violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of
Firearm, etc). In the deposition of witness (P/Lt. Florencio C. Angeles), it
was made mentioned of result of our continuous surveillance conducted
for several days. We gathered information from verified sources that the
holders of said firearms and explosives as well as ammunitions arent
licensed to possess said firearms and ammunition. Further, the premises
is a school and the holders of these firearms are not student who were not
supposed to possess firearms, explosives and ammunitions.
Person to be searched in Nemesio Prudente at the Polytechnic University
of the Philippines, Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, has in his control or
possession firearms, explosives hand grenades and ammunitions which
are illegally possesses at the office of Department of Military Science and
Tactics and at the office of the President.
Petitioner moved to quash the Search Warrant. He claimed that:
Petitioners, had no personal knowledge of the facts
The examination of the said witness was not in form of searching
questions and answers
Search warrant was a general warrant
Violation of Circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant
failed to allege under oath that the issuance of the search warrant on a
Saturday, urgent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search and seizure was valid?
HELD:
Search Warrant annulled and set aside.
RATIONALE:
Valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which is to
be determined personally by the Judge, after examination under oath and
affirmation of the complainant, and that witnesses he may produce and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons and
things to be seized. The probable cause must be in connection with one
specific offense and the Judge must, before issuing Search Warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, In

writing and under oath, the complainant and any witnesses he may
produce, on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their
sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.
Probable Cause for a valid search warrant, has been defined as such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that
objects sought in connection which the offense are in the place sought to
be searched.
This probable case must be shown to be personal knowledge and
of the complainant and witnesses he may produce and not based on mere
hearsay.
PARTICULARITY
For violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) while the
said decree punishes several offenses, the alleged violation in this case
was, qualified by the phrase illegal possession of firearms etc. Reformed to ammunitions and explosives. In other words, the search
warrant was issued for the specific offense of illegal possession of
firearms and explosives. Hence, the failure of the Search Warrant to
mention the particular provision of PD1-866 that was violated is not of
such gravity as to call for the invalidation of this case.

10)
GUANZON VS. DE VILLA [181 SCRA 623; G.R.
80508; 30 JAN 1990]

Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation drive" or "aerial

target zoning" that were conducted in their place (Tondo Manila) were
unconstitutional. They alleged that there is no specific target house to be
search and that there is no search warrant orwarrant of arrest served.
Most of the policemen are in their civilianclothes and without nameplates
or identification cards. The residentswere rudely rouse from their sleep by
banging on the walls and windows of their houses. The residents were at
the point of high-powered guns and herded like cows. Men were ordered
to strip down to their briefs for the police to examine their tattoo marks.
The residentscomplained that they're homes were ransacked, tossing
their belongings and destroying their valuables. Some of their money and
valuables had disappeared after the operation. The residents also
reported incidents of maulings, spot-beatings and maltreatment. Those
who were detained also suffered mental and physical torture to extract
confessions and tactical informations. The respondents said that
such accusations were
all
lies.
Respondents
contends
that the
Constitution grants to government the power to seek and cripple
subversive movements for the maintenance of peace in the state. The
aerial target zoning were intended to flush out subversives and criminal
elements coddled by the communities were the said drives were
conducted. They said that they have intelligently and carefully planned
months ahead for the actual operation and that local and foreign media

joined

the

operation

to

witness

and

record

such

event.

