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4
VOLUME
THE
PEOPLES
LIBERATION
ARMY OF CHINA:
current
state
and
trajectory
OCCASIONAL
PAPER
APRIL 2016
02
THE
PEOPLES
LIBERATION
ARMY OF CHINA:
current state
and
trajectory
C 2016 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
* The views and opinions expressed in this Paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute.
03
C 2016 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
In Chinese military parlance, the so-called PLA force providers are the
PLA Army (PLAA), the PLA Navy (PLAN), the PLA Air Force (PLAAF),
and the PLA Second Artillery Force (PLA SAF). The Paramilitary and
reserve forces are also included as force providers.5 Based on the
2006 National Defense White Paper, PLA forces have undergone
drastic downsizing since mid-1980s.6 The PLAAs share in the total
force structure went down from 77% in 1985 to 69% in 2014.7
Conversely, PLAN grew from 8.6% in 1985 to 10% in 2014, the
PLAAF from 12% to 17%, and the PLA SAF from 2% to 4%.8
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The PLA is composed of 2,285,000 active troops and 510,000 reserve forces, which far surpasses US military
troop numbers.9 According to the 2013 Defense White Paper, PLAN accounts for 235,000 troops and the
PLAAF for 398,000 troops.10 The PLAAs mobile operational units comprise 850,000 troops of an estimated
total of 1.6 million PLAA troops. The PLA SAF accounts for about 100,000 personnel.11 Interestingly, Chinas
paramilitary forces, such as the Peoples Armed Police (PAP), has a total strength of 660,000 staff as well as the
militia.12 Since its activation in 1983, the PAP was primarily tasked to address internal security challenges, such
as natural disasters and ethnic and social unrest, especially in the restive regions of Xinjiang and Tibet.13
B. Organizational Structure
and Command Chain
Distributed into seven (7) military regions, the PLAA serves
as force employers, namely: Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou,
Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou, and Chengdu.14 Every region is
overseen by four (4) general departments, namely: the PLAs
General Staff Headquarters, the General Political Department,
the General Logistics Department, and the General Armaments
Department.15 The PLAN, PLAAF and PLA SAF
have separate headquarters.16
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Under the Chinese command chain, the CMC plays a crucial roleit
exerts direct organizational control over the PLA. The CMC oversees
military and defense affairs and is a high-profile party body, through
which the CCP exerts control over the PLA since the 1930s.17 The
Ministry of National Defence is subordinated to the State Council and
is outside the PLAs direct command structure. It serves as a liaison
office with foreign militaries. Meanwhile, the PAP being an auxiliary
force to the PLA and law enforcement body is subject to a different,
dual command structure18 it is both under the supervision of the
CMC and the State Council through the Ministry of Public Security.
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07
C. Defense Budget
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C 2016 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
Source: BBC.CO.UK
09
C 2016 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
Comparison of PLAs old and new force structure and troop strength
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PLA.68 According to You Ji, overseer of the Department of Government and Public Administration at the
University of Macau, the new title symbolizes that Xi will exert a more direct role in the command and
control of the joint battle command systems with the aim of strengthening inter-service
coordination and raising the prospects of military victory.69
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Critical Analysis
Overall, the PLA under Xi is undergoing radical
force restructuring, transforming from an armycentric to a navy/air force-centric military with
a greater qualitative edge at an unprecedented
pace. This restructuring can be explained by
recent developments in Chinas domestic, regional
and global strategic and economic landscapes.
Domestically, the relatively stable internal security
situation, the civilianization of law enforcement
agencies and the looming cost of maintaining huge
personnel disincentivize the PLAs sustainment of
massive ground forces. Regionally, the perception of
containment by the US and its network of security
allies in the Asia-Pacific regionthe Philippines
includednecessitates the PLA to strengthen its
naval and aerial capabilities for better deterrence
and force projection. Globally, the internationalization
of its developmental interests as shown in One BeltOne Road Initiative (OBOR) creates the imperative
for the PLA to develop more advanced capabilities
to protect Chinas sea lanes of communications
(SLOCs) and transcontinental roads and railways.
It is highly unlikely, however, that the PLA will be
able to proceed smoothly with its radical force
restructuring in the coming years. Internally, the
ongoing anti-corruption campaign of Xi in the military
is opening up a Pandoras box that could create
more instability within Chinas defense and security
establishment. The arrest last year of Xu Caihou,
former general of the PLA and vice-chairman of
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14
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Conclusion
The Peoples Liberation Army has gone a long way from being a
small ragtag guerrilla force in Nanchang into the Communist Party
of Chinas colossal modern armed forces, promoting the security
and developmental interests of the worlds nascent economic
and political power, the Peoples Republic of China. The PLAs
growing regional and global footprint is, in effect, altering threat
perceptions, the regional balance of military power, and risk
calculi in the greater geopolitical game. For this reason, it is
imperative for the Philippines to transcend the amorphous China
threat metanarrative that has dominated the political-security
discourse in the Philippines and objectively re-examine
what the PLA is, why it exists and where it is headed.
