ECONOMIC STRIKE

1. Caltex v Phil. Labor Corp

Caltex vs. Philippine Labor Organization
May 27, 1959 No. L-9915Unreported CasesPonente:
Paras, C.J.
Facts:
Hipdion del Rosario was hired by Caltex as labourer in its
Pandacan Terminal. After twomonths he was suspended for
insubordination. Caltex filed a petition with the Industrial
Courtfor authority to dismiss him. After hearing, the court
found del Rosario guilty of the actscomplained of but
believing that a permanent dismissal was to severe a
punishment, the courtordered his reinstatement with
payment of backwages.Caltex claims that the court committed a
serious mistake of law and grave abuse ofdiscretion in compelling
it to retain del Rosario in its employ and in substituting its
judgment indetermining the fitness and qualification of a
temporary employee to become permanent orregular.
Issues:
Whether or not del Rosarios discharge was proper.
Whether or not the court has a right to substitute Caltexs
judgment in determining the fitnessand qualification of
a temporary employee.
Held: Del Rosarios discharge was proper. The acts of
insubordination for which del Rosario was
found guilty consist of disorderly conduct and willful
disobedience which to note was committedin a very short
period of two months from the time of his hiring. Willful
disobedience is ajustifiable ground for an employees
discharge.
Considering the period of time that del Rosario had been
working for petitioner (Caltex) beforehis suspension, it can be
said that he was on temporary or trial basis. Caltex has the
right toplace him under this condition to determine his
fitness and competency.

2. Central Vegetable Oil Co. vs. Phil Oil Industry

Workers Union
FACTS: CVOMC, Inc. and POIWU entered into an agreement
which provided that, upon the reopening of the factory, after
the installation of 6 new duo expellers necessary to increase
production and effect economy in management, the
company and a duly authorized representative of union shall
determine who shall be hired for each kind of work among
the former laborers and shall fix the wages they should
receive similar to those of laborers of Philippine Refining
Company agreed to pay its laborers who shall be returned to
work.
The union agreed to allow its affiliated laborers to resume
work immediately upon the signing of the agreement and will
not consider the re-employment of those who already
received gratuity prior to the signing of the agreement, and
severed their relations with the company. CIR approved the
agreement one week afterward.
While the machineries were being installed, the 24 laborers
were laid off. However, upon their demand, the company
allowed them to work one day a week, and continued to work
on shifts of 4 men a day. When the expellers were being
tested the 24 laborers were allowed to work on a full time
basis. The following year, notice was posted by the plant
superintendent that the oil mill would stop operation for two
days. On the second day, the 24 laborers did not report to
work.
The CVOMC filed with CIR to discharge them on the basis that
they declared an illegal strike. After hearing, the court
ordered for their dismissal. Upon MR, CIR ordered for
reinstatement and payment of wages, stating that no strike
was staged because there was no work as announced by the
notice. Even admitting that there was a strike, the same was

not illegal. The company then filed a petition for review on

certiorari.
ISSUES: WON the 24 laborers act of not reporting for work
was a strike
Assuming there was a strike, WON it was illegal
RULING: Assuming there was a strike. The court ruled that
the plea of the laborers for better conditions and for more
working days cannot be said to be trivial, unreasonable or
unjust, much less illegal, because it is not only the inherent
right but the duty of all free men to improve their living
standards through honest work that pays a decent wage.
The demands that gave rise to the strike may not properly be
granted under the circumstances of this case, but that fact
should not make said demands and the consequent strike
illegal. The ability of the Company to grant said demands is
one thing, and the right of the laborers to make said
demands is another thing. The latter should be kept inviolate.

4. DIVINE WORD UNIVERSITY OF TACLOBAN VS.

SECRETARYOF LABOR
FACTS: Divine Word University Employees Union (DWUEU) is
the sole and bargaining agent of the Divine Word University.
Sometime in 1985, DWUEU submitted its collective
bargaining proposals. The University replied and requested a
preliminary conference which unfortunately did not take
place due to the alleged withdrawal of the CBA proposals.
Because of this, the union filed a notice of strike on the
grounds of bargaining deadlock and unfair labor practice.
Then, an agreement between the University and
DWUEU-ALU were held after the filing of the notice of strike.
DWUEU-ALU, consonant with the agreement, submitted its
collective bargaining proposals but were ignored by the
University.

ISSUE: WON the complaint for unfair labor practice filed by

the Union is with merit.
HELD:A thorough study of the records reveals that
there was no "reasonable effort at good faith bargaining"
specially on the part of the University. Its indifferent towards
collective bargaining inevitably resulted in the failure of the
parties to arrive at an agreement. As it was evident
that unilateral moves were being undertaken only by the
DWUEU-ALU, there was no counteraction of forces or
an impasse to speak of. While collective bargaining should be
initiated by the union, there is a corresponding
responsibility on the part of the employer to respond in
some manner to such acts. This is a clear from the provisions
of the Labor Code Art250 (a) of which states: a.) when a
party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a
written notice upon the other party withal statement of its
proposals. The other party shall make a reply thereto not
later than 10 calendar days from receipt of such notice.
Hence, petitioner's contention that the DWUEU-ALU's
proposals may not be unilaterally imposed on it on
the ground that collective bargaining agreement is a
contract wherein the consent of both parties is
indispensable is devoid of merit. A similar argument
had already been disregarded in the case of Kiok Loy
v. NLRC, where we upheld the order of the NLRC declaring
the unions draft CBA proposal as the collective agreement
which should govern the relationship between the
parties.
Kiok Loy vs. NLRC is applicable in the instant
case, considering that the fact therein have also
been indubitably established in this case. These factors are:
(a) the union is the duly certified bargaining agent; (b) it
made a definite request to bargain submitted its
collective bargaining proposals, and (c) the University
made no further proposal whatsoever. As we said in Kiok Loy
v. NLRC, a company's refusal to make counter
proposal if considered in relation to the entire
bargaining process, may indicate bad faith and this
is especially true where the Union's request for a
counterproposal is left unanswered. "Moreover, the Court
added in the same case that "it is not obligatory upon either
side of a labor controversy to precipitately accept or agree to
the proposal of the other. But an erring party should not be