Issue: Whether or Not the saturation drive committed consisted of

violation
of
human
rights.
Held: It is not the police action per se which should be prohibited rather it
is the procedure used or the methods which "offend even hardened
sensibilities" .Based on the facts stated by the parties, it appears to have
been no impediment to securing search warrants or warrants of arrest
before any houses were searched or individuals roused from sleep were
arrested. There is no showing that the objectives sought to be attained by
the "aerial zoning" could not be achieved even as th rights of the
squatters and low income families are fully protected. However, the
remedy should not be brought by a tazpaer suit where not one
victim complaints and not one violator is properly charged. In the
circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring soldier or
policeman whom the court can order prosecuted. In the absence of clear
facts
no
permanent
relief
can
be
given.
In the meantime where there is showing that some abuses were
committed, the court temporary restraint the alleged violations which are
shocking to the senses. Petition is remanded to the RTC of Manila.
11) PITA vs CA
FACTS:
An anti-smut campaign initiated by the Mayor of City of Manila, Ramon
Bagatsing, seized & confiscated from dealers, distributors, news stand
owners and peddlers along sidewalks, magazines, publications and other
reading materials believe to be obscene, pornographic and indecent and
later burned the seized materials in public at University belt along CM
Recto Avenue. Among the publications seized, and later burned was
Pinoy Playboy magazines and Co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita.
Pita assailed, Preliminary Injunction, as to whether or not the defendants
and or their agents can without a Court order confiscate or seize plaintiffs
magazine before any judicial finding is made on which is said may be
obscene or not.
HELD:
Petition is GRANTED, reversed & set-aside.
RATIONALE:
TEST OF OBSCENITY (PEOPLE vs KOTTINGER)
1.
Whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to
deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral

influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged is

being obscene may fall.
2.
Those that shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an
indecency
PASEI vs DRILON (Definition of Police Power)
State authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote GENERAL WELFARE
PROCEDURE (OBSCENE MATERIALS)
1.
The authorities must apply for the issuance of a Search Warrant
from a Judge, in in their opinion, an obscenity rap is in order;
2.
The authorities must convince the Court that the materials sought
to be seized are obscene, and pose a CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER of
an evil substantive enough to warrant a State interference and action;
3.
The Judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed
obscene the question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on
his hands sound discretion;
4.
If, in the opinion of the Court, probable cause exists, it may issue
the Search Warrant;
5.
Paper suit, Article 201;
6.
Any conviction is subject to appeal

12)

Valmonte vs. De VillaFacts:

O n 2 0 J a nu ar y 19 8 7, th e N at i on al C ap it al Re gi o n Di s t ri c t
C om m an d (N C R D C ) w a s activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction
02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters,AFP, with the mission
of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility
andperipheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial
defense, maintainingpeace and order, and providing an atmosphere
conducive to the social, economic andpolitical development of the
National Capital Region. A s pa rt of i ts d ut y to m ai nt ai n pe a c e and
order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila.Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said
checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed
and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary,capricious and whimsical
disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, consideringthat their
cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups,
especiallyat night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant
and/or court order. Their allegedfear for their safety increased when, at
dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supplyofficer of the Municipality
of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold bloodby the
members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway
at Malinta,Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to
the checkpoint and forcontinuing to speed off inspire of warning shots
fired in the air.

Issue:
WON the installation of checkpoints violates the right of the people
againstunreasonable searches and seizures
Held:
Petitioner's concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed
by themilitary manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to
declare the checkpoints per se
, illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in
the course of theirroutine checks, the military, indeed, committed specific
violations of petitioners'' rightsa ga i n s t un l a w f u l s ea rch a nd s ei z ure
of ot he r ri gh ts . T h e co ns ti t ut i on al r i g ht a ga i ns t unreasonable
searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose
rightsh av e b e en i nf r i n g ed , o r th re a te n e d to b e inf ri ng e d. No t
al l s e arc he s an d s e i z ure s arep roh i b i te d . T ho s e w h ic h a re
re as on a bl e a re n ot f or bi dd en . T h e s e tt i n g u p of t h e
qu es t i o n ed c h e ck po i nt s m a y b e c on s i d ere d as a s e cu ri t y
m e as ure to e na b l e t h e NC R DC t o pu rs ue i ts mission of
establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order
for thebe n e fi t o f t he p ub l i c . C he c kp o i n ts m ay n ot a ls o b e
re ga rd e d as m e as ures t o th w a rt p l o ts t o destabilize the govt, in
the interest of public security. Between the inherent right of thes t at e t o
prot e c t i t s exi s t e n c e an d prom ot e pu bl i c w e lf a re an d an
in di vi d ua l s ri gh t ag ai ns t aw a rr an t l e s s s ea rch w /c i s ,
ho w e ve r, rea s o na b l y c o nd u c te d , t he f orm e r s h ou ld p re v ai l.
Tru e, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse
by the military in thes am e m an ne r th a t al l g ov e rnm en t al p ow er
is s u s c e pt i bl e of ab us e . B ut, at t h e co s t of occasional
inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the
checkpointsdu ri ng t h es e ab no rm a l ti m e s , w he n co n du c t ed w /i n
re as on a bl e l i m i ts , a re p ar t of th e pr i ce w e p a y f or an o rd e rl y
s o ci e t y an d a p e a ce f u l co m m un i t y.