By comprehensively reviewing the multifaceted aspects of the PLA
as a military organization (i.e. organization, chain of command,
budget, doctrine and strategy, and modernization goals and
trends), one may conclude that the PLA is the new indispensable
factor in the Philippines security equation. The PLA deserves
serious attention in national security policy formulation and
military strategy-making. Finally, an unadulterated picture of the
PLA as Chinas hard power instrument in pursuing its objectives
should lead key stakeholders in the Philippine government and
academia to the naked realization that adherence to the Aquino
administrations balancing strategy will have positive and negative
consequences well within and beyond the military realm.
C 2016 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
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16
Endnotes:
Embassy of the Peoples Republic of China in the Republic of India, White Paper: Chinas Peaceful Development,
2011, Chinese Government.
Ibid.
Grieger, Gisela, The Role of the Army in Chinas Politics, European Parliamentary Research Service, 29 June
2015, accessed 26 October 2015, http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/564375/EPRS_
BRI(2015)564375_EN.pdf.
Ibid.
22
43
Ibid.
64
Ibid.
44
Ibid.
65
Ibid.
45
23
Ibid.
46
Ibid.
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
47
Ibid.
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
48
Ibid.
Ibid.
26
49
Ibid.
Ibid.
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid.
52
Ibid.
53
Ibid.
54
Ibid.
The Military Balance, International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2013, p. 287, cited in Chinese Strategy and
Military Power in 2014, op. cit, p. 159.
Gisela Grieger, The Role of the Army in Chinas Politics, European Parliamentary Research Service.
10
11
D.J. Blasko, The 2013 Defense White Paper in Perspective, China Brief, Vol. XIII, issue 9, 25 April 2013, pp.
6-10.
Gisela Grieger, The Role of the Army in Chinas Politics, European Parliamentary Research Service.
12
13
14
15
16
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
17
J.C Mulvenon and N.D. Yang, The Peoples Liberalization Army as Organization, RAND National Security
Research Division, 2002, pp. 45-121.
Gisela Grieger, The Role of the Army in Chinas Politics, European Parliamentary Research Service.
18
Xi urges breakthroughs in military structural reform, Xinhuanet, 26 November 2015, accessed 09 February 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/201511/26/c_134859089.htm.
19
20
C 2016 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid.
Gisela Grieger, The Role of the Army in Chinas Politics, European Parliamentary Research Service.
29
30
Ibid.
55
Ibid.
31
Ibid.
56
Ibid.
57
Ibid.
32
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid.
35
Ibid.
36
Ibid.
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid.
39
40
Ibid.
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid.
Chinas Military Strategy, Ministry of National Defense: The Peoples Republic of China, May 2015, accessed
27 October 2015, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/.
58
59
Ibid.
60
Ibid.
61
62
Ibid.
Edward Wong, Jane Perlez and Chris Buckley, China Announces Cuts of 300,000 Troops at Military Parade
Showing Its Might, The New York Times, 02 September
2015, accessed 27 October 2015, http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/09/03/world/asia/beijing-turns-into-ghost-townas-it-gears-up-for-military-parade.html?_r=0.
63
66
67
Ibid.
US Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
Peoples Republic of China, 2015, US Government.
70
Charles Clover, Xi warns China military amid anticorruption purge, Financial Times, 20 July 2015, accessed
28 October 2015, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5e5314802eb8-11e5-91ac-a5e17d9b4cff.html#axzz3ppAkoeMJ.
71
Patricia Lourdes Viray, UN tribunal to issue Philippines vs China decision by 2016, Philippine Star Global, 01
December 2015, accessed 10 February 2016, http://www.
philstar.com/headlines/2015/12/01/1527874/un-tribunalissue-philippines-vs-china-decision-2016.
72
73
Mike Ives, Vietnams Communist Party Gives OldGuard Leader a New 5-Year Term, The New York Times,
27 January 2016, accessed 10 February 2016, http://www.
nytimes.com/2016/01/28/world/asia/vietnam-communistparty-nguyen-phu-trong.html?_r=0.
74
75
76
Bong Lozada, AFP nears minimum defense posture, Inquirer.net, 21 July 2014, accessed 22 April 2015,
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/622005/afp-nears-minimumdefense-posture.
77
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9.4
VOLUME
ABOUT
Mark Davis M. Pablo
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