tolerated and allowed with impunity to resort to schemes

feigning negotiations by going through empty gestures
7. MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER PLANT EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION, et. Al vs HON. TEODULO C. TANDAYAG,
MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER CORPORATION
These two cases have a common factual background. L29217 is about the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance
of Lanao del Norte to entertain an action for damages arising
from unfair labor practices and to issue an injunction
restraining the picketing concomitant with the strike. And L33935 is a consolidation of two unfair labor practice cases
originating from the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR).
The first case was filed by the employer against the union in
connection with an alleged illegal strike and picketing. The
second case was filed by the union against the employer for
the latter's alleged refusal to enter into a collective
bargaining agreement.
Case 1:
Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation, a company engaged in
the manufacture of fertilizer and chemicals at its plant in
Iligan City, had a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with
the Maria Cristina Fertilizer Plant Employees Association
expiring on December 31, 1967. In September, 1967 the
union submitted to the company a draft of a new CBA. The
company countered with the suggestion that the existing
CBA be renewed for a five-year period.
Believing that the company did not want to negotiate a new
CBA, the union on November 2, 1967 sent to the company a
notice of strike. The company clarified that it was not
refusing to negotiate. It sent to the union its own draft of a
new CBA. In December, 1967 fruitless negotiations regarding

a new CBA were held on several occasions between the

company and the union.
On January 5, 1968 the company proposed that all regular
employees would be given an increase of twenty pesos and
that those whose monthly salary was below P130 would be
paid P150 a month. The union rejected the proposal. On
January 15, 1968 the company president sent a radiogram to
the union president, requesting the latter to specify the
provisions in the draft of the CBA, which were unacceptable,
and appealing to the union members to take into account the
problems facing the company.
The union in its letter of January 16, 1968 reminded the
management of its four major demands previous submitted
to the company president. The letter ended with this ominous
warning: "Until midnight tonight, we beg your understanding
and acceptance." (Exh. M or 17). On that same day, the
company president sent a wire to the union president,
suggesting mediation and conciliation by the Department of
Labor. The union president promised to reply in the afternoon
of the next day, January 17, after consultation with the
officers of the union.
Without having made any reply, the union declared a strike in
the evening of January 17, 1968 with the declaration of a
strike served upon the plant manager at eleven-thirty in the
evening.
Two weeks after the strike was declared. The company filed
with the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte against the
union and its officers a complaint for damages with a petition
for preliminary injunction. The company alleged that the
strike and picketing were illegal and that it was suffering a
loss of P39,000 daily as a result of the strike. The union
alleged in its answer that the lower court has no jurisdiction
because the case involves labor dispute which fails within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the CIR. The union opposed the

issuance of an injunction on the ground that the strike was

lawful, peaceful and orderly. (Civil Case No. 1262).
The lower court issued an injunction restraining the union
and its agents and representatives from preventing the
employees, who are not members of the union, from entering
the fertilizer plant and performing their usual duties and from
going out of the same and from preventing the customers
from loading the fertilizer and other products purchased from
the company.
The company on January 31, 1968 filed against the union and
its officers a charge of unfair labor practice with the CIR's
regional office at Cagayan de Oro City. After due
investigation, the CIR's prosecution division on March 12,
1968 filed in behalf of the company a complaint for unfair
labor practice against the union and its officers for having
declared an illegal strike and resorted to unlawful picketing
which were the same acts complained of in the first case
(Civil Case No. 1262).
Case 2:
The union on March 8, 1968 charged the company and its
president with unfair labor practice. After due investigation,
the prosecution division filed on October 30, 1968 in behalf of
the union a complaint for unfair labor practice against the
company, its president and personnel officer for having
allegedly refused to enter Into a collective bargaining
agreement, for restraining the members of the union in
exercising their right to self-organization, and for
discriminating against them by not giving them the privileges
enjoyed by non-union members.
The strike was terminated on October 18, 1968 when the
parties entered into a collective bargaining agreement which
took effect on the following day. The picketing was lifted. But
before that settlement was made, or on July 9, 1968, the

union filed in this Court the special civil actions of certiorari

and prohibition against the Court of First Instance of Lanao
del Norte and the company in order to nullify the injunction
and to secure a declaration that the lower court has no
jurisdiction
The two unfair labor practice cases were heard jointly. It was
held that the strike was illegal because there was no notice
of intention to strike, as contemplated in section 14 of
Republic Act No. 875, and because the picketing was highly
coercive in character. The officers and members of the union
named as respondents were declared to have lost their
status as employees of the company.
ISSUES:
1. Jurisdictional issue: Can the CFI enjoin on strike and
award damages arising from alleged unfair labor
practices?
Ruling: We hold that the Court of First Instance of Lanao del
Norte has no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 1262 which is
interwoven with the unfair labor practice case, CIR Case No.
109-ULP-ORO. The two cases involve the legality of the strike
and picketing conducted by the union against the company.
It is settled that where the plaintiff's cause of action for
damages arose out of, or was necessarily intertwined with
the alleged unfair labor practice committed by the union, the
jurisdiction properly belonged to the Court of Industrial
Relations
The lower court has no jurisdiction to issue the injunction
against the union. Where the issue in an action filed in the
Court of First Instance was tied up with an unfair labor
practice case pending in the Court of Industrial Relations,
the. action was outside the jurisdiction of the regular courts
even if acts of violence, intimidation and coercion were

imputed to the union. The injunction should have been

obtained from the Industrial Court which was empowered to
restrain such acts under the Industrial Peace Act.

The strike was not peacefully conducted and that the

picketing was characterized by coercion and intimidation.
Only peaceful picketing is allowed.

All the proceedings in Civil Case No. 1262 are void for lack of
jurisdiction and should be dismissed.

A strike is a legitimate weapon in the universal struggle for

existence. But to be lawful, a strike must be preceded by the
requisite notice of intention to strike. It should have a lawful
purpose and it should be executed through lawful means.

2. L-33935 Legality of the strike.

The strike was illegal.
The CIR on the basis of the evidence found (a) at no instance
did the company refuse to negotiate with the union on the
terms of a new collective bargaining agree that the company
did not coerce the employees to resign from the union on the
promise of increased compensation and, therefore, it did not
interfere in the right of the employees to self-organization (c)
that the company did not perpetrate acts of discrimination
against the members of the union, and (d) that the strike was
staged because of the company's refusal to grant the union's
four demands regarding the inclusion of foremen and casuals
in the union, the increase of the basic monthly pay to P180
and the increase to P240 a month of the salaries of
employees already receiving P180 a month, free medical and
dental treatment for the employees and their families, and
gratuity pay.