13)

People vs. Burgos

G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUBEN BURGOS y TITO, defendant-appellant.
Facts: Defendant is charged with illegal possession of firearm in
furtherance of subversion (tasks such as recruiting members to the NPA
and collection of contributions from its members) and found guilty by the
RTC of Digos, Davao del Sur. From the information filed by the police
authorities upon the information given by Masamlok, allegedly a man
defendant tried to recruit into the NPA, the police authorities arrest
defendant and had his house searched. Subsequently, certain NPA-related
documents and a firearm, allegedly issued and used by one Alias Cmdr.
Pol of the NPA, are confiscated. Defendant denies being involved in any
subversive activities and claims that he has been tortured in order to
accept ownership of subject firearm and that his alleged extrajudicial

statements have been made only under fear, threat and intimidation on
his person and his family. He avers that his arrest is unlawful as it is done
without valid warrant, that the trial court erred in holding the search
warrant in his house for the firearm lawful, and that the trial court erred in
holding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of PD 9 in
relation to GOs 6and 7.
Issue: If defendants arrest, the search of his home, and the subsequent
confiscation of a firearm and several NPA-related documents are lawful.
Held: Records disclose that when the police went to defendants house to
arrest him upon the information given by Masamlok, they had neither
search nor arrest warrant with themin wanton violation of ArtIV, Sec 3
(now Art III, sec 2). As the Court held in Villanueva vs Querubin, the
state, however powerful, doesnt have access to a mans home,
his haven of refuge where his individuality can assert itself in his
choice of welcome and in the kind of objects he wants around
him. In the traditional formulation, a mans house, however humble, is his
castle, and thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by the
government.
The trial court justified the warrantless arrest under Rule 113 Sec 6 of the
RoC:
a)
b)
c)

When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,

or is about to commit an offense in his presence;
When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it;
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another
and the confiscation of the firearm under Rule 126, Sec 12:
A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of
the offense.
However, the trial court has erred in its conclusion that said
warrantless arrest is under the ambit of aforementioned RoC. At the time
of defendants arrest, he wasnt in actual possession of any firearm or
subversive document, and was not committing any subversive acthe
was plowing his field. It is not enough that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a
crime in a warrantless arrest. An essential precondition is that a
crime must have beenin fact or actually have been committed
first; it isnt enough to suspect a crime may have been
committed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of
the perpetrator. The Court also finds no compelling reason for the haste

with which the arresting officers sought to arrest the accused. We fail to
see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a warrant
of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the
accused had truly committed a crime. There is no showing that there was
a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or escape.
Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were
unknown.
In proving the ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged
subversive documents, assuming they were really illegal, the defendant
was never informed of his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest;
thus the admissions obtained are in violation of the constitutional right
against self-incrimination under Sec 20 Art IV (now Sec 12, Art III) and
thus inadmissible as evidence.
Furthermore, the defendant was not accorded his constitutional right to
be assisted by counsel during the custodial interrogation. His extrajudicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged subversive documents
are all inadmissible as evidence. In light of the aforementioned, defendant
is acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt of the crime with which he
has been charged. Subject firearm and alleged subversive documents
have been disposed of in accordance with law.
The Court also maintains that violations of human rights do not help in
overcoming a rebellion. Reiterating Morales vs Enrile, while the
government should continue to repel the communists, the
subversives, the rebels, and the lawless with the means at its
command, it should always be remembered that whatever action
is taken must always be within the framework of our Constitution
and our laws.

14)
The People of the Philippines vs Mikael
Malmstedt

The Swedish National with Hashish Case

Facts:M i k a e l M a l m s t e d t , a S w e d i s h n a t i o n a l , w a s f o u n d
, v i a a ro u t i n e N A RC O M i n s p e c t i o n a t K i l o m e t e r 1 4 , Ac
o p , Tu b l a y M o u n t a i n P r o v i n c e , c a r r y i n g H a s h i s h , a d e r
i v a t i v e o f M a r i j u a n a . R T C L a Tr i n i d a d f o u n d h i
m g u i l t y f o r v i o l a t i o n o f t h e Dangerous Drugs Act. The
accused filed a petition to the Supreme Court for the reversalof the
decision arguing that the search and the arrest made was illegal because
there wasno search warrant.
Issue:W h et h er o r no t th e de c i s i o n of th e t ri al c ou r t s h ou ld b e
re v er s e d ( or a ffi rm e d) because the accused argues that the search
and arrest was made without a warrant

Held:The RTC decision is affirmed.

Ratio:The constitution states that a peace officer or a private person may
arrest a personw i t h o u t a w a r r a n t w h e n i n h i s p r e s e n c e
t h e p e r s o n t o b e a r r e s t e d h a s c o m m i t t e d , i s actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The offense was
recognizedwith the warrantless search conducted by NARCOM prompted
by probable cause: (1)
ther e c e i p t o f i n f o r m a t i o n b y N A R C O M t h a t a C a u
c a s i a n c o m i n g f r o m S a g a d a h a d proh ib i te d d ru gs i n
h is po s s es s i on a nd ( 2) f ai lu re of t he a c c us ed to im m ed ia t e ly
p re s en t his passport.

15)

People v. Lo Ho Wing,

F: Peter Lo , together with co-accused Lim Cheng Huat alias Antonio Lim
and Reynaldo Tia, were charged with a violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act, for the transport of metamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known
as "shabu". The drug was contained in tea bags inside tin cans which
were placed inside their luggages. Upon arrival from Hongkong, they
boarded the taxis at the airport which were apprehended by CIS
operatives. Their luggages were subsequently searched where the tea
bags were opened and found to contain shabu. Only Lo and Lim were
convicted. Tia was discharged as a state witness, who turned out to be a "
deep penetration agent" of the CIS in its mission to bust the drug
syndicate .
Issue: W/N the search and seizure was legal.
HELD: YES That search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant
is not an absolute rule. One of the exceptions thereto is a search of a
moving vehicle. The circumstance of the case clearly show that the
serach in question was made as regards a moving vehicle.
Therefore, a valid warrant was not necessary to effect the search on
appellant and his co-accused. It was firmly established from the factual
findings of the court that the authorities had reasonable ground to believe
that appellant would attempt to bring in contraband and transport within
the country. The belief was based on intelligence reports gathered from
surveillance activities on the suspected syndicate, of which appellant was
touted to be amember. Aside from this, they were also certain as to the
expected date and time of arrival of the accused from China via
Hongkong. But such knowledge was insufficient to enable them to fulfill
the requiremnents for the issuance of a search warrant. Still and all, the
important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the
warrantless search, which must still be present in the case.

16)

Yee Sue Kuy v. Almeda,

F: By virtue of the sworn application of Almeda, the Chief agent of the

Anti-Usury Board, a SW was issued to search the store and premises of
the petitioner, accused of violating the Anti-Usury Law. Receipt books, PNs
and other articles were seized and retained in the possession of the AntiUsury Board.
ISSUE: W/n the requirements for the issuance of valid SW were complied
with.
RULING: YES. The applicant, Almeda, in his application, swore that "he
made his own personal investigation and ascertained that petitioner is
lending money without a license, charging usurious rates." The witness he
presentted testified before the judge and swore that he knew that YEE
was lending without a license because he personally investigated the
victims who secured loans from the petitioner. Their affidavits were
sufficient for, thereunder, they could be held liable for perjury. The
existence of probable cause has been determined by the justice of the
peace before issuing the warrant complained of, as shown in the warrant
itself. Charo.