Others: re: Strike

Factual findings are final and binding when
(1) the parties were given the opportunity to present
evidence;
(2) the tribunal considered the evident, presented;
(3) there is something in the record to support the findings,
and
(4) the evidence supporting the findings is substantial
Substantial evidence means evidence which is more than a
mere scintilla. It is relevant and credible evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion

The CIR found that the union struck in order to attain those
demands and not because of the alleged refusal to the
company to enter into a new collective bargaining
agreement. The company had a pending suggestion for
mediation by the Department of Labor when the strike was
declared.

7. MECHANICAL DEPARTMENT LABOR UNION SA

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS,petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and SAMAHAN NG
MGA MANGGAGAWA SA CALOOCAN
SHOPS, respondents.

Hence, the union should have filed with the Conciliation

Service or with the Director of Labor Relations thirty days
prior to the strike a notice of its intention to strike, as
required by section 14(d) of the Industrial Peace Act.

FACTS:
The case began on 13 February 1965 by a petition of the
respondent "Samahan ng mga Manggagawa, etc." calling

attention to the fact that there were three unions in the

Caloocan shops of the Philippine National Railways: the
"Samahan", the "Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Manila
Railroad Company", and the Mechanical Department Labor
Union; that no certification election had been held in the last
12 months in the Caloocan shops; that both the "Samahan"
and the Mechanical Department Labor Union had submitted
different labor demands upon the management for which
reason a certification election was needed to determine the
proper collective bargaining agency for the Caloocan shop
workers.
The petition was opposed by the management as well as by
the Mechanical Department Labor Union, the latter averring
that it had been previously certified in two cases as sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of the employees and laborers of
the PNR'S mechanical department, and had negotiated two
bargaining agreements with management in 1961 and 1963;
that before the expiration of the latter, a renewal thereof had
been negotiated and the contract remained to be signed;
that the "Samahan" had been organized only in 21 January
1965; that the Caloocan shops unit was not established nor
separated from the Mechanical Department unit; that the
"Samahan" is composed mainly of supervisors who had filed
a pending case to be declared non-supervisors; and that the
purpose of the petition was to disturb the present smooth
working labor management relations.
Issue:
Whether or not a new unit should be established, the
Caloocan shops, separate and distinct from the rest of the
workers under the Mechanical Department now represented
by the Mechanical Department Labor Union.
Ruling (CIR) :

Yes.
The Locomotive crew and Motor Car Crew, though part of the
Mechanical Department, is a separate unit, and is
represented by the Union de Maquinistas, Fogoneros Y
Motormen. The workers under the other two main units of the
departments are represented by the Mechanical Department
Labor Union. The workers of the Shops Rolling Stocks
Maintenance Division or the Caloocan Shops now seek to be
separated from the rest of the workers of the department and
to be represented by the "Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa
Caloocan Shops." .
There is certainly a community of interest among the workers
of the Caloocan Shops. They are grouped in one place. They
work under one or same working condition, same working
time or schedule and are exposed to same occupational risk.
Though evidence on record shows that workers at the
Caloocan Shops perform the same nature of work as their
counterparts in the Manila Shed, the difference lies in the fact
that workers at the Caloocan Shops perform major repairs of
locomotives, rolling stocks, engines, etc., while those in the
Manila Shed, works on minor repairs. Heavy equipment and
machineries are found in the Caloocan Shops.
Ruling (SC):
Judge Martinez held that the employees in the Caloocan
Shops should be given a chance to vote on whether their
group should be separated from that represented by the
Mechanical Department Labor Union, and ordered a
plebiscite held for the purpose. The ruling was sustained by
the Court en banc;wherefore, the Mechanical Department
Labor Union appealed to this Court questioning the
applicability under the circumstances of the "Globe doctrine"

of considering the will of the employees in determining what

union should represent them.
Technically, this appeal is premature, since the result of the
ordered plebiscite among the workers of the Caloocan shops
may be adverse to the formation of a separate unit, in which
event, as stated in the appealed order, all questions raised in
this case would be rendered moot and academic. Apparently,
however, the appellant Mechanical Department Labor Union
takes it for granted that the plebiscite would favor
separation.
We find no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the
ruling under appeal as would justify our interfering with it.

8. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR WORKERS

(NFSW), petitioner, vs. ETHELWOLDO R. OVEJERA,
CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE LA CARLOTA (CAC), COL.
ROGELIO DEINLA, as Provincial Commander, 3311st
P.C. Command, Negros Occidental, respondents. (I think
ang first issue lang ang relevant sa topic but just in case
interested kamo what happened)
FACTS : NFSW has been the bargaining agent of
and file employees and has concluded with CAC a
bargaining agreement effective February 16,
February 15, 1984. Under Art. VII, Sec. 5 of the said

CAC rank
collective
1981
CBA

Bonuses The parties also agree to maintain the present

practice on the grant of Christmas bonus, milling bonus, and
amelioration bonus to the extent as the latter is required by
law. The Christmas and milling bonuses amount to 1-
months' salary.

NFSW struck allegedly to compel the payment of the 13th

month pay under PD 851, in addition to the Christmas,
milling and amelioration bonuses being enjoyed by CAC
workers. To settle the strike, a compromise agreement was
concluded between CAC and NFSW on November 30,1981.
Under paragraph 4 thereof, The parties agree to abide by the
final decision of the Supreme Court in any case involving the
13th Month Pay Law if it is clearly held that the employer is
liable to pay a 13th month pay separate and distinct from the
bonuses already given.
As of November 30, 1981, G.R. No. 51254 (Marcopper Mining
Corp. vs. Blas Ople and Amado Inciong, Minister and Deputy
Minister of Labor, respectively, and Marcopper Employees
Labor Union, Petition for certiorari and Prohibition) was still
pending in the Supreme Court. The Petition had been
dismissed on June 11, 1981 on the vote of seven Justices. 1 A
motion for reconsideration thereafter filed was denied in a
resolution dated December 15, 1981, with only five Justices
voting for denial. (3 dissented; 2 reserved their votes: 4 did
not take part.) On December 18, 1981 the decision of June
11, 1981 having become final and executory entry of
judgment was made.
After the Marcopper decision had become final, NFSW
renewed its demand that CAC give the 13th month pay. CAC
refused. NFSW filed with the Ministry of Labor and
Employment (MOLE) Regional Office in Bacolod City a notice
to strike based on non-payment of the 13th month pay. Six
days after, NFSW struck. One day after the commencement
of the strike, a report of the strike-vote was filed by NFSW
with MOLE.
CAC filed a petition to declare the strike illegal, principally
for being violative of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, that is, the
strike was declared before the expiration of the 15-day
cooling-off period for unfair labor practice (ULP) strikes, and