17)

Pasion vda. de Garcia v. Locsin,

F: This is a petition for mandamus presented to secure the annulment of

a search warrant (SW) & 2 orders of the resp. judge, & the restoration of
certain documents alleged to have been illegally seized by an agent of
the Anti-Usury Board. Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usury Board, obtained
from the justice of the peace of Tarlac, Tarlac, a SW, commanding any
officer of the law "to search the person, house or store of the petitioner
for certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents & other papers relating
to her activities as userer." On the same date, Almeda, accompanied by a
captain of the PC, went to the office of the petitioner, and after showing
the SW to the petitioner''s bookeeper, Salas, & w/o the presence of the
petitioner, who was ill and confined at that time, proceeded w/ the
execution thereof. Two packages of records & a locked filing cabinet
containing several papers and documents were seized by Almeda and a
receipt thereof issued by him to Salas. Separate criminal cases were filed
against petitioner. Petitioner demanded the return of the documents
seized. Bu motion, pet. challenged the legality of the SW and the
devolution of the documents demanded. By resolution, the resp. judge of
CFI denied the petitioner''s motion for the reason that though the SW was
illegal, there was a waiver on the part of the petitioner. The resolution of
10/5/37 & the order of 1/3/38 are sought, together w/ the SW, to be
nullified in these proceedings.
HELD: Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a
popular right and for a SW to be valid, (1) it must be issued upon
probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge
himself and not by the applicant or another; (3) in the determination of
probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; & (4) the
warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and
persons or things to be seized.

In the instant case, the existence of probable cause was determined not
by the judge himself but by the applicant. All that the judge did was to
accept as true the affidavit made by agent Almeda. It does not appear
that he examined the applicant and his witnesses, if any. Even accepting
the description of the prop. to be seized to be sufficient and on the
assumption that the receipt issued is sufficiently detailed w/in the
meaning of the law, the prop. seized were not delivered to the court w/c
issued the warrant, as required by law. Instead, they were turned over to
the resp. provincial fiscal & used by him in building up cases against
petitioner. Considering that at the time the warrant was issued, there was
no case pending against the petitioner, the averment that the warrant
was issued primarily for exploration purposes is not w/o basis. IS THERE A
WAIVER? No express waiver. IS THERE AN IMPLIED WAIVER? None.

18)

Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staf

Facts:
Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the
premises of Metropolitan Mail and We Forum newspapers and the
seizure of items alleged to have been used in subversive activities.
Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that
respondents be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence
against petitioner.
Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and
that the two warrants issued indicated only one and the same address. In
addition, the items seized subject to the warrant were real properties.
Issue:
Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.
Held:
The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was
held by the court as a typographical error and immaterial in view of the
correct determination of the place sought to be searched set forth in the
application. The purpose and intent to search two distinct premises was
evident in the issuance of the two warrant.
As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court
applied the principle in the case of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling
that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when
placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when
placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a
temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner. In
the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners of the land
and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being the
case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground
remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.

Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances

which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the
warrant did not satisfy the requirement of probable cause, the statements
of the witnesses having been mere generalizations.
Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of
general warrants. (Stanford vs. State of Texas). The description and
enumeration in the warrant of the items to be searched and seized did
not indicate with specification the subversive nature of the said items.

19)

Corro v. Lising

F: Respondent Judge issued a search warrant for the seizure of articles

allegedly used by petitioner in committing the crime of sedition. Seized
were printed copies of the Philippine Times, newspaper dummies,
typewriters, mimeographing machines and tape recorders, video
machines and tapes. The petitioner moved to quash the warrant but his
motion was denied.
HELD: The statements made in the affidavits are mere conclusions of law
and do not satisfy the requirement of probable cause. The language used
is all embracing as to include all conceivable words and equipment of
petitioner regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The search
warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which
is objectionable.

20)

Olaes v. People

F: Petitioners claim that the SW issued by resp. judge was invalid. They
also question the extrajudicial confession taken from them without
according them the right to assistance of a counsel. The articles seized by
virtue of the SW consisting of dried marijuana were admitted as evidence
for violation of RA 6425 or Dangerous Drugs Act.
RULING: While it is true that the caption of the SW states that it is in
connection with "the violation of RA 6425," it is clearly recited in the text
thereof that "there is probable cause to believe that Olaes of Olongapo
City has in his possession and control, marijuana dried stalks which are
suject of the offense stated above." Although the specific section of the
law is not stated, there is no question at all that the specific offense
alleged to have been committed as basis for determining probable cause
is alleged. Furthermore, the SW specifically described the place to be
searched and the things to be seized. As to the extrajudicial confessions
of the accused, the same are deemed inadmissible against them. In
People V. Galit, the Court declared that: " At the time the person is
arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the
reason for the arrrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any;
he shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to

counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against
him.
The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer,
a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means - by
telephone if possible - or by letter or messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished.
No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence
of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf,
or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or
by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the
wiaver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any
statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence." These requirements were even made stricter
under the 1987 Constitution which provides that the rights of a person
under custodial investigation cannot be waived except when made in
writing and in the presence of counsel.

21)
CA,

Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force v.

F: The PASTF was created by virtue of PD 1936 to serve as the President''s

arm called upon to combat the vice of dollar salting or the blackmarketing
and salting of foreign exchange.
ISSUE: W/N the PASTF is "such other officer as may be authorized by law"
to issue warrants under the 1973 Constitition.
RULING: NO. The Court, in reviewing the powers of the PASTF under its
enabling law, sees nothing that will reveal a legislative intendement to
confer upon the body, quasi-judicial responsiibilities relative to offenses
punishable by PD 1883. Its undertaking is simply to determine w/n
probable cause exists to warrant the filing of charges with the proper
court, meaning to say, to conduct an inquiry preliminary to a judicial
recourse, and to recommend action of appropriate authorities. The Court
agrees that PASTF exercises, or was meant to exercise, prosecutorial
powers, and on that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and
detached judge to determine the existence of probable cause for
purposes of arrest or search.
Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of
his case. Although his office "is to see to it that justice if done and not
necessarily to secure the conviction of the accused," he stands invariably,
as the accused''s adversary and his accuser. To permit him to issue
warrrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge and
jury in his own right, when he is neither. This makes to our mind and to
that extent, PD 1636 as amended by PD 2002, unconstitutional. The

"responsible officer" referred to under the Cosntitution is one not only

possessing the necessary skills and competence but more significantly,
the neutrality and independence comparable to the impartiality presumed
of a judicial officer.

22)

Salazar v. Achacoso,

F: Pursuant to the powers vested by PD 1920 and EO 1022, POEA

Administrator Achacoso ordered the closure of the recruitment agency of
Horty Salazar, having verified that she had no license to operate a
recruitment agency. He further ordered the seizure of the documents and
paraphernalias, being used or intended to be used as the means of
commiting illegal recruitment. This order was enforced on 26 January
1988. Petitioner filed this suit for prohibition.
Issue: May the POEA (or the Sec. of Labor) validly issue warrants of serach
and seizure (or arrest ) under Art. 38 of the Labor Code?
HELD: NO. The provisions of PD 1920 and EO 1022, now embodied in Art.
38 of the Labor Code, are the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in its
twilights moments. Under Art. III, Sec 2 of the 1987 Constitution, it is only
judges and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search. The
exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens,
whom the President of the Commissioner of Immigration may order
arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of
deportation.
The Sec. of Labor , not being a judge. may no longer issue search or
arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial
process. To that extent, we declare Art. 38, par. C of the Labor Code,
unconstitutional and of no force and effect. a. Existence of probable
cause. Probable cause is such facts and circumstances as would
reasonably make a prudent man believe that a crime have been
committed and that the documents or things sought to be searched and
seized are in the possession of the person against whom the warrant is
sought. Without probable cause, there can be no valid search warrant.
See Pasion vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689, (1938)