the strike was staged before the lapse of seven days from the
submission to MOLE of the result of the strike-vote. Labor
Arbiter Ovejera declared the NFSW strike illegal.
NFSW by passing the NLRC filed the instant Petition for
prohibition alleging that Labor Arbiter Ovejera, CAC and the
PC Provincial Commander of Negros Occidental were
threatening to immediately enforce the decision which would
violate fundamental rights of the petitioner.
ISSUES :
1. Whether the strike declared by
resolution of which mainly depends
directory character of the cooling-off
strike ban after report to MOLE of the
as prescribed in the Labor Code.

NFSW is illegal, the

on the mandatory or
period and the 7-day
result of a strike-vote,

2. Whether under Presidential Decree 851 (13th Month Pay

Law), CAC is obliged to give its workers a 13th month salary
in addition to Christmas, milling and amelioration bonuses,
the aggregate of which admittedly exceeds by far the
disputed 13th month pay. (See petitioner's memorandum of
April 12, 1982, p. 2; CAC memorandum of April 2, 1982, pp.
3-4.) Resolution of this issue requires an examination of the
thrusts and application of PD 851.
III. DISCUSSION
The cooling-off period and the 7-day strike ban after
the filing of a strike- vote report, as prescribed in Art. 264 of
the Labor Code, are reasonable restrictions and their
imposition is essential to attain the legitimate policy
objectives embodied in the law. We hold that they constitute
a valid exercise of the police power of the state.

The NFSW declared the strike six (6) days after filing a
strike notice, i.e., before the lapse of the mandatory coolingoff period. It also failed to file with the MOLE before launching
the strike a report on the strike-vote, when it should have
filed such report "at least seven (7) days before the intended
strike." Under the circumstances, we are perforce
constrained to conclude that the strike staged by petitioner is
not in conformity with law.
As to the Second Issue. President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued Presidential Decree No. 851 on 16 December 1975.
Thereunder, "all employers are hereby required to pay salary
of not more than all their employees receiving a basic P1,000
a month, regardless of the nature of their employment, a
13th month pay not later than December 24 of every year."
Exempted from the obligation however are:
Employers already paying their employees a 13th
month pay or its equivalent. This view is justified by the law
itself which makes no distinction in the grant of exemption:
"Employers already paying their employees a 13th month
pay or its equivalent are not covered by this Decree." (P.D.
851.) In the case at bar, the NFSW-CAC collective bargaining
agreement provides for the grant to CAC workers of
Christmas bonus, milling bonus and amelioration bonus, the
aggregate of which is very much more than a worker's
monthly pay. When a dispute arose last year as to whether
CAC workers receiving the stipulated bonuses would
additionally be entitled to a 13th month pay, NFSW and CAC
concluded a compromise agreement by which they agree(d)
to abide by the final decision of the Supreme Court in any
case involving the 13th Month Pay Law if it is clearly held
that the employer is liable to pay a 13th month pay separate
and distinct from the bonuses already given.
When this agreement was forged on November
30,1981, the original decision dismissing the petition in the

aforecited Marcopper case had already been promulgated by

this Court. On the votes of only 7 Justices, including the
distinguished Chief Justice, the petition of Marcopper Mining
Corp. seeking to annul the decision of Labor Deputy Minister
Amado Inciong granting a 13th month pay to Marcopper
employees (in addition to mid- year and Christmas bonuses
under a CBA) had been dismissed. But a motion for
reconsideration filed by Marcopper was pending as of
November 30, 1981. In December 1981, the original decision
was affirmed when this Court finally denied the motion for
reconsideration. But the resolution of denial was supported
by the votes of only 5 Justices. The Marcopper decision is
therefore a Court decision but without the necessary eight
votes to be doctrinal. This being so, it cannot be said that the
Marcopper decision "clearly held" that "the employer is liable
to pay a 13th month pay separate and distinct from the
bonuses already given," within the meaning of the NFSW-CAC
compromise agreement. At any rate, in view of the rulings
made herein, NFSW cannot insist on its claim that its
members are entitled to a 13th month pay in addition to the
bonuses already paid by CAC. WHEREFORE, the petition is
dismissed for lack of merit. No costs.

9. G.R. Nos. 95494-97 September 7, 1995

LAPANDAY WORKERS UNION, ARQUILAO BACOLOD,
JOSE ERAD, FERNANDO HERNANDO, EDDIE ESTRELLA,
CIRILO DAYAG, EDUARDO POQUITA, CARLITO PEPITO,
RENE ARAO, JUANITO GAHUM, EMILIANO MAGNO,
PERLITO LISONDRA, GREGORIO ALBARAN, ABRAHAM
BAYLON, DIONESIO TRUCIO, TOMAS BASCO AND
ROSARIO SINDAY, pertitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS:

Private respondents are sister companies engaged in the

production of bananas. Their agricultural establishments are
located in Davao City.On the other hand, petitioner Lapanday
Workers' Union (Union) is the duly certified bargaining agent
of the rank and file employees of private respondents. The
Union is affiliated with the KMU-ANGLO. The other petitioners
are all members of the Union.
The records show that petitioner Union has a collective
bargaining agreement with private respondents, covering the
period from December 5, 1985 to November 30, 1988. A few
months before the expiration of their CBA, private
respondents initiated certain management policies which
disrupted the relationship of the parties.
First, private respondents contracted Philippine Eagle
Protectors and Security Agency, Inc., to provide security
services for their business premises .Their contract also
called for the protection of the lives and limbs of private
respondents' officers, employees and guests within company
premises. The Union branded the security guards posted
within the company premises as private respondents'
"goons" and "special forces." It also accused the guards of
intimidating and harassing their members.
Second, private respondents conducted seminars on Human
Development and Industrial Relations (HDIR) for their to
promote their social education and economic growth. Among
the topics discussed in the seminar were the mission
statement of the company, corporate values, and the
Philippine political spectrum. The Union claimed that the
module on the Philippine political spectrum lumped the
ANGLO (Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor
Organization), with other outlawed labor organizations such
as the National Democratic Front or other leftist groups.
These issues were discussed during a labor-management
.The labor group was represented by the Union, through its
President, petitioner Arquilao Bacolod, and its legal counsel.
After private respondents explained the issues, the Union
agreed to allow its members to attend the HDIR seminar for