23) Stonehill v. Diokno

Facts:
1. Respondent (porsecution) made possible the issuance of 42 search
warrants against the petitioner and the corporation to search persons and
premises of several personal properties due to an alleged violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Custom Laws, Internal Revenue Code and
the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines. As a results, search and
seizures were conducted in the both the residence of the petitioner and in
the corporation's premises.

2.The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as
their issuance violated the Constitution and the Rules of Court for being
general warrants. Thus,he filed a petition with the Supreme Court
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction to prevent the seized
effects from being introduced as evidence in the deportation cases
against the petitioner. The court issued the writ only for those effects
found in the petitioner's residence.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can validly assail the legality
of the search and seizure in both premises
RULING: No, he can only assail the search conducted in the residences
but not those done in the corporation's premises. The petitioner has no
cause of action in the second situation since a corporation has a
personality separate and distinct from the personality of its officers or
herein petitioner regardless of the amount of shares of stock or interest of
each in the said corporation, and whatever office they hold therein. Only
the party whose rights has been impaired can validly object the legality of
a seizure--a purely personal right which cannot be exercised by a third
party. The right to object belongs to the corporation ( for the 1st group of
documents, papers, and things seized from the offices and the premises).

24)
25)

Papa v Mago
Nolasco, et al vs. Pao

Facts:
The present case was subject for resolution.

Supreme Court held in a criminal case that the arrest of the petitioners
was illegal, annulling the decision of respondent Judge Pao, and that the
seizure of the items by virtue of the warrant by the same respondent
judge are inadmissible as evidence in the Subversive Documents case.
However the Court held that the items were to be retained in case it
would be used as evidence in a separate criminal case pending before the
Special Military Commission No.1, returning the rest which are determined
irrelevant by petitioner.
Petitioners questioned the portion of the decision regarding the retention
of the properties seized. One of the petitioners also assailed the
respondents claim that the search was incidental to her arrest for the
crime of rebellion.
Issue:
Whether or not some of the properties seized may be introduced as
evidence in a separate criminal case.
Held:

The Court ruled the propriety of the declaration of the arrest and search
as null and void. It was held that the warrant was one of a general
warrant issued in gross violation of the constitutional mandate against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The Bill of rights also orders the
absolute exclusion of all illegally obtained evidence: "Any evidence
obtained in violation of this . . . section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding" (Sec. 4[2]).
All the articles thus seized fag under the exclusionary
rule totally and unqualifiedly and cannot be used against any of the three
petitioners, as held by the majority in the recent case of Galman vs.
Pamaran (G.R. Nos. 71208-09, August 30, 1985).
Since the search was not an incident of an arrest as it was in fact made
under a void general warrant, the seizure of documents could not be
justified as an incident of an arrest

in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, it is reasonable

considering that it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The
probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and
attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he
was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty
of
the
police officers to
inspect
the
same.
It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the
possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search
warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile
and much
too late.
Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the
exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated.

The Court ordered the return of all seized items to petitioners.

26)

27)

POSADAS VS. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: Members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao

Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task Force, Pat. Ursicio Ungab
and Pat. Umbra Umpar conducted surveillance along Magallanes Street,
Davao City. While in the vicinity of Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted
petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting
suspiciously. They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as
members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get
away was unsuccessful. They then checkedthe "buri" bag of the petitioner
where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial
No. 770196, two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun, a
smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber
gun. They brought the petitioner to the police station for further
investigation. In the course of the same, the petitioner was asked to show
the necessary license or authority to possess firearms and ammunitions
found in his possession but he failed to do so. He was then taken to the
Davao Metrodiscom office and the prohibited articles recovered from him
were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty. He was prosecuted
for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional
Trial Court
of
Davao
City.