the rank-and-filers. Nevertheless, on August 19 and 20, the

Union directed its members not to attend the seminars
scheduled on said dates. Earlier on, or on August 6, 1988, the
Union, led by petitioners Arquilao Bacolod and Rene Arao,
picketed the premises of the Philippine Eagle Protectors to
show their displeasure on the hiring of the guards.
Worse still, the Union filed on August 25, 1988, a Notice of
Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB). It accused the company of unfair labor practices
consisting of coercion of employees, intimidation of union
members and union-busting. 2 These were the same issues
raised by the Union during the August 2, 1988 labormanagement meeting.
The Union officials did attend the seminar. While they no
longer objected to the continuation of the seminar, they
reiterated their demand for the deletion of the discussion
pertaining to the KMU-ANGLO.With the apparent settlement
of their differences, private respondents notified the NCMB
that there were no more bases for the notice of strike.
An unfortunate event brake the peace of the parties. On
September 8, 1988, Danilo Martinez, a member of the Board
of Directors of the Union, was gunned down in his house in
the presence of his wife and children. The gunman was later
identified as Eledio Samson, an alleged member of the new
security forces of private respondents.
On September 9, 1988, the day after the killing, most of the
members of the Union refused to report for work. They
returned to work the following day but they did not comply
with the "quota system" adopted by the management to
bolster production output. Allegedly, the Union instructed the
workers to reduce their production to thirty per cent (30%).
Private respondents charged the Union with economic
sabotage through slowdown.
Hence, private respondents filed separate charges against
the Union and its members for illegal strike, unfair labor

practice and damages, with prayer for injunction. These

cases were docketed before Labor Arbiter Antonio Villanueva.
Then the petitioners skipped work to pay their last respect to
the slain Danilo Martinez who was laid to rest. Again, the
petitioners did not report for work. Instead, they proceeded
to private respondents' office at Lanang, carrying placards
and posters which called for the removal of the security
guards, the ouster of certain management officials, and the
approval of their mass leave application. Their mass action
did not succeed.
In a last ditch effort to settle the deteriorating dispute
between the parties, City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte intervened..
Again, the dialogues proved fruitless as private respondents
refused to withdraw the cases they earlier filed with public
respondent.
On October 3, 1988, a strike vote was conducted among the
members of the Union and those in favor of the strike won
overwhelming support from the workers. The result of the
strike vote was then submitted to the NCMB on October 10,
1988. Two days later, or on Ootober 12, 1988, the Union
struck.
On the bases of the foregoing facts, Labor Arbiter Antonio
Villanueva ruled that the union staged an illegal strike. Before
the NLRC could resolve the appeal taken on the Villanueva
decision ,Labor Arbiter Sancho rendered a decision in the two
(2) cases filed by the Union against private
respondents LADECO and CADECO . The Sancho decision,
declared LADECO and CADECO guilty of unfair labor practices
and illegal dismissal and ordered the reinstatement of the
dismissed employees of private respondents, with backwages
and other benefits. Significantly, the Sancho decision
considered the refusal of the workers to report for work on
September 9, 1988, justified by the circumstance then
prevailing, the killing of Danilo Martinez on September
8,1988.
Private respondents appealed the Sancho decision, claiming,
among others, that labor arbiter Sancho erred in passing

upon the legality of the strike staged by petitioners since said

issue had already been passed upon by the Regional
Arbitration Branch and was still on appeal before the NLRC.
Considering that the four (4) cases before it arose from the
same set of facts and involved substantially the same issues,
the NLRC rendered a consolidated decision, promulgated
August 29, 1990, upholding the Villanueva decision.
ISSUE:
Petitioners now claim that public respondent NLRC gravely
abused its discretion in: a) declaring that their activities, from
September 9, 1988 to October 12, 1988, were strike
activities; and b) declaring that the strike staged on October
12, 1988 was illegal.

HELD:
A strike is "any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted
action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor
dispute." 4 It is the most preeminent of the economic
weapons of workers which they unsheathe to force
management to agree to an equitable sharing of the joint
product of labor and capital. Undeniably, strikes exert some
disquieting effects not only on the relationship between labor
and management but also on the general peace and progress
of society. Our laws thus regulate their exercise within
reasons by balancing the interests of labor and management
together with the overarching public interest.
Some of the limitations on the exercise of the right of strike
are provided for in paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the
Labor Code, as amended, supra. They Provide for the
procedural steps to be followed before staging a strike
filing of notice of strike, taking of strike vote, and reporting of
the strike vote result to the Department of Labor and
Employment.

Applying the law to the case at bar, we rule that strike

conducted by the union on October 12, 1988 is plainly illegal
as it was held within th seven (7) day waiting period provided
for by paragraph (f), Article 263 of the Labor Code, as
amended. The haste in holding the strike prevented the
Department of Labor and Employment from verifying
whether it carried the approval of the majority of the union
members. It set to naught an important policy consideration
of our law on strike. Considering this finding, we need not
exhaustively rule on the legality of the work stoppage
conducted by the union and some of their members on
September 9 and 23, 1988. Suffice to state, that the ruling of
the public respondent on the matter is supported by
substantial evidence.
We affirm the decision of the public respondent limiting the
penalty of dismissal only to the leaders of the illegal strike.
especially the officers of the union who served as its major
players. They cannot claim good faith to exculpate
themselves. They admitted knowledge of the law on strike,
including its procedure. They cannot violate the law which
ironically was cast to promote their interest.
We, likewise, agree with the public respondent that the union
members who were merely instigated to participate in the
illegal strike should be treated differently from their leaders.
Part of our benign consideration for labor is the policy of
reinstating rank-and-file workers who were merely misled in
supporting illegal strikes. Nonetheless, these reinstated
workers shall not be entitled to backwages as they should not
be compensated for services skipped during the illegal strike.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed for failure to
show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public
respondent. Costs against the petitioners.

10. MECHANICAL DEPARTMENT LABOR UNION SA

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS,petitioner,
vs.

COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and SAMAHAN NG

MGA MANGGAGAWA SA CALOOCAN
SHOPS, respondents.
FACTS:
The case began on 13 February 1965 by a petition of the
respondent "Samahan ng mga Manggagawa, etc." calling
attention to the fact that there were three unions in the
Caloocan shops of the Philippine National Railways: the
"Samahan", the "Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Manila
Railroad Company", and the Mechanical Department Labor
Union; that no certification election had been held in the last
12 months in the Caloocan shops; that both the "Samahan"
and the Mechanical Department Labor Union had submitted
different labor demands upon the management for which
reason a certification election was needed to determine the
proper collective bargaining agency for the Caloocan shop
workers.
The petition was opposed by the management as well as by
the Mechanical Department Labor Union, the latter averring
that it had been previously certified in two cases as sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of the employees and laborers of
the PNR'S mechanical department, and had negotiated two
bargaining agreements with management in 1961 and 1963;
that before the expiration of the latter, a renewal thereof had
been negotiated and the contract remained to be signed;
that the "Samahan" had been organized only in 21 January
1965; that the Caloocan shops unit was not established nor
separated from the Mechanical Department unit; that the
"Samahan" is composed mainly of supervisors who had filed
a pending case to be declared non-supervisors; and that the
purpose of the petition was to disturb the present smooth
working labor management relations.
Issue:

Whether or not a new unit should be established, the

Caloocan shops, separate and distinct from the rest of the
workers under the Mechanical Department now represented
by the Mechanical Department Labor Union.
Ruling (CIR) :
Yes.
The Locomotive crew and Motor Car Crew, though part of the
Mechanical Department, is a separate unit, and is
represented by the Union de Maquinistas, Fogoneros Y
Motormen. The workers under the other two main units of the
departments are represented by the Mechanical Department
Labor Union. The workers of the Shops Rolling Stocks
Maintenance Division or the Caloocan Shops now seek to be
separated from the rest of the workers of the department and
to be represented by the "Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa
Caloocan Shops." .
There is certainly a community of interest among the workers
of the Caloocan Shops. They are grouped in one place. They
work under one or same working condition, same working
time or schedule and are exposed to same occupational risk.
Though evidence on record shows that workers at the
Caloocan Shops perform the same nature of work as their
counterparts in the Manila Shed, the difference lies in the fact
that workers at the Caloocan Shops perform major repairs of
locomotives, rolling stocks, engines, etc., while those in the
Manila Shed, works on minor repairs. Heavy equipment and
machineries are found in the Caloocan Shops.
Ruling (SC):
Judge Martinez held that the employees in the Caloocan
Shops should be given a chance to vote on whether their

group should be separated from that represented by the

Mechanical Department Labor Union, and ordered a
plebiscite held for the purpose. The ruling was sustained by
the Court en banc;wherefore, the Mechanical Department
Labor Union appealed to this Court questioning the
applicability under the circumstances of the "Globe doctrine"
of considering the will of the employees in determining what
union should represent them.

G.R. No. L-28223

Technically, this appeal is premature, since the result of the

ordered plebiscite among the workers of the Caloocan shops
may be adverse to the formation of a separate unit, in which
event, as stated in the appealed order, all questions raised in
this case would be rendered moot and academic. Apparently,
however, the appellant Mechanical Department Labor Union
takes it for granted that the plebiscite would favor
separation.

Sisenando Villaluz for petitioner.

Gregorio E. Fajardo for respondent Samahan ng mga
Manggagawa sa Caloocan Shops.

We find no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the

ruling under appeal as would justify our interfering with it.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

August 30, 1968

MECHANICAL DEPARTMENT LABOR UNION SA

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS,petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and SAMAHAN NG
MGA MANGGAGAWA SA CALOOCAN
SHOPS, respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Petition by the "Mechanical Department Labor Union sa PNR"
for a review of an order of the Court of Industrial Relations, in
its Case No. 1475-MC, directing the holding of a plebiscite
election to determine whether the employees at the
Caloocan Shops desire the respondent union, "Samahan ng
mga Manggagawa sa Caloocan Shops", to be separated from
the Mechanical Department Labor Union, with a view to the
former being recognized as a separate bargaining unit.
The case began on 13 February 1965 by a petition of the
respondent "Samahan ng mga Manggagawa, etc." calling
attention to the fact that there were three unions in the
Caloocan shops of the Philippine National Railways: the
"Samahan", the "Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Manila
Railroad Company", and the Mechanical Department Labor
Union; that no certification election had been held in the last
12 months in the Caloocan shops; that both the "Samahan"
and the Mechanical Department Labor Union had submitted
different labor demands upon the management for which
reason a certification election was needed to determine the
proper collective bargaining agency for the Caloocan shop
workers.

The petition was opposed by the management as well as by

the Mechanical Department Labor Union, the latter averring
that it had been previously certified in two cases as sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of the employees and laborers of
the PNR'S mechanical department, and had negotiated two
bargaining agreements with management in 1961 and 1963;
that before the expiration of the latter, a renewal thereof had
been negotiated and the contract remained to be signed;
that the "Samahan" had been organized only in 21 January
1965; that the Caloocan shops unit was not established nor
separated from the Mechanical Department unit; that the
"Samahan" is composed mainly of supervisors who had filed
a pending case to be declared non-supervisors; and that the
purpose of the petition was to disturb the present smooth
working labor management relations.
By an order of 18 August 1967, Judge Arsenio Martinez, after
receiving the evidence, made the following
findings:.1wph1.t
The Court, after a cursory examination of the evidence
presented made the following findings: That petitioner
union is composed of workers exclusively at the
Caloocan shops of the Philippine National Railways
charged with the maintenance of rolling stocks for
repairs; major repairs of locomotive, engines, etc. are
done in the Caloocan shops while minor ones in the
Manila sheds; workers in the Caloocan shops do not
leave their station unlike Manila shop workers who go
out along the routes and lines for repairs; workers both
in the Caloocan shops and Manila sheds are exposed
to hazards occasioned by the nature of their work; that
with respect to wages and salaries of employees,
categories under the Job Classification and Evaluation
Plan of the company apply to all workers both in the
Caloocan Shops and Manila sheds; administration over