People v. De lara

F: After a surveillance conducted, a buy-bust operation was conducted by

the police, as a consequence of which, accused was arrested. The
accused already pocketed the marked money and handed two foils to the
police when he sensed the presence of police operatives. He tried to
retrieve the two foils but he was prevented from doing so. He tried to
escape by running inside his house. The police pursued him and were
able to subdue him. The accused admitted that he kept prohibited drugs
in his house. He even showed the arresting officers a blue plastic bag
containing prohibited drugs. The team, together with the accused,
proceeded to WPD headquarters for investigation. During the
investigation, accused was apprised of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to have the assistance of counsel. When appellant was asked
to give a written statement, he refused to do so pending arrival of his
lawyer. Accused contends that his arrest and the seizure of the bag
containing prohibited drugs was null and void. He also contends that he
was not assisted by counsel during custodial investigation, where he was
forced to sign the photocopy of the marked money, the Receipt of
Property Seized, and the Booking and Information Sheet.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest of the accused and the seizure of the
plastic bag were valid.

Issue: Whether

or

Not

the

warantless

search

is

valid.

Held: In justifying the warrantless search of the buri bag then carried by
the petitioner, argues that under Section 12, Rule 136 of the Rules of
Court a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons
or anything used as proof of a commission of an offense without a search
warrant. It is further alleged that the arrest without a warrant of the
petitioner
was
lawful
under
the
circumstances.

RULING: YES. The accused was caught in flagrante as a result of a buybust operation. There was no need for a warrant. The policemen were not
only authorized but were also under obligation to apprehend the drug
pusher even without a warrant. The policemens entry into the house of
the accused without a search warrant was in hot-pursuit of a person
caught committing an offense in flagrante. The arrest that followed the
hot-pursuit was valid. The seizure of the plastic bag was the result of the
accuseds arrest inside the house. A contemporaneous search may be
conducted upon the person of the arrestee and the immediate vicinity

where the arrest was made. ISSUE: Whether the documents signed by the
accused during the investigation were admissible in evidence. RULING:
NO. There was no showing that accused was then assisted by counsel nor
his waiver thereto put into writing. (The rejection of these evidence would
not affect the conviction of the accused in view of the abundance of other
evidence establishing his guilt.)

28)

People v. de Gracia,

F: The incidents involved in this case took place at the height of the coup
d''etat staged in December, 1989. Accused-appellant Rolando de Gracia
was charged in two separate informations for illegal possession of
ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion, and for attempted
homicide. Appellant was convicted for illegal possession of firearms in
furtherance of rebellion, but was acquitted of attempted homicide.
Surveillance was undertaken by the military along EDSA because of
intelligence reports about a coup. Members of the team were engaged by
rebels in gunfire killing one member of the team. A searching team raided
the Eurocar Sales Office. They were able to find and confiscate six cartons
of M-16 ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different
calibers, and "molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms belonging to a
certain Col. Matillano. De Gracia was seen inside the office of Col.
Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door. The
team arrested appellant. They were then made to sign an inventory,
written in Tagalog, of the explosives and ammunition confiscated by the
raiding team. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team.
Accused was found guilty of illegal possession of firearms. That judgment
of conviction is now challenged before us in this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure in this case.
Ruling: YES It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the
Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with a search warrant at that time.
The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office
was being used as headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the raid, there was a
surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the surveillance team
was fired at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar building.
When the military operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof
refused to open the door despite requests for them to do so, thereby
compelling the former to break into the office. The Eurocar Sales Office is
obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not an armory or arsenal
which are the usual depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is
primarily and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The presence of
an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could not be
justifiably or even colorably explained. In addition, there was general
chaos and disorder at that time because of simultaneous and intense
firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo
which was under attack by rebel forces. The courts in the surrounding
areas were obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and houses
therein were deserted. Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our
considered opinion that the instant case falls under one of the exceptions
to the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the
military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case,
had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed.
There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant
their action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding
team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from
the courts. Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search
warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.