employees, members of petitioner union as well as

oppositor is under the Administrative Division of the
company; that from the very nature of their work,
members of petitioner union and other workers of the
Mechanical Department have been under the coverage
of the current collective bargaining agreement which
was a result of a certification by this Court of the
Mechanical Department Labor union, first in 1960 and
later in 1963. Subsequently, when the latter contract
expired, negotiations for its renewal were had and at
the time of the filing of this petition was already
consummated, the only act remaining to be done was
to affix the signatures of the parties thereto; that
during the pendency of this petition, on June 14, 1965,
the aforesaid collective bargaining agreement was
signed between the Philippine National Railways and
the Mechanical Department Labor Union sa Philippine
National Railways (Manila Railroad Company).
The main issue involved herein is: Whether or not a
new unit should be established, the Caloocan shops,
separate and distinct from the rest of the workers
under the Mechanical Department now represented by
the Mechanical Department Labor Union.
The Caloocan Shops, all located at Caloocan City have
360 workers more or less. It is part and parcel of the
whole Mechanical Department of the Philippine
National Railways. The department is composed of four
main divisions or units, namely: Operations, Manila
Area and Lines; Locomotive Crew; Motor Car Crew; and
the Shops Rolling Stocks Maintenance. (Exhibits "D"
and "D-1").
The Locomotive crew and Motor Car Crew, though part
of the Mechanical Department, is a separate unit, and
is represented by the Union de Maquinistas, Fogoneros

Y Motormen. The workers under the other two main

units of the departments are represented by the
Mechanical Department Labor Union. The workers of
the Shops Rolling Stocks Maintenance Division or the
Caloocan Shops now seek to be separated from the
rest of the workers of the department and to be
represented by the "Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa
Caloocan Shops." .
There is certainly a community of interest among the
workers of the Caloocan Shops. They are grouped in
one place. They work under one or same working
condition, same working time or schedule and are
exposed to same occupational risk.
Though evidence on record shows that workers at the
Caloocan Shops perform the same nature of work as
their counterparts in the Manila Shed, the difference
lies in the fact that workers at the Caloocan Shops
perform major repairs of locomotives, rolling stocks,
engines, etc., while those in the Manila Shed, works on
minor repairs. Heavy equipment and machineries are
found in the Caloocan Shops.
The trial judge then reviewed the collective bargaining
history of the Philippine National Railways, as
follows:1wph1.t
On several similar instances, this Court allowed the
establishment of new and separate bargaining unit in
one company, even in one department of the same
company, despite the existence of the same facts and
circumstances as obtaining in the case at bar.
The history of the collective bargaining in the Manila
Railroad Company, now the Philippine National
Railways shows that originally, there was only one

bargaining unit in the company, represented by the

Kapisanan Ng Manggagawa sa MRR. Under Case No.
237-MC, this Court ordered the establishment of two
additional units, the engine crew and the train crew to
be represented by the Union de Maquinistas,
Fogoneros, Ayudante Y Motormen and Union de
Empleados de Trenes, respectively. Then in 1961,
under Cases Nos. 491-MC, 494-MC and 507-MC three
new separate units were established, namely, the yard
crew unit, station employees unit and engineering
department employees unit, respectively, after the
employees concerned voted in a plebiscite conducted
by the court for the separation from existing
bargaining units in the company. Then again, under
Case No. 763-MC, a new unit, composed of the
Mechanical Department employees, was established to
be represented by the Mechanical Department Labor
Union. Incidentally, the first attempt of the employees
of the Mechanical Department to be separated as a
unit was dismissed by this Court of Case No. 488-MC.
In the case of the yard crew, station employees and
the Engineering Department employees, the Supreme
Court sustained the order of this Court in giving the
employees concerned the right to vote and decide
whether or not they desire to be separate units (See
G.R. Nos. L-16292-94, L-16309 and L-16317-18,
November, 1965).
In view of its findings and the history of "union
representation" in the railway company, indicating that
bargaining units had been formed through separation of new
units from existing ones whenever plebiscites had shown the
workers' desire to have their own representatives, and
relying on the "Globe doctrine" (Globe Machine & Stamping
Co., 3 NLRB 294) applied in Democratic Labor Union vs. Cebu

Stevedoring Co., L-10321, 28 February 1958, Judge Martinez

held that the employees in the Caloocan Shops should be
given a chance to vote on whether their group should be
separated from that represented by the Mechanical
Department Labor Union, and ordered a plebiscite held for
the purpose. The ruling was sustained by the Court en
banc;wherefore, the Mechanical Department Labor Union
appealed to this Court questioning the applicability under the
circumstances of the "Globe doctrine" of considering the will
of the employees in determining what union should represent
them.
Technically, this appeal is premature, since the result of the
ordered plebiscite among the workers of the Caloocan shops
may be adverse to the formation of a separate unit, in which
event, as stated in the appealed order, all questions raised in
this case would be rendered moot and academic. Apparently,
however, the appellant Mechanical Department Labor Union
takes it for granted that the plebiscite would favor
separation.
We find no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the
ruling under appeal as would justify our interfering with it.
Republic Act No. 875 has primarily entrusted the prosecution
of its policies to the Court of Industrial Relations, and, in view
of its intimate knowledge concerning the facts and
circumstances surrounding the cases brought before it, this
Court has repeatedly upheld the exercise of discretion of the
Court of Industrial Relations in matters concerning the
representation of employee groups (Manila Paper Mills
Employees & Workers' Association vs. C.I.R. 104 Phil. 10;
Benguet Consolidated vs. Bobok Lumber Jack Association,
103 Phil. 1150).
Appellant contends that the application of the "Globe
doctrine" is not warranted because the workers of the
Caloocan shops do not require different skills from the rest of

the workers in the Mechanical Department of the Railway

Company. This question is primarily one of facts. The
Industrial Court has found that there is a basic difference, in
that those in the Caloocan shops not only have a community
of interest and working conditions but perform major repairs
of railway rolling stock, using heavy equipment and
machineries found in said shops, while the others only
perform minor repairs. It is easy to understand, therefore,
that the workers in the Caloocan shops require special skill in
the use of heavy equipment and machinery sufficient to set
them apart from the rest of the workers. In addition, the
record shows that the collective bargaining agreements
negotiated by the appellant union have been in existence for
more than two (2) years; hence, such agreements can not
constitute a bar to the determination, by proper elections, of
a new bargaining representative (PLDT Employees' Union vs.
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., 51 Off. Gaz., 4519).
As to the charge that some of the members of the appellee,
"Samahan Ng Manggagawa", are actually supervisors, it
appears that the question of the status of such members is
still pending final decision; hence, it would not constitute a
legal obstacle to the holding of the plebiscite. At any rate,
the appellant may later question whether the votes of those
ultimately declared to be supervisors should be counted.
Whether or not the agreement negotiated by the appellant
union with the employer, during the pendency of the original
petition in the Court of Industrial Relations, should be
considered valid and binding on the workers of the Caloocan
shops is a question that should be first passed upon by the
Industrial Court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the order appealed from is
affirmed, with costs against appellant Mechanical
Department Labor Union sa Philippine National Railways.

12. LIBERAL LABOR UNION OF THE PHIL. VS PHIL CAN

COMPANY
FACTS: This is a Petition for Review of a Resolution of the
Court of Industrial Relations, declaring illegal the strike
staged by the members of petitioning labor union, and giving
authority to respondent not to hire those responsible for the
strike on the ground that petitioner violated the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement it concluded with
respondent when it failed to submit its grievance, first, to a
committee of top officials of both the union and the company
and, later, to the Court of Industrial Relations before
declaring the strike.
It appears that because of a labor dispute that had arisen
between petitioner and respondent a case was filed, and, by
way of compromise, a collective bargaining agreement was
entered into between them.
One of the provisions agreed upon concerns the
procedure that should be followed in the
settlement of a labor dispute which in substance consists as
follows:
If a worker has a complaint the same shall first be
submitted to a grievance committee, which shall be
composed of six members, three representing the union, and
three the company. If the complaint is not satisfactorily
settled, it shall next be taken up by the top officials of both
the union and the company. And if still no settlement is
reached, the matter shall be submitted to the Court of
Industrial Relations, which shall determine it in accordance
with law.
On the very day the collective bargaining agreement
was concluded, respondent reduced the wages of seven of
the laborers of petitioner. Two days after, petitioner protested
this reduction to the assistant manager of respondent, and
when the latter intimated that he had nothing to do with it,
petitioner reiterated its protest to the general manager who
told the protestee to come back because the management
would meet to discuss the matter. When the representatives
of the union returned

days later they were told that the reductions could not be
returned because they do not appear in the pay-roll, and that
in case the matter would reach the court, the management
would deny it. Because of this refusal, and the fact that the
matter could not be brought to the grievance committee by
reason of the failure of respondent to name its
representatives to said committee, after the union had
designated
the names of those who should compose it in its behalf, the
union struck on March 14, 1949.
As a consequence, the union filed the petition that
initiated these proceedings praying that the strike be
declared legal and that respondent be ordered to restore the
former rate of wages that the laborers affected were
receiving and to refund to them all the reductions that were
made in their salaries.
The case was decided holding that the strike was legal
and justified because of the failure of respondent to
designate its representatives in the grievance committee as
provided for in the bargaining agreement; but on motion for
reconsideration, said holding was reversed, wherein it was
held that the strike was illegal and that the respondent was
justified in not continuing in its service those responsible for
the strike. Hence this petition for review.
ISSUE: W/N THE STRIKE WAS LEGAL.
Petitioner contends that the opinion of the Court of
Industrial Relations erred in declaring that petitioner had
violated the collective bargaining agreement, when it
declared a strike, without first submitting its dispute with
respondent to the Court of Industrial Relations, because while
it is true that in said agreement a grievance committee was
provided for to which any dispute should first be submitted,
petitioner could not make use of the procedure agreed upon
in view of the failure of respondent to designate its
representatives in said committees, as it was done by the
labor union, and that because of this failure of the
respondent which amounted to an outright violation of the
agreement, the union became relieved of its duty to follow

the grievance procedure and, therefore, its failure to go to

the Court of Industrial Relations before declaring the strike
did not amount to a violation of the agreement.
RULING: PETITION DENIED.
The parties have expressly agreed on a procedure to
be followed in the settlement of labor disputes. That
procedure should be followed. The Court of Industrial
Relations has interpreted correctly the import and effect of
the procedure for settlement of labor disputes agreed upon
by the parties.
On this point, the majority opinion said: Admitting therefore
that the respondent company has not yet nominated its three
representatives to said grievance body . . . it cannot be
denied, too, that the petitioner union, by its strike on March
14, 1949, has acted beyond its bound in the collective
bargaining agreement when it failed to submit the workers
grievance to a conference of top management officials and
top union officials and on top of all, to the Court of Industrial
Relations which has jurisdiction on the subject matter of the
dispute.
The main purpose of the parties inadopting a
procedure in the settlement of their disputes is to prevent a
strike. This procedure must be followed in its entirety if it is
to achieve its objective. This procedure provides for three
steps which should be resorted to before any other step may
be taken for the redress of a particular grievance. It is true
that the management hasfailed to do its duty in connection
with the formation of a grievance committee, but this failure
does not give to labor the right to declare a strike outright,
for its duty is to exhaust all available means within its reach

before resorting to force. There is no use providing for these

steps if they can be ignored. This is a compulsory arbitration
which received the sanction of the court. And if labor chooses
not to deal with the management, either because of distrust
or prejudice, the other way left to achieve a peaceful
settlement of its grievance is to
resort to the Court of Industrial Relations. This the union
failed to do. The authorities are numerous which hold that
strikes held in violation of the terms contained in a collective
bargaining agreement are
illegal, specially when they provide for conclusive arbitration
clauses. These agreements must be strictly adhered to and
respected if their ends have to be achieved.
IN ADDITION, the majority opinion predicated the
illegality of the strike not merely on the
infringement of said agreement by the union but on the
proven fact that, in carrying out the strike, coercion, force,
intimidation, violation with physical injuries, sabotage and
the use of unnecessary and
obscene language or epithets were committed by the top
officials and members of the union in an attempt to prevent
the other willing laborers to go to work. A strike held under
these
circumstances cannot be justified in a regime of law for that
would encourage abuses and terrorism and would subvert
the very purpose of the law which provides for arbitration
and peaceful settlement of
labor disputes.